Med. 2007

2006 IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN SPACE
Med.2007. 2006 in the Euro-Mediterranean space

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The Mediterranean is no longer the centre of the world as it was in Antiquity, but it has once again drawn international attention in 2006. More than any other region in the world, the Mediterranean region is faced with a major challenge in attaining an environment of peace, security and shared prosperity. Until it meets the challenge, the conflicts will continue to burden our ancient sea and drain its lifeblood. During the summer of 2006, the war in Lebanon clearly revealed a situation of concern regarding future evolution in the Middle East. Few signs invite optimism in the face of the radicalisation of positions in the region. The interrelated nature of conflicts in the Middle East requires a global perspective and the active participation of the International Community alongside the different parties in order to advance towards a solution, or at least contain the crisis and break the deadlock in economic and institutional processes. The European Union’s commitment to an active role in the region, as demonstrated by its presence in post-war Lebanon, could be considered one of the year’s few steps forward. In light of the situation in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East in 2006, the fourth edition of the Mediterranean Yearbook begins the section on key issues of the year with a contribution analysing the complex reality of the Middle East from different perspectives.

Med.2007 highlights other key issues of the year, beginning with African migrations, which reveal the need for cooperation between the European Union and African countries of migrant origin and transit to establish a Euro-Mediterranean strategy. Another issue of decisive transcendence for the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations is energy, including the impact of oil prices, the perspectives of a rise in natural gas prices and the need to establish a truly Mediterranean dimension of European energy policy. The Dossier of the current edition focuses on the knowledge society and its role in the social modernisation of the Mediterranean area. This section analyses the challenges and opportunities relating to the knowledge society in the Mediterranean Basin in a series of articles dealing with topics ranging from the production of knowledge to its role in development processes, not to mention aspects as important as the weight of education, university cooperation and the circulation of know-how through the Mediterranean area. Hence, the Yearbook analyses one of the facets that will certainly play a determining role for the future of human, social and economic development in the Mediterranean region.

As in previous editions, the Panorama section does not stop at topical issues but also offers an overview of the different aspects of the year through an analysis that covers political and business spheres, cultural aspects, development issues, security, partnership, cooperation and migration, with a variety of perspectives offered by over fifty authors from both northern and southern Mediterranean countries. This fourth edition of the Mediterranean Yearbook is the result of collaboration between the Fundació CIDOB and the European Institute for the Mediterranean (IEMed). The yearbook has become an essential vehicle for information on the situation in the Mediterranean area for both the experts and the most active political, economic and social actors, as well as for those who may be interested from among the general public. For both institutions, Med.2007 represents the will to a sustained effort in information and analysis based on quality and the plurality of our contributors.
Perspectives
The European Union Strengthens its Role in the Euro-Mediterranean Region

Angela Merkel
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

For this new edition of the Mediterranean Yearbook, I would like to send my warmest regards to the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) and the Fundació CIDOB, and congratulate you on this publication, which in so little time has become an important forum for dialogue and understanding between the European Union and its neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean Basin.

In 2007, during its Presidency of the G-8 and the Council of the European Union, Germany assumed a double challenge that holds great significance for Mediterranean States as well. At the G-8 Summit in Heiligendamm, we made significant progress in the struggle against climate change and in support to Africa. During the remainder of the year, within the framework of the G8 Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, we will step up a cooperative and reform-oriented dialogue with the States and societies of the Middle East and North Africa, a dialogue which will deeply involve civil society. During our EU Presidency, we felt it particularly important to bring Europe closer to its citizens. The European Union has managed to strengthen its institutions, in particular the European Parliament, and recover its capacity to act, which will also be of benefit to our Southern Mediterranean Partners. The Berlin Declaration of 25 March 2007 clearly stated that all Member States are “united in our aim of placing the European Union on a renewed common basis by the European Parliamentary elections in 2009.” Thanks to the consensus achieved at the European Council meeting of June 2006, we can attain this goal. Despondence and skepticism are things of the past for the EU. Europe can once again look to the future.

We have also made considerable inroads with regard to international relations: European external policy will be strengthened by the so-called EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as by the European External Action Service. With their support, Europe will be able to better defend its interests. Europe will also be able to place this new capacity for action at the service of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. Peace, stability and prosperity for the whole of the Mediterranean Region continues to be one of the primary objectives of our cooperation. We must continue to strengthen economic integration and the political and cultural ties that unite us. The European Neighbourhood Policy is an important tool to such an end. We can make progress on specific issues such as migration, energy, the environment, education opportunities, the role of the media and other social matters. The Barcelona Process continues to be highly relevant. My hope is that all EU States will participate in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

We must also make all efforts to seek a solution to the Middle East conflict that will facilitate development and economic and social progress throughout the region. The aim is and will continue to be to find a solution that acknowledges the existence of two States, allowing Israel and Palestine to coexist within recognised borders and with good neighbourly relations.

Last year was marred by a second conflict in the region, the Lebanon crisis. Through our commitment as an EU Member State as well as a member of the United Nations, we helped to strengthen Lebanon’s stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this way, we have actively contributed to the implementation of the UN Security Council’s Resolutions 1559 and 1701.

Cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region constitutes an important task for our future, to which a strong EU can and will contribute. Major challenges remain on our agenda, however, such as that of improving the socio-economic situation in a manner compatible with environmental and climate protection. Together we can contribute to overcoming the religious and cultural differences that extremist and terrorist forces use to their ends. On the solid foundation represented by our value system, we wish to build bridges among cultures through tolerance and dialogue.

May this Yearbook contribute to better understanding among people throughout the Mediterranean Basin.
Keys
Introduction

A Euro-Mediterranean Union?

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2006 was a difficult year in the Mediterranean; some have even called it a black year. The war in Lebanon, which fustigated a country that had held free elections and initiated a difficult democratic transition, and the worsening of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict confirmed the centrality of political issues and reinforced the idea, if there was any shadow of a doubt, that the issues of reforms and democracy are inevitable. This matter already marked the preparation of the 2005 Barcelona Summit, during which the action programme that was approved introduced—as did the European Neighbourhood Policy—the question of democracy and human rights as common objectives, lending a practical sense to what was jointly agreed in 1995.

However, progress made in European and southern Mediterranean thinking regarding the need to make the political reform agenda advance has not prevented the perspectives that place it in the background—whether economic or inspired by theories about the clash of civilisations, based on the absurd thesis of the incompatibility of Islam and democracy—from continuing to predominate and, unfortunately, marking the political debate.

The predominance of culturalist views of political action is clearly present in the European debate on the identity of the European Union (or of the nations themselves). Many saw the cartoon crisis as proof of the radical confrontation between political Islam and modernity. Despite the importance of the start of negotiations with Turkey, the growing opposition against its entry into the Union from certain significant political sectors is seen as a means to affirm Europe’s Christian identity. Reality, however, differs greatly: it is still marked by new, more or less democratic electoral processes in various countries, which underscores the need for the Partnership to be capable of responding to the emergence of a more active and demanding civil society in the South.

Nowadays the conclusions that numerous political leaders are drawing from Mediterranean crises, particularly from the emergence of political Islamism—and, in this regard, the caricature crisis was paradigmatic—are out of step with the course that needs to be followed to resolve the region’s crisis situation. Most European leaders still believe that the problems are essentially economic and aim to prioritise development, seeing it as the best way to neutralise political Islamism, which many view as an undifferentiated whole and a serious threat. In this regard, many still share the point of view of some—although not all—Southern leaders. However, as demonstrated during the 2005 debate, the development-stability equation and, who knows, maybe one day democracy itself, has failed. Today we must prioritise democracy while supporting development. Only an effort that incorporates political opening and an efficient response to social needs can be successful—which involves accepting that Islamist parties are an inevitable trend and that the best option is to support the integration of parties that are ready to take part in the political process and reject violence as a means of gaining power.

There are plenty of examples to verify this, including the emergence of democratic Muslim trends such as the Justice and Development Parties in Turkey and Morocco.

Evidently, such a contradiction has serious repercussions in the evaluation that must be made of the Barcelona Process and in the course of European politics in relation to the Mediterranean. The year 2007 has seen the rise in various European capitals, par-
particularly in the South, of harsh criticism against the Barcelona Process and statements about it failing to meet the region’s needs. Certain issues have been particularly emphasised: the limited nature of the resources made available to the Partnership, the institutional weakness with a real ownership problem, and the lack of commitment from Heads of State and Government.

It is highly likely that 2007 will be a transitional year in terms of Euro-Mediterranean relationships that should eventually lead towards the end of 2008 to a significant transformation of European policies during the French presidency of the EU. But for such an attempt to relaunch Euro-Mediterranean relations to have any chance of success, it is necessary for there to be no analysis errors and for the legacy of the Barcelona Process to be accepted—especially that which turns the Partnership into a project with few alternatives. As many have already come to understand, the most essential part of what was proposed by the Union to its Southern partners in 1995 was a long-term integration project, which was above all economic, inspired by the European model and which should create a common space of prosperity and freedom between the North and South. At the outset, the European Neighbourhood Policy, which clearly accepted this purpose during its launch under the formula “all but institutions”, was also understood in that light. It is true that the Barcelona Process is far from having achieved the objectives established, and a growing number of political leaders on both shores are realising this. Today people speak of the need to find alternatives or, at the very least, complementary projects to cover its deficiencies. In 2005 the debate focused on the best way of relaunching the Barcelona Process. Nothing should be done without revisiting that debate, since what is essential in terms of Euro-Mediterranean relations and the means of achieving the objectives set out in 1995 was discussed during the process that led to the Summit.

A vast intellectual heritage remains from that year, with a significant mobilisation of the civil society, which proves that Barcelona’s most important achievement may precisely be having ceased to be merely a project of States. Furthermore, it is precisely at that level that the difficulties have been most significant, as shown by the absence of the Arab Heads of State at the Summit. But if today we carefully analyse the inter-governmental debate on this entire process, we realise that some have verified that Barcelona is not on a par with the region’s needs. It is true that the absence of an overwhelming majority of southern Heads of State in Barcelona adds to that perception.

Most of the works conducted in the framework of the Summit’s preparations already made a harsh evaluation of some of the aspects of the Partnership’s ten years, but on the contrary to current criticism, it was believed that the Euro-Mediterranean framework was still the most adequate. The critics are now looking for an alternative framework. The argument is double: some consider it necessary to mobilise much more important resources than those of Barcelona for the Southern States to solve their current problems. A type of “Marshall Plan for the Mediterranean”, supported, for instance, by Luis Amado, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal—which takes on the Union presidency during the second semester of 2007—who believes that “today’s main priority for the EU is to confront the difficult situation faced by its southern Mediterranean border.” Meanwhile, during a recent intervention, Miguel Ángel Moratinos defended the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Community. For others it would be forced to establish that the Mediterranean is, above all, a project of southern European countries and it is with them that the Mediterranean Partners can recreate the élan that enabled the Partnership to be launched in 1995. According to the new President of the French Republic, a Mediterranean Union with real institutions would be the adequate response.

All of these statements refer to the centrality of the Mediterranean problems and the depth of the crisis affecting the region. A verification that barely differs from the one made at the start of the eighties by President Mitterrand, who even then advocated the idea of holding a conference on the western Mediterranean that focused above all on economic affairs. This verification on the economic and social situation is accompanied, as occurred back in the eighties, by a concern for the emergence of radical Islamism as the main alternative to the current regimes and problems of emigration, matter which, after all, motivated the Barcelona Summit of 2005.

It is not only desirable but also essential for the leaders of Mediterranean countries to voice the need for the Union to prioritise the region in a clearer, more unequivocal manner, but it is also necessary for them to get the remaining European members involved.

One of the most important aspects of the Union’s Mediterranean policy following the fall of the Berlin Wall is that it has been developed in the framework of a common perspective, with the involvement not only of the Mediterranean countries but also of the Union as a whole. It was not accepted, nor should it have been, for Germany to focus on the East and the Southern Eu-
European countries on their North African and Middle Eastern neighbours. Moreover, the political statements subscribed by Mitterrand and Kohl advocated the need to maintain a balance in the Union’s policies between the East and South. And although it is true that the enlargement policy towards the East has concentrated the main efforts of the Union in the last decade, it is also true that during the same period the importance attributed by central and northern European countries to Mediterranean problems has increased. In 1998, Volker Perthes wrote a EuroMeSCo Paper with the revealing title *Germany Gradually Becoming a Mediterranean State*. Indeed, today the Union not only has a single market and currency, but also a single border. Germany’s southern border is Spain’s Mediterranean border, just as Poland and Estonia are Portugal’s eastern borders. Proof that the EMP has become a common project was the presence of all European Heads of State and Government at the Barcelona Summit in 2005.

But one must also bear in mind the aspirations of Southern countries. There is no doubt that they all consider important the cooperation with their close neighbours, but their economic objectives—access to the European market—can only be satisfied by the Union. A meeting was held in Barcelona a few months ago that analysed the issue of Morocco’s advanced status with the European Union. Many Moroccans aspire to active participation in common European policies without having to put forward the issue of membership, which they know is a simple chimera in these historic times. The “European Union” incentive continues to be a factor of political and economic transformation for certain countries including Morocco, and if this horizon disappears, eventually others will be sought, particularly in the Atlantic.

The enormous difficulties of political and security cooperation in the Barcelona Process will not be overcome in the framework of a simple Union project if no progress is made to create a Palestine State and, with it, to normalise the relationship between Israel and Arab countries. As in 1995, only a serious perspective of peace, which does not currently exist, will launch an ambitious initiative of multilateral cooperation involving all the States in the region.

It is also necessary to adequately treat the matter of Turkey. The future of Turkey’s integration process is essential for Euro-Mediterranean relations. And it is so in multiple aspects. It is important to keep in mind two of them: the impact of that membership on the Union neighbouring countries and the role Ankara may play in Euro-Mediterranean policies. The start of the negotiation process in 2005 was welcomed in countries with a Muslim majority as evidence that the Union was opening up to citizens of all religious faiths without discrimination. The uncertainty that currently surrounds the negotiation process has exactly the opposite effect: it is seen as evidence that the Union would be a Christian club. On the other hand, the Turkish equation is very simple: the more European, the more Mediterranean; the less European, the more reluctant to take part in European initiatives that may appear as alternatives to membership. The rejection of a Turkey that complies with the membership criteria would have very serious consequences for the credibility of the European project.

The power of attraction of the European model would be deeply affected, as would the capacity to influence its neighbours’ development. Europe must be diverse or otherwise it will cease to be the international public good that its founders hoped to build and that European leaders, despite their divisions, wish to reassert through the Berlin Declaration, which commemorates the 50 years of the construction of the European Union. A Mediterranean Union built to contain emigration would not be successful. The issue of emigration should be treated in keeping with the values of the Barcelona Declaration, of respect for human rights, and it cannot allow the proliferation of racism and xenophobia. From the outset, emigration has been regarded as a problem rather than an enormous means of progress in both the North and the South, and so far Euro-Mediterranean relations have not been capable of becoming free from that original sin that has prevented emigrants from becoming political and economic agents in regional relations.

Only the World Europe will be capable of building a Euro-Mediterranean Union. The project of a Euro-Mediterranean Community based on the values that have led to the success of European integration would certainly be a major project that would mobilise the region in coming decades. However, to be successful, it should be capable of clearly marking the objective of building a Community of Democratic States, as advocated in the EuroMeSCo report *Barcelona Plus: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States*, prepared for the Barcelona Summit.

Such an objective is incompatible with culturalist views or with a return to a purely developmental perspective that forgets the no less decisive nature of the most important political objectives of peace in the Middle East and of defence of democracy and human rights in the region.
US Policy in the Middle East: Coping in a Year of Instability

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US policies in the Middle East region faced acute challenges in 2006. The ongoing war and struggle to legitimize the new government in Iraq were the preoccupying concerns, and progress in that arena was modest. The year was also shaped by the war between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, which caught the United States off guard and had repercussions, both good and bad, for US relations with other key actors in the region. There was neither stability nor security for the United States and the states of the Middle East.

US Policy in Lebanon: Between Success and Disenchantment

In early 2006, Lebanon counted as a rare success of US policy in the Middle East. The departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon ushered in what the United States hoped to be a new era of state-building, an end to the state of war between Lebanon and Israel, and a major strategic success in isolating Syria and validating the democracy vision articulated by the Bush administration. These expectations depended on a smooth transition away from traditional sectarian politics, a domestic consensus to affirm the primacy of the state over other allegiances, a formalization of relations between Lebanon and Syria, and the removal of the remnants of Syrian influence. To support this process, Washington dramatically stepped up its engagement, pledging considerable political, economic and military assistance to Lebanon.

Regional and domestic Lebanese developments conspired, however, against such a process, culminating in a destructive summer war between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia guerilla group, kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, prompting Israel to launch a massive military operation aimed at substantively degrading Hezbollah’s military capabilities and reestablishing its deterrent. In the early weeks of the war, Israel’s decision to act with devastating force was met with cautious support rather than outright opposition by important Arab states, weary of the rising power of the Iranian-supported Hezbollah. Even key European states refrained from harsh criticism of Israel. But as days went by, Hezbollah stood its ground, inflicted serious blows to the Israeli military and gained domestic and Arab standing. Indeed, the 33-day war all but failed to achieve Israel’s stated objectives. Rather, it had devastating consequences for the Lebanese population: more than 1,200 dead, hundreds of thousands of displaced refugees, billions of dollars in destroyed infrastructure, a disastrous blow for the Lebanese economy, and a huge setback for efforts at state-building.

The outcome of the war was less than satisfactory for all parties. Although the strategic environment in Southern Lebanon had changed with the deployment of a beefed-up UN peacekeeping force, the apparent victory, albeit Pyrrhic, of Hezbollah over Israel meant that the United States’ Lebanon allies were in a precarious political position. The war also ended the timid efforts at state building in Lebanon. Rather, Lebanon entered a new phase of political bickering over power-sharing, as Hezbollah and its allies demanded a bigger share in the government and articulated an agenda at odds with that of the US-allied parliamentary majority. As of late 2006, the political paralysis in Beirut and the crisis of gov-
ernmental legitimacy that ensued had worsened, leaving the pro-US government and US policy in deep trouble. Both had lost momentum, and the measure of success became survival instead of progress.

Could the United States Have Done More?

The Lebanon war exposed conflicts between US interests with two friendly states, Israel and Lebanon. By acquiescing to the goals of the stronger state, its ally Israel, the United States undermined some of its own achievements and strategic interests in Lebanon and the Arab world. Lebanon had not yet fully adapted to post-Syrian hegemony and lacked the capacity and political cohesion to carry out the disarmament of Hezbollah, lest the country slide into a new civil war; the war threatened to deal a fatal blow to the pre-war optimism that the United States itself encouraged; the war further eroded its image in the Arab world, a loss balanced by the hope that an Israeli strategic success would advance Washington’s own interests.

The management of the crisis illustrated these tensions. Instead of pushing for a quick end to the violence, the United States wagered that Israel could achieve its goals and therefore maneuvered to give Israel the required time and political space. In the early days of the war and in face of the devastation in Lebanon, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice talked about the “birth pangs of the new Middle East,” suggesting that the war itself was an element of the grand transformational vision Washington had for the region. The United States also brushed off the repeated calls of the Lebanese government for a quick ceasefire. At the Rome conference on July 26, 2006, after the Lebanese Prime Minister pleaded for an immediate end to violence, Rice cautioned against what she dubbed a meaningless, premature ceasefire.

As Israel’s military efforts floundered in the face of efficient Hezbollah tactics and mounting international and Arab criticism of the costs of the war, the United States scrambled to negotiate a ceasefire. Initial US obstruction of a ceasefire in July, however, had eroded its capacity to impose a strong UN resolution in mid-August. Moreover, by subordinating a quick resolution of the crisis to Israeli military and strategic objectives, it harmed its own allies in Lebanon.

The United States was on the losing side of the Lebanon war. By putting too much faith in a military solution to Lebanon’s complex and interconnected challenges and not engaging in intense shuttle diplomacy, it lost credibility and the power to shape outcomes. It also came across as hopelessly ideological, framing the war as part of the war on terror and the advance of freedom in the region.

The United States tried to salvage its image and good will in post-war reconstruction. It offered humanitarian, financial and technical assistance in an attempt to shore up the central government as it competed with Hezbollah to win over the victims of the war. This assistance included the cleaning of beaches soiled by oil spills, the rebuilding of key infrastructure and the distribution of humanitarian help to refugees and other communities in need. This welcome but late effort did little to change perceptions in Lebanon. It is telling that, in an attempt to delegitimize the Lebanese government by association, anti-US protesters in Beirut carried images of the Lebanese Prime Minister hugging Rice during a visit in the midst of the fighting.

Palestinian Political Developments: A Tumultuous Year

For Palestine, 2006 was a dramatic year. From the surprise success of the Hamas polls in legislative elections in January to a Saudi-mediated agreement to form a national unity government of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Fatah party and its existential foe, Hamas, in December, it was a year that exposed all of the raw nerves and unresolved issues inside Palestinian politics. Midyear there were serious concerns about a civil war, and intermittent violence broke out. The United States engaged mainly in anti-Hamas strategies and security sector reform. It did little to break the political impasse between Israel and the Palestine Authority and at year’s end, the
US was ambivalent at best over Arab efforts to help the two Palestinian factions share power.

**Elections**

The United States reacted harshly to the Hamas victory, and cutting aid and contact to any components of the Palestinian Authority that were under Hamas control. There were legal disputes about presidential authority and how to channel funds to non-government entities and to Fatah-controlled elements. The cutoff of US, EU and bilateral European aid contributed to the sharp deterioration of the Palestinian economy and to serious humanitarian concerns about Gaza in particular. The Quartet (a contact group composed of the US, the EU, Russia and the UN) set three conditions for normalizing relations with Hamas: renouncing violence and terrorism, recognizing Israel and honoring prior agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA).

**Summer Tensions**

A series of events in June led to regional tensions and a Hamas decision to break its 16-month truce with Israel. Civilian deaths from Israeli missile attacks and Palestinian hits on an Israeli school in Ashkelon triggered an escalation of violence. In late June, Hamas militants crossed the border from Gaza into Israel, killing two Israeli soldiers and kidnapping another. Israel then launched Operation Summer Rains, which was soon overshadowed in media attention by the even larger operation in Lebanon.

The United States was largely supportive of Israel’s responses to Hamas violence. The US did, however, try to maintain some level of contact with Palestinian security forces that were not Hamas-controlled, and its designated security coordinator, General Keith Dayton, worked to keep his mission moving forward, despite the heavy obstacle of the aid cutoff. His goal was to promote security sector reform through training and streamlining of the multiple Palestinian forces. The US also encouraged Israel and the Palestinians to maintain some level of intelligence and operational contact, despite the high level of tension. Efforts to allow US aid to flow to Fatah forces did not materialize.

At the same time, internecine violence between forces loyal to the PLO and Hamas forces broke out, raising the prospect of full-scale civil war. Both sides seemed to have easy access to guns and bullets.

**Fall Diplomacy**

The US engaged in new diplomatic efforts in the fall, trying to channel the regional worries about the Lebanon war into new energy for helping the Lebanese state and the Israel-Palestine problem. The US hoped to promote some common understanding among conservative Gulf states, Israel and the West about the need to further restrain both Hamas and Hezbollah, and Iranian influence on either group. In September the Secretary of State traveled to the region to reaffirm the “Quartet Principles” and to demonstrate US willingness to work with, and even strengthen, the hand of the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas. She brought the issue to the UN Security Council and returned to the region in October and November, hoping to create conditions for talks between Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Olmert.

But a second set of regional dynamics were also in play. Saudi Arabia and Iran began working together on the Lebanon file, hoping to create a new consensus and forge a new domestic peace between Hezbollah and other political forces. The Saudis called for an international conference on Palestine and were also active with the Palestinian groups, eventually setting on an approach that encouraged formation of a national unity government of Fatah and Hamas elements. This was contrary to the US policy of isolating Hamas. The US found itself in a holding pattern, waiting to see if the national unity concept would permit moderate policies to be pursued or would unravel, convincing the Saudis and other regional players to take a different tack.

**Iraq: the Quest for Security and Political Legitimacy**

Iraq continued to dominate the US Middle East agenda, both internationally and domestically. Security was elusive, and the new political class of Iraq spent the whole year trying to establish itself and build the legitimacy of the new political institutions. Social and economic conditions were precarious, sectarian tensions grew, and the region faced a new side-effect of the Iraq war, the migration of nearly two million Iraqis in search of safety and security.

In December 2005 Iraqis elected their first permanent post-Saddam parliament. The turnout was strong, and a Shia-led United Iraqi Alliance emerged with a plurality, but not majority of votes. Secular and non-
sectarian parties fared poorly. It took the new political class four months to form a government, and compromise candidate Jawad al-Maliki from the Dawa party became Prime Minister. Without a strong base, Maliki faced the challenge of balancing different interests from the Shia majority, including pressure from radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who vacillated between supporting the government and opposing it. Sunni politicians in the national government were not able to rally broad support in the Sunni community that would undermine the insurgent groups, although anecdotal reporting suggested that many Sunni majority towns were in fact resisting the insurgents and working courageously to restore order.

The US hoped to promote some common understanding among conservative Gulf states, Israel and the West about the need to further restrain both Hamas and Hezbollah, and Iranian influence on either group

Even before the government was formed, prospects for Iraq’s stability worsened dramatically in February, when an important Shia shrine in Samarra was destroyed by insurgents, presumably with ties to al-Qaeda in Iraq. This single act shifted the mood among Shia, and was widely seen as a critical turning point in the sectarian tensions and violence in the country. Until Samarra, the Shia community largely avoided escalations of violence, even when attacked by former Baathist and radical Sunni insurgent forces. That restraint eroded after the February incident. Sectarian violence was most acute in Baghdad, with reports of ethnic cleansing in formerly mixed neighborhoods. In the United States, popular support for the war eroded steadily. Politicians of both parties debated the stakes of an American withdrawal. Would an early departure of US forces generate more chaos and violence, or would it change the focus and enable the Iraqis to work more effectively on national reconciliation and reconstruction? The November congressional election returned the Democrats to the majority in both the House and Senate, and was widely viewed as a referendum on Iraq and the unpopularity of the President’s policy. Later in the fall, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, co-chaired by former Congressman Lee Hamilton and former Secretary of State James Baker, recommended a dramatic rethinking of US policy, with an aim to a planned drawdown of American forces, a stronger push at capacity building and reconciliation by the Iraqis, and more American effort at garnering regional support for Iraqi stability, including through contacts with Iran and Syria. The report was initially rejected by the White House, but individual components of it were subsequently embraced as US policy adapted to changing and deteriorating conditions on site.

The year ended with the execution of former dictator Saddam Hussein by hanging. What could have been a somber event that would contribute to national healing and dedication to a more peaceful future turned into a new chapter in a mean-spirited mood of sectarian strife. The timing and manner of the execution appeared to be manipulated by Shia radicals, and was not coordinated within the government.

Iran and America

In late 2005, the confluence of the coming to power of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on a platform of economic populism combined with renewed Islamic fervor, Iran’s assertiveness on the nuclear front through its rejection of an EU package and mounting allegations of Iranian influence in Iraq made Iran appear a strong and determined foe of the United States.

The Nuclear Issue

The nuclear issue remained at the forefront throughout 2006. Iran asserted its right to acquire a full nuclear fuel cycle, while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western countries sought to limit Iran’s nuclear knowledge in light of Iranian violations of its obligations according to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As Iran ignored IAEA and Western demands by crossing technological redlines (namely the installation of centrifuges and subsequent beginning of uranium enrichment activities), Washington attempted to build a united front at the UN Security Council to handle the Iran file and impose sanctions on Iran. However, Chinese and Russian distrust of US intentions and divergent interests seemed to make such a consensus difficult to achieve. To demonstrate its good intentions, in May the United States offered to join talks between European nations and Iran if it agreed to suspend uranium enrichment activities.
Continued Iranian defiance and deft European and American diplomacy led in July to the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1696, then in December, Resolution 1737, both under Chapter VII, both imposing economic sanctions on specific entities and individuals. This threw Iran's leadership, long confident that the Security Council was divided enough, off balance.

In the United States, popular support for the war eroded steadily. Politicians of both parties debated the stakes of an American withdrawal

The United States pursued other tracks in its effort to contain Iran. It mobilized key Arab allies worried about the rise of Iran through the GCC+2 (Gulf Cooperation Council+Egypt and Jordan) forum. Washington also stepped up its security and defense cooperation with the GCC states by way of a new initiative called the "Gulf Security Dialogue," focusing on new arms packages as part of a political-military effort to deter and defend against the emerging threat from Iran. Finally, in an innovative and under-the-radar fashion, the US Treasury began efforts to deter financial institutions and other companies from dealing with Iran.

Rise of Iran as a Regional Power

Iran's newfound regional standing proved deeply problematic for US policy. It made American policy and options in Iraq dependent on Iranian goodwill. Iran was seen as having a hand in each of the acute regional crises: Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza, and Iraq. But polls suggested that, while Arab leaders feared Iran's growing power, Arab publics generally supported the fiery Iranian president's defiance towards the United States.

Iran remained confident for much of 2006 that the United States, bogged down in Iraq, was too weak and constrained to pursue regime change. To counter this perception, Washington forcefully repeated that while it favored a peaceful diplomatic solution to the crisis, all options remained on the table. This game of gaining or restoring leverage carried the risks of accidental escalation or misinterpretation. This situation was rendered even more unstable by President Ahmadinejad's hardline statements on Israel and Iran’s role in the region.

In the aftermath of the Lebanon war, the United States attempted to rally regional support for an anti-Iran strategy that would entail a tacit alliance among the US, Israel and moderate Arab regimes. This idea resonated to some degree, but was weakened when one key player, Saudi Arabia, demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with Iran to facilitate a peaceful solution in Lebanon and took a leadership role in reconciling the Palestinian factions.

The United States framed its policy as opposing the government of Iran, but sought contact with elements of Iranian society presumed to be favorable to the West and to democratic values. The Administration and Congress allocated 75 million dollars to pro-democracy initiatives and broadcast programming into Iran. This new effort, however, was met with ambivalence by reformers in Iran, who were concerned that accepting US funding would be detrimental to their cause and image, and with outright hostility by the Iranian authorities, convinced that this funding was part of a larger policy of regime change. An opportunity for détente and mutual understanding was the September trip of former Iranian President Khatami to the United States. But nothing substantive materialized from this visit, leading many to wonder what it would take to encourage rapprochement between the two countries.

As 2006 ended, the position of the hardliners in Tehran had apparently weakened. Disaffection with Ahmadinejad's policies, the deterioration of Iran's economy and the adoption by the UN Security Council of resolutions imposing sanctions against Iran led to the defeat of the Ahmadinejad-supported candidates to the Assembly of Experts and municipal councils during the December elections. But the United States maintained the pressure by dispatching a second aircraft carrier and accusing Iran of meddling in Iraq, prompting some to predict a looming showdown in the Persian Gulf.
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Diplomat, Spain

The consequences of last summer’s devastating war in Lebanon and the north of Israel did not only affect the parties in conflict but also their neighbouring countries and, in general, the entire region of the Middle East. The conflict led to an entrenchment in more radical postures, which played in detriment of the more moderate sectors both on the Arab and on the Israeli sides. However, in view of the armed conflict, the international community reaffirmed its conviction that only a negotiated solution can resolve the conflicts in this region. As a token of their commitment to stability in Lebanon, northern Israel and the region as a whole, Europe and its member states have become increasingly involved in reviving the Middle East Peace Process.

The Armed Conflict

On 12th July 2006, members of the Hezbollah militia struck two combat cars of the Israeli armed forces killing three soldiers and leaving three wounded. They also kidnapped two soldiers: Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev. Some hours later, the Israeli army launched a raid in an attempt to rescue the captured soldiers, but met fierce resistance by Hezbollah militia men who killed five soldiers and destroyed a Merkava combat car. In view of this situation, the government of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert decided an attack on Lebanon initiating a war that lasted 33 days. It is worth analyzing, if only briefly, the decision of the Israeli government as one that will have a definitive impact on the future developments of the conflict. Traditionally, Lebanon’s southern border – one of the most heavily guarded by Israel – was a zone of relative calm with sporadic episodes of violent incidents limited to the border area. This strike-and-respond dynamic was kept within certain limits that minimized the range of the attacks and the subsequent reprisals. According to Israel, Hezbollah was and continues to be a terrorist organization that until last August stopped the Lebanese State from asserting authority in the southern zone of the country and used the territories south of the river Litani as a ground for launching attacks on the territory of Israel and its population. Until last summer, Israel’s response to the attacks by Hezbollah was guided by this principle and it regarded the organization as a separate entity from the Lebanese State and its institutions. But on the night of 12th July Israel radically shifted focus on this issue and began to consider that the attacks were launched by the Lebanese State and not by a terrorist organization. This change of approach would bear consequences on the range and duration of the war. Thus, instead of targeting Hezbollah-occupied positions, the first Israeli air raids were aimed at the Beirut airport and the main roads of the country.

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harm to Lebanon, the Lebanese people themselves would confront Hezbollah and put an end to the looming threat of their presence in southern Lebanon. This strategy was doomed to failure from the very beginning, and as events unfolded, it also inspired political and military action almost simultaneously undertaken by Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip that proved to be equally wrong. The Lebanese did not react to the bombings in the way Israeli authorities had expected. On the contrary, following the Israeli military action Lebanese civilians and the Arab public opinion at large rallied against the policy of Israel and showed support for the defence of the Lebanese territory led by Hezbollah. Additionally, there was yet another element that most surely played a determining role in Israel’s decision: its conviction that the time had arrived to defeat Hezbollah militarily, thus sending a clear message that it would not consent to any further political and military interference from Iran in the region.

In any case, the Israeli government publicly defined its military objectives from the outset: the release of their kidnapped soldiers; defeating, and as far as possible, destroying the Hezbollah movement and their commanders; and, lastly, dissipating any threats to Israeli security directed from the Lebanese territory. However, none of these objectives were achieved by the use of military force after 33 days of war. Unlike the military action, diplomacy provided a way out of the conflict as far as it provided peaceful means to settle differences. UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) favoured the suspension of all military actions, the deployment of Lebanese armed forces in the south of the country and the extension of authority of the Beirut Government over its entire territory. Moreover, the Resolution urged the Lebanese Government to “secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry, without its consent, of arms or related material.” At the same time the Security Council called upon Israel and Lebanon to find a bilateral solution to the conflict on the basis of the following elements: full respect for the Blue Line; the security arrangements between both countries; full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of Security Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006); and no foreign forces or supply of arms to Lebanon without the consent of its government. Lastly, Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) authorized UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) to increase its troop strength to a maximum of 15,000. From an Israeli perspective, Resolution 1701 (2006) entails the disarmament of Hezbollah and the imposition of an arms embargo. At the same time, the presence of Lebanese troops south of the River Litani should help put an end to Hezbollah’s control of southern Lebanon. These measures reduce – or at least diminish significantly - the risk of violent actions directed to the north of Israel. Likewise, this Resolution allows Israel to claim that the objectives stated at the beginning of the hostilities have been achieved, at least partially.

For the Lebanese government, the Resolution adopted on 11th August signified in the first place the cessation of all the hostilities that had taken a serious toll in material and human terms. But the adoption and implementation of this Resolution further enabled the extension of the Government’s authority and institutions throughout Lebanon, particularly by being present south of the River Litani. Hence, the end of the war contributed to strengthening the Lebanese State in a formal way, in the face of the power and

The End of the Conflict

Three weeks into the conflict it became evident that Israel would not achieve any of its objectives and that a military victory would only be possible at a high toll that none of the parties was willing to pay. When they became convinced that an extended conflict was no longer useful, US authorities decided to accept a diplomatic solution that was being forged with great difficulty by the United Nations Security Council. On 11th August 2006 the Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1701 (2006) and

When they became convinced that an extended conflict was no longer useful, US authorities decided to accept a diplomatic solution that was being forged with great difficulty by the United Nations Security Council.
The end of the war contributed to strengthening the Lebanese State in a formal way, in the face of the power and influence exerted thus far by Hezbollah and its various ramifications.

For Hezbollah and its leaders, however, the adoption of Resolution 1701 (2006) provided a way out of a conflict that they would have never been able to win by force, but which made them appear victorious because their militia were not defeated. Even though the Resolution establishes - at least on paper - that Hezbollah must transfer control of a large number of zones in Lebanon, it also provides an opportunity for the Party of God to direct its popularity and influence through relevant political channels that would allow Hezbollah leaders to actively take part in the political life of the country while giving up their military force.

Was a one-month war really necessary to reach this compromise? Surely not. Already in the first week it became evident that a military solution was impossible and that the situation required a diplomatic solution. From the beginning, the Spanish Government held - in agreement with various European partners -, that the problems in the region would not be resolved unilaterally by resorting to military force. Early into the crisis and despite resistance from Israel’s Prime Minister Olmert and some of his cabinet members, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni made efforts to find a solution to the conflict by way of diplomacy in order to stop the increasing number of victims and the huge devastation inflicted on both sides of the border. But the determination of some Israeli leaders to eliminate Hezbollah and to indirectly inflict a heavy blow on Iran prevailed over any appeal for common sense and moderation.

The Effects of the Conflict

Israel

For Israel this war resulted in a political and military fiasco. None of the objectives were achieved and the price paid for this military adventure was exceedingly high. Not surprisingly, the great majority of the Israeli population currently feels frustrated and ultimately regards this war as a lost war. The ceasefire did not result in a stronger and safer country, but rather, in one that lives in fear and is internally divided with regards to the policy to be followed in order to ensure the survival of the Israeli State.

Following the armed conflict, weaknesses in both the government and the armed forces have emerged as they received heavy criticism for the military and political decisions taken during the war. For the first time in its history, the Israeli armed forces lost credibility and prestige, their capacity and potential to ensure the survival of the Israeli State being put into question. For its part, the Israeli Government and the Prime Minister’s party, the Kadima, lost sight of their main political plan which envisaged unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank. Following last summer’s events, it became evident that a unilateral withdrawal from the occupied territories does not guarantee peace and security. Devoid of a political program and with low popularity rates, the government coalition is now faced with the dilemma of either continuing with the occupation and settlement policy in the territories or proceeding to negotiations.

Lebanon

The outcome of this war is tragic for Lebanon. It will take years of reconstruction work to repair the huge destruction caused by 33 days of war. Over the period of one month the country lost most of what it had achieved since the end of its civil war. Initially, Hezbollah appeared to gather strength out of this conflict. Its prestige in the Arab world increased dramatically. For the man in the street, Hezbollah had restored the Arab people’s honour and dignity by confronting the powerful war machinery of Israel to some degree of success. But as weeks went by, the division within the March 14 movement became evident (Hariri, Jumblat and Siniora along with Gega...
Lebanon is faced with a serious institutional crisis that is dividing the country in two, and for which no easy solution is envisaged. A peaceful solution to this situation can only be found nationally by way of dialogue and agreement.

and Gemayel’s Christian groups); this division was also evident in the main opposition groups such as Hezbollah, Amal and General Aoun’s group. Since the end of the war, Hezbollah tried to take political advantage of its prestige by demanding more power for the Lebanese Shiite community and aiming at forming a powerful minority group within the Lebanese government. However, the majority groups in government led by Prime Minister Siniora do not appear to be in favour of changing the system of power quotas, in place since Lebanon’s independence, and which was only slightly modified by the 1989 Taif Accords.

Lebanon is faced with a serious institutional crisis that is dividing the country in two, and for which no easy solution is envisaged. A peaceful solution to this situation can only be found nationally by way of dialogue and agreement. There is yet another factor to consider along with the high complexity of Lebanese society and politics: the external dimension of the Lebanese crisis. While the opposition receives support from Syria and Iran, the government of Prime Minister Siniora is backed by Western countries (especially the US and France) and some moderate Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This external aspect poses great difficulties in the way of finding a solution to the crisis, since it introduces conditions that are not strictly relevant to the current internal debate between the government and the opposition, but are rather instrumental to the conflict involving such countries. Some of the main points of disagreement, such as the designation of an international tribunal to judge those responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and for other political crimes seem to be more relevant in this external dimension rather than internally.

The Arab Countries

When the war broke out moderate Arab states were faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, they condemned the Israeli aggression and expressed the Arab world’s solidarity with Lebanon. But on the other hand, their governments did not disapprove of Israel’s military lesson to Hezbollah and to Iran in addition. The governments of Egypt and Jordan have always disapproved of Hezbollah’s aggressiveness and militant Islamism and they fear the consequences of their influence over the Islamic parties of their own countries if they were to gain a victory. On the contrary, a defeat of the Party of God may have a positive influence on the conflict they have with the Muslim Brotherhood. Likewise, a defeat would have put an end to the influence and power of Iran in the region, thus restricting its role as a “regional power” in the Middle East.

This dilemma was present over the first days of the war, and it explains why the reaction of moderate Arab states to “Israel’s aggression” was sober. However, Hezbollah’s resistance, the growing number of civil victims and the material damage inflicted on Lebanon made it increasingly difficult to maintain this posture. In some Arab capitals there were signs that governments were becoming estranged from what was felt in the “Arab streets.” As the days went by, Hezbollah’s presumed defeat began to transform into a victory. The limit was drawn by what came to be known as the slaughter of Qana. From that moment on, the Arab governments showed their solidarity with Lebanon and openly criticized the Israeli aggression.

Lessons to be drawn from the Conflict

It is worth underscoring the conclusions that can be drawn at the end of the war between Israel and Lebanon, even if these are not new. There is no military solution to the conflicts in the Middle East. As happened in its previous invasion of Lebanon, Israel’s wager on war was a failure; any future military action will also be a failure. A solution for the devastating conflicts of this region can only be achieved through negotiations. Those who employ creating violence as a means to resolve controversies only contribute to creating more violence and radicalization between the parties involved. All the current conflicts in the Middle East are interrelated. It is impossible to solve any of them in an isolated manner, without taking account of the other conflicts. Therefore, the only feasible solution is a comprehensive one.
All the current conflicts in the Middle East are interrelated. It is impossible to solve any of them in an isolated manner, without taking account of the other conflicts. Therefore, the only feasible solution is a comprehensive one.

This interrelatedness should not lead to considering all conflicts equally or finding solutions that are comparable to all of them. In particular, the Israel-Palestinian conflict is at the heart of all crisis. It is a conflict resulting from the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Let us not ignore that this is the greatest affront for the Arab world, one that is perceived as such by its population. As long as no progress is made in the peace process there is no possible solution for the rest of conflicts. The Palestinian question is at the heart of this problem, and our first efforts must be dedicated to it. But a solution shall only be possible if progress is made towards resolving the other conflicts in the region, particularly on the Syrian and Lebanese sides.

A crisis in which the main actors of this zone appear internally weakened is one of the current problems, and peace is unlikely to be inspired by the region itself. Forces and trends in favour of peace can be found in the Middle East, but they need a boost from outside the Arab world.

The US has shown little interest in promoting the Peace Process in recent years. This may be explained by the fact that they have many fronts to attend in the region, by their perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict or by the importance they give to the Palestinian side. Nonetheless, it is fair to acknowledge that in recent months State Secretary Condoleezza Rice fostered a series of bilateral contacts between the Israeli Prime Minister and the Palestinian Presidency. Even though the US is a relevant actor in the region, Europe is bound to play a decisive role in the Peace Process. Following the extension of UNIFIL’s mandate and for the first time in many years, Europe’s presence is not only limited to aspects related to finance or cooperation. By being present on site, Europe is adopting for the first time an active role and assuming political responsibilities of the greatest importance. By sending several thousand troops from France, Italy, Spain, Germany and other European states, the European Union is obliged to take a relevant and active role in the region once and for all. The great challenge ahead is to form a united front, while inspiring a multilateralism leading to a common and autonomous policy. If it fails to do so, the European Union’s potential as a key international actor will be called into question. From this viewpoint, the EU can play a major role in calling for the Quartet’s full assumption of its responsibilities, including an outreach toward the main regional actors. A Palestine unity government may well provide the opportunity to reinforce Europe’s position, consolidate a common posture and work towards achieving peace. If this is not pursued, the Middle East shall be most likely hit by the violence and devastation of war once again.
War Revisits the Mediterranean

In the Eye of the Storm:
The Summer 2006 War in Lebanon

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Together with Iraq and the situation in Palestine, Lebanon represented another factor of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean. 2006 was a year that saw the Land of Cedars again at the centre of the Middle Eastern maelstrom. It is not the first time this small Mediterranean country is used as a convenient battleground by regional and global actors.

Background to the 2006 Lebanon War

There are several factors to explain the events that led to the summer 2006 war between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah (Party of God): the internal situation in Lebanon following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri; the emergence of Iran as a major player in the Middle East following the US war in Iraq; the role of Syria, that has never accepted its forced ousting from Lebanon in the spring of 2005; Israel’s concern with the Palestinian reality; and the US administration inability to implement the global war on terror and the uncontrollable situation in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since the end of the civil war in Lebanon (1975-1989) the country has gone through a period of amazing reconstruction shepherded by the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Thanks to his contacts and global friendships, Hariri brought back to Lebanon a respect it had lost and a role it used to have. The major drawback though was that Hariri focused on the rebuilding of stones at the expense of reconciliation among Lebanese people.

In fact reconciliation between Lebanon’s various communities did not really take place. The Christians especially came out feeling defeated and betrayed while the Sunnis and the Shias came out with more control of power levers in Lebanon. Unlike South Africa and some Latin American countries, there has never been a truth and reconciliation commission created to “police the past” in Lebanon.

The other major fault line in this Lebanese scenario is Hezbollah’s ever growing role and influence on the Lebanese scene. Created following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Hezbollah became a major linchpin of the resistance against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. The party’s leadership succeeded, thanks to Syria and Iran’s help, in creating a large network of institutions to meet the various social and humanitarian needs of the population of South Lebanon. Hezbollah became the paramount military and social power in South Lebanon, mostly dominated by Lebanese Shias. Calls to send Lebanese troops to the border with Israel were always faced with resistance. Lebanon’s president Emile Lahoud (Syria’s major ally in Lebanon) has always argued that sending Lebanese troops to the border would be tantamount to acting as defenders of Israeli security. The summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah demonstrates how wrong this reasoning was. This is why, almost one month after the beginning of the Israeli campaign, Lebanon’s government offered to send 15,000 Lebanese army troops to the border. A non-viable option at this stage, given Israel’s refusal to withdraw unless replaced by a strong international force. Then we have the question of Hezbollah and its weapons and how to integrate this militia into the Lebanese Army, a tall order for a weak and dismembered country.

Following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri (February 2005), UN Security Council Resolution 1559 was adopted calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops
From Lebanon (in this case meaning Syria) and the dismantling of Hezbollah as a militia, the rationale being that Israel had ended its occupation of South Lebanon and the Hezbollah resistance movement had become moot. This was not Hezbollah’s interpretation. For the Shia-dominated militia, Israel was still in occupation of the Shebaa Farms (an area of around 20-25 kilometres in South Lebanon), which justified maintaining its weapons.

Because of the weakness of the central government in Lebanon, the country had become rife ground for armed groups to create a state within a state

Because of the weakness of the central government in Lebanon, the country had become rife ground for armed groups to create a state within a state. This was the case of the PLO in Lebanon for at least 25 years until Arafat and his men were forced out of Beirut in the mid 1980s. Then we had a Lebanese brand supported by Iran and Syria: Hezbollah.

Iran and Syria: Regional Spoilers?

Since the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, regional politics in the Middle East have changed. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini wanted to export his brand of fundamentalist Islam throughout the Middle East and the Muslim world. Lebanon with its large Shia community became a favourite target of Teheran entreaties. Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Iranian regime took advantage of the mistakes committed by the IDF to consolidate its influence in the Land of Cedars.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 consolidated Iran as a major player in the region. The Shiite arc of influence extended now all the way from Teheran to Basrah and Beirut. The Iranian regime took advantage of the fragmentation of Iraq to extend its influence and presence in southern Iraq.

Teheran is waiting to see how the Bush administration will play its cards (both with the issue of Iraq and the Iranian nuclear weapons program) to determine its behaviour in Iraq and the Middle East. Hezbollah is a convenient instrument for Iran’s disruptive policies against US interests in the region.

Another major player is Syria. The Syrian regime has never formally acknowledged Lebanon as a sovereign country. Proof has always been the absence of embassies between Syria and Lebanon. In 1976, with US and Israeli support, President Hafez al Assad of Syria sent his troops to Lebanon to maintain a state of controlled tensions. The Syrians played willing Lebanese factions against one another to maintain its supremacy. With Washington’s tacit support, Syrian suzerainty over Lebanon lasted for thirty years.

Syria’s pre-eminent role in Lebanon was challenged by the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Hariri, who had never had a viable relationship with Emile Lahoud, Syria’s appointed president of Lebanon, was incensed by Syria’s decision to renew Lahoud’s presidential mandate; an unconstitutional move. To reverse this trend, Hariri lobbied hard with his European and American friends to have the UN adopt a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops out of Lebanon and the disarming of Hezbollah.

In the spring of 2005, following Hariri’s assassination, Syria was forced to pull its troops out of Lebanon. Moreover, the Syrian regime is facing the prospect of an international tribunal that will be investigating all the assassinations that took place in Lebanon since Hariri’s death, including of course his killing.

Israel in the Lebanese Quagmire:
“Plus Ça Change...”

After the advent of Ariel Sharon to power in Israel and throughout his period in power the Palestinian issue became a foremost concern, especially the demographic dimension of the conflict. Sharon decided then to build a wall (or “separation fence” in official Israeli description) around most of the West Bank, creating a new fact on site. He also decided to undercut Hamas’ regional connections. Since the beginning of the Second Intifada (2001), pro Syrian and Iranian groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah had forged a close political and military alliance. The victory of Hamas early in 2006 in the Palestinian legislative elections forced the Israelis to get rid of Hamas and undermine its legitimacy as a democratically elected force in Palestine. We have the prospect of weak leaders trying to reach an unreachable compromise: Ehud Olmert in Israel, Muhammad Abbas in Palestine, and Fuad Siniora in Lebanon. This is not a good prescription for a lasting peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel’s military decision to strike out against Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank and Hezbollah in
Lebanon falls within the objectives stated by the Bush administration in its *global war on terrorism*. This war was weakened by the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the break-up of Iraq because of the rampant civil war going on in Baghdad and the Southern part of the country.

**The US, Europe and America’s Arabs**

The Bush administration objectives to fight terrorism and bring democracy to the Middle East lay in shambles. Sensing a possible US decision to whittle its military presence in Iraq and given Iran’s rising influence in the region, Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert decided to strike Lebanon. The joint US-Israeli vision was to impose a *New Middle East Order* that sounds more like an oxymoron, and a dangerous one at that. In Arab intellectual circles there was speculation that this new old policy is very similar to ideas attributed to some Israeli and American circles to divide the Arab Middle East along ethnic and sectarian lines: a Shia state in Southern Iraq; a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq; a Sunni rump state protected by Egypt and Saudi Arabia; Alawi, Sunni and Druze entities in Syria; and lastly the partition of Lebanon into Christian, Sunni, Shia and Druze enclaves. The purpose of this balkanization – according to these circles – is to ensure Israel’s hegemony as a Jewish state in a confessionally fragmented region. Certainly, this is a prescription for disaster and will foster never ending wars and terrorism in the Middle East and around the world.

**The summer 2006 war between Hezbollah and the IDF was a harbinger of the new situations emerging in the Middle East**

The summer 2006 war between Hezbollah and the IDF was a harbinger of the new situations emerging in the Middle East. First, the war in Lebanon was the longest confrontation between the Israeli army and an irregular militia. Usually wars between regular Arab and Israeli armies last between one to two weeks. As a result of the summer 2006 war, Hezbollah has emerged as a major player in future Lebanese and regional politics. Second, by using Hezbollah as its regional instrument, Iran has emerged as a major power, and especially as a protector of the Shias in the Middle East. Moreover, Iran will be an inevitable interlocutor for the US and Britain regarding the future of Iraq. Regardless of whether Iraq breaks out in civil war or not, Iran is a major player to contend with. Third, the old regional Arab order controlled by Sunni-dominated countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan was on the wane. Saudi Arabia has lost its leverage, especially since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (most of the attackers were Saudis). In 2006, Egypt was also in a transition that could be a destabilizing factor in the country. Hezbollah’s victory in Lebanon was a major boost for the political fortunes of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan and Hamas in Palestine. Jordan reaped the consequences of the wars in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. Prospects for the Hashemite monarchy will be determined by regional instability and global intervention.

**Europe and the West have had to undergo a major paradigm shift. The West’s Arab interlocutors have changed**

Lastly, Europe and the West have had to undergo a major paradigm shift. The West’s Arab interlocutors have changed. Those in the Middle East who wanted to bring democracy and liberalization to the region have been defeated by the war in Lebanon. The West will have to learn to talk and accept an Islamist, more radical vision of the region. However unsavoury such an option is, the West will have to adopt a different approach to the Middle East. This applies especially to the Bush administration, whose Manichean view of relations with the US.

**Winners and Losers of the Summer 2006 Israel - Hezbollah War**

The confrontation ended with the adoption by the UN Security Council (August 11) of Resolution 1701. In it, the international community set out the principles of a lasting solution to the crisis. UN Security Council Resolution 1701 called for a “full cessation of hostilities” between Hezbollah and Israel and reiterated the international community’s “strong support for full respect of the Blue Line (separating Israel and Lebanon)”. It also called for the “full implemen-
tation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Agreement (1989) – that ended the Lebanese civil war – and the disarmament "of all armed groups in Lebanon." Resolution 1701 also involved the release of the abducted Israeli soldiers and the Lebanese prisoners and the delineation of the borders, especially in the Shebaa Farms area. Finally, UN Resolution 1701 called for the deployment of 15,000 troops to be added to the UNIFIL contingent in South Lebanon. France, Spain and Italy provided half of this number.

The biggest losers of the Summer 2006 conflict, the longest Arab-Israeli war, included the Israeli government, the Lebanese people (initial assessment of the direct costs of the war amounted to 2,464 billion dollars), the Bush Administration's Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the US campaign to promote democracy in the Middle East.

For many US, European and Middle Eastern observers, the major winner was Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.

For many US, European and Middle Eastern observers, the major winner was Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah became a major hero in the Arab world by succeeding in confronting the most potent army in the Middle East for more than four weeks. Certainly, this has come at a major cost in life and property. The downside of Nasrallah’s victory was the kind of options Hezbollah will adopt: being Iran’s long arm in Lebanon or accepting to be part and parcel of the reconstructed Lebanese state. According to Lebanese sources Hezbollah collaborated with the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the South and still respects the presence of UNIFIL II. The Shia group stated that it would refuse to disarm as long as there were still Israeli soldiers on Lebanese soil.

The summer 2006 war was a major wake up call to the Israeli government and army. This was the first major war between a regular highly sophisticated army and a guerrilla movement known for its recourse to terrorism in its inception.

What became clear was that Ehud Olmert’s policy of unilateral disengagement from Gaza and the West Bank had received a major blow and lost its credibility in Israeli public opinion. The upshot was that the settlers in the West Bank have gained the upper hand.

Their voice and concerns will probably be carried by Olmert’s major opponent Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu. A change in the Israeli government was not to be excluded. The same applied to the tactics and war strategies of the IDF. In summation, Israel will not accept the current status quo and in 2007 will do its best to mete out a major defeat against its bitter Shia enemy in Lebanon.

As far as the Bush administration was concerned the Lebanese fiasco has been added to the rampant civil war in Iraq and the unstable situation in Afghanistan. Last but not least, and as a result of the summer 2006 war in Lebanon, the US campaign to spread democracy in the Middle East received a major setback.

After the Lebanon War: Trends and Outlooks

Lebanon will have to be rebuilt once again. An ironclad guarantee will have to be put in place that its southern borders will never be used as a launching pad against Israel. This means the introduction of a major international peacekeeping force or expanding the current UN troops (UNIFIL) mandate, placing it under UN Charter Chapter VII.

The 2006 war led to a new realignment in the region. Iran succeeded in maintaining its influence both in Iraq and Lebanon; it will do its utmost to maintain its nuclear weapons program. These factors (Shias in Iraq and Lebanon and nuclear program) will be Iran’s trump card for possible negotiation or confrontation with the US.

The 2006 war led to a new realignment in the region. Iran succeeded in maintaining its influence both in Iraq and Lebanon; it will do its utmost to maintain its nuclear weapons program.

There may be a possible redrawing of regional influence, with Iran being allowed a right of suzerainty over Iraq, especially of its Shia-dominated region. Israel would be allowed to maintain its control of what is left of the West Bank. Egypt and Jordan could be brought in somehow to participate in this condominium.

The regime in Syria will survive, but with clipped
wings and some kind of an indirect influence in Lebanon. The US and France will still have a say in Lebanon’s future, but this all hinges on the outcome of presidential changes in the US and France (Bush administration and Jacques Chirac). The Syrian leadership is still anxiously awaiting the results of the UN Commission investigating the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and the creation of a special tribunal.

The implications for the US and the global war on terrorism were that there will be more recruits available to Al Qaeda and its cohorts, especially following the disasters in Lebanon and Iraq. The implications for the US and the global war on terrorism were that there will be more recruits available to Al Qaeda and its cohorts, especially following the disasters in Lebanon and Iraq. This is why it was of utmost urgency for the US and the world community to end the Israeli-Hezbollah war in Lebanon and help the country get on with reconstruction. Lebanon urgently needs a strong central government with a well-trained army. The big challenge is how to create a lasting solution that would satisfy all factions. Regional settlements will heavily impact Lebanon’s future and regional stability. The US has a major say in that, but will have to accommodate regional interests (Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt and Jordan). The Lebanese still have to reach a final agreement on the three following basic issues: the viability of the Taif Agreement and whether it is still applicable in the current situation, especially in light of the changes brought about by the 2006 Israeli war against Hezbollah; the role Lebanon should play in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and whether Lebanon should implement war or peace economic policies.

In early 2007 what are the prospects for the small Mediterranean country? Stability or civil war? The jury is still out for Lebanon. There is going to be a period of instability until a new President is elected next October. As a playground for regional and global tensions, Lebanon will have to await the outcome of the following events: results of the current Iranian-Saudi talks; Syria’s struggle to get out of its isolation and the role Damascus will play as a spoiler in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine; a stronger Israeli leadership; and the results of the current debate in the US on what course to follow with the Iranian regime: diplomacy or military action.

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**Yawmiyyat al Harb al Israeiliyya ala Lubnan 2006 Beirut: Al Markaz al Arabi lil Maaloumaat, As Safir, 2006.**
Whereas everything seemed to point to the contrary and the cultural and “civilisational” divide seems never to have been so wide, the demographics of the Southern Mediterranean Basin are beginning to converge with those of the Northern Mediterranean countries, though not to the point of becoming identical. There are many different scenarios: in some cases, the resemblance is very high (Lebanon and Tunisia); in other cases convergence is near at hand and will take but a few years or perhaps a decade at most (Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Turkey); and still in others, it seems yet a distant reality (Egypt, Syria, Israel and Palestine).

Table 1 provides several pertinent indicators of the current demographic situation: population, fertility rate and its transition, child mortality and its correlates of literacy among boys and girls, urbanisation and per capita GDP. So as not to overload the table, we have not included other common indicators which are easily found in international demographic yearbooks.

In the following lines, we will place particular attention on the fertility rate, which is the number of children that a woman will have during the course of her reproductive life. To provide an idea, this index has varied over time and always varies over space, ranging from 8 children (in certain Sub-Saharan African countries) to little more than one, as in certain regions of Europe, namely northern Italy and former East Germany. Before the demographic transition some thirty years ago, the Arab countries had very high rates (except Lebanon and Israel) and there was no difference to speak of between the Maghreb and the Mashreq, as can be seen in the column on peak fertility rates.

At first glance, a significant difference can be seen between the Maghreb (including Libya) and the Middle East (excluding Lebanon). One cannot but see the effect of European cultural influence, stronger in the Maghreb than in the Middle East countries: geography, colonial and post-colonial history, language, the media, as well as the nearly obligatory use of European languages and above all, the effect of cultural mediators consisting of Maghrebi émigrés who are nearly wholly Europe-oriented, have contributed – via a series of diffuse processes (both direct and indirect) – to deeply modifying family behaviour in countries of migrant origin and to bringing about a re-evaluation of fertility intentions. Nevertheless, upon closer look, the differences among Maghreb countries are not trivial.

Morocco, despite its less satisfying demographic, cultural and economic conditions, was a pioneer in demographic change in the Arab World. Naturally, Tunisia and Lebanon began to experience demographic change earlier, but apart from factors specific to both countries, they also have a demographic size advantage over Morocco, that is, change occurs more easily in small countries than in large ones. Hence, despite its highly rural population, its low standard of living and very high infant and juvenile mortality rates at the time, Morocco began to undergo its demographic transition in the mid-1970s, 10 years earlier than the majority of Arab Countries. Today, Morocco still bears the stigma of an under-development more marked than elsewhere and the standard of living is low. The rural population is no longer predominant, but this is above all due to the effect of the administrative promotion of certain areas, which have moved from rural towards urban. Infant mortality remains very high: 40‰, which is 10 times higher than in developed countries. Boys and girls aged 15-24, who are nearly all literate in the other countries concerned, still suffer here from the past lacunae of the educational system, which has proven
unable to generalise education: 4 girls out of 10 are still illiterate in this age group. Nevertheless, despite its poor performance in these areas, Morocco ranks high in demographic transition. Its fertility rate of 2.43 children per woman is quite low, considering the other indicators. It is quickly approaching that of Tunisia. The population is increasingly pushing back the marriage age and has broadly adopted family planning, the standard of two children tending to prevail (the desired fertility rate of 1.80 is even lower, 27% less than the effective fertility rate). Though the government has not generated this evolution towards greater demographic moderation, it has efficiently attended the process.

In Algeria, after the militant anti-Malthusianism, which can be largely ascribed to compensating the ravaging effects of the Algerian War, the administration suddenly changed course, opting in 1983 for a population policy that was openly against a high birth rate. Several years later, the oil bust of 1986 gave an even more definitive boost to the drop in fertility rate, a process which continued steadily until the year 2000, when the fertility index reached a plateau of 2.38 children per woman, less than 3 points above the replacement fertility level of 2.10. Nonetheless, the decrease in fertility not only levelled off, but thanks to improved economic and security conditions, has now rebounded, increasing by 10% in 2005.

Tunisia displays all the features for successful demographic transition. The political will to reduce population growth is long-standing, dating back to the 1960s. Nevertheless, the decisive factor has not been so much this – profusely emphasised – political will, but rather the aspirations of the population to limit its progeny. It has been so successful in doing so that today, Tunisia’s fertility rate has reached the same level as that of France: 2.0 children per woman. Due to the late average age of marriage, one of the latest in the world, generalised use of contraception and occasional abortions, Tunisians have lowered their fertility rates to match European standards. Demographers did not hesitate some years ago to forecast an even lower fertility rate of only 1.5 children. This trend can in part be attributed to the population’s wish to educate their children to the highest degree possible, hoping to put them through higher education, preferably at private institutions abroad. Despite this aspiration, Tunisia is still behind in some respects. A significant proportion of young people approximately 20 years of age, especially among the female population (8%), have not had the chance to attend school and are thus illiterate. Moreover, the Malthusian trend can have negative effects in a country where the family structures have evolved less (endogamy and a marked preference for male children). Thus, as in hyper-Malthusian countries of Asia, female foeticide (which can be inferred when the proportion of male to female births surpass the normal biological rate of 1.05) is beginning to emerge to aggravate the negligence towards female children common in these latitudes (evident from the abnormally high mortality rate of girls from 0 to 4 years of age in comparison to that of boys of the same age).

Libya, underpopulated and rich in resources, has undergone a demographic transition like the oil-producing countries of the Arab-Persian Gulf. For a long time, official pronatalist policy has been compensated by a generous redistribution of income.

On the demographic level, Libya remains the least known of the countries in this region. The variation in estimates can easily make the user despair. If we rely on international data sources (World Bank, the UN, the US Census Bureau, Population Reference Bureau, CIA, etc.), Libya appears to fit in well with other Mashreq countries, with a fertility rate approaching that of Syria or Egypt. On the other hand, if we consider – and why wouldn’t we? – the last and only demographic survey taken in Libya, then we find quite a modern demographic situation for a country that seems rather closed to globalisation trends, as reflected in its moderate fertility rate: 2.85 in 2005. Libya, underpopulated and rich in resources, has undergone a demographic transition like the oil-producing countries of the Arab-Persian Gulf. For a long time, official pronatalist policy has been compensated by a generous redistribution of income. The population, though highly urbanised and educated, maintained the habit of large families. Things have changed since the oil price collapse and the international embargo, which ruined the standard of living and entailed a painful yet necessary demographic adjustment to the new situation. Now that prosperity has returned due to high oil prices and that the country is once again in the good graces of the international community, it would be interesting to ascertain whether the fertility rate, which was falling irremissibly, has stabilised or is rising. Unfortunately,
the data so scantily provided by Libya obliges us to put off the answer to this question, interesting on both the theoretical and the practical levels.

The most populated country in the Southern Mediterranean Region, Egypt’s population data is not the best known. Nevertheless, despite their random nature, the data suggest great demographic immobility, with a fertility rate that has practically not decreased at all since the 1990s. It is nonetheless in this country more than anywhere else in the Southern Mediterranean that the demographic “concern” has been the most persistent, regardless of the regime, whether royalist under Farouk or republican under Nasser and his successors. The latter had made excellent progress: between 1965 and his death in 1970, the Egyptian fertility rate had dropped, which is the least one could expect of a country where 4% of the surface area is arable. The great increase in population since then and the stabilisation of the fertility rate at a high level in 2005 – twice as high as in Lebanon and 2/3 higher than in Tunisia – demonstrate that environmental constraints (barren areas, enormous population densities and so on) and economic constraints (limited natural resources and a mediocre standard of living) are not enough to prevent the fertility rate from remaining high and the population from growing at a rhythm allowing it to double in a single generation. Egyptian facts refute the theory of modernisation: it is the fertility of illiterate or little educated women which decreases. That of more educated women, on the other hand, remains stable

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The desired number of children continues to be high: approximately 3 children, that is, nearly 50% higher than in the Maghreb countries. Egypt is certainly the country in the world that offers the best refutation of Malthusianism, demonstrating that the Reverend’s positive checks are an imposture.

Israel is the most pronatalist and populationist in the region, attitudes which large segments of the population share. The Jewish fertility rate in Israel, 2.69 children (2005), is very high no matter what the criteria used for comparison, whether it be the Jews of the diaspora (1.5 children), the Arab Maghreb coun-
between individual and community values. For the Palestinians, demographic transition does not have the same connotations as for the Moroccans, Egyptians or even Syrians. In Palestine, the transition entails a definite political risk, because, in contrast to the Palestinians, the Israelis occupying the West Bank and East Jerusalem retain all of the assets of demographic dynamism. Their fertility rate is on the rise though it is already very high (4.75 children). Immigration remains stable and mortality very low.

**Yasser Arafat discovered that the womb of Palestinian women was a biological weapon and implored couples to have 12 children, 2 for themselves and 10 for the struggle**

This high fertility rate is due to the expansionist, nationalist and religious views predominating among settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as to the billions of dollars pouring into the settlements that lighten the load of child rearing and thus reward pro-family choices. While the settlers’ standard of living rose due to direct aid and subsidies, that of the Palestinians plummeted. By 2000, the Palestinian fertility rate, which had collapsed to 4.18 (3.40 in the West Bank), had fallen below that of Israeli settlers: 4.51.

Another – emotionally loaded – matter of concern: Jerusalem. Even more than in the rest of the West Bank, the resistance to occupation/annexation went hand in hand with a high fertility rate. But in 2005, the fertility rate of the 245,000 Palestinians in the Holy City was surpassed for the first time – though by a fraction of a decimal point – by that of the 475,000 Jews: 3.94 as compared to 3.95 children per woman, respectively.

In the face of an Israel whose expansionism is also de-mographic, **Syria’s** official policy as well as its civil so-ciety ideals prove to be just as populationist and pronatalist. In official proposals or in conversation with the citizens at large, the demographic issue immediately takes on a strong emotional bent – a heritage of the past which continues to weigh upon the Syrian mindset. The Israeli-Arab Wars have accentuated the populationist impulse, numbers being promoted as a strategic factor in a very long-term conflict. Nationalism and demography go hand in hand.

In Syria, the demand for children has always been high. The State has never needed to intervene. Syrians unani-mously opt for large families (4.6 children today). Syria was and remains one of the rare countries where the ideal number of children is higher than the effective number. Demographic evolution will be slow here. There is a dilemma. The most pro-regime communities and regions – the Alawites in the coastal mountains (2.10 children per woman in 2004), the Djebel Druze (1.80 children), the Golan community (2.66 children) and the Damascus community (2.45 children) – display very low fertility rates, as do the Christians disseminated throughout the country (their fertility rate is uncertain but is believed to be 2.0 children or less per woman). Therefore, these groups are the most threatened by the “explosive” demography of the majority (3.83 children in Aleppo, 5.46 in Rakka, 6.21 in Deir el Zor), which is two to three times higher.

The administration knows it is useless to play the battle of numbers, the war of cradles, for its community of origin and the communities backing it. High rates of procreation do not ensue in the Alawite, Druze, Is-maili or Christian traditions of Syria. Alone among the larger minorities, the Kurds are hyper-fertile. Yet the majority community, the Sunni Arab community, may be a giant in numbers, but it is also a giant with feet of clay: an artificial category, a comfortable aggregate that suits statisticians well but has no socio-logical consistency. In contrast, the other communities are less numerous but more unified.

Pragmatically, the current regime has employed a laissez-faire policy, not intervening in demographic mat ters. Even if the control of fertility could have contributed to diminishing imbalances between majority and mi-nority populations, it would have been politically incor-rect to proclaim this and thereby injure religious sensibili ties. Hence Syrian demography will always be marked by its unstable balances. Its fertility rate, which had reached world record highs at 8 children in the mid-80s began to diminish after 1986. The Syrians began to have fewer children, even in the countryside and in conservative strongholds (Aleppo). Nonetheless, since the 1990s, the fertility rate has hardly fallen: 3.5 in 2005.

Lebanon has the lowest fertility rate of the region, lower even than Tunisia, Turkey and the Jewish Is-raelis. But this could not have occurred if some groups continued to have a fertility rate much higher than others. Paradoxically, the war and post-war period in Lebanon (1975-2007) has brought communities to similar levels, at least in terms of demography, where-as a hypothetical political rapprochement is yet to come. The Lebanese household is typically the nuclear
Syrians unanimously opt for large families (4.6 children today). Syria was and remains one of the rare countries where the ideal number of children is higher than the effective number.

Family throughout the Muslim, Shiite and Christian communities. Shiite areas demonstrate a strong propensity towards “modernity,” if we consider the fertility indicator as representing the spirit of evolution in family structure and mentality. The speed of fertility transition from 1971 to 2005 was highest among the Shiites (-3.2% per year and falling) than in any other group: -2.3% for the Maronites, -2.3% for other Christians, -3% for the Sunnis. Modernisation directly affects reproductive behaviour; education in particular, residence in a city or suburbs, an opening to the world and the media and the globalisation of mindsets and of reproductive behaviour are no longer a privilege reserved for the Christian community.

The demographic transition also has a negative facet, that of the so-called transition due to poverty. The Lebanon War (1975-1990) and above all the post-war period (1991-2007) have caused pauperisation among all confessions without discrimination, obliging households to limit their wishes for a large family. Shiite households, which a generation ago had 6 to 8 children, must now settle for 2 to 3.

In contrast to a political situation that would seem to indicate the opposite, these demographic convergences are perhaps a presage of political and ideological convergence. If the Shiites are now in line with other Lebanese in their demographic behaviour, this means they share a number of values. In any case, they are closer to other Lebanese, whether Christians, Sunnis or Druze, than to Syrians, who continue to give birth to nearly four children per nuclear family, or to Jewish Israelis, who have three.

Turkey is a candidate for accession to the European Union despite the numerous uncertainties pending resolution: Cyprus, the Armenian and Kurdish questions, human rights and so on. Turkish demography, however, is rarely mentioned among these handicaps. Yet on the demographic level, Turkey remains well anchored in the Middle East. Its fertility rate remains high – the highest among the member states of the Council of Europe – only surpassed by the proto-State of Kosovo. Recently, Turkey was singled out by a reputed US demographer as one of the rare Third World countries where the fertility transition is “stalled.” The real causes behind this stall in the fertility transition are unclear. But apart from its fertility rate, Turkey displays other demographic characteristics not very conducive to its integration into Europe. Some are well known, such as female illiteracy, which is significant even among young women, and the predominantly rural society. Little remarked is the fact that girls pay quite a heavy tribute to fertility control: the mortality rate among girls under 5 was abnormally high at the end of the previous decade. On average, girls under 5 years of age died at a rate 20% higher than the biological standard.

### TABLE 1

**Several Recent Indicators for Southern Mediterranean Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Population (in millions)</th>
<th>Fertility Rate (children per woman)</th>
<th>Peak Fertility Rate (children per woman)</th>
<th>Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)</th>
<th>Literacy Rate (Boys 15-24 age group)</th>
<th>Girls 15-24 age group (%)</th>
<th>Urban Population</th>
<th>GDP per inhabitant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>32,784</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>33,861</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>8.36</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>10,312</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>6,085</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>76,853</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>19,988</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3,653</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>2,867</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>5,967</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>75,161</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

African Migrations and Mediterranean Strategy

Trans-Mediterranean Migration and Euro-African Strategies

Mehdi Lahlou
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Institut National de Statistique et d’Économie Appliquée (INSEA), Rabat

The repeated assaults from late August to early October 2005 by hundreds of Sub-Saharan migrants—living ever longer in Morocco with less and less resources for surviving and, above all, seeing their hopes for crossing to the other side of the Mediterranean progressively dwindle as all sorts of controls on both shores are intensified—in attempts to storm the barbed wire fences erected by the Spanish authorities around their enclaves in Moroccan territory, Sebta and Melilia (i.e. the Arabic names for Ceuta and Melilla), alarmed the Spaniards, frightened their EU partners and troubled the Moroccans. The latter were suddenly confronted with a situation that was certain in nature, but unimaginable insofar as the scope it had taken on, both on site and through the images it produced in the media and its impact on public opinion, both in Europe and Africa.

The two countries frontally affected by these events, i.e. Morocco and Spain, quickly took advantage of the situation in order: in the case of Morocco, to display its position as ‘victim’ of its geography and request a new ‘Marshall Plan’ for Africa, if only to reduce the propensity of Sub-Saharan Africans to emigrate; and in the case of Spain, to call for greater involvement (and greater solidarity) by other EU Member States; both countries basing their arguments on the fact that “they are doing everything that should be done” to reduce the migratory flow to Europe, though without success. These same countries moreover demanded that countries of emigration and transit, in particular Algeria, take greater responsibility and tighten controls on their citizens emigrating abroad and/or border crossings by emigrants in transit through their territory, and therefore to assume responsibility in managing a matter in which they should likewise be deeply involved.

Generally speaking, the autumn 2005 events seem to have produced a major shock wave regarding the significance of the migratory phenomenon originating in Africa, its causes and possible evolution if nothing of import is done to stem its determining factors and mechanisms. For the Europeans, on the one hand, this shock wave would soon translate into the search for improved political convergence and more means to reinforce controls already in place to protect Europe’s southern borders. In the Maghreb, on the other hand, from Libya to Morocco, a certain tendency has emerged to adopt an approach that increasingly integrates European policy goals on migration, although the official discourse contains many nuances.

Two essential factors should nonetheless be kept in mind with regard to the process unleashed:

- The explosion in the number of irregular migrants arriving in Spain over the course of 2006 and, above all, the shift in destination, the majority now arriving on the Canary Islands instead of the coast of Andalusia, seem to indicate that protection measures of a direct security nature remain inoperative.
- There is an attempt to collectively deal with the Euro-African migratory issue in an inter-governmental framework involving the countries of destination as well as those of transit and departure. This attempt, whose contours are not yet politically and institutionally well defined or established, comes after a long period when the Spanish and particularly Moroccan Authorities were considered the main policymakers— if not the only ones— responsible for all issues relating to migration in the Western Mediterranean.
Another Migratory Path: The ‘Cayuco Way’ or the Dakar-Tenerife Maritime Route

The near sealing off of the Strait of Gibraltar against irregular migrant travel through the combination of different Moroccan-Spanish land and sea controls – controls that have also become more effective along the Saharan coast of Morocco closest to the Islands of Fuerteventura and Lanzarote – has led nearly automatically to the ‘opening’ of the Dakar-Canary Islands maritime route, which is longer and more dangerous, but more direct and less costly. Although it was foreseeable long ago, this new path constitutes a real surprise for the speed with which it began to be used and the number of migrants using it, especially in the summer of 2006. In fact, the sharp decrease in migratory flow across the Strait of Gibraltar to Europe is understandable and has been more than compensated by the shift of migratory channels to Western Africa, to the area between Mauritania and the Republic of Guinea. In this regard, the emergence of two new transit countries, first Mauritania in November of 2005 and then Senegal in the spring of 2006, translates into what seems like a true explosion in the number of migrants travelling irregularly to Spanish territory and the consolidation of the Canary Islands as the main gateway to Europe along its southern flank.

Thus, over the course of 2006, over 31,000 Sub-Saharan migrants (as indicated in the tables below), in other words, four times the number of arrivals registered on the Canary archipelago in 2002 – a year in which irregular arrivals were considered to have reached a historical peak since the start of the current migratory phenomenon – landed on the Canary Islands, primarily the Island of Tenerife, the most populated and tourist-oriented of the islands, on board cayucos (small, fragile boats) generally carrying from 100 to over 170 migrants, whereas the pateras or outboards arriving on the Andalusian coasts carry an average of only 20 to 40.

### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path of Arrival Year</th>
<th>Strait of Gibraltar</th>
<th>Canary Islands</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Arrivals via Canary Islands / Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4,952</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>4,952</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4,189</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>4,189</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5,287</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>5,287</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7,741</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>7,741</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>7,348</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>7,348</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>7,031</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>7,031</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>7,178</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>8,053</td>
<td>10.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>16,885</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>19,272</td>
<td>12.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>14,405</td>
<td>4,112</td>
<td>18,517</td>
<td>22.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6,748</td>
<td>9,756</td>
<td>16,504</td>
<td>59.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9,794</td>
<td>9,382</td>
<td>19,176</td>
<td>48.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7,425</td>
<td>8,426</td>
<td>15,851</td>
<td>53.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7,066</td>
<td>4,715</td>
<td>11,781</td>
<td>40.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6,976</td>
<td>31,106</td>
<td>38,082</td>
<td>81.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mehdi Lahlou, based on data from Spanish newspapers, primarily El País, and the 2006 Annual Report of the Asociación pro derechos humanos de Andalucía (APDHA).

### TABLE 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islands</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tenerife</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>17,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gran Canaria</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>5,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Gomera</td>
<td>72*</td>
<td>3,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuerteventura</td>
<td>2,249</td>
<td>2,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Hierro</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanzarote</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Palma</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,751</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,106</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Asociación pro derechos humanos de Andalucía (APDHA) – Annual Report, 2006, published January 2007; and * the newspaper El País (Madrid), 28/08/2006.
These tables reveal the continuity into 2006 of the new migration process from Africa set in motion in the autumn of 2005, which consisted in shifting migratory routes over 2,500 km from Spain’s Andalusian coastline, obliging Spain in particular to extend its surveillance and security intervention zone to areas generally outside of its sphere of political, economic or cultural influence, with all the diplomatic difficulties this entails.

The new migration process from Africa set in motion in the autumn of 2005 consisted in shifting migratory routes over 2,500 km from Spain’s Andalusian coastline, obliging Spain to extend its surveillance and security intervention zone to areas generally outside of its sphere of political, economic or cultural influence

Hence, migratory routes were following the traditional south-north axis until the end of 2005, that is, crossing the Sahara (via Gao and Kidal in Mali or Agadez in Niger), Algeria then Morocco and arriving in Spain via the Strait of Gibraltar (with a variant of the same south-north axis forking off once in Morocco – or in south-western Algeria since 2003 or so – towards the Atlantic coastline across from the Canary Islands). Now, on the other hand, they are oriented south-west or east-west, draining the migrant populations of the majority of Sahel countries directly to the Canary Islands, which have become a springboard towards mainland Spain and the rest of Europe. The only significant difference is that whereas before, the crossing was done in an easily controllable area under high surveillance and consisted of crossing 15 km of sea (between Tangiers and Tarifa, for instance), today, the route involves navigating over 1,200 km between the Senegalese coast and the Canary Islands in an ocean area that requires entire fleets to even begin to be under surveillance.

There are several apparent reasons for this, namely:

- The bloody events of September-October 2005 at the outskirts of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla (i.e. Sebta and Melilia) in northern Morocco. These events, which led to the death of 11 migrants (in fact, 5 migrants were shot under similar conditions in the vicinity of Melilla on 3rd July 2006), caused a great deal of fear, not only among the migrant community living in Morocco, and demonstrated that the risk of being shot to death by Moroccan or Spanish security forces can no longer be ruled out in the migratory odyssey, calling forth a survival instinct among both migrants and their families.
- The fact that the Spanish security/defence authorities have strengthened their Integrated External Surveillance System (SIVE), one of its essential terrestrial components being the reinforcement of ‘protective’ fences around the cities of Ceuta and Melilla.
- The overall strengthening of border patrols along the Algerian border with Mali and Niger occurring in October-November 2005, with massive deportations of irregular Sub-Saharan migrants (primarily detained in the vicinity of the city of Magna)\(^\text{1}\) carried out by Algeria for the first time.
- The relative revival of the Tuareg rebellion in one of the most important border crossing zones, that of Kidal, between Mali, Niger and Algeria, with the subsequent mobilisation of troops (as occurred in May 2006) and dismantling of transport networks, thus inciting fear among migrants and above all, their smugglers.
- The multiplication of US military exercises in the Sahel area within the framework of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, formerly called the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), a US initiative to fight against terrorism in Africa. Over the course of the first half of 2006, two joint US-Malian exercises were carried out in the region of Gao\(^\text{2}\), rendering the area highly risky for people smugglers, particularly due to the presence of plentiful military forces that are well-equipped and, in addition, under foreign supervision.

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\(^{1}\) The Associated Press (AP), Algiers, 5/12/2005.
\(^{2}\) Such exercises had already taken place in 2003, 2004 and 2005. In 2006, they took place from 10th February to 24th March and again from 10th May to 15th June.
Migratory Policies and the New Regional Context

The new state of affairs has led to a new political situation whereby each Maghreb country is approaching the options currently expressed by Europe, whereas until 2002/2003, only Morocco was targeted as the main gateway to Europe. In this regard, there is hardly any relation between current Maghreb action on migratory matters since 2002 and action taken before the EU began to consider this issue significant in its relations with a number of third countries.

Nonetheless, the approach to this issue taken by Libya, and above all Tunisia and Algeria, is given less media coverage because the European pressure on these three countries was much weaker until recently and in any case, more sporadic, Morocco always being in the front line. Targeted from the start and in the hot seat since 1998, when the European Council established its “High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration,” and once the latter structure had developed six action plans, one of which focussed on Morocco – placed on this occasion on a level with Somalia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan or Albania insofar as EU foreign relations –, Morocco has been subject to strong pressure, particularly from Spain, which reached a peak in June 2002 at the Seville European Council. This pressure has but changed form, going from highly ‘discourteous’ (during the central-right wing administration governing Spain until the spring of 2004) to ‘friendly,’ without ceasing to be as sharp as it is strict since the arrival of the Socialist administration in Madrid in April of 2004. Moreover, it is this same government that is progressively attempting to rally its EU partners around its own foreign migration policy objectives, furthermore making them joint objectives for the countries of origin, transit and destination of African migrants.

Moroccan Migration Policy: Progressively Aligned with the European Security Approach

The European approach to management of external migratory flows vis-à-vis Morocco has been insinuated since 2002 in particular through friendly advice, primarily from France, alternating with more or less accentuated diplomatic pressure, primarily from Spain, all of this in a tense ‘regional atmosphere’ brought about by the ‘war against terrorism,’ the onset of the Anglo-American campaign against Iraq, the recurring Morocco-Algeria conflict regarding former Spanish Sahara and, finally, the pathetic incident of the tiny island called Perjil/Leila, off the northern coast of Morocco. To make matters worse, Morocco has experienced persistent economic and financial difficulties, while as of July 1999, the country has experienced a rejuvenation and renewal of part of its political and decision-making agents, beginning with the king. The combination of all of these elements constitutes an excellent opportunity that Europe will certainly not forego. At best, it considers Morocco as the good student of the region who cannot but follow the ‘migratory’ policy path laid out by Europe; and at worst, as a sort of ‘soft underbelly’ of the Maghreb and as such, Europe feels there is no risk in multiplying demands and raising the level of these demands.

In this regard, the first major initiative by Morocco was of a legislative order. It consisted of a bill on ‘irregular emigration and immigration in Morocco,’ put forth in January of 2003 by the administration in Rabat (a new administration had just taken office in November of 2002), which was unanimously passed into law by the Moroccan Parliament following the terrorist attacks in Casablanca on 16th May 2003.

The law, best known by the name of Law 02-03 and which became effective as of its promulgation in November 2003, was qualified by certain Moroccan jurists as an emergency law. But above all, given that it does not respond to any internal logic, it can be considered a law of European-Moroccan co-sovereignty, in the sense that it can be inscribed, first and foremost, within the will of the EU to protect itself against illegal migration coming from one of the major points of transit towards Europe.

With the autumn 2005 events, Morocco employed nearly 9,000 people to attempt to improve surveillance of its land and maritime borders.

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3 On 12th July 2002, an armada of nearly 6,000 soldiers from all forces of Spain’s troops evacuated, via Bab Sebta, 6 Moroccans gendarmes who had disembarked on the island, located less than 200 metres from the Moroccan mainland and inhabited by goats.
With the autumn 2005 events, Morocco employed nearly 9,000 people – of both the military and police forces – to attempt to improve surveillance of its land and maritime borders. It also hosted the first Euro-African Conference on Migration in Rabat in July 2006 and proceeded to carry out sporadic, media-hyped “rapier thrust” operations to transfer Sub-Saharan migrants residing illegally in different Moroccan cities to its Algerian border.4

**Tunisia and its Law of February 2004**

Though not subject to the same pressure by circumstances – since this country does not really lie along major migratory paths from Sub-Saharan Africa, nor is it a significant departure point – or the same impositions by the EU on the matter, Tunisia has likewise felt obliged to model its legislation along the lines of the evolution occurring in the Maghreb region since 2002.

It was in this framework that Tunisia passed a law on 3rd February 2004 (less than 3 months after Morocco had passed its Law 02–03) amending the one previously extant (Law of 14th May 1975) on passports and travel documents5 and expanding it to include a series of penal provisions strictly sanctioning clandestine migration.

To sustain how well-founded this law was, the Tunisian government argued that “the security of the Mediterranean Basin is incumbent upon all perimeter countries and therefore Tunisia as well, and that all countries have established penal provisions in order to deter clandestine migration.” At the same time, the Administration also justified violations of its general principles of penal law, adducing the severity of offences relating to clandestine migration, arguing that such migration entailed an elevated loss of human lives, a breach of the peace and undermining of national security. In this same context, an association was made between migrant trafficking and terrorism which coincided nearly point per point with the arguments espoused by the Moroccan government on the issue.

In fact, the Tunisian law of February 2004 meets a primary objective, which is the harmonisation of internal law with the commitments made by Tunisia to fight against illicit migrant traffic rings, both through the ratification of the protocol against illicit migrant trafficking by land, air and sea, an addendum to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement. This reveals a double phenomenon: that of the rising importance of clandestine migration and the wish of the Tunisian State to keep it out. The latter conclusion is based on the significance given to new migratory stipulations in a law whose title does not invoke the repression of irregular migration but simply designates the regulation of passports.

The importance of the phenomenon, however, is revealed by the particularly repressive nature of the law. In fact, many jurists, including Tunisian ones, doubt that it complies with the general principles of (Tunisian) penal law or the treaties regarding fundamental human rights officially ratified by Tunisia.6

**Libya: Migration Policy as a Tool for ‘Reintegration into the International Community’**

Libya is in a unique situation within the Maghreb with regard to the migration issue. The second largest country in the region (1.76 million km²) but above all, one of the most sparsely populated in the world (with an overall population of some 5.5 million inhabitants and an average density of 3.1 inhabitants/km²), with the discovery of oil fields it has become a significant immigration country in a phenomenon similar to that occurring in the Arabian Peninsula. It has become a destination for both Arabic citizens (Moroccans, Tunisians, Egyptians, Sudanese, etc.) and Sub-Saharan migrants (from Chad, Mali, Niger, etc.).

This migration has, however, changed origin often according to the changing political considerations of Tripoli over the course of the past three decades and above all in the 1990s.7 Official statistics from the Libyan population census of 1995 revealed a workforce of nearly 100,000 Sudanese and 40,000 Sub-Saharan migrants, as compared to 5,000 Sudanese

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4 As occurring as of 23rd December 2006. This matter was eventually taken up by the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights, which demanded that Morocco stop violations of human rights accompanying such police operations.

5 Official Gazette of the Republic of Tunisia, No. 11, 06/02/2004.

6 This analysis was sustained precisely by a Tunisian jurist – whose name will not be mentioned here for obvious reasons – in a working paper presented at a Maghreb seminar under the auspices of the Maghreb representation to the ILO in Algiers in early April 2005.

7 Hence, according to regional political circumstances and the evolution of its international relations, Libya has given precedence to this or that migrant nationality, which has led to a constant alternation between countries, above all between the Arabic world and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Libya is in a unique situation within the Maghreb with regard to the migration issue. With the discovery of oil fields it has become a significant immigration country in a phenomenon similar to that occurring in the Arabian Peninsula.

and several hundred Sub-Saharan twenty years earlier. According to different researchers, “although spectacular, this growth is apparently an underestimate.” The estimates made at the beginning of the current decade registered the number of Western and Central African nationals in Libya at approximately 1.5 million (The Baltimore Sun, 26/10/2000), of which 500,000 were from Chad (Agence France-Presse, 01/10/2000). The technical commission sent by the European Commission to Libya in late 2004 found that Libyan Authorities estimated the number of legal workers living on Libyan territory at 600,000, with the number of irregular migrants lying somewhere between 750,000 and 1.2 million.

In reality, the case of Libya is symptomatic of the confusion prevailing on the issue of migration relating to the Maghreb since 2002/2003, especially in Europe. Libya is not a country of emigration and has been known since the start of its enrichment through oil to be a land of immigration, all the more popular because attracting immigration was one of the objectives of the Pan-African policy followed by its leaders until the end of the 1990s.8

The position it would take up with regard to this issue – well-justified by the numerous dramatic incidents occurring between 2003 and 2005, and above all by an influx, as massive as it was surprising, of Sub-Saharan migrants to Sicily departing from the coast of Libya between September and October 2004 – is an advanced expression of a political ‘realism’ unprecedented in international or North-South Mediterranean relations.

For several years now and especially since the 2nd Gulf War starting on 20th March 2003, Libya has been highly interested in “returning to the international community,” as it is very concerned with the access to foreign capital and European and US technology that this return would bring, thus allowing it to recover its production capacity. By the same token, it is also apparently interested in a change in its migration relations with the countries from which it has traditionally received its labour force, at no significant political cost to itself; European injunctions to Libya on this account are most likely to facilitate the change without Libya having to go to great pains to justify its actions. Moreover, Europe – experiencing a period of record energy prices and concern for its energy supply – is necessarily attracted by Libyan oil and the investment and trade opportunities it represents; and since Libya is part of the Maghreb, that is, an effective and potential area of transit for irregular Sub-Saharan migrants, nothing is stopping the European approach of the management externalising of migratory flows from Africa to encompass Libya as well. Indeed, Europe even considers it an area for experimentation on the matter, as the Libyan Authorities themselves “seem to be party to it.”

This explains how this country – although it considers itself the most ‘African’ of Northern Africa, is not participating in the Barcelona Process, is not bound to Europe by any political or commercial agreement such as the agreements for establishing a free trade zone between the 3 central Maghreb countries and the EU, and has not signed the Geneva Refugee Convention – is now one of the leading states in the region insofar as cooperation with Europe on migration issues.

Algeria: Intolerable Indifference

Algeria, which opened its Saharan borders as a key option of government strategy concerning territorial development, is also an important country of emigration, although the number of Algerian emigrants is presently much lower than that of Moroccan emigrants, just as the proportion of remittances by these migrants vis-à-vis the Algerian GDP is much lower than in the case of Morocco.

For many years though, this country considered that the problem of Sub-Saharan migration was

8 This was confirmed in the report by the technical commission sent by the European Commission to Libya in late 2004: “Libya’s Pan-African policy has been and still is one of the main reasons that contributes to attracting thousands of immigrants from all of Africa who have fled from war, famine, disease, AIDS, etc, coming particularly from the Sub-Saharan region and the Horn of Africa. For many of them, Libya is a destination country although few of them have the possibility to legally establish themselves as foreign workers in Libya”.


not its concern, despite the fact that nearly all irregular migrants in transit through Morocco on their way to Europe have crossed Algerian territory and continue to do so today, whether moving towards Oujda (in north-eastern Morocco) or any point along the south-eastern border separating the two countries.

This posture, for which certain Algerian leaders adduced the fully erroneous concept that Algeria was more of a country of destination that of transit for Sub-Saharans, was related to the different problems existing in Moroccan-Algerian relations (not the least of which was the Sahara issue9), the attempts by both Algeria and Morocco to appear solidary vis-à-vis black Africa, and the much less ‘insistent’ European approach to relations with Algeria as compared to its approach with Morocco.

The Algerian position has nevertheless progressively changed, also beginning in 2002/2003, with the onset of the group 5+5 Western Mediterranean meetings, the signature in April of 2002 of the agreement to institute an EU-Algerian free trade zone (which entered into effect in September of 2005) and finally, events relating to the Moroccan incidents of August to October 2005, which Morocco as well as Spain and the EU took as an opportunity for discussing the ‘Algerian responsibility’ in Sub-Saharan migration more openly and requesting the Algiers Authorities to become more actively involved in controlling the southern Maghreb border and struggling against migrant trafficking rings.

Spain: Dealing with the Canary Islands Phenomenon

Frightened by the mass migration attempts in the autumn of 2005 – which it staved off with the invaluable assistance of the Moroccan Authorities – Spain, which could hardly keep pace with the arrival of cayucos to the Canary archipelago in the summer of 2006,10 was one of the instigators, along with Morocco and later France, of the initiative of organising a major Euro-African ministerial conference to discuss all aspects relating to the management of migratory flows moving through Africa as well as issues relating to African development.

It has become progressively evident for the majority of those involved that these flows emerge and develop not only according to increasingly accentuated economic and social deficits, but also in reaction to human rights violations (most often concurrent with the stated deficits) in the majority of countries of departure.

In any case, there are certain common conclusions – shared by the Moroccans in Africa and the French, Italians and Germans in Europe – that can be summed up in the following three points: 1) Migration is one of the major challenges facing African and European societies and governments at this early stage of the 21st Century; 2) The persistence of demographic imbalances and unequal perspectives for well-being among different societies presage the continuation and probable acceleration of the propensity to emigrate, not only from Africa to Europe, but also among African countries in accordance with their respective levels of development; and 3) The propensity to emigrate is fuelled by structural factors operating in both the countries of origin and those of destination. Spain – which is currently one of the European countries with the greatest need of significant demographic influx – now has a number of political objectives with regard to African countries,11 principally to:

- Strengthen the capacity to control national borders by means of improving equipment and training civil servants.

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9 In this regard, a speech by the Algerian President made a particularly deep impression when, just after a visit from the King of Morocco to Algiers in April 2005, he maintained that the issue of the border between Algeria and Morocco (that is, the question of whether the borders should be open or closed) was a matter of “bilateral relations between His Majesty (the King of Morocco) and myself (i.e. himself),” emphasizing in the same speech that “the issue of Western Sahara rests, on the other hand, with the United Nations.” The Associated Press (AP), Paris, 05/04/2005.

10 Over 4,600 migrants crossing in cayucos from the western coast of Africa disembarked on the Canary Islands over the course of August 2006. Of these migrants, over 1,500 arrived between the 17th and 20th August. Source: Spanish newspapers, including El País and El Mundo.

• Effectively detect and pursue the mafias controlling traffic across national borders.
• Establish readmission agreements between countries of origin, transit and destination.
• Facilitate the temporary reception and repatriation of national or third country migrants, respecting their dignity and human rights.

In fact, in May of 2006, the Spanish Authorities alerted the other EU Member States of the risks it was incurring, and with it, all EU countries, due to the massive influx of Sub-Saharan migrants at the time, coming from the coast of Mauritania and Senegal. At the same time, in order to tackle the problem at its source, the same authorities also formalised a ‘vast diplomatic offensive’ involving a plan for development aid to Africa called the ‘Africa Plan.’ It was to concern Senegal, Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Richard with a budget of slightly over 600 million euros.

With the initiative by the EU’s Frontex Agency not managing to obtain the support initially expected nor sufficient means and migratory pressure rising over the course of 2006 for Spain – despite the launching of the ‘Africa Plan’ and the Euro-African Conference in Rabat – as well as for Italy (the Island of Lampedusa receiving nearly 22,000 African migrants over the course of 2006) and Malta, these three countries turned to the other EU Member States to attempt to convince them that the issue of clandestine migration from Africa to the southern European coast was a problem whose material and political aspects should not be incumbent solely upon the countries of entry (Le Monde, 31/08/2006).

In early September 2006, Spain and Italy – later joined by France – would again demand that European solidarity in the face of clandestine immigration be a priority topic at forthcoming EU summits:

"We have decided to address the European Union to request that joint action regarding immigration be on the agenda of the informal summit in October (Lahti, Finland) as well as at the summit in December (Brussels). Joint action should not only involve joint border patrols but also cooperation with neighbouring countries from which immigrants are arriving in order to assist them economically." 12

By way of summary, all factors seem to demonstrate the following:

• Having diverse interests and needs insofar as population and the labour market, EU countries, which are not all at the same level of development and economic vitality nor at the same stage of demographic evolution, are not prepared to take the same approach to the migratory issue, although a certain consensus has been reached with regard to the principle of struggle against irregular immigration.
• At the conference held in Rabat in July of 2006, although a document relatively coherent with the initial aims of the event was published, the impression given insofar as recommendations was that it proved more of a dialogue of the deaf, where the Europeans spoke of “readmission agreements and the need for greater control of borders in the south” while the Africans were more inclined to discuss development aid and the facilitation of legal migration.
• Moreover, the explosion in the number of Sub-Saharan migrants arriving on the Canary Islands has shown that the propensity to depart from southern Sahel areas and Western Africa will only increase; the greater distance of departure areas and the stretching out of migratory routes (now essentially maritime) will oblige Spain as well as all of Europe – insofar as they make joint decisions – to implement even more material, human and financial means for largely hypothetical results, unless they decide to employ war means. This is aggravated by the fact that no Sub-Saharan State seems capable of ensuring even minimally ‘serious’ control of their borders, even if they had the political intention of doing so, which is far from being the case due to a variety of internal reasons.

12 Romano Prodi, Italian Prime Minister, quoted by AFP, 10/09/2006
Integration of Immigrant Communities in Europe: A Euro-Mediterranean Challenge?

The map of the Mediterranean has become permanently impressed upon European demography through various migratory flows, ranging from migrations from Southern Europe transformed into 'EU citizen' mobility as the EU progressively integrates and expands (will we one day speak of Turkish or Balkan migrants in the same manner?) to post-colonial migrations after colonial adventures and empires had come to an end. Public debate on integration saw the light in Europe beginning in the 1980s with regard to the latter influx. With the closing of borders to labour immigration in 1973-4, migrant workers were joined by their families and these populations have settled and become sedentary. They progressively gained access to the citizenship of their host country by virtue of the different nationality rights in effect in EU countries, which evolved in the 1980s towards greater birthright citizenship and a major liberalisation of legislation on dual nationality, despite some exceptions. Having become the 'new' citizens of EU countries, these populations often have dual nationality because the nationality laws in their countries of origin, in particular Maghreb countries, establish perpetual allegiance. Today, of the slightly over 15 million non-EU nationals living in the EU, the Turkish community (numbering 3 million) constitutes the largest population, followed by citizens of the former Yugoslavia. The Maghreb is another significant reservoir of migration to Europe, with 2.3 million nationals, principally Moroccans and Algerians, not including those with dual nationality. These populations have long been settling in certain countries according to historical ties and social networks established by migrants (people from Turkey in Germany, Maghrebis in France, New Commonwealth nationals in the United Kingdom). Nonetheless, for some years now, there has been a trend towards diversification of these migratory routes, with the arrival of migrants from francophone countries of Western Africa in London, for instance, and the transformation of such countries of emigration as Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Ireland into countries of immigration beginning in the 1990s. This socially and culturally diversified population, regardless of whether or not its members have acquired the nationality of their country of residence, is now rooted in European societies and constitutes an important source of ethnocultural and religious diversity, which is not foreign to Europe.

Nonetheless, does this diversity of European societies constitute a resource for the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean region? Are the members of these immigrant or second-generation communities social, political, economic or cultural actors in the Euro-Mediterranean space under construction?

Immigrant Communities: Europe's Strengths and Weaknesses

Migrants are actors within social spheres that overlap, lying somewhere between their country of origin and destination country or country of passage. They are recognised as playing an important role in the development of their countries of origin through massive money transfers, but also through the circulation and spread of 'human,' cultural and political capital contributing to the transformation of 'underdeveloped' societies. Yet for migrants to be social actors on 'both shores' (i.e. Northern and Southern) of the
Mediterranean, they must be fully integrated – socially, economically, culturally and politically – in their host EU countries. Nonetheless, the progress made by Europe in this sphere, in particular under the impulse of the European Institutions, which, beginning in the late 1980s, worked to formulate a project of citizenship dissociated from nationality and based on cultural and religious diversity (fostering the struggle against discrimination in particular) has reached an impasse. Since the year 2000, the onset of a crisis in national discourse in Europe has been aggravated by a perceived crisis in models of national integration accompanied by a return to xenophobe, racist and Islamophobe discourse and discrimination against members of ethnic and religious minorities in EU countries.

Rather than serving as actors capable of forging a Euro-Mediterranean ‘civil society,’ they find themselves powerless in both Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries, trapped between the democratic deficit of southern countries and the deficits in citizenship and participation in the northern countries.

This gives rise to a problem shared by many migrants: no longer belonging to their country of origin yet not feeling ‘recognised’ in their country of residence. Rather than serving as actors capable of forging a Euro-Mediterranean ‘civil society,’ they find themselves powerless in both Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries, trapped between the democratic deficit of southern countries and the deficits in citizenship and participation in the northern countries. With the exception of an elite of bi-national entrepreneurs who actively invest in business, service, health or training projects, the absence of real freedom of circulation in the Mediterranean region aggravated by a dearth of socio-economic opportunities in EU countries that would allow the majority to consolidate themselves in a situation of ascending social mobility prevents the creation of an authentic bridge across the Mediterranean.

Integration in the Face of Discrimination, Participation and Public Opinion

The members of immigrant communities in Europe share a common fate on the road to integration into European society. First of all that of discrimination, including in gaining access to the labour market. Often difficult to measure effectively, in particular due to a dearth of appropriate statistical tools that would allow a precise comparison on a European level, discrimination characterises access to the labour market as well as the social mobility of immigrant communities in Europe. Foreigners as well as members of ethnic minorities are confronted with racism in access to the labour market, finding employment only in jobs below their qualifications, this leading to a brain waste that has a significant cost for European societies. Immigrant unemployment, in particular among youth and women, is two to three times higher than that of nationals in certain EU countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark or France. The gap is not so wide in Southern European countries, which are dealing with a more recent immigration phenomenon, where immigrants are attracted by the informal labour market and underground economy. But discrimination is not limited to job opportunities. It also concerns the spheres of housing, education and recreation, and combines with and reinforces urban segregation and social marginalisation. The riots in French suburbs in late 2005 are an illustrative example. These riots also brought up an equally important issue for Europe: populations of immigrant origin have not been effectively integrated into the institutional society of the EU countries.

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experienced. The media, high administrative levels, State security institutions such as the police or the armed forces and the local and national political spheres are all involved. This often gives rise to conflictive relations between second-generation immigrants and such institutions as the police, these conflicts being the primary cause of urban rioting in Europe. Citizens by right, they often do not enjoy real citizen status: in addition to the deficit in access to social and economic rights, they have a low level of political participation and nearly inexistent representation. It was not until the parliamentary elections of 2004 that three women senators of Maghrebi immigrant origin were elected in France, despite the republican model of integration claimed. Despite a nationality law based exclusively on jus sanguinis until the reform in the year 2000, two Members of the German Bundestag (out of 605) were born in Turkey. In Belgium, there are seven Representatives and eight Senators in parliament of immigrant origin and twelve in Great Britain. On the local level, on the other hand, an increase in elected officials of immigrant origin can be observed where the right to vote is not associated with nationality, as in the Netherlands, or in Belgium since the municipal elections of 2006. Elsewhere, the issue of universal suffrage is not progressing.

Public opinion is not irrelevant in this impasse. In France, giving local suffrage rights to foreign nationals was proposed by Mitterrand in his campaign for the 1981 presidential elections but was never adopted (despite a vote in the National Assembly in 2000 that was never confirmed by a vote in the Senate). Over time, opinions are progressing against this right for foreign nationals. In 2003, 38% of French people were against it. This number rose to 57% in 2006. The latter figures contrast with the favourable opinions in countries experiencing immigration only recently, such as Spain (62%) and Italy (54%), according to a poll taken in 2004. Negative attitudes can be ascribed to the fear that immigrant votes would be associated with religious confession or ethnicity and would not support the values of the majority citizenship or democracy, associated with the fear of a dissolution of national identity. Nevertheless, research shows that ethnicity and religion do not serve as grounds for election choices but remain primarily associated with social class. Populations of immigrant origin traditionally support social-democratic parties, and attempts to constitute ‘identitary’ party lists have failed, as for instance, the ‘Euro-Palestinian’ list in France for the European elections of 2004.

**Europe’s Identity Boundaries**

The discourse transmitted by the media and by political leaders identifies Islam as an obstacle to the socio-economic and political integration of these ‘new citizens’ of immigrant origin into European countries. This diagnosis would also explain their refusal to integrate. Whereas in the 1990s, populations targeted by integration policies were identified according to their post-colonial or national origin (the Maghreb community in France) or their ethnic or racial background (Asians and Blacks in Great Britain), they are now identified everywhere as ‘Muslims’ - without moreover explaining whether Islam in this sense should be understood as a religious, cultural or political identity, or a combination of all three.

The September 11th attacks simultaneously broke the distinction between Islam, Muslims, Islamism and terrorism. All of a sudden, global fear of Islam transformed the Islamic religion into a global identity.

The September 11th attacks simultaneously broke the distinction between Islam, Muslims, Islamism and terrorism. All of a sudden, global fear of Islam (“war on terror”) transformed the Islamic religion into a global identity, which in the eyes of European opinion-makers, places terrorist violence against the values of liberal democracy on the same qualitative level as the hijab, considered as moral violence against the principles of Western citizenship. Hence the fact that Muslims are now considered by EU countries as ‘unintegratable.’ This type of discourse on Islam is deeply rooted in the ambiguities inherited from the colonial period, where “Islam is not only a link among Muslims, but a barrier between us and them” and “renders Islamic society nearly wholly impermeable to our Christian and rationalist society.” These quotes are not taken from speeches on wearing the veil in France, Germany or, more recently, Great Britain, where the issue of its use in schools was raised in 2006, nor on the possible entry of Turkey into the European Union. They are excerpts from a description of ‘Muslims’ in Algeria in L’histoire universelle des pays et des peuples (Universal History of Countries and Peoples) published by Éditions Quillet in 1923.
This results in a broad gap between the way European Muslims see themselves, primarily as full members of the national communities of which they are citizens, and the manner in which public opinion perceives them. A study carried out by the Gallup World Poll shows that ‘Muslims’ living in the capitals of Great Britain, France and Germany strongly identify with these respective countries, while considering that religion is an important dimension in their lives. They demonstrate strong allegiance towards Great Britain, France and Germany (74%, 73% and 72%, respectively). In this regard, only 35-45% percent of a sample of the (non-Muslim) general population of Great Britain, France and Germany answered that they perceived their fellow (Muslim) citizens as loyal.

By mirror effect, the more these ‘new citizens’ are identified as ‘Muslim,’ the more the Europeans have appealed to a new, so-called ‘Judeo-Christian’ identity, a term becoming particularly widespread after 2002 and the debate on the European Constitution. This constitutes a rupture in Europe’s identity grammar as it developed up until the 1990s. The idea of a European citizenship, finally instituted despite its limitations by the Treaty of Maastricht, consisted in finding an alternative to the single criteria of nationality based on citizens’ rights and duties in a yet homogenous conception of national identity. Since 2004, however, the project has taken on a new direction. In converting the construction of the European Union from a simple market into a political and civil structure, the integration of the enlarged EU has become a matter of identity. And it is precisely this problematic identity issue that led the constitutionalisation of the EU to fail, namely after the French and Dutch referendums in 2005.

All of this has created a paradoxal situation currently characterising integration and identity policies in Europe. In the first place, Europe is experiencing a strong crisis of the concept of ‘nation’ as a simultaneous space for ‘peaceful coexistence,’ distribution of Welfare State resources, access to equal rights, mediation between institutions and citizens, structuring of public challenges into public policy and configuration of power within the context of European integration and globalisation (including the internationalisation of migrations). At the same time, it is also experiencing a surge of nationalist discourse to make sense of solidarity in globalised, plural societies.

In the second place, there is a crisis of ‘integration models’ (British multiculturalism, French republicanism, Dutch liberalism), yet the demands of immigrant minorities for full access to substantial, first class citizenship and against racial and ethnic discrimination are emerging at the same time.

Finally, the crisis of ‘peaceful coexistence’ as perceived by public opinion is accompanied by the instrumentalisation of immigration and Islam to give a sense of a more global crisis for which the only political response ‘that pays’ would be a return to national identity. This has led to the creation of a new ministry in France officially in charge of "immigration, integration and national identity."

Clearly, the issue is shifting. It is no longer a question of ascertaining how immigrant communities in Europe can be or become actors in the Euro-Mediterranean area but how to build the Euro-Mediterranean area without acknowledging that Europe is now a multi-cultural society. Though being the leading destination for international migration in the world (surpassing the United States since 2004), the Europe of diversity remains in a political impasse, despite the fact that 2007 has been designated the Year of Equal Opportunities for All.

The fact that this issue is put forth within the framework of broader reflection on the future of the Euro-Mediterranean region is not innocuous. Ethnic discrimination as well as the reinforcement of attitudes and discourses hostile to Islam in EU Member States have now gone beyond national or even European borders to reach the regional Mediterranean level. Public opinion and the media in countries of migrant origin of the are particularly sensitive to the fate of émigrés living in Europe. In the Arab countries, the media coverage of the French riots in late 2005 or the scandal of the Prophet Mohammed caricatures published in Jylland Posten in September of the same year are a good example. By the same token, the attacks of 11th September 2001 in New York and Washington, 11th March 2004 in Madrid and 7th July...
2005 in London have had far-reaching repercussions, both on the security approach to ethnic and religious diversity in Europe as well as on European public opinion. This projects in Europe a perceived divide between Europe and the Southern Mediterranean countries.

**Reforming European Citizenship**

How can this trend be reversed? A Euro-Mediterranean civil society cannot emerge without a reform of European citizenship symmetrical to the political and economic reforms necessary in the Southern Mediterranean countries. Three different lines of action for this reform can be identified in order to adapt European national societies to their ethno-cultural and religious diversity and Europe to its new regional environment.

**A Euro-Mediterranean civil society cannot emerge without a reform of European citizenship symmetrical to the political and economic reforms necessary in the Southern Mediterranean countries**

The first of these lines of action concerns the role to be granted to national identity in integration policies and the definition of citizenship in multi-cultural, globalised societies. The second deals with the manner of measuring material inequalities when these occur in societies where racial, ethnic or religious discrimination is a factor. The third should allow adaptation of institutional frameworks regarding citizen involvement in globalisation, including the globalisation of international migrations. Without going into excessive detail, we will focus on the interdependence between each of the lines of action proposed, calling for institutional and political response:

**The role of national identity in integration policies:**

- **Dissociating nationality from citizenship:** At least on the local level, such a dissociation could be based on the stipulations in the Treaty of Maastricht regarding nationals of EU Member States. Once generalised where it has not yet been applied, it could constitute an important vector for recognising members of immigrant communities as equal members of European societies. Political participation on a local level is a highly important aspect for sound integration.
  - **Conducting campaigns on multi-culturalism:** Public opinion must be educated on the falsehoods propagated by the media and electoral discourse on immigration, cultural and religious diversity and the integration of populations of immigrant origin. The aim would not be to reproduce the campaigns solely put forth by European institutions, but also to engage in national and local debate on these issues to depoliticise them.
  - **Strengthening the capacities of immigrant associations:** Associations constitute an essential relay between public institutions, the State and the labour market. They are a tool for furthering the acquisition of the resources necessary for participation. Moreover, they serve as an intermediary space between the cultures of immigrant origin and the dominant society.

**Combating material inequality within a context of diversity:**

- **Combating direct and indirect discrimination:** Political and participation rights are futile if they are not accompanied by substantial socio-economic rights. By promoting voluntary anti-discriminatory policies, the authorities of EU countries should demonstrate the imperative of not relegating citizenship to a simple petition of principle but of considering the matter of equal rights and opportunities in multi-cultural societies where racism and xenophobia exist, as established in Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Combating indirect discrimination is necessary, as is expanding the scope of these policies to public institutions.
  - **Guaranteeing the representation of minorities in public institutions:** Struggling against access racism in public institutions is necessary if these institutions, as service providers and schools of citizenship, are to be anchored in the sociological reality of European societies. They should not give the impression of being ‘closed’ to members of minorities of immigrant origin. The public institutions in question include schools, the media, the highest administrative circles, the State’s police, justice and defence
institutions, sub-state-level government, the healthcare system and political institutions.

- **Undertaking mainstreaming social programs to combat pauperisation and growing job insecurity:** The 'racial' issue is deeply interrelated with social class, both in the formation of racist attitudes in European societies and in the relegation of immigrant communities to outlying urban areas or inner cities. Unemployment lies at the heart of the matter, along with housing. Focalised integration policies must be prevented from being perceived by the rest of the socially disadvantaged population as an injustice of social distribution. Competition among the different groups benefitting from the Welfare State must be avoided.

**Rooting citizenship in the complexity of globalised societies:**

- **Facilitating dual nationality:** Though European nationality rights have liberalised dual nationality, there are certain exceptions. Above all, we are witnessing a renewed politicisation of the topic at a time of a return to nationalist discourse or discourse considering Islam as a 'problem of allegiance.' In fact, dual nationality practices have changed considerably since the 1980s and no longer involve possible competition among several allegiances. Dual nationality is above all a factor of empowerment fostering the development of social, economic and cultural initiatives in both the Northern and Southern Mediterranean Basin.

- **Facilitating the free circulation of migrants:** Though the issue of opening the borders is a particularly sensitive topic in Europe, especially with the discourse on combating illegal immigration, its channels and the search for ‘selective immigration,’ the fact of the matter is that the rigidity of Europe’s borders vis-à-vis migrants from Southern Mediterranean countries hampers circulation, in particular short-term, back-and-forth travel that would allow an investment benefiting both host societies and those of origin.

These lines of action are interdependent insofar as building a Euro-Mediterranean area where immigrant communities having settled in Europe could become actors. Such an agenda requires the expression of a clear political will to engage in reform of such scope. The credibility of citizenship as an institution of common belonging is at stake, as well as the European project as an alternative to the limitations of national democracy in the context of multi-culturalism and migration. Whereas the EU countries with a long-term migration experience are undergoing a ‘crisis of conscience’ of their traditional integration models, such a reform would allow overcoming numerous contradictions underlying integration policies. This reform is also necessary at a time when 'new immigration countries' must anticipate the long-term sedentarization of a significant part of their migrants.

**References:**


Impact of the Rise in Oil Prices

High Oil Prices and the Mediterranean Countries

Robert Mabro
Fellow of St Antony’s College
Former Director of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

Introduction

The Mediterranean has always exercised a fascination not simply because of its beauty as a sea. The Romans looked on it as a sort of big internal lake central to their empire – *mare nostrum*. Europe saw it later as the cradle of civilisation. Greece, Rome, Judaism and Christianity, all these sources and components of European culture and civilisation emerged and flourished along its shores.

More recently, the Mediterranean has been used as a concept of analytical value or relevance in a number of contexts – history, geography, trade, climate, migration, etc. The Mediterranean, however, is no longer unified by a single empire as it was at some point in Roman times. The Ottomans occupied its Eastern and Southern shores, Greece and most of the Balkans; and the Arabs, before them, extended their reach to Andalusia, Malta and Sicily. However, neither the Arabs nor the Ottomans managed to create a pan-Mediterranean empire.

Today, and for a number of centuries, a large number of countries, recently increased by the break-up of Yugoslavia, populates its shores. When it comes to issues such as economic development, energy, and domestic policies in these fields the Mediterranean regional concept as a unifying theme loses much of its analytical significance. The reason simply is that every country has different economic structures, a different resource endowment, and often faces different circumstances.

Furthermore, the list of Mediterranean countries is very long indeed, as clearly appears in the footnote1. For our concerns in this paper, which is about the energy situation and developments in 2006, these countries are different from one another in a number of relevant respects.

First, they are of different population sizes. France, Italy, Turkey, Spain and some others stand at one end of the size spectrum and much further away we would find Malta, for example. These countries are at different stages of developments. Some of them really belong to what economists tend to call the North, which means the industrialised, fairly wealthy region of the world. In our list these would include France, Italy, and Spain among others. By contrast, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Jordan and Palestine belong to the third world. The differences between per capita incomes of the various countries in the region are wide. Some Mediterranean countries are members of the EU and/or the OECD; two others – Algeria and Libya – are members of OPEC; nine of the Arab League; and a few have none of these institutional attachments.

More generally, one can say that the countries’ international standing and political weight in the world differs from case to case.

For these reasons, our approach is bound to be selective. It will not cover all 25 Mediterranean countries; and the ones referred to in different sections may vary according to the issue discussed and the availability of data.

Energy

As regards energy the important distinction is between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. The region only has three oil exporting counties – Algeria, Libya

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1 In circum-Mediterranean order the countries are: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. They are 25 in all.
and Syria. Egypt used to be part of this group although as a minor exporter. Preliminary data for 2006 suggests that it has become a marginal net oil importer; but it is beginning to export natural gas. The vast majority of the Mediterranean countries, 22 out of the 25 on the list, are oil importers albeit in widely different amounts. The oil import data for 2005 were as follows (in million barrels a day, mb/d):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Import Volume (mb/d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Oil imports of the Arab Mediterranean countries in 2005, which we can assume to correspond to the import volumes in the case of non-oil exporting countries, were as follows (in mb/d):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Import Volume (mb/d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Import data are unlikely to prove much different in 2006 for the European Mediterranean countries detailed above. The reason is that demand data for both OECD and non-OECD Europe show almost absolute stagnation in demand between 2004 and 2006. The same characteristic will most likely be found for the European Mediterranean countries, a group in which the giants are OECD members. The oil demand data are as follows (in mb/d):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Demand (mb/d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OECD Europe</td>
<td>15.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-OECD Europe</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IEA.

The small growth of 0.4% in 2005 was completely eliminated in 2006. It is also worth noting that oil demand in non-OECD European countries, many of which belong to the Mediterranean group, has been growing by 4% between 2004 and 2005 while it fell by 0.1% over the same two years in the OECD group. This is consistent with a general pattern in which oil demand grows faster in poorer countries than in the industrialised North, particularly Europe and Japan. The Arab Mediterranean countries –whether oil importers or exporters– show high rates of oil consumption growth as shown in the data below. Demand growth rates in this group in 2005, which to my mind approximates what happened in 2006, were as follows (in %):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Growth Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Oil prices in international trade were on average higher in 2006 than in 2005. The price developments in 2006 did not have the shape of a linear upward trend. In the first half of 2006 prices rose, reaching a peak of $78 per barrel during the first days of the Israeli war on Lebanon. They then began to fall, coming down to about $60 per barrel by the end of the year. Annual average oil prices in 2006, compared with relevant earlier years were as follows (in $):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average Price ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>15.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>15.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>15.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 The significant exception to this pattern is the USA where oil demand tends to grow faster than in Europe and Japan.
4 Except for Lebanon where the economy was damaged by the Israeli war against the country in the summer of 2006.
Brent is the relevant reference price for the Mediterranean region. Not that the importing countries of that region purchase much North Sea crude oil. They import mainly from the Gulf countries and Russia. The relevant price formulae used have Brent as the reference and a discount coefficient which reflects the lower quality of the imported crude relative to Brent. Broadly speaking the changes in Brent price trends over time are more or less similar to changes to the trends in the prices of the imported varieties of crude oil. But price levels are different of course. We can assume that the average price basket of imported crude oil in the Mediterranean is about 10% lower than the Brent price. This is not the case for the average export prices of Algerian and Libyan crude oil as these include high quality varieties -extra light and low sulphur oil. We assume conservatively that the relevant reference in this case is the full Brent price.

**Balance-of-Payment Effects**

In 2006, the average Brent price increased by 19.5%, this was a smaller increase than in 2005 when the Brent price was 45.5% higher than in 2004, adding a heavy burden on the balance of payments of importing countries. And if we were to take the year 2001 as our base, the increase in the Brent price in 2006 turns out to be a huge 165%.

Assuming that the net imports of the European Mediterranean countries were in 2006 almost identical to 2005 the increase in their import bill in 2006 would have been as follows (in $ million):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Increase in Import Bill 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7,989.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1,695.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6,701.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1,261.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6,307.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,562.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These increases ranging between $1.26 billion and $8 billion are significant but not necessarily crippling. The increases will undoubtedly be smaller for the smaller European countries for which, unfortunately, we have no up-to-date statistics. This does not mean that the burdens suffered are lighter than for the bigger countries. In general, the smaller the size of the economy of a country that imports all its oil needs, the heavier, and the more significant, is the impact of an increase in prices.

For all countries, irrespective of size, the burden is better assessed if one looks at the increase in the import bill between 2001 and 2006. A five-year period is not too long for an assessment in this context as it takes at least this length of time to realise all the necessary economic adjustments.

The net oil import volumes in 2001 of the six European countries considered above were as follows (in mb/d):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Import Volumes in 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.645</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the same quantities were imported in 2006 the import bill in that year would have been of the order of (in $ billion):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Oil Import Bill in 2006 (according to 2001 quantities)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>43,916 (an increase of 27,368 over 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>8,921 (an increase of 5,559 over 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>39,888 (an increase of 24,617 over 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7,099 (an increase of 4,424 over 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>32,703 (an increase of 20,368 over 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>13,927 (an increase of 8,651 over 2001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all cases the increase was by a multiple of 2.654 when compared with 2001.

Import volumes were not the same in 2001 and 2006. In three countries -France, Italy and Portugal- the 2006 volumes were smaller by 62 thousand barrels per day, 58 thousand and 7 thousand respectively. This reduced the import bill by $1.346 billion for France, $1.17 billion for Italy and $0.1521 billion for Portugal had the 2001 volumes remained unchanged. In three countries -Greece, Spain and Turkey- the import volumes were higher in 2006, thus adding to the import bill $0.369 billion, $2.091 billion, and $0.108 billion respectively. The increases in the import bills due to the price rise

---

**TABLE 8** Annual Average Oil Prices (2001-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>WTI</th>
<th>Brent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Barclays Capital (*) West Texas Intermediate

**TABLE 9** Expected Increase of the Import Bill in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Increase in Import Bill</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7,989.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1,695.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6,701.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1,261.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6,307.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,562.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 10** Net Oil Import Volumes in 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Volumes (mb/d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.645</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 11** Northern Mediterranean Countries Estimated Oil Import Bill in 2006 (according to 2001 quantities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Import Bill (in $ billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>43,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>8,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>39,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>32,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>13,927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(ignoring changes due to higher/lower import volumes) between 2001 and 2006 compared with the current balance deficits in 2006 are of interest. We see that in some cases – France, Italy – the increase of the import bill compares as a high percentage of the current balance deficit in 2006. But in Greece, Turkey and Spain the deficit appears to have many other elements than the increase in the costs of imported oil. The figures are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2006 Balance Deficit</th>
<th>2001 in Oil Import Bill</th>
<th>% (2)/(1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>27.37</td>
<td>87.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>24.61</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>110.7</td>
<td>20.37</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Economist, Data from above, own computations.

The figures are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimated Oil Import Bill in 2006 (according to 2001 prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The oil price increase effect (that is excluding volume growth effects) on the balance of payments is thus of the order of $0.93 billion for Jordan, $1.10 billion for Lebanon, $1.42 billion for Morocco and $0.82 billion for Tunisia. The volume effect is computed on the basis of the following increases in imports between 2001 and 2006 (in b/d):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Increase in Oil Imports in b/d (2001-2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At 2006 prices these would have cost $0.238 billion (Jordan), $0.260 billion (Lebanon), $0.326 billion (Morocco) and $0.174 billion (Tunisia). Clearly, the impact of the volume increases on the trade balance was less significant than the burden imposed by price increases in international trade.

Three Mediterranean countries are net oil exporters. These are Algeria, Libya and Syria. The Brent price increase of 2006 was of the order of 19.5% compared with 2005, as mentioned above. Export volumes (crude plus products) were as follows in 2005: Algeria 1.435 million barrels per day, Libya 1.469 million barrels per day, and Syria 0.367 million barrels per day. Gross revenue estimates for that year are: Algeria, $29.570 billion; Libya, $29.651 billion; and Syria, $6.667 billion. The same export volumes in 2006 would have generated 19.5% more gross revenues for each of these three countries. These increases would thus be: Algeria, $5.766 billion; Libya, $5.782 billion; and Syria, $1.3 billion. A more dramatic picture would emerge if we compared the revenue increases between 2001 and 2006. The oil price rise (Brent) was a huge 165%. The same volumes exported at 2001 prices in 2006 would have generated gross revenues of only $13.334 billion instead of $35.336 billion (Algeria); $13.371 billion instead of $35.433 billion (Libya); and $3.006 billion instead of $7.967 billion (Syria). These numbers give a better feel for the size of the windfall.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimated Oil Import Bill in 2006 (Southern Mediterranean Countries)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Had the volumes of 2006 been imported at 2001 prices
Other Macro-Economic Effects

Did the oil price increases have a significant impact on the rate of growth of the macro-economy? Most observers were puzzled by the apparent robustness of the world economy which did not suffer a deep recession as had happened in the 1970s, and more dramatically in the early 1980s.

“Robustness” is perhaps the wrong diagnosis. What did actually happen was a continuation of a pattern that existed before the price rise. China continued to grow at a high rate, and paradoxically in the early 2000s at an accelerated rate; many developing countries, and the USA, sustained relatively high rates of economic growth while Europe performed as previously in a lacklustre manner.

This is as far as the world as a whole was concerned. In the Mediterranean region, in 2006, earlier patterns continued to prevail. The oil-exporting countries, particularly Algeria which also benefited from a big rise in the price of exported natural gas, were booming. In Europe, Spain continued to grow faster than France and Italy. In the Arab world, Egypt and Jordan showed good rates of growth but Lebanon, in the second half of the year, suffered from the effects of the Israeli war. One may thus ask: are changes in world oil prices largely irrelevant at the macro-economic level? The answer to this question cannot be a definite “yes”. We have already seen that there were non-negligible balance-of-payment effects for both oil-importing and oil-exporting countries in the five year period over which the oil price did increase. As mentioned earlier on, the oil price increase over that period was a huge 165%, that is, by a multiple of 2.65. In 2006 the annual increase was 19.5%, not an insignificant but relatively small rate. The quantitative impacts on the balance of payments as estimated in a previous section can be considered to have been small.

To eliminate these effects by a deflationary policy would not be necessary in most countries; and if macro-economic adjustments were nevertheless deemed necessary the efforts required would not be too demanding.

Looking at the issues in the longer period perspective (2001-2006) may lead to different conclusions. The impact on the rate of economic growth of oil-importing countries in 2006 is not entirely attributable to changes in oil prices between 2005 and 2006. They may well be the resultant of changes that have been occurring over a number of previous years. Macro-economic impacts are often delayed (after all, macro-economic stories are ones of time lags). What did happen in 2006 has most likely been influenced by developments in 2003 or 2004. The trouble is that we cannot assess quantitatively by how much the rates of economic growth in importing countries were reduced (if at all) in 2006 compared with what they would have been in the absence of an oil price rise. This would require reliable data on 2006 rates of economic growth, not yet available for the majority of countries in the Mediterranean region and access to a model incorporating the relevant variables.

The next question is about the inflationary impact in the domestic economy of changes in the international oil price. There are a number of reasons why the impact may prove to be small. In some countries the transmission of world oil price increases to the prices paid by a domestic consumer is mitigated by high excise taxes imposed on petroleum products. This is clearly the case for Spain, Portugal, France or Italy in 2006. The 19.5% increase in the Brent price did not result in more than a 5% increase at the gasoline pump. Where prices increased by a higher percentage the cause will have to be sought in increases in excise taxes and/or in supply constraints in refinery. And the impact of a rise in petroleum product prices on the inflation index depends on the share of these petroleum products on total demand, also taking into account secondary effects. The consumption share is now typically small in advanced countries. In fact, a more significant inflationary impact in 2006 in Europe was due to more significant increases in gas and electricity prices.

In developing countries such as Egypt or Tunisia energy prices are controlled administratively. Some increases were allowed in 2006 but they did not reflect the full extent of the international price rise. In Egypt, in 2006, this policy resulted in a further increase in the fiscal burden imposed by energy subsidies. And this burden is becoming unsustainable. Jordan followed a different approach, probably on the recommendation of the World Bank or the IMF. It allowed oil product prices to rise domestically but compensated poorer users of these products with lump sum grants.

Finally and to conclude, it will only be possible to fully and correctly assess the impact of oil price changes when data become available. This should be done for every country separately. As mentioned in the introduction, belonging to the Mediterranean does not imply homogeneity of economic conditions, be it structure, performance or policies.
Impact of the Rise in Oil Prices

PERSPECTIVES FOR ALGERIAN NATURAL GAS

Mustapha K. Faïd  
President  
SPTEC, Pétrole & Gaz - Etudes et Conseil, Paris

With significant natural resources and infrastructures of demonstrated reliability, Algeria exports approximately 65 billion m³ (bcm) of natural gas per year. This is more than double the overall quantity that it exported, both by pipeline and in liquefied form, some ten years ago. This growth in exports has occurred despite certain constraints, not only of a financial order but also of an organisational type, in particular with regard to the implementation of programmes, whether involving liquefaction or increasing production and transport capacities. Moreover, investment efforts relative to increasing natural gas export capacity have all the more merit since they were undertaken in an ‘arduous’ political and economic climate, to say the least. Indeed, the targeted increase in export capacity announced in the early 1990s has been surpassed.

The challenge Sonatrach is now undertaking is on a higher level, involving different initiatives on all fronts to increase natural gas sales: development of natural gas fields, creation of new transport infrastructures and the establishment of partnerships, as well as acquiring shares in downstream activities and/or gaining a position on certain European markets, namely in Italy, France, Spain and the UK.

“Our natural gas potential is constantly on the rise and this, combined with the highly promising perspective of increasing demand in Europe, ensures we will reach our goal of annual natural gas exports of between 85 and 100 bcm by 2010 - 2015,” declare Sonatrach representatives.

Development Goals

This degree of development cannot be attained, however, without radical change in support measures and business approach. There are three main development goals:

Increasing the Algerian natural gas share of the closest traditional markets in Southern Europe.

This increase, in response to the quickly growing needs of the region, in particular for electricity production, is to be essentially effected by means of natural gas pipelines for the following reasons:

- A large portion (10 to 15 bcm/year) of this increase will be effected at the lowest possible cost, by the addition of compression stations on existing structures, namely, the Enrico Mattei Trans-Mediterranean Gas Pipeline in the East, and the Pere Duran Farel Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline in the West (MEG).
- The strengthening of market relations by means of new physical connections, apart from contributing

1 The Medgaz Pipeline will directly connect Algeria and Spain, whereas the Galsi Pipeline will link Algeria and Northern Italy via Sardinia.
to greater supply security for the European consumer, would lend value to the gas as the resale cost would be lower in the case of an LNG supply chain.

- The creation of new gas pipelines to both the east and west directly serving the target markets will ensure greater diversification of export means. Export capacity by gas pipeline would thus reach 60 bcm by the end of the present decade, in other words, it would increase by 60%.

*Maintaining or increasing shares in markets already supplied by LNG and diversifying outlets insofar as possible.*

Hence the construction of a liquefaction plant with a capacity of 4 million tonnes per year (mtpa) in Bethioua is envisaged as part of the project for integrally developing the Gassi Touil gas field, and the acquisition of large-capacity liquefied gas tankers is underway. This call for partnership is a first for Algeria and will involve the participation of the Spanish companies Repsol and Gas Natural in developing the gas fields, in the liquefaction process and in the marketing of LNG.

Among the markets that could be targeted for increased LNG capacity, apart from the Southern European one, are Great Britain and Northern Europe on the one hand, and the USA on the other.

The British market, which has become a strong importer and has originated great changes on the European market, as well as the Northern Europe market, can be accessed in different ways:

- For the UK market, either through the reservation of capacity at the regasification plant of Isle of Grain, to which Sonatrach already delivers LNG, or through the regasification unit at Zeebrugge in Belgium, thereafter using the Interconnector pipeline linking continental Europe with the UK and whose capacity was increased in 2006.
- For the Northern European market, apart from the Zeebrugge Terminal, the regasification terminals being planned and/or considered in the Netherlands could be used.

The United States market, whose LNG demand potential is very high, would be supplied via existing regasification plants and/or the numerous plants currently being planned.

Sonatrach’s recent reservation of regasification capacity at the Montoir Terminal demonstrates the Algerian company’s wish, if need be, to seize any new marketing opportunity, even on the French market.

Considering the closing of the Arzew GL4Z (formerly Camel) plant and difficulties in replacing the LNG units destroyed in Skikda in January 2004, LNG export capacity will only reach approximately 30 bcm per year by the end of the present decade. Based on these

---

**TABLE 16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Gas Pipelines</th>
<th>Existing Capacity (bcm/year)</th>
<th>Planned Capacity / Time Horizon</th>
<th>Total (bcm/year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TransMed</td>
<td>24.80</td>
<td>+6.50c / 2008</td>
<td>31.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEG</td>
<td>12.70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medgaz</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.00c / 2009-2010</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galsi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.00c / 2010-2011</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>37.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>60.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* a) Additional compression stations; b) Under construction; c) Capacity could reach up to 18.0 bcm/year in the final stage; d) In the planning stage; e) In the preliminary study stage.

**TABLE 17**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liquefaction Plants</th>
<th>Capacity Trains</th>
<th>Capacity (mtpa)</th>
<th>Capacity (bcm/year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arzew GL4Z (1964)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethioua GL1Z (1978)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(GL1K1 (1981)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skikda GL1KII (1981)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Existing Capacity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethioua GL3Z (2009)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>32.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
premises, Algeria’s overall export capacity (via gas pipelines and liquefaction) by the 2010 horizon would thus be approximately 90 bcm per year.

It goes without saying that, in view of all expected or foreseeable opportunities accompanied by different and highly variable rises in value from one market to another (Southern Europe, Northern Europe, the UK, the US market and even the Canadian and South American ones) Sonatrach, alone or in conjunction with its partners, will be able to undertake trade-offs based on price.

Sustaining this development by creating a business partnership

The envisaged development goes hand in hand with the desire to establish a business partnership, attesting to a medium to long-term ‘ambition’. The aims would be to:

- Ensure a part of the income available on the final market;
- Foster long-term relations;
- Consider reciprocal flexibility in business relations;
- Reduce business risk and minimise, to a certain extent, the effects of the economic climate and the intensity of constraints;
- Be familiar with the inner workings and conditions of the market.

Approach

The approach taken by Algeria over the past few years combines two aspects: one relative to “dialogue or cooperation” and the other having to do with the business approach.

Dialogue or Cooperation

A number of forums, conferences and official and/or informal meetings have been launched and organised by the Ministry of Energy and Mines along with Sonatrach in order to attract the interest of possible partners and clarify Algeria’s approach to cooperation in the sphere of energy. These meetings, on both the business and the governmental and institutional levels, have resulted in a number of partnership agreements. Another positive result is that they allow the Algerian parties to consider partners' concerns and constraints. This effort towards opening and/or establishing relations should continue.

The Business Aspect

The market seems to be reacting positively to the partnership evolution occurring with the onset of Sonatrach’s share in downstream operations. Nevertheless, a number of problems remain:

a) - The first regards the differences between Algeria, as is the case with other gas-producing countries, and the European Commission.

These differences, slightly too hyped in the media by the parties and certainly not “without an ulterior motive” on behalf of either party, are disjointed and correspond to different outlooks and different time scales. The conflict between the parties basically lies in the clause on “destination.” The European Commission holds that opening up the market will foster a secure supply by multiplying actors, among other things. This opening should not be limited to only the purchasers, but should be equally effective for the suppliers. Estimates show that the European Union’s dependence on gas imports will grow, rising from 40% in 1999 to 50% by 2010 and even 70% by 2020. Moreover, within the framework of a geostrategic perspective of security of supply, the European Commission is attempting to reduce the European Union’s dependence on imports from its three traditional suppliers of natural gas (i.e. Russia, Algeria and Norway) as far as possible. Hence the Commission’s absolute need to seek a sort of “atomisation” of upstream processes through the participation of gas “retailers” on the market.

For the producer seeking the best value for its gas, a free destination means that it will no longer gain all the profit that the market allows and that the multiplication of “intermediary” actors will simply increase the pressure already exercised on it to lower prices. This situation could lead to “gas-gas competition” from a single source.

These are thus legitimate concerns for Algeria. It should be noted, however, that Sonatrach has adopted quite a pragmatic approach according to the market opportunities available to it. Among these are:

- Spot LNG sales;
- An LNG marketing joint venture with Gaz de France;
- The purchase of stocks in the Spanish LNG terminal at Ferrol;
- The purchase of 30% shares in the Spanish mar-
Partnership for Sonatrach

Algeria is today faced with the need to undertake a new direction in gas development, insofar as both quantities and marketing strategy. This new direction will have to be undertaken within a context marked by the profound changes that the world energy scene is currently experiencing. These changes are generated as much by the geopolitical, economic and technological evolution underway as by the increasingly marked concerns of:

- Large, energy-consuming countries with regard to security and diversification of supply as well as environmental protection issues; and
- A good many producing countries that are undergoing serious economic, social and/or political crises.

For Sonatrach, strengthening its positions on gas markets and searching for new niches and/or opportunities require a partnership approach adapted to the evolutions occurring on the world energy scene. Intense and diversified, this partnership would support self-sustaining, cumulative development not limited to the dimension of the natural resources income resulting from the effective price ratio and therefore variable over time. A purely financial approach via acquisition of capital in a European energy concern could be deemed uninteresting or at least insufficient. The partnership initiative would include hybrid access systems and/or value-enhancing operations and value-added industrial processing. The natural resources income would thus be accompanied by an industrial profit.

Algeria, which has major assets insofar as resources, diversity of export means and proximity of end markets, would thus see its role strengthened, in particular on the European market, whose increasing demand could not be met without calling on supplementary contributions from traditional suppliers and from new gas sources. Sonatrach is attempting to take the steps to act directly and thoroughly on the consumer market. Everything leads to believe that the Algerian concern, with all of its strengths, is moving towards greater participation in downstream processes within the framework of a targeted, ambitious partnership.

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2 It is believed that this contract primarily settles the conflict regarding the Algerian debt to the former USSR.
Impact of the Rise in Oil Prices

European Policy and the Mediterranean Energy Dimension

Abdenour Keramane  
Former Algerian Minister of Industry and Mining  
Director of the journal *Medenergie*

Energy, an Element of Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation

The participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona on 27th and 28th November 1995 realized the importance of the energy factor as a structuring element of European-Mediterranean cooperation and urged the strengthening of energy links, the establishment of significant infrastructures and, more concretely, the creation of electrical and natural gas connections uniting both shores of the Mediterranean. Since then, the multiplication of high-level meetings, continual dialogue in the sphere of energy policies, the creation of a favourable climate for investment and the activities of energy companies have given a definitive boost to energy cooperation.

The *Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Energie* (Mediterranean Energy Observatory, or OME), an association grouping together energy actors and companies operating on both shores of the Mediterranean, founded in the early 90s, constitutes a permanent framework for dialogue, collaboration and research that plays a prominent role in strengthening this cooperation.

In fact, the energy links between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean are very strong and growing stronger every year. Simply consider that the European Union (EU) depends on Mediterranean producers for 36% of its natural gas imports and 20% of its oil imports. Seen from the perspective of the producing countries, dependence is even greater: 86% of their natural gas exports and 49% of their oil exports go to European countries, principally Mediterranean European countries (92% and 53%, respectively, go to the latter).

The international energy context of the past few years, marked by geopolitical tension and the uncertainty of energy supply security, has strengthened European resolve to foster dialogue in the Mediterranean Basin, accelerate cooperation initiatives and launch new projects.

This article intends to provide an overview of the situation, make certain reflections and draw conclusions on the future potential of this cooperation.

The International Energy Context

The world energy context has been marked by new developments over the past few years, in particular:

- Globalisation and liberalisation of energy markets;
- The Kyoto Protocol and post Kyoto, with the development of mixed energy and the diversification of energy sources;
- Sustained rise in the price of oil and derivatives.

This unstable context brings the crucial issue of the security of the energy supply to the fore, although today’s global energy crisis does not arise from political grounds but rather for technical reasons, i.e. insufficient production and refining capacities due to lack of investment over the past 20 years. This notwithstanding, the slightest geopolitical tension entails an increase in price.

By the end of 2006, prices were back to the late 2005 levels, with an average rate of $60/barrel, after reaching a high of $78.30/b in August. This price, which corresponds to an OPEC basket of $55/b, seems to have levelled off somewhat and has met with the satisfaction of OPEC members. Although according to well-informed analysts, there is a slightly decreasing trend, the fundamental situation is favourable and as new investments are made, the production margin in...
relation to demand will become comfortable (at least 2 million b/d).

In this regard, the demand of producer countries to consider that “security of supply and security of demand are two sides of the same coin” must be kept in mind. Even if we sense the stench of a return to economic nationalism – not only in the sphere of energy, incidentally – there is no risk of radicalisation or use of energy for political ends. The existence of the International Energy Forum, which meets periodically, indubitably constitutes a major step forward for energy cooperation on a global scale.

Nevertheless, energy poverty remains a critical problem, to the extent where, as emphasised in the World Energy Outlook publication, 2.5 billion people in the world use fuelwood, charcoal, agricultural waste or animal dung to meet most of their daily energy needs for cooking and heating, with serious consequences for human health, the environment and economic development. 1.6 billion people in the world are still living without electricity, particularly in Africa, so close to Europe.

European Policy

In this context, Europe has carried out particularly intense activity over the course of 2006 in the sphere of energy, which has become a priority at European summits and meetings with non-EU countries. In early March 2006, the European Commission published a policy document entitled, “Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,” indicating the following priorities: completing the internal gas and electricity markets by developing a European network, whereby a single regulator and control centre are also being considered (IEA, 2005); developing new legislation on gas reserves; developing a global, integrated approach to meet the challenges of climate change through an appropriate energy mix; adopting a long-term Renewable Energy Road Map; adopting an innovation technology plan; and formulating a common external energy policy to establish a new partnership with Russia and step up dialogue with producer countries.

The development of a European Energy Policy being a long-term challenge, in particular due to deep disagreement on the energy mix to adopt (coal, nuclear), the EU intends to regularly publish a Strategic EU Energy Review covering the problems identified in the Green Paper beginning in January of 2007. This Review will offer a clear framework for national energy mix decisions and will serve as a basis for transparent and objective debate on the future role of nuclear energy, as well as for formulating a common vision allowing EU Member States to speak as a single voice. The crisis occurring in late 2005 between Russia and the Ukraine regarding the price of natural gas, fortunately short-lived, was about to trigger frantic, individual initiatives by each European Member State to ensure the security of their oil and natural gas supplies, all the more concerned since the demand of emerging Asian countries, in particular China (Yang, 2007) and India (Ouki, 2007), continues to rise at a steady rate. European imports of natural gas are expected to nearly double between 2005 and 2020, from 290 billion cubic metres (bcm) to some 565 bcm, according to the EU’s DG-TREN.

Negotiations with Norway, one of the greatest exporters of natural gas in the world as well as one of the three main suppliers to the EU, along with Russia and Algeria, led to an agreement on 15th September between the European Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, and the Norwegian Minister of Energy, Odd Roger Enoksen, for a delivery of 125 billion cubic metres of natural gas to the EU by 2010 (as opposed to the current 85 billion being supplied now), making Norway “an important, reliable gas supplier for the EU for a good many years,” according to Mr. Enoksen.

At the Lahti Social Summit in Finland on 20th October 2006, European leaders established the foundations for a long-term partnership agreement with Russia based on balanced mutual interest and containing firm commitments to transparency and reciprocity in their energy relations. EU Member States advocate “market rules, the opening of markets and non-discriminatory access to the transport network” for hydrocarbons, Moscow insisting that its natural gas giant, Gazprom, not be relegated to the role of supplier but be allowed access to the entire European supply chain (Issaev, 2006).

The EU is increasingly dependent on external im-

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1 “Oil Outlook to 2025,” speech by Mohamed Barkindo on behalf of the OPEC Secretary General at the 10th International Energy Forum, Doha, Qatar, 22nd - 24th April 2006
ports for its energy supplies, with Russia alone supplying over 25% of its natural gas and oil consumption. And it is seeking a reliable source, although the US warns the EU against dependence on Russian natural gas. Russia seeks an “ambitious global agreement based on new strategic objectives” with the EU, not limited to energy but encompassing the whole of their relations.

On the 14th November, an agreement qualified as ‘historical’ was signed in Milan between the Italian oil group, Eni, and Gazprom, allowing the Russian giant to sell its natural gas directly to Italy as of 2007. In exchange, Gazprom extended its natural gas provision to the Italian group until 2035, consolidating Eni as the leading client of the Russian concern. Gazprom will sell its natural gas directly on the Italian market as of 2007, attaining a volume of 3 billion cubic metres by 2010, which will be maintained throughout the remainder of the contract. The new strategic alliance between Eni and Gazprom covers numerous projects to be jointly developed both in Russia and abroad regarding production and transport by pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG) to supply the world gas market.

On various occasions, the leaders of the European Commission have condemned the EU’s divisions on energy issues and the absence of a coordinated European external energy policy allowing Europe to act coherently vis-à-vis its suppliers. A certain psychosis has even taken root following agreements between natural gas producing countries, suggesting that there could soon be a ‘natural gas cartel’ or ‘OPEGas’, as some have ventured to call this possible future organisation.

With regard to electricity, the year 2006 was marked by the major blackout on 4th November, the greatest in thirty years or so, which affected millions of European homes, particularly in Germany and France, but also in Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands, lasting about one hour on the night of 4th to 5th November. The blackout, which originated in Germany, was due to a power surge on its network after a high-voltage line was temporarily switched off, triggering automatic safety mechanisms (‘power cuts’) subsequently affecting other European networks delivering electricity to Germany, such as France. At first analysis, it appears that the dysfunctions leading to the 4th November power outage are similar to those occurring in the past, in particular the blackout occurring in Italy on 23rd September 2003, for which Italian and French regulators had already proposed remedies.

The preliminary report by the European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) points to the need for urgent intensification of cooperation among Transmission System Operators in order to guarantee the improved security of the power supply in Europe. A definitive report is expected in February 2007. Moreover, upon request of the European Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs and following the “Strategic EU Energy Review” to be presented on 10th January 2007, ERGEG will propose measures to the European Commission for inclusion in the third legislative package on energy. Among these proposals, which should be submitted by July, is that of greater separation between producers and transport and distribution system operators, possibly going as far as complete scission.

**Increasing Energy Cooperation in the Mediterranean**

In this situation of crisis marked by agitation and anguish, the EU has launched initiatives directed at the Mediterranean countries. Thus, an energy cooperation agreement with Algeria is soon to be concluded, as announced by the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, at the opening session of a recent European energy conference. A draft memorandum has been submitted to the Algerian authorities and discussions will soon be held with a view to establishing an energy partnership. 10% of the natural gas consumed by the EU comes from Algeria, and with the prospect of doubling Algerian exports, this level could approach that of Russia, the prime EU partner in the energy sector.

During November of 2006, high-level leaders from Spain, Italy, Portugal, Germany and France successively travelled to Algiers to engage in negotiations on the delivery of additional amounts of natural gas and, in some cases, to sign contracts. The Energy Commissioner himself went there at that time, which constitutes a clear demonstration of EU interest in this Mediterranean country so close to Europe, a country that is an important producer and exporter of natural gas by pipeline and in LNG form. In addition to existing facilities, new projects are on the table, designed to reinforce the infrastructure and increase the natural gas export capacity of Algeria in order to meet the growing European demand. They involve increasing the capacities of the Enrico Mat-
tei (or Trans-Mediterranean) Pipeline (from 25 to 32 bcm) and the Pere Duran Farell Pipeline (from 11.5 to 15 bcm), building two new pipelines across the Mediterranean and enlarging and constructing new LNG plants.

The project for building the Medgaz Pipeline, the second one connecting Algeria to Spain, advanced significantly in November 2006 with the visit of a delegation from Sonatrach to Spain, followed by that of the Spanish Minister of Industry, Tourism and Commerce to Algiers. The three Spanish companies, Cepsa, Iberdrola and Endesa, have signed natural gas purchase contracts with Sonatrach. With a capacity of 8 billion cubic metres per year in its initial phase, Medgaz will transport natural gas from Beni Saf on the Algeria coastline to Almeria, Spain. The pipeline will cover 200 km and reach marine depths of up to 2,160 m. Once it reaches Spain, it will be connected to the Almeria-Albacete Gas Pipeline. According to the timetable established by the Consortium, the gas pipeline should become functional by early 2009.

With regard to Algerian exports to Italy, Sonatrach proceeded to sign five natural gas sales agreements on the past 15th November with, respectively: Edison, for a volume of 2 bcm/year; Enel for 2 bcm/year; Hera for 1 Bcm/an; Ascopiave for 0.5 bcm/year and Worldenergy for 0.5 bcm/year. The contracts were signed on the Italian Premier Romano Prodi’s official visit to Algeria and pave the way for the construction of the second major gas pipeline from Algeria to Italy via Sardinia, with a total capacity of 8 bcm/year. Construction is to begin in 2007 and the pipeline’s inauguration is expected in late 2009.

Romano Prodi, who had expressed concern upon hearing of the partnership agreement concluded by Sonatrach and Gazprom last August, took advantage of his visit to ensure an additional supply of natural gas and to obtain information on the Gazprom agreement, as it had been cause for some concern to the European Union. In reality, the Sonatrach-Gazprom agreement is a classical cooperation contract between two oil companies, similar to that concluded between Sonatrach and Eni. No part of this agreement should give rise to such concern, neither in Europe nor elsewhere.

The EU likewise plans to step up relations with other exporting countries of the Mediterranean Basin, such as Egypt (6th LNG exporter to the EU) and Libya, which has not concluded any agreements with the EU. Syria seems to be emerging as a potential natural gas exporter as well, due to recent discoveries of gas deposits and its intermediary potential for the transport of gas to the EU from Iraq, Egypt and Persian Gulf Countries. In Egypt, two new, low-emission LNG plants and an extension of the regional gas pipeline to the eastern Mediterranean, known as the “Arab Gas Pipelines” are planned. The aim is to export Egyptian natural gas to neighbouring countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, supplying Jordan, Palestine, Israel, Lebanon and Turkey, but also Spain. Other projects concern four LNG plants (Damietta, Idku-East of Alexandria), to be built in conjunction with the European companies Unión Fenosa, BPAmoco together with ENI, British Gas together with Edison International, and Shell.

Libya is developing onshore and offshore gas facilities producing gas for export to Italy via the Greenstream submarine pipeline and is expanding and building new LNG plants.

The EU is moving to progressively integrate the Maghreb electricity market (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) and the Mashreq gas market (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Israel) into the European energy market. The countries in question have, in fact, created an appropriate agreement framework, in this case, the Mediterranean electricity liaison committee (Medelec), through which a group of specialists on major electricity networks shall determine the issue of electrical grid interconnections, that is, the interest and conditions of coordinated operation of national electricity grids, and define a framework for coherence within which each operator shall abide by common regulations while retaining its freedom in developing its own grid. This involves establishing the conditions for continuously functioning interconnections and for the creation of regional electricity markets.

With regard to funding, the instruments have been created and the European Investment Bank (EIB) has been invited to become the main development agent for the Mediterranean Partner Countries, fostering investments of mutual interest in Mediterranean countries in the fields of energy, communications and environmental protection, in particular through the establishment of the “Euro-Med Facility.”

Finally, among notable initiatives launched during the course of 2006 was Italy’s proposal on 1st December at the 3rd Mediterranean Energy Forum (Palma de Mallorca). Italy reiterated a proposal to set up a standing committee ensuring that the recommendations made at the Rome Euro-Mediterranean Energy Industry Summit (1st December 2003) were followed. The recommendations, known as the Rome
Euro-Mediterranean Energy Platform (REMEP), involved increasing development of energy transport infrastructures between southern and northern Mediterranean shores and among the southern Mediterranean states, as well as developing local distribution networks in these countries. These constitute key elements in order to: guarantee stable energy supplies at low cost for both the EU and producer countries; ensure market security for North African export countries; and foster the stability and socio-economic development of the region.

**Conclusions: Towards Extensive, Sustained Cooperation**

The structure of what could be called a common Euro-Mediterranean perspective on energy matters seems to be gradually emerging. In any case, objective onlookers may well ask themselves whether this constitutes real cooperation or simply commercial exchange. Are these important exchanges, these imposing infrastructures, these connections in multiple formats established among countries of the Mediterranean Basin the result of true cooperation or do they simply constitute a series of exchanges established on the basis of mutual interest? Can the intensification of commercial exchange (namely, hydrocarbon exports and equipment and expertise imports) be considered a determining factor in energy cooperation as defined at the Barcelona Conference (Keramane, 2005)?

The fact that the EU – unexpectedly faced with short-term natural gas supply problems over the course of 2006 – suddenly became aware of its vulnerability is beyond doubt. Isolated initiatives were undertaken by the largest Member States vis-à-vis supplying countries with a view to ensuring the security of their supply without coordination or a jointly-defined, global, coherent policy. Nonetheless, with the publication in early 2007 of the Strategic Energy Review, an important step will be taken towards adopting a global approach, thereby laying the foundations for a true European energy policy.

With regard to the contacts made by the EU with producer countries, their acceleration and multiplication in 2006, though uncoordinated, must be considered a major asset for improved mutual understanding and more in-depth cooperation. After all, to prevent crises, the same language must be spoken, not only by European countries amongst themselves, but by Europe and its energy product suppliers. When Europe appeals to the notion of security of supplies, the producers call for security of demand to justify the significant investments necessary to meet the growing energy demand. Shouldn’t we substitute these concepts of security with the notions of interdependence and solidarity beyond European borders, at least in the Mediterranean Basin, which seems ready for such a step?

Moreover, if energy is increasingly becoming a focal point of international relations, and justifiably so, shouldn’t energy issues be integrated within a broader framework, as indeed suggested by Russia? A broader framework of sustainable development, encompassing environmental protection, the struggle against energy poverty, research and technology transfer from North to South and true industrial partnership? This entails seeking and strengthening dialogue, cooperation and partnership, not only in the energy sphere, but also in the industrial and technical spheres; Euro-Mediterranean cooperation with greater involvement of the countries and actors of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. The establishment of a Euro-Maghreb electricity market could become an excellent example of industrial and energy cooperation with long-term effects.

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Dossier: The Knowledge Society and Social Modernisation in the Mediterranean
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The Knowledge Economy and Mediterranean Countries: Challenges and Opportunities

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This article presents the developing knowledge economies in the Mediterranean area. The importance of the concept for growth and employment in the region is treated in a first section. In a second section, benchmarking elements, based on the World Bank’s Knowledge Assessment Methodology, are presented. Significant Knowledge Economy initiatives at the national level are then detailed. Brief considerations on the importance of international cooperation in Knowledge Economy matters then conclude the paper.

The Challenges of the Mediterranean Region

The Mediterranean region was a source of global knowledge, innovation and modernization at the beginning of the last millennium. Left behind by the Industrial Revolution, the region’s socio-economic situation gradually worsened. Recent evolutions, although in some parts encouraging, still leave this region behind many others in the world in terms of development and growth, and new challenges are emerging. Furthermore the Mediterranean countries as a whole have entered a vast period of demographic, political, economic, social and cultural transition marked by a profound process of mutation which raises many important challenges.

Perhaps the greatest single issue facing the economies of the Mediterranean Region is the challenge of employing its people in good jobs to absorb rapidly growing populations. Meeting this challenge is neither simple, nor should it be postponed. While the region is heterogeneous in terms of developments in the labor market, the majority of the region has been characterized by high levels of unemployment, and in some cases by declining real wages as well. The problem of job creation for the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) region² is staggering. Some 47 million jobs need to be created over the next 10 years just to keep pace with new entrants to the job market (ILO). Close to 6.5 million additional jobs would be needed to reduce the regional unemployment rate by one half (World Bank). The implication is that the current employed workforce would have to expand by close to 60% over the next ten years. Such an accomplishment was not even achieved by the high performing East Asian economies during the height of their employment growth periods.

Another increasingly important challenge faced by the Mediterranean countries is increasing global competition. China and India are obvious examples of emerging countries that are contributing to a strong external shock for Mediterranean producers. These “continent-countries” are more and more influential in the types of industrial activities where international specializations have been developed by many Mediterranean countries, textiles, leather and clothing, as well as ICT and software development. Furthermore, this competition will become increasingly acute as the world economy accelerates its integration process. The need to raise competitiveness becomes a major challenge for emerging countries.

¹ The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work.
² The countries included in the World Bank’s MENA classification are: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza and Yemen.
In view of these challenges and in this context, there is a clear need for a new form of economic development.

**Knowledge Economy for Mediterranean Countries**

Knowledge makes the difference at all levels of development. When knowledge is put to work to accelerate and deepen the development process, and applied to all types of innovation, including the more modest ones in the form of basic technology diffusion, it becomes a major resource for generating wealth and jobs (see Graphic 1, which compares growth trends between Korea and Ghana and highlights the differences due to knowledge).

A new economic development model based on knowledge - its creation, dissemination, adaptation, and transformation into the productive sector - has emerged. The central role of knowledge in economic growth is widely acknowledged in advanced countries and the experience of those that have championed this new paradigm has led to the coinage of the expression “Knowledge Economies” (KEs).

A Knowledge Economy, as defined by the World Bank Institute’s Knowledge for Development Program, relies on four distinct pillars: 1. An educated and skilled labor force able to continuously upgrade and adapt their skills to create and use knowledge efficiently. Education and training systems encompass basic (primary and secondary) education, vocational training, higher education and lifelong learning; 2. A modern and adequate information infrastructure to facilitate the effective communication, dissemination, and processing of information and knowledge. ICT constitute the infrastructure of the global, information-based economies of our time; 3. An effective innovation system of firms, research centers, universities, consultants, and other organizations able to keep up with new knowledge and technology, tap into the growing stock of global knowledge, and assimilate and adapt it to local needs; and 4. An economic incentive and institutional regime that allows for the efficient mobilization and allocation of resources, stimulates entrepreneurship and offers incentives for the efficient creation, dissemination and use of existing knowledge.

Mediterranean countries need to take advantage of this new source of growth and employment. To date, related investments in education, information infrastructure, research and development (R&D) and innovation have been insufficient or inappropriate in most Mediterranean countries. Moreover, inadequate economic and institutional frameworks can prevent these investments from yielding desired results. Mediterranean countries therefore risk falling further behind in the world economy. Action is needed to
advance reform and intensity and adapt knowledge-related investments, especially in view of the particular challenges faced by many Mediterranean countries.

Benchmarking the Mediterranean Region on the Knowledge Economy

A good overview of the current situation of the Mediterranean countries can be gleaned through the Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM). The Knowledge for Development (K4D) program at the World Bank Institute has developed a database and a set of indexes to measure countries’ progress on the four KE pillars. The KAM (www.worldbank.org/kam) is a Web-based tool that offers a holistic view of the wide spectrum of factors relevant to the knowledge economy. It also provides a basic assessment of countries’ and regions’ readiness for the knowledge economy (not its performance). Based on the four-pillar framework, it is designed to help countries understand their strengths and weaknesses by comparing their performance over time and their performance relative to other countries. The KAM allows policy makers to pinpoint their country’s problems and opportunities, revealing areas where policy attention or investments may be required to make the transition to a knowledge economy.

Comparisons in the KAM are made on the basis of 80 structural and qualitative variables that serve as proxies for the four KE pillars. Because the variables are of different intervals and scales, all are normalized on an ordinal scale from 0 (weakest) to 10 (strongest). Currently, the KAM covers 128 countries and 9 regional groupings. The comparisons are presented on the Web in a variety of charts and figures that highlight similarities and differences across countries. Further technical details on the KAM normalization procedure and data sources are provided on the KAM website.

KAM’s “basic scorecard” is a snapshot of the performance of a specific country or region on all four pillars of the knowledge economy. It includes 14 standard variables: 2 performance variables that score the country in terms of GDP growth and its score on the Human Development Index; and 12 knowledge variables, as can be seen in Graphic 2. The 12 were selected because they are generally available for a long time series and are regularly updated for most countries. More robust data exist for individual countries, but not for enough countries or for long enough periods to make them useful for comparisons.

Graphic 3 shows the different situation of the Mediterranean countries on the aggregate Knowledge Economy Index (KEI). The KEI summarizes performance over the four KE pillars and is constructed as the simple average of the normalized
values, from 0 (weakest) to 10 (strongest), of 12 knowledge indicators with three variables representing each of the four pillars of the knowledge economy. The horizontal axis plots countries’ and regions’ performance in the KEI in 1995, while the vertical axis plots countries’ and regions’ performance in the KEI for the most recent year (updated in November 2006). This aggregate score has been econometrically tested to reveal that there is a statistically significant causal relationship running from the level of knowledge accumulation as measured by the KEI to future economic growth. As can be seen by Graphic 3 below, there are roughly two distinct groups in the Mediterranean Region: A “leading pack” which, when taken in the context of the world as a whole, is roughly in the average, consisting of Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Tunisia. A second group of Mediterranean countries, consisting of Syria, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco are further behind on this aggregate score, but are, encouragingly,
catching up over time (this can be seen by the fact that they are placed above the 45 degree line – their scores have improved since 1995). One country of the region, Israel, is close to the developed countries. Graphic 4 provides an interesting perspective on the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of the Mediterranean countries on each of the four different pillars that make up the KEI. It specifically details each of the different data that nourish the KEI aggregate score, which can be compared with Graphics 5 and 6 – showing in greater detail each of the different data scores for two contrasted groups of Mediterranean countries.

Moving Ahead in Knowledge Economy Reforms in the Mediterranean Area: Country Highlights

How can the different Mediterranean countries boost their growth to further become knowledge-based economies?

Three exemplary country initiatives are detailed below
The greatest single issue facing the economies of the Mediterranean Region is the challenge of employment

- Tunisia, Jordan and Dubai. The latter, although not included as a Mediterranean country as such, can also serve as an illustrative case on how to build a knowledge economy.

Tunisia and the Knowledge Economy

Tunisia is illustrative of an economy which has developed a strong industrial base in sectors such as electronics and textiles by efficiently attracting foreign investors. The success of these industries owes much to a pragmatic policy of significant improvement of the business environment, strong tax incentives and investment in labor force qualifications as illustrated by Tunisia. However, these industries and therefore the economy are experiencing a certain loss of competitiveness. To counter this, the Tunisian government has recently actively embarked on an ambitious knowledge economy program. Knowledge Economy is included as a major axis of the Five Year National Plan with a number of bold objectives and the publication of an annual report on the knowledge economy.

With regards to the different pillars making up the knowledge economy, Tunisia has made quite good progress recently on the ICT pillar, with, for example, the major ICT project represented by the Elgazala techno-pole. Inspired by the technopole approach, it consists in attracting a number of foreign and domestic firms around an infrastructure of schools and research centres. Results in terms of employment are not negligible. However half of the employment is public sector related, and there are not many spill-over effects for the whole economy, the pole tending to remain an enclave in the whole economic system. The Tunisian government plans to establish six techno-poles in other sectors and other cities of the country.

The R&D effort has also been boosted reaching one percent of GDP (in comparison to 0.4% in 1998). It remains however largely funded by the State. The private sector has benefited from technological upgrading through the EU supported “Programme de mise à niveau” (4,000 enterprises over the 2000-2005 period)

More generally, ICT investment was 3.3% in 2001 and 7% by the end of 2006, and has in total created 30,000 jobs from 2002 to 2006. There are a total of around 850,000 internet users in the country. Although recent investments have been made, much remains to be done, as can be seen from the chart below, which compares Tunisia’s ICT to that of higher middle income countries.

Education remains problematic in the Tunisian context, for although a significant amount of funding has been going in to financing education, these investments have not necessarily been fruitful, at least for the time being. Significant efforts in education can be seen from the following figures: enrolment in university was up from 23% in 2001 to 32% in 2004, and enrolment in short curricula was up from 21% in 2001 to 25% in 2004. The rate of Science and Technology diplomas was 13% of total enrolments. However, and alarmingly, the percent of graduates among unemployed rose from 35% in 2002 to 70% in 2005. This points to a severe mismatch between the educational system on the one hand, and the productive sector on the other, which also implies Economic and Institutional Regime problems (EIR).

The EIR in Tunisia is indeed problematic. Issues concern in particular the governance climate with serious weaknesses on voice and accountability variables as illustrated by a sustained control of the internet. One may suspect also some form of opaque and biased relationship between the rules and business segments, with mediocre conditions of local competition, as well as the problematic soundness of the banking system. These questionable governance conditions explain why there are obvious difficulties to get foreign firms to reinvest their profits in the country, as well as an insufficient influx of new technology-based firms. Finally there is an excessive centralization which prevents the development of local initiatives, notably at the city level. The engagement of the Tunisian government in a KE-based economy remains, however, impressive.

Jordan and Innovations in Education

The Jordan Education Initiative (JEI) grew out of an extraordinary challenge posed at the World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in January 2003. The JEI’s goal is to accelerate social and economic development in Jordan through broad application of e-learning hardware, curricula and training in order to support the development of a “knowledge economy” and produce sustainable economic growth. JEI has four main objectives: improving the delivery of
education in Jordan through public-private partnerships; unleashing innovation among teachers and students through the effective use of ICT; building the capacity of the local IT industry; and creating a model of reform that can be used by other countries. Program implementation began with the design, development, and deployment of a mathematics curriculum for grades K-12 to be delivered to over one hundred schools. The content is web-based, interactive, and multimedia.

A McKinsey study shows that by 2005, JEI had over 30 active partners from the public and private sectors, including Cisco, Dell, and Microsoft, and public sector organizations such as USAID and the British Council. One hundred Discovery Schools are now fully networked and have access to computer labs and online curricula. A full Math e-Curriculum (grades 1-12) has been developed; Arabic Online, English as a Foreign Language and ICT are also being tested at varying stages in the Discovery Schools; and civics and science online are being developed for introduction in these schools.

There are early indications of some positive outcomes although it is too early to judge the overall long-term impact. In terms of learning, the initial stage of JEI e-curricula and technology is demonstrating an impact on the approximately 2,300 teachers and 50,000 students in the 100 Discovery Schools. Over the longer term, the intention is to roll out the JEI learning model to all public schools in Jordan and to catalyze change throughout society. Informal assessments by external educationalists and members of the Ministry of Education show that the results are promising. However, more remains to be done to train teachers and principals and to deploy technology and e-curricula more broadly. A second intended outcome of the JEI is to develop the Jordanian ICT industry by encouraging partnerships with global firms. Five local companies have benefited from close working relationships with global partners, and approximately US$3.7 million has been transferred to local companies as a direct result of JEI programs (McKinsey estimates).

Dubai Transition to a Knowledge Economy

In four decades, Dubai has gone from a pearling and trading outpost to a fully fledged Knowledge Economy with global reach and significant regional impact. Its economy, like that of the seven sheikhdoms, or emirates, which made up the United Arab Emirates in 1971, was based on pearling, fishing, trade, and a limited amount of agriculture. In 1958 the discovery of petroleum off Abu Dhabi marked a first turning point. However, although Dubai had the second largest reserves after Abu Dhabi, these were far less rich, and around 1991 Dubai’s leaders began to realize that quantities and therefore revenues from oil would start to decline markedly from 2010.

For Dubai to prosper in the long run, the economy needed to diversify, and two successive generations of visionary leaders implemented a multi-phase, multi-dimensional program to bring Dubai to the forefront of the Knowledge Economy. A first phase aimed at turning the emirate into a transportation and logistics hub linking South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. This led to the creation of the world’s largest dredged port (currently ranked tenth in terms of container ship passage), a world class airline (Emirates), and, in view of the success of the Dubai International Airport, the construction of a second airport, the world’s largest, Jebel Ali Airport, which, when completed, will see 120 million passengers transit through it (compared to Heathrow’s current 85 million) each year. The success of the transport hub strategy led to the development of a tourism strategy which, contrary to all expectations, has been a noteworthy success. The Emirate received over 15 million tourists last year and has built several high-profile resorts and attractions (including Palm City, Dubailand, the world’s largest shopping mall, theme parks, resorts, stadiums) to keep tourists coming.

The second phase of Dubai’s development centered on building up core competencies in new areas such as technology, media, telecommunications, e-commerce, and other specialized technology- and knowledge-intensive domains. This strategy was launched by Dubai’s current head, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, and was formulated in two successive plans: the 2010 and 2020 Vision Plans. These competencies were built up through specialized development and free trade zones designed to attract foreign investment and firms in these fields. The zones were established with strong and
well-designed financial and economic incentives for companies, along with a strategy to facilitate business and adopt global rules and best practices. This strategy was at first structured around a technology, e-commerce and media free zone (TECOM) consisting of three separate entities: Dubai Internet City, Media City and Knowledge Village. Dubai Internet City provides a Knowledge Economy ecosystem that is designed to support the business development of ICT companies.

This complex has the Middle East’s most extensive IT infrastructure and the world’s largest commercial Internet Protocol telephony system. Dubai Media City was launched in January 2001, has attracted over 850 companies and is a leading media hub for the region. Knowledge Village provides infrastructure for developing, sharing and applying knowledge, and provides world-class training services in management, business, human resources and education support. Following these first highly successful experiments, several other specialized technology zones have been or are being created. These include Dubai Technology Park, DuBiotech and Dubai Industrial City. Dubai Technology Park is designed to attract foreign investment in research in oil and gas, desalination and environment management.

DuBiotech, otherwise known as the Dubai Biotechnology and Research Park, will service the entire biotechnologies industry. Dubai Industrial City (DINC) provides manufacturing facilities in high-value-added sectors and is strategically located close to the port and airport facilities. It focuses on sectors such as machinery and mechanical equipment, transportation equipment, base metals, foodstuffs (foods and beverages), chemicals and mineral products. It also has a vocational training zone for industrial skills aimed at creating potential entrepreneurs and a skilled personnel base, as well as a commercial area.

As its third and latest phase of its development, Dubai has sought to lure global financial firms and become an international financial hub. This has been facilitated by the massive repatriation of Middle-Eastern finance closer to home following the attacks of 11th September 2001, as well as the recent boom in oil prices. Dubai, after some wrangling with the U.A.E.’s central authorities, won permission to exempt its financial center from almost all of the federation’s commercial laws and set up a separate, Western-based commercial system for its financial district that would do business in dollars and in English. This included importing independent Western regulators and judges, a move that is particularly important for success as an international financial center. However, this phase has not been without difficulties, which almost led to the collapse of the entire project in 2002. When some property development rights in the financial center were allocated to local businessmen without going through the designated auction process, and although there was no suggestion of foul play, the Western regulator made it plain that anything even perceived as back-room dealing would undermine the center’s reputation. The Dubai financial-center official reacted by sacking the regulator. This created an uproar which almost became a panicked stampede among the international financial firms present. However the project was put back on track.

Driving Local-Level Change - Cities as Entry Points for Reform

As illustrated by the Dubai case and many other examples in advanced and emerging economies, innovation and growth often begin in specific sectors or locations. Such spots are characterized by an accumulation of a critical mass of talent, resources, and entrepreneurs. Moreover they feature adequate infrastructure (power, transportation) and a permissive, if not supportive, environment for entrepreneurial initiatives. When these conditions are met, competitive industries can emerge, clusters can develop, etc. Examples abound in advanced countries.

The role of government is to facilitate the emergence of such spots. Generally this requires bringing together the elements that can make a difference. In line with a pragmatic approach, some countries have deliberately created enclaves for growth in the form of export processing zones (EPZ) and techno-parks (see Tunisian and Dubai examples), which can offer financial and regulatory incentives to local and foreign enterprises willing to locate in them, along with training facilities. Beginning with low-skill manufacturing, it can be scaled up through astute competitive schemes. The successful creation and scaling up of entry points facilitates the propagation of reform processes by strengthening confidence, overcoming resistance, convincing skeptics and so on. This is why successful initiatives are so important. When they do not succeed, the concerned communities begin to have doubts. This is particularly so when huge investments have been made in ambitious projects that do not bear fruit as early or to the degree expected.
The Need for Intensified International Cooperation

The primary form of international cooperation for boosting knowledge economy initiatives in the Mediterranean area is, of course, the exchange of experience and knowledge sharing. There are plenty of events and loci where such exchanges and learning processes take place.

The Euromed Conference of Ministers of Industry, held in Rhodes in September 2006 was a good example of how, at a regional level, the European Union is supporting the development of the Mediterranean countries and innovation (through Medibtikar). Indeed, innovation is one of the key conclusions of this conference, as well as that of enhancing competitiveness of the business sector.

The World Bank Institute’s Paris and Marseille Offices provide expertise and assistance to MENA (and notably Maghreb) governments in developing their KE plans and strategies and hold seminars on specific topics such as technopoles (Tunis, 19–20 June 2007). The Mediterranean Development Fora, the fifth version of which was held from 6–9 April 2006 in Beirut, is a showcase event which can spur progress in the region. MDF5 was a high-profile regional conference focusing on Making Reforms Work in the Middle East and North Africa. MDF5 was organized by the partnership of MENA think tanks, the local hosting partner, the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, the World Bank Group and the United Nations Development Programme.

However seminars, conferences and knowledge sharing are not enough to cope with the challenges of the region. More operational involvement is needed. EU-related activities have been the main vehicle so far, through the Barcelona process, the MEDA program, and the European Investment Bank. These activities need to be considerably scaled up particularly for boosting all forms of North-South networking – being at the level of enterprises, schools, and individuals – including those of the diaspora communities which as demonstrated by China, India, Israel and Ireland, constitute an essential development factor in a knowledge economy perspective.

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The Knowledge Society and Social Modernisation in the Mediterranean

Knowledge Production: Research and Technological Development in the Mediterranean Region

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Since the Lisbon Declaration, aiming to make the EU “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010,” and various reports by international institutions on the knowledge economy, in particular those of the World Bank and the UNDP, the production of knowledge has become a major concern for Mediterranean countries. This concern is growing deeper as the date approaches for the full constitution of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone, slated for 2010-2012, as per the Euro-Med Association Agreements. The year 2006 constitutes the half-way point, in particular for the Maghreb countries – Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. It is also an important year because it is the first year following the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, celebrated in November of 2005. At the anniversary event, significant defects of the Barcelona Process were discussed, especially with regard to implementation, and important resolutions were taken, in particular in the sphere of scientific and technological cooperation. We should therefore stop to ask whether all of these resolutions have been put into practice and whether the Euro-Mediterranean scientific and technological Partnership has effectively been set in motion. This year likewise marks the end of FP6 (the EU’s 6th Framework Programme for Research and Development) and will be used to take stock of the progress made and prepare FP7, in which the issue of scientific and technological cooperation with TMCs (Third Mediterranean Countries) takes on great importance. At a time when innovation has become the catchword of global competition and when the Mediterranean market is increasingly flooded by Asian products, the European Union, and the Mediterranean countries a fortiori, realise that they are still far behind the USA in R&D expenditure (amounting to 23% of world expenditure, as opposed to 36.7% for the US) and that Southern Europe, particularly Portugal and Greece are lagging behind, and this lag is only intensified by the arrival of the new EU Member States.

The Mediterranean Region as a whole is even lower on the ranks, considering the weakness of the Southern Mediterranean countries. In this article, I will first present an overview of the state of research and technological development, and then discuss the perspectives open to the Mediterranean. The limited space of this article and the scope of the topic have led me to focus my analysis on the Maghreb as an illustration of this problem in the Southern Mediterranean, considering that there are no fundamental differences among the remaining TMCs, with the exception of Israel and Turkey, to a certain extent.

Imperatives, Challenges and Obstacles Regarding Technology Production in the Mediterranean Countries: An Inventory

Both facts and statistics confirm that the Mediterranean continues to experience a gap between its southern and northern shores, not only with regard to development, but also and above all, to research, technological development and the production of knowledge in general. If the expression of the digital divide is widely accepted in literature and use, the term “technology or cognitive divide” could easily apply as well. Although conventional indicators on research and technological development are not unanimous, we will use them here because there is a great deal of data available for these indicators.

Research Institutions and Infrastructures: If the
If the matter has been largely settled in the Northern Mediterranean countries, in the South, the majority of Mediterranean countries are still establishing institutional schemes. The majority of countries having established scientific and technological development as a national priority, they have for the most part instituted state decision-making entities designed to launch research initiatives and promote technological development. The latter entities take the form of Ministries, State Secretariats and National Commissions. Legislation has been passed to accompany this process, as, for instance, Algeria’s Law of 1998 on scientific and technological development. Scientific and technological research programmes and schemes have been developed, such as, in Morocco, the Thematic Scientific Research Support Programmes (PROTARS I/1999 and PROTARS II/2000) and “Vision et Stratégie de la recherche Horizon 2025” (Research Perspectives and Strategy, Planning Horizon 2025), published in 2006. This is also the case with Tunisia’s National Programme for Research and Innovation (PNRI), designed to meet the technological innovation needs of businesses.

By the same token, Algeria has established a five-year development and research plan (1998-2002) following the 1998 law and the roadmap, “Vision Algérie 2030,” which contains an important section on scientific and technological development. This institutional renewal has been accompanied by a strengthening of research infrastructures in the majority of countries. Thirty research centres, 139 laboratories and 634 research units were inventoried in 2005 in Tunisia, the majority of which were working in the natural sciences. In Algeria in 2006 there were 638 laboratories, of which 47% were working in the fields of science and technology. In 2006, some 2,300 projects were underway, of which 1,540, that is 70%, were being carried out at institutions under the auspices of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MESRS) and involved 76% of national researcher potential. The MESRS launched no less than 19 National Research Programmes (PNR) in 1999.

The Human Potential: This remains the keystone of a policy for knowledge production and competitive R&D. Despite possible reservations with regard to quality, the human potential becoming involved in research is on the rise. In 2004-2005, Morocco had 10,135 official researchers, two thirds of whom (6,256) were working in the natural sciences and technologies. In 2005-2006, Tunisia had 25,445 researchers with an FTE (full time equivalent) of 14,650, which constitutes an increase of 13.4% over the preceding year. This means there are 4.28 researchers per 1,000 workers. In Algeria, the number of researchers is 15,000 in all disciplines as per university statistics for 2006-2007, 77% of whom are working in research laboratories.

R&D Expenditure: The gap between the two shores of the Mediterranean in this sphere remains high, yet efforts continue to be made in R&D expenditure to reach the threshold of 1% of the GDP established by such international institutions as the UNDP. The Southern Mediterranean countries do not surpass 1% of GDP, with the exception of Israel, which assigns over 4% of its GDP to R&D (4.8% in 2001), on a level with leading world countries such as Sweden (4.27%), Finland (3.06%) and Japan (3.06%). Hence, in Morocco in 2003, the said expenditure was only 0.79%, of which only a negligible amount was attributable to the private sector (12% in 2003); the figure was 0.77% for Tunisia in 2004; and 0.75% in Algeria, where the private portion was likewise very weak. In terms of US dollars (USD) PPP per capita, Tunisia registered 52 USD PPP per capita in 2003 as opposed to Norway’s 649, France’s 617 and Italy’s 305. With regard to emerging countries, Brazil registered 77 and China 66.

On a global scale, the EU Innovation Scoreboard shows that, among the countries representing over 0.1% of worldwide research and development expenditure, only Turkey (0.18%) and Israel (0.80%), of all Southern Mediterranean countries, were given a non-negligible score. The other Southern Mediterranean countries listed ranked relatively low: Egypt (0.03%) and Tunisia (0.02%). Among Northern Mediterranean countries, France (4.21%) ranked highest, followed by Italy (1.68%). The other Northern Mediterranean countries had relatively modest scores: Spain (0.84%), Portugal (0.14%) and Greece (0.10%).

Performance

Performance will essentially be estimated with regard to scientific production and technological production.
Space limits do not allow the use of other indicators, such as high-technology product exports.

**Scientific Production:** Scientific production clearly confirms the cognitive gap between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries mentioned above. It remains relatively low, despite real financial efforts made by the public authorities. Nonetheless, it is a constantly evolving parameter: publications practically doubled from 1996 to 2003 in the three Maghreb countries, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. In Morocco, though ranked third in Africa after South Africa and Egypt, scientific production in the technological sphere remains relatively low: of 1,400 theses defended in 2004, the natural sciences represented 48% of the total, whereas engineering sciences only represented 1%. Moreover, 60% to 70% of scientific production is done in conjunction with foreign partners, primarily from Europe. In Algeria, the data published shows that scientific publications by national researchers did not surpass 5.41 publications per million inhabitants in 2002, and three fourths of these were joint publications, primarily done in conjunction with French and OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) partners. Another noteworthy point is that a substantial number of these joint publications were written by researchers of the Algerian diaspora living abroad. In Tunisia, there were 1,010 scientific publications in 2004, which was nearly double the number produced in 2000 (i.e. 540). The majority of these publications involve the natural sciences. Information Technology (IT) is burgeoning: the number of publications has multiplied by 10 since 1993. Yet they remain comparatively low. In 2003, some 425 publications were produced, as compared to the number in France (31,971), Italy (24,696) and Spain (16,826). Tunisia, with 40 publications per million inhabitants, is far behind France (524), but ahead of Egypt (24) and Morocco (15). In terms of quotes from IT articles, Tunisia (619) lags behind Morocco (926) and Egypt (3,319), and far behind Turkey (10,130) or Greece (1,996). Research is highly international, given that 69% of publications are co-signed with foreign partners.

**Technological Production:** The deficiency of technological production in the Southern Mediterranean countries is not difficult to demonstrate. In Morocco, 48 patents have been registered by 24 laboratories or laboratory groups in the past ten years, not including the fields of computer science and mathematics. Yet globally, 561 patents were registered in 2004, of which 104 were by nationals: 72% were registered by individuals. In Tunisia, 579 have been registered since 1990, 16% of which were registered by research institutions, 20% by businesses and 64% by individuals. In 2005, there were only 56 patents. If we consider the number of patents registered with the USPTO (US Patent and Trademark Office), the proportion was slightly over 0.1% per million inhabitants in 2002, identical to that of Egypt. This is very poor in comparison to Belgium (70.4%), France (68.1%), Italy (30.3%), and Spain (8%). Nonetheless, certain Northern Mediterranean countries are experiencing difficulties; suffice it to consider the performance of Portugal (1.3%) or Greece (1.8%). In Algeria, only four patents were registered at the USPTO level during the 1977-2005 period. This figure rises to 31 for Morocco, 14 for Tunisia and 154 for Turkey. Nevertheless, certain sectors are beginning to distinguish themselves for their dynamic innovation and constitute a true “success story.” This is the case with the Algerian public enterprise, SAIDAL, and the private groups Poulina and ONA (Omnium North Africa), in Tunisia and Morocco, respectively.

**The Imperatives**

One of the factors that explain the backwardness of the southern shore is the inexistence of national innovation schemes that are thorough, operational and competitive. It is well-known that in the majority of cases, these innovation schemes are embryonic, disjointed or incomplete.

**The Issues of Mobility and Brain Drain:** Although these two issues seem quite different, they are, in fact, related. Hindrances to the mobility of qualified workers indirectly contribute to their exodus. It is increasingly obvious that mobility poses major problems for knowledge production and, above all, for its socialisation. If the lack of qualified worker mobility has experienced little improvement in 2006, definitive departures continue to be one of the major concerns. This phenomenon, which also affects Northern Mediterranean countries, has affected Algeria more than any other Maghreb country. Approximately 420,000 Algerians left the country in the 90s.

**The Issue of Low Investment by International R&D Firms:** The Euro-Mediterranean region remains relatively poor in terms of attraction of innovative companies, both with regard to volume and sectors. Though a significant number of multinationals have established R&D facilities in Israel (Intel, IBM, Motorola, BMC, Marvell, CISCO, HP, Nestlé, etc.) that invest
1.5 billion US dollars in research partnerships, this is not the case in the other countries of this region.

**University-Business Relations and Enhanced Value of Research Results:** The problem of enhancing research remains a central concern for the authorities in the different Southern countries. Institutions have been established to manage these interfaces, but with little success. In Morocco, the department of scientific research has established programmes to build bridges between universities and the business world, as for instance, the “Valorisation de la recherche” (Enhancing Research Value) programme, staggered over the course of three years and with a budget of 7.7 million Euros.

**Financing Research and Development:** The matter of financing innovation remains central, considering the weakness of venture capital in the Southern Mediterranean region. In Tunisia, high technology venture capital only represented 22% of total risk capital for 2002-2003, compared to Denmark (69.8%), Germany (63.4%), France (57.4%), Spain (44.7%) and Italy (33.7%). Nonetheless, initiatives have been undertaken to make up for the R&D lag. In 2004, Morocco launched an innovation support fund, “Innov’act”, essentially for SMEs and supported by the international institutions, GTZ (Germany) and IFC (World Bank). Venture capital grew tenfold between 1990 and 2002, reaching 132 million US dollars (0.3% of the GDP) and putting Morocco in a good position in the Mediterranean Basin. Other funds have also been created, such as the Sindibad seed and venture capital fund. In Algeria, FINALEP, a venture capital bank, is just getting off the ground.

**Governance and Innovation:** Europe’s lag behind other parts of the world is likewise associated with a lack of suitable governance. This issue was raised in 2006 at the workshop organised in The Hague by the European Trend Chart on Innovation. One of the most crucial matters with regard to research in the Northern Mediterranean countries particularly concerns deciding on the best innovation governance system. This greatly affects research and development in the Southern Mediterranean countries.

One of the factors that explain the backwardness of the southern shore is the inexistence of national innovation schemes that are thorough, operational and competitive.

**Perspectives and Solutions on the Horizon**

The new awareness of the issue reached by both the public authorities and economic actors of the Southern Mediterranean countries has led to intensified efforts in the production of knowledge and technological research and development. These efforts were stepped up in 2006, particularly due to the situation explained above, but also because of the growing importance attached to the need to enter the knowledge economy by the Southern Mediterranean countries. In April 2006, Algeria organised its first national conference on the knowledge-based economy upon initiative of the réseau Maghtech (The Maghreb Technology Network) and the University of Mostaganem.

**National Initiatives**

**Simplifying Procedures and Improving the Innovation Climate:** The three Maghreb countries have begun a series of reforms with a view to simplifying procedures in order to allow greater celerity for investment and the transformation of ideas into projects and thus into investment. By way of illustration, according to a World Bank report (Doing Business in 2006), Morocco has reduced the number of steps required for registering a trademark or patent to 4, as opposed to the 6.6 required on average by the rest of the subregion, and the average of 4.7 steps registered by OECD countries.

**Creation of Networks:** Although still low, network creation is beginning to gain importance. In addition to already extant networks, such as the Maghtech Network, which is exclusive to the Maghreb, other networks have begun to emerge in the majority of the Southern Mediterranean countries, a phenomenon greatly facilitated by the massive introduction of ICT into their economies. In Morocco, eight thematic networks and six skill clusters existed in 2006. In Algeria, six thematic networks were launched and their number is growing exponentially.

**Growing Participation and Interest of the DIAST (Scientific and Technological Diaspora).** More and more programmes to involve expatriates in the transfer of know-how are being planned, such as TOKTEN (“Transfer Of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals”), which is operating in over 40 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Other national programmes exist. Tunisia’s Ministry of
Higher Education, Scientific Research and Technology has launched a programme for cooperation with Tunisians residing abroad; and Morocco has the FINCOME programme for collaboration with skilled expatriates (International Forum of Moroccan Competences Abroad).

**University - Business Partnerships for Enhanced Research.** In Algeria, an agency has been created to manage this interface – the ANVREDET (Agence Nationale pour la Valorisation de la Recherche et du Développement Technologique, i.e. National Agency for Research and Technology Development). In Morocco, university-business interface structures were created within the framework of the 2000-2004 Development Plan. There are 15 interface structures at present. In Tunisia, such liaison also involves foreign enterprise. Dassault Systèmes has signed an educational partnership with the University of Tunis according to which it will supply product development software.

**Onset of Multinational Investment in R&D in Southern Mediterranean countries.** In Algeria, a number of foreign companies are carrying out research in the field of hydrocarbons. In Morocco, there are several companies that have set up R&D facilities: STMicroelectronics, Matra Automobile Engineering - Casablanca and Lead Design in the field of integrated circuits, as well as Teuchos, a subsidiary of the European Safran Group, working in the field of aviation and aerospace component conception.

**Multilateral Cooperation**

As indicated above, the European Union – after the mixed conclusions reached in 2005 on results of the Barcelona Process, the birth of the US’s Greater Middle East Initiative and the establishment of the Morocco-US Free Trade Agreement – realised it was losing opportunities. It therefore decided to make up for lost time, accelerating the pace of scientific and technological cooperation with Third Mediterranean Countries and accentuating its efforts to support technological research and development. According to the MED7 report based on meetings held in 2005, the European Union considers scientific and technological cooperation one of the pivotal elements of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. European research policy for the 2007-2013 period, as manifest in FP7, is considered an opportunity for renewing Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and allowing Third Mediterranean Countries to become full actors in the knowledge society that the EU endeavours to build. These efforts were evident as early as 2006 in the 6th Framework Programme (FP6), which ended in December of 2006 and in which Morocco participated with 53 projects. This allowed it to strengthen its technological platforms, its centres of excellence and its skills areas and to develop scientific and technological information. In the Commission’s proposal for FP7, international cooperation appears explicitly in the FP7 Cooperation Programme (allocated 32.4 billion euros), where activities of mutual interest will be clearly identified and undertaken in a preferably multidisciplinary approach. Ten topics have been identified, namely, Energy, ICT, the Environment and Transport. The FP7 People Programme (4.7 billion euros) will involve ‘incoming’ and ‘outgoing’ international fellowships and action will be taken to limit ‘brain drain’. The FP7 Capacities Programme (4.2 billion euros) will include horizontal measures of support to political dialogue and national policy coordination.

The need to build competitive innovation systems was emphasised at the meeting in Casablanca in May of 2005. The implementation of national innovation systems in the Euro-Mediterranean region is considered a necessary means of reinforcing sustainable growth on both sides of the Mediterranean, particularly in view of the forthcoming Free Trade Zone, to be functioning by 2012. The establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Innovation Area or Euro-Med Innovation Space (EMIS) is considered not only crucial but also a necessity for sustainable growth and development. EMIS will be part of the EU’s broader policy to develop an Innovation Policy for Europe and the FP7. It is likewise a manner of strengthening neighbourly relations, as per the recommendations of the Lisbon Process. On an individual basis, the southern Mediterranean countries benefit in different ways from European cooperation. In Algeria, scientific and technological cooperation with the EU remains relatively weak. The main projects fall within the framework of the Eumedis initiative (interconnection of research networks) and Tempus (higher education reform and fellowship programme). But Algeria means to step up cooperation over the 2006-2010 period through a law in the process of being passed and a forthcoming agreement with the European Union. Morocco established an in-depth strategy to develop its scientific and technological relations with the EU, signing an agreement for scientific and technological cooperation in 2003 which came into force in 2005. Morocco hopes to receive 20 million euros through the MEDA...
initiative for 2007-2013. Tunisia has called its researchers to make proposals to participate in FP7. A partnership agreement between Lebanon and the EU was concluded in 2000 and the first action plan was established in 2006, with the primary institutions of higher learning concerned being the American University of Beirut, the University of Lebanon and Saint-Joseph University. CEDRE, the Lebanese-French research grant programme, is the main bilateral cooperation programme and has funded one hundred or so projects.

The implementation of national innovation systems in the Euro-Mediterranean region is considered a necessary means of reinforcing sustainable growth on both sides of the Mediterranean

Among other initiatives supported by the EU, the ESTIME project is designed to contribute to building bridges for research between Europe and the Mediterranean region by providing clear-cut guidelines on research, technological development and innovation in Mediterranean countries. It involves eight Mediterranean partner countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Palestinian Territories) and has received funding from the European Commission from September 2004 to February 2007. In this context, a number of meetings were organised over the course of 2006 to evaluate the progress made in building bridges and the problems and issues raised: in July 2006 in Algiers, in November 2006 in Casablanca and in December 2006 in Beirut. Likewise, the Euro-MedaNet1 and Euro-MedaNet2 projects worked towards scientific and technological cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean area. The international closure conference for the latter projects, held in March 2006 and organised by the IRD (French Development Research Institute) and the European Union, examined the conditions and feasibility of heightening cooperation in the Mediterranean. Such multilateral cooperation strengthens the extant bilateral cooperation between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries, which is relatively active but is more concerned with the scientific rather than technological domain.

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The Knowledge Society and Social Modernisation in the Mediterranean

Twenty-first Century Educational Skills for Development in the Mediterranean: Quality and Curriculum Relevance

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Relationships between Europe and southern and eastern Mediterranean countries were formalised in 1995 through the Barcelona agreement, even though relations between specific European and Mediterranean countries have been going on for hundreds of years. The fact that the Mediterranean is of economic, cultural, political, and security importance for Europe led to a major initiative, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, to encourage cooperation between Europe and a number of southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995, signified a starting point of the Partnership that represented a framework for political, economic, and social relations between the member states of the European Union and partners of the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. In 2006, the Partnership comprised thirty-five members, twenty-five European Union member states and ten Mediterranean partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) with Libya having an observer status since 1999. The Euromed partners established the following three main objectives of the Partnership in the Barcelona Declaration: 1) the definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue; 2) the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area; and 3) rapprochement among peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.

What is of concern in this paper is the partnership’s emphasis on social, cultural, and human affairs and more specifically on developing human resources. Statements in the Partnership declaration accentuate the readiness of European countries to contribute to enhancing education throughout the Mediterranean region, with special attention to Mediterranean partners, by establishing a system for ongoing dialogue on educational policies with a focus on vocational training, technology in education, higher education and research, with particular attention to the role of women in education. Leaders of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership renewed their commitment to the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration in a meeting held in Barcelona on the 27th and 28th of November 2005. In what concerns education, they pledged to support educational reform, projects to increase gender equity and create a skilled workforce\(^1\).

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, how can the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership contribute to improving access, quality, and relevance of education in the Euromed region? To answer this question, the status of education in the Euromed region will be described in an attempt to identify the current challenges facing education in the region. Following this description, suggestions will be provided to address these challenges in a manner that has the potential to benefit the peoples of the southern and eastern Mediterranean and of Europe by increasing quality and relevance of education.

\(^1\) See http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressedata/en/er/87165.pdf
Status of Education in the Euromed Region

Southern and eastern Mediterranean countries have seen a notable increase in access to education at the primary level in the past two decades. The same can be said about access to secondary education, albeit with some caution, because of variability among countries in the region. For example, while the net enrolment rate at the secondary level in Jordan was 82% in 2004, that of Morocco was 35%, with net enrolment in other countries lying in between these two countries. The most serious problem seems to be at the pre-school level in which the net enrolment rate is relatively low in this region, with the highest net enrolment rate being in Lebanon (72%) and net enrolment rates in other countries ranging from 5% to 46% (Table 18). This situation is coupled with relatively high student/teacher ratios in these countries (except for Lebanon). When compared to a selected number of European countries, specifically those bordering the Mediterranean, the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries seem to lag behind in net enrolment rates at the pre-primary and secondary levels (Table 18) and at all levels in student/teacher ratios.

Quality of education and the gender gap remain problems in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries even though there was some improvement in both recently (United Nations Development Programme/Regional Bureau for Arab States (UNDP/RBAS) 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006). Quality of education in a number of southern and eastern Mediterranean countries can be gleaned from the results of the 2003 PISA and TIMSS results. These results indicate that Turkey and Tunisia, two partners in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, scored low compared to European countries on the science and math literacy and problem-solving components of the 2003 PISA (Table 19). Moreover students in the Palestinian territories, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon, also partners in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, scored low compared to European countries on the eighth grade science and math components of the 2003 TIMSS (Table 20). This is not to say that the news about science and math education in Europe is all positive. Results of PISA and TIMSS show significant variability in student achievement across European countries.

<p>| TABLE 18 | Student/Teacher Ratios and Net Enrolment Rates at the Pre-primary, Primary, and Secondary Levels in Number of Euromed Countries for the Year 2004 |</p>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Pre-primary Education</th>
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<td>Student/Teacher Ratio</td>
<td>Net Enrolment Rate</td>
<td>Student/Teacher Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine Authority</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

... Data not available

2 Israel is included with European countries in the Global Education Digest 2006 (UNESCO, 2006). Statistics presented in this document show that Israel is similar to European countries on many indicators including net enrolment rates, student/teacher ratios and gender equality.


4 Net Enrolment rate is defined as the “Number of students in the theoretical age group for a given level of education enrolled in that level expressed as a percentage of the total population of that age group” (UNESCO, 2006).

Moreover, results of Project Rose6 show that students’ attitudes toward and interest in science in many European countries are lower than those in many developing ones. Southern and eastern Mediterranean partners in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership also lag behind European countries in access to information and communication technologies (ICTs). Table 21 indicates that Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey and Lebanon have a lower number of Internet users per 1,000 inhabitants and a lower number of fixed line and mobile phone subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants than European countries bordering the Mediterranean. Moreover, many southern and eastern Mediterranean countries in the Partnership still face problems related to gender inequality because of the effect of the complex interaction of cultural, social, economic and political factors. However, despite all hurdles, women of the region have achieved significant, although not sufficient, accomplishments in the past decade (UNDP/RBAS 2006).

As evidenced in the above description of the status of education in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries and in Europe, there are significant differences between these two regions in access to and quality of education. Consequently, collaboration in these two areas can be developed to benefit both. This collaboration can help achieve the goals of the Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments (UNESCO, 2000) which affirmed the universal right of access to high quality education and strongly recommended that all countries move toward achieving the goals of Education for All. Participants in the Dakar conference pledged to meet, among other things, the learning needs of all young people and adults, eliminate gender inequality in primary and secondary education, and create healthy and safe environments conducive to high quality learning. Moreover, they committed to developing responsive, participatory and accountable systems of education, enhance the status, morale and professionalism of teachers, and employ new ICTs to achieve the goals of Education for All (Billeh,

6 See www.its.uio.no/forskning/rose/
BouJaoude and Sulieman, 2002). In addition, UNESCO (2001, 2002) encouraged countries to give high priority to secondary education, specifically, by reforming curriculum content, teaching, and examinations, linking secondary education with the world of work to increase its relevance and rethinking the roles of teachers, school leaders and other education personnel.

How can the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership contribute to increasing access to and quality of education in the region? In the remaining part of this paper, approaches that can be used in this collaboration will be discussed.

### Access to Education

There are two access-related problems that require attention in most Euromed partner states: increasing access to secondary and pre-primary education for all students and attending to gender-related access issues. Southern and eastern Mediterranean countries such as Morocco, Syria, Algeria and Tunisia have net enrolment rates of 35, 58, 66 and 64 respectively as compared to an enrolment rate of 84 in Greece, which has the lowest rate among the European countries in Table 18. This relatively low access to secondary education is problematic at a time when an educated citizenry is necessary for social and economic development. Moreover, enrolment rates in pre-primary education are very low in partner countries compared to European ones; a situation that disadvantages students and decreases their chances of success at the primary level. To remedy this problem, a variety of approaches can be used such as: 1) providing funds for countries to build schools in areas of most need in different partner countries. These funds have to be linked to national strategies and plans and ought to encourage the widest possible collaboration and contributions of the community, including the business community. Building more schools, however, might not by itself solve access problems if they are not associated with campaigns to persuade parents of the value of education for improving their and their children’s, especially girls, social and economic welfare; 2) special programs might have to be developed for special groups of young people whose ages do not allow them to join regular schools. For example, programs could be designed for young children who need accelerated programs to prepare them to join mainstream classes because they did not join the formal education system at the appropriate age. Other programs might be needed for young adults who might be working and thus cannot join regular classes; and 3) access of girls to education should be a priority in programs to increase access. Funds provided to partner countries might have to be conditional to reaching specific targets for access of girls to education and making education more girl-friendly7. All the above interventions have to be done in a culturally friendly approach to reduce the

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**TABLE 21** Internet Users and Fixed and Mobile Line Subscribers for 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Internet Users per 1,000 Inhabitants</th>
<th>Fixed Line and Mobile Phone Subscribers per 1,000 Inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>1,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>1,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>1,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>1,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>1,541</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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7 See EUROMED Partnership: Acting for Gender Equality (2006) for a number of activities funded by the European Commission to reduce gender inequality in the EUROMED partner states.
possibility of negative reactions that could be detrimental to well-intentioned but misunderstood programs and initiatives.

**Quality of Education and Curriculum Relevance**

Increasing access to education might solve the problem of the degree to which education is available to students in most Euromed partner states. While this increased access is necessary, it is not sufficient to help students move safely into the twenty-first century. What is in fact needed is a change in the kind of education that is made available to students in Euromed partner states. All these students should have access to high quality education that responds and is relevant to their needs and the needs of society, provides them with skills appropriate for the twenty-first century and helps them develop lifelong learning skills. The recommendations provided below might benefit students in European as well as in Euromed partner states.

One set of considerations for improving education was presented by Resnick (2001). Resnick proposed nine principles of education that have the potential to define the nature of education in the twenty-first century derived from a synthesis of research in psychology and education. These are: 1) organising for effort, 2) clear expectations, 3) fair and credible evaluations, 4) recognition of accomplishment, 5) academic rigor in a thinking curriculum, 6) accountable talk, 7) socialising intelligence, 8) self-management of learning and 9) learning as apprenticeship. These principles can be used to design programs that aim to prepare thoughtful, reflective and competent individuals capable of living and working in the scientifically and technologically changing world of the twenty-first century. These principles are elaborated below.

Schools in the twenty-first century should convey the message that effort, not merely aptitude, produces high achievement in all students. Accordingly, these schools support all students to develop skills, knowledge and attitudes necessary to succeed and excel in all subject areas and in life. Furthermore, effort-based schools have clear and high expectations that stakeholders including students, school administrators, teachers, parents and the community share. These expectations require students to achieve minimum, although high, standards in all curricular areas, particularly in math, science and technology because these provide them with the tools to succeed in a scientifically and technologically rich world. Finally, effort-based schools do not tolerate mediocrity because it has the potential to widen the gap between those who have access to appropriate and useful knowledge and those who do not.

However, a context in which all students are expected to invest the effort to achieve high and challenging standards demands fair and credible evaluation that is recognised as such by all stakeholders. In the competitive environment of the new global community, society in general, and businesses more specifically, cannot afford to re-teach students who have just graduated from high school. They expect high school graduates to have mastered knowledge and skills and developed positive attitudes on which they can build and that they can transfer across domains and to novel situations. Teaching the “what” of knowledge is no longer sufficient; what is needed is underscoring the “how” in order to prepare students to be active producers rather than passive consumers of knowledge. When students exert the effort to achieve high and demanding standards and when evaluations are fair and credible, authentic achievement should be recognised and rewarded. Providing students with meaningful formative feedback and recognising and rewarding their achievements are necessary processes that guide them to produce high quality independent work.

Curricula in twenty-first century effort-based schools cannot continue to focus on old basics. Critical thinking and problem-solving should be the new basics in the new millennium. Learning and teaching content that is irrelevant to students’ lives and society is unacceptable. Also unacceptable is teaching thinking and problem solving isolated from subject matter. Thinking and a solid foundation of knowledge are inseparable: it is impossible to teach content without teaching thinking skills and thinking skills without content. Being “intelligent” is a social activity that requires problem-solving and reasoning abilities along with the preparedness to use these abilities to solve academic and everyday problems such as 

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8 See Jurdak, M. (1994). Selected lectures from the 7th International Congress on Mathematics Education, Quebec, Canada, August 1992, for a discussion of the differences between degree and kind of education.

problems associated with the environment. These abilities develop when teachers expect students to use them and provide opportunities for students to practice them. Finally, teaching thinking integrated with content should not be restricted to programs for the gifted and talented, as is currently the case in many schools. It should be an integral component of the curricula of all schools. To say it succinctly, all students in the twenty-first century need to develop critical thinking skills and a strong foundation of content that will make them productive and successful citizens.

Twenty-first century curricula at all education levels and in all subject areas should be *rigorous and organised around major concepts* that allow students to think and solve authentic and meaningful problems. If a rigorous thinking curriculum is advisable in all subject areas, it is essential in science and technology. The rate at which scientific knowledge is produced and technological advances are developed necessitates the emphasis on mastery of core concepts, thinking and problem-solving skills, and skills for lifelong learning. It also requires that students learn and apply science inquiry and investigative skills and understand the relationships between science, technology and society.

Research has revealed the existence of relationships between engagement in classroom discourse and achievement. This research has demonstrated that encouraging students to talk in the classroom is not sufficient; what truly matters is that this talk be *accountable* to the learning community, to accurate and appropriate knowledge and to rigorous thinking. Accountable talk takes place within a community of learners, draws on evidence appropriate to the discipline and follows appropriate logical standards. When used appropriately, accountable talk develops student thinking and allows them to construct personal and meaningful knowledge. Accountable talk models the process of scientific and technological inquiry in that its arguments take into consideration experiences of others along with new evidence to produce new claims. Helping students to use accountable talk at all educational levels and in all school subjects is instrumental in preparing them to be responsible citizens and life-long inquirers and learners.

The principles of education discussed above do not yield positive results if the educational process is controlled by others, especially the teacher. Thinking rigorously and using accountable talk call for helping students to develop a set of *self-monitoring strategies* that will help them manage their learning personally. The self-monitoring and self-correcting skills–meta-cognitive skills–characterise successful and efficient individuals who are persistent in their attempts to decide what new knowledge and skills they need to stay up-to-date in an ever-changing world. Developing self-monitoring skills is especially important in the scientifically and technologically changing world in which students live; a world that requires them to keep up with the new knowledge and skills needed in the world of work.

Finally, schools of the twenty-first century have to benefit from what is known about apprenticeship learning because of its possible implications for education. Apprenticeships help students to gain complex interdisciplinary knowledge, learn the norms of professional communities, develop practical abilities and skills in a natural setting and, more importantly, to create authentic products under the supervision of experts. Schools benefit from creating school environments that approximate the natural setting of knowledge production and work in order to maximise students’ learning and make school learning more relevant to students’ lives and the world of work. Recommendations regarding the need for educational reforms advanced in the Partnership for 21st Century Skills and reform in science and technology education advocated by Bybee and Fuchs (2006) echo those presented by Resnick (2001). Bybee and Fuchs’ recommendations identify the need for high quality teachers, rigorous content and coherent curricula, suitable classroom tests and assessments aligned with twenty-first century goals. Moreover, they identify the need to prepare citizens who have critical thinking skills, are able to use complex communications skills and have the ability to solve semi-structured and everyday problems. According to Bybee and Fuchs “These sound much like the abilities that students could acquire after instructional activities designed to give them practice in the processes of scientific inquiry and technological design” (p. 350). In its turn, the Partnership for 21st Century Skills recommends putting emphasis on understanding core academic content at high levels, learning information and communication skills, thinking and problem-solving skills, and interpersonal and self-directional skills. Moreover, it stresses the need to develop ICT literacy defined as “the interest, attitude

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10 See [www.21stcenturyskills.org](http://www.21stcenturyskills.org)
The second, and more essential step, is and ability of individuals to appropriately use digital technology and communication tools to access, manage, integrate and evaluate information, construct new knowledge and communicate with others in order to participate effectively in society (Van Joolingen, 2004). Finally, the Partnership for 21st Century Skills proposes that teaching and learning be implemented in a twenty-first century context, which necessitates learning academic content through real-world examples, applications and experiences and using appropriate tools and approaches to measure students’ performance on twenty-first century content and skills. These approaches help to bridge the gap between the knowledge and skills most students acquire in school and those needed in typical 21st century communities and workplaces; between how students live and how they learn. The world in which students will live in the very near future, and in which many of them are presently living, will require all of them to have access to technology and to function in a technology-driven world that will call for multitasking and continuous adaptation and change. The appropriate use of ICT in schools is a recurrent recommendation in the reports about education in the twenty-first century summarised above. However, how can this be accomplished in a manner that benefits European and Euromed partners alike? The first step is to guarantee access to ICTs to as many students as possible, irrespective of their economic background, a step that will require cooperation and financial and technical assistance by European countries. The second, and more essential step, is the meaningful integrating of electronic and information technologies into teacher preparation and consequently into classroom instruction. This integration should enable teachers to master the necessary skills to prepare students who think critically, solve problems and are able to adapt, adopt, invent and evaluate technology for independent lifelong learning and informed decision-making.

Meaningful integration of electronic and information technologies should enable students to know how and why they use technology, appreciate the role of technology in modern society, understand the perils and benefits of using technology, and be conscious of the ethical dilemmas associated with the development and use of technological innovations in all realms of life. Furthermore, education should not simply teach students the technical skills needed to use technology, but ensure that technology is used as a vehicle for thinking and learning. What is needed is to integrate technology in teaching and learning subject matter through the use of a variety of available tools. For example, rather than merely providing students with access to the Internet and letting them use it unsystematically, they can be encouraged to conduct targeted explorations to access information sources, evaluate information from these sources, find answers to authentic problems and solve problems by using inquiry processes explicitly in all subject areas. The focus ought to be on helping students use the Internet and the available inquiry-enabling technologies (Hofstein
such as calculator or computer-based laboratories, (CBL and MBL) in science to develop students' mathematical and scientific skills and abilities and make science learning as similar as possible to what goes on when scientific knowledge is constructed in laboratories and other research settings.

In summary, enhancing curriculum quality and relevance requires similar initiatives in all the Mediterranean states without neglecting the local culture of each of these states. It is evident that increasing quality requires learners to develop in-depth understanding of content, acquire and use thinking and problem solving skills, and apply the necessary effort to learn. It also requires educators to insure the alignment between curriculum content, teaching practices and assessment, and making education accessible to all. More importantly, it requires a redefinition of what constitutes “basics” in education. The basics of the new millennium include meaningful use of technology, rigorous content, and thinking, problem-solving, and lifelong learning skills, in addition to the traditional basics. This is because students in the twenty-first century will live in a "multitasking, multifaceted, technology-driven, diverse, vibrant world”11 that requires them to take ownership of their learning.

In its turn, teaching should adapt to the requirements of life in the 21st century. Teaching decontextualised subject matter will result in inert knowledge that is neither useful nor enduring. What is needed is using teaching to bridge the gap between school and life by bringing life into the classroom and taking the classroom to everyday life. This bridging increases the relevance of the curriculum; a curriculum that should be designed to take account of the twenty-first century basics and help students learn with others cooperatively and solve academic and authentic everyday problems, for example environmental problems. Approaches that might be effective in achieving the goals of a twenty-first century curriculum might require valuing and assessing academic as well as instrumental knowledge by treating teaching and learning as apprenticeship, emphasising and evaluating students' ability to solve authentic problems, and emulating the modern world by making technology part and parcel of the teaching/learning process rather than an add-on to this process. Finally, even though educators might agree that the changes described above are necessary, none of these changes will happen in the absence of the political will to change.

References


11 See www.21stcenturyskills.org/
The Knowledge Society and Social Modernisation in the Mediterranean

**Euro-Mediterranean Scientific Cooperation: Facts, Obstacles and Solutions Using ICTs. Practical Cases**

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**Juan Miguel González Aranda**  
Associate Scientist  
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Andalusia Delegation, Seville

**Background**

The Barcelona Declaration of 28/11/1995 marked a turning point in Euro-Mediterranean relations by creating a frame of reference for political, economic and social cooperation with a view to establishing a global Euro-Mediterranean association. It underlines the importance of scientific cooperation and establishing scientific cooperation networks between the European Union (EU) and Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC) as a key source of support for economic development. In line with this perception, a Monitoring Committee of Euro-Mediterranean Scientific Cooperation (MoCo) was created formed by high-ranking officials from the 25 EU Member States and ten countries that form the Euro-Mediterranean association (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Palestine and Turkey). Euro-Mediterranean scientific cooperation has two core components: bilateral cooperation activities between member countries and MPCs, and actions funded by the European Union through various means, mainly the MEDA programme, which was created as a result of the Barcelona Declaration and the EU Framework Programme (FP) for Research. Scientific cooperation between the EU and MPCs with community funding has had its own identity since 1992 with the INCO programme, which was created during the 3rd Framework Programme (FP) and continued through successive FPs. So far, some 500 million euros have been spent on over 600 joint projects in areas dealing with issues of common interest, from healthcare to the development of Information and Communication Technology (ICT).

**Importance of Scientific Cooperation**

The perception of citizens regarding the benefits of scientific research, its universal character, and its detachment from ideological models that cause conflicts between countries and religious communities enable cooperation models in this field to be seen as an experimental platform that issues recommendations on cooperation mechanisms contained in the Barcelona Declaration. Moreover, the cosmopolitan, international nature of scientific relations turns them into a model based on mutual respect and recognition of the abilities of the collaborating parties, becoming a referent for other areas of cooperation defined in the Barcelona Declaration. However, scientific activity cannot be undertaken independently of each society's cultural models and specific circumstances, particularly in terms of their public administrations.

The development of Euro-Mediterranean scientific cooperation suffers from a shortage of appropriate infrastructures to channel its activities. Nevertheless, a number of cooperation networks have been created through programmes that are either bilateral (state-to-state) or multilateral (framework programme or major regional programmes), yielding significant achievements on which to build projects of mutual interest and Euro-Mediterranean integration plans (the ERA European Research Area, and EMIS Euro-Mediterranean Innovation Space).

Certain research fields offer real collaboration opportunities based on mutual interest, and a large part of the scientific community in MPCs has forged and maintains strong ties with universities and research centres in the EU. Indeed, many elements suggest that
this type of collaboration can be successfully set up. However, the reality is somewhat different, with levels of cooperation and strengthening of ties producing results that are worse than expected. There is a generalised view that the tools and resources available to scientific cooperation policies are not being efficiently used. It is worth determining where the fault lies.

**The Impulse and Agents**

During the 9th Meeting in El Cairo in 2003, MoCo looked at the obstacles hindering EU-MPC cooperation and suggested that the real state of cooperation be analysed to create or enhance support structures favouring cooperation and to identify scientific problems of common interest to EU-MPC. As a result of these recommendations, the EUROMEDANET, ESTIME, MED7 and ASBIMED projects have been conducted over the past four years, and their conclusions have led to a diagnosis of the deficiencies and obstacles, as well as the opportunities, of Euro-Mediterranean scientific and technological cooperation.

There is an absence of centralised information on Euro-Mediterranean scientific and technological cooperation not only in the MPCs, but also within the EU Member States, and difficulties have been encountered in accessing this information online. Although no doubt due to the spontaneous nature of scientific relations between people and institutions, this seriously hinders the definition of sustainable long-term strategies that can be included in the framework of the Barcelona objectives.

Furthermore, many bilateral cooperation programmes are the result of political agreements between governments that provide a simple frame of reference generally lacking specific contents that provide for common interests or demands of the RDI system (Research, Development and Innovation), with the exception of research grants and mobility policies along with other training tools of crucial importance to southern Mediterranean countries. There is also a predominance of academic initiatives in these relations over the almost non-existent industrial demand for scientific cooperation from southern countries, the opposite of what occurs in relations with China and India.

However, there is a clear perception of common scientific interests between the two shores of the Mediterranean, particularly in the spheres of cultural heritage, public healthcare, global climate change, water and agriculture management, renewable energies and ICT application.

There is also a predominance of academic initiatives in these relations over the almost non-existent industrial demand for scientific cooperation from southern countries, the opposite of what occurs in relations with China and India.

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Obstacles

**Time Management**

Time management is one of the greatest obstacles in organising Euro-Mediterranean scientific cooperation. The “time” of the cooperation is that of the participants' slowest administration. This is a generalised phenomenon, but an efficient use of time is critical for research, and indeed for business. An idea is original when it first appears, but loses its novelty and impact
potential if its analysis and development is delayed. When scientific activity by public entities is seriously limited during the administrative process, there is a loss of leading activity referents, the results of which compete for global recognition.

**Administrative and Financial Management**

Broadly speaking, MPC structures are conceived for managing resources from national sources. Except in rare cases, there are no efficient procedures for handling international funds, whether due to the monetary precautions for controlling transfers and exchanges, or because treatment protocols for these funds excessively prolong their availability and/or cause considerable losses during the procedure. Some researchers even believe the money from the EU should be managed by institutions belonging to the EU itself to avoid delays in its use, which evidently does little to help transform the institutions. Therefore, it is a universal effort by the scientific community to gain autonomy and create management models that are adapted to research tasks while avoiding subordination of procedures and time and resource management typical of ordinary public administrations. The disconnection between management and function causes all kinds of serious problems in the development of international collaboration processes.

**Innovative Activity and Knowledge Management**

Another major issue is the analysis of the innovative function of cooperation, that is, its use as a source of knowledge that can be applied to the production system. With the exception of Israel, which has numerous bilateral and multilateral programmes focusing on innovation, collaboration projects in almost all MPCs appear more or less spontaneously in the academy, with low incidence of industrial sectors. This scenario is slowly changing with the creation of “Centres of Expertise” in Tunisia and Morocco and “Science Cities” and “Technology Parks” in Egypt and Jordan, where spaces shared by the industry and academy are being established and are beginning to gain relevance in the international cooperation arena. This trend should be encouraged and the EU can contribute to its consolidation by employing knowledge gained from national experience and the regional development policy defined by the European Commission REGIO general directorate.

**Knowledge Management and the Role of ICTs in Euro-Mediterranean Scientific Cooperation**

Nowadays, the role of Knowledge in organisations has changed due to the paradigms associated with the Information Society and new knowledge-based economy, which evidently also affects Euro-Mediterranean international cooperation in science and technology. Its assets are chiefly the quality of the scientific community on both sides of the Mediterranean, the longstanding relationships that have yielded excellent results in terms of scientific publications and research personnel training programmes and, above all, the need to cooperate in solving problems of common interest.

Research generates a need for communication, exchange and debate that cannot be subordinated to administrative procedures. It is necessary to disseminate the results of these networks and initiatives using specific knowledge management methods and techniques, with a communication strategy geared toward agents who are involved at an educational, research and industrial activity level, as well as toward the various administrations and political decision-makers.

Within this context, ICTs are an essential solution, since they:

- Detect the existence of “Communities of Practice” (CoP) (Wenger et al, 2002) in the scientific and technical field: groups of individuals (scientists, technicians, industrialists, etc) not necessarily structured around a formal nucleus who show an interest in a certain field or discipline area either individually or collectively.
- Strengthen these CoPs in Science and Technology by implementing a series of infrastructures that guarantee connectivity by means of Technology Platforms (points of access to Broadband Networks, Internet, Semantic Web, etc.), an essential requirement for adjusting cooperation time to that of their contents.

The EUMEDIS and CULTNAT initiatives are examples of a successful implementation of this type of “complementary duality” between Platform and Contents. It is clear that the resolution of problems and their global dimension on the international arena calls for communication tools that facilitate effective dialogue and ongoing updates of the most diverse content, allowing access to these tools regardless of the geographical location, time zones or organisational
borders. In other words, far from posing problems, the heterogeneity of organisational cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area actually enrich these types of structures.

In recent years, there has been a noticeable increase in the inception of virtual cooperation networks in the form of CoPs, which experience an ongoing transformation process from the moment they are created. At the same time, they unfold in a political, environmental and socioeconomic context that largely determines their evolution and, thus, their sustainability. The latter will depend on the impact of the results achieved, measured by indicators such as the day-to-day motivation of its members within the network, their “flexibility” and a somewhat informal knowledge exchange on an inter-organisational level. Trust is another important factor of ICT tools and depends largely on the users’ training during the initial launch. There is no “road map” setting the phases for the ideal articulation of these types of networks from a governance point of view. It is clear from experience that if they are managed by people and/or institutions with accredited reputations in the scientific and technological fields and assisted by an advisory committee of experts and suitable agents, the Governance and, as a possible consequence, the Sustainability of this kind of networks (CoPs) will be guaranteed.

In this particular case, the main aim of these ubiquitous, secure collaboration mechanisms is to generate an intellectual and knowledge base using the definition and identification of a series of indicators that may subsequently enable benchmarking and assessment of the science and technology policies of these networks, one of the main aims of the ASBIMED and MED 7 Projects described below.

**ASBIMED Project**

The members of organisations that form the International Science and Technology Cooperation Networks use collaboration that is generally based on bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation programmes

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**GRAPHIC 7**

*Programmes of Bilateral Cooperation in Science and Technology*

- AT - Austria: 1 (0.76%)
- BE - Belgium: 10 (7.63%)
- BG - Bulgaria: 2 (1.53%)
- CY - Cyprus: 2 (1.53%)
- CZ - Czech Republic: 2 (1.53%)
- DE - Germany: 19 (14.6%)
- DK - Denmark: 3 (2.29%)
- EE - Estonia: 12 (9.16%)
- FI - Finland: 4 (3.05%)
- FR - France: 96 (27.49%)
- GR - Greece: 4 (3.05%)
- HR - Croatia: 2 (1.53%)
- HU - Hungary: 1 (0.76%)
- IE - Ireland: 3 (2.29%)
- IT - Italy: 1 (0.76%)
- LV - Latvia: 2 (1.53%)
- MK - Macedonia: 2 (1.53%)
- MT - Malta: 2 (1.53%)
- NL - Netherlands: 2 (1.53%)
- NO - Norway: 3 (2.29%)
- PL - Poland: 4 (3.05%)
- PT - Portugal: 1 (0.76%)
- RO - Romania: 3 (2.29%)
- SE - Sweden: 1 (0.76%)
- SI - Slovenia: 1 (0.76%)
- SK - Slovak Republic: 7 (5.49%)
- TR - Turkey: 6 (4.62%)

* Distribution in number and percentage of programmes of bilateral cooperation in Science and Technology (over a total of 124 identified by 22nd June 2006) by EU countries and other European countries including Croatia, Macedonia, Norway and Iceland. Turkey is also included as a Candidate Country for incorporation in the EU.
that are subdivided into projects under the umbrella of a common knowledge management strategy applied to a certain scientific and technological theme.

The ASBIMED Project, coordinated by the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), aims to assess the topics and instruments of bilateral scientific and technological cooperation between the 25 EU Member States plus Romania and Bulgaria (which joined the European club in January 2007), and Turkey (viewed collectively with other countries including Croatia, Macedonia, Norway and Iceland), with the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC). The purpose was to identify the bilateral science and technology cooperation activities of Member States and determine the activities that may overlap and/or complement the strategic objectives of the European Research Area (ERA) in the field of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and the MEDA Agenda for Cooperation in Research, Development and Innovation.

Although at the beginning the period of study was 1998-2003, it has been extended to include Programmes and Projects of International Cooperation in Science and Technology outside this period given their interest. ASBIMED aimed to analyse and identify:

- The thematic priorities developed by bilateral cooperation, as well as its intensity, expressed as the number of joint publications, student exchanges, projects and funding. In addition, joint participation in projects of the EU Fifth Framework Programme was analysed as a preliminary indicator of traditional cooperation.
- The instruments used include travel grants, student exchange, joint projects, access to infrastructures and seminars, as well as their performance and relevance.
- The budget for bilateral cooperation and its distribution according to priorities and instruments.
- The industrial or social sectors that benefit from bilateral cooperation. The degree of innovation introduced in the socioeconomic fabric by bilateral science and development cooperation.
- The institutions, their character (universities, hospitals, research centres, companies, etc), personalities and experts involved in bilateral cooperation.

The ASBIMED Project has provided information for defining a “state of the art” of existing bilateral international cooperation in science and technology between EU Member States plus Turkey and the MPCs, and the cooperation between the latter (MPC-MPC), which can be used to guarantee increased effectiveness in terms of resource mobility to support, among other objectives, the participation of MPCs with possibilities of success in the Seventh EU Framework Programme and, at the same time, to refine the criteria for implementing the MEDA programme.

The consortium that constituted the Project used this information to draw up a report on each Mediterranean Partner Country's cooperation activities.
country and a global overview on the assets, obstacles and opportunities in bilateral science and technology cooperation between the EU and MPCs. The identification and awareness of the aforementioned cooperation mechanisms is a prerequisite for tackling the objectives defined:

- To support external relations, including those related to the Euro-Mediterranean Community’s development policy.
- To enhance coordination and complementarity with activities based on Community foreign policy instruments (MEDA and its MoCo, inter alia).
- To support joint efforts by the Community and EU Member States to open the European Research Area (ERA) to the rest of the Euro-Mediterranean Area. Bilateral cooperation between EU Member States and MPCs has a longer standing tradition than actions carried out since the founding of the Directorate-General for International Cooperation in Science and Technology (DG-RTD). However, there has been almost no coordination between these national and European actions. The participation of MPCs in the Framework Programme should not ignore existing networks and areas of expertise created under bilateral cooperation prior to the INCO Programme within the Framework Programmes. Various cooperation schemes between Member States, or even some of its regions, with a certain MPC have been shown to duplicate a similar effort by another Member State. This situation in itself reflects the urgent need for Member States to coordinate scientific and technological cooperation policies. Some graphics from the study are particularly representative of the degree and intensity of this cooperation. Other graphics, tables and maps belonging to general and specific reports by Mediterranean Partner Country (MPC) can be found on the Project’s Intranet website and on a Multimedia compilation CD that has been published for dissemination.

### MED 7 Project

The main objective of the MED 7 Project, organised under the auspices of MoCo and coordinated by CSIC, was to identify the most relevant topics, priorities and technical instruments to promote Euro-Mediterranean scientific and technological cooperation during the Seventh Framework Programme-FP7 (2007-2013).

Technically, the MED 7 Project consisted of six thematic workshops (plus an assessment workshop) that sought the opinions of prestigious experts in topics of interest in the Euro-Mediterranean area, from both EU Member States and MPCs. Representatives and personalities from MoCo and the European Commission also attended. These meetings were held in various Mediterranean locations, as shown in the following table (Table 22).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Workshops</th>
<th>Place and Date</th>
<th>Organising institutions belonging to the member consortium of the MED 7 Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Production Systems and Processes</td>
<td>(Casablanca, Morocco, 6-7 May 2005)</td>
<td>Technology Directorate – Ministry of Science and Higher Education of Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Risk Management and Renewable Energies</td>
<td>(Athens, Greece, 16-17 May 2005)</td>
<td>National Hellenic Research Foundation (NHRF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>(Tel-Aviv, Israel, 25-26 May 2005)</td>
<td>Israel Directorate for Scientific and Technical Cooperation between Israel-Europe for the EU Framework Programmes (ISERD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-Food and Industrial Agriculture</td>
<td>(Montpellier, France, 9-10 June 2005)</td>
<td>Centre for International Cooperation of Agro-Food Research for Development (CIRAD) – France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Heritage</td>
<td>(St. George’s Bay, Malta, 16-17 June 2005)</td>
<td>Malta Council for Science and Technology (MSCT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthesis/Assessment Conference</td>
<td>(Naples, Italy, 25-26 June 2005)</td>
<td>Department of International Activities – Third Division – Mediterranean and Middle East (CNR)-Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
<td>(Brussels, Belgium, 15 September 2005)</td>
<td>Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC, Spanish Council for Scientific Research) - Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 22: Summary of the Thematic Workshops Organised under the MED 7 Project
Among other recommendations, it acknowledged that the transition towards a knowledge-based economy in Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC) requires:

- An economic and institutional framework capable of promoting the efficient use of knowledge and innovative forms of entrepreneurship.
- Education for the population to create, share and use knowledge.
- Investment in dynamic information infrastructures and systems.
- Setting up national research and innovation systems to generate synergies with the industrial sector, research centres and, in general, the socioeconomic apparatus in MPCs.

The results of the MED 7 Project are compiled in a series of reports that include the remaining recommendations on the thematic areas considered and other areas that are summarised. These reports can be found on the Intranet of the MED 7 Project Website or on the Multimedia CD published for dissemination.

**Conclusions**

It is necessary to create management models that are adapted to research while avoiding subordination of procedures and time management marked by ordinary public administrations in the Euro-Mediterranean Area.

Management and dissemination of knowledge obtained by Communities of Practice (CoP) working in science and technology in the Euro-Mediterranean context should be undertaken using specific methods and techniques, with a communication strategy geared toward agents involved at an educational, research and industrial activity level, as well as toward the administrations and political decision-makers.

All of the above justifies the need to support the design, implementation and maintenance of ICT tools that enable the strengthening and emergence of new cooperation networks and are essential for the process of assessing the associated policies of cooperation in science and technology.

**References and Links**

Barcelona Declaration:  

11th MoCo Meeting: Vienna, 28th-30th June 2006  
[www.bmbwk.gv.at/moco](http://www.bmbwk.gv.at/moco)


EU International Science and Technology Policy (RTD-INCO)  

European Research Area (ERA)  

EUROMEDANET Project: [www.euromedanet.gr](http://www.euromedanet.gr)

ESTIME Project: [www.estime.ird.fr](http://www.estime.ird.fr)

ASBIMED Project: “Assessment of the bilateral scientific co-operation between the European Union Member States, Accession Countries, Candidate Countries and the Mediterranean Partner Countries”. Funded by the Sixth EU Framework Programme, identifier FP6-INCO-CT-2004-510659  
[www.asbimed.net](http://www.asbimed.net)

[www.asbimed.net/MED7/HOME.htm](http://www.asbimed.net/MED7/HOME.htm)

EU DG-REGIO:  


EUMEDIS Initiative: [www.eumedis.net](http://www.eumedis.net)

CULTNAT Initiative: [www.cultnat.org](http://www.cultnat.org)

EU Research DG (DG-RTD)  
The Knowledge Society and Social Modernisation in the Mediterranean

Brain Circulation and Knowledge Society in the Mediterranean Region

Ummuhan Bardak
Labour Market Specialist
European Training Foundation, Turin

Knowledge is recognised as a cornerstone of human development, a means of expanding people’s capabilities and choices, increasingly a dynamic factor of production and a powerful driver of productivity and sustainable growth. The transformation of existing societal structures by knowledge as a core resource for economic growth, employment and as a factor of production constitutes the basis for designating advanced modern society as a ‘knowledge society’. The societal transformation is through large-scale development in education, healthcare, agriculture and governance, which in turn leads to employment generation, high productivity and rural prosperity. In this society knowledge diffusion, production and application become the organising principle in all aspects of human activity – culture, society, economy, politics and private life – and the older measures of competitiveness such as labour and capital are superseded by dimensions such as patents, research and development, availability of (or ability to afford) knowledge workers.

Social transformation together with globalisation has increased the mobility of human capital and high-skilled individuals as knowledge forms an integral part of the global economy. Mobility schemes have become an important part of tertiary education and professional work at both national and international levels. For the initiators of these programmes, mobility is a good thing. In parallel to this view, however, there is a darker perception of international mobility – its supposed effect of ‘brain drain’. A sustained and substantial net outflow of persons from one country to another can threaten the foundations of a country’s science and innovation capacity and lead to concentration of economic activity abroad at the expense of origin countries. Recently such concerns have been additionally fuelled by the concept of knowledge society. Since the wealth and material well-being of a nation depends much more on its capacity to produce new knowledge and innovation today, to lose one’s key knowledge producers is deemed as much more damaging in times of knowledge-based economies than in past agrarian societies.

The parallel existence of the high regard for internationalisation and international mobility and the fear of fostering brain drain appear contradictory, but results depend on a vast array of complex variables: temporary with occasional returns versus permanent migration, multi-directional instead of unilateral movement, and a global phenomenon affecting developed and developing countries alike. Thus the complexity of the flows prevents any simple conclusion. Certainly the conditions that govern mobility have changed dramatically, in terms of new forms of communication, transportation, geopolitics, intercultural relationships and commerce, and have lost some of the traditional features that led to brain drain. Increased ability to interact at a distance helps maintain umbilical links with regions of origin. The barriers of distance and space have been minimised in the information era, opening up a whole array of opportunities and challenges in the way people communicate, live and run daily activities.

With ever increasing quantity of high-skilled labour mobility and significant changes in migration patterns, a paradigm shift has occurred from ‘brain drain’ to ‘brain circulation’, defining the issue in terms of ‘circulation’ of skills and manpower, which has a major consequence for public policy, namely that the mobility

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1 The Mediterranean countries included in this analysis are Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria and Tunisia.
of high-skilled labour is seen as a normal process that should not be stopped, its real challenge being its management in the best possible way. This circulation model approaches migration in terms of an on-going process rather than single permanent moves but it also distinguishes the issue of knowledge transfer from the physical presence of the individual migrant (recognising that forms of transfer may take place in other ways). Although it does not exclude any types of migrants, the concept of brain circulation implies a special focus on the high-skilled and their contribution to knowledge exchange, dissemination and (scientific, technological and economic) networking between the centre and peripheral regions. Particularly higher education students, university lecturers, scientists, research and development personnel, business networks of innovative start-ups and other professionals working for multinationals are cited.

Brain circulation emphasises a more dynamic process of networking and linkages and positive aspects of compensation mechanisms to mitigate the disadvantages—such as expertise development, business contacts, scientific exchange and cooperation, co-authorship and transfer of technology. As shown by Saxenian (2002) in the case of Indian and Chinese expatriates at Silicon Valley, mobile experts have the potential to become catalysts for expanding knowledge, business and venture initiatives and enhancing the knowledge transaction across borders. They do not need to be financial investors; they can serve as ‘bridges’ by providing access to markets, sources of investment and expertise. Influential expatriates can shape public debates, articulate reform plans and help implement reforms and new projects with their policy expertise and managerial knowledge. They can link local producers more directly to the market opportunities and networks of more advanced economies, create new market incentives that profoundly affect the pace and direction of economic progress in both locations, and transfer not only technology and capital, but also managerial and institutional know-how to formerly peripheral regions. This article starts with an overview of educational systems in the Mediterranean region since human capital formation is the starting point of any discussion on socio-economic development and knowledge society. Highly educated citizens generate more benefits for themselves and for society, create a positive effect on work productivity, provision of key public services, tax revenues and constructive social and political debates. They constitute the core of the middle classes of their countries, demanding better public services and more transparent and democratic institutions. Then, it continues with a brief migration history of the region with a special focus on migrants’ skills. The proportion of skilled emigrants is particularly relevant for its implications on brain circulation. Finally, it looks at the situation of returnees and diaspora networks regarding their potential for a circulation model between the south and north shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

**An Overview of Regional Education Systems and the ‘Knowledge Society’**

Education has been a political priority in the Mediterranean region for the last five decades, attracting a significant public investment from governments driven by rapidly expanding youth populations and the need to build nationhood. With an average investment of 5–6% of the GDP, a significant increase in the literacy rates and the average educational attainment of the labour force have been achieved. Literacy improved dramatically in almost all countries from 1960 to 2007, more than doubling in every country that started with a low base. Among the population aged 15 years and above, the literacy rate in 2000 was 90% in Jordan, 87% in Lebanon, 75% in Syria, 65% in Egypt and 55% in Morocco. This was achieved by improving access to education and recording increases in the average number of school years per person. The overall weighted average of school years for the Arab region amounted to 1.1 years in 1960, which increased progressively to 4.83 years by 2000. In 2000, the average school years for the population aged 15 years and above were 6.91 years in Jordan, 5.77 years in Syria and 5.51 years in Egypt (ETF 2007).

As a consequence, the formal education indicators have been improving rapidly in these countries. With
few exceptions, most countries provide basic education for most children and opportunities for upper secondary, vocational training and tertiary education for many. By 1999, the net enrolment rate in Egypt was 96.94% in primary education, 74.3% in preparatory education and 65% in secondary education. In Algeria, the enrolment rates for primary school are about 94% for males and 92% for females. In Tunisia, 99.2% attended primary education in 2001. Morocco, in spite of raising the primary enrolment rate from 84.6% in 2000 to 91.6% in 2004, is still one of the worst cases in the region. Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon are often mentioned among the better performers, while Morocco, Egypt and Syria are behind them on most indicators (Bardak 2006).

Despite the impressive educational expansion in the region, the coverage of the educational systems and the average attainment levels of education still lag behind compared with good examples of the developing world (e.g. Eastern Europe, East Asia, Latin America). This has potentially important consequences for knowledge society. Very low starting levels of education in the 1960s require continuing investment with significant financial costs since equal access to different levels of education by males and females, by rich and poor, and by urban and rural residents is still problematic, albeit to varying degrees among the countries. As literacy increases more rapidly in urban areas (Lebanon, Jordan and Tunisia), countries with very significant rural populations (Morocco, Egypt) have lower adult literacy rates – around and above 50%. A large proportion of dropouts include children from rural and poor families who are likely to join informal labour markets under economic hardships and poverty. In 1994, Moroccan net primary enrolment was 58% in rural areas and 85% in urban areas, and Tunisian secondary enrolment in rural areas was as low as 19% while in Tunis it was 78%. Literacy in the region is at least 20% lower among women, and females in predominantly rural countries are at a distinct disadvantage. Girls are less likely to be literate, to receive a secondary education and to reach university or higher vocational training in the region. Therefore, a continuing strong public sector commitment is necessary for the completion of universal access to compulsory education, reductions in dropout rates, higher completion rates and internationally competitive learning achievements. Due to high demographic pressure and continuous expansion in educational systems (with decreasing expenditure per student), focus on access also overshadows the issue of quality. According to observers, the quality of education is neglected at the expense of expanding mass education and the most serious problem facing Arab education is its deteriorating quality at all stages of education. The crucial question for Mediterranean countries is how education can meet the challenges of knowledge society, which are more than traditional literacy and schooling rates. Educational systems must generate awareness in students concerning the requirements of knowledge economy including its values, attitudes and practices; ensure that this process is inclusive and does not further exploit marginalised classes; sound work ethics are instilled into new generations. Students – one of the key pools of human resources for developing countries – must acquire certain skills that are required by a modern economy (i.e. core competences, languages, digital literacy, etc) (UN 2003).

Evaluating the quality of education in the Arab world is difficult owing to insufficient information and data. In one of the few examples of standardised comparative measurements, ten countries of the region (Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, WBGS, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Tunisia) took part in the 2003 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) together with 35 other countries of the world. The results showed that the proportion of students failing to achieve even the low benchmark in mathematics and science is 81% in Saudi Arabia, 71% in Syria, 58% in Morocco, 49% in Bahrain, 48% in Egypt, 45% in Tunisia, 40% in Jordan, and 32% in Lebanon. Similar national assessments also confirm that basic literacy and mathematics skills have deteriorated since the late 1980s in Egypt, and a declining performance in French and science has been reported in Morocco. There are also signs of high failure and repetition rates, leading to longer periods being spent at the different stages of education. In Algeria, the repetition rate in primary school reached more than 30% in the 9th year and 40% in the 3rd year of secondary education. In Tunisia it is about 16% in basic education and 16% in secondary education, and the drop out rate is about 10% in the lower secondary (Bardak 2006).

Recent pressures to expand higher education have also led to a significant decrease in the quality of education and research in universities. Strong demand for higher education in Jordan, for example, led to a dramatic increase in the number of students
enrolled in universities (from 31,049 in 1990/91 to 120,000 in 2001/02). While increase in enrolment can be viewed as a positive phenomenon, it can be argued that the quality of education has been compromised in most cases. Students face several problems within educational systems—overcrowded classes, inadequate libraries, poorly equipped laboratories, low quality and discouraged teachers and no student services. The wages of teaching staff, which are low, increase by seniority rather than by teaching abilities or research and publications. There is lack of coordination between universities, colleges and other technical training establishments, and some also mention an emerging duality in Arab education systems: an exclusive private education system enjoyed by the minority, and a lower quality public education system for the majority. There has been no analysis of skill needs and the limited interaction with the private sector in most countries. As a result, while the number of graduates from the different stages of education is increasing, they lack in most cases the core competences and relevant skills needed in a knowledge economy. Since the benefits of education (especially higher education) are eroded by political factors, a diploma is considered more important than the learning outcome itself, and higher education is perceived as a means of achieving social status, rather than increasing the productivity of individuals. Favouritism and nepotism in the selection of individuals for education and employment significantly undermine the value of knowledge and productivity. In fact, the prevailing environment does not reward the acquisition of knowledge and creativity. With few exceptions, curricula and teaching methods in the region give high importance to memorising and rote learning without active learning techniques, and the teaching content remains information-based, not knowledge application oriented. Students do not develop a sense of initiative, critical analysis and a problem-solving attitude. The resulting memorisation without thought of the meaning is in strong contrast with the new trends in the global world that seek to cultivate in students creativity, self-initiated reasoning and critical thinking. By most indicators, regional education systems do not reward these skills, if not punish them (UNDP 2003). Regarding scientific research and generation of knowledge, UN (2003) data pertaining to the mid-1990s reveal that gross expenditure on research and development (R&D) in the Arab world is marginal, amounting to approximately 0.4% of GDP, the lowest figure in the world. The number of patents held by Arab nationals is negligible, and the scientific output of the Arab world (as measured by publications per million inhabitants) is low, amounting to 0.7% of world publications. Another problem is the growing mismatch between the excessive supply of tertiary graduates in the conventional fields of arts and humanities and the requirements of a fluid global economy: 72.7% of the 1998/99 university graduates in the region majored in these fields compared to 6% in science subjects.

Returnees may bring new ideas, knowledge and skills, networks, savings, entrepreneurial and political ideas, but there must be something to return to, a stable environment which makes it an attractive and viable option for skilled expatriates.

7.4% in medicine and 9.8% in engineering (UN 2003). This mismatch has been exacerbated by increasingly rapid innovations in the field of technology. In 2001, only 1% of the world Internet users were from the region and the corresponding penetration rate at that time of the personal computer was around 2%. High cost is the main obstacle to Internet access and telephone connections.

Regional Migration Patterns and ‘Brain Circulation’

The Mediterranean region has been a source of labour emigration particularly to neighbouring labour markets during the last four decades. According to Bardak (2006b), 2.7 million Egyptians (around 10% of the country’s labour force) live outside their country, 70% of which are in the Gulf countries, while most of the remaining 30% are in the USA, Canada, Italy and Australia. The number of Moroccan nationals abroad is around 3 million, 85% of whom live in Europe (France, The Netherlands, Belgium and Spain). Some 1.2 million Algerians and 850,000 Tunisians live abroad, the vast majority of which reside in Europe (mainly France). Around 900,000 Lebanese nationals have left the country for emigration since 1975, 10% of which live in Europe. The number of Jordanian migrant workers is around 400,000, concentrated in neighbouring countries of the region. Significant
numbers of Syrians emigrated to Europe, Africa and America in the first half of the last century, but recently around 500,000 Syrians have found employment in Lebanon and Jordan as unskilled and low-skilled seasonal workers.

The regional migration flows with different source countries, destinations and periods of migration were far from homogeneous in terms of origin (rural or urban), skill levels and nature (temporary or permanent). For example, Moroccan migration towards Europe was part of the livelihoods of poorer communities mostly from rural areas, while Egyptian migration also involved temporary movement of skilled individuals from urban centres (such as teachers during the 1970s) to the Gulf, Iraq and Libya. Large amounts of unskilled and low skilled migration took place from North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) to Europe (France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany) in the 1960s and 1970s through labour agreements to meet heavy industry needs and subsequent family unification schemes. The oil boom of the 1970s and 1980s provided intra-regional migration to the Gulf from Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon. Jordanians and Palestinians generally were skilled workers and professionals, and Egyptian migrants spanned the entire spectrum of skill and occupation from manual labourers to advisors and managers. Despite the negative impact of the Gulf crisis and the changing composition of the Gulf labour markets, intra-regional worker movements still continue due to geographical, cultural and linguistic affinity.

An overall review of Arab migration history confirms the low proportion of skilled individuals in the total emigration stock, particularly where it concerned emigration to Europe (Adams 2003; Ozden & Schiff 2005). By and large, migration flows have been dominated by unemployed people from rural areas, decreasing the pressure of unemployment in stagnating economies and increasing earning capacity of individual migrants. However, recent global trends indicate increasing skilled labour flows from Egypt towards the USA, Canada and the UK; from Lebanon to the USA and Canada; from Iran to Germany; and from Maghreb to France (Bardak 2006b). University graduates represent 58% of the first generation migrants originating from the region in Canada and USA, against 10% in Austria, France, Germany, and Spain. 77% of recent Egyptian migrants have tertiary education, and the rate of scientists and technicians among emigrants increased from 20.4% in 1985 to 40.2% in 2002. The percentage of clerical workers decreased to less than one fifth, and the probability of migrating to OECD countries among those who obtained tertiary education is five times higher than among those with primary education or less. Emigration of scientists from Algeria has been considerably accelerated during the last decade with no return perspective. The French National Centre for Scientific Research only includes 700 Moroccan, 500 Algerian, and 450 Tunisian researchers.

Increasing international student mobility (mainly through post-graduate studies) and training and exchange programmes of professionals provide the seeds for future international skilled migration, but limited tracer studies are available on the Arab students. For example, a new form of emigration concerns graduates of some high performance engineering schools in Morocco, where 50 to 70% of best graduates travel abroad. Significant numbers of Syria’s educated elite have emigrated since 1970, only 20% of whom returned home after obtaining a PhD at a foreign university. Maghrebi qualified labour is rather more concentrated in France, where 58% of all foreign students come from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and only half of those who completed their PhD or post-doctorate studies return to their country of origin. A survey of Moroccan engineering students at French institutes in 1999 revealed that 88.7% do not think of returning to Morocco. Reasons cited include the archaic character of mentalities (64.3%), lack of transparency of social and economic rules (32.5%), lack of viable and attractive work and research opportunities (13.3%), low salaries (11.6%) and other issues related to the quality of life and work, such as freedom, security, work ethics, quality of public services, etc (Arab League 2003).

As seen from the responses, the material factor is not the main determinant for the majority and skilled migration from the region that is not explained only with economic arguments. The main determinants are the general environment which doesn’t sufficiently appreciate knowledge and competences, a lack of freedom and transparency in the administration of careers, difficult work conditions, and a scarcity of interesting and valuable job opportunities. This population is particularly sensitive to the frustrations associated with work and business, bad governance and complex bureaucratic restrictions, corrupt and/or unresponsive officials, low standards of living, poor public infrastructure (poor education and health services, unreliable power supplies, water shortages, costly telecommunication facilities, dangerous
Attracting and keeping in contact highly motivated, highly qualified and successful professionals while providing mobility opportunities to expand knowledge and research skills is a big challenge for origin countries.

Increasing permanent migration of the skilled from the region may partly illustrate the failure of the state, universities and private sector in keeping human capital in their countries or treating them as potential political and economic competitors, a perceived threat to their privileged position at home, leading to the departure of the unwanted elite.

‘Brain Circulation’ through Returnees and/or Diaspora Networks

Returnees may bring new ideas, knowledge and skills, networks, savings, entrepreneurial and political ideas, but there must be something to return to, a stable environment which makes it an attractive and viable option for skilled expatriates. Arab migrants are mainly affected by the destination and intended duration of migration in return decisions. While migration to OECD countries shows a more permanent feature, migration to the Gulf is mostly temporary and includes a higher degree of mobility. This is related to different costs and opportunities in destination countries and to the lack of attractiveness of home countries. There were some Lebanese entrepreneurs, professionals and skilled workers who returned and contributed significantly to the development of their country in the early and mid-1990s, but many had to leave again. Studies on Tunisian and Moroccan migrants reveal the following constraints preventing their return: lack of attractive jobs, weakening or loss of contacts, inefficient public services (education, health, transport), excessive administrative procedures, social and political control, scarcity of investment opportunities and difficulty of access to credits. As a result, particularly in Europe, the majority of Arab migrants settled down in the host countries, constituting large second and third generation communities.

Diaspora can also play a crucial role in business development, foreign direct investment, technology transfer, philanthropy, tourism, research and development projects, being agents for more intangible flows of knowledge, technology, know-how, new attitudes in culture and politics, hybrid identities and social capital from host to origin countries. However, their ability to contribute is conditioned by the integration level in host countries. No contribution can be expected from communities suffering from daily survival concerns (illegal status, precarious jobs, low education). Therefore, the notion of ‘diaspora networks’ is different from diasporas – a totality of individuals living abroad that are composed of very heterogeneous members, some constructive and useful and others dividing and alienating. Skilled diaspora networks and successful intellectual expatriates may constitute a powerful means of benefiting from emigration through exchange of knowledge and useful contacts.

The Arab diaspora in Europe often reproduces the divisions of class, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, language and region that are found in origin countries, reducing the influence and scale of their capacity and willingness to contribute to their society. The social interaction between host societies and the majority of Arab migrants is not always successful and sharing wealth but not identity with the host societies creates serious integration problems. Their social exclusion reinforces ethnic and religious identities and prevents the emergence of new combinations of social norms and values in these communities. Diaspora relations with the public authorities of the home country are not easy either. The position of Arab governments on their expatriates has been reactive rather than proactive and the institutions created to deal with migrants have not been effective in addressing their real needs. Political issues have sometimes weakened and even inflamed the bond between the diaspora and their home countries, leading to avoidance by migrants of active participation and contribution (Bardak 2006b). The case of Egyptian migrants illustrates well the uneasy relationship with public authorities in Egypt. They tend to avoid participating in initiatives promoted by the

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2 Tight migration policy and travel restrictions implemented by European countries may have contributed to the permanent settlement of migrants who had to make a choice between the country of residence and the country of origin. By choosing to stay in the country of residence, psychologically they still keep the return option open, maximising their opportunities with a rational reasoning, while they would have lost all the rights gained in the country of residence if they had permanently returned home.
government for them due to the bureaucracy and rigidity involved. Government interventions are perceived as an intrusion into their livelihood strategy; and most Egyptian expatriates have little interest in diaspora networks and collective mobilisation of resources for their country. The positive role of diaspora is partly exemplified by the Lebanese who easily integrate in their new environment and quickly move up to the middle and upper socio-economic classes of host societies. Strong attachment of Moroccans and Tunisians to their home countries is also illustrated by continuous investment in real estate and a high participation of the second and third generation descendants in local and national solidarity projects. Some Maghrebi migrants have become even successful entrepreneurs who manage a network of enterprises both in Maghreb and France; others have established French companies’ affiliations abroad, keeping their legal and regular status in the host country (Arab League 2003).

The Arab diaspora in Europe often reproduces the divisions that are found in origin countries, reducing the influence and scale of their capacity and willingness to contribute to their society.

Limited evidence confirms that a majority of Arab migrants reflect the low level of human capital in their home countries. A weak professional profile, low education and income, poor integration and networking in host societies, lack of social and financial capital and weak institutional mechanisms in home countries are obstacles for a circulation model. However, following the first generation of unskilled and low-skilled migrants, there are modest signals indicating improvements in Arab residents’ profiles in Europe. Though a minority, they may be found in many universities, at the heads of enterprises for import-export, transport, tourism, information and services, while others manage different branches of manufacturing such as clothing, foodstuff, carpentry and construction material. The impact of these better profiled and integrated emigrants remains to be seen in the longer-term. Whether as returnees or diasporas, these people have the potential to develop transnational and entrepreneurial links between home and host societies only if a dynamic interaction between diaspora communities and their host societies occurs. What is needed is a framework that allows their social, economic, financial and political inclusion in the host countries, without impeding the emotional, cultural, economic and social attachment to home countries.

Conclusion

Understanding the dynamics between education, knowledge society, migration and brain circulation is difficult due to complexity of the interactions and multiplicity of variables. Unlike the majority of traditional migrants who remain isolated in marginal, low-wage industries and trade/services, educated professionals/entrepreneurs have higher potential to create dynamism through the emergence of transnational communities linking the centre (host country) to the periphery (home country) and/or their eventual return. However this requires a critical mass of expatriates who are transformed with experience and interaction, the ability to operate in two countries simultaneously, quickly identify market opportunities, locate foreign partners, and manage cross-border business operations. In this way migrants can be an opportunity to set up all kinds of links between the host and the home country, thus not necessarily “burning the vessels” with one side. In the case of low-skilled migrants, brain circulation dynamics is a gradual step-by-step process requiring ingenuity and creativity to trigger the process. Remittances seem to be the simplest and least sophisticated level of economic ties between sending and receiving countries.

While the strength and magnitude of the talent abroad is important, the capacity of home country institutions to use this is also critical. Attracting and keeping in contact highly motivated, highly qualified and successful professionals while providing mobility opportunities to expand knowledge and research skills is a big challenge for origin countries. They may fail to create attraction for them or do not even recognise it as an opportunity. Expatriates can open doors and make connections, but the government and the private sector of home country are crucial to take opportunities. Weakness of home country institutions and capture of governments by special interests prevent the dynamics to harness the potential of skilled expatriates (discouraged professionals by non-transparent career progress, ill-mentality about knowledge, research and curiosity of returnees). Therefore, the outcome depends on the political and economic environment of the home country which either encourages their expatriates to take part or tries to contain them.
In conclusion, more information is needed on the movements of high-skilled people in the Euro-Mediterranean area to develop specific policies that can turn the loss of talent into an exchange of knowledge (encouraging more beneficial and temporary migration flows). Geographical proximity may enable brain exchange more easily with an increasing openness of the European Research Area to South-North cooperation. The European Commission speaks of brain circulation whereby high-skilled people would work in Europe for a temporary period, be trained further and then return home with new skills and experiences (COM 2005-0390). EU mobility programmes such as Erasmus and Tempus can contribute to such networks in the long run. Special measures for recirculation of brains (a permanent visa that lets foreign graduates from Western universities move to and from the home country) may be developed. More active EU support to increase the quality of Mediterranean education and research systems may be helpful. Finally, the inclusion of these countries in the EU Copenhagen and Bologna Processes would provide cooperation framework for improving quality, transparency and recognition of qualifications in education systems.

References


The Knowledge Society and Social Modernisation in the Mediterranean

Euro-Mediterranean University Cooperation. Towards the Construction of a Common Future

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University Cooperation in a Globalised World

Since the last decades of the 20th century, the world has witnessed profound changes largely stemming from the fall of the Soviet Empire. For better and for worse, the subsequent globalisation phenomenon has stepped up the pace of movements and contacts between peoples and individuals, while adding to the tension of ethnic and religious identities in its most violent form: terrorism.

Rampant globalisation brings about the emergence of new agents—citizen movements, NGOs, etc—and new challenges, such as cultural policies to defend cultural and linguistic diversity against US hegemony. Without losing ground, the political dimension of international relations is becoming increasingly enhanced by exchanges between civil societies, whose importance makes them an influential voice in multilateral politics. Within civic movements, the university has set itself up as an agent in human and socioeconomic development policies while cultural and educational issues are gaining relevance in the form of international exchanges.

With a view to creating a common area for countries in the Euro-Mediterranean region, the Barcelona Declaration (1995) promotes political, economic, social, cultural and human partnerships. In this framework, universities aim to contribute to consolidating relations between countries on both sides of the Mediterranean by creating transnational networks.

The Spanish-Moroccan Mixed Inter-University Committee: Ten Years of Intense Cooperation (1996-2006)

In the sphere of bilateral relations, university cooperation between Morocco and Spain boasts an important tool that commemorated its ten years of existence in 2006. Created in 1996 within the framework of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness, over the years the Spanish-Moroccan Mixed Inter-University Committee has consolidated relations between the university communities of both countries, funding joint research projects on pluridisciplinary issues deemed urgent and of common interest. It is estimated that over the past ten years some 4,000 researchers on both sides of the Mediterranean, many of them doctoral students and young researchers, have benefited from the programme’s backing. So far, over 800 research projects have been funded by the Spanish International Cooperation Agency (AECI) and Moroccan universities involved. The Spanish-Moroccan Mixed Inter-University Committee, with two headquarters (AECI and the Mohammed V-Agdal University of Rabat), is thus favouring long-term cooperation based on networks and poles of excellence whose scope can be included in the framework of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

Tampere University Rectors' Conference. From the Tarragona Declaration to the Creation of the EuroMed Permanent University Forum/EPUF

In the Euro-Mediterranean context, inter-university cooperation received a major boost in 2006 with the University Rectors’ Conference held in Tampere (Finland) from 9th-11th October. Under the aegis of
the Finnish EU presidency, the conference was jointly organised by the Meda Institute of the Polytechnic University of Tampere and the Rovira i Virgili University of Tarragona.

The conference was organised in the framework of the university network that was created in Alicante in 2004 and had continuity in Tarragona (2005) and Malta (2006). Implemented as part of the Barcelona Process, the network assists in strengthening cultural and educational exchanges between countries in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

The Tampere meeting has focused on establishing the EuroMed Permanent University Forum (EPUF), to which over 60 universities and university institutions from northern and southern Mediterranean countries have adhered. The EPUF Constitution was signed during the meeting.

The Tampere Conference constitutes a decisive, significant stage in the process that began in Alicante and developed with the Tarragona Declaration for Dialogue and Cooperation between Euro-Mediterranean Universities signed in 2005.

Focusing on "the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean society," the Tarragona initiative was created with a view to materialising the third approach of the Barcelona Declaration: the human and cultural sector (along with politics and security, and economy and finance). The Tarragona Declaration aims to enhance university institutions’ contribution on both sides of the Mediterranean and “foster dialogue between the region’s cultural traditions, disseminate a culture of human rights and democratic citizenry and promote the sustainable development of scientific and technological exchanges.” The Declaration is committed to “creating a Euro-Mediterranean Area of Higher Education and Research that contributes to the promotion of a knowledge society, encourages collaboration and dialogue among educational institutions, increases the institutions' efficiency and ensures quality of teaching and research, education based on equality and further involves civil society in the knowledge society.”

**EPUF: A Euro-Mediterranean University Area**

The EuroMed Permanent University Forum can be seen as the materialisation of the aim to create a “Euro-Mediterranean Area of Higher Education and Research.” Indeed, in terms of a Euro-Mediterranean university forum, EPUF intends to work towards improving quality in education and research by fostering university exchanges in the Euro-Mediterranean Area as contained in the action plan approved by the university representatives that attended the Tampere conference:

- Disseminate and propagate the Forum spirit with a view to creating a vast inter-university network based on long-term programmes and projects;
- Attempt to involve all actors in the region (local government and non-government institutions, associations, foundations) to join forces and accompany the projects planned;
- Reflect on the issue of raise funding, particularly crucial in southern countries, receiving decisive support from the EU and Anna Lindh Foundation programmes;
- Encourage academic mobility (academic staff, researchers and technical and administrative staff) paying special attention to young researchers and doctoral students. Encouraging exchanges between southern universities is also recommended. In order to achieve this objective, it is advisable to improve mobility accompaniment measures, namely:
  - The mutual recognition of titles and diplomas, which involves promoting the Bologna process for the application of the qualifications reform (Degree, Master’s Degree and PhD). Given the difficulty of a widespread implementation of the new system in the short term, mobility may be possible through specific programmes adapted to the Euro-Med Area, similar to the Erasmus programme;
  - Enable free circulation of researchers from the south to the north, establishing more humane and less arbitrary rules and criteria when it comes to granting visas.
- Celebrate a general meeting in June 2007 in Rabat or Alexandria;
- Establish working groups focusing on specific topics and programmes.
Moroccan universities have developed new strategies and tools to promote research and better teaching and training

The conclusions and recommendations of the University Rectors’ Conference were submitted during the November 2006 meeting in Tampere to the EuroMed Region’s Foreign Affairs Ministers, who also approved the establishment and programme of activities of EPUF. Following the University Rectors’ Conference in Tampere, an EPUF executive secretariat of northern and southern universities has been established with headquarters at the Rovira i Virgili University. Its members plan to meet in March 2007 in Tarragona. During the month of December, EPUF group coordinators held their first meeting at the University “L’Orientale” of Naples to define the work methodology and intervention area of each one. Five working groups have been formed on the following subject areas:

Group 1: Mobility
Group 2: Harmonisation and quality control
Group 3: Governability
Group 4: Human development and active citizenship
Group 5: Communication

Each group, led by two members representing a southern and northern university, has defined an activity programme with the aim of launching it shortly. Adherence to EPUF is open to all institutions with an interest in joining the Forum.

During the Naples meeting and in parallel to the constitution of the EPUF groups, Rovira i Virgili University has presented a new programme of cooperation between universities in the EuroMed area entitled Erasmus Mundus Window.

Perspectives: Erasmus Mundus Window Programme and the Creation of a Network of Young Researchers

With a view to exporting the Bologna process, the Erasmus Mundus Window programme intends to apply a common policy to universities in the EuroMed member countries, harmonising education systems and diploma recognition. This encourages mobility between northern and southern universities, its academic staff, students and administrative and technical staff.

As a result of the Rovira i Virgili University proposal made during the Naples meeting, a project has been drawn up by the northern university consortium, to

ICTDAR

According to the Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) “active knowledge acquisition and utilisation in the building of human capital are key aspects in the economic growth of the region. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are vital to build up a knowledge society and sustain human development. It is not only a matter of investing in computers and in spreading internet but it entails the adoption new organizational models and mentality”.

In October 2003, the UNDP’s regional Program established in Cairo the ICTDAR – Information and Communication Technologies for Development in the Arab Region. The objective of ICTDAR is to assist Arab States in harnessing ICT. ICTDAR’s main priorities for progress are: awareness raising, campaigns development and participation, employment generation and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the region mainly carried out through ICTDAR projects implementation in the region. The main pillars of its approach are the development of partnership agreements with key members in the private sector, local governments and NGOs who are believed to be aware of the key issues affecting their surroundings; focus on a small objective, involving and assisting local communities and governments to become instrumental to implement those initiatives at a national level.

“Different initiatives, one objective: opening the gates of opportunity to the Arab people”

ICTDAR projects have different targets and different geographical implementation.

- AjalCom: is a regional youth empowerment project aiming at enabling Youth in the Arab world to reach their potential by harnessing ICT and improving their access to knowledge. By including women and unemployed graduates, this project contributes to reduce poverty and illiteracy, part of the MDGs, and it has already been implemented in Morocco and Egypt.
- eGovernance: launched in 2004, its aim is to use information and communication technology to raise the quality of services delivered to citizens by governments according to a new culture of efficiency, optimization and transparency and to stimulate government administrative and political reforms.
- ICTDARB: the initiative aims at using ICT to help visually impaired individuals; it provides specialized tools made available through community access centres to have access to training, knowledge and services.
- WRCATI: it is a women empowerment initiative that uses ICT to allow women greater understanding and knowledge of their rights. This is achieved through the development of relevant legal information in a digital format and by disseminating them through CDs, websites, audiotapes. The content, in Arabic and in a simplified language, deals with civil, legal and religious issues relating to family law.

For further information: www.ictdar.org
which southern universities have become associated, among them the Mohammed V-Agdal University of Rabat. The European Union has recently approved the project, entitled MUNDUSFOR, consisting of a Master’s degree in Education of Professionals in Education that offers students and teachers from non-European universities the chance to take part in high-level training. The project will be developed in three stages from September 2007 to September 2010.

Moreover, a number of northern and southern Mediterranean institutions are organising a *Network of Young Researchers around the Mediterranean*. The network seeks to promote intercultural dialogue and improved mutual knowledge based on the construction of a new Mediterranean society. The first stage has included a preparatory meeting at the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) in Barcelona with the attendance of organising entities and associated bodies and the participation of the Instituto de Estudios Hispano-Lusos.

The first Meeting of Young Researchers around the Mediterranean as field of study will be held in Tarragona in May 2007. It will include the following thematic areas: globalisation, governability and north-south exchanges, sociocultural context, intercultural dialogue, development, cooperation and economic changes, etc.

**Innovative Initiatives from Morocco:**

**Instituto de Estudios Hispano-Lusos and Universidad de los Dos Reyes**

Over the past few decades, education and human development have become a national priority in Morocco, mobilising society as a whole, including government and non-government institutions. To mitigate the insufficiencies and ensure access to education for all, generalised literacy and training programmes have increased.

An ambitious modernisation programme has been launched for Higher Education, opening the university to its socioeconomic environment and thus meeting the challenges of globalisation.

Eager to become fully integrated into the international arena, Moroccan universities have developed new strategies and tools to promote research and better teaching and training, adapting them to new national and international demands.

Special attention has been paid to the Euro-

**Moroccan universities have developed new strategies and tools to promote research and better teaching and training**

Mediterranean Area, given that integration in the region is a priority for Morocco, where political strategies are being developed in all fields—security, economic, cultural and human—to achieve admission. Since 2001, a major educational reform has been underway following the recommendations of the Bologna Process. Moroccan universities are at a very advanced stage in the application of the reform, having organised their degrees and master’s degrees in semesters and modules. Now all that is left is to reform doctoral studies.

By establishing numerous cooperation programmes with eastern and northern Mediterranean universities, Moroccan universities have a strong presence in the Euro-Mediterranean university area. In addition to those mentioned above (Spanish-Moroccan Mixed Inter-University Committee, EPUF, Erasmus Mundi, etc), it is worth mentioning the following programmes: Between 2002 and 2004, nearly 30 projects were funded by the European Union in the framework of the TEMPUS MEDA programme. In association with various European and Arab university institutions, the Mohammed V-Agdal University is participating in this European programme with projects devoted to issues such as governability, initial or lifelong training (master’s degrees), institutional evaluation, higher education quality assessment, etc.

In December 2006, an important meeting was held in Morocco to present and launch the Mediterranean Network of National Information Centres for the Recognition of Qualifications (MERIC). Among the Moroccan initiatives that aim to influence the Mediterranean university area is the recently created Instituto de Estudios Hispano-Lusos and the Universidad de los Dos Reyes.

Instituto de Estudios Hispano-Lusos (IEHL) was set up by Royal Decree at the end of 2005 at the Mohammed V-Agdal University of Rabat. Intended for the study and research of civilisations and cultures in Spain, Portugal and Latin American countries, its task consists of revaluing the shared historical heritage of Morocco and the Spanish-Portuguese world, as well as investigating major pluridisciplinary issues of common interest linked to the present and future.

IEHL seeks to become a tool for “cultural and university diplomacy”, as well as a national and international
Universidad de los Dos Reyes (U2R), is a major Spanish-Moroccan educational project that is both ambitious and unprecedented. The initiatives are new to the Spanish-Moroccan university arena and open promising new perspectives for enhancing Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. From the viewpoint of Morocco, these initiatives are grounded in the conviction that the recognition of a state relies heavily on its cultural representation abroad, on the human and cultural image it projects. They also entail the opening of university institutions to their immediate and distant environment, and a commitment to active university diplomacy based on solidarity and reciprocity.

Towards an Active University and Cultural Diplomacy

Indeed, university diplomacy can be seen as an antidote against cultural conflicts and disagreements. Strong human ties are often formed around university exchanges, which help strengthen international communication and understanding. This explains why such cooperation is becoming increasingly necessary to ensure enduring, stable ties between states and countries.

University diplomacy can be seen as an antidote against cultural conflicts and disagreements

By promoting powerful ongoing initiatives and programmes that involve co-development, inter-university cooperation can make a valuable contribution to the betterment of relations between countries in the Euro-Mediterranean region and to prosperity and stability in the area. The will to construct a common university future that is based on solidarity and encourages the mobility of young researchers may bring about the emergence of a transnational Euro-Mediterranean collective conscience, a step towards the world citizenship that is so fervently sought.
The Knowledge Society and Social Modernisation in the Mediterranean

Knowledge Society and Human Development in the Arab world

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Introduction

In order to become a knowledge society, the Arab region needs to open up first to the information age. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are vital tools for building an Information society while sustaining human development. Such ICT-led transformation goes far beyond the use of computers and Internet. It entails the adoption of compatible organizational models. It involves a modernization of structures and processes in every organization. It implies moving from rigid mass production to flexible networks; from centralized pyramids to decentralized adaptable structures; from people as human resources to people as human capital; from global economy to knowledge economy.

This info-technological revolution is re-structuring the global socio-economic equations, namely shifting from “income divide” to “knowledge divide”. The revolution is spearheading the growth of knowledge societies in developed countries. It has raised much interest among civil society, markets and the agents of change. The creation of knowledge societies starts with the incubation of knowledge in human minds: individual, appropriate and pro-active policies, and the external environment.

The global economy investment capital will flow to where the greatest opportunities for reward can be found. These opportunities will be found in those places – cities, countries and regions – where value creating ideas can be realized. A recent study examined 11 global cities in the US, Canada, Germany, France, the UK, China, Singapore and Japan. It showed that emerging cities such as Shanghai and Singapore may soon outperform traditional metropolises in the new knowledge economy.

The poor in developing countries remain much isolated economically, socially and culturally from the burgeoning information and progress in the arts, science and technology. Especially important would be their failure to transform Knowledge into accrued value and equity, as people are often not conscious of the global value of what they know or the potential value of absorbing the available information.

Disparity between Europe and the Arab world, the northern and southern shores of Mediterranean, in their approach towards regional economic cooperation, the drive towards a Knowledge Society/Economy, might be a factor of future instability, and an accelerator of South-North migration, especially as the gap, noted in this paper based on latest 2006 statistics, is growing with time.

Investing to reverse this trend and reducing the gap might be considered as the prime, long-term strategic goal for cooperation between Mediterranean Countries.

Definitions

Knowledge Society

Interesting facts come up when searching for a definition of the “Knowledge Society”. Some resources (MSN Encarta, Factmonster.com, and Encyclopaedia Britannica) do not return any entries, while others confuse Knowledge Society and Information Society; even the World Bank used them interchangeably!!

Here is a summary of what was found:
Investing to reverse this trend and reducing the gap might be considered as the prime, long-term strategic goal for cooperation between Mediterranean Countries.

- a Knowledge Society is a formal association of people with similar interests, who try to make effective use of their combined knowledge about their area of interest, and in the process, contribute to this knowledge;
- a Knowledge Society/Economy is one in which knowledge becomes major product and raw material;
- Knowledge Societies are not a new occurrence. For example, since early history, fishermen have shared the knowledge of predicting the weather to their community and this knowledge gets added to the social capital of the community.

A common consensus seems to be that: knowledge societies need not be constrained by geographic proximity; technology offers much more possibilities for sharing, archiving and retrieving knowledge and knowledge is becoming the most important capital; hence the prize lies in harnessing it.

According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), active knowledge acquisition and its effective utilization and optimization in building human capital is a key driver to economic growth:

"Knowledge has become an essential factor of production, and a basic determinant of productivity. The solid connection between knowledge acquisition and the productive capacity of society translates into the value added production activities (based on knowledge intensity) that are also the mainstay of competitiveness worldwide. Further the formation of the ‘Knowledge Society’ refers to this current phase in the evolution of human progress"

This transformation however does not guarantee economic growth with "equity" either within or between nations. This is because knowledge (in spite of its public good characteristics) becomes a much valued resource to be possessed and harnessed for its economic benefits.

The creation of a Knowledge Society with "Equity": where does the answer lie?

The answer may lie in working towards a perfect knowledge society where all forms of knowledge get recognized and valued especially from where they originate, and increase in value proportionally to the extent they end up benefiting the end user.

The Arab World

The Arab World stretches from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Gulf in the east, and from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to Central Africa and the Indian Ocean in the south. Consisting of 23 countries and territories in two continents, with a combined population of some 325 million people, it is the second largest geo-linguistic unit in the world after Russia.

Estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is US $678 billion, which represents 1.6% of the world’s economy. In October 2002 the World Economic Forum released a report which highlighted that 40% of the population of the Arab world is under the age of 14, while unemployment is around 15%. The Arab world’s population is expected to increase from 280 million to over 400 million in 2020. The Arab world is also one of the richest regions in the world in oil deposits and other mineral wealth.

While some people hold the view that such wealth represents an excellent opportunity to fund the necessary changes, others have a different view:

As for natural resources, those countries that depend on their resources alone have been dramatically disillusioned. In a phrase that can only evoke a sign from oil-poor nations, oil wealth has been characterized as "a very mixed blessing" by none other than the former executive director of the International Monetary Fund. Yet he makes his point. The oil-exporting countries are extremely diverse, ranging from Algeria to Norway, from Kuwait to Mexico, but they have had surprisingly similar economic problems: the squandering of revenues, hyperinflation, stalled industrial development, an actual drop in agricultural production, and deeply painful social clashes among their various sectors—laborers, consumers, religious leaders who feel cheated, and government officials who feel accursed. Ali A. Attiga, an OPEC statesman, says that history may show that the oil-exporting countries "have gained the least, or lost the most, from the..."
discovery and development of their resources." (The fifth generation: Japan’s computer challenge to the world)

The amounts of money Arab countries invest in research and development (R&D) does not exceed 0.2% of their Gross National Products (GNP). Of this small expenditure, 89% comes from government sources and only 3% is funded by private industry (8% from other sources).

The Arab world has 5% of the world’s population, but less than 1% of Internet users, just one-tenth of the level of use in Southeast Asia, according to the UNDP Human Development Report 2001. "That single statistic underscores the wide disconnect between Arab society as a whole and ICT."

Towards Knowledge Society/Economy

Globally

In the 1980’s, it was written that: “The Japanese are planning the miracle product. It will come not from their mines, their wells, their fields, or even their seas. It comes instead from their brains. The miracle product is knowledge, and the Japanese are planning to package and sell it the way other nations package and sell energy, food, or manufactured goods (…)"

By the end of the 20th Century, ICT Penetration was considered as a measure of bridging the digital divide globally. Strategic global target 18 was stated by International Telecommunications Union (ITU) as: “In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications” and was measured by Indicators 47-48 as in the graphic below.

By the year 2005, 14% of the world’s populations were using the Internet, with a large digital divide separating developed and developing regions. Over half of the population in developed regions had access to the Internet, compared to 7% in developing regions and less than 1% in the 50 least developed countries. This gap is rapidly changing year by year, as best illustrated in the following graphic.

![Graph of Proportion of World Population with Telephone Subscriptions, Personal Computers and Internet Connections, 1990-2004 (Percentage)](image-url)

Source: ITU, 2005
The Arab World

The UNDP challenged the Arab world to overcome three cardinal obstacles to human development posed by widening gaps in: freedom, empowering women (note absence of any Arab country in Graphic 12) and knowledge across the region.

AHDR put forward a strategic vision for creating Arab knowledge societies based on five pillars:

- Guaranteeing key freedoms;
- Disseminating quality education;
- Embedding science;
- Shifting towards knowledge based production;
- Developing an enlightened Arab knowledge model.

A look at international, regional and local developments affecting Arab countries since the report was issued confirms that those challenges remain critically pertinent and may have become even more serious, especially in the area of freedom.

In a study conducted by the World Economic Forum on the challenges of ICT and media in the Arab world, Arab countries were classified into three groups: fast developing countries, comprising Kuwait and the UAE; emerging countries, comprising Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
and Saudi Arabia; and countries on the path towards development, including Morocco, Oman, and Syria. It could be argued that disabling constraints hamper the acquisition, diffusion and production of knowledge in Arab societies, despite its significant human and cultural capital which, under more promising conditions, could offer a substantial base for an Arab knowledge renaissance. In the Arab civilization, the pursuit of knowledge is prompted by religion, culture, history and the human will to achieve success. Obstacles in the way of this quest are the defective structures created by human beings – social, economic and above all political. Arabs must remove or reform these structures in order to take the place they deserve in the world of knowledge at the beginning of the knowledge millennium.

Note: 1= National Source, 2= Nielsen/Netratings, 3= TNS a= 2001 b= 2002.
Who Is Doing What

The League of Arab States

The League of Arab States resembles the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe, and the African Union in that it has primarily political aims; one can regard each of these organizations as a regional version of the United Nations. However, its membership is based on culture rather than geographical location. In turn, the memberships of the smaller Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) organizations are subsets of that of the League of Arab States. The League of Arab States differs notably from some other regional organizations such as the European Union, in that it has not achieved any significant degree of regional integration and the organization itself has no direct relations with the citizens of its member states.

In the context of the Information Society, one cannot find a declared group strategy similar to that of the European Union, namely:

“To become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”

The European Union has worked towards achieving its declared objective: it has set up its Internet portal for “Knowledge Society” (www.europa.eu/). In this portal the EU’s policies and activities are currently presented in one place, in all European languages, to tap those opportunities and address the risks of this new society, while making some research findings on the current developments known.

The League’s web portal (www.arableagueonline.org/las/index.jsp) contents are in the Arabic language, and the intent is to provide an English version as well. It works mainly as a TV or radio information media unit.

No statement on any specific group strategy, objectives or action plan towards the achievement of a knowledge society in the Arab World was found during the research. Some references to cooperation with UN bodies were found, most notably the ITU organizing activities towards the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) and to this end, the Cairo preparatory conference, and the “the Arab-regional dialogue” in May 2005.

A report from the Arab Union for Information Technology states that the Arab World ranks third in terms of middle range technical products after Latin America and the Caribbean region followed by Eastern European countries.

Arab States

On an individual basis, the Arab states have pursued various paths at different paces. The 2003 e-readiness indicator – a 60-country comparative measure to evaluate the digital environment, the ICT infrastructure, government programs, as well as the scope of e-commerce in each country – covered only three Arab countries. Saudi Arabia ranked 45, Egypt ranked 51, and Algeria ranked 58.

In the wake of the WSIS second phase, eight Arab states filed their “New Country Programme Documents 2007-2011”: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. It is not clear whether the other Arab states are still developing theirs or simply do not wish to publish them.

It is worth noting that many Arab States are affected by political and security instability in the region: the situation in Palestine and Iraq affects all their neighbours, internal strife and civil disorder in Sudan and Somalia, embargo in Libya, recovery from recent violent conflicts, such as Algeria, Lebanon and Western Sahara. Most are taking cautious and slow steps towards political and governance reform, thus lacking basic foundations and finance for the required transformations.

All Arab states declare they abide by UN declarations and projects towards the Information Society, yet each one charting its own path at its own pace.

United Nations Regional Offices and Organisations

“The Millennium Development Goals were adopted in 2000 by all the world’s Governments as a blueprint for building a better world in the 21st century.” - Kofi Annan

At the United Nations Millennium Summit, world leaders put development at the heart of the global agenda by adopting the Millennium Development
Goals (MDG), which set clear targets for reducing poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation and discrimination against women by 2015. The UN-sponsored project of a portable computer for every school child, announced in WSIS and which started deliveries in 2007, will further reduce poverty and the digital divide.

ICTDAR: ICT for Development in the Arab Region
A UNDP Regional Program was established in Cairo in October 2003. Its objective is to assist Arab States using ICT to reduce poverty, improve public administration performance and private sector prosperity. Its main tasks include: raising awareness campaigns (development and participation), capacity development and strategy implementation, pro-poor growth and employment generation, is implemented through the following approaches:

- Partnership: Agreements with key private sector elements (International, local or national), other UNDP sectors and local governments, communities and NGOs.
- Quick Wins: Capitalizing on Success.
- Rollout and Realization Strategy: formulating business model and execution framework, pilot implementation, consolidation on the national level then replication in other countries.
- Capitalize on National Expertise: build and develop local capacity and content in its initiatives
- Policy Formulation: assist local communities and governments in formulating the appropriate policies to implement and consolidate initiatives and projects on a national level.

WSIS
This significant UN sponsored project has been a definite catalyst and driver for Arab States to interact with the global drive towards Information Society on the way to Knowledge Society, such as:

- The action arising from the Council of Arab Ministers of Communications and Information to transform the Arab strategy for the ICT community, as adopted by the Arab Summit (Amman-March 2001), into specific projects in six main axes: human development, infrastructure, e-business, information environment, knowledge transfer and promotion of digital Arabic contents.
- Capacity-Building for ICT policy-making: To activate the execution of WSIS recommendation, the UN bodies provide technical assistance and advisory services to decision makers in order to:
  - develop comprehensive and sustainable ICT-for-development policies;
  - effectively integrate them into overall national development programmes and strategies;
  - establishing a network of ICT stakeholders and policy makers for knowledge-sharing on ICT policy-related issues,
  - promote bilateral, regional, and international cooperation, in particular South-South cooperation.

NGOs
The global phenomenon of NGOs and Civic Society is also manifesting itself in the Arab world, and its expansion was further enhanced by the WSIS. While the entrenched bureaucracy and rigid government structures have not been able to absorb and capitalize on the evolution of the Information Society, NGOs have practically mushroomed in that domain. All three forms of NGOs and projects, national, intra-national and international, are creating a momentum that seems to out-pace that of governments and UN bodies, and is definitely worth studying in more detail than the scope this paper permits. In the first example provided, we notice a National civic body focused on acting as a regional database and a forum of stakeholders in the drive towards the knowledge society. The second example shows us a sample of Regional Business Sector NGOs still reflecting political state border lines. Whereas the third example represents an instance of extra-national cooperation.

Example 1: Civic Bodies and Coordinators
The Middle East NGOs [MENGOS] Internet portal (www.mengos.net) contains information about non-governmental organizations, funding agencies, events, projects, success stories and other topics relevant to nongovernmental organizations across the Arab world.

Example 2: The Business Community and Conferences
The Arab Business Forum for ICT (ABFICT) was established by eighty leading companies in the fields of communications and information technology in Cairo in 2002. ABFICT Executive Committee consists of six members representing Egypt, Kuwait, Palestine and the United Arab Emirates. In WSIS phase II, ABFICT attended all council meetings as an observer, in addition to cooperation with international entities such as: ESCWA & ICC and Global Business Dialogue on e-Commerce.

Example 3: Academia and Content Generation
Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, is to put Arabic-language library resources online. Yale has been collecting Arabic and Middle Eastern texts for more than 150 years and has more than 150,000 books and 900 serial titles in Middle Eastern languages. In the first stage of the project, Yale has created a list of 14,000 Middle East journal holdings in 20 libraries from Arizona to Syria.

Digitizing Arabic texts requires particular care because the optical character-recognition software has difficulty correctly deciphering the printed Arabic script therefore requiring careful quality oversight. Yale chose Tishreen University in Syria to be the first partner in the region, provided its library with equipment and know-how to digitize part of their collection and make it available to other participating institutions through document sharing protocols.

Yale’s project "Iraq Re Collection" uses a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities to digitize a collection of Iraqi scholarly journals dating from the early 20th century through contemporary publications expected to include about 100,000 pages of digitized text.

Status Review

Infrastructure and Connectivity

Individually, Arab States have made significant progress in bridging the ICT digital divide, sometimes exceeding the trends shown in graphic 11, by acquiring and expanding telephony and wireless telecommunications networks.

This is illustrated by total ICT spending worldwide in the year 2006, which amounted to US $3 trillion. The population of the Arab world represents 5% of the world population. The Middle East and Africa region, (including non-Arab States) had a share of 2.7% of global ICT spending, the highest growth rate (15.7%), hardly sufficient to close the gap of the digital divide.

Comparing IT spending of US$ 3.04 billion in Saudi Arabia to US $165 million in Syria, both of comparable population size, a 20-fold difference is shown. Similarly UAE spending of US $2.32 billion vs. Lebanon’s US $217 million, shows a ten-fold difference. The digital divide is not just between the Arab States and the rest of the World, it is also seen intra Arab States, and it keeps widening.

Content: The Knowledge Base

In addition to universal challenges in building online digital content, the Arabic world faces serious handicaps. There is a lack of commercially proven Optical Character Reading (OCR) software. This prevents digitizing paper-based printed matter from earlier times (including legislation, records and archives), as well as the dissemination of Arab thought and culture to other people of the world. The lack of effective online translation tools is a show stopper for any form of globalizing present and future Arabic content. Furthermore, as of today, an Arab citizen cannot use of non-Arabic websites unless that citizen is fluent in foreign languages. The absence of a regulatory body to set and update norms and standards for the Data –Information – Knowledge Cycle is a definite delaying factor as well.

These are critical factors affecting both the active role of generating knowledge as well as the passive role of receiving knowledge from other countries and regions.

On a more positive note, the common Arabic language will ultimately be an accelerating factor for the automation of generation and dissemination of Arabic Content and Universal Knowledge. The present trends
in the world towards Ubiquitous computing, starting with mobile phones, will relax constraints of literacy and linguistics, especially as peripherals become more “intelligent” and “ergonomic”.

Closing Remarks

Reflecting on the internet metamorphosis from Electronic Bulletin Boards, Chat rooms, AOL, Yahoo, eBay, Google to present day You Tube and Myspace, renders any near future predictions an impossibility. The new age terminology (knowledge society, information society, e-Government etc.) does not seem to be clearly defined and distinguished among established and respected organizations. This is one indication among many, that human society, with its social rules and regulating laws, is breathlessly running to catch up with the accelerating pace of the digital age. A definite topic of serious consideration, especially that Human Development in the Global (Digital) Village requires the wisdom of elderly leaders of yester-year villages, in an updated format maybe, to sail us through the coming turbulent waters. Yet, in an Arab world where Blogs on the video of Saddam Hussein’s execution went around the globe before Arab Information and Media Executives were aware, where the outlawed Al Qaeda and associates are publishing violent content on the web, while ministries’ web pages get hacked by school kids, youth education and unemployment challenges grow by the day so we can safely assume that the Arab world is facing a Tsunami of change, that should better be grasped sooner than later...
Panorama: the Mediterranean Year
The Need to Manage the Achievements of 2005 in 2006

2005 was a “good year” for the Barcelona Process. Ten years on, and following the Summit held in November, our Partnership continues working with new plans for a common future in the Mediterranean region. Although the year 2006 developed amidst a general climate of difficulties, the balance for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a positive one. Moreover, during 2006, the Alliance of Civilizations initiative took shape with clear outlines and the Barcelona Process represents the regional realization of the methods and principles inspiring the Alliance of Civilizations.

The early days of 2006 can be regarded as a time for “decompression” following the submission of a first series of initiatives and documents, along with the input adopted in Barcelona in the context of the Partnership’s tenth anniversary. The challenge for the Austrian and Finnish Presidencies was to adopt a “managerial” profile so as to develop the documents – essentially political – that were approved during the Summit.

The Barcelona Process in the Face of the Difficult Political Situation of 2006

The year began with grim expectations due to the regional political situation. In Syria the political situation was – and remains – an obstacle for the signing of the already negotiated Association Agreement; Lebanon was going through times of extreme internal political instability (later aggravated by the Israeli intervention); in Palestine, a mounting feeling of uncertainty followed the election of Hamas; Egypt was facing discomfort due to the ascent of the Muslim Brotherhood; Algeria showed growing scepticism with regard to the Barcelona Process due to its financial situation, which led to a gradual and strategic approach to the United States and Russia; not to mention the developments in Libya, in which some observers saw signs of a potential bilateral relationship outside the multilateral institutional framework. This complex situation represented a new challenge for our Partnership in terms of dealing and channelling those differences and aspirations, sometimes diverging.

In this context, the Barcelona Process was not at its best moment, but its strength and usefulness can be proved precisely in such circumstances: for its original conception and the maturity achieved through the continuous debate generated among the various institutions created in its framework.

Three Great Unexpected Challenges Met in 2006

It is worth remembering the three main issues that the Barcelona Process was faced with in 2006: firstly, the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections; secondly, the so-called “cartoons crisis”; and thirdly, the dramatic events that took place in Lebanon and put our Partnership to a test, not only concerning its normal functioning but its very survival.

Managing to sustain vital aid to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was the first and foremost challenge. Although a government had been democratically appointed, it was led by a party listed as a terrorist organization by the same EU, and it was
Although the year 2006 developed amidst a general climate of difficulties, the balance for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a positive one.

not willing to accept the rules of the game, as set out in the Road Map, in order to further the peace process.

The second challenge came with the "cartoons crisis", since the Barcelona Process could not turn its back to it; the resilience of the Process and its ability to absorb conflicts were then put to a test. At the end of February, on a Spanish initiative, the High Officials’ Committee held a meeting to deal – amidst great expectation — with the issue of how to improve the dialogue between cultures and civilizations in order to overcome such a sizeable crisis, eventually showing the uniqueness and usefulness of the Barcelona Process.

The third and most serious development that put to a test the ability of the Barcelona Process to redirect tensions was the dramatic events that took place in Lebanon, which threatened to destabilise the regional situation. If the "cartoons crisis" tested the social and cultural dimensions of the Barcelona Process, the crisis in Lebanon tested the resiliency of the political and security aspects of the only framework of political dialogue where Arabs and Israelis sit as partners.

A great deal of speculation went on during the summer concerning the ability of the Process to absorb the impact; for this reason, the monthly meeting was awaited with great expectation, given the high level of tension that characterized the end of the Committee meeting in July, which coincided with the announcement that Israeli military operations had begun in Lebanon.

The Finnish Presidency, counting on the efficient assistance given by the community coordinators, did not deem convenient to call for an extraordinary Euromed meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Eventually, the "ordinary" High Level Officials’ meeting, masterfully prepared and conducted, took place almost without incident. Some speeches were harsh and conclusive, but very focused and delivered by political representatives in the highest ranks. This event proved that the Barcelona Process is a resilient and flexible one and that it can surmount the regional crises it has experienced since it was created 11 years ago, including the latest and most serious one.

On the other hand, as the crisis developed in Lebanon, the EU broke the old adage “the EU pays and the US plays” since the EU member countries actively participated – for the first time on the ground – in police and military operations in Gaza, the Rafah border crossing and in Southern Lebanon with the UN Interim Force (UNIFIL).

The Tampere Ministerial Conference and its Political Context

It is worth mentioning that the climax of the Euromed year was reached at the 8th Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Tampere in November. In the days preceding the event, the announcement of a truce between Palestinians and Israelis and the prospect of a national unity government in Palestine led to a rather cautious optimism that also made possible that, for the second time in the history of our Partnership, Conclusions were approved by consensus. This was regarded as a success in itself, but was further reinforced by the fact that it was put down on a single document, as was demanded by the Arab counterpart, with the aim of formulating the political and technical aspects in the same text.

2006: The Year of Technical Meeting at Ministerial Level

Whereas the Ministerial Meeting in Tampere was the political climax, a series of technical meetings at ministerial level were also held, particularly during the second semester.

The largest part of these meetings took place during the Finnish Presidency, which established a busy work agenda focused on aspects of the greatest

The dramatic events that took place in Lebanon put our Partnership to a test, not only concerning its normal functioning but its very survival.
THE EIGHTH EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TAMPERE, 27TH-28TH NOVEMBER 2006

The Euro-Mediterranean cooperation process brought together 37 states to the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs within the framework of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and under the Presidency of Erkki Tuomioja, Foreign Minister of Finland.

The meeting culminated in the unanimous adoption of the “Tampere Conclusions,” and it was only the second time that Foreign Ministers had been able to adopt conclusions unanimously.

Conclusions touched a wide range of issues such as:

- Political and Security Dialogue: Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the objective of achieving a common area of peace, stability and shared prosperity in the Mediterranean region. They also considered it paramount to achieve a lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, encouraging the parties to continue on the path of direct dialogue and negotiation in the fulfillment of the vision of two states. They emphasized the importance of co-ownership and co-responsibility of the Process, agreeing on holding regular Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the end of each year and considered the European Neighbourhood Policy as an important tool which contributes to reinforcing and complementing the Barcelona Process.

- Implementation of Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism: Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to fully implement the Code in order to enhance security through more effective counter-terrorism policies while reiterating the rejection of attempts to associate any religion or culture with terrorism. They also focused on the role of the media in preventing incitement and ensuring human rights.

- Free Trade and Investment: Ministers reiterated their commitment to achieving a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010. In this context the 2007 agenda will focus on the progressive liberalisation of trade in services and the right of establishment, as well as progressive liberalisation in agriculture and processed agricultural and fisheries products. Ministers noted also that FEMIP has been instrumental in channeling substantial amounts of funding to the region and underlined the importance of strengthening FEMIP’s support to the private sector.

- Energy: the scheduling of a Ministerial conference on energy was welcomed by Ministers. Ministers emphasised the need to further reinforce co-operation in securing energy supplies in the Euromed region. To this end, Ministers emphasised the importance of examining means aiming at the diversification of energy resources, including renewable energy.

- Environment and Tourism: Ministers welcomed the adoption of the timetable which sets out the steps for implementing Horizon 2020. In 2007, implementation will start on the Horizon 2020 initiative for the de-pollution of the Mediterranean. Ministers also underlined the importance of the contribution of tourism in the economies of the Euromed Partners.

- Education: Ministers reiterated their commitment to increase funding devoted to education in the Mediterranean region and welcomed the proposal made by Egypt to host a Euromed Ministerial Conference on Higher Education and Scientific Research. The objective will be to reinforce the efforts of all countries in the region to meet the Millennium Development Goals in the areas of education, taking into account the complementarity between education, scientific research, innovation and industry.

- Strengthening the role of women in society: Ministers endorsed the Ministerial Conclusions adopted during the Ministerial Conference on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society, held in Istanbul on November 2006. They urged its full implementation with a view to promoting the full participation of women in economic, political, civil, social and cultural life in the Euromed region. Ministers also took note of the Marrakech Civil Forum on gender equality.

- Dialogue between Cultures: Ministers underlined the need to further strengthen intercultural dialogue, including through the Euro-Mediterranean Anna Lindh Foundation and the development of the Cultural Heritage programme. They agreed to intensify efforts to promote the culture of dialogue ensuring a better mutual understanding, freedom and respect for all religions, beliefs and cultures among Euromed people. The Alf was invited to contribute to the preparation of the ‘2008 EU Year of Intercultural Dialogue’. Ministers took note of the designation of Algiers as the capital of Arab culture in 2007.

- Migration: Ministers underlined the need to strengthen the management of migratory flows in a comprehensive and balanced manner while respecting migrants’ rights and fighting against trafficking in human beings. A ministerial meeting on migration due to take place in 2007 aims at agreeing on a series of further measures to promote cooperation on all issues pertinent to migration.

For further information:

The Barcelona Process is a resilient and flexible one and is proving that it can surmount the regional crises it has experienced since it was created 11 years ago, including the latest and most serious one.
September 2006) and, most especially, the First Ministerial Conference on the Role of Women in Society (Istanbul, November 2006).

**The Importance of the Educational Dimension and Human Contacts**

Following the Euromed Universities Rectors Conference held in Tampere in October 2006, the ground for building a Euromed education community is being laid, along with the project to establish a Euromed Permanent University Forum. In this respect, the major achievement in 2006 was the Commission’s launching of a scholarship programme for university students; a kind of “Erasmus” programme, which initially was conceived for the Euromed exclusively but will eventually apply to all countries in the Neighbourhood area.

The issue of the sound management of migratory flows is also high on the Euromed agenda, particularly in the light of the upcoming Ministerial Conference on immigration to be held in 2007 and which will receive the positive inputs of the Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migrations and Development held in Rabat (July, 2006) and the EU-Africa Conference on Migrations and Development held in Tripoli (November, 2006).

**Incorporating the Barcelona Process in the European Neighbourhood Policy**

Throughout 2006, a great deal of work was done – particularly within the Commission – to shape and conduct existing complementarities between the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and their respective instruments (particularly, the National Action Plans that are a part of the existing Association Agreements).

In fact, the ENP should help to strengthen relationships with our Mediterranean partners in order to further our common agenda of commitments regarding gradual political and economic reforms, which should always keep to the principles that inspired Barcelona: regional actors’ appropriation; association procedures (and refusing any kind of imposition); and keeping the Mediterranean region as a frame of reference.

**Conclusions: A Positive Year in a Difficult Context**

Huge political difficulties had to be dealt with throughout 2006. However, the flexibility of the Barcelona Process enabled it to overcome both the chronic and structural obstacle of the region as well as other obstacles resulting from added international tensions, allowing it to get over the conflicts by absorbing them.

In spite of the bad winds that blow in the region, Europe and its Southern Mediterranean partners prevented their common initiative from failing, thus proving wrong the announcements made by the prophets of doom. Moreover, they faced the existing difficulties at the multilateral level with great realism, a will to understand and a vision of the future through regular High Officials’ meetings, ministerial meetings, APEM meetings and meetings with social agents in the framework of the Civil Platform and the Anna Lindh Foundation, among others.
The title of this article, which refers to an individual point of view, was not chosen by chance but reflects an irrefutable truth: since the Southern Mediterranean region consists of many countries it cannot be viewed as a monolith. A diversity of socioeconomic models, subtle differences in the chosen reform routes, anthropologic idiosyncrasies and the different challenges faced by each nation all explain why the Euro-Mediterranean region is an unidentified geopolitical entity. Representing the point of view of such a complex region is not a risk I am willing to assume.

I would draw attention to the subtle differences in attitudes and strategic postures adopted by the southern member states of the EU, as an echo of southern idiosyncrasies.

I had the opportunity, during the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, to call for the creation of a Mediterranean community. This call was inspired by the need to equip the Euromed process with legitimacy, popular and strategic visibility, and, in sum, greater credibility.

This call, which was echoed and supported by my colleague, Jean Louis Guigou, has attracted the interest of European decision makers, and evidence of this is the fact that the main candidates for the French Presidency all support the idea of a Mediterranean community. The road to this goal, however, will be a long and difficult one sown with pitfalls, as follows:

1. The inclusion of the southern shore of the Mediterranean in a community project would require further political reform to ensure that the concept of joining with Europe is popularly accepted. The implementation of commitments undertaken in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), irrespective of their scope, is an essential test of the credibility of any actions undertaken.

2. The relaunching of the process for reconstructing Europe’s institutions, in addition to creating a strong consensus regarding the social project for Europe in the future, needs to take account of a foreign and common security policy that is both foreseeable and visible and which also gives Europe an international role. Essential tests will be the EU’s contribution to resolving the Middle East crisis and successfully managing the crisis in Iraq. And logically, other regional conflicts, such as the case of the Sahara, also need to be addressed.

3. Security in the region—from the Black Sea to the Sahel region and including Gibraltar—is essential in order to foster emerging democratic movements that are vulnerable to extremism and Mafia networks.

4. Islam needs to be rehabilitated as a component in the plural nature of European identity. The ghettoisation of Muslim communities, the marginalisation of Islamic religious practice, and the different forms of laicity advocated by the EU distort messages, create confusion and trigger behaviours leaning towards terrorist activism.

5. Migration needs to be managed within a framework of consensus-based policies grounded in a holistic approach that takes into account all the factors behind the strongly felt need for free circulation. The public image of a European fortress and the humiliation implied by regulatory procedures inside and outside the Schengen area are incompatible with the Euromed spirit of partnership, and even more so with the idea of a community sharing a destiny.

In addition to these pitfalls, there is the problem of ensuring that the Barcelona Process remains minimally functional. Its many defects should not lead to neglect...
of its core principle, which is that it represents the only platform for dialogue that brings together all the actors in the Mediterranean region.

The five-year action plan and the projects undertaken by national governments within the ENP are the most important tools for achieving the Barcelona Process’ aim

The five-year action plan (which includes a huge catalogue of measures adopted by heads of states and governments at the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process) and the projects undertaken by national governments within the ENP are the most important tools for achieving the Barcelona Process’ aim of creating an area of shared prosperity and common security where the universal values of freedom, democracy, and human rights are respected. An impressive series of sectoral meetings were held to implement these programmes.

An analysis of all these commitments regarding the goals underlying the Barcelona Declaration raise questions in relation to the relevance of the chosen measures, the strength of EU commitment to supporting these programmes (particularly in terms of funding) and the sense of commitment of the southern countries to the measures — in regard to which the following comments are in order:

1. What is striking about the nature of the Barcelona Declaration is its strictly bilateral character. The *acquis communautaire* that covers the single market (1993) is not being considered within the perspective of regional harmonisation. À la carte adhesion to regulatory prescription tends to generate greater distortions in south-south exchanges, which are still weak. The aim of promoting these exchanges has been completely overlooked. The recent implementation of the Agadir agreement should have triggered a negotiation process with the EU that ensured that national programmes operating within the framework of the ENP included a market harmonisation dimension.

2. No political conditions or commitments have been foreseen regarding the creation of favourable circumstances for the resolution of possible conflicts. There is little protest at the closing of a border, the lack of dialogue between neighbours, or the aggravation of instability caused by non-management of security situations in a particular region.

3. The funding supplied by the EU within the framework of the new ENP instrument not only fails to meet the need for improving human development standards in the south, but also perpetuates an aid model that does not render actors sufficiently accountable and that overlooks the leveraging potential that could result from an alternative approach.

4. An evaluation of the entire apparatus raises doubts about its capacity to help overcome the considerable deficits experienced by the south in all areas. In a timeframe of five years, the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean—with some exceptions—will not have succeeded in reversing the strong trends that mark their possibilities for growth and human development. In areas such as poverty reduction, job creation, the improvement of education and the integration of women, etc., indicators reveal an accumulated structural lag with respect to other regions in the world. In terms of competitiveness, the situation depicted by the transformation indices issued by international institutions (World Bank, Davos, Bertelsmann, etc.) is even more alarming.

The funding supplied by the EU perpetuates an aid model that does not render actors sufficiently accountable

What can be done while we wait for the conditions to be created that will launch us on the long road to the creation of a Mediterranean community? Some alternatives are as follows:

1. The Tampere Declaration needs to be taken into consideration as a minimum requirement for boosting the faltering Barcelona Process.

2. An institutional mechanism with equal representation from both sides needs to be created to take charge of monitoring progress, evaluating sectoral policies, and tailoring national policies to the commitments undertaken by Euromed actors.

3. Common policies on both sides of the Mediterranean should be implemented in sectors in which Eurosceptics and members who are not involved in the Mediterranean will not exercise their veto.
4. A conference for peace and security in the Mediterranean needs to be implemented that will address political and geostrategic threats in the region (Black Sea-Mediterranean-Sahel).

These four principles could be articulated in the framework of projects such as the following:

1. A Mediterranean Bank (which would not function like other regional or international banks) should act as a socioeconomic observatory of the Mediterranean and as a source of innovative investment funding that meets public and private sectors needs. This bank would not provide grants or concessional loans, but would provide funding through various instruments and manage externalities through public mechanisms that represent both sides equally. It would represent a mix of the European Investment Bank and the EU Structural Funds, but would also have a guarantee and risk capital component.

2. Drawing on the lessons to be learned from the Iraqi crisis and from Iran, highlighting the need for collective security (economic and energy, civil, natural disasters, terrorism, trafficking of all types), and taking stock of the failure of the actors involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a revisited and adapted Helsinki-type conference might represent an opportunity for a new deployment of concepts, past agreements and future demands. In partnership with the USA and other major international players (Russia), this represents an avenue to be explored (and one that will eventually have to be explored anyway).

3. A Euromed airspace, founded on the open-sky principle, seems to offer considerable potential for laying the basis for a sustainable tourism industry.

4. A Mediterranean agricultural market would regulate preferential exchanges and allow consensual redesign of the Mediterranean agricultural area.

5. A knowledge area and knowledge economy would assist in managing the demographic asymmetries between the north and the south and offer a credible alternative to the quantitative management of migratory flows in terms of quotas.

These ideas would enable the mobilisation of the kind of popular support that is currently lacking for the Barcelona Process, and would also provide the dynamism necessary to accelerate political reform in the south. They would not overshadow current programmes, rather they would make them more visible and define a horizon that would catalyse energies and sow hope where there is currently doubt. The provocative dimension aims merely to foster a broad-based debate that would go beyond the political sphere.
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Euro-Arab Relations Redefined

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This analytical review of Euro-Arab relations is written from an activist civil society perspective. If the review has a critical tilt, it is done in order to balance the claims of official Progress Reports, especially those of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The latter is understandably disposed to be self-congratulatory, and while this review does not deny several achievements since the initiation of ENP in 2004, it does attempt to bring a more comprehensive picture to the complex relationship between Europe and the Arab world. Since the ENP has made a point of taking an active interest in the neighbours of the EU, it is important to point out that only occasional reference is made to countries and events outside the immediate five countries which signed the ENP Articles of Association or Partnership Agreements. Consequently, I will make every effort to expand the scope of the ENP in my analysis and comment when appropriate on emerging trends and patterns that are relevant to Euro-Arab relations.

A Non-State Actor in Euro-Arab Space

The year 2006 witnessed a new populist factor that is relevant when discussing current Euro-Arab relations. The stormy entrance of this factor was a controversy over a series of Danish newspaper cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed. The year ended with yet another controversy involving Pope Benedict XVI, who was quoted making what many perceived to be unflattering statements about Islam. In both cases it was not governments disputing or disagreeing, but street politics at work. Governments on both sides were reluctant to get involved, yet as events progressed their intervention became necessary as the tension escalated in both the EU and in several Arab countries. Consequently, the growing Arab-Muslim population in many EU countries presents a new variable complicating the dynamics on both sides. In the Danish cartoon episode, it is instructive to look into the fine print of how the tempest unfolded. The cartoons were first published in the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, in September 2005. Yet the uproar over the issue did not begin until five months later, when the London-based Muslim Clerics Council (MCC) heeded an outcry by Danish Muslim leaders. These leaders decided to appeal for outside support because they felt that their protests within Denmark had fallen on deaf ears. To Muslims in Denmark and elsewhere, portraying sacred religious symbols such as God and any of his prophets in human form is sacrilege, let alone singling out the Muslim Prophet and depicting him as a terrorist. This was construed by many Muslims as a triple affront. To the Danish authorities and media, this same act was a simple exercise of the basic right of freedom of expression. For this reason, no party in Denmark was ready or willing to apologize for an action that they felt was protected as a sacred right within a democracy. In reaction the small Muslim community of Denmark dispatched some of its leaders to Mecca, where an Islamic Summit was being held in January 2006 to plead its case. The Summit obliged and issued a statement condemning the Danish cartoons and demanding an apology. With the Islamic Summit’s statement in hand, the Muslim Danes made the rounds in several Muslim capitals. Their campaign paid off and several angry demonstrations marched in various Muslim capitals to Danish embassies, consulates and companies. The worst of these were in the Syrian
capital of Damascus, in which the Danish Consulate was set on fire. Since the Syrian regime has total control over its society, many observers thought the anti-Danish demonstrations were either allowed or orchestrated by the Syrian state in order to deflect attention from its domestic and regional problems. As to the second episode, Pope Benedict XVI gave a lecture on September 12th, 2006 to the faculty of the University of Regensburg, in which he quoted a medieval Byzantine Emperor as having alleged that the Prophet Mohammed had preached nothing of value but only violence and hatred. As soon as news of the lecture became public many in the Muslim world were outraged once again. Given the respect with which the Pope is held worldwide, Muslim Arab governments stayed out of the fray, leaving it to other Muslim clerics to judge his words.

BENCHMARKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE EMP

How Feasible and How Useful?

How to set about the task of overcoming shortcomings in the crucial area of human rights and democratic development is a central concern for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and has featured prominently in EuroMeSCo’s 2006 programme. The main findings of two reports addressing the issue of benchmarking from two different, complementary angles were discussed in the course of the year within the network as well as in official circles concerned with the EMP. EuroMeSCo’s work on benchmarking suggests that, although a greater clarity of vision on the part of the EU concerning its democracy-promotion strategy is needed, especially as to the involvement of civil societies and ascertaining whether appropriate incentives indeed exist, devising a benchmarking system within the EMP is a useful exercise provided a joint sense of responsibility in achieving the desired outcomes is present from the start.

As to feasibility, the wealth of available indicators suggests that setting an EMP-wide system in place depends mostly on the willingness to do so. The first report, written by Azzam Mahjoub (University of Tunis), aims to design a framework for the evaluation of progress within the Partnership in the broad category of human rights – political and civil rights – and democratic development which relates primarily to the first chapter and marginally to the third chapter of the Barcelona Process. The basic assumption underlying the study is that objectively monitoring progress towards commonly targeted goals is a powerful tool that civil societies and governments can use to foster their achievement. Monitoring is thus regarded as a partnership-building instrument.

The study identifies a set of priority areas for a common benchmarking system which are directly derived from the set of “founding documents” of the EMP relevant to human rights and democratic development, from the Barcelona Declaration to Neighbourhood Action Plans. Having briefly discussed methodological issues relating to the task of compiling suitable indicators and included a set of practical recommendations, the study presents the main sources that guided the selection of the eight priority areas identified as crucial for the evaluation of progress in human rights and democratic development, i.e. the commitment to human rights, the right to physical integrity, political participation, the rule of law, civil liberties, civil society, empowerment and women’s rights, rights of migrants and minorities. In a subsequent step, the pre-selected sources producing appropriate indicators are described at length, in order to ascertain which would be more suitable to evaluate progress within the EMP.

Although the study recommends mutual scrutiny as a precondition for benchmarking to successfully achieve its stated objectives – fostering real and widespread progress in areas which are crucial to the emergence of a regional partnership –, it is no less obvious that in certain areas, namely formal commitment to human rights, the South has generally a longer way to go than the North; but in other areas, namely migrants and minority rights and the associated issues of intolerance and xenophobia, it is the North that can be more consistently scrutinised so that benchmarking can perform the constructive role for which it is designed.

The study concludes that designing a benchmarking system to monitor progress towards commonly stated goals in human rights and democratic development is a useful task conducive to the achievement of those same goals within the EMP, provided the sense of joint ownership, based on shared responsibility and common understanding, is present from the very early stages of its implementation.

The second report, written by Raffaella Del Sarto (EUI, Florence), with contributions from Tobias Schumacher (IEEI, Lisbon) and Erwan Lannon (IEEI, University of Ghent), with and the collaboration of Ahmed Driss (AEI; University of Tunis), takes a somewhat different angle. It critically analyses key concepts in the realm of democratisation and human rights, such as the notions of ‘democracy’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘human rights’ – terms which are often employed without providing clear definitions – the concept of benchmarking, as well as the action plans concluded with Morocco, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and Israel. It furthermore points out problems associated with the process of democratic transition and discusses the necessary ingredients for any benchmarking process to be successful. The report argues that the EU’s current benchmarking approach suffers from a number of conceptual and analytical flaws, all of which may have serious implications for the successful and sustainable implementation of benchmarking political development in the Euro-Mediterranean area. It proposes taking the conceptualisation of democratisation as a process that entails different phases as a starting point for any democracy-promotion strategy. It suggests that such a model may be used as a ‘check list’ of sorts in a cross-country comparison and may serve as a ‘meta-scheme’ within which specific ‘benchmarks’ in the realm of ‘human rights’ or ‘the rule of law’ may be defined and evaluated in the specific context of Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Recognising that the respect for human rights is the first and most essential building block of democratic development, the report suggests ways to establish what could be called an ‘intelligent benchmarking’ strategy. This entails, among other issues, the need to clearly define the objectives and strategies in the EU’s democratisation approach (‘democracy’ vs. some sort of ‘political liberalisation’?), and thus clear indicators and ex-ante decisions on timetables and regular monitoring, as well as the necessity to increase the incentives – along with the proper use of conditionality – and a decision as to what extent the southern Mediterranean civil society should be part of EU democracy-promotion strategies.

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to wage a counter offensive. The leading cleric of Al-Azhar, the oldest Islamic university, took on the task. The Vatican was wise enough to distance themselves from the speech, claiming that the Pope did not mean to insult either the Prophet or Islam. They stated that he was merely narrating a historical event and that his remarks were misinterpreted. When that retraction was deemed insufficient in many quarters of the Muslim world, the Pope followed the Vatican’s statement with an explicit apology for having unintentionally hurt the feelings of Muslims.

While various intrigues were no doubt involved in both episodes, the passionate debates that ensued brought into focus the complexity of Euro-Arab relations. In the process, all concerned were forced to confront the fact that Islam has become the second largest religion in Europe with its numbers hovering around 50 million. It is also the fastest growing religion thanks to both migration and higher birth rates. Additionally, native born European Muslims also have begun taking a more active role in the European public space bringing their own demands and complaints on the scene. The governments and publics of the home countries of origin have also been equally pressed to get involved by this young and dynamic section of the population. Although Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilization’ thesis was occasionally invoked throughout these conflicts, many on both sides were eager to dismiss it, as if to suggest that dialogue and coexistence are not only possible but also inevitable.

**Little Trust Between Neighbours**

The EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been hailed as a fresh operationalization of the limping 1995 Barcelona Accords. However, ten years after its signing, European partners were to discover that they had been outmanoeuvred by autocratic Arab regimes of the southern Mediterranean. Thus, the ENP was established to help rectify previous failings through the closer monitoring of progress in both human rights and democratization. The ENP shied away from the language of conditionality and instead heavily relied on incentives for those Arab countries which would speed up their reform agenda.

The ENP’s founding document makes the point early on that in dealing with its neighbours in the southern Mediterranean, the EU recognizes their vast diversity and would tailor its approaches accordingly. While this is a commendable proposition, too much cultural relativity could play into the hands of indigenous autocrats, as indeed happened with the first Barcelona Accord (1995-2005). Of the three baskets proposed, the economic aid and security measures were readily embraced by the autocrats but managed to put the third basket, civil society and democratization, on hold. It is true that, following 9/11, the US possibly went to the other extreme. They imposed a cookie-cutter approach towards democratization that ended with disastrous results in Iraq and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan. However, Europe should not use the American example as an excuse to back further away from civil society and democratization efforts in the Arab world.

The best practice approach would suggest a stick-and-carrot strategy as was the case with the 1975 Helsinki Accord between NATO and Warsaw countries. What the Arab countries witnessed in 2006 represented a wholesale Western retreat on the democracy promotion front. As the Islamists scored significant gains in recent elections, both the EU and the US back-tracked. They preferred the stability that is found with autocrats over the unknown and perhaps unpopular outcomes of electoral democracy. Such change of heart has reinforced the widespread belief that there exists a Western double-standard when it comes to the Arab world.

The fears that are evident in the ENP could have been assuaged if the EU had considered the example of Turkey. The Turkish Islamic party called the Justice and Development Party has evolved into a Muslim Democratic institution akin to those of the Christian Democrats in several EU countries. Something similar is equally emerging in Morocco, and should be encouraged instead of being shunned, feared or boycotted. In fact the EU, not particularly its ENP, has fared better than the US with regard to the Palestinians, as we see later.

**What the Arab countries witnessed in 2006 represented a wholesale Western retreat on the democracy promotion front**

**Is It Business As Usual**

The ongoing issues of common concern continued to appropriate sizable volume of interstate and media attention on both sides. These included what the EU
labels as Frozen Conflicts – namely in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan. While some countries continued to be more involved than others, the EU as a whole has kept an active attention, through its respective media, NGO’s and humanitarian assistance. The deteriorating situation in Darfur is another case in point. As some of the conflicts thawed or took an unexpected turn to the worst, EU policy battled to ameliorate the situation, even by distancing itself from the position of the US.

Though not a signatory to ENP, Sudan is an important neighbour of other actual or potential members. It is noteworthy that the EU and a majority of the African countries have seen eye to eye on the tragic issue of Darfur. They supported the international military and humanitarian intervention against the wishes of the Sudanese government, backed by the Arab League. This pan-Arab solidarity vis-à-vis the will of the international community will be recurred with regard to Syria and Somalia.

A different Euro-Arab alignment took place with regard to the 2006 Summer War between Israel and a non-state actor, Hezbollah. Without officially taking sides, the so called moderate Arab states of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan were on the side of the EU and the US against Hezbollah. Those Arab states were of the view that the latter provoked Israel into attacking Lebanon when it captured two and killed six of its soldiers. Syria and Iran, on the other hand, stood by Hezbollah. The rest of the Arab governments were silent. Meanwhile, the vast majority of Arabs surveyed on the issue backed Hezbollah, often in defiance of their own Governments.

One public opinion survey revealed that defiant militant leaders tend to capture the imagination of the majority of those surveyed.

In keeping with the emerging prominence of non-state actors in the Arab World, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah in various surveys has led in popularity over other Arab leaders. In fact none of the Arab kings or presidents made it into the top ten. One public opinion survey, conducted in September by the Cairo-based Ibn Khaldun Center, revealed that defiant militant leaders tend to capture the imagination of the majority of those surveyed. Thus Iran’s Ahmed Ahmadinejad came second; followed by Khaled Mishaal of Palestinian Hamas; and Magdi Akef, leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brothers. Early on in 2006, the election of Islamic Hamas in Palestine took the Europeans, as everyone else, by surprise. As member of the International Quartet, the EU had committed itself to withholding aid and recognition from organizations unwilling to renounce violence or who refused to abide by previously signed agreements by the Palestinian Authority (PA). Meanwhile, there were some three million Palestinians in dire need of international aid to merely survive. While the US stood firm on boycotting Hamas the EU was more flexible and channelled much of its allotted aid either to civil society organizations or through the non-Hamas Presidency of Mr. Mahmoud Abbas. It also maintained low level contacts with some Hamas officials.

It is noted that whenever Europeans take an independent stand from the US, they immediately draw editorial praise. This is due to Arabs’ popular wisdom that the US is always on Israel’s side against Arabs and Palestinians. Thus being independent from the latter carries with it the possibility of being fair, and hence pro Palestinian.

While Lebanon had been on the Euro-Arab agenda since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005, the summer of 2006 witnessed an eruption of yet another war between Israel and the Shiite militia Hezbollah. Europe would get involved both in an early mediation for a cease-fire, and later in peace-keeping. In the fall of 2006 Hezbollah and the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora became locked in a confrontation over the issue of the International Tribunal. This tribunal was authorized by an earlier UN Security Council resolution and was deemed necessary in order to determine who was responsible for the assassination of Hariri. The EU along with the US and the Arab regimes sided with the Siniora government.

Conclusion

ENP did not do badly in 2006. In view of its mission statement, however, it could have been more robust and more visible. Two years after its initiation, it has remained quite shy and mostly confined to intergovernmental dealings. Arab civil society organizations have not significantly benefited from its resources. Hopefully ENP will expand its outreach in 2007.
Reforming the Security Sector: A Euro-Mediterranean Challenge?

Aside from rare exceptions, the security sector reform is not among the priorities of the EU when it comes to dealing with the political reform in the Mediterranean, despite the fact that the European Security Strategy highlighted its importance. A number of questions arise when analysing this situation: What do we understand by security sector reform? How is the concept of human security involved? Why would the EU be interested in encouraging these processes among its southern and eastern Mediterranean neighbours? What has been done so far? What should be taken into account when promoting this issue in its policies towards the Mediterranean area?

The concept of security sector reform encompasses a variety of areas: the armed forces, police, gendarmerie, intelligence services, the prison system, the judicial system and the public institutions in charge of supervising the sector. There are also different viewpoints as concerns the meaning of the term ‘reform’. Whilst for some it refers only to its modernising aspect, that is, a means to enhance security forces’ efficiency, others believe it must play a democratising role. From this viewpoint, the reform must be aimed at bringing security forces under democratic civil control and ensuring they perform in accordance with human rights norms and citizens’ fundamental freedoms.

This second approach is connected with the new concept known as “human security,” made popular by the 1994 UNDP Report on Human Development, which can be defined as an attempt to shift the focus of who should be protected. According to this conception, citizens’ security should be prioritised over that of the State (or regime). Thus, a security sector reform from a democratising perspective not only relates to this new concept of security but is an essential part of it.

Why Promote the Security Sector Reform in the Mediterranean?

The Barcelona Process and European Neighbourhood Policy documents, as well as the European Security Strategy published in 2003, underline a shared interest in promoting democracy and rule of law in the Mediterranean. To be consistent with this objective, the EU and its southern and eastern Mediterranean partners should include the security sector reform on its reform agenda.

In order to embark on a democratic security sector reform in the Mediterranean, the area clearly needs to undertake a series of political reform and democratic consolidation processes that in some cases are conspicuously absent. However, it is also evident that no democratising process will be complete without a thorough security sector reform.

Nonetheless, and despite the growing interest that the security sector reform is awakening in the Arab world and other international forums (UNDP, but particularly NATO), the security sector reform has little bearing on European policies towards the Mediterranean. There are, however, two exceptions: the case of Turkey, insofar as candidate country for accession, and Palestine (in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP). With these exceptions, Europe’s
involvement in the Mediterranean security sector reform has been scarce and partial.

The Experience of Turkey

It is worth keeping in mind that matters related to the role of the Armed Forces have traditionally been a key issue on Turkey’s domestic political reform agenda. The continuous military interventionism in Turkish politics has been viewed with concern, not only in Turkey but also by the EU. Thus, civil-military relations have become one of the aspects that European Commission reports have taken into account when evaluating whether Turkey meets the Copenhagen political criteria, which are required before starting accession negotiations with a candidate country.

The fact that substantial progress has been made in the security sector reform in recent years and, in contrast to EU relations with other Mediterranean countries, this issue has become consolidated on the Euro-Turkish agenda, is intimately linked to Turkey’s process of accession to the EU. This, in addition to the will to consolidate democracy in the Turkish Government and Grand National Assembly, has led to the reform of the National Security Council (MGK) and brought about rapid progress in the zero-tolerance policy related to torture and improvements in the state of Turkish prisons. All of this has been supervised and supported by various EU structures.

Certain aspects are yet to be improved, and many analysts believe that the Armed Forces still play an excessive role in the country’s politics and society, and that civilian control mechanisms remain insufficient (Cizre, 2006). Indeed, the political tension of spring 2007 has recently surfaced this concern. However, progress achieved in the past six years suggests that substantial improvements can be obtained when the EU and competent authorities share the same objective.

To what extent could reformers have achieved such progress without the perspective of accession? This is a central issue when it comes to defining and implementing a European or Euro-Mediterranean policy for promoting the security sector reform, since the EU is not in a position to offer the accession incentive to other Mediterranean countries, with the exception of the Balkans.

The Experience of Palestine

Palestine’s experience of security sector reform has a series of distinctive features that make it a special case in the region. Three aspects should be noted. Firstly, the Palestinian National Authority is not an internationally recognised State. Secondly, the Palestinian territories are under Israeli occupation and, therefore, in a situation of open conflict. Thirdly, the Palestinian National Authority has various active police forces, including the Palestinian Civil Police and Presidential Guard, as well as armed militia such as the Izz ad-Din al Qassam Brigades and al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (Fiedrich, 2005).

In view of this situation and with the publication of the 2002 Quartet Roadmap, which established the achievement of good governance of Palestinian institutions as one of its main objectives, it became a priority for a number of countries and institutional organisations to create a unified police force in the Palestinian territories that held monopoly of violence and was under civil and democratic control. It is under this conception that the EU decided to launch the ESDP civil mission known as EUPOL-COPPS, which began operations on 1st January 2006. The mission, with a three-year mandate, should contribute to launching the Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme with a view to establishing a transparent police organisation featuring a clear legal framework to constitute a strong police service capable of meeting society’s needs (CITPax, 2006).

Although there are missions that define it in an even more precise way, EUPOL COPPS is an ESDP mission aimed at promoting the security sector reform. However, this experience is not yielding the results expected and the contingent dedicated to the mission has been considerably reduced following the new escalation of violence in most of the Palestinian territories in 2006 and the European blocking of the Government of Hamas after its victory in the January 2006 elections, which also led to the interruption of this area of cooperation.

To summarise, the experience of European intervention in Palestine illustrates some of the EU’s deficiencies in being able to act effectively in the security sector reform in a conflict situation. However, the EUPOL COPPS mission also highlights the importance attached by the EU to the security sector reform, not only from a democratising perspective, but also as a
vector for achieving long-lasting peace. Independently of the difficulties involved in its implementation, it is also worth mentioning the emphasis the mission has placed on the need to understand the police sector as a service to citizens, which may inspire new European actions in the field of police reform.

**Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation and the European Neighbourhood Policy**

As mentioned above, the experiences of Turkey and Palestine are exceptional not only due to the specific circumstances of both countries but also because it is unusual for the EU to become so deeply involved in matters related to security sector reform in Mediterranean countries. Cautiousness has characterised the EU’s actions in this area and neither the 1995 Barcelona Declaration—the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s foundation text—nor subsequent texts approved in this framework mention the need to carry out a security sector reform in member countries. Indeed, only after the Euro-Mediterranean conference in Valencia in 2002 did the issue of police begin to appear on the agenda. However, much more sensitive matters related to the Armed Forces remain absent from Euro-Mediterranean discussions on security matters and political reform. This may be due to the Partnership’s inherent principle of non-interference with the domestic affairs of its members and the fact that the domestic and international political context in these countries is less conducive towards and even advises against the launch of such reforms.

The creation of a new cooperation framework, the European Neighbourhood Policy, raised some hopes that this situation would change. Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner (2005) believed that the action plans could be a good instrument for the gradual progress of a security reform agenda following a strictly bilateral logic. However, the action plans approved so far contain scarce reference to security sector reform, referring only to the police and judicial reform and, as a general rule, from a perspective of European interest and as a modernising rather than democratising factor. A good example is the greater attention paid to border control issues in these documents.

**Perspectives for the Future**

The security sector reform is becoming an essential matter for agents wishing to promote political reform processes and more stable regional contexts. One of the objectives of Europe’s foreign policy, as well as of all the States that comprise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, is a more stable and democratic Mediterranean. Consequently, there is no reason not to gradually begin to introduce the security sector reform with its multiple facets into the Euro-Mediterranean agenda and European Neighbourhood Policy. However, if the EU does adopt an active role in this area, it should take four matters into account. The first is that these efforts may be in vain if actions are not simultaneously implemented to solve the causes of regional instability. Regional conflicts hinder any political reform process, particularly in the area of security, since they legitimise (internally and externally) the strongest possible Armed Forces that are given a degree of autonomy to deal with real or latent threats.

The second is that it should be aware that other organisations are promoting, or may be prepared to encourage, security sector reform processes. Among them, it is worth noting NATO’s will to enhance this dimension in the Mediterranean Dialogue framework. Not only that, some EU Member States also have an active policy in this sector, especially in the area of training. Therefore, these agents need to look for areas of collaboration and synergy to prevent unnecessary overlapping or contradictions.

Thirdly, and maybe most importantly, it is necessary to encourage agents that are in a position to domestically bring pressure to bear in favour of a security sector reform. They may include members of civil society, the political class, the media and even certain sectors of the Armed Forces and other security forces. If this domestic pressure does not exist, all efforts will be fruitless given that external pressure will easily be seen as interference in the State’s domestic affairs aimed at weakening it. Forth and lastly, it is necessary to define the incentives that the EU is willing to offer states that voluntarily
To decide to accept the EU’s cooperation in promoting security sector reform. The issue is not confined to this sector; it is a general concern of the European Neighbourhood Policy and should be resolved if there really is a will to have a bearing on the processes of political and economic reform in the Mediterranean. If it does not offer the necessary incentives, the EU runs the risk of facing a legitimacy crisis. All the same, as regards the security sector reform, it is even more necessary to set up this structure of incentives and find suitable methods to evaluate the progress made given the limited impact of these matters on Europe’s policies toward the Mediterranean. A recent report by the EuroMeSCo network (Soler i Lecha et al, 2006) presented a number of recommendations regarding the need to incorporate the security sector into the Country Reports and European Neighbourhood Policy’s Action Plans, underscoring the need to find and process factual information on the matter. To do so, it is of vital importance to associate domestic agents with this task, thus contributing to a heightened social awareness of the need for such reforms. The EU can use this information in cooperation with the partner country to design medium and long-term strategies in the field of security sector reform. In line with the European Neighbourhood Policy’s philosophy, in the event of substantial and sustained progress, these partners should take part in foreign, security and defence policies, and in programmes and agencies related to these matters. Meanwhile, it would be advisable to open all options of collaboration, training and experience sharing to countries bordering the Mediterranean, regardless of their progress in terms of security sector reform. Opening these areas of cooperation will lay the foundations for greater mutual trust and, in the not so distant future, for Mediterranean Partners to advance in security sector reform processes.

Conclusions

The security sector reform, a matter that is barely present in the EU’s policies towards the Mediterranean, is gaining ground on the political reform agenda in the Mediterranean and the Arab world (Luethold, 2004). It would therefore be advisable for the EU to strengthen and in some cases begin to define the means to contribute to the success of these security sector reform processes. Such an approach would be in line with the European Security Strategy and the philosophy of the Barcelona Process and European Neighbourhood Policy, and would encourage a human security doctrine in its relations with its environment. This issue is clearly not the only one nor is it the most urgent in the aim to turn the Mediterranean into an area of shared peace, where democracy is the rule rather than the exception. Resolving regional conflicts and the need to initiate political reform processes are, in some cases, preliminary steps towards the consolidation of the will to undertake security reforms. However, this does not exempt the EU from designing a global strategy to promote security sector reform and, in the case of the Mediterranean, to accompany it with regional strategies that are sufficiently broad to act on a case by case basis, adapting to the specific requirements of each country and moment.

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The autocratic regimes of north-west Africa are beset by the twin ravages of economic underperformance and the political marginalization of a large and growing underclass. Fundamentally flawed, if resilient, systems of governance in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia coupled with grinding poverty are contributing to a host of social ills, not least the appearance of disaffected Muslim youth vulnerable to indoctrination by extremist elements. Conditions are such that al-Qaeda now appears able to penetrate the western reaches of the Islamic world, bringing often unwanted attention to the Maghrebi north-west of Africa and the neighbouring Sahel. There are fears in some quarters about potential spillover effects in oil-rich West Africa, most notably Nigeria, where tension between the mainly Islamic north and the predominantly Christian south has led to open clashes on several occasions. The impact of these developments is being felt in the Mediterranean region as well as in Northern Europe, the Middle East and the United States.

The Long Shadow of the GSPC

To date, the specific incidents of terrorism in north-west Africa have not constituted a grave threat to local or regional stability. The most prominent of the region’s jihadi organizations, the Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is trying to transform into a regional actor, which accounts in part for the announcement by the group’s leader, Abu Mus'ab al-Wadoud, in October 2006 of an alliance with al-Qaeda and the group’s renaming as “The al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb.” (The more familiar acronym for the group will be used in this essay.) This “merger” signaled GSPC’s role as the leader of jihadi groups in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Spanish intelligence has reported that the network also includes the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Perhaps the most disturbing outcome of this development, as seen in many western capitals, is the creation of a pipeline currently feeding fighters into Iraq that will eventually accommodate the return of veterans to fight in other theaters. The strategic intent of this network has been described by US-based terrorism analyst, Andrew Black, as follows:

"Integral to [al-Qaeda/GSPC’s] plans is the formation of an extensive training cycle, which in essence provides the means by which al-Qaeda can move fighters between Iraq and the Maghreb. This training cycle, which first came to light from sources in Morocco, begins with regional fighters participating in training provided by the GSPC, presumably at one of the group’s mobile training camps in the Sahara desert. Following completion of this phase of their training, fighters will move on to fight alongside the GSPC against the Algerian government. In this phase, jihadis gain operational experience, which will serve them well in the next stage of the cycle: the Iraq jihad. Once they have been smuggled in through one of Iraq’s neighbouring countries (like Syria), fighters will participate in terrorist and insurgent activities and potentially conduct martyrdom operations. For those select few who complete this stage and survive, they are to return to the Maghreb to await operational orders from al-Qaeda.”

Of course much of this analysis is speculative and questions might be raised about the absolute number
of hard core fighters involved in such operations; but as successful attacks in the US and Spain demonstrate, terror plots do no require large numbers of foot soldiers, only dedicated martyrs with the operational experience and support networks to undertake complex missions.

**Striking the Apostates in Spain and Morocco**

December 2006 saw al-Qaeda’s chief propagandist, Ayman al-Zawahiri, refer to the southern Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla as being “occupied” by infidels. In May of 2006, a group identifying itself as Nadim al-Magrebi (a name used at times by an Algeria-based jihadist network) had issued a direct threat to Spanish interests by likening Ceuta and Melilla to “liberation” struggles in Chechnya, Iraq and Kashmir. GSPC/al-Qaeda has also been linked to Moroccan terrorists charged with the 2004 Madrid train bombings.

The Moroccan-based Salafiya Jihadiya, which was spawned by the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), has been charged with many crimes, but its most notorious operation was the May 2003 coordinated attack in Casablanca that targeted a private club (Casa de España) near the Spanish Consulate, the Israei Alliance Club, a Jewish cemetery, the Belgian Consulate, and a hotel frequented by business travelers. Of the 31 Salafiya Jihadiya members found responsible, 10 were condemned to death penalty while others received lengthy prison terms, including the group’s spiritual leader, Mohamed Fizazi, now serving a thirty-year sentence. Some contend that for prosecutorial convenience, the term Salafiya Jihadiya was coined by the Moroccan government to describe a host of Salafist groups operating in Morocco, such as al Hijra Wattakfir, Attakfir Bidum Hijra, Assirat al Mustaqim, Ansar al Islam, and the Moroccan Afghans, and that the term is generally associated with a broader jihadi doctrine that was promulgated throughout the Arab world by Saudi radicals in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991. In fact, most Moroccans subscribe to the moderate Malekitite strain of Islam. The support of most Moroccans, however, is not a requisite condition for terrorism operations to be mounted.

One of the individuals who had been imprisoned for involvement in the Casablanca bombings, Hassan al-Khattab, turned up as the leader of a previously unknown terrorist group, Ansar al-Mahdi, which was uncovered in July 2006 by Moroccan officials. Some 56 people associated with this group were arrested in cities throughout northern Morocco. Most disturbing to government investigators was the discovery that the group had recruited members of the Moroccan military. The military operations wing of Ansar al-Mahdi included five soldiers who served at the primary airbase in Salé. These were young conscripts (perhaps coincidentally, the government ended conscription in August 2006, at the same time there were major purges of the security services) who had been directed by the leadership of the al-Mahdi group to undertake a very bold operation to blow up the airbase, robbing weapons depots before destroying them with explosives. The operation was to include the killing of personnel serving at the airbase.

Moroccan authorities announced in January 2007 that a radical Islamist network recruiting volunteers to fight in Iraq was broken up and 62 people involved in this scheme were arrested. The network was said to have ideological, financial, and operational ties to GSPC.

**Continuing the Jihad in Algeria and Tunisia**

A recent series of car bombings and other operations in Algeria were staged by GSPC, including a December 2006 attack on a bus carrying personnel working for Brown & Root-Condor, a subsidiary of the US-based contracting firm Halliburton. The attack was lauded by al-Qaeda in Iraq, which issued the following communiqué: “We bless the conquest of Bouchaoui [where the attack took place]; we say to our GSPC brothers continue your Jihad against the apostates in Algeria in order to establish an Islamic State and install the Sharia(…)We call on all Muslims to strike the Crusaders’ interests on Muslim land to take revenge for our brothers in Iraq, Afghanistan and everywhere else on Muslim land.” Early in 2007, GSPC claimed responsibility for a coordinated wave of car bombings in the Algerian provinces of Boumerdès and Tizi Ouzou. The GSPC also carried out a rocket attack on an Algerian army post in January of 2007 killing five soldiers. A counterattack by government forces in the eastern region of Batna reportedly resulted in the death of 10 jihadists.

During the same period, Tunisian security services engaged in an exchange of fire with gunmen associated with GSPC who apparently planned to attack foreign diplomats. The Tunisian cell was reported to have strong ties to North African networks active in northern Italy. The purported leader of the group, a Tunisian named Lassad Sassi (also known as Abu Hashem), had fought in Bosnia, Chechnya and Afghanistan. He
had been indicted in Milan in April 2005 but slipped out of Italy before likely joining GSPC in Algeria. Sassi was one of twelve operatives killed by government forces. Tunisian Interior Minister, Rafik Haj Kacem, announced that an additional fifteen suspects had been arrested. The arrests also yielded explosives, embassy maps and lists of foreign diplomats. Tunisian human rights groups charged that the police had actually arrested several dozen people, including some young men who had just come out of mosques after prayers.

Indicating the growing expanse of GSPC operations, in late-December 2006, the 10th and 11th stages of the Paris-Dakar Auto Rally race were cancelled on the advice of the French secret service, who believed GSPC might call upon 500 armed followers across the Sahara to carry out attacks. The broader, potentially global, impact of jihadists in north-west Africa is thought by some – in this instance, Africa watchers at the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies – to result from the convergence of the following:

- indigenous militant Islamic groups that are linked to externally supported local madrassas;
- the migration southwards from Algeria and other North African venues of terrorist movements, most notably [the GSPC], which reportedly has established training bases in Mali and Niger;
- Lebanese trading communities, long-standing support networks for Hezbollah, some of which are reportedly engaged in illicit diamond trafficking, money laundering and the movement of lethal materials; and
- a rising number of conspicuous minimally protected economic installations, especially in the energy sector, that are overtly tied to Western corporate interests. [It is a matter of record that] early in 2003, Osama bin Laden publicly exhorted his followers to make Nigeria a global priority.

Terrorist Threats in the Sahel?

The Sahel is of special interest to Western powers and jihadists alike because its immense size and topography as well as weak governments and porous borders render it virtually ungovernable, a condition not terribly dissimilar to what obtains in the tribal regions of Northwest Pakistan. The centuries-old caravan routes across the vast expanses of Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad now serve as conduits for illegal migration, trafficking in arms and narcotics, and a redoubt for terrorists and criminal elements. Since the early 1990s, there has been a rise in activity by Islamist missionaries and NGOs in all four countries of the Sahel. Chad has been the site of considerable stirrings, with locals reporting the presence of large numbers of foreign travelers carrying false identity papers and infiltration by Islamist networks linked to the Sudan. It is the northern region of Mali, however, that has witnessed a significant influx of foreign Jihadists, with the GSPC penetrating from Algeria and other armed elements moving in from South Asia and the Middle East.

The most comprehensive counterterrorism program in the region has been launched by United States through the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and its successor, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which in addition to the four Sahelian countries includes Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. These programs are designed to be part of an overarching policy that also strives to advance good governance, economic reform and expansion, and health and education. To date, it has been the military component of the PSI/TSCTI initiatives that has received the lion’s share of attention. Critics wonder if such investment is commensurate with the gravity of the terrorist threat. According to risk analysts at UK-based Oxford Analytica:

“The United States fears that Muslim communities in Africa could develop radicalism in the same manner as Indonesia and other peripheral Muslim states. However, with the exception of the Tabliq sect of the Ugandan Allied Democratic Front, the recent incidence of Islamic militancy is actually very low in almost all African states. In fact, traditional African religions are more closely linked to the insurgent warfare on the continent.

Muslim communities largely draw on the moderate Suwarian tradition of Sufi Islam, which has not engaged in jihad in Africa since the 19th century. Importantly, these communities remain largely detached towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Anti-Israeli and pro-Iraqi sentiments are muted throughout western, central, and southern Africa, with minor exceptions in Nigeria and South Africa. Both these states have experienced some radicalization through the influence of Saudi-sponsored mosques, which have encouraged a more extreme Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.”
The Belgian-based International Crisis Group (ICG) has also determined that "the Sahel is not a hotbed of terrorist activity," as its report, *Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction*, notes, "...in this region, few things are exactly what they seem at first glance." A self-described Islamic republic, Mauritania does not tolerate Islamic activity of any kind. Mali, a model of 1990s neo-liberal democratization, "runs the greatest risk of any West African country other than Nigeria of violent Islamist activity." Niger, the world’s second poorest country, gives the lie to the notion that poverty breeds religious fanaticism. The government of Niger "has maintained its tradition of tolerant Sufi Islam by holding to an unambiguous line on the separation of religion and the state."

Analysts generally argue that the terrorist threat in the Sahel has been largely exaggerated. Various motives are cited, from the desire of oppressive local governments to silence critics, avoid political reform and attract U.S. dollars (at least on paper, TSCTI represents an annual commitment by the U.S. of tens of millions of dollars), to efforts on the part of Washington to gain more of a military foothold in the region to ensure access to oil (the U.S. is likely to import over 50% of its oil from Africa by 2020). Whatever the motives of the key actors, critics worry that counterterrorism policies that rely heavily on military measures may, in fact, have the opposite effect. The observations of the ICG reflect this concern:

"The resultant equation [of U.S. policy] is laden with risks, including turning the small number of arrested clerics and militants into martyrs, thus giving ammunition to local anti-American or anti-Western figures who claim [the PSI/TSCTI] is part of a larger plan to render Muslim populations servile; and cutting off smuggling networks that have become the economic lifeblood of Saharan peoples whose livestock was devastated by the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, without offering economic alternatives. To avoid creating the kinds of problems the [PSI/TSCTI] is meant to solve, it needs to be folded into a more balanced approach to the region, one also in which Europeans and Americans work more closely together."

**Conclusion**

Taken in isolation, terrorist operations by jihadists in north-west Africa do not appear to pose a global threat. Their cumulative impact, however, is disruptive to state and society in the region, has caused material damage and economic loss and, most importantly, has cost many lives. Furthermore, as has been amply demonstrated in recent years, even modest training facilities situated in remote desert locations can serve as staging areas for significant attacks, particularly in the immediate neighborhood of the Maghreb and parts of Mediterranean Europe. Terrorist operations also pose potentially grave threats to the energy sector and this does have global implications. With such considerations in mind, it would be foolhardy not to closely monitor operational as well as ideological penetration of the region by radical Islamists as well as the activities of self-radicalized locals. The challenge has been and will continue to be achieving the right balance between counterterrorism operations, which are for the most part reactive in nature, and more proactive efforts at political liberalization and economic reform that go hand-in-hand with “hearts and minds” campaigns. Doing too little to counter the jihadi threat may risk another Casablanca or Madrid style attack, doing too much, i.e., using heavy handed tactics and effectively providing cover for oppressive regimes, risks the possibility of playing into the hands of radical proselytizers and small armies of all too willing assassins.

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The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in Bulgaria’s Foreign Policy Priorities on the Eve of European Union Accession

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Background Features of Bulgaria’s Foreign and European Policy

Analysing the role and significance of the Mediterranean and, more specifically, of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Bulgaria’s foreign policy has to be placed in several broader frameworks. These are the general features of the country’s foreign policy making patterns, the setting of its “European policy” on the eve of accession to the European Union (EU), and the specific context of the design and implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Furthermore, such analysis has to bear in mind a set of factors influencing the process of goal setting and implementing concrete foreign policy actions.

Bulgarian foreign policy has traditionally been perceived as tending to follow already established agendas rather than contributing to the design and formulation of new ones. The pattern of foreign policy making, based on both geopolitical and historic premises, can be characterized as re-active rather than pro-active. The Bulgarian “political horizon” is quite low and dictates the predominance of short-term preoccupations. It is connected with spending political resources and capital on immediate achievements, sometimes to the detriment of strategic interests or visions. Even in cases where long-term political vision is displayed, it normally has two features. Firstly, such vision is careful not to deviate too much from the “mainstream”, or it is *suiviste*, in the words of the former French President François Mitterrand. Secondly, in many cases it is limited to declaratory activism, which stops short of producing concrete foreign policy deliverables. The above features can be explained also by a relatively modest institutional and expert capacity in the country’s foreign policy making field that is difficult to overcome but in a long-term perspective.

On the eve of EU membership, Bulgaria’s “European policy” – the second framework that has to be considered – was focused almost exclusively on accession. The internal dimension of pre-accession preparation aimed at stepping up efforts in key areas monitored by the European Commission with special concern (e.g. fighting corruption and organized crime). Its foreign policy dimension followed a consistent programme of action to secure the ratification of its Accession Treaty by all 25 EU member states. In order not to antagonize political elites in the “old” EU-15, and especially in those states that had not yet completed ratification (e.g. Germany and France), Bulgarian political actors adopted an attitude of general *non-involvement* in internal EU affairs. They preferred to focus on “doing the pre-accession homework” and to distance themselves from debating problems that stood high on the agenda of the EU-25. However, insofar as the ratification process was taking place in the general ambience of a “post-2004-enlargement fatigue,” the above approach was complemented by a sort of *defensive/negative involvement*, an attempt at damage limitation, which was meant to prevent Bulgarian accession from being taken hostage by non-related internal EU developments and negative public attitudes.

All pre-accession preparations were targeted at the gradual internalisation of EU policies – a process that was relatively easy in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in comparison...
Experience gained since the mid-1990s of adherence to EU positions on foreign policy and security issues contributed to a relatively smooth upgrade of Bulgaria’s role of active observer (in 2006) and full-fledged participant in the CFSP and the ENP as of accession. The CFSP problematic in general and specific issues related to the EU’s neighbourhood were among those, where Bulgarian foreign policy displayed positive involvement by expressing concrete views on specific substantive issues that were relatively non-contentious. It served a double purpose. First, as a PR tool, developing “pro-European” positions in support of non-conflicting causes would help Bulgaria build the image of a “good European” and would further promote the country’s accession. Second, on substance, this could be a modest contribution to fleshing out the current debate and, in the medium term, could help distinctly place Bulgaria on the “map” of EU foreign policy making.

**The Mediterranean in the Bulgarian Neighbourhood-Related Agenda**

From “day one” of EU membership, Bulgaria fully faces the challenge of participating in common EU foreign policy making. For objective political, economic, demographic and other reasons, the country lacks sufficient policy-making capacities to get efficiently involved and effectively deliver within the vast spectrum of external policy actions – not only regarding the Union’s global role, but also within the scope of the ENP. Bulgaria has to prioritize and select target countries even within the geographical coverage of the EU’s “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” concept, in order to be able to claim a more pro-active role in foreign policy.

In the Bulgarian foreign policy agenda setting, the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean as a region (i.e. the Southern dimension of the ENP) and the Barcelona Process in particular face the competition of two other regions. Firstly, there is the Eastern dimension of the ENP, itself sub-divided in two overlapping sub-areas – the ENP towards the Eastern European countries along the land border of the enlarged EU-27, and the ENP towards the Black Sea Region. The second competitor is the region of the Western Balkans, which should not be omitted for two reasons: on the one hand, during the initial stages of designing the ENP, the EU itself hesitated as to how to approach these countries. On the other hand, despite the initial promise of EU membership for the Western Balkan countries made in Thessaloniki in June 2003, the general mood of post-2004-enlargement fatigue has led to downgrading the status of this area in the political discourse of many EU Member States.

How could we expect Bulgaria to prioritize the Southern dimension of the ENP, if compared to its Eastern dimension and to the Western Balkans? What factors could influence the reduction of the geographical focus of Bulgaria’s involvement in the ENP?

*Geopolitical considerations*, in the version relevant for a small state such as Bulgaria, are decisive for goal setting. Bulgaria “measures” the ENP against its own – more restrained – perception of neighbourhood. Bulgaria’s circle of neighbours is, of course, much narrower than Europe’s. The Balkan Peninsula and the Black Sea area have always stood central in defining Bulgarian foreign policy priorities. Projecting geopolitical leverage beyond these two segments of the ENP zone of action could be expected only in cases where other factors demonstrate clear preponderance – specific vested interests, specific know-how, politically sensitive questions, etc. (Nikolov, 2005: 264.)

*Strategic foreign policy choices* made by Bulgaria – membership in NATO and the EU – will impact participation in the ENP. These choices, especially in the field of security, and the ensuing obligations are likely to involve bearing costs in terms of bilateral relations. With a view to the country’s accession to NATO, Bulgaria’s decision back in 2003 to join the US-led “coalition of the willing” and send troops to Iraq negatively affected relations with Arab countries. In the future, this could indirectly reduce the country’s potential to take part in activities in the Southern dimension of the ENP.

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1 Such pre-accession experience is, however, of lower significance for the Mediterranean ENP partners and of greater significance for those countries neighbouring the EU from the East that cherish EU-membership aspirations. By the end of 2006, Bulgaria had already signed bilateral memoranda for cooperation in the field of European and Euro-Atlantic integration with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
Traditions of bilateral relations in the political or economic field are a necessary point of departure for developing a pro-active Bulgarian policy within the ENP. A distinction should be made, however, between the real potential of traditionally good, “mutually beneficial” bilateral relations, on one hand, and public perceptions and discourses sometimes based on myths, on the other. A tradition that has once been positive might have become a myth after clashing with strategic priorities of a higher degree. For example, traditionally good Bulgarian-Arab relations during the Cold War have been overshadowed by recent strategic commitments. After about ten painful years of demystification, changing realities are finally recognized by Bulgarian policy makers. Thus, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivailo Kalfin, admits the “lowered intensity” of Bulgarian-Arab relations prior to EU accession and emphasizes the need to heighten such intensity again in a new EU membership framework (Kalfin, 2006a). However, recurring references to “the good traditions, which we continue to develop” in the official discourse even at the highest level of the Prime Minister (Stanishev, 2007) are telling about the persistence of myths. Stripping bilateral links from such myths will be useful for narrowing down and focusing the future ENP activity of Bulgaria.

The above factors are instrumental in explaining the place of each of the three geographic regions neighbouring the EU-27 – (1) the Western Balkans, (2) Eastern Europe and the Black Sea area, (3) the Southern and the Eastern Mediterranean – within the general order of priorities of Bulgarian foreign policy. Among them, Bulgaria has always attached and will continue to attach greatest importance to the Western Balkans and will therefore work for maintaining the European perspective of the region. In 2006, the country’s diplomatic action was concentrated both on assisting EU efforts in solving outstanding problems blocking regional progress (such as the status of Kosovo), and on helping the countries in the region to enhance their pre-accession preparation. At official level and in the framework of public debates triggered by the International Commission on the Balkans in 2006, Bulgarian policy makers and opinion leaders advocated a firm EU commitment for a future accession of Western Balkan countries to the EU (International Commission, 2005). The immediate proximity of the Black Sea area and the fact that Bulgarian and Romanian EU membership brings the Union’s external borders to this region raises the latter’s importance on the list of Bulgarian foreign policy priorities. The seriousness of the country’s commitment is proved by the adoption of a novel approach – the elaboration of a special governmental policy paper “Bulgaria and the Black Sea Region” in November 2006 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

The Mediterranean, therefore, comes third on Bulgaria’s neighbourhood-related agenda. Single issues – such as the trial against five Bulgarian nurses in Libya – which grasp public attention and are capable of mobilizing and even overstraining political and diplomatic efforts, are no more than exceptions that prove this conclusion. The impasse of the trial in Libya illustrates serious shortcomings not only in bilateral relations between Sofia and Tripoli but also in the approach to the country’s Arab partners in general.

The “lowered intensity” of Bulgaria’s foreign policy action within the Southern dimension of the ENP is complemented by the absence of a public or even of an academic debate, which would develop approaches or generate ideas to facilitate Bulgarian participation in the ENP. While the EU is gradually starting to appreciate the trouble-making effects of excluding political Islam from the various formats of the ENP and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Springborg, 2007: 2-3), such a linkage is not established in the Bulgarian academic discourse. A recent conference on “Islam and Politics” held in Sofia (International Conference, 2006) could serve as an example: Although the formulation of the conference title included the notion of a “Wider Europe”, the ensuing debate was not focused on EU policy. On the contrary, the Southern dimension of the ENP was barely mentioned and even its shortcomings did not “earn” any substantive criticism coming from speakers and the audience. Increased attention to political Islam as a field of study detached from the ENP remains problematic.

Bulgarian Positions on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The ENP has been identified by Bulgarian policy makers as an EU policy area where the country could contribute to policy shaping and implementation from the outset, and especially after accession. Solid experience gained both in the framework of the enlargement process and in bilateral relations with
ENP partner countries is the rationale behind the assertion of President Parvanov that Europe’s "new neighbours" are not new for Bulgaria and that the "credit of trust" of the country among ENP partner countries could play a favourable role in future ENP actions (Parvanov, 2004). Pre-accession experience has been stressed as a relevant asset in the transformation and modernization efforts of the ENP partner countries\(^2\). The emphasis made on conducting the ENP as a whole is that it should be balanced and effective and should take into account the interests of neighbours. From this general perspective, Bulgaria has supported the efforts of successive EU Presidencies (especially the Finnish Presidency in 2006) for a broader application of the regional approach in deepening group-to-group relations within this policy.

While shaping its own contribution to the ENP, Bulgaria has established shared democratic values as a point of departure. The fundamental ENP principles are to be implemented in a differentiated and flexible manner and by building up specific action models for individual countries. Progress in bilateral relations of the EU with each partner country under the ENP should be assessed according to the set of fundamental principles and values and the country’s individual merits and achievements. The Summit of Heads of State and Government in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on 27-28 November 2005 in Barcelona offered a unique opportunity for Bulgaria to formulate its overall attitude and specific positions on the Southern dimension of the ENP even prior to EU accession. The participation of Prime Minister Stanishev in the forum was viewed as a key impetus for developing a European dimension to Bulgaria’s bilateral relations with Mediterranean countries, which would be an additional playing field for Bulgaria as from 2007 onwards. In his address to the summit, Stanishev outlined the involvement of Bulgaria in such a multilateral framework as a basic format of cooperation and interaction in the future (Stanishev, 2005).

An important accent in Stanishev’s speech was the understanding that the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability should be based on common democratic principles and should protect human rights. Among the priorities of the Five-Year Working Programme adopted by the forum, Bulgaria’s government leader outlined good and democratic governance, sustainable economic growth and reforms, education, justice, security and social integration. He expressed the hope that reforms initiated in the countries from the region would enhance the rule of law, the development of active civil societies, as well as the protection of human rights and the freedom to express personal opinions. Both summit documents – the comprehensive working programme mentioned above and the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism – were assessed as adequate for enabling partner countries from the EU and the Mediterranean to meet the challenges of the new century. On the issue of fighting terrorism, the Bulgarian position expressed was to develop concrete cooperation measures on strengthening control over illegal migration flows, on preventing terrorist acts, as well as on initiating relevant legislative changes.

Following this summit, 2006 was a year of a plethora of sectoral dialogues and meetings at political, official and non-governmental level, in which Bulgaria participated. Among them, the 8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which was organized by the Finnish Presidency of the EU on 27-28 November 2006 in Tampere, was a key forum giving the opportunity to summarize the achievements of sectoral developments and to flesh out specific foreign policy positions and initiatives. The speech of Bulgaria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivailo Kalfin at the meeting outlined the country's views on the Southern dimension of the ENP and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership immediately on the eve of EU accession (Kalfin, 2006c). It stated the commitment of Bulgaria to play an even more active role in pursuing the objective shared on both sides of the Mediterranean to define a common area of peace and stability, to construct a zone of shared prosperity and to develop a comprehensive social, cultural and human partnership.

Bulgaria has made a substantive effort to meet the challenge of developing specific positions on the broad spectrum of issues covered by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership by trying to focus on the potential added value that trans-regional initiatives can bring to bilateral relations. Preparation for full-fledged EU membership and for responsible participation in CFSP actions has usefully coincided with the re-launch of the Euro-

\(^2\) Such pre-accession experience is, however, of lower significance for the Mediterranean ENP partners and of greater significance for those countries neighbouring the EU from the East that cherish EU-membership aspirations. By the end of 2006, Bulgaria had already signed bilateral memoranda for cooperation in the field of European and Euro-Atlantic integration with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
Mediterranean Partnership at the 2005 summit. This has helped the elaboration of views on the following areas of cooperation:

**Political and Security Dialogue**

From a Bulgarian point of view, the Barcelona Process is seen as a forum for furthering mutual understanding that contributes to the promotion of progress in the Middle East Peace Process. The achievement of a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict in accordance with the principles of the Road Map and on the basis of relevant UN Security Council resolutions is of utmost importance for establishing lasting peace and security in the Middle East.

**From a Bulgarian point of view, the Barcelona Process is seen as a forum for furthering mutual understanding that contributes to the promotion of progress in the Middle East Peace Process**

As an integral part of the EU as of 1st January 2007, Bulgaria welcomes the Union’s increased engagement in the region in view of the escalation of violence in 2006. Sofia has made the assessment that the efforts of the EU’s Institutions and Member States to achieve cessation of hostilities and to alleviate humanitarian suffering were active and constructive.

The above prudent evaluation of the role the EU played in the Lebanon war in 2006 was reflected also in terms of public discourse. Debates in the electronic media and the press in July-August employed a very restrained language. Politicians in power or in opposition, many analysts and even a significant number of journalists generally avoided calling the war “a war”. This hot topic was referred to as an “escalation of tension,” “conflict,” “outbreak of hostilities,” “crisis,” but very rarely a “war”. Such attitude was consistent with the official discrete and _suviste_ positions expressed by high representatives of the Bulgarian executive. Thus, Foreign Minister Kalfin explicitly pled for precaution in formulating the country’s position on the Lebanon War and on the participation of the country in the UNIFIL. In his words, “right after […] European states demonstrate their clear stand for participation [in the UN-led mission in Lebanon], then we can take our position” (Kalfin, 2006b).

An advancement of the Middle East Peace process will, without any doubt, exert a positive impact on the dynamisation of the Barcelona process. On the contrary, adverse developments in the Levant, such as those in July-August 2006, will most likely deprive this multi-lateral format of a true sense of direction in the political and security field. In general, the fundamental objectives of the Barcelona Process are a solid point of departure in promoting the understanding that this forum should be used for advancing dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues, conflict prevention, crisis management activities and partnership building measures in accordance with universal standards and existing international obligations.

**The Implementation of the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism**

The adoption of the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism at the Barcelona summit in 2005 was a very important achievement. It showed that all Euro-Mediterranean partners were united in the struggle against terrorism and that they all recognized the threat that terrorist activities posed to these countries’ security, prosperity, values and principles. The focus in continuing efforts to combat terrorism should be placed on strengthening national mechanisms as well as on advancing cooperation and coordination to respond to this global challenge. In conformity with the principles of the Code of Conduct, proper attention should also be devoted to addressing the underlying causes of terrorism. In parallel to stepping-up anti-terrorist action, governments cooperating in the Euro-Mediterranean area should not forget, in Bulgaria’s views, the fundamental principles and values that form the basis of cooperation. They should strive to ensure that counter-terrorism activities do not impede the enjoyment of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and do not deviate from domestic and international legal frameworks. In this respect, Bulgaria welcomed the initiative to hold a Euro-Mediterranean Seminar in 2007 on ensuring respect for human rights in the fight against terrorism in accordance with international law.

**Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform**

One of the pillars of the Barcelona Process is the progressive establishment of a common area of security and prosperity, which includes the creation of a Free
Trade Area by 2010. Bulgaria welcomes the steps already taken in this direction and in particular the results of the Conference of Ministers of Trade in March 2006 in Morocco. It is important that negotiations towards the progressive liberalization of trade in goods and services proceed without unnecessary delays.

Bulgarian views expressed at the forums held in 2006 in this area of cooperation are in support of the opinion that the Mediterranean partners have come a long way towards improving the business and investment climate in their respective countries. In this context, the important role of FEMIP is acknowledged in particular. This gives sound ground to expect positive results of the next Euromed Ecofin Ministerial Meeting scheduled to take place in May 2007.

Sustainable development and economic prosperity are closely related to the establishment and maintenance of a reasonable and well-defined policy in the field of energy. Bulgarian representatives at the relevant forums in 2006 expressed satisfaction that the triple objective of ensuring energy security, environmental sustainability and economic development remains a priority of the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership. In line with Bulgaria’s own national policy priorities and in conformity with the efforts of the EU to establish a common strategy on energy policy, the country welcomes the initiatives in the energy field undertaken in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In this respect Bulgaria has offered its support for the idea of holding a Conference of Ministers of Energy in 2007.

Tourism can exert significant impact on the enhancement of economic prosperity as well as on the advancement of intercultural understanding since it helps facilitate social exchanges. In accordance with the consensus reached by Heads of State and Government at the Barcelona Summit in 2005, Bulgaria fully supports the call for a Euromed Ministerial Meeting on tourism to be organized in a timely manner.

**Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges**

Events unfolding in 2006 confirmed the understanding that the strengthening and enhancement of intercultural dialogue should remain a shared priority. Bulgaria has had a long history of multicultural exchanges that taught the Bulgarian people of the utmost importance of tolerance and mutual respect. Bulgaria confirms its commitment to the principles of dialogue. The establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Anna Lindh Foundation in Alexandria and the launch of the Cultural Heritage Programme were important steps forward. Yet efforts at promoting and enhancing dialogue and understanding should continue until the objectives of our partnership are reached.

**The Dilemma between Values and Interests – the Libyan Trial as a Test Case**

In conclusion of the above overview of the place of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in Bulgaria’s foreign policy priorities, we should outline the impact of a single-issue factor that might influence Bulgarian behaviour as partner in this dialogue. This is an issue that could block or at least minimize Bulgarian efforts to play a role in the Southern dimension of the ENP – the problem of the trial against five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor.

The problem of the trial against five Bulgarian nurses is an issue that could block or at least minimize Bulgarian efforts to play a role in the Southern dimension of the ENP

These six medical workers are in captivity in a Libyan prison since February 1999 on the accusation of having established a conspiracy against Libyan national security, in cooperation with Western secret services, by contaminating around 400 children in a hospital in Benghazi with AIDS, some of whom have already died. The trial against them has gone through one death sentence at first instance revoked by the Supreme Court and confirmed for a second time by the first instance court at the end of 2006. Expected to happen in 2007 are: a second pronouncement of Libya’s Supreme Court followed by a decision of the Supreme Judicial Council and – as an anticipated but uncertain step – a pardon by the leader Gaddafi.

2006 became the year of unfounded hope and self-deceit caused by an extensive rhetoric on behalf of Bulgarian politicians promising a rapid positive solution. After that, the start of 2007 saw the launch in Bulgaria of a massive public campaign “you are not alone” in support of the cause of the nurses. This trial became a test case for the political meaning of Bulgaria’s membership in the EU and for the capacity
of the political class to mobilize effective formats of solidarity within the EU in order to save our compatriots. The failure to solve this human and political problem sparked a heated debate in Bulgaria, whereby the dilemma between values and interests was clearly displayed.

On one hand, the cause of the nurses was seen as one of unjust imprisonment, of confessions extracted by torture serving by far as the major proof of guilt, of depriving them of basic human rights for a number of years of cell life, of deliberate neglect by the court to recognize the testimony of world-renowned professors in AIDS from France and Italy. In brief, this case has been viewed as essential for demonstrating the EU’s capacity to protect its newest “European citizens” on an issue directly related to the problematics of human rights and fundamental freedoms. On the other hand, after the Iraq war of 2003, Libya renounced its plans to develop nuclear weapons and initiated a gradual reintegration of Gaddafi’s regime in the international community. Political and economic interests of some EU Member States and multinational companies, which point in the direction of upgrading Euro-Libyan cooperation (especially on energy sources), have dissuaded hopes for a moral solution to the trial. In Bulgarian public opinion, the moral obligation of Europe to protect its citizens’ rights clashes with the promotion of commercial and political interests, often to the detriment of the former. The plea to sideline private interests and to promote the cause that is in conformity with the basic principles of the Union is frequently combined with a certain degree of scepticism about the possibility of this happening. In unison with public opinion, in the context of this trial Bulgarian politicians have intensified their emphasis on human rights and democratic principles. For example, despite all the tactful language employable at the highest state level, Bulgarian president Parvanov expressed his concern about an imbalance between developing profitable businesses in Libya and supporting noble causes. During his first speech before the European Parliament after the date of accession, he stated his concern about the insufficient amounts accumulated in the special Benghazi Fund established jointly by Bulgaria, the EU and its Member States in order to finance medical treatment of contaminated Libyan children. “I find that the participation of the big oil companies, which have their good business in Libya, is overtly symbolic in this fund.” (“Bulgaria launches an offensive”).

Bulgarian politicians and public opinion alike point at the EU’s dilemma between values and interests, as exemplified in the Libyan trial. The cause of the liberation of the nurses has become a standard bearer of the protection of human rights in the Bulgarian public discourses. Moreover, in several multilateral formats at EU level, Bulgarian representatives have consistently emphasized Bulgaria’s adherence to the fundamental democratic principles the EU is built upon, also in the way they are formulated in the framework of the ENP as a whole and in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in particular. However, at the level of bilateral relations between Bulgaria and the Arab countries, it is economic interests and not so much the Libyan case that dominate the agenda. For example, at his annual meeting with Arab ambassadors in January 2007, Prime Minister Stanishev elaborately explained Bulgaria’s priority to “look for new forms for the development of commercial-economic cooperation”. He reassured the ambassadors of Bulgaria’s commitment to undertake steps in order “to upgrade and harmonize the complete spectrum of bilateral relations, which regulate Bulgaria’s relations with the Arab countries in the field of economic and commercial cooperation” (Stanishev, 2007). That is just one example of a common policy-making pattern, which is employed by policy makers in Bulgaria and in other EU member states. Multilateral formats, such as the ENP and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, are used to promote human rights and democratic values, while bilateral relations are found suitable for pushing forward national economic interests.

The Libyan trial illustrates the difficulty of balancing values and interests, which arises both at EU level and at national level

Overall, the Libyan trial illustrates the difficulty of balancing values and interests, which arises both at EU level and at national level. A successful balance in this test case could have the tremendous positive effect of giving the nurses a chance of liberty and

3 In this general perception of “Europe” shared broadly in Bulgaria, there is no distinction between EU member states and the Union’s institutions. However, the analysis of specific steps and initiatives reveals a higher degree of intensity of the involvement of the Union’s institutional representatives and a lower degree of involvement of EU member states.
homecoming, and could teach Bulgaria to apply productive methods of coalition building and representation of interests.

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European Financial Perspective and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

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The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

From the beginning of the new Financial Perspective in 2007, financial support for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) will be provided through a new dedicated financial instrument: the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)1. The ENPI aims specifically at developing an area of prosperity and friendly neighbourliness involving the European Union and seventeen2 neighbouring partner countries. It targets sustainable development and approximation to EU policies and legislation, and brings a radical improvement in our capacity to support cross-border cooperation along the EU’s external borders – thus giving substance to our aim of avoiding the creation of new dividing lines and promoting harmonious territorial development across the EU external border. The ENPI has a budget of €11.2 billion over seven years (2007-13) and replaces MEDA3 and part of Tacis4.

The ENPI is a “policy driven” financial instrument that will operate in the framework of the existing bilateral agreements between the EU and neighbouring countries. It has been specifically designed to support the implementation of the ENP and in particular of the bilateral ENP Action Plans concluded by the EU and twelve partner countries5. For Russia, our cooperation will take place in the context of the EU-Russia “Strategic Partnership” and support the implementation of the road maps for the four common spaces. ENPI will go further than promoting sustainable development and fighting poverty to encompass, for example, considerable support for measures leading to progressive participation in the EU’s internal market. Legislative approximation, regulatory convergence and institution building will be supported through mechanisms such as the exchange of experience, long-term twinning arrangements with Member States or participation in Community programmes and agencies. A specific and innovative feature of the instrument is its cross-border cooperation component. Under this component, the ENPI will finance “joint operational programmes” bringing together regions of Member States and partner countries sharing a common border. The instrument brings a radical simplification in procedures and substantial gains in efficiency. It uses an approach modelled on the experience of the Interreg6 Community Initiative (Structural Funds) which

2 Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Russian Federation, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.
5 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Tunisia and Ukraine.
6 Interreg was the Community Initiative funded by the European Regional Development Fund to promote Cross Border Cooperation within the EU. It was launched in 1990 and it is now coming to an end. From 2007 onwards, under the new regulation, cross border cooperation will be covered by the “Territorial Cooperation” objective of Structural Fund.
The ENPI brings a radical simplification in procedures and substantial gains in efficiency

is based on multi-annual programming, partnership and co-financing. The cross border cooperation component of the ENPI is co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).

The Origins of the ENPI

The process that has led to the development of the ENPI in its current shape, i.e. a comprehensive, single instrument tailored to best support the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, has been a gradual one which has led, over time, to major changes in the envisaged scope. Responses to a number of different issues were developed in parallel and converged in the final Commission proposal. In particular, reflection focused on the need to elaborate a policy for our neighbours, new and old, the need to address obstacles to effective cross-border cooperation at our external borders and the need to simplify external relations instruments. The elaboration of the policy framework started with the Commission Communication “Wider Europe”7 of March 2003, where the Commission recognised the importance of elaborating a new policy for our neighbours with the overall aim of preventing the creation of new dividing lines on the European continent. The process continued in the Commission’s May 2004 Communication “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper”8 and in the most recent Communication “Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy”9. With the Communication, “Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument”10 the Commission addressed the long-standing problem of how to facilitate cross-border cooperation at all EU external borders through a single Regulation. In the past, the interface of internal and external funding instruments operating with different rule had given rise to widespread criticism. The main features of this new cross-border instrument were outlined in the 2004 “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper”. The assumption, at this time, was still that the ENPI would complement, rather than replace, the existing instruments (MEDA, Tacis) or their successors and would focus exclusively on cross-border cooperation activities at the external borders between the EU and the countries covered by the ENP.

As conceptual work on setting out the framework for a new and simplified political and administrative structure for the delivery of the Community’s assistance and cooperation programmes proceeded, it became apparent that a specific instrument with a broader scope was necessary in order to reflect the specificity of the ENP approach, in order to give the required visibility to relations with neighbouring countries and to provide optimal coherence and further simplify delivery of assistance. On that basis, the Commission’s July 2004 Communication on the “Financial Perspectives 2007-2013” indicated that the scope of the ENPI should be enlarged to cover all financial assistance to the ENP countries. Nevertheless, the new ENPI maintained an important cross-border cooperation component, along the lines of the May 2004 ENP Strategy Paper.

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The Approval Process:
The Commission Proposal

In its effort to simplify the legal framework for delivering external assistance, the Commission proposed to replace the wide range of existing geographical and thematic instruments that had grown up in an ad-hoc manner with six instruments: three of which were designed to implement particular policies, and three to provide the necessary response to particular needs.

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10 Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, COM (2003) 393 final of 1.7.2003
ENPI, together with the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) were to be the policy-driven instruments meant to support the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Accession and Pre-Accession Policy and the Development Policy. The Instrument for Stability, the Humanitarian Assistance Instrument and the Instrument for Macro-Financial Assistance were to be the instruments designed to address crisis of political, humanitarian and macro-financial nature. The simplification effort resulted in the Commission proposing, on September 29th 2004, four new draft Regulations, including the one for ENPI\(^\text{12}\), replacing all pre-existing geographical and thematic Regulations except for the humanitarian and macro-financial assistance where existing legal arrangements were maintained.

The legislative process that started with the Commission proposals took place at two inter-related levels: on the one hand, there was the horizontal aspect, linked to the consequences of the "simplification" and to negotiations on the Financial Perspectives and, on the other hand, the instrument-specific aspects.

The Approval Process: Horizontal Aspects and Financial Amounts

The proposed simplification and the package of new proposals were not favourably received by the European Parliament. The Parliament, and in particular its Development Committee, felt that the new framework would severely curtail its powers. Their main objection was that legal instruments with a very wide geographical scope had very general objectives and global allocations (originally one amount per instrument). This was perceived as diminishing Parliament’s possibility of orienting cooperation priorities and determining the level of allocations per region and per theme. The Parliament also insisted on the need to have a dedicated Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and strongly objected to the fact that the Stability Instrument was not “co-decided”.

The Council, on the other hand, was broadly in agreement with the approach proposed by the Commission, provided that existing comitology arrangements allowing Member States to provide opinions on all Commission programming and implementation documents were maintained. Member States were more concerned about finding an agreement on the overall “Financial Perspective” which could keep Community spending below the threshold of 1% of GDP. They also objected to the full integration in the Community budget of the European Development Fund (EDF).\(^\text{13}\)

Discussions on these horizontal aspects lasted over two years and resulted in a compromise. The requests of the Parliament were addressed by including more detailed legal provisions in the instruments (revision of the objectives and breakdown of funding), by including an expiry date and a review clause, by introducing co-decision for the Stability Instrument and by creating a few additional instruments including a new “European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights”. A political mechanism providing for dialogue on Country, Regional and Thematic Strategies was also established. Concerning funding, the agreement on the Financial Perspectives reached under the Austrian Presidency saw a severe reduction in the overall budget for external relations (-20% compared with the original Commission proposal). How can this compromise be assessed in relation to the stated goal of simplifying the framework for external cooperation? We now have less instruments than we had before, but more than the Commission originally proposed.


\(^{13}\) The European Development Fund is the financial mechanism through which the EU funds technical and financial cooperation with 79 countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. This fund is not part of the Community budget and Member States Contributions follow a different repartition key than for the General Budget. The Commission has been long arguing for its full integration into the Community budget.
and the beneficiaries. On the other hand, the Development Cooperation Instrument had to be radically re-written as a result of the negotiation process and has now become quite complex. The expiry dates on all the instruments will also oblige the Commission to present new legislative proposals before the end of this Financial Perspective.

The Approval Process: ENPI-Specific Aspects

Several Committees of the European Parliament (in particular, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Regional Policy Committee) examined the ENPI Regulation and received it favourably overall. The Parliament’s concerns about the ENPI specifically concerned a few main issues such as a reference to a wider list of values and objectives, greater conditionality on the provision of EC assistance, greater involvement of civil society and the participation of the countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland in ENPI projects. Most Member States were also broadly in agreement with the approach proposed by the Commission although some would have preferred that funding for cooperation with neighbouring countries be provided through the Development Cooperation Instrument (thus increasing the focus on development aspects and the Millennium Development Goals) and that a specific instrument focussing only on cross-border cooperation be maintained. The most difficult issue, in the discussions in Council, was whether or not to include in the Regulation a specific breakdown between the two main geographical regions covered by the ENPI, notably the East and the South. In the end, Member States agreed not to include such a breakdown, following reassurances provided by the Commission that past levels of assistance will be taken into account while determining allocations. Intense discussions also took place with Member States concerning the amount of the contribution of the European Regional Development Fund to the Cross-Border Cooperation Component of the ENPI. This led to the inclusion of specific new provisions in both the ENPI and the Structural Funds Regulations.

A compromise text, including an agreement on the horizontal and specific aspects, was approved in May 2006 at COREPER and on 6th July the European Parliament voted, in a first reading, a final report on ENPI whose content reflected that agreement. The ENPI Regulation was formally adopted by Council on 17th October, over two years after the original Commission proposal, and the act was signed by Parliament and Council on 24th October. Publication in the Official Journal took place on 9th November (OJ L 310) and the Regulation entered into force on 29th November. It applies as of 1st January 2007.

Conclusions

Over three years after the idea of a new instrument to support the European Neighbourhood Policy was first floated and more than two years after the draft ENPI Regulation was approved by the Commission, one can legitimately ask whether the act that was finally adopted does justice to the original ambitions of the European Commission and if it provides the European Union with a better cooperation tool to promote its policy vis-à-vis neighbouring countries. Even at the end of a long negotiation process, ENPI preserves its original “policy-driven character”. Its scope, as defined in Article 1, to establish an area of cooperation and friendly neighbourliness, refers to a text present in the draft Constitutional Treaty about the importance for the EU of having special relations with its neighbours. Its comprehensive list of cooperation areas allows support for the implementation of 360-degree Action Plans. Its policy framework (Article 3) clearly refers to the “ENP Action Plans” as a key point of reference for assistance programming. Allocations (Article 7) are defined in a way that takes into account the level of ambition of the relationship between the EU and a partner country and the progress made towards implementing agreed objectives.

The ENPI retains a specific Cross-Border Cooperation component under which it will be possible to implement joint programmes involving border regions of Member States and partner countries. Member States have

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agreed to co-finance the CBC component through
the European Regional Development Fund (approx.
€590 million over the period 2007-13) and that this
funding, together with an almost equivalent amount
from the ENPI budget (approx. €530 million), will be
implemented using ENPI rules. This finally addresses
the shortcomings of the past and provides border
regions with the opportunity to play a role in the
implementation of key external relations priorities.
Funding-wise, the original Commission proposal was
severely curtailed. The amount originally proposed for
ENPI was €14.93 billion for the period 2007-2013. The
amount finally agreed for cooperation with neighbouring countries is approximately €12 billion
(€11.18 billion under the ENPI budget and approximately €0.8 billion under the new Instrument
for Democracy and Human Rights and in the thematic envelopes of the Development Cooperation
Instrument). While this constitutes a cut of almost
20% over the Commission proposal, it represents
an increase compared to the previous Financial
Perspective (2000-2006). On the whole, funding for neighbouring countries in the next seven years will
grow, in nominal terms, by 45% compared with the
amount available in the previous Financial Perspective (approx. €8.3 billion). In real terms this represents
an increase of 32% that, although not as substantial as anticipated, remains significant. Under ENPI, national
allocations will in almost all cases grow significantly already from 2007.
Finally, ENPI has a number of new technical features which will allow cooperation to be implemented more effectively than under MEDA and Tacis in the past. Unlike Tacis, it can support investment projects and fund budget and sector support programmes (Article 15). It further opens the "procurement" market (Article 21) allowing beneficiaries to get better value for money and companies from neighbouring countries to compete for aid-related contracts in the whole neighbourhood (as well as in candidate and potential candidate countries). It allows the Commission to provide co-financing for projects managed by other donors and to receive and manage co-financing from other donors (Article 17).

ENPI has a number of new technical features which will allow cooperation to be implemented more effectively than under MEDA

In light of that, there is no doubt that ENPI constitutes a clear improvement over the past legal framework: the link between policy and cooperation is stronger, there are more resources at its disposal, it is simpler and more flexible than MEDA and Tacis and, last but not least, it allows effective implementation of cross-border cooperation at our external borders. Will it also be more effective?
ENPI remains a tool. As such it is only one, albeit important, element in making assistance more effective. Equally, if not more important, will be the will and ability of all partners to take advantage of the new opportunities, to identify good operations and to implement them well. The action now moves from the rooms of the legislators to the field.
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Battistina Cugusi  
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Introduction: Changes in Italy’s Policy Towards the Mediterranean

The two overarching priorities of Italian foreign policy against which all other priorities need to be evaluated consist of playing an important role within the European Union and maintaining good relations with the United States. The Berlusconi centre-right government (2001-2006) had somewhat inverted the order of these priorities, even though official rhetoric did not recognise this shift. Italy’s interests were modelled more strongly on Washington’s positions rather than on searching for consensus in Brussels. As far as the Mediterranean is concerned, the centre-right’s search for raising Italy’s international profile led to the government’s support of military intervention in Iraq, moving away from the country’s traditional focus on the Mediterranean Basin in favour of the broader Middle East, as well as to a position on the Middle East conflict that was strongly influenced by US support of Israel. With the election of the centre-left government led by former European Commission President Romano Prodi in the spring of 2006, the balance between Italy’s foreign policy priorities shifted back to its more traditional sensitivity towards its European partners. Prodi’s government has reaffirmed also the centrality of multilateralism, and the reinforcement of the role of the UN and of the other international organisations, especially in conflict resolution. As non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Italy will try to put a renewed emphasis on multilateralism as the guiding framework to address crises in Afghanistan and the Middle East. This position is not dictated solely by ideology; it constitutes the glue that is supposed to hold together the slim majority – wrought by internal conflict – that the centre-left holds in Parliament. The renewed importance attributed to the UN and the EU thus serves the dual purpose of ensuring Italy’s participation in the major international forums (seen as the best way to promote the country’s international profile), as well as providing an external justification for internal political cohesion.

The Middle East and the Mediterranean have constituted an important terrain on which these priorities and different political positions were measured

Although this shift does not imply any profound questioning of Italy’s long-standing relationship with the US, parts of the governing centre-left coalition have a more ambiguous relationship with Washington. In other words, the interaction between these positions has not only marked the key discontinuity between the Berlusconi and Prodi governments, but has also been one of the factors determining Italy’s successes and failures during the 9 months of the centre-left government. The broader Middle East and the Mediterranean have constituted an important terrain on which these priorities and different political positions were measured.

Italy’s Priorities and Interests in the Mediterranean during 2006

Prodi, in a speech given at the European Parliament, stated that “the Mediterranean represents the priority”
of Italy’s foreign policy. The government envisages a new role for the Mediterranean in the emerging global geo-economic order: “the Mediterranean should become the Euro-Asian platform” (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006), since commercial flows between the Far East and Europe go through the Suez Canal and thus go through the Mediterranean. This return to a focus on the Mediterranean Basin reflects the country’s longstanding interests in the region. However, given its structural weaknesses and scarcity of resources, the reference framework for developing its Mediterranean policies is strongly tied to the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

This return to a focus on the Mediterranean Basin reflects the country’s longstanding interests in the region

Rome’s dilemma between supporting EU eastern or southern policies has by and large been overcome. On the one hand Italy has consolidated its interests and ties especially with the broad Southeast European region (hence its support for further enlargement to the Balkans and to Turkey). On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also lobbied first to include the Southern Mediterranean countries in the European Neighbourhood Policy with the aim to ensure a distribution of EU political attention and resources between Eastern Europe and the country’s immediate South, and then during 2006 to ensure that these would receive a substantial share of the budget earmarked for the ENP. Within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Italy is also continuing to put pressure on its EU partners to make the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) an autonomous lending mechanism – already proposed by Prodi during his mandate as President of the European Commission but not supported by the previous government.

At a bilateral level, even though the country’s foreign policy has been characterised by insufficient resources dedicated to the Mediterranean compared to its declared commitments, Rome has a developed web of relations with the Arab states. These have been strengthened by the Foreign Minister Massimo D’Alema, who has stressed the need to launch dialogue with the Arab world and in particular with Islamic moderate forces, in order to encourage and sustain the democratic potential of these countries (De Giovannelli, 2006).

Other traditional priorities have also been reiterated, which range from the importance attributed to security issues and alliances, the EMP, NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and the ‘5+5 Group’, to maintaining relations with energy supplying countries, especially with Libya and Algeria. A diplomatic meeting between Prodi and Bouteflika in November 2006, for instance, led to an important agreement between Edison and Sonatrach on the distribution of hydrocarbons.

Another crucial dossier for Italy regards the containment of illegal migration flows that arrive on Italy’s Southern coasts from Africa, especially through Libya. After some deterioration, relations between the two countries have been recently relaunched with the creation of a joint task force for cooperation between police forces in combating human smuggling. With Morocco, the Foreign Ministers of the two countries agreed, last November, on the development of an approach which would see the containment of illegal migration as part of a broader strategy of social, political and economic cooperation.

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In terms of developing economic interests, alongside the large enterprises involved in the energy market, the government has supported an agreement with Algeria for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and for the creation of a business network in Algeria; it participated in the Casablanca Economic Forum (with the Italian Minister for International Commerce Emma Bonino), which gathered 200 Italian enterprises and the main enterprise and banking associations.

Alongside these longstanding interests, Italy has also placed a renewed emphasis on the centrality of the resolution of the Middle East conflict as key to regional stability. In contrast with the previous government, D’Alema considers the role of multilateralism, the Quartet and the Road Map as the framework through which negotiations should
take place between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, aligning the country once more to the EU position on the Middle East.

**The Test of Lebanon**

The war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 represents a test case of Italy’s ambitions and role in the Mediterranean. The choice of taking on a leading role was determined both by a widespread belief within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the need to support Lebanon, as well as by the opportunity to recover national credibility in Brussels. From this point of view, D’Alema’s gamble, which could have posed numerous political and military risks, proved a successful endeavour. According to one authoritative commentator, Italy’s involvement in the Lebanese crisis represented the only area in which the country managed to live up to the widespread expectations that it would play a stronger role in Europe, regaining prestige in the EU after the five years of the Berlusconi government (Cerretelli, 2007).

**Italy’s involvement in the Lebanese crisis represented the only area in which the country managed to live up to the widespread expectations that it would play a stronger role in Europe**

Italy’s strategy was both political and military, exploiting to the most the multilateral organisations and instruments available. After hosting the international conference on Lebanon in Rome on 26 July 2006, bringing to negotiation the relevant parties (Arab States, EU Member States, the European Commission, the EU Presidency and the High Representative for Foreign Policy, the UN Secretary-General and the World Bank) in order to find a political solution to the crisis, Italy raised the stakes by pushing the EU Member States to take a leading role in the military management of the crisis, in the framework of a UN peacekeeping force. This proposal led to the UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted on 11th August 2006, which called for a reinforcement of UNIFIL (the UN monitoring force in South Lebanon created by the UN Security Council Resolution 425 in 1978) in order to assist the deployment of the Lebanese army to Southern Lebanon.

Support to the implementation of Resolution 1701 was immediately expressed by the EU, already engaged in the efforts to find a lasting solution to the conflict, through the mission of the Troika in Israel, Gaza and Lebanon and the engagement of the High Representative Javier Solana in further diplomatic contacts. The common position of 25th August 2006 reiterated the EU’s will to play a key role in supporting the rapid implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 bringing humanitarian relief to the Lebanese population and supported the member states’ willingness to contribute to the reinforcement of the UNIFIL forces by providing troops.

**Rome’s perseverance helped overcome the initial hesitations and make the EU the backbone of the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon, with almost 8,000 troops**

In this latter effort, Italy played a valuable role. It responded to France’s resistance to taking the lead militarily and Germany’s reluctance to sending troops to Israel’s northern border with Lebanon by committing 3,000 soldiers (Operation ‘Leonte’) and accepting to assume command of the peacekeeping force, as proposed by Israel. Rome’s perseverance helped overcome the initial hesitations and make the EU the backbone of the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon, with almost 8,000 troops.

Italy capitalised on its unexpected role in the Lebanese crisis also to nourish its relationship with Washington, by justifying to the international public its readiness to send troops also as a way to compensate for the absence of the United States in leading the resolution of the conflict due to its military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan (Fisher, 2006).

Nonetheless, the extent to which this commitment could lead to a stronger role of the EU and Italy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East remains questionable. If the EU managed to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Middle East, it lost an opportunity of using the toolbox it has created to support its development as an autonomous international actor. Instead of deploying the existing mechanisms of rapid reaction foreseen by the “Petersberg’s tasks”, EU
intervention has been possible only by creating an
ad hoc coalition under the flag of the UN. Italy too
would need to persevere in the maintenance of
diplomatic, military, political and economic resources
if it wants to reap the benefits of its role in the
Lebanese crisis. In any case, the Italian Minister of
Foreign Affairs D'Alema has recognised the need
to define a long-term strategy which goes beyond
the UNIFIL and concerns the entire region. In
particular, the Lebanese crisis can not be overcome
without taking into account the conflict between
Israel and Palestine, and the resumption of nego-
tiations between Israel and Syria.

Conclusions:
The Problems of a Middle-Sized Power

In February 2007 D'Alema gave a speech to the Senate
that outlined a vision for Italy's foreign policy that
suggested that the government had been developing
a strategy that rests on short as well as long-term
objectives, interests and an analysis of priorities. It is
thus ironic that that speech led to a government crisis
(that was eventually contained). The absence of a
long-term strategy has been historically one of the
reasons behind Italy's weaknesses in translating its
interests and priorities into policy.

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reasons behind Italy's weaknesses in translating its interests and priorities into policy

One of the issues of contention, alongside Italy's role
in Afghanistan, was precisely the degree to which
the centre-left government has marked a discontinuity
with the previous government's foreign policy, with
part of the coalition favouring a bipartisan foreign
policy and another keen to underline change. This
article has tried to illustrate the changes in emphasis
that the centre-left government has entailed, through
the withdrawal from Iraq while seeking to reassure
the US of Italy's international commitments, by
returning to a more active involvement in the
Mediterranean and by maintaining its military presence
in Afghanistan. Despite these discontinuities between
the Berlusconi and Prodi governments, they both
share the structural problems of limited resources,
weak coordination of the many actors involved in
promoting Italy's interests abroad, and a weak
economic and political backbone supporting foreign
policy.

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Uncertain Climate in the Maghreb

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Resurgence of Terrorist Activities

The terrorist attacks occurring over the past few months in different Maghreb countries give the impression of a consolidation of radical Islamic violence in the region, whereas the phenomenon now pertains to the dominion of international Jihadism. In December 2006, confrontations pitted the forces of order against a group of Jihadists in the suburbs of Tunis. This caused great surprise, as Tunisia was considered free from such violence. Nonetheless, though structured Islamism is not apparent in this country, Tunisia can hardly escape the regional or international dynamics of Jihadism. According to the little information that can be gleaned on this event, the terrorist cell that was broken up apparently consisted of at least one gendarme and six Salafists who had been trained at camps run by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) near Tebessa, in Eastern Algeria. It seems likewise probable that the cell had a relatively significant cache of weapons.

Radical Islamism has gained support among certain sectors of the middle class and the intelligentsia. Finally, it also raises the issue of the existence of weapons that had not been detected by a surveillance system reputed for its effectiveness. Moreover, the link among Jihadists on either side of the Algerian-Tunisian border leads to the belief that it could be a one-off command from the “al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”, the GSPC’s new denomination. In any case, the capacity of the Algerian Salafist group to unify forces in the region is not a recognised fact and any links existing among the different terrorist acts seem more ideological than operational.

The fact that the former GSPC has gone over to al-Qaeda has given rise to a great deal of speculation on the presence of Bin Laden’s movement in the region. Actually, the GSPC, which arose in 1998 from a scission in the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), allegedly suffered great setbacks due to the Algerian government’s policy of national reconciliation, consisting of amnestying militant Islamists who complied with certain conditions and reintegrating them into society. This policy allegedly made them lose a large part of their members, producing massive desertions among its rank and file and reducing the movement to some one thousand people in the country. This development may have led its current leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, an explosives specialist trained in Afghanistan, to implement a new strategy. The organisation rallied around the nebulous al-Qaeda in January of 2007 and organised attacks whose operational mode was absolutely new to the Maghreb: an attack on a bus transporting employees of an Algerian-American company in Bouchaoui and simultaneous attacks perpetrated against Algerian security force buildings on the outskirts of Tizi Ouzou and Boumerdès. On 11th April 2007, it organised two nearly simultaneous attacks in Algiers, first against the seat of the Algerian Government and then a police station in Bab Ezzouar, resulting in 30 dead and 240
wounded. The organisation thus seems to be giving precedence to spectacular actions targeting the symbols of Algerian power. In doing so, it is refuting all government assertions stating that radical Islamism is but a residual force.

The new Jihadists have set themselves a more global objective consisting of declaring war on the ruling class of the Maghreb, which they deem corrupt and subject to the will of the United States and Westerners in general.

In contrast to the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and to GIA, which intended to establish an Islamic State within Algerian borders, the new Jihadists have set themselves a more global objective consisting of declaring war on the ruling class of the Maghreb, which they deem corrupt and subject to the will of the United States and Westerners in general, whom they refer to as “crusaders and Jews” in their official communiqués.

In Morocco, though the goals pursued by the authors of suicide bombings are not clearly known, their methods nonetheless resemble those of al-Qaeda, even if their leadership is independent. The regular dismantling of cells preparing terrorist attacks by security forces – as occurred in November 2003 when a cell of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) attempted to bomb the premises of 2M, the local television station – demonstrates the persistence of the threat and the capacity of different Moroccan Salafist groups to regenerate their rings. In this country, ‘marginal radical Islam’ is associated with the return of certain ‘Afghans,’ that is, people having fought in Afghanistan and having brought back with them a new culture focusing on the jihad. Today, there is a series of small, violent groups with no ties among them, all of them basing themselves on international Salafism. They have no precise political agenda.

Though violence relating to radical Islamism is present in all the Maghreb countries, it is deployed in different manners in direct relation to the national context. The concordance in the timing of certain bombings such as those of the 11th April 2007 in Casablanca and Algiers and the fact that the GSPC claimed authorship for a terrorist attack occurring in Mauritania in 2005 are insufficient grounds for inferring the existence of a single, regional command, which would in turn receive orders from al-Qaeda.

**Algeria: Low Turnout at Legislative Elections**

Slightly over a month after the double suicide bombing of 11th April 2007, the Algerian authorities wanted to use the legislative elections as a sort of ‘referendum against terrorism.’ The Minister of Home Affairs, Yazid Zerhouni, urged the Algerians to vote in order to “reject terrorism and confirm the democratic option.” In fact, the Algerian legislative elections in April 2007 registered an abstention rate of nearly 65%, thus revealing a crisis of confidence in the representatives of the people and more generally, in the ruling class as a whole.

In reality, the low turnout rate can be adduced to several different reasons. In the first place, the Algerians are convinced that parliament is not really a place of political power, President Bouteflika having concentrated all power in his hands, leading to greater weight being placed on the executive branch in the Algerian political system. By the same token, they have a negative image of an Assembly composed of some twenty parties that are maintained artificially in order to give the illusion of a democracy and pluralism that does not actually exist. As they do not have a real constituency, the majority of parties do not have political programmes. During the electoral campaign, their leaders called on the population to vote as if “placing a ballot in the ballot box” really had a programmatic value. Moreover, the three major parties in competition – i.e. the National Liberation Front (FLN), formerly the only party, the National Rally for Democracy (RND), a party of important people under the former head of state, Ahmed Ouyahia, and the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), an Islamist party under the sphere of influence of the Muslim Brotherhood – have generally upheld the policies of the Head of State. This convergence of viewpoints was particularly perceptible with regard to the policy of national reconciliation. Nevertheless, after the 11th April attack claimed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, pursuing this policy has become highly controversial. The capacity of the former GSPC to strike at the very heart of Algiers has demonstrated the limits of the initiative to reintegrate the former insurgents and end the violence.

It is in this context, marked by the resurgence of terrorist attacks and uncertainty on the Head of State’s health...
The capacity of the former GSPC to strike at the very heart of Algiers has demonstrated the limits of the initiative to reintegrate the former insurgents and end the violence accompanying the numerous inquiries into the matter of his succession that the past legislative elections were held. They were elections with no real issues because the Algerians knew perfectly well that, no matter what the composition of the Assembly ended up being, the representatives would not be able to act on the real problems of society, namely: unemployment, pauperisation, insecurity and the housing shortage.

Proposal for Western Sahara as an Autonomous Region

On 11th April 2007, Morocco submitted a proposal for Western Saharan autonomy to the UN in an attempt to ‘end the stalemate.’ The proposal was backed by the United States, France and the Spanish government, whereas it was immediately rejected by the Polisario Front, which submitted its own proposal to the UN regarding self-determination. The Secretary General of the United Nations responded to these two documents with a resolution (Number 1754) calling upon both parties “to enter into negotiations without preconditions and in good faith, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.” These negotiations, which took place in New York in June and will resume in August, may end in failure like all preceding negotiations, which faltered because the parties held positions that seemed irreconcilable. Nevertheless, today, two major factors could incite the leaders of the Maghreb, the US, France and Spain to wish to put an end to this conflict: the multiplication of traffic of all sorts in the desert areas of the Maghreb, which could constitute a safe haven for al-Qaeda, and the recurrent protests occurring in the cities of Western Sahara, in particular in El Aaiún.

The establishment of an autonomous region in Western Sahara seems to constitute the most probable solution to this conflict. In any case, it undeniably poses a series of questions to the Moroccan government in the first place, but also to other countries in the region. With regard to Morocco, it would imply a new institutional architecture requiring a revision of the Constitution. It would also involve establishing a new pact with the Sahrawis, who would have regional prerogatives as they would be represented by an assembly. The question then arises of the composition of this assembly, in other words, what Sahrawis would be involved in local governance in this autonomous region? Should the displaced people from Tarfaya or Goulimine be involved? Moreover, will the Moroccans living for two decades in the Western Sahara be associated with life in the region? How will the latter so-called Saharan populations be able to coexist with the members of the Polisario Front, a movement they have been fighting for thirty years now? For them, it is their ‘resistance’ and their exile in Tindouf that has led to the conditions for the establishment of an autonomy based on the recognition of the Sahrawi identity. Whereas for the Sahrawi ethnic group in Western Sahara, this option is what they have been demanding for a good many years now. The question of legitimacy then crops up, closely linked to the possibility of negotiating the limits of local power with Rabat. With regard to education, for instance, can one imagine school curricula different from those in other regions? If these curricula were similar, what would remain of the Sahrawi identity and the history of Western Sahara, which is a history that will certainly have to be written? How should they recast a national pact, and how will they write an official history that takes into account plural identities?

Beyond these difficulties relative to the formation of a nation, the principle of regionalisation based on the recognition of specificity can give rise to an ‘ethnic nation,’ with all of the dangers this can entail. Because eventually, groups whose identities are recognised as forming part of a region could considerably weaken central power.

Despite the exceptional nature granted by Rabat to this region, the proposal for granting autonomy to the Western Sahara entails a transformation of Morocco’s territorial framework and internal regime that could affect its political identity. Moreover, this autonomy could set an example and give rise to other claims from other Moroccan regions whose populations could be tempted to put forth their identity or simply their specificities. If this occurred, would the outcome be a happy federalism that certain observers already associate with the natural configuration of the kingdom?
or a fragmentation of central power to the benefit of local identities and liberties? The Moroccan regionalisation scheme could likewise appear attractive to groups from neighbouring countries. The Kabyle, tired of submitting to a Jacobin central power, could wish to be autonomous from Algiers. The establishment of autonomy in Western Sahara could thus be a prelude to a Maghreb of regions that would substitute a Maghreb of Nation-States, a Jacobin political model inherited from their former colonisers. In any case, should such changes, which could occur subsequent to the establishment of autonomy for the Western Sahara, be considered potential risks or dangers? Aren't the demands of different populations in certain regions or of certain ethnicities already moving in this direction?

Though after 1991, date on which a cease-fire was declared, Western Sahara was a controlled area characterised by a low-intensity conflict, today new elements are causing concern among the ruling classes in the region. On the one hand, the existence of training camps of the former GSPC in the vast area of the Sahel could attract members of the Polisario Front established in Tindouf. And on the other hand, some idle Sahrawis, searching for bearings and ideology, could join the several traffickers operating in the region.

Over the past few months, inquiries and police raids have demonstrated that there could be a link between these two categories. The study conducted by Altadis on tobacco contraband in the Maghreb shows that Sahrawis have been involved in a vast contraband ring, receiving the merchandise in Casablanca before distributing it. This traffic, which uses diverse routes, also passes through Western Sahara, in particular the city of El Aaiún, and enters Algeria via Tifariti and Bir Lahlou, water points controlled by the Polisario Front. Moreover, on 1st and 2nd May, Mauritanian police forces having been alerted to the presence of a drug trafficking operation took control of the Nouadhibou airport in order to seize a small aeroplane. The crew, which managed to escape, left behind over 600 kg of cocaine. The investigation revealed that the crew apparently found shelter with the Sahrawis in the areas controlled by the Polisario Front.

These few examples reveal the porosity of borders and the possible connections between traffickers, Jihadists and Sahrawis in an area little controlled by the States of the region. This absence of control is causing concern among Americans and Europeans alike, who fear the region could become a safe haven for al-Qaeda. Similar concerns are shared by the States of the region, who fear their opposition could also find a safe haven there. All the more reason to put an end to the conflict in Western Sahara, the first stage in pacifying the region.

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1Ignacio Cembrero, La contrebande du tabac malmenée par Altadis, Le Journal Hebdomadaire 2nd-8th June 2007.
2En Mauritanie, un trafic de cocaïne éclaboussé des notables, Libération, 17th June 2007.
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The Western Sahara problem has two fundamental dimensions: an internal one where a great deal is at stake, considering the role this issue plays in political relations among the different actors, including the monarchy, and in terms of democratisation of institutional relations; and a regional one, because its evolution and principle mutations involve several Mediterranean States, in particular Algeria, Spain and France. Hence my interest in this topic. In this paper I will explore a particular facet of this conflict: the manner in which the social dynamic in Western Sahara is evolving and how it attempts to redefine its identity parameters. This raises a problematic issue: how did the conflict evolve in 2006 and how do those primarily concerned, the young Sahrawis comprising the ‘new generation,’ perceive their present and future within the framework of an identity that they must redefine in light of the major mutations undergone by the Western Sahara conflict?

The Determining Factors

The Western Sahara dispute is one of the oldest regional conflicts, dating back to 1975. It is also one of the most complex affairs due to the imbroglio of factors having directly or indirectly contributed to its evolution and destiny. This territory of 266,000 Km², colonised and held by Spain from 1885 to 1975 and thereafter annexed by Morocco, is now a territory claimed by the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. From 1975 to 1999, the Moroccan authorities adopted a dual-faceted policy: on the one hand, it was arbitrary, resorting to nearly systematic repression of the Sahrawi opposition (imprisonment, disappearances, etc.); and on the other hand, it employed cooption, the authorities establishing relations of favouritism with important Sahrawi people.

But since the 90s, with the relative aperture of the Moroccan political regime, the imbalances engendered by the strategy of favouritism have become more evident. In terms of social implications, certain indicators have forced Morocco to reconsider some aspects of its political strategy in Western Sahara. In 2006, for instance, in El Aaiún, the capital of Western Sahara, the unemployment level was 29% of the active population, and despite the “Plan for Saharan Economic Development, 2004-2008” (with a budget of 650 million euros) established by the current Moroccan government, the gap between a powerful – yet increasingly contested – elite and the rest of the population is becoming increasingly consolidated. The hotbed of contention is essentially the slums, including Mâatallah, where the majority of the Sahrawi population lives in overcrowded conditions. On his last trip to Western Sahara in March 2006, King Mohammed VI insisted on visiting this slum neighbourhood. The ‘inland’ Moroccans suddenly discovered that the Sahrawis do not all live ‘in opulence’.

It is important to emphasise that the relative aperture of the political regime initiated by King Hassan II in 1994 and continued by his successor, King Mohammed VI, was accompanied by a strengthening of the role played by civil society and a section of the independent press (2003 Committee to Protect Journalist [CPJ] Press Freedom Award laureate, Le Journal Hebdomadaire is the most emblematic among the country’s press. In only a few years, it has managed to break a good many taboos, in particular those concerning the status and role of the Moroccan monarchy). A reinterpretation of the Moroccan political past was then effected on various levels. The role
played by the Justice and Reconciliation Commission (IER) in this process and its impact on Moroccan society and the international community cannot be underestimated (created by the current King in January 2004 and presided by Driss Benzekri, former political prisoner, this commission has nonetheless been greatly criticised by human rights militants because it does not authorise victims to state the names of those responsible for violations). This ‘officialised’ process of reconciliation of the State with society was done via a reinterpretation of the recent past, including the Western Sahara as a component of recent Moroccan political memory, the repression of the Moroccan State having likewise been deployed against the inhabitants of this territory. The repercussions on Sahrawi political identity, which is constantly being ‘reconstructed,’ are considerable.

The New Order

The young Sahrawi generation born in the 70s and having studied at Moroccan universities seems to have conceived and redefined the essence of their political identity on the basis of this recent history. The structuring of collective memory, built upon decades of contention, struggle, resistance and repression, has given rise to a construction of identity now seeking to go beyond the specificities of Sahrawi society and its conceptual mutations. The third-world ideology, the weight of the cold war context and decolonisation, the basic principles from which the combat for “the liberation of the Sahrawi people” drew its ideological and identity-building foundations are thus being replaced by new legitimising concepts: human rights culture, universal principles governing individual and political rights and liberties, international legality, etc. All of these concepts, both precise and generous, are in turn being grafted on a fundamental principle based on dissidence, protest and a legitimizing capacity – the principle of self-determination for the Sahrawi nation, to be attained through a referendum supervised by the United Nations.

On 25th March 2006, during a trip to El Aaiún, King Mohammed VI announced the dissolution of the Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs, created by his father in 1982 and composed of members entirely elected by the Sahrawi tribes. It was ‘replaced’ by a new organ called the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS). Its 141 members (important Sahrawis are not elected but rather entirely appointed by the Head of State. Certain observers consider this form of constituting the council a ‘retreat’ of democratic logic and believe it could weaken the council’s representativeness.

In his address at the inauguration of the new council, the King defined the main identity traits of its members: “We appeal to you, considering the virtues of patriotism and fidelity to consecrated constants and values, to be the best interprets for expressing your brothers’ positions before organizations and other international bodies, with a view to bringing out the justice of our cause for territorial integrity.”

Action by CORCAS would thereafter be deployed within the framework of the ‘official’ policy culture of the State of Morocco, which perceives the Western Sahara issue from an authoritarian and stilted perspective of the Nation: a presupposed and quite vague ‘unanimity’ with regard to a ‘just and consecrated cause.’ The expressions used in the royal address of 25th March 2006 recall certain ‘principles’ expressed in Article 19 of the current Moroccan constitution: ‘the consecrated values of the kingdom’, ‘territorial integrity’, ‘fidelity to constants’, ‘national unity and territorial integrity’, etc.

A Dual-Faceted Dynamic

It is in the context of these ‘traits,’ falling under the official line of political identity, that the Moroccan State intends to implement its new strategy in Western Sahara by involving a Sahrawi political elite which it scrupulously selects and whose missions it establishes. Hence, in this same address, the CORCAS, whose faculties are strictly consultative, is entrusted by the King to engage in “serene, in-depth reflection… (on)… the autonomy plan within the framework of the sovereignty of the Kingdom and its national unity and territorial integrity.”

The concept of an autonomy plan for Western Sahara, launched unilaterally by the King of Morocco in March of 2006, aims in reality to replace the Baker III Plan (April 2003). Considered ‘obsolete’ and ‘outdated’ by
Moroccan diplomats, the Baker III Plan called for a referendum after five years of autonomy for Western Sahara. Nonetheless, no longer certain of the favourable results of the referendum, Morocco intends to make this ‘new’ autonomy plan its diplomatic hobby-horse. To uphold it in Western Sahara and before international organizations, it has involved the important personalities on the CORCAS, albeit in consultative status, while adopting a ‘subtext’ of ‘participation’ based on “good governance (...) the expansion of space for participation in the management of local affairs and the emergence of new elites capable of assuming responsibilities, (...) mobilising the legal means and material resources necessary to concretise the afore-stated objectives, at the service of the citizens, their dignity and the common interest.” (excerpt from the Royal speech on 25th March 2006)

This ‘subtext,’ which is expressed through the use of different terminology in a single address, is impelled by the King and seems to indicate a certain wish for rupture in the internal management of the Western Sahara issue. The King’s recourse to ‘universalist’ concepts such as: ‘citizen’, ‘good governance’, ‘emergence of new elites’, ‘dignity’, ‘the common interest’, and so on, is highly significant.

This official will for rupture, taking the form of a re-definition of official concepts, is deployed in parallel to the emergence of a new Sahrawi elite, which is trying to assert its visibility and political identity via new mechanisms. The protests in El Aaiún in May of 2005 succeeded in empowering the main ‘personalities’ of this generation, with whom many young Sahrawis identify on a political and identity level. Today, they are embodied in certain, media-hyped people conveying a legitimating discourse based essentially on international legality and a universal conception of human rights. The use of the Polisario flag during demonstrations, for instance, as well as the introduction of the term ‘Intifada’ into the protest movement, among other things, limit the dissidence dynamic to the level of two actors, each referring to a different legal and political situation: on the one hand, an ‘authoritarian’ State (lacking legitimacy, primarily due to its acknowledged repressive past and controversial present); and on the other hand, a ‘colonised’ peoples (who claim their rights on the basis of international law).

**Conceptual Mutations and Legitimising Discourses**

The eminent ‘personalities’ of this power struggle have moreover gained a certain degree of militant and political legitimacy because of their condition as former prisoners of conscience. The cases of Aminatou Haidar, Mohammed El Moutawakil and Ali Salem Tamekare are certainly the most emblematic. They were last sentenced to definite prison terms (ranging from seven to ten months) in December of 2005, following the May 2005 incidents in El Aaiún.

Released from prison on 17th January 2006 after a 51-day hunger strike, Aminatou Haidar was nominated for the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought by the European Parliament during her detention. On 17th September 2006, she received the 2006 Freedom Award in Washington DC from the US Defense Forum Foundation “for her struggle to defend human rights and the international legality of Western Sahara.”

In the face of pressure from the international community and NGOs, the Moroccan Authorities were obliged to release these activists, but once again involving the members of the CORCAS, such that the Council, playing a role approaching that of an NGO, was placed in an advantageous position. Indeed, a week after the creation of the CORCAS on 25th March 2006, the Council’s first ‘initiative’ was to ‘propose’ the King grant the ‘militants’ imprisoned after the El Aaiún incidents of May 2005 ‘amnesty’; a ‘proposition’ that the King, of course, saw fit to accept.

The support that these militants – who are most often presented as ‘human rights advocates’ – receive from international civil society and semi-official organisms can be ascribed, in part, to the content of their discourse, i.e. non-violent (given they have never considered the terrorist option), legalist, universal or even a so-to-speak ‘attractive’ discourse essentially aimed at the West. It has a real impact on civil society and semi-official organisms.

What is the content of this discourse? It is a discourse of identification and repositioning, with marked identity...
The support that these militants – who are most often presented as ‘human rights advocates’ – receive from international civil society and semi-official organisms can be ascribed, in part, to the content of their discourse, i.e. non-violent legalist, universal and essentially aimed at the West dimensions. Its development is legitimising, as it takes the form of nearly constant recourse to international principles and legal references, raised to the level of components of Sahrawi political identity, under redefinition. Several declarations made by the main individuals concerned express it in a clarifying manner: “We demand that our most basic rights be respected, as, for instance, the freedom of assembly. We likewise demand international law be respected, namely, our right to self-determination,” declared Aminatou Haidar, for instance, in Le Journal Hebdomadaire (No. 273, 14th to 20th October 2006). “Our discourse, which is at the same time an integral part of our political identity, is clearly based on a human rights culture. The right to self-determination is part of this. Without this right, our people will have no political existence. The position of women in our society confirms that our culture is consistent with universal principles,” asserted Mohammed El Moutawakil. This discourse is conceived and developed to discredit Moroccan diplomatic initiatives. The latter now seems aware of this issue, and more precisely, of the role played by the notions of ‘human rights,’ ‘international law’, and so forth in the ‘new’ Sahrawis activists’ redefinition of their political identity. By way of example, on 7th October 2006, a confidential report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) revealed that the Parisian daily, Le Monde, had qualified the “human rights situation (as) a matter of concern, particularly in the section of Western Sahara under Moroccan administration.” Its publication by Le Monde in October 2006 called forth vivid reactions among Moroccan official circles, because now the power struggle is on the legal level and that of universal ‘principles’. It is essentially on this level that the new Sahrawi elite are redefining their political identity.
In early 2003, few people would have predicted the changes which were about to happen in Libya with regard to its external relations. Since then, Libya has come a long way towards its international rehabilitation by resolving the major international disputes affecting the country, including the Lockerbie case; the lifting in 2003 of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations to this country in 1992 and 1993; Libya’s announcement, three months later, of its intention to scrap its programme for weapons of mass destruction; the subsequent gradual removal of US bilateral sanctions, including trade, diplomatic and military sanctions; and the decision by the European Council in October 2004 to lift all economic sanctions and the arms embargo which has been in place for 18 years. But Libya’s turnaround in its relations with the US was the most decisive factor for its full rehabilitation. On May 15th 2006, the US administration announced that it was removing the Maghrebi country from the list of states sponsoring terrorism (in which it was since 1979) and that it was restoring full diplomatic relations with Tripoli. In spite of major progress achieved in three years and the promises for change made by the Libyan regime, the reforms implemented thus far have been limited and have focused on the economic sphere, so as to attract direct foreign investment, especially in the oil sector. The Libyan regime made important political concessions to Western countries, but hardly any with regard to Libyan nationals and to introducing political reforms and improving the country’s human rights situation.

**The Political Situation**

The Jamahiriya (state of the masses) system was created by Colonel Gaddafi in 1977 in line with the “third universal theory” which he expounds in his Green Book, which enables him to control the entire political system and to prevent the emergence of any other centre of power, however modest. To this end, all the changes that are constantly introduced in the system are aimed at consolidating his authority as the “Guide of the Revolution”. Gaddafi’s decision in early March 2006 to replace Shukri Ghanem, a liberal technocrat who is an advocate of a market economy, with a new Prime Minister, Baghdadi Mahmudi, less enthusiastically in favour of reform, allowed him to present it as a victory for the old guard’s sui generis and long discredited system of “people’s power” versus more pragmatic sectors. Ghanem was then appointed President of the National Oil Corporation (NOC). These changes would also indicate a repositioning of the candidates to succeed Gaddafi (who was born in 1942 and has been in power since 1969), which would imply a loss of influence for his son, Saif al-Islam, more in favour of introducing certain reforms in the system and who is often – although unofficially – presented as the candidate to succeed his father.

For a long time, Gaddafi has been able to contain the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, and his regime has closely collaborated with Western countries to combat this phenomenon. However, in mid-February 2006, a series of violent demonstrations took place in Benghazi and other cities; there were clashes between the police forces and demonstrators enraged by an Italian Minister’s TV appearance in his country with a T-shirt decorated with media cartoons satirising the prophet Mohammed. At least 11 people were killed and hundreds were injured during the riots in
For a long time, Gaddafi has been able to contain the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, and his regime has closely collaborated with Western countries to combat this phenomenon which religious radicals and regime opponents took part. In spite of this, opponents in Libya do not appear to be in a position to challenge the existing political system. In June 2005, close to 300 exiled opponents of the Gaddafi regime gathered in London for a “National Conference of Libyan Opponents” to demand Colonel Gaddafi’s resignation and that the 1951 Constitution be restored. However, they have been historically divided, and do not appear to attain the unity required to present a coherent alternative to the current regime.

The Economy and Hydrocarbons

The Libyan economy is almost entirely dependent on hydrocarbons. The country saw a major economic growth (over 6% in 2006) due to improved oil revenues as a result of an increase in prices. This situation has afforded Libya enough cash liquidity (over 59,000 million dollars in foreign reserves at the end of 2006) to implement a wide range of economic policies to encourage the entry of foreign companies. NOC accounts for around 95% of the country’s foreign currency revenues. Libya is the second-largest crude oil producer in Africa, with an estimated 1.7 million barrels per day in 2006 (considerably less than the 3.2 million barrels which it produced in the early 1970s). Furthermore, it has proven oil reserves of 41 billion barrels, which amounts to almost half of the total proven oil reserves in the African continent.

Libya needs to attract investors in the oil sector as it is vital for the economy of the country, and as long as it is not capable of diversifying its sources of income. In fact, the survival of the Gaddafi regime may depend on its ability to produce more oil and gas. The Libyan Government expects to increase oil production to 3 millions barrels per day by 2015. In order to achieve this and recover from the negative effects of over two decades of embargo and sanctions, Libya needs to attract more than 30 billion US dollars in foreign investment and modern technology. Oil production and prospective licensing has increased lately, while there is greater competition between international companies to obtain NOC concessions.

The economic and commercial opportunities currently offered by Libya, following years of sanctions and with huge revenues from hydrocarbons, are considerable and have a highly lucrative potential. Recognition of the need to privatise (“expanding the base of property owners,” in the official discourse) implies recognition of the failure of the economic model in place since the 1970s, as well as the insufficiency of the reforms implemented since 1987. At the same time, abolition of one of the maxims of the Green Book, whereby workers are “partners, not wage-earners,” opens the door to changes in other revolutionary principles. However, the repeated promises of economic liberalisation focused on diversification, privatisation and structural streamlining have not been effectively implemented outside the oil sector.

Libya and Spain have mainly economic relations. In 2006 Spain’s imports from Libya amounted to over 2.647 billion euros while its exports were only of 84 million euros. These figures show a significant trade deficit of over 2.563 billion euros. Most imports from Libya consisted of fuel oil and lubricants, amounting to almost 10% of Spain’s total imports of crude oil.

Libya in the Euro-Mediterranean Context

In spite of there being a large number of issues of mutual interest, Libya’s relations with the EU are still anomalous. Several European countries that have commercial relations with Tripoli are regarded as Libya’s main trade partners. However, Libya is the only Mediterranean country which does not have formal relations with the EU since, among other reasons, the European Commission does not have a permanent delegation in Tripoli (although since May 2005 it has a non-resident ambassador). Libya currently has the status of an observer country in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). In 2004, Libya declared its interest in becoming a full member of the EMP, although it has not yet formally applied. Together with Syria, Libya is the missing link in the EU’s Project for creating a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010. The reason given by the Libyan authorities for its absence is that Libya cannot participate in an initiative whose final purpose is to create a “zone of peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean” while one member continues to occupy the territory of another (in reference to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territories). In fact,
Libya knows that it can achieve much of what it needs from Europe bilaterally without committing itself to the Barcelona acquis. Likewise, Tripoli already enjoys in practice all the advantages of a free trade area with the EU, since its energy exports are not submitted to tariffs.

The line taken by the European Commission of implementing a realistic, conditional and progressive approach towards Libya, although perhaps necessary in the current conditions, runs the risk of offering Tripoli a version of the EMP à la carte. In some European circles it is believed that Libya's active involvement in the 5+5 Group (which includes the five Maghrebi countries – Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia – and five European countries – France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) serves for it to become gradually involved in political dialogue, as a previous step to its full integration into the EMP. However, the European Commission recalls that the EU has 27 Member States. If the EU's ultimate aim is Libya's full integration in the EMP and in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), it may need to explore incentives relating to access to European technical aid, as well as the possibility of participating in regional infrastructure projects or joint initiatives to support development in Africa, currently an area of the greatest priority in Libya's foreign policy.

The line taken by the European Commission of implementing a realistic, conditional and progressive approach towards Libya, runs the risk of offering Tripoli a version of the EMP à la carte

Once again, Libya's relations with Western countries are not free of controversy and mutual accusations, as is seen in the case of the five Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor who were imprisoned in February 1999 and later sentenced to death, accused of spreading the AIDS virus to hundreds of patients in the Benghazi children's hospital. The EU and other countries have repeatedly expressed reservations as to the trial process. Although the Supreme Court in Libya overturned the death sentences in December 2005 and ordered an inquiry of the trial process to determine whether there were procedural flaws, the Tripoli Criminal Court confirmed the death sentences on 19th December 2006, a few days before Bulgaria's accession to the EU. According to a study published in Nature magazine twelve days before the sentence was made known, the AIDS epidemic in the Benghazi hospital broke out one year before the incorporation of these members of staff. This matter is still generating tension between Libya and the international community in view of the arbitrariness of the trial process, the lack of cogency of the prosecution evidence and the utilisation of the case to distract the attention of the Libyan population.

Not Fully Normalised

The reforms thus far implemented in Libya have been limited and have focused on the economic sphere. It is unlikely that reform will be accompanied by any significant political liberalization. There are still many obstacles which hamper the full normalisation of Libya's foreign relations. These obstacles are linked to the nature of Libya's political regime and to a mutual distrust as a consequence of the country's isolation period. Some recurring problems include the lack of coherence in the design and application of policies, bureaucratic red tape, the high degree of administrative discretionality, the lack of transparency, difficult access to information and the existence of an unpredictable legal system and a deficient banking system. All of these factors make the country less appealing than it could be from a business standpoint. It is unlikely that all of these obstacles will disappear in the short term, although Libya will try to make gestures towards boosting the confidence of foreign investors.

Once Libya has received the certificate of rehabilitation from the international community, a new climate of cooperation with its neighbouring countries is required in order to ensure the development of Libya’s constructive potential, both at home and abroad. This cooperation should not be limited to economic and security issues. An adequate framework for normalizing Libya's relations with its neighbours is its full integration into the Barcelona Process. In Spain's favour is the absence of recent conflicts or of a colonial past with this country of the Maghreb (unlike other European countries such as Italy, the UK, France and Germany). For Spain it is important to boost bilateral relations and to partly correct its high trade deficit with this country.
The 2006 elections in Israel undoubtedly made a significant difference if compared with previous elections. For the first time in the political life of Israel the electoral victory went to a party without a history and probably with narrow chances for the future, created artificially to serve the ideological turn of its political and military leader. President Ariel Sharon’s press conference announcement on 21 November of the creation of the new party Kadima (Forward) and his resignation from the Likud Party clearly marked a split in Israel’s political system or a “Big Bang”, as Minister of Justice Haim Ramon dubbed it (Yediot Aharonot, 4/3/2007). From an historic perspective Sharon’s step has a much greater significance than the step taken by David Ben-Gurion in the 1950’s, when he founded the Rafih Party and turned away from the Mapai (Labour). The political estrangement of the mythical leader David Ben-Gurion did not break apart the historic Mapai; in the case of Sharon, it gave rise to a different, almost unprecedented situation. Sharon broke with the Likud, a historic and popular party, in order to confront it in the elections, while his final aim was to continue with his policy of establishing the Israeli borders unilaterally.

At first, any observer could interpret that the future of the Kadima and its plans for unilateral withdrawal proposed in the political programme for the March 2006 elections relied solely on Sharon. As Akiva Eldar wrote in Ha’aretz “the creation of the Kadima and its possible success were attributable only to Sharon and to the face-lift performed by a brilliant group of political consultants and public relations aides” (Ha’aretz, 28/11/2007). In spite of the dramatic events following Sharon’s brain stroke and the transfer of the party’s leadership to Yehud Olmert, Kadima still won the elections. In other words, the central thesis that this article attempts to prove briefly is that, besides the uncontested leadership of Sharon, the Kadima represents much more than a party of his own. In fact, since the late seventies Kadima represents – although with a different name – an incipient middle class in Israel that looks for a safe place at the centre of the country’s political landscape. In this sense, the Kadima represents a large portion of Israeli public opinion that for many years formed party lists under different banners. Moreover, the phenomenon of the Kadima will force the Labour and Likud parties to reflect on their political discourse in order to aim at the core block of Israeli voters who support the Centre. But the Kadima phenomenon, in all its pervasiveness, was not the only one that marked the 2006 elections. Clearly there was a protest vote addressed to the entire political class of Israel. The high number of abstentions and the so-called “post-modern youth” vote to the Pensioners’ Party in Tel Aviv which gave them 7 seats pointed at the existing distrust, not only in traditional parties, but in the political class itself. Usually, ethno-religious and new Radical Right parties are indirectly favoured by this kind of anti-system voting trend. The Shas Party (religious Sephardic), for instance, recovered part of its electorate, and although Arab parties did not see a dramatic increase in the number of voters, ideological radicalisation in the last years has contributed to give political relevance to the New Radical Right (“Israel Beiteinu”) led by Avigdor Lieberman, who won 11 seats and almost surpassed the Likud, which barely reached 12 seats.

To sum up, there is a strong trend towards the Centre and a clear protest vote aimed at the political class that shows popular apathy with respect to traditional
parties and their old political proposals, be it Amir Peretz’s Labour socialist proposal or the territorial nationalism proposed by the Likud and its ideological allies such as Mavdal (national religious). On the other hand, the votes cast for ethnic-religious parties and Lieberman’s New Right show that there is a growing mobilization of other sectors of the population. While Arab parties channel the vote of the Arab population – particularly young voters – support for the Shas Party is growing considerably among the low-income sector of eastern Jewish population, and Avigdor Lieberman’s party channels the vote of Russian immigrants. As a point of interest and differing from other analysts’ views, Avigdor Lieberman’s party, or the “liebermanist faction” as it were, appears as the new partner of the political centre and not of the territorial right, which would have seemed logical. We will try to explain this dilemma in the light of internal sociological developments and the relationships between Palestinians, not only in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but also within Israel, that is, the relationships with Arab-Israeli citizens. More specifically, it can be said that this new trend observed in Israeli society in the last elections is most likely to continue in future electoral processes.

a) Disenchantment with traditional political parties and their ideological postures. Above all, there is an absolute lack of confidence in the party system, which is regarded as below standards and inefficient. The war in Lebanon further increased this trend of distrust of a number of institutions such as the Army, which used to be critical in order to rely on national security.

b) A lack of confidence in the possibility of reaching territorial and peace agreements with the Palestinians. A lack of confidence as to being able to continue coexisting politically with the Arab-Israeli minority.

c) A rejection of the ultranationalist option in favour of settlements in Judea and Samaria.

d) The affirmation of the Jewish character of the State of Israel with borders close to those of 1967, which shall be unilaterally determined since there is no viable political negotiator on the Palestinian side, especially after the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian legislative elections.

e) The little relevance of a social vote. Although the social vote was initially thought to be much more important in these elections than in preceding ones, eventually leading to massive support to Amir Peretz’s Labour Party, the final results showed a somewhat different scenario. The 19 seats obtained by the Labour Party led by Amir Peretz were less than expected for a figure that had put all the emphasis on the social agenda.

These trends were unchanged by the Second War in Lebanon. In other words, there is a continuity that dates back to the days before this electoral process and is related to the social, economic and ideological strengthening of a global-thinking upper middle class of consumers. The political bloc representing this social class forms a government coalition which includes Kadima, the Pensioners’ Party, which can be regarded as an extension of Kadima, Lieberman’s New Right, which although appearing as a Radical Right party presents a political programme that could be an alternative to the programmes for settlements of Mavdal – the Radical Right – and even the Likud Party itself. Finally, Labour’s joining of the coalition with its 19 seats is explained by a loss of identity of a party that is currently lacking a political and social agenda. This became evident with the role of Amir Peretz as Minister of Defence in the last war of Lebanon. These forces make up a stable coalition that represents the centre of Israeli society beyond considerations on the political future it may have. In other words, any possible future coalition will have to represent social sectors that wish to have a Jewish state “without settlements,” or one with the least number possible of such settlements as well as of “Arab-Israelis” in the Jewish state. These conditions are supposed to enable continuity for a democratic Jewish state and also maintain its international legitimacy, particularly with regard to Western democracies.

Changes in the Party System

Without doubt, Israeli society – like many other Western societies — is going through a process of disenchantment with its political parties, which has led to a number of crises in the party system. Dalton & Wattenberg (2000) explain that the loss of connections between society and the political parties is a largely extended process among modern Western societies. High standards of living, political activities no longer espousing an ideology, the development of other civil society groups that channel political expression, and the growing corruption of the political class are so commonly extended that they have led to an overall weakening of representative democracy.
Undoubtedly, traditional political parties are mainly the most affected by this process. They are forced to move towards the centre of the political landscape, in accordance with the trend established by Anthony Downs (1957) which describes how traditional parties are forced to do away with the last traces of an ideology. In addition, bureaucracies and flourishing corruption transform the headquarters of traditional parties into “job agencies” and places for political machines. This leads the public to move away from traditional parties. Another factor that plays against traditional parties is the birth of what can be called “one-issue parties” that generally show a rejection of immigration and usually channel anti-system votes. The agendas of many of these anti-system parties are also taken up in some or other way by moderate right or conservative parties. Finally, the single factor that weakens voting for traditional parties is the trend of voting according to performance rather than responding to long-standing allegiances. This leads to an increased volatility, and in many cases, to fragmentation of the political system. This process of disillusionment with traditional political parties and the breaking apart of the political system are sometimes accompanied by realignment on the basis of new social and ideological coalitions. This redefinition of the parties system alters the traditional balance for the coalitions which are bound to survive in the next elections. (Burnham, 1970; Crotty, 2006; Key, 1959). An increase in political activism and a greater polarization as a consequence of the new issues and coalitions are among the symptoms observed in party redefinitions.

In the case of Israel, and although a redefinition of the parties system took place, there are no signs of a sociologic or political revolution taking place. The Centre bloc that was thus far slightly dominant within the different political configurations such as Shinui and also in increasingly stronger factions within the traditional parties such as the Likud and Labour, is now consolidating itself as a winning political force. But Kadima, for the time being, is not a new ideological force. It lacks a mobilizing nationalism such as the one embodying the myth of the “Land of Israel” as contended by the extreme Right, nor does it reflect the utopianism of the “New Middle East” proposed by the Left. Kadima represents a tendency towards the Centre in Israeli politics whose "modern" history dates back to 1977 with the appearance of the D’ash Party (Democratic Movement for Change), which then contributed with its 15 seats to the downfall of the Labour Party. Although it disappeared as a political party, D’ash survived as an ideological posture that aimed at the burgeoning middle classes of the country. A series of different configurations followed in different electoral processes and finally, with Shinui, it had very remarkable elections results under the leadership of Tomi Lapid, and won 10 seats in the elections of 2003. The voters of these parties represent the new secularized and liberal middle classes of Israel. They have grown tired of Labour, a bureaucratic and corrupt party with links to professional circles, and are in total disagreement with the religious orthodoxy represented by parties like Shas (Sephardic religious orthodox) or Agudat Israel (Ashkenazi religious orthodox); the Israeli bourgeoisie appears to be tired of the Likud’s populist national politics, let alone of the settlers’ ultra nationalism.

The new Israeli middle class that flourished with the economic boom of the 70’s became stronger as a social class thanks to the economic reforms carried out in Israel and throughout the world. Israel reaped the benefits of globalisation and technification and the strong social class that emerged, although not in absolute majority, represents a growing part of the population, one that keeps in control both economically and politically through its ideological dominance in the Supreme Court of Justice, and in key positions in the Bank of Israel and the Ministry of Finance. Just as Itzhak Rabin understood it in the early 1990’s, Ariel Sharon also saw their electoral potential and thus adapted his political discourse in order to address this dynamic and modern sector of society. According to analysts Yoav Peled and Gershon Shafir (2002), the Oslo peace process initiated by Rabin was basically the result of the social pressure exerted by this dynamic sector of society, especially of the industrialists seeking new regional markets.

What marks a difference from Rabin’s days is that the great majority of this social class reached the conclusion that, albeit necessary, the peace process with the Palestinians was a failure, fundamentally due to Palestine’s reactionary stance. They feel frustrated with the peace process and have misgivings about the Palestinians, but they oppose the idea of a Great Israel and hence they support the unilateral withdrawal proposed by Sharon. And what is interesting from a sociological standpoint, an important sector of Russian immigrants has joined this new and modern middle class in the last years. Russian immigrants generally
belong to the secular right and have in mind the model of an American democracy based on a strong state with authoritarian elements. Overall, the ideology of a great Eretz Israel is of no great appeal to this population, although they give importance to preserving the Western and modern character of Israeli society, even to the point of upholding a policy of military deterrence. In other words, although they are not entirely opposed to achieving peace with an eventual Palestinian state, they are largely in favour of maintaining—as long as peace does not come about—strong and decisive defence policies that are contrary to the pacifist postures of the liberal Left. This vision that sometimes has racist features, points at this sector's misgivings about Israeli multiculturalism in which political parties for Eastern orthodox Jews and Arabs alike are allowed to exist. Israel must be a Western country completely adhering to Western culture, particularly to American culture. There is no doubt that Lieberman is a representative of Russian immigrants. And what is probably most important, Lieberman, or rather, his political plans are increasingly gaining sympathies among the autochthonous middle classes. In other words, his plan is also in the spirit of a philosophy of "conflict resolution" that is dear to many voters of Kadima. According to Timothy Waters (2007), Lieberman's plans have many coincidences with the classic solution of "two states for two peoples, the Jewish and the Palestine." Moreover, to some extent it can be defined as a radical post-territorial, post-expansionist right since it assumes that in order to protect Jewish cultural or ethnic hegemony within the State of Israel not only is it necessary to give up the settlements in the territories but also disengage from parts of the sovereign territory of Israel where the Arab population is concentrated. This includes the border zones such as Umm El Fahan, which would supposedly, and in turn, become a part of a future Palestinian State (Spektorowski and Klauber, 2006).

This New Radical Right can neither easily be integrated into the territorial project of right-wing settlers, nor to that of the "Mavdal" or the Moledet's project, based on territorial conquest, settlements and transfer of the Palestine population. The vote to Lieberman’s party can thus be explained by two main reasons. On the one hand, the mass of Russian immigrants who feel represented by Lieberman. But besides Lieberman’s specific personality, the “Lieberman Plan” aims at the Centre of Israeli citizens and can even be appealing for some people in the Zionist Left. This ought to be explained accurately: Israeli leftists find it difficult to accept a politician that shows little respect for democratic procedures and who advocates an electoral reform that would turn Israel from a parliamentary to a presidential democracy without a liberal Constitution and would transform the Israeli political system into a democracy of power-concentration. For many, Lieberman is a fearsome character precisely because of his continuous attacks on the Supreme Court of Justice and the State accountability bodies that are supposedly a hurdle for “democratic governance” (Sternhell, 2007). What is more, Lieberman can hardly be accepted in view of his racist notions; as Akiva Eldar wrote in Ha'aretz (13/03/2006), "although some extremist parties that sat in the Knesset—for instance, Rehavam Zee'vi's "Moledet"—had a fascist agenda, Lieberman's is the first extremist party that is embraced by the Israeli mainstream," which gives evidence of the degradation of Israeli society. The question is why this becomes a mainstream phenomenon, the answer lying on the Israeli Jewish public perception of the radicalization of Arab-Israelis and the growing popularity of post-Zionist ideology advocated by Jewish intellectuals like Ilan Pappe, Yoav Peled, Iri Ram and others, as well as by Arab members of Congress, especially Azmi Basharra.

Lieberman is the clearest voice opposing post-Zionist ideology. And while for Jewish people from the Left and the Right alike, Israel is a Jewish and democratic state, even when these two criteria may seem difficult to coordinate, but which are the basis of what can be called liberal or democratic nationalism (a Jewish cultural hegemony that also concedes civil liberties to all citizens), Arab-Israeli citizens, especially the young ones, are not resigned to this situation. Lieberman uses an increasingly radicalised rhetoric that in the last years led to a greater demand of “Liebermanism” among the Jewish population. In other words, this demand denotes that
the creation of an independent Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is not seen as a problem in times of peace, but that the claim by Arab-Israeli to put an end to Zionist dominance in the State of Israel is the most worrying issue for the Jewish population of Israel.

From the electoral standpoint, for many observers Lieberman’s Israel Beiteinu Party would be a relevant partner for Netanyahu’s Likud, both forming an opposition force or as a future government coalition. But the feasibility of such rapprochement is overshadowed by Israel Beiteinu’s current partnership with Kadima, which seems a more natural one because they both represent the “new spirit” of the population of Israel, while Netanyahu’s territorial nationalism and that of the Mavdal (national religious) are perceived as something from the past, hence its rejection by the Israeli electorate. This implies that if Netanyahu seriously intends to win the next elections, he will clearly need to dissociate himself from the Mavdal and its flirting with the territorial right. It is clear that both the political corruption within the Likud and what was understood as an unrealistic political programme contributed to move Netanyahu away from his voters. In the last months Netanyahu has rooted out corruption in the party and he now appears as an outstanding candidate in the upcoming elections. However, in order for this transformation to be complete so as to allow his political comeback, Netanyahu must aim at the political centre of the electorate, as the Kadima did. This is not a difficult deed at present, since the idea of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal is now completely delegitimized. On the other hand, Netanyahu would need to avoid being associated to the settlers’ ideology considering that, since Oslo, the political centre of Israel gave up the idea of massive settlements in spite of the successive governments’ settlement policies, especially in the areas bordering Jerusalem and in the city itself. This means that any political party aiming at forming a government in future elections cannot move away from what was outlined by Kadima in the 2006 elections, since it is based on an increasingly hegemonic and all-encompassing public opinion trend that includes sectors of the Labour Party and, to a certain extent, pragmatic sectors of the Likud.

Thus, the 2006 elections registered a steady trend which had been building up for quite a long time. In spite of the unprecedented number of voters that decided to vote a Centre party, opinion among the Israeli population had for some time been largely oriented to the centre of the political landscape. As Arian and Shamir (2005) demonstrated in previous elections, 51% of those who felt identified neither with the Left nor with the Right voted a Centre party. 73% of those who identified with the Left voted a Right party while 71% of those who did with a Left party voted a Left party. This was the prevailing model since 1969. In the latest elections, however, a larger number of voters who identified with the Left and the Right voted a Centre option, whereas those who previously identified with the Centre maintained their preference and voted the Centre in the political landscape (Samir and Arian, 1999). En 2003, 32% of people who identified with the Centre voted a Centre party as compared with 82% of leftists that voted the Left and 88% of rightists who voted for a party of the Right. In 1999 the figures showed 51% for the Centre, 88% for the Left and 90% for the Right. In 2006 the correspondence between votes to the Right and to the Left and those who have sympathies for either of them was weaker, while the correspondence between votes to the Centre and those who have sympathies for the Centre was reinforced. This means that the Centre was politically consolidated as a winning force.

What Future Lies Ahead for the Ideological and/or Political Debate?

As a conclusion, it seems relevant to reflect on two criteria that are not necessarily relevant. Political debates around the issue of ideology among Centre-left parties and Right parties, that is Zionist parties, is practically over, following the handover of Gaza, which is consistent with what was previously explained here. Any future debate shall be focused around the issues of corruption or those regarding good or bad management. There are no differences in any of the opposition to Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran. Left and Right agree insofar as justifying the Israeli operations in Lebanon. Criticisms of the army (IDF - Israel Defense Forces), of government planning and perhaps to how relevant a war was at the specific moment in which it happened come from the entire political spectrum. But nobody has any doubts when regarding Hezbollah, Iran and Hamas as the enemy to whom nothing can be conceded. Likewise, there are no doubts that Israel should agree to establish dialogue with Syria if this country takes significant steps such as dismantling its relationship with Teheran and with terrorist organizations based in Damascus. This is part of a
political debate with organizational implications rather than ideological ones.

There are no differences in any of the opposition to Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran. Left and Right agree insofar as justifying the Israeli operations in Lebanon

In other words, the ideological confrontation between a "Great Israel" and an Israel for Peace is now concluded. However, this does not mean that an ideological discussion about the future of Israel or of its political identity in the long-term cannot be initiated; even if the political sense of such a debate were overlooked in the short term, it would be still a valid one for the future. Debate will most likely take place between Azmi Bashara, Arab-Israeli parties and post Zionist Jewish intellectuals, on the one hand, and "moderate liebermanism" on the other. Bashara and Lieberman are the personification of two tendencies, although this does not mean that they shall necessarily represent them in the form of a "Zionism-versus-Post-Zionism" debate in the future. There is no doubt that the future of Post-Zionism is not a promising one in Israel. It is practically impossible to witness a transformation of such an ideological version into a politically critical mass. In other words, it is difficult to see it emerge as a political deciding force or a "third force" that could emerge to define a competition between a Zionist Left and a Zionist Right. For the time being, none of the leftist parties would agree to negotiate their Zionist tradition with post-Zionist forces coming from Arab parties. The Ra'am –Tal Party, with four seats, the Hadasht communist party and Balad with three seats each, have too little political weight for any Zionist party to accept even a small part of their political agendas. As long as the issue at debate is equality in the labour market, the great majority of Zionist parties are in favour of the claims of Arab citizens, perhaps only by paying lip service to it. But when the debate is carried out in the field of symbols and the Israeli Citizenship Law, Zionist parties are not willing to negotiate.

Bibliography


On 26th January 2006 legislative elections were held in Palestine for the second time since the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993 and 1995; the first elections were held in January 1996 without the participation of Hamas and with a clear victory for Fatah. Thus, an electoral cycle was brought to a close; it had begun with the local elections held in four phases between 2004 and 2005 and, following the death of Yasser Arafat, with the presidential elections of 2005 in which Mahmoud Abbas was elected as the new chairman of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). In August 2005, Ariel Sharon began the announced unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip; however, this did not stop the Israeli Army raids during 2006 and the closing of the border when necessary, thus sealing off the area completely and preventing it from having contacts with the outside world. In spite of the difficulties derived from continuous occupation, the elections were carried out in such a climate of freedom and transparency as never before witnessed in an Arab country; this was confirmed by the reports submitted by over 1,042 international observers (of which 33 were from Spain) who attended and supervised the campaign and the electoral process. The results could be anticipated in view of the events that took place during the latest stages of the local elections, particularly during the fourth stage of December 2005, in which Hamas won 73% of the votes and 13 out of 15 municipalities in dispute in the West Bank. The legislative elections thus gave a clear and indisputable victory to the Islamic Resistance Movement – Hamas – which was by far greater than the polls' forecast of a tie in the results between Fatah and Hamas. The final results of the count, with 77.18% voter participation (out of 1,350,034 voters registered by 1st January 2006) were:

### TABLE 24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Total Seats by Lists</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total Seats by Districts</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change and Reform²</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44.45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41.43</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martyr Abu Ali Mustapha³</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Alternative⁴</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Palestine⁵</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Third Way⁶</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent list</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(¹) There are 16 electoral districts with a number of seats ranging from 9 in the Hebron district, 8 in Gaza and 6 in Jerusalem and Nablus to a single seat for Tubas, Salfit and Jericho respectively. A total percentage calculation is of no use, since the difference in the number of voters between districts and the Christian minority quotas (2 deputies for both Jerusalem and Bethlehem and 1 in Ramallah/Al-Bireh and Gaza) account for a distortion factor than cannot be corrected.

(²) Hamas.

(³) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

(⁴) Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), People’s Party, Fida and the independents.

(⁵) Electoral list headed by Mustapha Barguti

(⁶) Electoral list headed by Salam Fayad and Hanan Asharaui.

Fatah’s electoral setback by districts gave all of the 9 seats to Hamas in Hebron and only retained 6 seats of the 5 Gaza electoral districts – half of them in Rafah — accounting for 25%, while Hamas won 15 and 3 went to the Independents); the defeat was a little less conclusive in the rest of districts in the West Bank (11 seats accounting for 33% for Fatah while Hamas won 21 and the Independents 1). The key to this indisputable majority won by Hamas was already underlying in the feeling of frustration after nearly four decades of occupation: the failure of the Oslo Accords which Hamas opposed from the beginning and which ten years after have not led to the creation of a politically and territorially viable Palestinian state, while the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank has grown tenfold in the same period; the high levels of corruption that have undermined the credibility of the PNA and the leaders of Fatah; and the ever-increasing difficulties for the survival of the Palestine population, especially in the Gaza strip. The victory of Hamas had immediate consequences: in March Israel refused to have contacts with a government led by Hamas and suspended the payment of revenues collected (VAT, customs duties and donor payments that account for three quarters of the PNA budget) while it tightened security measures (restrictions on the movement of goods and persons, shutting off the border crossings between the occupied territories and the outside world) and resumed military operations, especially in Gaza. The United States and the European Union, who had listed Hamas as a terrorist organization, also responded negatively to this victory of the Islamic movement and halted the transfer of international aid funds to the PNA. In March the EU urged Hamas to give up violence and acknowledge the State of Israel if it wanted the PNA government to continue receiving financial aid. As a consequence of these measures, the GDP per capita fell by 27% in 2006 while personal income fell by 30% to the extent that, according to a report by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA, Emergency Appeal, 2007: www.un.org/unrwa/emergency/appeals/2007-appeal.pdf), poverty levels increased significantly during 2006. In June 2006, 2.7 million people (over a total population of 3.7 million) were living below the poverty line, of which 2.4 million were living in extreme poverty, without having the minimum income to meet their basic clothing, housing and food needs. Of course, the situation is much worse in the Gaza Strip, where endemic poverty affects 87.7% of homes (55.6% in the West Bank) and extreme poverty affects 79.8% (43.2% in the West Bank). According to a 2006 Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the degrading situation of the occupied territories is also seen in the data for the year 2004 of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which are grouped with middle-income countries and placed in number 100 in a list of 177 countries (http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf). Additionally, the suspension in the transfer of revenues directly affected the payment of PNA government workers who had been paid only two months’ salary since February 2006, and which led to a strike and internal tensions that caused violent clashes between the various security services under the control of the PNA presidency and the Hamas government. All this happened amidst an anomalous political situation: in June 2006 the Legislative Council had met only on three occasions, and a number of Hamas members were arrested by Israeli Forces during the spring and summer 2006 military operations. The kidnapping of an Israeli soldier on 25th June triggered the Israeli military attack on the Gaza Strip known as Operation Summer Rain. The operation was clearly out of all proportion and it included air and ground attacks with combat cars and artillery that caused scores of victims on the Gaza Strip and destroyed vital infrastructures such as the only existing electric power station; likewise, 64 elected officials of Hamas were arrested, including legislators, mayors and ministers. A number of military operations were carried out in the West Bank, although they went largely unnoticed as the media mostly reported on the impact of the massive Israeli raid in Lebanon, also in the summer, and which caused over 1,000 dead and an overall destruction of infrastructures. By fall, on 1st November, Israeli Forces began a large military operation in Beit Hanoun to put an end to rocket attacks launched on cities of Israel. The army occupied the zone for six days, imposed a 24-hour curfew and destroyed infrastructures while it shut off water and electricity supplies and health services for the population. The final toll of Operation Autumn Clouds was of 82 Palestine dead, of which at least 39 were civilians (18 women and 10 children) and over 260 injured people. An Israeli soldier was shot dead by a sniper. (UNRWA, Beit Hanoun Flash Appeal: www.un.org/unrwa/emergency/appeals/BeitHanoun_F A_Nov06.pdf). Even after the withdrawal of Israeli Forces from northern Gaza, two Israeli shells were fired over a group of houses on 8th November, which
resulted in 19 dead — of which 13 were members of the same family — and 60 injured in what was called a “technical error” by Prime Minister Yehud Olmert. To sum up, the material damage caused in the Gaza Strip contributed to aggravating the difficult financial situation of the population to such an extent that UNRWA made an emergency appeal to the international community in 2007 in the face of a potential crisis of food supplies that would have terrible consequences.

Meanwhile, Chairman Mahmoud Abbas was barely successful in his attempt to conform a national unity government that would do away with the embargo of international financial aid, and threatened to call for early legislative and presidential elections if Hamas refused to accept such a government. However, as the year came to a close the national unity government had not been formed and Abbas failed to announce early elections, in a climate of growing tension with the militias of the Islamic movement, which in May 2006 created their own police forces dependent on the Ministry of the Interior, while the Fatah militia supported presidential security forces. In the final months of 2006 they were on the verge of a civil war and scores of victims were counted; in early 2007 Abbas outlawed Hamas’ police force while President Bush requested from the US Congress an additional 80 million dollars in aid for the Abbas and Fatah-controlled security force comprised by some 18,000 men.

The balance for 2006 in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is possibly the worst that could be imagined after the signing of the Oslo Accords and the death of Yasser Arafat. The second legislative elections were held in full compliance with these agreements and under close international observation, and resulted in an indisputable victory for Hamas. Israel and the United Stated did not accept the new negotiator, while the EU asked the Islamic movement to give up violence and acknowledge the State of Israel as a precondition to be accepted as a valid negotiator; Fatah’s response was to present its refusal of a Hamas government as a fact by entrenching itself in the powers it still retains within the PNA presidency. Consequently, the financial aid to the PNA was embargoed, which resulted in economic recession that could lead to a food supplies crisis of catastrophic magnitude; violence in the form of suicide attacks or rocket attacks did not cease; disproportionate military operations by Israeli Forces in the Gaza Strip, and to a lesser extent, in the West Bank caused hundreds of dead and injured and massive destruction of infrastructures that further worsened the already difficult living conditions for most of the Palestinian population; and the death toll of growing tensions between the Palestinian militias is increasing by scores and could easily lead to a covert civil war. To sum up, it is evident that this is not a situation in which to feel optimistic, and this is reflected in the latest opinion polls carried out by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (www.pcpo.ps/polls.htm), which describes a state of confusion, dejection and frustration.

1. In October 2006, 65.4% of respondents showed support for the government workers’ strike; 61.8% was against the dissolution of the PNA; 45.9% regarded the policy of Chairman Abbas as “good” or “very good”; likewise 40% regarded Prime Minister Haniyeh’s policy in the same way; 57.5% showed various degrees of agreement with the holding of early legislative elections, but only 42.5% agreed, also in various degrees, to holding early presidential elections; 35.3% were in favour of forming a national unity government and 30.1% believed Ismail Haniyeh was the most credible politician to lead a unity government; 33.5% believed that US intervention was responsible for the current Palestine crisis and 27.7% believed that this strengthened Hamas postures.

2. In November 2006, 80.9% of Palestinians showed concern for the survival of their families and 78.6% for their personal security; 78.1% believed that the economic situation was bad and 62.3% were pessimistic about the improvement of the political and economic conditions; 62.1% believed the US, Israel and other donor countries were responsible for the worsening of the economic conditions in the Palestinian territories.

3. In January 2007, 80.4% of the respondents were in fear of their personal security; 77.2% believed that suspension of financial aid contributed to increase violence in the region; 60.7% were in favour of holding new legislative elections and 54.9% showed various degrees of agreement with holding presidential elections. Among the former, 26% disclosed their intention to vote for Ismail Haniyeh and 21.8% for Marian Barguti, a Fatah leader currently jailed in an Israeli prison; among the latter, 35% showed a preference to vote for Mahmoud Abbas.
Egyptian Politics 2006: Democratic Mobilisation Wanes and the ‘Hereditary’ Political Succession Scenario Becomes Consolidated

The year 2006 in Egyptian politics was preceded by a period of an unprecedentedly broad-based movement for democracy, political and institutional reforms, the first ‘pluralist’ presidential elections, which confirmed Hosni Mubarak in his post and finally, legislative elections, with the significant entry of the Muslim Brotherhood into the People’s Assembly, which won 88 out of a total of 444 seats. The year 2006 itself, on the other hand, was characterised by an ebb of democratic activism, the regime’s return to authoritarian methods and above all, the consolidation of the ‘hereditary political succession’ scenario, with Gamal Mubarak succeeding his father. In any case, the regional situation, in particular with the victory of Hamas in Palestine, the war waged by Hezbollah against the Israeli military forces in Lebanon and the rise of Iran as a possible future regional power, contributed significantly to diminishing international and particularly US pressure for democratisation of the Egyptian regime. The latter thus consolidated its continuity. Egypt 2006 was likewise the stage for important social movements, as if the change of political climate in 2005 had had delayed effects on other spheres, in this case, the social and labour milieus. The democratic movement instigated and developed among the ranks of the political and intellectual elite subsided in 2006 due to a series of factors: the disillusionment generated by the poor political and institutional results of 2005; the demobilisation of part of the actors; the repressive stance taken against them; and finally, increasing internal division. This was precisely the case with the Egyptian Movement for Change, better known by its slogan, ‘Kifaya,’ or ‘Enough,’ which was singular because it united all branches of political opposition in the country, including the Islamist political tendency.

Demobilisation and Conflicts within Kifaya

Since the beginning of 2006, the authorities have sought to stop one of the primary forms of action undertaken by Kifaya, namely, the right to demonstrate without previous authorisation as established by Egyptian legislation. Kifaya’s support of Egyptian magistrates in conflict with the authorities gave them the opportunity. It was after a number of demonstrations organised by Kifaya that the Minister of Home Affairs undertook waves of arrests of young activists participating in the movement, generally keeping them in custody for long periods thereafter and putting them in prison for terms of over ten months, as allowed by the state of emergency still in effect in this country. With regard to its internal affairs, the composite nature of Kifaya that gave it so much force in 2005 became a source of weakness and infighting in 2006, fuelled, true enough, by a vast press campaign in official newspapers against the movement. Significantly, the ideological and political divisions within the movement came to the fore precisely following the statement issued by its leaders on remarks by Farouk Hosni, Minister of Culture, criticising the wearing of the Islamic veil. The statement by Kifaya leaders was interpreted by a group of eight members as supporting Farouk Hosni’s remarks. Despite the retraction of the statement, the group quit the Movement in a spectacular manner, accusing the leaders of authoritarianism. It is thus not surprising that the close of the year brought a renewal of the Movement’s leadership, in particular the replacement of its charismatic leader, Georges Ishaq, by the historian, Al Messiri.

The End of Egyptian Political Parties

If the Muslim Brotherhood has become the main political opposition force in the People’s Assembly,
Such deplorable electoral results reveal the extreme weakness of the different political parties of the legal opposition as well as their incapacity to produce an electoral machine.

other recognised opposition political formations and parties gained but 14 of the 444 seats. Such deplorable electoral results reveal the extreme weakness of the different political parties of the legal opposition as well as their incapacity to produce an electoral machine after the fashion of the candidates to the National Democratic Party – the party of the State and current administration – or after the fashion of the Islamist candidates heading important social and charitable activities.

Withdrawn in their headquarters and cut off from all social and electoral grassroots supporters after over thirty years of having their activities limited by the regime, in 2006 their historic leaderships experienced a series of divisions and incidents of infighting. The phenomenon is general but has above all involved the three main political formations: the National Progressive Unionist Party, the Wafd Party and the Arab Democratic Nasserist Party. Hence, in the Wafd Party, there was a conflict between Mahmud Abaza and Noman Gomaa, the former party chairman who ranked only third after the outsider Ayman Nour in the presidential elections of 2005. This power struggle among party leaders reached its apogee in an armed clash between the two rival clans at the party’s headquarters, resulting in 23 people wounded. The near disappearance of political parties reveals the limits and deep ambiguity of the Egyptian regime’s position vis-à-vis its legal opposition, which persisted through 2006. Hence, the Political Parties Committee of the Shoura Council has refused to grant authorisation for 12 political parties, in particular the Al-Wasat Al-Jadid party, created by former members of the Muslim Brotherhood in conflict with the leadership for over a decade now.

Wrestling Match between Judges and the Authorities

The control of judges over polling stations established by the Supreme Constitutional Court in 2000 has contributed to significantly decrease one of the forms of electoral fraud in this country, namely ballot stuffing. In 2005, grouped together in the Judges Club, Egyptian judges threatened to refrain from supervising elections unless conditions were established to allow them to supervise all stages of the electoral process. By the same token, they demanded a law guaranteeing their full independence from the Executive Branch. This wrestling match between the judiciary and the executive continued throughout the course of 2006. The appearance in May before a disciplinary tribunal of the two senior judges of the Court of Cassation, Mahmud Makki and Hisham al-Bastawisi, for having publicly denounced cases of fraud in the 2005 legislative elections gave rise to a significant movement in their support within the country. The tribunal issued a reprimand against the former and exonerated the latter. A new law on judicial authority passed in June did not take into account the demands formulated by the Egyptian judges to guarantee their independence and in November, the new Minister of Justice blocked subsidies that the State has traditionally granted the Judges’ Club. But the apex of the regime’s attempt to quell the rebellion of the Egyptian judges consisted in the presidential project to reform Article 88 of the Constitution in order to ban the judges from supervising elections by ‘constitutionally’ imposing the holding of various elections in a single day. In previous elections, voting was carried out in several stages to allow the number of judges available to correspond with the number of polling stations to be supervised.

Consolidation of the ‘Hereditary’ Succession Scenario and Restrictions of Islamist Parties

Egypt’s political future is largely linked to the future occupant of the presidency, who is the true fulcrum of the country’s political system. The next presidential elections are set for 2011 and will be preceded by legislative elections in 2010, unless the current Assembly is dissolved before the end of its term.
If in 2005 the regime was more or less ‘obliged’ to accept the arrival of 88 Muslim Brotherhood delegates to the People’s Assembly, the victory of Hamas in Palestine demonstrated that neither the Americans nor the Europeans were in favour of such a turn of events in Egypt. The return of the Muslim Brotherhood to the official political stage was thus accompanied, throughout 2006, by waves of arrests against grassroots members and important party leaders. The constitutional reforms announced at the end of the year anticipate the complete banning of the Muslim Brotherhood from the country’s politics in the future. The reform of polling methods to establish a party-list proportional representation system will result in barred access to the People’s Assembly by political movements not belonging to a legal political party, as is the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, a constitutional amendment will prohibit all religious-based political or advocacy activity. This prohibition, which existed in legislation on political parties, will henceforth have constitutional status. The position of the leaders of the Brotherhood, reiterated in 2006, of not abandoning what makes them different, namely, the simultaneously political and religious nature of their organisation, points to a future political impasse characterised by a dissociation between the formal political system and the country’s real political situation.

The year 2006 thus presents all the indications of a confirmation of the scenario of ‘hereditary political succession’

In 2006, President Mubarak announced his intention of remaining in his post for life. Today, with the current state of affairs, only one candidate of the National Democratic Party (NDP) will be capable of meeting all the conditions established in Article 76 of the Constitution as reformulated in 2005 for running in the future presidential elections, and this is Gamal Mubarak, who has become the real boss of the NDP, the party in power and holding a majority in parliament. The year 2006 thus presents all the indications of a confirmation of the scenario of ‘hereditary political succession.’ Apart from the constitutional reforms that will oust the Muslim Brotherhood from legal political life, the National Democratic Party Congress of September 2006 was once again marked by the ‘presidential’ posture of Gamal Mubarak, who eclipsed all other senior party members and who above all replied to journalists’ questions on foreign policy problems. The announcement by Gamal Mubarak of Egypt’s ambition to acquire civil nuclear energy shows the future role Egypt would like to play in the framework of Iran’s rise as a regional power and confirms a new Egyptian alignment with regard to US foreign policy, which was clearly expressed during the Lebanon War between Hezbollah and Israeli military forces during the summer of 2006.

Controlling Trade Unions and Meeting Labour Demands

The return of the Egyptian regime to authoritarianism was likewise confirmed by the flagrant corruption in both Student Union elections and trade union elections. For the labour milieu, the stakes are higher in trade union elections for the leaders of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation. The bureaucratic nature of the trade unions, under the regulatory authority of the Ministry of Labour, has been a constant in Egyptian politics over the past few decades, as the working class has been hard hit by neo-liberal economic policy. The privatisation of public enterprise is generally synonymous with layoffs and inflation has brought with it a general decline in living conditions. In 2006, although making sure to replace certain ageing high trade union officials, the elections took place with a total absence of transparency and were above all marked by the refusal to register hundreds of ‘undesirable’ opposition candidates belonging to left-wing parties as well as the Muslim Brotherhood movement. In this manner, 85% of the positions on trade union executive committees were filled by administrative candidates who faced no competition. The administrative takeover of the trade unions did not prevent 2006 from being punctuated by important social movements. In September of that year, 27,000 workers from the State-owned Mahalla textile factory went on strike for 3 days to demand their withheld bonuses and to indicate their concern about the factory’s future. They were followed by the workers of the Mahalla dye-works, then the Helwan and Tora cement workers and finally the railway workers. The most significant phenomenon of these different social movements was the State’s attitude, conciliating to say the least, which differed greatly from its ‘classic’ handling of such conflicts in the worker and farmer milieu. Preceding movements had been systematically
suppressed and the instigators generally fired. In 2006, on the other hand, not only was there no repressive action, but above all, the ensemble of the strikers' demands were accepted in the public sector and the State put pressure on the directors of private companies to comply with their employees' demands. Apparently, the regime’s new attitude of ‘playing it calm’ is related to its wish to maintain its presence in the worker milieu, which has not yet been greatly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, and to its fear of a possible junction of such worker movements with political protests led by intellectuals. What is certain is that the development of social movements is not unrelated to the country’s change in ‘political climate,’ in particular, the increased freedom of expression and of the press. Hence independent publications have provided thorough coverage of these movements and alerted political opinion at home and abroad.

The Independent Press and the New Characteristics of Public Debate

Another positive element that marked Egyptian politics in 2006 was the consolidation of freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Thus 2006 witnessed a strike by 28 newspapers on the day the People’s Assembly was to discuss a reform bill to limit press freedom. President Mubarak intervened in person to request the cancellation of the reform. His attitude reveals how the President of the Republic is trying to renew dialogue with the intellectual elite, whereas the preceding year had signalled a low point in the rift between the two. By the same token, freedom of the press/publication is one of the country’s most important public freedoms and it is also the regime’s main democratic façade. The Egyptian press, in particular independent publications, can be considered one of the main spaces for debate, not only on the political level, but also on the social and economic levels. In 2006, it was the newspaper columns that informed on and investigated the tragedy of the Salem Express ferry shipwreck, with a death toll of over 1,000, major corruption scandals and finally, problems concerning religious freedom and confessional relations in the country.
Over the course of this year, the situation in the Middle East has not experienced any changes providing optimistic perspectives for possible future evolution. On the contrary, the situation is cause for concern, with a wholly unprecedented extent of simultaneous crises and conflicts in the region. This growing bellicose scenario is developing within the complex framework of a multiplicity of non-state actors (armed groups, militias and resistance movements of diverse social and political backgrounds) while institutional and economic processes have reached an impasse: no sign of political change or development processes can be discerned. Despair and frustration are gaining ground in these societies and their immense population of young people along with the professional elite oscillate between desertion (via emigration) and progressive alienation.

By the same token, the international community is also at an impasse here. US policies insist on the militarist option while the USA’s image has deteriorated and fallen into unprecedented discredit in the region, even among its most trusted allies. Saudi Arabian diplomatic initiatives are not necessarily in line with Washington’s policies. The European Union is divided between passivity and following US policies, at a time when the failure of the Pax Americana and its project to reorganise the Middle East offers the necessary opportunity for other powers to put the region back on course. This opportunity is being more decisively taken advantage of by Russia and China. The effects of the so-called “war on terror” are manifestly deplorable. They are eroding human rights and creating a highly insecure world. Irene Khan, Secretary General of Amnesty International, in the Amnesty International Report 2007, asserted that “Through shortsighted, fear-mongering and divisive policies, governments are undermining the rule of law and human rights, feeding racism and xenophobia, dividing communities, intensifying inequalities and sowing the seeds for more violence and conflict. The ‘war on terror’ and the war in Iraq, with their catalogue of human rights abuses, have created deep divisions that cast a shadow on international relations, making it more difficult to resolve conflicts and protect civilians.”

In the case of Iraq, the chaos and extreme violence the country has been experiencing since 2003 is aggravated by other factors that are spreading the conflict throughout the region. Confrontations between Sunni and Shiite militias are increasingly creating conditions of division that go beyond Iraqi borders, contaminating the entire region. Imbalances and discrimination suffered by Iraqi Shiites and Arabs in general should be dealt with through democratically-based processes of national reconciliation and never through the impositions of foreign military occupation that open the doors to historical revenge, sectarian opportunism and the lack of regulations under a Rule of Law established by consensus. The imposition of the autonomy and near independence of Iraq’s Kurdistan region is facilitating the return of PKK activity in Turkey, with the consequence of Turkish military intervention this could entail. The lack of legitimacy, international legality and regional consensus in
Confrontations between Sunni and Shiite militias are increasingly creating conditions of division that go beyond Iraqi borders, contaminating the entire region

establishing said autonomy, imposed by the US and Great Britain after the Gulf War in 1992, has contributed to opening a Pandora’s Box where there is no regional strategic plan instead of settling a national claim accepted by all. Finally, Iraq has become a school for new Arabic and Muslim resistance movements, feeding on radicalisation and exporting terrorist forms of action.

Another evident risk whose regional consequences would be catastrophic is Iraq’s collapse and implosion. In fact, State structures hardly subsist and the government is formal but not real. In Iraq it is not a civil war that is brewing but an extreme fragmentation into resistance movements, militias and extremist groups acting in accordance with their respective demands and ideological parameters in a double war against the occupying forces and those not sharing their local or regional interests. A violent, devastating chaos prevails that can only be overcome by taking into account the most cross-cutting organisations, the one’s with the most popular legitimacy and with an Iraqi outlook going beyond clan-like and sectarian interests. The ideal would be for these organisations to defend Iraqi sovereignty and the end of foreign occupation such that they do not adapt to the strategy of interested selection of leadership imposed by external actors. Nonetheless, movements such as that of Muqtada al-Sadr cannot be ignored in the search for a solution.

The Humanitarian Tragedy

We are all familiar to some extent with Iraq’s political problems but are we aware of the scope of the human tragedy brought about by this conflict?

The growing deterioration of law and order has fostered crime, delinquency and abduction for purposes of economic extortion, raising indices of civilian insecurity in everyday situations to untenable levels for the majority of those residing in the country. The social and economic costs are extremely high: Iraqi unemployment oscillated at about 30% before the US intervention but is now between 60 and 70%. Reconstruction is not progressing, both because insecurity and violence represent an insurmountable obstacle and because the funds allocated to this end are being diverted to finance the increase in military forces and private companies contracted to guarantee security for US personnel and Iraqi authorities. Moreover, in May of 2005, the first audit on the disbursal of the Development Fund for Iraq revealed the disappearance of significant sums of money, the double payment of contracts and manipulated accounting books. It must be kept in mind that said Fund is an enormous bank account where the profits from Iraqi oil sales are deposited, and contains the vast sums of frozen money from the secret accounts of the Saddam Hussein regime in foreign banks as well as the sum remaining from the Oil for Food programme once it was dissolved. The United States continues to retain control over the Fund and its management through the Central Support Unit under the US Embassy in Baghdad.

The health and educational systems have plummeted to the levels of pre-industrial society due to the destruction of infrastructures. UNICEF has estimated that hundreds of schools have been destroyed since 2003 and progressive violence prevents their reconstruction, the distribution of equipment and their regular operation. By the same token, environmental destruction is generating severe imbalances in the ecosystem, and the destruction of water sources, water purification systems and wastewater drainage systems are putting the sanitation and health of the Iraqi population at large at high risk.

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The lack of security and basic services, sectarian confrontations and frequent military operations have generated a gigantic reserve of displaced people in Iraq, who now number some two million individuals. They live under the most extreme conditions, some
The lack of security and basic services, sectarian confrontations and frequent military operations have generated a gigantic reserve of displaced people in Iraq in camps, others taken in by relatives, friends or simply other people of their community. Some also “squat” in semi-dilapidated or abandoned public buildings. Nevertheless, this critical humanitarian situation in Iraq, far from remaining within the country, has crossed borders and is now posing enormous challenges to neighbouring countries and the international community. Another two million Iraqi refugees are distributed between Syria and Jordan, and some 250,000 have even reached Egypt. Before the Iraqi tragedy, the figures were already shocking, revealing the intensity of conflicts in Northern Africa and the Middle East: according to the United Nations, this relatively small region of the planet contains 47.2% of all the refugees in the world. Of this immense quantity of displaced people living under highly precarious conditions, Palestinian refugees comprise the majority by far. Today they are a social group numbering over four million human beings, yet they are wholly neglected by the media, politics and international relations. They are the dark face of the longest conflict in contemporary history, a conflict which the international community has proven incapable of resolving, though this means relegating a huge number of people to a marginal subsistence devoid of dignity and with no future, whose numbers, as a consequence of this political impasse, continue to increase, giving rise to new generations living in insalubrious, foul-smelling ghettos with an absolute lack of hope in the alarming social and political powder keg which the Middle East has become.

In any case, though the number of Palestinian refugees has reached four million since 1948, there is now a new wave of Iraqi refugees, who in only four years already number two million. The UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East) has seen its budget reduced enormously as the problem persists over time and becomes entrenched, and is therefore increasingly dependent on private or bilateral donations. Hence, today, Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan (with 1,780,701 refugees), Lebanon (400,582), Syria (424,650), the West Bank (687,542) and Gaza (961,645; in this case, comprising 80% of the total population in the Gaza Strip) basically rely on volunteer workers and on whether or not States or private institutions recall the existence of this neglected part of humanity. The emergence of two million “new” Iraqi refugees heralds a highly difficult budgetary and financial situation where international organizations will have a hard time handling this intense number of neglected human beings who are wholly dependent on them for survival. The capacity of host countries is quite limited, such that regional and internal conflicts may continue to intensify because refugees will gradually become actors increasingly filled with rage and frustration.
The Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean were at the centre of world affairs in 2006 for a variety of reasons. The ongoing violence in Iraq that morphed into a civil war after the bombing of the al-Askariya shrine, the continuing tension over Iran’s nuclear ambitions and finally the Israeli-Hezbollah war in Lebanon that almost transformed the strategic balances of the region kept the world focused on its developments. The Lebanese tragedy brought forth the strategic outreach of Iran in the Eastern Mediterranean and the links between the politics of the Middle East and the Mediterranean in general. The year also witnessed the rage over the re-publication of the unflattering cartoons of the prophet of the Muslims, Mohammed, in several European newspapers. The cultural divide between Europeans concerned with freedom of expression and the Muslims incensed by what they considered to be blasphemy against their prophet brought home the burning issues of integration and post-colonial sensitivities. It was no surprise though that the two countries that took the lead in bringing about a report on a “dialogue of civilizations” were Spain and Turkey, legatees of two great Empires representing two adversarial faiths that once dominated the Mediterranean.

The work and the efforts over “the dialogue of civilizations” was not the only engagement of Turkey in the Mediterranean. The country’s long-standing involvement with the Cyprus imbroglio continued as the government tried to find ways of accommodating its obligations to the EU with the political needs of Turkish Cypriots and its own strategic interests. Beyond this perennial issue, Turkey’s stance on the Lebanon war underscored the rising interest in Turkey’s foreign policy for the Middle East and the importance the country attributes to the stability of the region. More importantly, Turkey’s decision to send troops to the newly beefed up UNIFIL despite popular resistance demonstrated both the country’s commitment to harmonize its foreign policy with its EU partners and its ambition to be counted in the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean. Given the fact that three of Turkey’s neighbours were either in a state of war (Iraq) or in the eye of the storm (Iran and Syria), such concerns had a bearing on the stability of the region and arguably of the world. In the course of its efforts to play a central role in the region, Turkey also ran afoul of its allies’ policies as in the case of the invitation of Hamas’ radical leader Khaled Mashaal, who resides in Damascus, to Istanbul in the aftermath of the Palestinian elections that brought Hamas to power. Similarly, President Sezer’s official visit to Damascus only a couple of months after the murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri of Lebanon caused a minor diplomatic row with the United States. Throughout the year, heads of state or government from the region visited Turkey. Arguably the two most important were the visits by Prime Minister Maliki of Iraq and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in the middle of the war between Israel and Hezbollah. The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mottaki also showed up in Ankara in August. Conspicuously absent from the list of visitors was President Talabani of Iraq. He was not invited by the Turkish President because he is a Kurd and President Sezer did not find it appropriate to meet with him even if foreign policy professionals and the government insisted that it was a necessary move.
The Benighted Island

The Turkish government decided to make a fast move on the Cyprus issue when the year began. In 2005 the issue almost blocked the start of accession negotiations with the EU because of pending problems over the extension of the customs union to the Nicosia government. Turkey refuses to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels although it promised to do so in 2005. It wants the European Union to honour its commitments to the Turkish Cypriots who, although they voted in favour of the unification of the island, are being punished by the continuation of embargoes imposed on them by their once and future compatriots. The EU is unable or unwilling to break the grip of its member and plays along with the non-conciliatory policies of the Papadopoulos administration.

Turkey’s decision to send troops to the newly beefed up UNIFIL despite popular resistance demonstrated both the country’s commitment to harmonize its foreign policy with its EU partners and its ambition to be counted in the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean

The Turkish opening, a so-called action plan made up of ten items admittedly did not have any new proposals but it was mostly a gesture of good will reflecting the government’s preference for a policy of being “one step ahead.” The opening drew no positive responses from Greek Cypriots and the Union through the year failed to break Nicosia’s veto on the direct trade directive. Some funds were finally allocated to the Turkish side. Ultimately the year ended with the issue of the ports still unresolved. Using the absence of any moves by Ankara on this issue the opponents of Turkey’s accession raised the ante. The European Commission charged with reviewing whether Turkey fulfilled its commitments finally ended up recommending the suspension of eight chapters, presumably to avoid a total suspension. Thus the irresolution on the Cyprus issue harmed Turkey-EU relations and substantially diminished the Turkish public’s enthusiasm for EU membership. More importantly perhaps, the Eastern Mediterranean security situation did not ameliorate because Turkey continued to block Cyprus’ participation in NATO exercises and tensions between Ankara and Nicosia remained alive even in latent form.

The Visitor from the South

The American policy of democracy promotion took a considerable blow when the Palestinians, defying earlier polls, gave the militant organization Hamas a clear majority in the Parliament. The results, arguably surprising even the Hamas leadership, sent shock waves through Israel and the Western world. The United States positioned itself to isolate Hamas and force it to change its stance and behaviour. Immediately plans were drawn to ensure the failure of Hamas and its future government so long as it did not renounce violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist and accept agreements signed earlier between the PLO and Israel. It thus came as a truly unpleasant shock to Washington that the exiled leader of Hamas, Khalid Meshaal, who resides in Damascus and was not even an elected deputy, was allowed to visit Turkey for meetings with Turkish officials. The visit organized by the ruling AKP’s foreign policy cadres sidestepped the Foreign Ministry. Once the immensity of the reaction that the visit by what the West considered a terrorist organization would engender was understood, Ankara did change Meshaal’s programme and the Prime Minister did not meet with his Palestinian guest. The explanation issued by the government suggested that the visit was meant to let Mr. Meshaal understand that he had to recognize Israel and that he should not visit Iran immediately.

The irresolution on the Cyprus issue harmed Turkey-EU relations and substantially diminished the Turkish public’s enthusiasm for EU membership

Furthermore, the government expressed the belief that it would be better to engage Hamas if the world community expected moderate behaviour from the organization. Not only did Mr. Meshaal go to Tehran upon returning from Ankara; the government’s explanations did not satisfy either Israel or the United States. The American secretary of state Condoleeza...
Rice was particularly incensed. The Israelis, who first reacted by asking how Turkey would feel if they met with representatives of the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK, ultimately decided to play the episode down but there was no doubt harm was done to the government’s standing. Outwardly contrite, the government nonetheless remained unrepentant. Throughout the year, and particularly during the Israel-Hezbollah war of the summer, its good offices were sought to relate messages to Meshaal or his Syrian hosts and the government presented these as evidence that its policy of engagement was well advised and therefore accepted by his Western and Israeli partners.

The Unravelling Neighbour

Atop the list of Turkey’s foreign policy priorities was Iraq. In fact, in the wake of the start of accession negotiations with the EU, Prime Minister Erdogan declared that Iraq replaced the EU as the most important item on Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. Three issues were of particular concern for Turkey: the territorial integrity of Iraq and the avoidance of a full-fledged civil war; the fate of the province of Kirkuk; and the elimination of the PKK, a Turkey-based Kurdish terrorist organisation that finds refuge and support in the Kurdistan Regional Government territory.

In the wake of the start of accession negotiations with the EU, Prime Minister Erdogan declared that Iraq replaced the EU as the most important item on Turkey’s foreign policy agenda.

To secure all three goals, Turkey chose to engage the central government in Baghdad and even invited outgoing Prime Minister Jafari to Ankara for consultations during the long crisis of government formation in the wake of the general elections. Later in the year Prime Minister Maliki visited Ankara with his ministers to discuss these matters. Reports indicated that Turkey could not bring the government in Baghdad to share its vision on either the PKK or the Kirkuk issues. This was no surprise since the Kurds hold important positions in the Iraqi government and the Turkish government refuses to engage the Kurdish authorities, including the Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, who is a Kurd. On the issue of the ongoing sectarian strife that the Turks saw as a civil war, Turkey’s efforts were like others’: futile. Turkey welcomed the Iraq Study Group report that was published at the end of the year in Washington and appreciated its realistic assessment of the situation and its basic agreement with the Turkish approach that it would be wise to engage Iraq’s neighbours, particularly Syria and Iran. In the spring, the PKK ended its self-imposed cease fire and began attacking Turkish troops. By July the pressure on the government and the military alike became unbearable as body bags kept coming from the southeast of the country. In July, as the Turkish troop concentrations increased significantly along the border with Iraq, the United States decided to make a move. Until then, Washington kept pressing the Turkish side not to make a military move so as not to alienate the Iraqi Kurds and turn the only stable part of Iraq into a battle zone. Using this excuse as well as its inability to allocate troops to fight the PKK, which it recognized as a terrorist organisation, Washington drew the ire of the Turkish public and was accused of being hypocritical. There is no doubt that the Iraqi Kurds used the PKK as leverage against Turkey and counted on the Americans to avoid a Turkish military operation. By September the United States and Turkey appointed two retired generals to coordinate efforts to fight the PKK. The American side preferred to make use of non-military means. To that end, the American side shared intelligence information with the Turks, helped cut the financial resources of the PKK in Europe and elsewhere and closed down its representative offices. Repeatedly, though, the American side told its Turkish interlocutors who invoked the right of self-defence to desist from a military operation, which so far the Turkish side has not undertaken. The Turkish demands for rendering some 150 PKK operatives residing in Iraq and the demand for operations against PKK camps went unheeded.

The matter of Kirkuk remained one that periodically raised tensions between Iraqi Kurds and Turkey. The Kurds’ claim that Kirkuk belonged to them and their insistence on holding a referendum to determine the fate of the city, i.e. whether it would be part of the Kurdish region, prompted strong responses from Ankara. Although it is unlikely that Turkey would consider a fait accompli by Kurds in Kirkuk a casus belli, it made clear that the response would be considerably harsh. The President of the Kurdistan regional Government, Mr. Barzani, in his turn continued to defy Turkey, relying on American unwillingness to...
pressure the Kurds. Yet by the end of the year, partially in connection with the Iraq Study Group Report the administration in Washington was also moving towards the idea of postponing the referendum that might bring about intervention by all Iraq’s neighbours and the Shiite and Sunni Arabs of Iraq.

**Beyond Lebanon**

On September 5, 2006, the Turkish Parliament voted 340 to 192, along strictly partisan lines, in favour of sending troops to Lebanon to join the UNIFIL contingent beefed up by UN Security Council

The Lebanese crisis fully exposed Turkey’s strategic position where East and West meet and clearly highlighted the Mediterranean dimension of our identity

Resolution 1701. The government defied overwhelming public opposition and risked alienating its own base by taking a distinctly unpopular position. The Israeli war against Hezbollah was widely disliked in Turkey and emotions there ran high against Israel and the US. In such an emotional atmosphere, when the time came to debate peacekeeping operations most of the

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**A STANDOFF IN TURKEY’S EU MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATION**

2006 will not be remembered as a good year for the relations between Turkey and the European Union. Early in the year there were signs of potential difficulties looming on the horizon. Nonetheless, the various actors did not modify their postures, and thus were unable to reach agreement on a large number of issues. This situation saw its climax by the end of the year, when the EU Council decided to suspend accession talks with Turkey on a number of important areas.

In addition to this dispute, confrontation between the governments of Cyprus and Turkey remained the main obstacle. Other factors such as France, Germany and Austria’s opposition to Turkish membership to the EU played a major role, along with the slow pace of reform implementation by the government in Ankara.

In early February the European Commission recommended the opening of detailed negotiations over issues of science and technology, the first of 35 chapters established to allow the accession of Turkey.

On 8th March the Turkey – EU negotiating team held a meeting in Vienna, the first one to be held since the official announcement of accession negotiations was made in October 2005. The postures that remained largely unchanged over the following months were defined in this meeting. The EU requires that Turkey comply with the customs protocol that envisages the opening of Turkish harbours and airports to the traffic of Greek-Cypriot vessels. The proposal was not considered sufficient by the Council of Ministers of the EU, which approved at its meeting of 12th December, the suspension of negotiations and asked the Commission to submit an annual report on the progress of Turkey’s implementation of the commitments derived from the additional protocol of the Customs Union agreement.

**Reference Documents**

European Commission, Turkey 2006, Progress Report:

The Commission presents its recommendation on the continuation of Turkey’s accession negotiations:

Press Release of Council Session # 2736, EU General Affairs and External Relations, Luxembourg 12th June 2006:

Press Release of Council Session # 2770, EU General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels, 11th December 2006:

Further information:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkey/index_en.htm
public saw in the possible deployment of Turkish troops an effort to protect Israel and do Washington's bidding. Before the government called for an extraordinary session of parliament to debate and vote on the matter, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul attended the Rome Summit and visited Lebanon, Israel and Syria to make sure that all the relevant parties would welcome Turkey's participation in a peacekeeping force once the Security Council passed the relevant resolution. In the wake of the vote, the Financial Times reported that the result was "more than a signal (of) Ankara's determination to participate in what it considers an urgent humanitarian cause." Despite the fact that the Turkish contribution would be mostly limited to naval operations and that ground forces would only be deployed to protect Turkish Red Crescent personnel and other officials, for the newspaper's Ankara correspondent the decision highlighted Turkey's aspiration to be considered an important regional player. It enabled Turkey to serve on an equal footing with European Union countries.

Despite the fact that the Turkish contribution would be mostly limited to naval operations, the decision highlighted Turkey's aspiration to be considered an important regional player.

In his defence of the government's policy in parliament, Foreign Minister Gul intimated that broader strategic considerations guided government thinking. "In short," he stated, "the Lebanese crisis fully exposed Turkey's strategic position where East and West meet and clearly highlighted the Mediterranean dimension of our identity... suffice it to mention the security of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to underscore our ties to [the Eastern Mediterranean]." Emphatically denying that Turkish troops would be used to disarm Hezbollah, Gul argued that, "this position is consistent with our status as a bridge between civilizations (...) and our claims that the European Union will become a global power with Turkey."

Therein lies the true significance of the Turkish decision. The Lebanon war can only be appreciated in the broader context of a regional balance of power, where it is related to the American-Iranian struggle to shape the region and define Iran's role in it. The strengthening of the Lebanese state is the stated goal of Resolution 1701 and the aim of the West. This will be a challenge to both Syria and Iran, particularly if the mission succeeds. Turkey, which enjoys cordial relations with both Tehran and Damascus and whose government as well as public are sympathetic toward Hezbollah, thus unequivocally took the side of its Western allies. This choice also reflected Turkey's newfound commonality of interests with the established Arab states. Concerned with the growing influence of Shiite Iran, the Sunni Arab states are determined to contain Tehran's hegemonic aspirations. This explains their criticism of Hezbollah and the effective, if undeclared, support for Israel's war that drew fire from their own publics. In these efforts to contain Iran, Turkey is considered an important ally. It is as part of this quest to forge alliances to balance Iran and to limit the effects of the Shiite ascendance that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia visited Turkey, the first visit of this kind in 40 years.
Montenegro: The Difficult Rebirth of a Mediterranean State

With Montenegro’s independence resulting from a referendum held on 21st May 2006, Europe and the Mediterranean Basin gained a new State. In reality, it is the rebirth of a State, since the full independence of the small mountain principality had been recognised at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Montenegro was admitted to the League of Nations in 1918, despite its annexation that same year into the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Montenegro had enjoyed near independence for many years. Faced with serious environmental challenges and the weight of organised crime, this small country with a surface area of 13,000 square kilometres and 672,000 inhabitants must now reinvent its destiny.

The Long Road to Independence

The vote on 21st May closed a long process of distancing between Montenegro and Serbia that had been underway for a decade. At the time of the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the leaders of the small southern republic were followers of Slobodan Milosevic. They took power as a consequence of the “Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution” of 1988, orchestrated by the Belgrade leader. The two strong men of Montenegro, Momir Bulatovic and Milo Djukanovic, respectively President of the Republic and Prime Minister in the early 1990s, both paraded on the Dubrovnik front, providing their support to the Montenegrin conscripts mobilised for the war against Croatia.

After signing the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, Milo Djukanovic began a process of progressive distancing. He began to approach the West as well as Montenegrin separatist movements headed by the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LSCG). In the summer of 1996, the final rupture came with the break-up of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), successor of the former Communists League. Milo Djukanovic and his followers kept control of the party, obliging Momir Bulatovic to create a new party, the Socialist People’s Party (SNP). At the presidential elections of autumn 1996, Milo Djukanovic defeated his rival. The subsequent years, particularly marked by the Kosovo crisis and NATO bombings in the spring of 1999 – which did not spare Montenegro – accentuated this political evolution. Milo Djukanovic posed as an advocate of Montenegrin ‘sovereignty,’ even if he had not yet uttered the word independence. Milo Djukanovic managed to assert himself as a privileged spokesperson for Montenegro with the West, which earned the small republic highly significant financial aid from the USA and the European Union. At the same time, he launched a process of reconciliation with Montenegro’s neighbours, first and foremost with Croatia. Djukanovic cultivated the support of Montenegro’s national minorities. By receiving some 100,000 Albanians expelled from Kosovo during the 1999 conflict, for instance, the Montenegrin government won the recognition and support of the Albanians in Montenegro. Djukanovic likewise acted as a protector of other minority communities, namely, the Croat community of Boka Kotorska (Bay of Kotor) and the Muslim Slavs in the north, alarmed by Serbian nationalism.

Milo Djukanovic or the Art of Synthesis

Milo Djukanovic’s rallying to ‘pro-Montenegro’ postulates represented an unexpected turn with respect
The political skill of Milo Djukanovic has consisted in successfully uniting the different components of the Green tradition as well as educated urban social strata and profiteers who managed to get rich during the period of sanctions to positions he had assumed at the start of his political career, but this evolution is in keeping with his family’s tradition. Since 1918, Montenegro has effectively been divided into two major political traditions, the ‘Greens’ (Zelenasi) and the ‘Whites’ (Bjelasi). The Whites advocated Montenegro’s annexation into the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, approved in December 1918 by the Podgorica Assembly, an assembly whose legitimacy was contested by the Greens. The Greens, on the other hand, remained party to national independence and the Petrovic Njegos Royal Dynasty. In any case, King Nikola died in exile in Antibes without having abdicated. The effective annexation of Montenegro led to a bloody civil war, whereas during the Second World War, Green detachments fought against the Serbian Chetniks. These Green units were initially supported by the Italian occupying forces, though the majority of them rallied around the Communist followers of Tito.

Montenegro remains a clannish society. In ‘Old Montenegro’ (Stara Crna Gora), corresponding to the four districts (or nahije) that formed the heart of historic Montenegro around Cetinje, the majority of clans are Green. Both Milo Djukanovic and Ranko Krivokapic, the current President of Parliament, are from ‘Green’ families of the district, Katunska nahija. The clans of the Brda (or ‘Mountains’) Region to the north of Niksic and Podgorica are primarily ‘White,’ as are the Vasojevici, the members of a large confederation of tribes from northern Montenegro, who are always defined as Serbs and never considered Montenegrins. Along the coast, particularly at Kotor Bay, tribal allegiances and therefore political orientations constitute a complex mosaic, changing from one village to the next.

Historically, the ‘White’ tradition is related to Serbian, anti-communist nationalism based on the Orthodox Church and the Chetnik tradition. The ‘Green’ tradition, on the other hand, combines two political lines – the Montenegrin monarchists and the communists. The Greens will never forget that Tito recognised a distinct Montenegrin Nation different from the Serbian Nation. The most radical Green movements, represented in particular by the writer, Jevrem Brkovic, exiled in Zagreb in the 1990s, go as far as to suppose an ethnic Montenegrin origin different to that of the Serbs: the Montenegrins would thus be the descendents of the ‘Red Croats’ of the High Middle Ages. By the same token, certain ‘pro-sovereignty’ movements were behind the ‘rebirth’ in 1993 of a Montenegrin Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which contests the legitimacy of the Serbian Orthodox Church, presented as the ‘usurper’ of the churches and monasteries of Montenegro, but its influence remains essentially limited to the region of Cetinje and ‘Old Montenegro.’

The political skill of Milo Djukanovic has consisted in successfully uniting the different components of the Green tradition, while securing the support of national minorities as well as educated urban social strata and profiteers who managed to get rich during the period of sanctions that afflicted Serbia and Montenegro in the 1990s. During this period, the Djukanovic regime was directly engaged in certain large-scale trafficking activities, such as cigarette contraband, and ‘granted’ different groups specific sectors of the ‘grey market.’ Thus the Albanian criminals from the coastal municipality of Ulcinj had control of illegal traffic with Italy, in particular transport of illegal migrants, whereas the Albanians of Tuzi, near Podgorica, got rich through trafficking in petrol with neighbouring Albania.

Serbian or ‘Yugoslav’ Dissent

The opponents of Milo Djukanovic also vacillate between two ideological traditions. The ‘White’ movement has a clearly nationalist discourse and is associated with the Serbian Orthodox Church and its local metropolitan,

The final results could not have been reached, however, without the support of ethnic minorities. Hence, for the first time in the region’s recent history, the ethnic minorities of a country rallied around a political project that allied them with the majority community.
Amfilohije, very much a politician. Mgr. Amfilohije had strong ties with the chief of the Serbian militia, Arkan, of Montenegrin ascent, who repeatedly protected him. Mgr. Amfilohije was also reputed to have offered hospitality at Montenegrin monasteries to Radovan Karadzic, former leader of the Bosnian Serbs, who was found guilty of crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague and has been in hiding since 1995. In addition to these Chetnik movements, there were also firm believers in ‘Yugoslavia,’ advocates of a joint State who saw Slobodan Milosevic as a champion of such unity.

After Milosevic’s fall (October 2000), relations between Serbia and Montenegro did not cease to deteriorate. Relations between Milo Djukanovic and Vojislav Kostunica were atrocious. Montenegro viewed the international subsidies and other aid pouring into Serbia with irritation and could not accept losing all strategic interest for the West. Diplomats who had been waiting patiently for an audience in Podgorica turned away from Montenegro after the summer of 2000. Montenegrin leaders then radicalised their ‘pro-sovereignty’ discourse, explicitly advocating independence. The European Union managed to defer said independence through the replacement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the provisional “Union of Serbia and Montenegro,” proclaimed on 4th February 2004.

At the same time, the unionist opposition was increasingly turning away from Yugoslav nostalgia to rally to an exclusively Serbian vision. This process reached its culmination during the census of 2003. The ethnic structure of Montenegro emerged from this census wholly modified. The Serbs represented 10% of the population in 1991, whereas they would henceforth comprise 30%. In fact, individuals are free to declare their ethnicity as they see fit, and unionist parties as well as the Serbian Church had launched a campaign to convince individuals to declare themselves ‘Serbs’ and no longer ‘Montenegrins.’ Under these conditions, the ‘Montenegrins’ only comprised a rather weak majority in relation to the country’s entire population (41%). As has often been the case throughout Balkan history, the census became a form of political expression: declaring oneself Serb was equivalent to ‘voting’ against independence while registering as Montenegrin was akin to advocating it.

A Society as Yet Divided

Three municipalities were the ‘keys’ to referendum results. Cetinje, the former capital of the kingdom, voted 85% in favour of separation, yet this ever pro-independence stronghold was surpassed by two other municipalities: Ulcinj, a primarily Albanian coastal city, voted 88% in favour and Rozaje, a ‘Bosnian’ Muslim Slav enclave in the northern sector of the country voted 91% in favour. The final results could not have been reached, however, without the support of ethnic minorities – the country’s 7% Albanians, 13% Muslim Montenegrins who at times call themselves ‘Bosnian’ and at others ‘Muslims in an ethnic sense’ and 1.5% Croats.

Hence, for the first time in the region’s recent history, the ethnic minorities of a country rallied around a political project that allied them with the majority community. Croatian independence was based on the exclusion of the Serbian minority in the country, the Albanians of Macedonia never supported the project for an independent Macedonian State and the independence of Kosovo is a mono-ethnic project advocated only by Albanians. The proponents of Montenegrin independence, however, championed the idea of a multi-ethnic, civic Montenegro. They won their bet – Montenegro cannot exist as a State without the support of its ethnic minorities.

Therefore, Montenegro’s independence is anything but a new ‘nationalist spasm,’ as certain commentators, concerned by the ‘proliferation’ of new States, would have one believe. Quite on the contrary, it has represented the most serious refutation of ethnic nationalism in the Balkan region for fifteen years now. Another point to keep in mind is that this independence does not represent any ‘legal precedent’ whatsoever. Montenegro was a federated republic of socialist Yugoslavia. As such, it had the right to secede, recognised by the Badinter Arbitration Committee in 1991, as did the other republics comprising part of former Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. The case of Montenegro has no direct legal impact on the status of Kosovo or on

The proponents of Montenegrin independence, however, championed the idea of a multi-ethnic, civic Montenegro. They won their bet – Montenegro cannot exist as a State without the support of its ethnic minorities
Montenegro is thus attempting to reverse its image as a small racketeering State, while capital acquired in the 1990s is reinvested in other sectors, primarily the tourist industry in the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Challenge of Combating Organised Crime

It is clear that the European Union did everything in its power to prevent the independence of Montenegro, in particular by imposing an electoral system requiring 55% of the votes for a majority in the referendum on independence. This attitude can be ascribed, not only to a fear of regional consequences, but also to the fact that Montenegro has a very poor image – the small country is considered a racketeering haven.

The direct involvement of Montenegrin leaders in European cigarette contraband goes back to the years of international sanctions and embargoes. Those in high government circles under Djukanovic have acknowledged their participation in such contraband, explaining that it was a ‘question of survival’ for Montenegro at the time. For five years now, Milo Djukanovic has been summoned to appear in court in various proceedings instituted not only in Italy, but also in Switzerland, Germany and the USA. Nevertheless, Montenegro’s leader does not seem to be concerned about his legal future. After the elections of 10th September 2006, moreover, he relinquished his responsibilities as head of state, retaining only his position as President of the DPS.

Cigarette contraband is rapidly decreasing and the State of Montenegro has partially broken with mafia activities, even if other trafficking activities continue to enjoy a high degree of tolerance on behalf of the authorities, in particular arms trafficking with Albania and Kosovo. Montenegro is thus attempting to reverse its image as a small racketeering State, while capital acquired in the 1990s is reinvested in other sectors, primarily the tourist industry, which has been experiencing an explosion for the past few years. In the country’s new political and economic configuration, the main investors are Russian, which poses other problems.

The Challenges of Development and the Environment

The primary foreign investor in Montenegro is, in fact, Oleg Deripaska, the owner of the Rusal Group and a Russian oligarch who is very influential in the Kremlin. Rusal bought out the Podgorica Aluminium Plant (KAP), by far the most important company in Montenegro.

The production of aluminium requires huge amounts of electricity, in particular for the process of electrolysis. KAP could be profitable if it can obtain electricity at a low price. Nevertheless, Montenegro, as the remainder of the Balkan countries, suffers from a chronic energy deficit. The government has already guaranteed preferential rates for KAP, whereas the company’s consumption represents nearly half of the country’s overall energy consumption. This was not enough for Oleg Deripaska, who in autumn of 2006, purchased the lignite mines and the thermoelectric power plant of Pijevi察, and who is pressing Montenegro to build more hydraulic power plants.

In 2004, a project was proposed to build a new hydroelectric power plant at the confluence of the Tara and Piva Rivers, at the border between Montenegro and Bosnia’s Republika Srpska. The dam would have flooded the Tara Canyon, the largest canyon in Europe. Strong citizen protest forced the government to give up the project, but it has resurfaced over the past few months, whereas another power plant project is well under way on the Moraca River, upriver of Podgorica. In a highly seismic region, all specialists agree that this power plant will put the Montenegrin capital in a highly risky situation.

In theory, tourism under proper administration could represent a major resource for developing small Montenegro.

These energy projects are therefore fraught with environmental risks, while the Montenegrin coast is currently being sold off to Russian businessmen, who now own all the country’s major hotels from the towns of Kotor to Ulcinj and are continually building new ones. To make matters worse, there is a generalised growth of urban sprawl along the coast characterised by unbridled construction in which all urban planning regulations are violated and there is no specific law to protect the coastline. At the Tivat Airport, regular
ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA. FIRST ELECTIONS WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

The 1st October general elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were the first elections to be fully administered by the BiH authorities and represented further improvement in the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law. These elections were conducted in a manner that can be considered in line with international standards for democratic elections. International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) regretted, however, that, due to constitutional ethnicity-based limitations to the right to stand for office, these elections were in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) as well as the commitments made to the Council of Europe for universal and equal suffrage. Citizens who do not identify themselves as one of the three “constituent peoples”—Bosniak, Croat, Serb—are effectively barred from standing State and Republic of Srpska (RS) presidencies. Voters registered in the Federation of BiH are limited in their choice of presidential candidate to either a Bosniak or a Croat, and RS voters can only vote for a Serb presidency member. Save for the constitutional limitations just mentioned, the election legislation provided a sound basis for the conduct of democratic elections and the campaign was dominated by nationalistic issues and rhetoric.

54.48% of the voters went to the polls, which is in line with those who voted at the previous elections.

The opening of the polling stations was assessed as "good" or "very good" by IEOM observers in 92% of cases. Voting during election day proceeded smoothly, although overcrowding and group voting were noted in many places by observers. Procedural problems were observed, especially voters not receiving a proper explanation as to how to fill in ballots, voters not always marking their ballots in secrecy, and signatures not being checked against ID number. On a positive note, there were no observations of multiple voting or carousel voting. However it was noted that in 55% of polling stations observed, voters were turned away due to either not being on the list where they are registered or for being at the wrong polling station. Polling station committees offered helpful assistance to the voters in locating their correct polling station. A deterioration of the process was noted during the count, which was assessed negatively by 26% of the observers due to procedural irregularities. However, no significant infringements of the OSCE 1990 Copenhagen Document were pointed out.

For Further Information:
www.oscebih.org/documents/6465-eng.pdf

and charter flights to Moscow and Saint-Petersburg are multiplying. Montenegro is surrendering to the temptation of easy money, essentially of Russian origin, running the risk of squandering its natural capital in a short time.

The Constitution adopted in 1992 defined Montenegro as "an ecological State," but this stipulation is simply an empty formula, as no coherent environmental protection policy has even been sketched out and the pillage of natural resources is dangerously accelerating. In theory, tourism under proper administration could represent a major resource for developing small Montenegro. Such rational tourism should be combined with a coherent regional planning policy in order to smooth out the development inequalities between the Mediterranean south and the middle and high mountain regions farther inland. Unfortunately, it is obvious that independent Montenegro is not taking this road.

For further information:
Le Courrier des Balkans http://balkans.courriers.info/
Rating the Competitiveness of the Economies of the South

Samir Radwan
Former Managing Director, Economic Research Forum, Cairo

In March 2007, after a protracted process of negotiations, Egypt signed its “Action Plan” with the EU. This brings to seven the number of southern partners (MPCs) who have such an agreement, with Algeria and Syria remaining reluctant partners, and Turkey aspiring to full access. In principle, the action plans provide a detailed framework for bilateral relations between these countries and the EU. But an important aspect is that they provide an opportunity to assess the performance of MPCs, and to establish benchmarks against which their progress could be measured. This is particularly important in order to measure the degree of convergence between the economies of the North and the South, which is the ultimate objective of creating a space of prosperity in the Mediterranean (Radwan, 2005).

It is the objective of this article to provide an evaluation of the performance of MPCs, assess their competitive position, and speculate on the role of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in enhancing their competitive edge.

Rating MPCs’ Competitiveness

The reform drive in several countries of the South has begun to deliver some results, especially at the macro-economic level. Table (25) provides a summary of the relevant indicators. GDP growth in real terms was about 5% in 2005, thus reversing a long-term trend of slow growth. Although unemployment remains at the highest rate in the world, it has shown some decline. Inflation seems to be under control and reserves are up, but both budget and current account deficit continue to represent a challenge to the policy makers.

Yet, the integration of the MPCs in the global market is far from complete. Measured in terms of its share in world trade, the MPCs combined represent only 2.3% in 2004, up from 1.7% in 1995. More significant perhaps is the structure of these countries’ exports.

As Table (26) shows, 76% of MPCs exports to the EU, and 68% to the rest of the world were of “low technology and high natural resources content”, and only 24% and 32% respectively of “high and medium technology content.” Finally, GNP per capita puts the MPCs within the lower echelons of the middle income category of countries as defined by the World Bank (see table 25). This, together with a typically skewed income distribution pattern explains the persistence of the problem of poverty in the region. This performance, together with other factors – partly structural and partly institutional –, goes a long way to explain the competitiveness situation of the MPCs vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Table 27 sums up the rankings of these countries on the basis of the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) published by the World Economic Forum. This index draws on a large number of indicators under nine “pillars” that determine a country’s competitive standing. These are: Institutions, Infrastructure, Macroeconomy, Health and Primary Education, Higher Education and Training, Market Efficiency, Technologies Readiness, Business Sophistication and Innovation.

Out of a sample of 125 countries, the ranking of MPCs ranges from the 30th position for Tunisia to the 63rd for Egypt and the 76th for Algeria. This compares fairly well with countries like South Africa and Indonesia, but certainly remains far below Malaysia, Korea and Israel. Another observation relates to the change over time in the ranking. While countries like Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco and Algeria have registered some
improvement in their competitive position, Jordan and Egypt scored less in 2006 than before. An important question is how to explain this ranking. Going into the details of the indices that make up the GCI, we find that a common feature of the South is the low score in what is called “Efficiency Enhancers” and “Innovation Factors,” which mainly refer to education and business sophistication. Whatever our view maybe about these rankings, they point to the major constraints on increased competitiveness, especially the quality of the human resources which defines a country’s ability to engage and deal with technology, and the way business is organized and conducted.

Business Climate

The latter point is dealt with in details in by the World Bank Report “Doing Business”. Table 28 presents the ranking of the Southern economies in terms of the ease of doing business. Like the GCI, the Doing
TABLE 26  
MPCs Exports by Technological Intensity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High and medium technology content</th>
<th>Low technology and high natural resources content</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1995 24%</td>
<td>2004 37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1995 24%</td>
<td>2004 37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the World</td>
<td>1995 32%</td>
<td>2004 36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Comtrade, calculations Institut de la Méditerranée

TABLE 27  
Global Competitiveness Index Rankings (GCI) (Rankings out of 125)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GCI 2006 Rank</th>
<th>GCI 2005 Rank</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>82</td>
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</table>

Comparator Countries

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>GCI 2005 Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Rep.</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
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Business Index is a composite of ten indicators that characterize the business environment in a given economy.

These are: Starting a Business, Dealing with Licenses, Employing Workers, Registering Property, Getting Credit, Protecting Investors, Paying Taxes, Trading across Borders, Enforcing Contracts and Closing a Business. With the exception of Israel, and to a lesser extent Tunisia, the next of MPCs score low along this measure. Examining the details of constraints that militate against a business-friendly environment we found that two factors, with urging degrees of importance in the different countries, are common. First, is that the reform of these countries has certainly been serious, but it is not deep enough. To give but one example from Egypt, the bald reforms of the tax and customs systems and the sweeping improvement in investment environment are usually frustrated by a well-entrenched bureaucracy of 5.7 million civil servants. Secondly, there are too many rules and regulations that have accumulated from the past, and now stand as an obstacle against reform. Dealing with these two constraints will be a challenge for MPCs in the future.

Improving Performance: The Role of the ENP

There is no doubt that the task of improving the performance and rating of MPCs lies primarily at the national level. We believe, however, that a stronger linkage with the EU can provide both a stimulus and a framework for such a task. This position has been expounded elsewhere in the work of FEMISE (Radwan & Reiffers, 2005) and only a summary will be provided here based on the report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 2006 (Radwan & Reiffers, 2007).

The Barcelona Declaration is attractive for its ambition to establish a large Euro-Mediterranean region based on elements that go beyond free trade, by including a political project of co-development – peace and shared prosperity – supported by financial transfers, by reaching out to civil society and sub-national cooperation. This ambition is far from having reached its objective.
In the face of this, multiple voices have called for actions that bring this project to fruition, which ultimately indicates the fundamental need for it. Whether for this reason or not, Europe has started implementing its new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The outline of this new tool should now be carefully drawn up. The ENP embraces a wider geographic zone than that of the Euro-Med, which creates fears of loss of influence for the MEDA partners (whether this be justified or not does not matter, as these fears exist in actual fact). The method adopted here is pragmatic: to concentrate on relations between the Neighbourhood Policy and the Barcelona Process, in a way that the ENP effectively constitutes a complement which consolidates the partnership without substituting it.

The first point of this method consists of defining precisely the notion on which this policy is based – theoretically, the translation of a vision and a project. Until now, the term associated de facto is deep integration. This concept is the one that has undoubtedly presided over the development of European integration, marking an undeniable success story. The basic contract of the European model, which embodies 2,000 directives of the Internal Market, is not only of an economic nature, but also a social one that encompasses a conception of democracy, individuals' rights and, also, a strategic vision towards forming a group that has its weight in world relations. It is quite obvious that the concept of deep integration goes far: basically, it is a political project built on economic stages. The project requires serious institutional evolutions and important actions of convergence inside the whole zone. The orientations announced by the Commission indicate that the Neighbourhood has certainly the concern to take into account social and political elements, as is the case with the Partnership. It will however, include an additional innovative point, "a stake in the internal market": specific elements of the European legal frameworks, case by case and partner by partner negotiations.

This is where we depart far from the notion of deep integration: the modus operandi of the ENP is fundamentally bilateral; the regional logic seems to be replaced by the logic of partner by partner negotiation. This allows deeper integration with some partners, while only providing simple technical assistance to others, with the hope of not having a third case equivalent to an exit the Euro-Mediterranean institutional environment. The notion of bilateral negotiation is justified by the concern to respect the willingness and the specifications of every neighbour; although at the same time, both the TACIS Eastern Europe countries and the MEDA countries of the South are put in the same framework. This may be a detail, as long as the Euro-Mediterranean specificities continue to be recognized, but keeping in mind that the bilateral discussion cannot improve South-South integration. Here, the point of view of FEMISE is that the solution allowing the ENP to take its full dimension is to strengthen simultaneously the weight of the coordination level, which is in fact the Partnership. Actually, the essential question is not to know if a new orientation as the ENP can bring more with regard to the initial situation, but to find the best combination “Partnership-ENP," the most appropriate according to the objectives of development in the Mediterranean. It requires at first to always refer to the initial purpose of creating a zone of peace and shared prosperity, then to mix the regional and bilateral approaches in view of this purpose. Finally to determine the arrangements that will allow the necessary convergence of average incomes between the EC and the Mediterranean. Some kind of political coherence still remains to be assumed. It is clear, from the viewpoint of European construction, that the only coherent perspective with the concept of European integration is membership (accession). That is the only engine able to activate the implementation of all necessary adjustments and reforms, of supplying the necessary means and willingness, and insuring anticipations that reduce the risk. That is to say, in conclusion, that the reference to the deep integration for the Euro-Mediterranean region is not adapted and can only, at this moment, lead to new disappointments. This does not mean a rejection of the ENP. On the contrary, it is necessary, once the concept is clarified, to build the right tool, which means an indispensable reversal of the perspective: the starting point should be to determine the concrete conditions of a better insertion of the MP in the European market.

It is the advantage of the European proposal – the concession of a stake in the internal market – to provide this reference, an advantage that compensates partly the absence of vision. The merit of the European offer is, indeed, to depend on a precise group of 2,000 directives which constitute an explicit normative device
with the double advantage to allow an increased access to the main market of the MP and an undeniable rise in the quality of the implemented techniques of production and institutions. The method of understanding adopted in the report is divided into three large stages. Firstly, it is a matter of well identifying the directives impossible to circumvent and which correspond, in a certain way, to an improvement of universal quality. Here, there is an undeniable contribution of the EU which offers a normative framework. It is then necessary to thoroughly study the economic and social indices, which will largely decide the feasibility of the transposition of a consequent number of directives, which means that the diffusion of part of the *acquis communitaire* that should impulse the behavioural and institutional modifications that benefit the Mediterranean development, could not be neutral and without any consequences on societies. It seems quite obvious, from the point of view of convergence of institutions between European and Mediterranean societies, that implementing technical or sanitary standards on products does not have the same implication as liberalizing services, opening procurement contracts or cultural goods markets or initiating discussions on questions of deep integration, such as people circulation. Here a decisive step has to be made, which consists, in fact, of replying to a question that was raised during the Barcelona Summit: to what extent do European and Mediterranean societies want to converge? From the answer comes the third stage, which consists of organizing priorities into a hierarchy, given the shared vision, and defining the main responsibility levels. In other words, what is contained in the national domain, the bilateral negotiation and regional multilateral discussion. From this point of view, with the idea to build a great Euro-Mediterranean area, it is necessary to support as much as possible the regional level by strengthening the partnership coordination mechanisms, in particular by establishing the authorities in charge of implementation (authorities in charge of solving conflicts, of monitoring, etc).

This Euro-Mediterranean dialogue represents an interesting case with regard to an approach that is restricted to the sole economic efficiency, in which the question of stakes would arise differently since it is not in function of the European integration model anymore but of world integration. It will be the responsibility of the authorities to incarnate this decision of convergence; to precisely define the set-up of the Partnership tools, including the ENP, by taking account of the strong interdependence between Europe and the Mediterranean, of the European experience in terms of convergence, thereby increasingly involving the social domain. This will attribute a major importance to the regional contextualization, as can be shown with the issue of the role of women in the economic development of the Mediterranean.

### References


### Table 28

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<th>Economy</th>
<th>Ranking on Ease of Doing Business</th>
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The current international system is undergoing a process of transition as a consequence of changes brought about by globalisation, giving rise to a set of unprecedented opportunities for the development of Southern countries. The new regulations have fostered the growth of the world economy and have facilitated the rise of China and India as emerging powers of the 21st Century.

Nevertheless, the window of opportunity that opened with the rehashing of the international structure will not remain open indefinitely and therefore, in the medium term, only those countries that manage to take advantage of the opportunity now and make the right decisions will gain a better position. By the same token, those that do not manage or refuse to take advantage of the situation will have to pay the price of a lost opportunity, insofar as they shall be in a weaker situation and risk being relegated to an increasingly irrelevant position in the global arena.

In this perspective, the Maghreb countries are at a crossroads: they must decide whether to continue as before, playing the old game of the Nation-State closed in on itself, or on the contrary, whether they prefer to bet on advancing towards real integration, which would allow them to gain a more solid position in the international arena.

With this concern in mind, the European Institute for the Mediterranean (IEMed) in conjunction with the Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz (International Peace Centre of Toledo, CITpax) organised the first edition of the international seminar, Del Coste del No Magreb al Tigre Norteafricano (From the Cost of the Non-Maghreb to the North African Tiger), held in May of 2006. It attracted over a hundred major figures of the economic, political and intellectual spheres of the Maghreb, Europe and North America. One of the organisers' goals for the seminar, whose second edition is slated for autumn of 2007, is that it becomes an annual gathering where experts of the region can come together to explore strategies and cooperation opportunities among the countries of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the European Union.

Being aware of the fact that, in the face of ever-increasing international economic competition, only processes of integration offer a sufficiently efficient dimension on a global scale – and this principle is particularly applicable in the case of small and medium-sized States –, we have decided to approach the seminar as a prospecting exercise allowing us to foresee the gains that could ensue for the Maghreb countries by the year 2020.

The initial situation has both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side of the balance sheet, there has been substantial progress over the past few years resulting in stable macroeconomic conditions, the application of certain economic reforms, an increase in foreign investment and growth in GDP, which has lately been registered at an annual 4% to 5%. Such progress notwithstanding, there are sufficient shortcomings, evident in the fact that economic growth rates have not managed to rise on a par with demographic growth, a particularly serious matter in an area of the world where unemployment rates are expressed in two-digit figures, reaching 20% among youth. The same is true of direct foreign investment, which, though it is on the rise, has not reached the levels of other areas in the world. Another item on the negative side is the fact that the intra-Maghreb goods trade rate is very low and compares negatively with that achieved by other regional blocks. This can be partially attributed to the existence of little intraregional complementariness due to the low diversity...
of exports (although this has been changing since the 1990s, in particular in Tunisia and Algeria, countries that have demonstrated greater dynamism in export activity) and the limited size of markets. In the face of such a panorama, it is clear that none of the Maghreb countries is in a position to stand alone in the growing world competition for resources, investment and markets, especially insofar as competing with China, India or South-East Asian countries. In this regard, regional integration emerges as the most reasonable alternative allowing Maghreb countries to successfully compete in the world economy.

None of the Maghreb countries is in a position to stand alone in the growing world competition for resources, investment and markets. Regional integration emerges as the most reasonable alternative allowing Maghreb countries to successfully compete in the world economy.

Among the first benefits that could result from the economic integration of the Maghreb would be the creation of a regional market of over 75 million inhabitants, of a similar or even larger size than the markets of many major actors in the international arena. This would, in and of itself, constitute a stimulus for local businesses to grow and become more efficient, as well as a significant factor in attracting foreign investment. The advantages of constituting such a market would be manifest not only in terms of macroeconomic growth, but also in improvement in the quality and prices of goods and services as well as in the creation of jobs. Limited integration of regional goods trade would be a good initial response, though not sufficient to meet the challenges discussed above. This is why, according to economic prospect analyses, it would be best if this process were accompanied by the reform and a gradual opening up of the services sector, whose positive effects would translate into a substantial increase in per capita income. In any case, it is obvious that the potential benefits resulting from regional Maghreb integration would go beyond productive improvements to be reflected in the achievement of other goals common to the countries involved, such as the implementation of indispensable reforms and greater stability and social progress, among other things.

In this perspective, the consolidation of the Maghreb as a regional block should also serve to position it on the global arena and strengthen its ties with the European Union. Its relation with the latter is of particular importance, since it is the main source of imports and the primary destination of exports for Maghreb countries. It is worth pointing out the multiple benefits of the Maghreb’s geographical and political proximity to the EU. Such geographical proximity represents an opportunity to access the large European market and provides an elevated potential for development, above all if work is done to foster the complimentary nature of strategic sectors. By the same token, it is doubtless that the European Union constitutes an invaluable ally in South-South integration processes, in the Mediterranean Basin in general and in the Maghreb region in particular, as has been repeatedly demonstrated by policies implemented within the frameworks of both the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are EU Partner States through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement, whereby Libya has an observer status at Foreign Minister Conferences while Mauritania, a signatory country of the Cotonou Agreement that aspires to become fully integrated in the Barcelona Process, traditionally participates in meetings as a “special guest of the EU Presidency.” It would therefore not be extravagant to assert that the Maghreb countries all share the status of special EU partners.

On the other hand, it is undeniable that the benefits of Maghreb integration would also have a positive effect on common Euro-Mediterranean strategy and the attainment of objectives such as creating a zone of peace, security and shared prosperity. Among the spheres that could be useful as a basis for Maghrebi integration, energy plays a distinguished role, the countries of the region being sources or strategic areas of transit for natural gas and oil. Energy can serve not only to structure intra-regional relations, but also to consolidate ties with the EU and other African countries. Other spheres of interest that could serve to foster integration are the financial sector, that of telecommunications and, obviously, that of construction of the necessary infrastructures, which play a fundamental role because they serve as a support for the remainder of economic activities.

In this regard, in 2006 two specific steps forward
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM ON THE MIDDLE EAST
SHARM EL-SHEIKH 20TH–22ND MAY 2006

More than 1,200 government, business and civil society leaders from 46 countries met together in pursuit of outcomes to help pave the way to a more peaceful future for the Middle East under the working theme “The Promise of a New Generation.”

For the first time, the main themes at the heart of the World Economic Forum’s agenda were the challenges and opportunities given by an increasingly youthful Middle East. Even though the focus was on how to create 80 million jobs over the next 20 years, participants highlighted other challenges: the conflict in Iraq, the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian problem; increasing tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme, the negative impact of higher oil revenues, and insufficient investment in essential infrastructure.

Participants deliberated on five sub-themes: Democracy, Peace and Security; the Business Agenda; Global Integration; Investing for the Future; and Youth and Understanding.

- Democracy, Peace and Security: political and business leaders attending the Forum expressed a strong desire to move faster on political participation and dialogue. Many leaders stressed that reforms towards democracy are proceeding but at the same time emphasized that change has to come from societies themselves. During the Summit a meeting took place between the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister, Tzipi Livni, and the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. It was the first high level meeting between the two sides in almost a year. President Abbas restated the necessity of a two-state solution and the implementation of the UN-supported roadmap.

For the first time, the Forum gathered women ministers from across the region to develop an action plan to face the region’s gender gap in terms of private and public sector policies.

On the subject of Iraq, some participants considered the formation of the new government positively while others remained unpersuaded that democracy, peace and stability would move forward as long as the occupation continued.

- The Middle East Business Agenda: the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries’ greatest asset is its young men and women together with under-utilized and unrecognized values, but the region has to face enormous challenges and obstacles in the future: a weak legal system, poor regulatory framework and underdeveloped financial institutions. To attract more investors and promote stability, markets in the region need tighter regulations, stricter enforcement, reliable rule of law and investor education. The current oil price windfall offers the chance to promote genuine reforms to those countries that should promote growth with social equity.

According to the results of a survey conducted by the World Economic Forum and involving business participants regarding their perception of the risk environment in which they lead their corporations, the key concerns are the escalation of violence and the rise of terrorism.

- Global Integration: The integration of the Middle East in the global economy will deliver benefits and disadvantages. The most problematic factors for doing business in the MENA region is linked with policy and security risks but even if they disappeared, other investor concerns would be: bureaucracy, access to financing and lack of education. At the same time, the presence of representatives of other countries (France, USA, Japan and Pakistan) showed their will to deepen relations with the Middle East.

- Youth and Understanding: more than half of the Arab world is under 18. This demographic situation poses challenges: the need to create 80 million new jobs in the next two decades and the need to give these young people a proper education to form the leaders of tomorrow. A proper education, on the one hand, to improve job prospects and, on the other, to create a generation of peace-builders. To this end, curricula must be reformed to embrace diversity and teach the common values of all religions, encouraging a dialogue between cultures.

The World Economic Forum on the Middle East closed with a call for government, business and civil society leaders to collectively address all the challenges mentioned above confronting the region.

For Further Information:
General information: www.weforum.org/middleeast
Programme: www.weforum.org/middleeast/programme
Interviews with key participants: www.weforum.org/middleeast/indepth

were taken within the framework of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which groups together the five countries in the region and seeks to serve as the motor for its integration. Thus, at a meeting in Tripoli in January, the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed to call upon a task force to complete a draft for the creation of a regional free trade area. Two months later, at a meeting in Rabat, the ministers approved the creation of the Maghreb Bank for Investment and Foreign Trade, constituted under the control of the central banks of the five countries of the region and which will be endowed with an initial capital of one billion dollars. Neither the arguments in favour of Maghreb regional integration based on rational economic and technical analyses nor the proposals to advance in this direction made by the AMU, which was founded in 1989, are wholly new. What is recent is the accelerated increase in pressure from international economic competition, as well as the perception of a change in the structure of the international framework which – in this sphere – tends towards multi-polarity, providing an opportunity for the emergence and/or consolidation of new actors. This is a situation that calls for overcoming difficulties of a marked political nature that have been preventing the execution of an integrative process whose benefits for all countries concerned could well compensate the effort necessary for changing the current status quo, best represented by the closed borders between Morocco and Algeria. To dream of a united Maghreb and do everything possible to achieve it is an opportunity that must be taken today to prevent nightmares tomorrow.
Although European businesses have demonstrated a clear interest in the Maghreb (particularly in 2006), no major developments have taken place, and the region continues to attract considerably less investment from Europe than from other areas (Asia, Eastern Europe, etc.).

The question of the economic development of the Maghreb region has frequently been posed in social terms, given the integration difficulties experienced by immigrants in Europe, particularly in France.

Attention has now focused on the large remittances sent from Europe to the Maghreb. The fact is that this attention is long overdue, as the amount involved—equivalent to an annual Marshall Plan—is some 8,000-10,000 million euros a year, which is more than the amount received in international aid by Maghreb countries. Most of the money flows through informal channels because of the lack of suitable banking systems in both the host and destination countries (with the exception of Morocco).

A report entitled *Study on improving the efficiency of workers’ remittances in Mediterranean countries*, published by the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), clearly drew attention to the issues at stake in regard to these flows. Two other reports from France—one published by the Caisses d’Epargne (*L’intégration économique des migrants et la valorisation de leur épargne*) in September 2006 and the other published by the Institut de Prospective Economique du Monde Méditerranéen (*L’espace financier euro-méditerranéen*) in July 2006—proposed a number of strategies for facilitating these flows in a context of Euro-Mediterranean integration. Three inseparable integration phenomena are currently at work on both sides of the Mediterranean: a) economic integration driven by European investment; b) population integration driven by regular remittances of large sums of money; and c) integration of the Maghreb in a globalised economy. Meanwhile, heads of state will be making every effort in 2007 to give a new impetus to the Barcelona Process.

We would like to demonstrate how commercial banks can play a crucial role in the intersection between these three dimensions. Algeria’s current drive to modernise its banking system in order to catch up with neighbouring Morocco is undoubtedly driven by this perspective. The capital of at least one of Algeria’s main public banks, which put new payment systems in place in 2006, will be opened up to foreign investors.

**In Search of New Channels for European Aid to Maghreb Countries**

Growth is not as good as it could (or should) be in any of the three Maghreb countries, largely due to difficult-to-manage demographic and urban growth rates, an alarming unemployment rate among young people (particularly among qualified young people), and generally degraded public infrastructures.

There has been no shortage of aid from the international community—particularly from Europe. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s MEDA programme, for example, represented a cash injection of €5.35 billion between 2000 and 2006. This aid, however, has not been sufficient to trigger a sufficiently strong development environment capable of attracting high amounts of sustained investment.

Given the current trend towards the restriction of public budgets in Europe, a search is underway for new ways of providing aid to northern African countries, such as direct or indirect intervention in investment capital or the promotion of more targeted local initiatives.
(e.g., business creation, micro-credits, etc.). Although such interventions are eminently desirable, they still require considerable funds if deployed on a large scale; moreover, it is difficult to control aspects such as employment outcomes and impact.

Sight must not be lost of the important potential role that can be played by commercial banks at the grassroots level in terms of selecting projects and controlling methods of payment. Although the countries in the Maghreb region have sufficient resources and means for facilitating development, current banking practices are strangling development by blocking the transformation of large injections of cash into investment.

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the Maghreb represent the bulk of companies and employment. However, determining factors for these companies—which are a means for channelling savings into more productive uses—is the leveraging role of the banking system and the multiplier effect of credit.

**Maghreb Banking Systems Are Ill-Suited to Fostering Development**

Large borrowers (typically public companies and the state) absorb the majority of readily available resources. Banks, however, are obliged to take serious credit risks on board, as a consequence of a volatile economic environment and a legal system that does not adequately defend the rights of creditors.

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Banks, in a sense, bear the brunt of this reality, which has repercussions for all economic agents. Credit is rationed by economic agents—in particular as far as SMEs are concerned—yet banks are excessively liquid. This is why very few private individuals have a bank account (20% of Moroccans).

Given high loan delinquency and default rates and bank vulnerability in terms of collecting outstanding debt, credit supply in the Maghreb tends to be limited in terms of the number of loans (many companies have no access to credit), the quality of loans (few medium- or long-term commitments are undertaken), and lending conditions (asset-based guarantees and cash collateral for international trade operations are required). Credit in the Maghreb, in sum, is both difficult to obtain and expensive.

**Major Change Is a Matter of Urgency**

In the three Maghreb countries, the market of the banks—which preserve value above all else—is limited to a restricted group of privileged individuals and companies. In such a context, credit does not act as a leverage mechanism for the creation of wealth; it is, rather, circumscribed by the prior possession of wealth. The banking system, consequently, has developed no project-funding culture as banks are not willing to assume the risk.

Rather than being typical of the Maghreb region, this stance is a feature of nearly all developing countries. Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria are far from the bottom of the list, nonetheless, with banking cultures comparable to those of Turkey, India or Brazil. The Maghreb region, however, does not attract the same interest as these other countries; black Africa aside, the Maghreb has undoubtedly attracted remarkably low levels of foreign direct investment in recent years—even from European neighbours. Their level of participation in international trade, furthermore, means that they fail to report the growth rates of 6% to 8% that distinguish today’s emerging economies.

The growth evident in the Tunisian economy or the modern and dynamic Moroccan banking system should not be overlooked, however. Furthermore, the fact that Algeria is currently lagging behind is partly a consequence of a recent crisis that should soon be resolved.

Although the overall picture is to some extent reassuring, the fact remains that banking systems in the Maghreb countries—all very similar—are ill-suited to supporting emerging economies.

Although there is no question of denying the development potential of the Maghreb economies, it should be stressed that, from a banking perspective, major changes are required which need to be tackled in the framework of a global strategy—in other words, more from a Mediterranean than a local perspective.

**The Issues at Stake Regarding Remittances by Emigrants**

The economic development of the Maghreb does not depend exclusively on financial aid from Europe.
Nonetheless, available cash needs to be pooled for allocation to productive uses. From this perspective, a logical starting point is mobilisation of the remittances of migrants located in Europe. It should be mentioned in passing that these have continued to increase over the years, despite a generalised opinion that they would eventually taper off as migrants settled down in their host countries. The issues at stake are such that they need be taken on board by a multilateral body. For example, the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean institution would seem to be a logical step, given the shared growth process participated in by the two sides of the Mediterranean.

The role to be played by transfers from migrants is likely to change: no longer will transfers be viewed as exclusively providing financial support to families, but also as generating opportunities for investment and savings. Integration in the host country leads to increased incomes and to a desire to benefit from the different purchasing powers on the two sides of the Mediterranean. This, in turn, leads to a desire for savings that are convertible—and convertible savings represent a potentially powerful tool for leveraging co-development.

The fact that remittances have long been overlooked is barely credible, given the amounts involved: in Morocco, for example, remittances from abroad are not only equivalent to 25% of the country’s balance of payments, but are Morocco’s most important source of foreign currency.

Bearing in mind the geographic and cultural proximity of the Maghreb to Europe—and particularly to France—the reality is such that the ‘middle classes’ of Morocco, Tunisia or Algeria are generally to be found beyond the borders of the respective countries. This situation will lead to new formulae for integrating migrant populations and particularly those born in Europe—who, in all likelihood, will not fully integrate in either the host country or country of origin, but will hover somewhere in between the two cultures. This circumstance would imply powerful potential for leveraging growth in the entire region, and again, this situation applies equally to each of the three countries in the Maghreb region.

**The Maghreb Will be Forced to Exist!**

The return of political stability to Algeria has indisputably led to the Maghreb region— as a whole, rather than in terms of individual countries—acting as a pole of attraction for European companies.

The three countries of the Maghreb, however, do not represent a single economic area, and a common political initiative to create such an area is unlikely to be embarked on in the medium term. It is, however, important to bear in mind a possible external impetus to this development, and to start thinking in terms of a Euro-Mediterranean co-development zone, featured by steady growth in flows of people, business, and capital. This would undoubtedly make the region more homogenous—although nationalistic sentiments will undoubtedly continue to exist as an irrefutable potential destabilisation factor.

Although business exchanges with the European Union and beyond (the USA and China, for example) will undoubtedly continue to develop, the three countries will need to cooperate further, given that none of them has the critical mass necessary to function alone at the international level.

International investors are likely to design common strategies for the area and will tend to favour investment in projects that embrace the entire region. We can therefore anticipate the development of an increasingly uniform Maghreb market, even if not accompanied by the creation of a free trade area (which is possible despite the developments underway) or of a political association (which is probable).

**Perspectives for Euro-Mediterranean Co-Development**

One can speculate as to the existence, within a period of ten years, of a Mediterranean region, which—even if politically diverse—will raise few barriers to financial flows. Although, at present, these flows are essentially in the north-south direction, in the future, financial flows between countries in the broader region are likely to increase. In 2006, for example, a million Algerian tourists visited Tunisia, and Egypt is already investing more than France in the region, particularly in the telecommunications field.

Flows, in general, are currently dissymmetric—typically, raw materials and agricultural products exchanged for almost everything else. That said, the Maghreb could well develop into the EU’s industrial hinterland in the near future—i.e. a platform for delocalisation. This trend is already evident: Morocco is the leading African destination for the establishment of call centres (with 150 call centres and 15,000 positions employing...
20,000 employees). This could eventually lead to the emergence of economic champions in the Maghreb. Given the constraints on subcontracting (in the purest sense) highlighted by problems in the Moroccan and Tunisian textile sectors (in a context of wage-cutting across the globe), the future is likely to be marked by co-subcontracting on the basis of delocalised platforms that prove capable of producing value-added finished goods and services (Renault, for example, had parts of its Logan manufactured in Morocco). Other sectors providing services to private individuals could also emerge, including health tourism, as is currently the case in Tunisia, or services for resident European pensioners. Although little acknowledged, there is an increasing alignment of social trends on both sides of the Mediterranean. Similarities in terms of demographic growth are particularly striking: the population growth rate in Morocco, for example, has fallen from 2.1% for the 1982-1994 period to a current rate of 1.4%, and the birth rate has dropped from 5.5 children per couple in 1982 to 2.5 in 2002. Cultural and national particularities aside, what is clear is the gradual emergence of a Mediterranean economic area, marked by enhanced economic (and cultural) flows, and despite the fact that each side is featured by clearly different levels of development.

From a macroeconomic point of view, these differences in development are likely to respond largely to demographic inequalities:

1. The relative ageing of Europe’s population is likely to result in a flow of savings from north to south.
2. The lower standards of living and relative youth of the Maghreb populations is likely to trigger a desire for consumption which will lead to a level of growth that is not likely to occur in Europe.

Given these two circumstances, the money sent home to the Maghreb by immigrants in Europe is likely to represent an important link between the two sides of the Mediterranean. Although remittances from Europe mainly take the form of cash, it would be advisable to convert them into savings flows.

The interlinked savings and credit issue, which is key to the development of the Maghreb region, requires a global—or rather Mediterranean—solution, which is not possible without a properly functioning banking system.

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**THE SECOND EUROMED ECOFIN MINISTERIAL MEETING 25-26 JUNE 2006, TUNIS**

Building on the successful outcome of the joint Euromed ECOFIN/FEMIP Ministerial Meeting held in Morocco in 2005, this meeting took place in Tunis on 25th and 26th June 2006 under the Austrian Presidency of the European Union and hosted by Tunisian Authorities.

High level participants included the Finance Ministers of the 25 EU Member States and the ten Mediterranean Partner Countries, as well as representatives of the European Commission and leading European and international Institutions active in the region on financial and economic matters.

Ministers reiterated the importance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). They recognised the high unemployment rate as the main challenge for Mediterranean countries and underlined that the strategies to reform are common in the region and concerned raising competitiveness, improving the investment climate to attract foreign investment and greater trade openness.

Ministers reaffirmed their support to the four inter-related priority areas for reform:

- Improving the business climate to enable firms to invest, create jobs and expand. Ministers welcomed the progress achieved by Mediterranean countries in improving the business climate by easing the business environment. This will pay in terms of increased investment flows, lower unemployment rates, better standards of living for workers and higher government revenues.
- Further liberalising trade and opening the economy to increase competitiveness, efficiency and productivity. Ministers recognized that trade reforms have advanced strongly in the region through the implementation of the association agreements and the ENP Action Plans. Ministers attached great importance to the rapid progress towards completing the process of liberalisation of trade in services and investments and in agricultural products by 2010. Ministers also restated the importance of deepening regional economic integration among Mediterranean Countries.
- Upgrading public institutions and governance systems. Ministers noted that in the area of governance, Mediterranean countries continued improving public sector accountability and the quality of Administration.
- Consolidating macroeconomic stability. Ministers welcomed greater macroeconomic stability in the region but noted that it remains vulnerable to external shocks.

EU Ministers reiterated their willingness to continue supporting Mediterranean partners’ efforts to improve their public finances through technical assistance and training projects with the EU public finance administrations.

Ministers took note of the recently approved 2007-2013 Financial Perspectives for the EU, which provides for a significant increase of financial support to its neighbours through the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

For further information:

At the Heart of the Euro-Mediterranean Challenge: The Agriculture and Food Issue

Bertrand Hervieu
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At the 8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held on 27th and 28th November 2006 in Tampere, Finland, the decision taken in late 2005 by the European Commission to initiate negotiations on the liberalisation of trade in agricultural products with Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) was discussed and reiterated. It may seem surprising that the agricultural issue is so late in arriving on the Euro-Mediterranean agenda, but there is no denying the complexity of this matter, which also involves rural development and food issues.

The agricultural and food issue is, in fact, decisive for the future of the Mediterranean Basin, as it is at the junction of politics, commerce and society. Questioning the situation of agriculture and its future in the Mediterranean region is ultimately equivalent to questioning the very destiny of the Euro-Mediterranean project at a time when it seems to be running out of steam and disintegrating, caught in a crisis of lack of convergence and vitality.

Bringing to light the strategic dimension of agriculture in the Mediterranean and examining how the perspective of liberalisation of agricultural trade is evolving constitute the primary objectives of this paper. The third objective, more modest, is to question the future of the Euro-Mediterranean project vis-à-vis the agriculture priority.

Features of Mediterranean Agricultural Dynamics

Agriculture is strategic for the Mediterranean Basin. This observation is based on a broad range of determinants, but the five factors below, weighty enough in and of themselves, adequately sum up the situation.

The Demographic Scope of the Matter

Within a period of half a century, the Mediterranean population will have nearly doubled, going from 285 million inhabitants in 1970 to 525 million by 2020. Yet this demographic growth is relative, because the population in Northern Mediterranean countries has been stabilising for several decades, whereas the Southern Mediterranean area has experienced an overwhelming population explosion. In 2005, a third of the population of the Mediterranean Basin was living in rural areas and a third of the active population in Mediterranean South Shore countries are still working in the agriculture industry. The rural and agricultural population naturally grew along the South Shore with the population boom, whereas in the North Shore countries, at the same time, depopulation of rural areas accelerated while the number of people active in agriculture continued to decrease. At this early stage of the 21st century, let us make no mistake: the Mediterranean region is not exclusively urban, coastally-inhabited and service-oriented.

The Complex and Vulnerable Situation of Agribusiness

The deteriorating agribusiness balances of the Arab Mediterranean Partner Countries deserve particular attention. In fact, for three decades, these countries have been in a situation of chronic food dependence and certain States now seem to have severe structural deficiencies (Algeria and Egypt). Hence, a negative balance of nearly $9 billion was registered in 2004 in the MPCs’ agricultural trade relations with the rest of the world. Only Turkey showed a positive balance, having contributed 48% of the MPCs’ overall agricultural exports to the world.
With regard to Euro-Mediterranean trade, three important factors should be kept in mind:
- First of all, the asymmetry of commercial relations: The European Union’s (EU-25) commerce with the ten MPCs only amounts to 2% of its agricultural imports and exports, but in contrast, polarises 52% of the MPCs’ agricultural exports and comprises 28% of their imports. There is therefore a clear gap between the Northern and Southern Basin areas in terms of agricultural trade intensity;
- Secondly, the deceptive balance of Euro-Mediterranean trade: the results only appear positive in the MPCs (+$0.6 billion in 2004) because Turkey alone contributed nearly half the MPCs’ agricultural exports to the EU-25. Therefore, without the Turkish agricultural power, the MPCs’ trade balance shows a deficit with Europe ($1.5 billion in 2004);
- And finally, the opening of the MPCs to the world market: despite their commercial preference for the EU-25, in 2004 they imported 72% of food supplies from the rest of the world. Europe is thus not the only actor exporting to the Southern Mediterranean – USA, Argentina, Brazil and Australia are likewise important business partners, as demonstrated by cereal exports of the latter countries to Southern Mediterranean countries. The attitude of Morocco, which signed a free trade agreement with Washington in 2004, reveals that certain MPCs are now seeking to establish political-trade alliances beyond the Euro-Mediterranean boundaries.

The Challenge of Rural Development

The urgent need for developing the rural areas of Southern Mediterranean countries constitutes one of the region’s major challenges. This imperative remains primarily focussed on the struggle against poverty, a persistent affliction in the countryside. The number of people living on less than a US dollar per day may have even increased since 1990, a decade during which the effects of structural adjustment programmes weighed down upon development processes in these countries. If over the course of the 1970s and 80s, significant progress was made by the MPCs, the problem since the 1990s resides not only in the maldevelopment perceived but also in the non-development which is sometimes sensed. Community social infrastructures are lacking or in a state of deterioration (e.g. access to water, access to health services and access to education), not to mention gender inequality, which continues to be greater than in urban environments. Finally, there is a risk of a return to territorial fragmentation in this region, which is apparently divided into globalised cities looking abroad and rural areas that are quite often isolated, underdeveloped and marginalised: this is the inner gap of the South. This entails a double risk: uncontrolled city growth on the one hand and the proliferation of isolated areas on the other.

Environmental Tension

The environmental challenge in the Mediterranean Basin is present on several levels, with the following simultaneous problems: climate change, desertification, soil erosion and air and water pollution. At the focal point of ecological tension is the issue of water, which is considered the greatest cause for concern. This rare resource is very unequally distributed in the Mediterranean region, with 75% of the supply located on the North Shore. Today, nearly half of the world’s population with little access to water (less than 1,000m3/inhabitant/year) lives in the Mediterranean region. Whereas agriculture absorbs approximately 80% of water resources in the MPCs and a significant part of this volume is lost due to a lack of effective supply networks, the ‘water divide’ is growing wider between the well-off and the poor population, whose access to potable water differs greatly from the former. Today, much more so than in Europe, water quality has become a factor of social discrimination in these countries.
Quantitative and Qualitative Food Security

In the face of the population boom in the region and the deterioration of agribusiness equilibrium, the issue of food security for Mediterranean populations remains unsolved. First and foremost is the quantitative dimension, as malnutrition remains a non-negligible scourge (approximately 4% of the Southern Mediterranean population suffers from daily undernourishment) and is on the rise under the effect of the population boom (7 million people in 1990, 9 million in 2002). With regard to the quantitative aspect, an important example to consider is the cereal dependence of the majority of Mediterranean countries. The Mediterranean region, for instance, currently accounts for 22% of world cereal imports but only has 7% of the world’s population. More specifically, the MPCs account for 12% of world cereal imports but only comprise 4% of the world’s population.

In addition to this quantitative problem, there is the increasingly worrisome problem of the quality of food. Whereas the Mediterranean diet is recognised by the World Health Organization and identified as one of the most magnificent aspects of the Mediterranean Basin’s heritage, the Mediterranean countries are increasingly distancing themselves from this model. The mutation in eating habits is a universal phenomenon accompanying economic development and urbanisation. This transition, progressive in the North, brutally rapid in the South, has resulted in a phenomenon of food quality deterioration. The increase in obesity among populations is, among other things, a convincing indicator of this deterioration, which weighs upon the community and the well-being of the population at large (in particular among the youngest generations: in the Maghreb, 17% of children under five years of age are obese).

This factor has led to a new facet in the North-South divide. Europe, notified by health alerts that had become such a topical issue (dioxin, mad cow disease) over the course of the 1990s, has managed to strengthen the traceability and safety of its food products (through a quality and certification policy as well as the establishment in 2002 of a European Food Safety Authority). The Southern Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, despite their efforts, remain handicapped with regard to such health imperatives (emerging as the new non-tariff barriers for the area) due to their lack of an adequate, operational structure guaranteeing food safety and certifying product quality.

In light of the above state of affairs of Mediterranean agricultural dynamics, which is not an exhaustive description, an analysis of the agricultural issue within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is called for.

The Agricultural Issue within the Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Since the Barcelona Process was launched in 1995, the agricultural sector has been considered a delicate issue specific to the EMP. In any case, three different stages can be distinguished in Euro-Mediterranean agricultural developments.

1995-2002: The Agricultural Exception

Whereas trade constitutes one of the cornerstones of regional cooperation, the ultimate objective being to create a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010, agriculture remains a neglected sector in the establishment of the Association Agreements between the European Union (EU) and the MPCs. The delicate agricultural issue is deliberately concealed, whereas it simultaneously attracts the attention of the WTO and multilateral international negotiations. Though industrial free trade matters have been settled, Euro-Mediterranean agricultural liberalisation continues to be postponed. The causes for this are complex, but the general diagnosis is well known.

EXCERPT FROM THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE 8TH EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HELD IN TAMPERE, FINLAND ON 27TH AND 28TH NOVEMBER 2006

From Section III, Paragraph 15:

“(…) the progressive liberalisation of trade in agriculture, processed agricultural and fisheries products, with a possible selected number of exceptions and timetables for gradual and asymmetrical implementation, taking into account the differences and individual characteristics of the agricultural sector in different countries, building on the Euro-Med Association Agreements and regional free trade agreements, based on the Rabat roadmap. Non-tariff aspects of agricultural trade liberalisation should be properly dealt with, along with other issues such as rural development, agricultural productivity and quality, as well as sustainable development (…)”
In the North, the EU producers dread facing heightened competition should their preferential EU status disappear. In the South, exporters demand greater access to the EU market. In any case, the MPCs are major importers of staple products from the EU, such as cereals, sugar and milk. Yet considering the poor performance of their food-producing agriculture, these States are little inclined to expose it to foreign competition. Moreover, part of the Euro-Mediterranean trade ‘conflict’ is due to the heightened risk of competition between the two shores of the basin on the same agricultural products (olive oil, fruit and vegetables) should liberalisation arrive. Finally, another, extremely delicate factor must be taken into account: the dual nature of the agricultural sector in the Southern Mediterranean region. There are only a few competitive agro-food industries able to handle globalisation, as compared to a multitude of very small family farms scattered throughout the countryside and essentially dedicated to subsistence farming. Thus, agriculture has always been the object of restrained treatment by the EMP. Evidently, the logic of a so-to-speak ‘agricultural exception’ has prevailed in Association Agreement negotiations.

2003-2006: Towards Liberalisation

It was not until the 27th November 2003 that the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Agriculture was held, namely in Venice, under the Italian EU Presidency. The primary recommendations concerned stepping up rural development, fostering agricultural product quality and launching specific organic agriculture initiatives. From then on, the debate has essentially focussed on the speed and method to be used in the process. Furthermore, decision-makers have deemed that agriculture can only be handled on a case-by-case basis, according to the delicate status of each product on the EU market and the export competitiveness of each MPC (the logic of differentiation). This corresponds with the philosophy of the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) conceived that same year. In 2005, declared the “Year of the Mediterranean” by the European authorities, agriculture was on the agenda for reforming and relaunching the EMP. The EU officially announced its decision to start agricultural negotiations with the MPCs in a communiqué from the 15th November 2005, stipulating that negotiations would be held as of 2006 towards “a progressive liberalisation of fresh and processed agricultural and fishery products.” This decision was reiterated in the five-year work programme adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Summit of Heads of State and Government on 28th November 2005 in Barcelona. Since 2006, a Committee of Experts has been in charge of following up on the matter at the Commission and applying the “Euro-Mediterranean Roadmap for Agriculture.” The latter is oriented around several strategic pillars, namely: reciprocal liberalisation (joint efforts by countries on both shores of the Mediterranean); a progressive, gradual approach; temporary asymmetry (the EU having to accept a slower rate of liberalisation by the MPCs); and the definition by country of a list of exceptions containing the most ‘delicate’ products, not to be included in the liberalisation process. Moreover, this Roadmap insists on the imperatives of rural development, fostering quality products, promoting traditional Mediterranean products, attracting private investment in the agriculture industry and improving access to export markets. Certainly, the matter of agricultural liberalisation in the Mediterranean has experienced a certain degree of progress between 2003 and 2006. However, this should not mask the numerous uncertainties and concerns brought up by the scenario of agricultural liberalisation within the Euro-Mediterranean region.

2007: Future Prospects

In 2006, the Commission thus launched bilateral negotiations with certain MPCs. Jordan has engaged in a process of elevated liberalisation in the sphere of agriculture. This country has gone quite far in these negotiations, resulting in a perspective of elevated agricultural liberalisation in the near future for both parties. Negotiations are also progressing with Israel. Progress is difficult with Tunisia, on the other hand, as the country proves reticent and rather unwilling to commit. With Egypt, negotiations got off to a bad start but the European Union is re-examining its proposition as Cairo would like to follow the Jordanian model. With regard to Morocco, negotiations are running up against a certain apprehension in Rabat, which is adopting a highly cautious attitude insofar as the degree of liberalisation to attain. And finally, nothing has been undertaken for the time being with Algeria. Everything thus leads to believe that the Euro-Mediterranean agricultural negotiation process will not be completed until late 2007, especially since the Commission is simultaneously becoming more and more demanding with regard to non-tariff aspects of
trade while the MPCs are still displaying reticence. The year 2007 will be decisive for both the Mediterranean – with the implementation of the ENP – and the agricultural issue, with negotiations that promise to be difficult and have heterogeneous results. According to predictions, the ENP could lead to three types of relations between the EU and its MPCs: more in-depth relations, a continuation of the status quo or a break in negotiations.

Another major issue has to do with the limits of current agricultural debate, too centred on trade and insufficiently touching upon matters of public health, territorial balance and social cohesion. A Mediterranean region where relations are definitively broken between coastal cities in pace with globalisation and poverty-ridden, isolated rural areas is not a desirable scenario. No less than a future where forms of consumption are definitively westernised and the Mediterranean diet recommended by the WHO relocated outside of the Mediterranean area. These are the challenges of the expected impacts in the case of unregulated liberalisation of Euro-Mediterranean agricultural trade, which would certainly be profitable for certain actors while possibly being devastating for many. The accumulation of more wealth by the rich and the accentuation of poverty among the poor are often manifestations of globalisation and liberal trade; this is also one of the most significant phenomena occurring in the Mediterranean.

**Conclusion**

Though the Mediterranean shows signs of clear-sighted pessimism, it also offers the perspective of a project capable of mobilising optimism and determination. Because agriculture is the base of Mediterranean identity and structures the societies in the region, there is no doubt that a convergence of action on this strategic interest would lead to close collaboration that would mobilise people because of its features of solidarity, humaneness and mutual profitability for both shores of the Mediterranean.

A less fatalist, more deliberate scenario is therefore conceivable – that of a Mediterranean region where development is collectively sought and globalisation redefined, placing the will for progress and competitiveness within a project for sustainable development tailored to it and combining liberalisation with the preservation of diversity and wealth of its heritage. In sum, creating a successful Euro-Mediterranean project entails building acceptable, responsible globalisation.

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**6TH MEETING OF CIHEAM MEMBER STATES’ MINISTERS OF AGRICULTURE, CAIRO (EGYPT), 2ND DECEMBER 2006**

Since 1999, CIHEAM has been organising a biennial meeting of Ministers of Agriculture from its thirteen Member States. At these ministerial conferences, CIHEAM’s action timetable is established and progress is made in fostering dialogue and a common culture on agricultural aspects among Mediterranean countries.

The 6th Meeting was held in Cairo on 2nd December 2006 under the auspices of the Egyptian Authorities. With the attendance of 10 Ministers of Agriculture from countries of the Mediterranean Basin, the meeting primarily discussed three major challenges facing the region: the liberalisation of agricultural trade, policies of rural development and the promotion of quality products. On this occasion, CIHEAM also enjoyed the participation of Mariann Fischer-Boel (EU Commissioner for Agriculture) and Harsha Singh (Deputy Director General in charge of the Agriculture Division of the WTO), as well as representatives of numerous international institutions (Plan Bleu, FAO, OECD, Council of Europe and the World Bank).
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It only took four years – from 2002 to 2006 – for the Free Trade Agreement between Morocco and the US to be proposed (2002), negotiated (2003), signed (2004), ratified (2004) and enter into effect (2006). In contrast, the negotiation of Association Agreements between the European Union (EU) and Lebanon and Syria took nearly 9 and 10 years, respectively, while negotiations on a free trade agreement between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council have been ongoing since 1988. In this brief paper, I would like to provide an overview of the general context, analyse the content of the Agreement and the reactions it generated, and make a preliminary appraisal of its application.

The United States' Commercial Offensive in the Arab World

In another paper (Khader; 2005a), I analysed in greater depth the factors leading the United States to engage in a serious commercial offensive in the Arab world as of 2001. A study carried out by the Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy (IRMEP) entitled “Dividends of Fear,” asserted that in 2002, the share of US exports to Arab countries had plunged from 18% in 1997 to 13% in 2001. The IRMEP estimated that the American profit loss in exports to Arab countries amounted to $31 billion from 1998 to 2002. On the demand side, the eroding commercial position of the United States has been ascribed not only to the growing Arab mistrust of US unilateralism and its unfailing alliance with Israel, but also and above all to Europe’s privileged position on the Arab and Mediterranean market, consolidated by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995) and corroborated by the elevated trade rates between Mediterranean and Arab countries and the EU, surpassing 50% (for Mediterranean countries) and 40% (for the ensemble of Arab countries). In general, average European trade with Euro-Mediterranean Countries represented over 4 times that of US trade, concentrated in Turkey and above all, Israel.

The conclusions drawn by US analysts and policymakers are clear: the EU has captured a particularly lucrative market in the Mediterranean Basin.

Morocco on the Lookout for New Markets

The erosion of the United States' commercial position in the Arab world became clear at a time when certain traditional US allies, including Jordan, Morocco and Egypt, were experiencing the need to diversify their export markets in order to gain opportunities and
minimise the effects of EU Enlargement, perceived as negative insofar as diversion of investment and trade, and the alarming perspective of the entrance into effect of the World Trade Organization’s new regulations on 1st January 2005, with everything this entailed, such as increased competition, in particular in the textile industry.

It is in this context that the eagerness of the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, to accept President Bush’s offer to engage in negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement on his visit to the US in April of 2002 must be understood. Indeed, in the summer of 2002, Morocco appointed a Secretary of State to coordinate such negotiation. By the same token, President Bush established an American negotiation team presided by Catherine Novelli in November of 2002.

On 21st January 2003, negotiations began in Washington, in a climate rendered uncomfortable by the perspective of the US invasion of Iraq and the “openly hostile reaction” of Morocco’s European partners, in particular France. Najib Akesbi (2006) reported on the cutting statements by made by the French Minister of Foreign Trade, who considered that “a free trade agreement between Morocco and the United States is incompatible with strengthening economic relations with the EU,” a position which was dubbed a retrograde point of view by the US Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick. Nevertheless, despite the invasion of Iraq and the EU’s ill temper, negotiations continued at an accelerated rhythm: 11 task forces were working on different aspects. The stalemate – particularly on such issues as agricultural products, textiles, medicines and intellectual property – was quickly overcome; indeed, too quickly, as both sides were eager to close negotiations as rapidly as possible. This occurred in 2004. After 9 rounds of negotiation that lasted nearly 14 months (January 2003 - March 2004), everything had been settled: the Free Trade Agreement was concluded on 2nd March 2004 in Washington, signed on 15th June in the same city and ratified by the US Senate and House of Representatives on 21st and 22nd July. Less than a month later, on 17th August, President Bush signed the order making the agreement effective. This was the second agreement of this type between the United States and Arab countries after the one signed with Jordan.

Reactions to the Agreement

As could be expected, the Americans did not conceal their satisfaction. The agreement was hailed by Robert Zoellick as “the first stone” laid in their Greater Middle East plan, “the best agreement made with an emerging country,” and “a concrete example of American commitment to supporting open and prosperous Muslim societies” (L’Intelligent, 14 March 2004). On behalf of Morocco, Taib Fassi Fakhri, the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation emphasised the new opportunities that the Agreement represented for the Moroccan economy insofar as access to a dynamic market of 300 million Americans, encouragement of tourism, attraction of US investment and diversification of export markets. Nevertheless, he was confronted with a great deal of protest by the media and civil society, which rebuked him not only for the ‘opacity’ of negotiations, but also the absence of political debate and concessions granted with ‘lightness.’

The objection by certain Moroccan organisations to the Free Trade Agreement grew over the course of the months following its signature. Certain opponents put forth an objection based on principle: you cannot negotiate with an imperialist power that turns its back on Arab rights, is insensible to the suffering of the Palestinian people and imposes “a new form of colonialism” on Morocco, as asserted by Mahdi El-Manjara (l'Economiste, 22nd April 2004). Others doubted its appropriateness: “why negotiate with a power that invades Iraq and, what’s more, poses as ‘the Axis of Good’?” While others decried the “hasty concessions” made by the Moroccan government that go beyond the standards set by the WTO (World Trade Organisation). The following concessions were namely singled out:

1) Extension of protection by patent beyond the commonly accepted duration of 20 years;
2) Acceptance of American conditions with regard to access to medicines and intellectual property.

Is the discontent of the leaders of Moroccan civil society organisations founded? The reply to this question is most probably condensed in the following remark by Robert Zoellick, the American representative, who boasted of having concluded an agreement that established “an inordinately elevated level for
intellectual property" (Action 93, 15th May 2004). It is thus easy to understand the great number of Moroccans who view the Agreement with scepticism, going so far as to predict "a dire future" for the nation’s pharmaceutical industry, which could be destroyed by US competition. The statements by Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize Laureate in Economics, made a few days before the signature of the Agreement, should have sounded the alarm bell. Speaking in Casablanca on 17th February 2004, Stiglitz appealed to Morocco to demonstrate prudence, not to accept "inequitable" conditions going beyond the “standards established” by the WTO in Doha in 2001 (in particular on access to pharmaceuticals), to learn from former agreements concluded by the United States with Mexico and Chile, where the Americans were clearly the most benefited party, and finally, to engage in public debate on the different clauses of the Agreement, thereby reiterating one of the main demands of the Moroccan coalition in favour of freezing negotiations (communiqué dated 16th February 2004).

Surprisingly, France, which usually baulks at ‘lecturing’ Morocco so as not to incur the rebuke of super-annuated paternalism, did not hesitate, via the voice of Jacques Chirac, to denounce “the immoral extortion” of Morocco by the American administration.

Nevertheless, neither the mobilisation of some forty Moroccan NGOs grouped together in a coalition, nor the repeated warnings by Joseph Stiglitz, nor the concerns expressed by certain Moroccan industrialists (above all in the pharmaceuticals sector), to say nothing of the denunciation of the agreement by J. Chirac and other French senior officials, succeeded in reorientating the position of Moroccan negotiators.

The process of ratifying the Agreement began in the Moroccan Parliament on Wednesday, 5th January 2005. Strangely enough, under the pretext that the Agreement and its annexes comprised 1,600 pages, only the parliamentary groups were issued a copy on paper. The 31 Representatives of the Foreign Affairs

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<tr>
<th>THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT CAN BE SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural Products</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Agreement establishes a progressive liberalisation that takes into account national production and the needs of the industry. In this regard, ceilings were fixed taking into account the country’s annual needs with transitional periods and customs duty roll-back schemes of up to 25 years in duration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>In exchange, immediate free access for fresh or processed Moroccan agricultural products such as clementines, flowers, olives and tomatoes is stipulated. This free access likewise concerns all agro-industrial products with or without a quota (500 T for tomato concentrates).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Industrial Products</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Asymmetrical conditions to the benefit of Moroccan products are stipulated. Thus, immediate free access will be given to nearly all Moroccan industrial and fisheries products (98%); of 7,052 American tariff headings, 6,966 will be exempt from the onset of the Agreement. Insofar as access to American products to the Moroccan market, the Agreement stipulates an exemption from import duties at the onset of the Agreement amounting to 58% of the tariff headings. The remainder of duties shall be eliminated within a maximum period of 9 years.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Textiles:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Agreement establishes three symmetrical lists:</td>
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<td>- A list of duty-free items as of the onset of the Agreement;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- A list of 43 products that will be duty-free within the limit of a contingent to increase by 25% every year for 5 years.</td>
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<td>- Duties on the remaining products will be symmetrically eliminated over the course of 6 years, with a 50% reduction as of the first year.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rules of Origin:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Simplification of customs procedures.</td>
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<td>- 35% ad valorem for industrial products excepting textiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Specific rules for agricultural and textile products;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Specific rules for certain industrial products (electric cables and certain chemical and metallurgical products).</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Bilateral cumulation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Trade in Services / Investment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Moroccan investors and service providers are guaranteed conditions, insofar as access to the American market, at least equal to those granted other partners already having entered into free trade agreements with the United States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>With regard to access to the Moroccan market, Morocco managed to obtain the following conditions:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The protection of existing monopolies (OCP, ONE, ONCF, municipal monopolies, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Limited access to the Moroccan market in certain sensitive sectors for Moroccan enterprise;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The granting of priority to Moroccan nationals for the majority of professional services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moreover, Morocco made exceptions concerning certain highly sensitive sectors allowing it to maintain or adopt (in the future) any regulation measures for these sectors. And finally, Morocco obtained a transitional period of 2 years for certain unrecognised or non-regulated sectors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>With regard to financial services, Morocco managed to retain manouevring room with regard to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Control of major banks: Morocco has reserved the right to prohibit the takeover of large Moroccan banks by foreign capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Future regulation of financial services: Morocco was guaranteed the authority to introduce restrictions to market access in the future for financial services that were unregulated at the time of signing the agreement as well as for new financial services emerging thereafter.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Granting advantages to State financial institutions: Morocco retains the prerogative of granting advantages to public financial institutions, which may not be extended to the private sector.</td>
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</table>
Commission of the Chamber of Representatives (Morocco’s lower house) each received only a CD-Rom, whereas not all Representatives know how to use a computer, ironically remarked Lahsen Daoudi, Vice-President of the Islamist Group of the lower house (*Le Monde*, 8th January 2005). Finally, the text was adopted on 13th January by the Chamber of Representatives and on 18th January by the upper house, the Chamber of Councillors, without having cleared up the thorny issue of the Agreement’s geographical scope. In fact, whereas R. Zoellick stated that the Agreement ratified by the United States on 22nd July 2004 concerned “the internationally recognised territory of Morocco, not including Western Sahara,” the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taieb Fassi Fihri, made the opposite interpretation, asserting that the Agreement covered “the entirety of Moroccan territory, including the southern Saharan provinces” (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, 19th January 2005) – an edifying example of the confusion permeating this controversial agreement.

The opposition to the US-Morocco FTA was not mitigated throughout 2005. European circles in particular continued to see the risk of a diversion of trade. Thus, in a meeting on the eve of the visit by Spain’s King Juan Carlos to Morocco in January of 2005, King Mohammed showed irritation at the criticism. “We Moroccans are obliged not to put all our eggs in one basket,” he stated, before adding “this is an initiative that complements but does not substitute the agreements concluded by Morocco with the EU.” It is a “decision based on Morocco’s sovereignty,” he further emphasised, claiming not to understand that “certain circles in Europe have reacted negatively to this agreement concluded with the United States,” which he qualified as a “friendly country” with whom Morocco maintained “excellent relations” (*El Pais*, 16th January 2005).

**Preliminary Economic Evaluation**

Morocco is not Mexico: it is many thousands of kilometres away from the United States, does not have an émigré community in the US as it does in Europe and is a nearly insignificant partner in commerce. At the end of 2005, Morocco was the 79th US merchandise export market and the 89th US import market, commerce in goods having totalled $989 million in 2005.

**General Overview of Commerce**

*Exports*

Goods exports from the United States to Morocco in 2005 totalled $528 million, increasing by 1% ($524 million) over the amount in 2004 and by 29% over 1994 (the year before the Uruguay Round). The five leading export categories (according to the Harmonisation System codes for commodities classification) in 2005 were: Aircraft ($166 million); Cereals ($82 million); Machinery ($55 million); Oil Seeds, Miscellaneous Grains, Medical Plants and Straw (primarily soybeans) ($63 million); Electrical Machinery ($25 million); and Animal Feed ($17 million). Exports of agricultural products from the United States to Morocco amounted to $165 million in 2005. Among the main products were: maize ($94 million), sugar ($16 million) and soybeans ($95 million).

*Imports*

Imports of Moroccan goods by the United States amounted to $443 million in 2005, sinking by 14% ($62 million) vis-à-vis 2004 and rising by 130% vis-à-vis 1994. The five leading import categories in 2005 were: Electrical Machinery ($107 million); Salt, Sulphur, Earth and Stone (primarily calcium phosphate) (94 millions de $); Mineral Fuels ($45 million); Woven Fabrics ($37 million); Edible Preparations of Meat, Fish, Crustaceans, Molluscs or Other Aquatic Invertebrates ($23 million); and Preparations of Vegetables, Fruits, Nuts or Other Plant Parts (primarily olives) ($23 million). Imports of Moroccan agricultural products by the United States amounted to $88 million in 2005. Among the main products were: fish, olives and olive oil.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>-152</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>528</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Trade Balance
The US-Morocco trade balance exceeded $85 million in 2005. (TABLE 29)

1st January 2006:
The Agreement Enters into Effect

The Agreement was initially slated to enter into effect in 2005 but this was postponed due to a proposal made late in the process regarding patent rights and considered to take Morocco’s ‘cultural exceptions’ into account. This project was not examined and adopted by both of Morocco’s parliamentary chambers until 20th December 2005. The ground was set for the Agreement’s entry into effect on 1st January 2006. Morocco thus became the first African State and second Arab country (after Jordan) to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with the United States.

Endorsing the Agreement’s entrance into effect, Mohamed Benayad, Secretary General of Morocco’s National Council for Foreign Trade, acknowledged its ‘political dimension’ and did not conceal his frustration with the results of the Association Agreement between Morocco and the European Union. “The promises made to upgrade companies have not been kept, the implementation of financing systems has proven Kafkaesque and we have not obtained the expected compensation.” One could deduce from these remarks that the Morocco-US Agreement was a reaction to the perception that the Morocco-EU Agreement was a failure. Benayad held his ground, pointing out Morocco’s interest in diversifying its partnerships and markets and sharpening its competitive edge in an increasingly globalised economy. “There’s more than just Europe,” he asserted, adding that “we must go beyond Europe” (Libération, published in Casablanca, 9th January 2006). He could not have been more explicit. What Benayad is not saying is the risk of a global agreement – concerning agriculture as well as industries and services – between two economies with such asymmetrical levels of development.

In any case, one thing is clear: since 1st January 2006, 98% of Moroccan industrial products have entered the American market exempt of duties, in exchange for the roll-back of Moroccan duties on imports of American industrial products that are not in competition with local production. Apart from the risk of Morocco’s becoming specialised in industrial markets of low added value (textiles) and low technological content, it is highly probable that trade in industrial products will become more and more imbalanced, to the detriment of Morocco.

Globally, in the first semester of 2006, the value of Moroccan exports was nearly 1.8 times less ($193.8 million) than what it imported from the United States (L’Economiste, 17th August 2006). In all, the United States represented $353 million in 2006, that is, 3% of overall Moroccan trade, a ludicrous percentage compared with Moroccan-European Union trade (+55-60%). In 2006, the United States was Morocco’s 7th supplier and its 8th most important customer.

Conclusion

Morocco is a key factor in US strategy for economic expansion in Africa. As recalled by Yahia Zoubir in July of 2006, Morocco is a pillar for the United States in the Maghreb (Zoubir, 2006). It is thus no coincidence
that it was the first African State to sign a free trade agreement with the United States, just as Jordan was the first Arab State to sign a similar agreement. This privileged treatment arises from Morocco’s traditional alliance with the United States during the cold war, its support of the Gulf War in 1991, its “role as a bulwark” against anti-Western forces, its position – deemed by Washington to be moderate – concerning the Israeli-Arab conflict, its potential role as a natural bridge to Africa and the progressive reform of its political system.

In a context of asymmetrical competition, the profits of free trade are far from being equitably distributed and the Moroccan agricultural sector may be the hardest hit.

The idea underlying the American approach to economic partnerships like the one with Morocco is that economic and political reform, “coupled with free trade, judicious governance and well-focused aid programmes evaluated on the basis of their results, should foster economic development and social integration, thus reducing the risks of insecurity and instability” (Deblock, 2003). The aim is commendable and coincides with the postulates of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Khader, 2005b); yet the supposed sequence of events – economic liberalisation, political reform, attracting investment, stability and security – may not be so automatic. It is indeed clear that, in a context of asymmetrical competition, the profits of free trade are far from being equitably distributed and that the Moroccan agricultural sector may be the hardest hit. In the first 6 months of 2006, US cereal exports to Morocco had already jumped up by 50%. By the same token, the costs of adjustment are likely to be very high. ‘Competitive integration’ into the global economy largely depends on the economic dynamism of the industrial fabric, the capacity of national enterprise to adapt to market constraints, regulation mechanisms and training adjusted to market needs. And it cannot be said that Morocco currently meets these criteria for taking advantage of the potential of a free trade agreement with a post-industrial economy like the American one.

References


In the early 2000s, the MEDA region, which includes the European Union’s Mediterranean partner countries (Algeria, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Libya as an observer country) did not feature on the global investment map. While the region accounted for 4% of the world’s population, it only received about 1% of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Its growing economy, however, has gradually attracted increasing interest in recent years and it now enjoys a normal share of global FDI flows (4%).

The Figures

As data from different sources (UNCTAD World Investment Report, ANIMA Mediterranean Investment Project Observatory-MIPO), demonstrate, FDI inflows to the region have been growing considerably for several years:

• According to the UNCTAD, which measures macroeconomic flows in national accounts, FDI flows to the MEDA region grew from US $12 billion in 2000 to US $30 billion in 2005, and are expected to have exceeded US $40 billion in 2006 (Tables 30 and 31);

• According to ANIMA (through its European-based MIPO, founded in 2003 under the umbrella of the Invest in France Agency, otherwise known as AFII), the announced microeconomic flows to the region (calculated from data for individual investors) increased by the same proportion (Table 32). The MIPO measurements announced investments in year x, which is when the investor (or sometimes even the National Investment Commission) publicises or confirms a project for implementation that will lead to payments or transfers in the same or following years (year x + 1 etc.). The data provided by ANIMA-MIPO is therefore forecast data.

A time-lag is evident in comparing announced flows in euros (ANIMA-MIPO) and real flows in dollars (UNCTAD) (Graphic 13): whereas ANIMA-MIPO measures potential investment, UNCTAD measures actual transfers.

The Increasingly Important Role Played by FDI in Foreign Revenues

What share of external foreign flows to the MEDA region does FDI account for? Capital inflows are growing sharply (Table 33), whereas public aid for development has dropped to moderate levels. Other forms of income, however, are becoming increasingly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 30</th>
<th>Growth in FDI Flows to 3 Host Countries 1997-2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆ as a %</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Provisional data published in mid-January, 2006
### TABLE 31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>1,196</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td>1,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>2,919</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>2,157</td>
<td>5,376</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1,628</td>
<td>1,760</td>
<td>2,889</td>
<td>4,392</td>
<td>3,044</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>3,745</td>
<td>1,619</td>
<td>5,587</td>
<td>13,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>1,899</td>
<td>2,573</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>1,578</td>
<td>6,113</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,188</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2,808</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>2,429</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>2,933</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>3,266</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>1,752</td>
<td>2,837</td>
<td>9,681</td>
<td>17,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for MEDA-12</td>
<td>6,445</td>
<td>6,532</td>
<td>11,039</td>
<td>11,136</td>
<td>12,881</td>
<td>6,147</td>
<td>14,706</td>
<td>13,420</td>
<td>31,773</td>
<td>46,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDA-10</td>
<td>5,873</td>
<td>6,001</td>
<td>9,532</td>
<td>9,680</td>
<td>11,915</td>
<td>6,225</td>
<td>12,857</td>
<td>12,032</td>
<td>30,045</td>
<td>46,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDA-9 without Israel</td>
<td>4,245</td>
<td>4,241</td>
<td>6,643</td>
<td>5,288</td>
<td>8,871</td>
<td>4,577</td>
<td>9,112</td>
<td>10,413</td>
<td>24,458</td>
<td>33,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Estimates by ANIMA based on the extrapolation of official figures. 2 Figures published by UNCTAD, 10 January 2007. 3 Figures published by Israel Trade in January 2007. 4 EDC estimates.


### TABLE 32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Country</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2,204</td>
<td>6,355</td>
<td>3,493</td>
<td>6,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>2,504</td>
<td>8,922</td>
<td>14,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>5,922</td>
<td>11,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>3,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>1,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>3,225</td>
<td>4,261</td>
<td>2,430</td>
<td>5,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>2,982</td>
<td>5,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>3,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>2,712</td>
<td>16,895</td>
<td>11,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for MEDA-10</td>
<td>8,371</td>
<td>19,567</td>
<td>43,498</td>
<td>63,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MEDA-10 + Cyprus, Malta, Libya</td>
<td>8,372</td>
<td>19,567</td>
<td>43,920</td>
<td>64,162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANIMA-MIPO

important, including remittances (which have doubled in ten years), tourism earnings (which tripled from US $12.5 billion to US $42.7 billion between 1995 and 2005) and FDI (relatively lower initial levels but increasing rapidly). By 2006, for example, FDI (over US $45 billion) could become the region’s primary source of foreign capital.

Capital outflows are also considerable (US $8 billion annually in foreign investment from the central Maghreb region, a total outward stock of US $100 billion, according to the IE-Med, and dividends paid out by foreign companies in Tunisia alone of US $1.5 billion in 2004). It is evident, however, that the MEDA region as a whole, taking into account its insufficient level of savings, has recently begun to benefit from the net inflow of foreign capital, which has offset and often compensated the weak level of domestic productive investment (thereby indicating the importance of joint ventures).

### What Lies Behind This Interest in the MEDA Region?

After a long period of neglect by foreign investors, the region has recently begun to attract interest again. The reasons are as follows:

- Most of the countries have made a genuine effort
to reform by implementing legislation and regulations that protect the interests of companies, developing competitive logistic systems and technologies, and actively promoting the region (see box on the following page). Although a lot remains to be done, the market response indicates that investors have received the message.

- A strong energy-driven economic surge has had a triple effect in terms of the development of oil and gas projects (prospection, pipelines and refineries), the reinvestment of substantial sums of petrodollars in the Mediterranean, and the announcement of major Algerian-style infrastructure programmes (US $80-100 billion over 5 years), which have attracted investors, capital and projects.
- There has been an increase in the creation and trading of banking and insurance networks and in the creation of funds, sometimes involving substantial investment (e.g. in Egypt, Turkey, Syria and Algeria), accompanied by the development of many privatisation and licensing projects (with a particular impact in Egypt, Syria and Algeria in 2006, and in Turkey in 2005).
- There has been a sharp acceleration (a 3.5-fold
**Examples of Major Actions Aimed at Attracting Investment**

- **Egypt:** Creation of a Ministry of Investment (2004), coupled with a revamp of its General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI).
- **Syria:** New foreign investment legislation (2006) which includes authorization for the repatriation of dividends, and the creation of an investment promotion agency (2007).
- **Cyprus:** Creation (2005) of the Cyprus Investment Promotion Agency (CIPA).
- **Turkey:** Creation of the Invest in Turkey body (2006).
- **Other countries, including Lebanon and Algeria:** New legislation to facilitate investment and offer equal conditions to foreigners and nationals (2005-2006).
- **Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt:** Promotion of annual FDI events (the Carthage Forum, Intégrales de l'Investimment, Egypt Invest) and benchmarking opportunities, with strong declarations of intent with regard to investment potential (2003-2006).

**Table 34: Breakdown of Projects 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Project</th>
<th>No. of Projects</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Flows in EUR m</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-projects</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>7,349</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenfield projects</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>19,687</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion projects</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocation projects</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholdings</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>28,301</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatisation and licensing</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>7,382</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiaries and branches</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chains, stores and franchises</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation offices</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships and joint ventures</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>5,377</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>826</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>73,445</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Of which FDI</strong></td>
<td><strong>720</strong></td>
<td><strong>87.2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>64,162</strong></td>
<td><strong>87.4%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Pre-projects, chains, stores, franchise, representation offices, and supply contracts are not counted as FDI.

Source: MIPO for MEDA-10, including Cyprus, Malta and Libya.

**Increase in Flows** in the real estate, public works and tourism sectors, particularly in terms of investments from the Gulf region (huge projects in Morocco, Syria, the Dead Sea and Red Sea areas, etc.).

- There is a growing awareness in Europe of the growth (new markets) and productivity (lower costs) opportunities offered by neighbouring regions (Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean). These markets are more easily entered than China or India by the frequently cash-strapped European small and medium-sized enterprise (SME). This trend is also accompanied by the relocation (although rarely referred to as such) of subcontractors and service providers to the region (Axa-Morocco is one example).

- Many companies from China and other emerging economies are taking the plunge and setting up in markets such as Egypt and Algeria, which, until recently, have been relatively protected (especially the heavy industry, chemicals, metallurgy and public works sectors).

Specific examples from each country serve to illustrate spectacular performances. Turkey, for example, is benefiting from the opportunity-driven effects of its status as an EU candidate country, with a surge in industrial projects (in the automotive, chemicals, supply-chain sectors, etc.), and with the western part of the country witnessing a chain reaction that is one of the main driving forces in the economy. Israel, meanwhile, continues to specialise in technology (and not just information and communication technologies), while Syria, with a potential market of 30 million inhabitants and an industrialised culture, has become a magnet for businesses.

The transformation of ANIMA into a powerful European institutional network consisting of 19 founding organisations (Euro-Mediterranean development agencies and employers) has monitored and strengthened this trend.

**The Weakness of Industrial Investment**

Table 34, which shows inflows by project type for 2006, reveals how production projects (whether greenfield,
The Conference gathered the Ministers of Trade of the ten Mediterranean countries which are members of the Barcelona Process, together with Ministers of Trade of the EU Member States. Besides tariff dismantling, important progress had been achieved through the elimination of quantitative restrictions, removals of non-tariff barriers and greater transparency. The issues addressed during the meeting focused on the priorities defined by the Barcelona Summit of November 2005, namely:

- Promotion of regional integration: Euromed ministers welcomed the entry into force of the EU Association Agreement with Algeria and of the Agreements between Turkey and Tunisia, Turkey and Morocco, Israel and Jordan. The EU encouraged the other Southern Mediterranean countries to accelerate signature, conclusion and entry into force of Free Trade Agreements among themselves so as to strengthen regional integration. They also agreed on the need to have a clear vision of the future of the textile/clothing sector to allow Euromed partners to face the challenge of increased competition in this sector.

- Liberalisation of trade service: Ministers reiterated their commitment to complement the liberalisation of trade in goods with an integrated Free Trade Area for services and investment across the Euro-Mediterranean region. They considered that the liberalisation of services and the right of establishment is an indispensable step in a genuine Free Trade Area by 2010, for this reason they welcomed the launch of negotiations on these issues between EU and some Mediterranean partners.

- Regulatory convergence on industrial products: participants acknowledged the importance of regulatory convergence in the Euromed to facilitate trade, especially on the approximation of technical legislation, standards and conformity assessment procedures with the EU system. Such a convergence would remove regulatory and technical barriers thus facilitating the free circulation of industrial products in the Mediterranean region.

- Deepening agricultural liberalisation: Ministers confirmed their commitment to a progressive liberalisation of trade in agricultural and processed agricultural and fisheries products. The Ministerial Conference was followed by the formal opening of negotiations on the liberalisation of trade in services and the right of establishment with a first wave of Mediterranean countries.

The Arrival of Major Operators

The investment portfolio announced in 2006 included 54 large-scale projects worth over €500 million each. Given that this compares to 30 such projects in 2005, it is evident that there is increasing interest in investing in large-scale projects. The portfolio also contains 99 major projects (€100-€500 million), compared to 73 in 2005, and 51 significant projects (€50-€100 million), compared to 36 in 2005. Of the 720 definite FDI projects for 2006, 204 crossed the €50-million threshold. The remaining 516 projects included 119 standard projects (€10-€50 million), 130 subsidiary office set-ups without major investment, and 267 relatively modest projects (partnerships representing FDI of less than €10 million). According to the MIPO, the average amount invested

Leading Sectors: Real Estate and Banking

A sector-by-sector analysis confirms the importance of finance-related activities (Graphic 14). The seven main sectors, in decreasing order of importance, are as follows: real estate and transport (119 projects and €16.8 billion), banking (107 projects and €15.3 billion), telecommunications (28 projects and €6.2 billion), software and computer services (42 projects and €5.8 billion), energy (67 projects and €5.4 billion), tourism (54 projects and €3.6 billion) and finally, cement and other minerals and materials industry (27 projects and €3.3 billion). This leaves little room for non-financial sectors, with a few exceptions such as chemicals, agrobusiness and pharmaceuticals (the latter two of which showed growth with respect to 2005).
in projects keeps increasing—to €92 million per project in 2006 compared to €64 million in 2005 and €30 million in 2003. These figures are known for 75% of projects (official amounts for 55% of cases and projects involving the creation of few jobs in 20% of cases). This figure would confirm the arrival of major operators, but also confirms a trend that was already becoming evident in 2005, namely, increasing investment in large-scale real-estate and tourism projects (major resorts and new urban centres)—which are often questionable in terms of sustainability, environmental impact, and their effect on urban and social diversity.
Investors are looking for high returns, minimal risk (bricks and mortar), rapidly assessable environmental impact and quick maturity—just the opposite, in fact, of what the region needs.

The Gulf Region Replaces Europe as the Lead Investor

Europe—responsible for 42% of projects but just 21% of total investment—no longer accounts for the greatest share of FDI in the MEDA region. The share of the USA (around 25%) has been on the rise since 2003 due to energy demands. What is surprising, however, is that the Gulf states and other MENA countries (Middle Eastern and North African countries, i.e. non-MEDA Arabic countries plus Iran) have overtaken Asia (8% and rising) and the MEDA region (2.4%) in terms of total investment. Averaged out over the period 2005-2006, 50% of FDI came from developed countries (Europe and the USA) and 50% from new sources (two thirds from the Gulf and one third from emerging countries).

The Pace is Stepping Up in the Near East

Despite a geopolitical scenario that continues to be complicated—and particularly for Lebanon in 2006 (which yielded high returns to investors in the first half of 2006)—the near East is performing remarkably in terms of announced FDI inflows (Map 1). Egypt, which has traditionally been a favoured destination for United Arab Emirates (UAE) investment, has overtaken Turkey, for which possible accession to the EU continues to play a role, and Israel, which is breaking all records in terms of computer development company sales. Nor are Syria and Jordan lagging behind, and the Maghreb has doubled announced FDI with respect to 2005.

Leading Projects

A detailed list of projects, compiled by the MIPO, can be consulted at www.animaweb.org. Described in the following box are announced projects worth over €1 billion, although these are not necessarily the most interesting nor the most significant projects.\(^1\)

\(^1\)These large-scale projects mainly involve the real-estate, tourism, finance and telecommunications sectors. The figures in the MIPO database are based on announced FDI flows divided by the number of years the project is scheduled to last (typically 3 to 10 years for real-estate projects).
The FDI figures for the MEDA region in 2006 confirm that the poorest part of the Mediterranean basin is attracting renewed interest, which is good news indeed. However, although substantial FDI in terms of quantity has been achieved, the challenge remains to improve quality. National governments and economic development agencies need to focus on two issues in particular, namely, employment creation and the multiplier or leverage effect—i.e. the direct and indirect tangible impact of a project (the return for each euro invested in local activities in the customer-supplier chain). Viewed from this perspective, governments need to urgently implement measures aiming at:

- Enabling both foreign and national SMEs to operate in a secure environment, as this will foster the development of a more resilient, professional and integrated industrial fabric.
- Fostering investment in infrastructures that are necessary for economic activity.
- Defining realistic industrial priorities that underpin targeted territorial marketing strategies (for different sectors, depending on the country—the ICTs, petrochemicals, light industry, food processing, consumer goods, services for companies, subcontracting, etc.).
26 PROJECTS WORTH OVER €1 BILLION ANNOUNCED IN 2006 (SOURCE: ANIMA-MIPO)

- **Egypt**: The UAE company Damac launched its Gamsha Bay development project on the Red Sea coast, with an anticipated investment of US$16 billion.
- **Egypt**: The UAE group Dubai Ports World plans to invest in several projects in Egypt, including a new port and container terminal in Eastern Port Said.
- **Algeria**: The Chinese CITIC/CRCC Group has won a bid to build two sections of the east-west motorway (worth US$6.9 billion).
- **Algeria**: Cojaal, a Japanese consortium with Itochyu participation, has won a bid to build a section of the east-west motorway (worth US$5.9 billion).
- **Turkey**: The Korean companies Rotem and Hyundai, together with local partners, are to invest US$10 billion in JV Eurotem, a new rail materials manufacturer.
- **Tunisia**: The UAE group Bukhater is to begin the Tunis Sports City project in 2007, worth US$5 billion and expected to lead to the creation of 40,000 jobs.
- **Jordan**: Horizon Development Holdings, based in Beirut, Lebanon, is to invest US$5 billion over a period of 10 years in an urban regeneration project in Aqaba.
- **Israel**: The American giant, HP, is to buy Mercury Interactive Corporation for US$4.5 billion.
- **Israel**: Warren Buffett has purchased an 80% share of the Israeli company Iscar Ltd. for US$4 billion through its investment company Berkshire Hathaway.
- **Algeria**: The UAE group Dubai Aluminium plans to build the first stage of an aluminium foundry near Jijel for US$3.6 billion.
- **Turkey**: The US firm Citigroup has signed an agreement to buy 20% of Akbank (one of Turkey’s main financial institutions) for US$3 billion.
- **Egypt**: The UAE company Etisalat has purchased an Egyptian telecom licence for US$2.9 billion.
- **Morocco**: The UAE group Dubai Holding is to invest $2 billion in the Bouregreg Valley development project (the Amwaj project).
- **Israel**: The American giant SanDisk has purchased the Israeli company M-Systems Ltd. for US$1.5 billion.
- **Egypt**: The national bank of Greece, Ethniki Bank, has purchased 46% of the Turkish Finansbank for €2.3 billion.
- **Morocco**: The UAE group Al Qudra has signed several agreements with Adoha and Somet and plans to invest US$2.72 billion over 10 years.
- **Syria**: The UAE group Universal Investment Group plans to build an Internet city in Syria for $2.7 billion.
- **Turkey**: The French company Dexia has announced its acquisition of 75% of DenizBank (Turkey’s 10th largest bank) for US$2.44 billion.
- **Tunisia**: The UAE Tecom-Dubaï Investment Group has purchased a 35% shareholding in the Tunisian public operator Tunisie Telecom for around €1.8 billion.
- **Egypt**: The Italian group Sanpaolo IMI has purchased an 80% share of the Bank of Alexandria for US$1.6 billion.
- **Morocco**: The UAE group Dubai Holding is to invest $2 billion in building Serrenia, a tourism complex in Sahl Hasheesh on the Red Sea coast.
- **Tunisia**: The UAE group Emaar Properties is to invest US$1.8 billion in the Al Qussor marina project near Hergla.
- **Tunisia**: Quatar Petroleum has won the contract to build the Shkira refinery at an estimated cost of US$1.872 billion.
- **Morocco**: The UAE group Emaar is to invest US$1.55 billion in developing the Rabat waterfront development project (the Saphira project).
- **Israel**: The Kuwaiti investment firm Noor is to build a refinery in Deir Ezzor for around US$1.5 billion invested over a period of 4 years.
- **Morocco**: The UAE group Emaar Properties is to invest US$1.4 billion in Oukaimeden, Africa’s only ski resort.

**Attracting socially responsible and sustainable investments that increase and protect the human and natural wealth of the fragile economies of the southern and eastern Mediterranean basin.**
Tourism continues to beat records in 2006 with 842 million arrivals and over 4.5% growth. This will have been an excellent year in the Mediterranean Basin, despite a certain slowdown in the Middle East due to events in Lebanon, with an overall growth rate of approximately 5%, broken down to 5.8% for North Africa, 4% for the Middle East and 4.6% for Mediterranean Europe. An in-depth analysis of the statistics published also shows highly encouraging results: seasonal distribution has improved over preceding years; new products and services, often using new information and communication technologies, were launched everywhere; destinations emerged in the southern and eastern areas of the Basin; and the sector is creating more and more employment. It is no longer only the beaches that attract holidaymakers and other visitors. The Mediterranean will not become Europe’s swimming pool, as one of the scenarios in the Blue Plan (United Nations Environment Programme, Mediterranean Action Plan UNEP/MAP) supposed in the 1980s. Nevertheless, it remains an environmentally fragile region and the first effects of climate change are beginning to be felt: persistent droughts, disappearance of wetlands, appearance of tropical animal species, etc.

A Record Year

On the whole, the Mediterranean countries, with the exception of the Middle East, have beat records. Spain, for instance, registered over 58.5 million international tourist arrivals – 2.5 million more than the preceding year. Other countries along the northern shore of the Mediterranean experienced similar success. The growth of tourism in North Africa has been accelerating since 2003: Morocco (+9.3% in 2006 as compared to 2005) and Tunisia (+2.6%) have far surpassed 6 million tourist arrivals in 2006. According to the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), Morocco obtained nearly 65% of tourism revenue in the region, against only 30% by Tunisia. In Morocco, it seems that the implementation of the “Vision 2010” plan will meet its objectives and will have significant effects on major aspects of the country’s macroeconomic equilibrium, namely:

- Fostering additional GDP growth, on the order of 2-3 points per year;
- The creation of approximately 600,000 jobs; and
- An annual revenue growth in local currency from approximately 20 to 80 billion dirhams (1 dirham = €0.0902).

In Tunisia, the aim is to consolidate the results obtained and improve the quality of existing products and services, hence the interest in thalassotherapy and fitness holidays. Turkey, today the 9th tourist destination in the world, has consolidated its position as the 4th destination in the Mediterranean after France, Spain and Italy and the 6th destination in Europe. Egypt, with over 8 million international tourist arrivals and Jordan, with over 3 million, are destinations experiencing particular success.

If peace had continued to reign in Lebanon, growth would have been even more impressive: in the first semester of 2006, this country experienced an increase of +49% in international tourism! In July, all of this was shattered. The hope remains that the situation will stabilise in 2007. The UNWTO is actively contributing to this stabilisation. Due to the assassination of a Lebanese political leader, however, it had to postpone the International Conference on
Partnerships to Enhance Tourism Safety and Security in the Middle East and North Africa, originally slated to take place on 6th and 7th December 2006 in Beirut but now programmed for the same date as the 29th Meeting of the UNWTO Commission for the Middle East, i.e. the second quarter of 2007.

**Challenges and Threats**

These events reflect the current situation: the divide continues to increase between the northern and eastern/southern shores of the Mediterranean. The good growth rate of certain destinations in the south such as Morocco will not be able to compensate for the lack of perspective and global policies. The war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 had disastrous consequences on tourism in the entire subregion: Israel, Syria and Jordan were affected as well. At the same time, ‘safe-haven’ destinations in southern Europe became consolidated, such as Andalusia in Spain, the Côte d’Azur in France and the Costa Smeralda in Sardinia, Italy, for upper class customers from North African and Middle East countries.

2006 will also have been the International Year of Deserts and Desertification, and a number of seminars and meetings have been held on the Saharan and Middle-Eastern deserts, as for instance the one held in Elche/Elx, Spain in mid-December 2006: the 1st International Congress on Oasis and Sustainable Tourism, organised by the association, La Cultura del Oasis, with the participation of the UNWTO, UNESCO and UNEP. The fragility of semi-desert and desert regions in conjunction with climate change and the persistence of drought will have serious impacts on countries having essentially focussed on this type of products. Algeria and Libya will have to make additional efforts to open their borders and define tourism policies that are clearly orientated towards the creation of employment, that is, along the Mediterranean coast and not in the large southern Saharan area, highly vulnerable on an environmental level and whose capacity remains limited. Water shortage will be the Damocles’ sword hanging over the entire Mediterranean region, and the desalination of seawater will be but a partial solution, decreasingly expensive but entailing environmental dangers of its own.

Challenges and threats were at the heart of debate on the 4th and 5th May 2006 in Barcelona, at the first MEDA TOURISM FORUM, a meeting of world business leaders and Mediterranean tourism policymakers. Another conference under the lemma, “Tourism and Change: Mediterranean Challenges,” was organised in Tunisia by ASCAME (Association of Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce and Industry) and presided by Jilani Ben’marek. It attracted one hundred or so businesspeople. At this conference, a study published in April 2006 by Anima, the Euro-Mediterranean Network of Investment Promotion Agencies, was presented (Hatem, F., La filière tourisme dans les pays méditerraneens, www.animaweb.org/Documents/Tourisme.pdf).

The Anima network’s activity was made permanent by the European Commission after the 2005 Barcelona Summit. According to the authors of the study, tourism will be one of the prime investment sectors in the Mediterranean: “The southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean attract less than 50 million tourists per year (6% of the world’s tourism in 2004). The opportunities are enormous, in particular for countries that are as yet little frequented, such as Algeria, Libya and Syria. Yet the pitfalls of mass tourism must be avoided – destruction of outstanding sites, intense development of shorelines and destabilisation of cultures. The experience of European countries in this regard is priceless.” At the same time, certain analysts emphasise that, though it is a single Mediterranean region, it does not have a unified image, much less so a common trademark. It is thus necessary to cooperate!

**Realistic Hopes for Mediterranean Tourism Cooperation**

2006 will have been, above all, the year of relaunching Mediterranean cooperation on tourism, an excellent opportunity for the Barcelona Process. The European approach, structured on the three pillars of the Barcelona Process of 1995 – the political / security, economic and social / cultural pillars – aimed to create tourism cooperation instruments, though it did not really succeeded between 1995 and 2006. At the Rabat Conference in Morocco in 1996, participants lacked the consensus necessary to establish a structure
acceptable to the majority of actors and set up a work programme. Furthermore, the attempt to create a tourism organisation for the Middle East including Israel was unproductive.

Nevertheless, tourism was included on the majority of MEDA programmes and initiatives, such as the LIFE programme for the environment or EUMEDIS initiative for information and communication technologies. Since the creation of the FEMIP (Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership, part of the European Investment Bank) in October of 2002, tourism has been considered one of the main sectors to foster in order to facilitate access of SMEs to funding and support regional cooperation projects (South-South cooperation) and those of joint interest to the EU and the MPCs.

In 2005, the Declaration "in favour of a joint vision of progress and solidarity within the framework of the Mediterranean Partnership," adopted at the 12th ministerial conference (Hammamet, Tunisia, 1st and 2th October 2005) of the Mediterranean Forum, which brought together Ministers of Foreign Affairs from 12 Mediterranean countries, called for fostering Euro-Mediterranean tourism cooperation by "including aspects of tourism in the different Euro-Mediterranean programmes with a view to fostering sustainable development and establishing training programmes on tourism in the Mediterranean countries."

In late November 2005, the Euro-Mediterranean Summit organised to commemorate the 10th Anniversary of the Barcelona Process was concluded. On this occasion, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership leaders reiterated their intention to establish a common space of peace, stability and prosperity "in total synergy with and complementary to" the action plans of the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). For the first time, heads of state took tourism cooperation into consideration as a factor contributing to the advent of an area of joint economic development, to be achieved, on the one hand, by complying with the engagement of creating a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, and on the other, by promoting a vast policy of economic development and equitable, sustainable employment. The final declaration made by British Prime Minister Blair contained highly favourable comments on Mediterranean tourism.

**Multiplication of Initiatives in 2006**

The multiplication of initiatives occurring in 2006 demonstrated the great vitality of this cooperation in both the public and private sectors and the will to develop concrete projects. These projects, in turn, require increasing coherence, cohesion and coordination.

Thus, a Mediterranean Tourism Association (META) was created. The private sector certainly needed to take the initiative again: it therefore organised a sort of Mediterranean ‘PATA’ (Pacific Asia Travel Association) whose headquarters would be in Marseille or Madrid and would receive the support of major tour operators, airline companies and cruise companies. The Mediterranean tourism industry consists of small and medium-sized enterprises; indeed, 95% are micro-businesses. Certainly, major projects could structure local and regional tourism within the framework of sustainable development. In the majority of cases, these projects involve North-South rather than South-South relations. Japanese tourists travel the Andalusia and northern Morocco circuit or the Sicily and Tunis circuit, and not a Tunisia - Algeria circuit or a Morocco - Mauritania - Algeria circuit. At the International Seminar, "From the Cost of No Maghreb to the North African Tiger," held on 25th-26th May in Madrid, debate was generated on “the economic, political and social impact of a regional airline company with private capital.” Is this merely political speculation? No, as such liberty would allow north-south movement of populating and capital to be approached from a new perspective, that of a strategy beneficial to the Maghreb and, in a more general manner, to both shores of the western Mediterranean Basin.

By the same token, the Blue Plan (UNEP – Mediterranean Action Plan), in pursuing its macro-economic and forecasting work on Mediterranean affairs, organised an experts’ workshop on tourism for the Mediterranean Commission for Sustainable Development (MCSD) on 23rd-24th March 2006, with the participation of the UNWTO, focusing on recommendations to foster sustainable development and environmental protection in the Mediterranean region.
Finally, with regard to civil society, such associations and organisations as the Mediterranean Charter Organization (Carta Mediterránea) have included tourism on their agenda to foster co-development, and the International Seminar on Co-Development (hosted by Carta Mediterránea and BBK) held in Madrid on 16th-18th November 2006 considered tourism one of the sectors with good practices for Mediterranean co-development.

**The Feasibility of Dialogue among 5+5 Countries**

Tunisia’s initiative was highly significant – it organised a conference on the 5th-6th May 2006 in Yasmine Hammamet for the Ministers of Tourism of the “5+5 Dialogue” countries of the western Mediterranean Basin, with the collaboration of the UN World Tourism Organization. It was established that cooperation on tourism, at first on a subregional level, would be effective in the fields of employment, infrastructure development, co-development, cultural dialogue and the alliance of civilisations. In view of the difficulties experienced in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on tourism, the impossibility of uniting all Mediterranean countries including Israel under a single organisation, and above all, the relations already existing among western Mediterranean countries, this perspective is more realistic and would have a greater chance of meeting its goals, according to certain observers. The Hammamet 5+5 Declaration adopted on 6th May 2006 advocates tourism as a tool for fostering tolerance, comprehension, rapprochement of cultures and sustainable development. It announces that endorsing parties are determined to promote cooperation and solidarity among both shores of the Western Mediterranean for partnership in the various spheres of tourism, and that professional training and service quality are two fundamentals of the tourism business. It also indicates that tourism cooperation is more necessary than ever in the western Mediterranean region. This solution may be adopted in the near future if a consensus is reached by the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) countries on using tourism as an element for building confidence among them. It is apparently backed by France, whose influence continues to be significant in North Africa.

**The Alicante Declaration and Tourism**

The issue of tourism cooperation was taken up again at a larger forum: the 13th ordinary meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Mediterranean Forum countries (held in Alicante, Spain, on 28th October 2006), which brought ministers together in a spirit of partnership and continuity. At the meeting, participants discussed the role of tourism as a motor, as a vehicle for socio-

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**THE MAIN POINTS OF THE HAMMAMET 5+5 DIALOGUE DECLARATION**

Towards tourism as a tool for fostering cultural rapprochement and sustainable development

We, the Ministers of the 5+5 Dialogue countries (…):

(…)

- In the conviction that tourism is a motor for economic and social development, as well as a vehicle for fostering rapprochement, comprehension and tolerance among peoples;
- Determined to promote cooperation and solidarity among the Western Mediterranean countries on both the northern and southern shores, in order to build partnership in the various spheres of tourism;
- Profoundly convinced that development initiatives should be in keeping with the logic of both national and regional development, as well as of decentralised international cooperation, making regions and municipalities sustainable socio-economic axes;
- Convinced that professional training and service quality remain two fundamental pillars of the tourism trade (…)

Hereby declare:

(…)

- Our determination to cooperate with all pertinent national, regional and international institutions whose aim is to support tourism development in our region, in particular the UN World Tourism Organization;
- Our commitment to take action towards a harmonised policy to develop solidary, sustainable tourism in our region, within the framework of the conventions and principles to which we subscribe, in particular by:
  (…) - Studying the establishment of a training and research mechanism for tourism in the Mediterranean;
  (…) - Exploring triangular cooperation niches in the tourism industry among southern and northern countries through appropriate mechanisms;
  (…) - Including courses to raise awareness on environmental issues in hotel and tourism education programmes;
- Our conviction that tourism should contribute to raising international awareness on the region’s human, natural and cultural potential, both beyond the region and within it, and to this effect, we recommend:
  (…) - Studying the opportunity to establish an instrument adding value to the image of western Mediterranean civilisations,
  (…) - Encouraging the organisation of a series of events fostering communication among university communities of the Member States of the 5+5 Dialogue. The first of these events will be a forum on “Tourism, a Vehicle for Cultural Rapprochement and Tolerance,” to be held in Tunisia in 2007.
economic and cultural development fostering rapprochement, comprehension and open-mindedness among different peoples, and also as a source of enrichment, insofar as it generates significant perspectives for direct and indirect employment. The Member States thus expressed their will to strengthen this important sector.

The informal document drawn up by Tunisia and Spain at the forum emphasised that: “The Mediterranean tourism industry primarily consists of small and medium-sized companies, 95% of them being micro-businesses, and major projects could structure local and regional tourism within the framework of sustainable development;

- Tourism cannot develop without a climate of trust and security;
- Education and training are the pillars of quality and sustainability for the tourism sector, which is undoubtedly the top economic sector in the Mediterranean region.”

It recommends that, in view of the progress made since the 12th session in 2005:

“It would be highly recommendable to consider creating a regional training and research institution for tourism in the Mediterranean and then fostering partnership relations between this institution and other training structures existing in the region. This proposition should be accompanied by an initiative to identify opportunities for joint investment and intensification of partnerships in this field, with the essential and necessary participation of the private sector.”

The ministerial meeting also called for immediate implementation of measures to:

- Facilitate the organisation of travelling exhibitions and cultural tourism weeks in order to raise awareness of the rich cultural and artistic heritage of the civilisations of our respective countries and of the Mediterranean region as a whole;
- Organise joint events, in particular, a periodical forum for partnership in the tourism sector;
- Jointly promote combined tourism products for distant countries;
- Exchange expertise and savoir-faire in the sphere of exploring new markets.”

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs encouraged “the UN World Tourism Organization and its members from the Mediterranean region to pursue coordination efforts in order to increase the efficiency and coherence of joint Mediterranean initiatives and to work towards a harmonised policy for the sustainable and solidarity development of tourism, in keeping with the existing conventions and principles of respect and dialogue among all Mediterranean peoples.”

In the final declaration made at Alicante on 29th October 2006, the Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs reiterated the ensemble of these recommendations. The terms of the Final Declaration were taken up a month later at the 8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Tampere, Finland, 27th - 28th November 2006).

At this meeting, the Ministers of the countries involved in the Barcelona Process (27 European countries and the 10 MEDA countries plus Libya and Mauritania as observers) referred to the results of the Barcelona Summit of November 2005 and discussed a preliminary work programme for 2007 designed to develop new initiatives, in particular in the fields of higher education, employment, health, tourism, fostering investment, migration and intercultural dialogue. The Final Declaration discusses tourism in Section V: “Environment and Tourism,” under Paragraph 29. According to this paragraph, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs:

“underline the importance of the contribution of tourism to the economies of the Euromed Partners. They recall that at the Barcelona Summit, the Heads of States and Governments agreed upon cooperating to ‘enhance the impact of tourism on job creation, infrastructure development and intercultural understanding, while ensuring environmental sustainability.’ In this respect, they welcome Morocco’s offer to host a Euromed ministerial meeting on tourism and mandate Senior Officials to work on its preparation.”

An Instrument for Consensus and Cooperation on Tourism in the Mediterranean by 2007/2008?

The Mediterranean cannot long remain one of the rare regions of the world that does not have an instrument
of its own for consensus and cooperation in the field of tourism. This type of structure exists in Asia, the Caribbean and Europe. Certainly, the UNWTO has endeavoured to foster cooperation in Northern Africa and the Middle East through two of its commissions. Publications and statistics with marketing and forecasting aims have been published to this effect. Meetings have been and will continue to be organised to ensure cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, major pandemics such as AIDS or the threat of avian influenza, and travel advisories. Furthermore, projects have been prepared with the aim of organising the Euro-Mediterranean information and communications technologies sphere and training agents. Without a specific institution, this cooperation will not operate efficiently. This time, the European Commission and the governments participating in the Barcelona Process have grasped this. The question remains of whether it will be created within the subregional framework of the 5+5 Dialogue countries or within the global framework of the Mediterranean Basin – stretching from Mauritania to Jordan and which should also include the countries emerging from former Yugoslavia as well as Albania and the Principalities of Andorra, Monaco and The Republic of San Marino. 2007-2008 will be the decisive years. The hesitation to tackle the non-economic dimensions of this cooperation will also have to be overcome! How can we overcome age-old fears, fears too often linked to a marketing vision of the Mediterranean?

All sustainable development demands a long-term, ‘win-win’ strategic perspective and not a short-term one aiming at quick profits. Cooperation is not just a means of allowing northern enterprise to expand into the south. Cooperation has other aims as well, in particular that of attaining the material as well as spiritual well-being of populations on both shores of the Mediterranean.

**The idea of making tourism one of the vectors of the Alliance of Civilisations has met with everyone’s satisfaction**

This is why the idea of making tourism one of the vectors of the Alliance of Civilisations has met with everyone's satisfaction. The UNWTO, in its function as agency of the United Nations in charge of tourism affairs, will manage the Alliance’s action programme, which will begin, as announced by the UNWTO’s Secretary-General, Francesco Frangialli, with a World Summit on Tourism and Religion, under the auspices of the Spanish government and the high patronage of the King of Spain. Participants will discuss the means by which to strengthen ties between tourism and the major world religions so as to foster development in peace and intercultural dialogue. The Summit will be held in the autumn of 2007 in Cordoba, Spain.
Groundwater Challenges in the MENA Region

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Water in the Mediterranean Region

Freshwater plays a pivotal role for sustainable development in the Mediterranean region. Water in the region is unequally distributed both in time and space. Groundwater is a limited resource in the Mediterranean region, due to arid and semi-arid climatic conditions in many countries and to periods of periodic drought in others. Under these circumstances, aquifer recharge is significantly reduced. The reserves of groundwater and the storage capacity of aquifers play an economic and strategic role in guaranteeing agricultural production and urban water supply in the Mediterranean.

The article takes a look at issues of groundwater management for the countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions. The MENA region has among the lowest per capita amount of water supply in the world. Issues of surface water have been at the forefront in much of the debate on water scarcities, water sharing and improved water resources management. Groundwater continues to be a hidden or forgotten issue that deserves much more attention among policymakers.

Water in the MENA Region

Most countries in the MENA region are experiencing water scarcity combined with low water use efficiency in irrigated agriculture. According to FAO, water use efficiency is about 40 percent. This is higher than in Latin America but lower than in South Asia. Figures from the World Water Development Report (WWDR) show that countries like Malta, Libya, Algeria and Jordan are facing extreme situations of water scarcity. Out of 182 countries ranked in the WWDR with regard to the annual per capita total renewable water resources availability, more than half of the countries in the MENA region are ranked in the lowest 10 percent. This has caused almost all renewable water resources to be in use, and many countries have resorted to the use of their non-renewable water resources for agricultural, industrial and domestic purposes.

Groundwater is a hidden problem, since many countries extract more than is being recharged. This puts the region’s irrigated agriculture at risk and leads to saltwater intrusion in aquifers close to the seas. Weak enforcement of environmental legislation leads to groundwater pollution, which further decreases groundwater quality throughout the region. In some cases, legislation is not comprehensive enough, lacking specific rules on solid wastes, hazardous chemicals, etc. A disproportionately large share of available freshwater is used in irrigated agriculture, but it is accompanied by an intensive use of fertilisers which also contributes to water quality degradation through pollution and salinisation. The Jordan River, for example, is in poor shape due to overuse of the upper Jordan by Israel and overuse of its tributary, the Yarmouk River, by Syria and Jordan. There is a great need for improved water resources governance, as well as improved water efficiency and productivity in irrigated agriculture.

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economic development further increases water demand, with serious implications for development and poverty reduction. Even though some countries in the region are on track to reach the Millennium Development Goal targets on improved water supply and sanitation, ongoing urbanisation will necessitate increased investments in water supply and sanitation. According to the World Bank, the MENA region will have grown to a projected 430 million in 2025 from around 100 million in 1960 and the present 311 million, bringing the per capita water average to extremely worrying levels. This raises ever bigger questions on the present approximately 80 to 85 percent of water that is used for irrigated agriculture in the MENA region.

The complexities of managing and sharing common water resources are well-known to the region. Conflicts over water in both intra-national and international settings evolve in complex political and hydrological environments. The MENA region’s potential for conflict is increasing because it has one of the highest demographic growth rates of the world at 3-4 percent. The water-intensive agricultural irrigation policies are motivated by the pursuit of national water and food security in countries with burgeoning populations but little economic diversification. Some of the highest demographic concentrations in the world are found in the region, such as in the Gaza Strip.

The water resources are used in an agricultural sector which produces little wealth in the MENA region economies. It has been suggested that a gradual reallocation of water from irrigated agriculture to other economic uses that can provide a higher economic return (industrial and services) will be a more realistic and long-term sustainable policy option. Such change will not come easy since many people, the poor in particular, have agriculture as their economic mainstay and employment opportunity.

**Groundwater Regulations in Select Countries**

Many countries in the region are currently in a stage of institutional reform, orienting priorities and practices towards integrated approaches to water resources management.

Also at the national level there have been some improvements in groundwater management. For example, in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria water is under the public realm and the pumping and use of groundwater is regulated by legislation. Well drilling is subject to a permit, which also specifies the volume of water that can be extracted and its use. In Jordan, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation has also developed a groundwater management policy, which sets out the Government’s policy and intentions concerning groundwater management aiming at the development of the resource, its protection, management and measures needed to bring the annual abstractions from the various renewable aquifers to a sustainable rate for each. However the actual implementation and monitoring of legislation and permits continues to be a challenge for all three countries.

**In Syria, despite existing rules and regulations on required permits, almost 50 percent of the total number of wells in the country are considered illegal.**

As previously noted, as much as 80 to 85 percent of the water resources in many MENA countries are used for irrigation and countries like Jordan, Lebanon and Syria rely heavily on groundwater. For example, in Syria 60 percent of all irrigated areas are currently irrigated by groundwater. Despite existing rules and regulations on required permits, almost 50 percent of the total number of wells in the country are considered illegal. The consequences include water over-abstraction. Too many times extraction exceeds groundwater recharge, leading to falling groundwater tables. In coastal areas over-used groundwater aquifers are suffering from salt-water intrusion.

**Transboundary Groundwater**

Countries like Libya, Tunisia and Algeria are sharing vast amounts of groundwater. Despite the region’s heavy reliance on groundwater, most of the political focus in the region is on shared surface water. There are some exceptions to this, such as the groundwater between Palestine and Israel. Interesting cases are now emerging where countries have started to cooperate on transboundary groundwater, such as between Tunisia, Algeria and Libya regarding the North Western Sahara Aquifer System. Cooperation has so far been on a technical level, such as jointly defining the boundaries of the aquifer, identifying
areas where the pressure on the groundwater resource is the strongest and developing a common database. Cooperation is now moving into a second phase of establishing joint legal and institutional frameworks: a steering committee consisting of the three countries' national water authorities; a joint coordination unit; and an ad hoc scientific committee. The framework will manage common databases, establish monitoring indicators and promote information exchange.

There are long-standing traditions in the region of developing small- and large-scale water management alternatives. The irrigation-based civilisations that have emerged in the region are of course well known. Less emphasised, however, are the nomadic and pastoralist cultures that for centuries have applied, for example, rainwater harvesting techniques and sustainable ways of using water resources. The more recent water scarcity responses include, among others, desalination, reuse of wastewater, water pricing, modern irrigation technologies and virtual water and water imports. Countries in the MENA region have applied these techniques when they find it necessary and appropriate to gain more supply and/or use the existing limited supply in a more efficient way. So far, these national water policy adjustments have not been reflected in the transboundary water allocation discussions and negotiations.

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Regional Work on Groundwater – Recent Responses

As compared to surface water, groundwater aquifers do not have the same level of attention with regard to water resources protection and legislation. Normally, existing knowledge and information on groundwater replenishment and boundaries are weak, thus making it even more difficult to regulate. There is a long tradition in the Mediterranean of cooperation and networking on issues of sustainable development, environmental protection and management of natural resources. Water is a priority in many regional processes, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Barcelona Convention, and the Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development (MCSD). The EU Water Framework Directive offers a concrete example of water management in the European Union that could also be explored by other countries along the Mediterranean.

**Málaga-Marrakech Declaration on Groundwater in the Mediterranean**

A very recent initiative to improve groundwater management in the Mediterranean region is the Málaga-Marrakech Declaration on Groundwater in the Mediterranean from 2006. The Declaration is aimed at influencing the governments of Mediterranean and EU countries, national and international associations and agencies, companies and local and regional administrations that are concerned with groundwater. In sum, the Declaration recommends promoting research, to passing new regulations and national legislation to promote integrated groundwater management, and developing educational programmes to raise awareness of groundwater, to protect it and to promote sustainable use of this natural resource in Mediterranean countries.

Not only countries in the MENA region are dependent on groundwater; the same holds true for many other countries along the Mediterranean basin. This would underscore the need for prudent use of groundwater for future generations. With this as the backdrop, researchers, technicians, managers and politicians participated in two international congresses on groundwater in the Mediterranean, held in Málaga, Spain, and Marrakech, Morocco, in April and May 2006. Both meetings have given their backing to the present Declaration on Groundwater in the Mediterranean.
The Road Ahead – Making Groundwater Visible

Groundwater extends beyond administrative frontiers and international borders and it is clear that effective management of groundwater must be carried out in cooperation between stakeholders as well as countries. Even though groundwater is regulated, it has not received the same attention as surface water and there is therefore a continued need for national and regional cooperation programmes for sustainable use of groundwater aquifers. It is thus very important to continue efforts of national, regional and sub-regional cooperation. As has been pointed out, there are some promising signs of, for example, transboundary groundwater cooperation between countries like Libya, Tunisia and Algeria. The recent Málaga-Marrakech Declaration on Groundwater in the Mediterranean is also promising. These types of regional and sub-regional arrangements should be increasingly supported. With a view to improving groundwater management it is important to:

- Make groundwater a strong part of integrated approaches to sustainable water resources management;
- Support processes of national and regional cooperation on shared groundwater;
- Enhance capacities to work with groundwater management;
- Increase the knowledge on groundwater recharge and boundaries;
- Not only focus on declarations, policy and legislative developments but increasingly on stricter enforcement of existing as well as new groundwater policies and legislation.

The above changes will not come easy for the MENA region and will require much political commitment and resolve.

Bibliography


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Due to its geographical location, the Mediterranean region is one of the areas in the world that is most vulnerable to climate change. A 2°C rise in global temperature will most likely bring about a warmer, more variable climate in the Mediterranean region, with an increase in water scarcity, particularly in the summer, more forest fires, a decrease in crops, a drop in tourism and the extinction of species. Climate change is a reality that even the most sceptical would not dare to question. Since the beginning of the 21st century, we have endured extreme climatic events more frequently and with greater intensity. For the first time a hurricane—Hurricane Vince—reached the Mediterranean region and landed on the southwestern coast of Spain. Tropical storm Delta then hit the Canary Islands causing severe damage. A significant trend has been observed in the increase in droughts in the Mediterranean and Sahel. Beyond our borders, the greater frequency and intensity of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico—twice as many as there were 30 years ago—has left a trail of destruction and death. It is thus not an isolated phenomenon but rather the culmination of a trend that has been occurring in recent years and about which scientists have been warning us for more than twenty years.

Climate Change

History of life on Earth goes back approximately 3,800 million years and humanity is a very recent guest, appearing at the end of the last million years. If we were to use a fast camera capable of compressing time since the Earth was formed—some 4,500 million years ago—into a one-year period, we would see that man appears ten minutes before the end of the year and the industrial revolution and our technological era would appear in the last 13 seconds. However, in such a short period of time we have deeply affected the system that sustains us, to the extent that we are even changing the climate. The alterations we are inflicting upon the Earth in such a short period of time are producing an impact with catastrophic consequences for human populations. Extreme climatic events are increasing in frequency and severity and scientists are warning us that if we do not implement urgent measures we may find ourselves heading down an irreversible path of much more drastic changes with even greater catastrophic consequences, particularly if the increase in the planet’s global temperature is more than 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures. We are releasing enormous amounts of CO₂ into the atmosphere by burning fossil fuels—coal, petrol and gas—for the production and use of energy. CO₂ is the main gas responsible for the greenhouse effect; that is, it “traps” heat in the atmosphere and produces a rise in the planet’s global temperature, 0.7°C in the last century, the highest rise in 10,000 years. However, the consequences of climate change become apparent in different parts of the planet in different ways, poor countries being more vulnerable and less responsible for the problem.
Impact of Climate Change in the Mediterranean

The physiognomy of the Mediterranean region is a combination of its geographical conditions and culture that has adapted to these conditions over centuries for its development. The Mediterranean’s resources are inseparably linked to its climatic characteristics. A hot and dry summer climate combined with 45,000 km of coastline has turned the region into a leading tourist destination, attracting 30% of world tourism. Hot summers and mild, rainy winters have enabled agriculture to develop as an integral part of the region’s economy. Furthermore, around one hundred million hectares of woodland cover the entire Mediterranean basin, supporting considerable biodiversity. Today, this natural wealth is under significant pressure—from population and the current development model—that climate change could make even worse. To ascertain the impact of global warming in the Mediterranean, WWF commissioned a study to a team of scientists from the region—Christos Giannakopoulos, Marco Bindi and Tina Tin—with the aim of finding out how the Mediterranean region’s climate would change if global temperature rose 2°C over pre-industrial temperatures, and determining the impact on water resources, forest fires and biodiversity, as well as on the region’s main economic sectors: agriculture and tourism. The analysis is based on the global climate model of the Hadley Centre in the United Kingdom and on the A2 and B2 emission scenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It has also considered climate information based on temperature, precipitation and wind. The study focuses on the period between 2031-2060, when global temperature is expected to reach 2°C above pre-industrial levels. It then goes on to summarise the main impacts that a 2°C rise in global temperature are likely to have on the Mediterranean region. Heat Waves: With a 2°C rise in global average temperature over pre-industrial levels, the climate in the Mediterranean region will be warmer, drier and more variable. The annual average temperature in the region could increase by 1-2°C over current conditions. However, inland in countries such as Turkey, northern Italy and the Maghreb, far from the moderating effect of the sea, maximum temperatures could rise up to 5°C. Heat waves and extremely hot days are expected to increase, especially in inland areas, but even the north Aegean islands, with their sea breeze, are expected to endure two more weeks of heat waves a year.

Decreased Rainfall: Annual precipitation is likely to decrease up to a fifth in the southern Mediterranean, while summer rainfall in the northern Mediterranean may decrease over 30%. The study suggests that there will be a shift in drought periods and that they will last longer. The number of dry days will increase and rainfall is likely to be concentrated in short periods of time, which may lead to storms in Italy, western Greece, the south of France and the north-western part of the Iberian Peninsula. This warmer, drier and more variable climate will probably bring with it increased fire risk, lower agricultural yields, changes in tourist seasons, a rise in water demand and loss of species.

Fires: A 2°C global warming will lead to a greater risk of forest fires practically throughout the year in the southern Mediterranean. In almost the entirety of the rest of the region, the fire risk period is expected to be an additional one to six weeks. Extreme fire risk will probably increase an additional month in the Iberian Peninsula, northern Italy and the Balkans, putting greater pressure on local nature, including various species of animals that are already in danger of extinction.

Agriculture: A hotter and drier climate will also lead to a decrease in agricultural yields, particularly in summer crops that are not irrigated. Beans, soybeans and lentils are among the most affected crops in the region, with an up to 40% drop in yields, depending on the location. The impacts are not evenly distributed: the decrease in yields will be more severe in the south than in the north of the Mediterranean. Throughout the region, agricultural strategies could generate an increase in crop yields that are more resistant to the warmer and drier climate. However, such strategies could require up to 40% more water for irrigation, which may not always be available with a 2°C warming.

Tourism: A greater frequency in heat waves and droughts will probably discourage summer holidays in the Mediterranean region. Tourists may prefer...
In October 2006, the UNESCO Bureau for the Man and the Biosphere Programme established by unanimous vote the Intercontinental Biosphere Reserve of the Mediterranean on a proposal by the Council for the Environment of the Junta de Andalucía and the Kingdom of Morocco. UNESCO highlighted that this conservation programme is a pioneering initiative involving two countries located in different continents that have different social and economic conditions. Moreover, this is the first time that a marine transition area is established as a reserve, which comprises a system of reserves that include the Sierra de las Nieves and the Sierra de Grazalema, both already classed as Biosphere Reserves.

With a total area of one million hectares and located on both shores of the Mediterranean, the reserve includes some of the most emblematic natural spaces of the Spanish provinces of Cádiz and Málaga as well as those in four provinces of northern Morocco: Tangier, Tetouan, Larache and Chefchaouene; it is also expected to have an impact on nine other provinces in this country. The area comprises various Eastern Mediterranean ecosystem types which are of great importance for the conservation of the world’s biodiversity and offers great opportunities to carry out tests and some innovative interventions and activities relating to sustainable development. In addition to the natural parks of the Sierra de Grazalema and the Sierra de las Nieves, the Intercontinental Biosphere Reserve of the Mediterranean also comprises two natural parks in the Andalusian territory, four natural spaces, three Natural Monuments, and 11 sites proposed as Community Interest Sites. The sector located in northern Morocco comprises 18 natural spaces: eight continental Sites of Biological and Ecological Interest (SBEI), such as the Talasssentane National Park, and 10 coastal SBEIs. The project aims to contribute to the conservation of natural resources by aiding the development of the SBEI network in northern Morocco, consolidating the Andalusian Natural Spaces Network (RENPA) and promoting a sustainable use of resources to the benefit of local populations. Moreover, it encourages a shared use of tools for the management and coordination of human and natural resources. The reserve is to bring benefits to both regions as it will ensure conservation and a sustainable use of its shared natural resources by establishing sound management principles and by fostering and supporting participation along with the social and economic development of rural communities. The new reserve also provides a unique opportunity for cooperation between Andalusia and Morocco, which may bring positive economic developments for northern Morocco, for maritime traffic, fishing and tourism. The Project also envisages the creation of a nature interpretation centre in northern Morocco, a training scheme for tourism professionals, the introduction of a quality seal for local products, as well as the development of tourist facilities and rural development groups.

The project proposal for this reserve was drafted between 2003 and 2006 under the aegis of the Council for the Environment of the Junta de Andalucía with the cooperation of Morocco’s High Commission for Water, Forests and Combating Desertification, and the UNESCO MAB programme through its Spanish and Moroccan national committees along with the Andalusian committee. The Project is based on the MAB program of UNESCO and the Interreg III Community Initiative Programme which aims to strengthen social and economic cohesion throughout the EU and foster cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation with the goal of promoting conservation and a sustainable use of resources by local populations. The programme has a budget of 3.7 million euros, 75% of which are financed through the FEDER funds.

of the region, especially in the south. In the south of the Iberian Peninsula and along the entire southern Mediterranean coast to Syria, an additional month of heavy cooling will be required. With increasingly dry years, there will be less hydroelectric energy available and the problem will worsen if the energy deficit is covered with fossil fuels.

Biodiversity Studies: warn us that a 3.6°C warming could lead to a loss of over 50% of plant species in the northern Mediterranean, with a loss of over 80% in northcentral Spain and in the mountains, particularly in France. A greater fire risk as a result of a warmer and drier climate will also encourage the spread of invasive grass species, which in turn could lead to more frequent and more intense fires.

Health: Climate change has a direct and indirect impact on human health. A shorter period of frost and a longer warmer period would bring about an expansion of infections that are transmitted by animal vectors, such as malaria and dengue, which are transmitted by mosquitoes and require specific temperature and humidity conditions to survive. A rise in temperatures also accentuates other illnesses such as allergies, which are a consequence of an increase in pollen and spore concentrations.

Today's Actions Determine Tomorrow's Climate

The good news is that we are still in time to mitigate this important problem. To do so, it is essential and urgent to decrease emissions and set up adaptation measures to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. It is very important to keep global temperature below the 2°C rise since pre-industrial levels, which requires: industrialised countries to comply with their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and adopt reductions of around 30% by 2020 and 80% by 2050; developing countries to control their emissions and directly adopt clean technologies with the help of wealthy countries, which must transfer technologies and resources; the replacement of the current energy model that is greatly responsible for greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change.

The Cost of Not Taking Measures Will Be Even Greater

It is frequently said that the measures to combat climate change have a cost, but that not taking them has even greater costs, both in economic terms and in loss of human lives. The Stern Report, published in October 2006, reached the conclusion that the cost of inaction could be 5 -20% of the annual global GDP, while acting could limit such a cost to 1%. It also warns that a delay in implementing measures increases both the danger and the cost.

Bibliography

Transport, Logistics and Economic Integration in the Euro-Mediterranean Region

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The European Investment Bank (EIB) convened the 1st FEMIP Conference (9th and 10th November 2006 in Monaco) to discuss economic integration in the transport sector in the Euro-Mediterranean region. FEMIP, or the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership, is the financial arm of the EIB for the 9 Mediterranean Partner Countries associated with the European Union through the Barcelona Process. Investing 1.4 billion euros annually in support of the private sector, socio-economic development infrastructures and regional cooperation projects, FEMIP is the leading multilateral source of financing in the region.

The creation of the FEMIP Conferences has allowed Euro-Mediterranean dialogue to advance. In fact, beyond its primary responsibility, which is to contribute to financing and development on behalf of the European Union, FEMIP seeks to foster the exchange of knowledge in the Euro-Mediterranean region and generate opinion in favour of a shared destiny. To this end, these conferences bring together the political, economic and scientific actors of the region, from both Mediterranean Partner Countries and the enlarged European Union to discuss subjects of use to development. Thus, the conference held in November of 2006 was attended by some 200 transport actors to engage in interactive dialogue with some twenty experts, among them three Transport Ministers from southern Mediterranean countries, the Governor of Tangiers, a dozen business executives, five bankers and financiers from both North and South, three transport economists, the Minister of State of Monaco, Philippe de Fontaine Vive, Vice-President of the EIB, and Jacques Barrot, Vice-President of the European Commission (see the FEMIP Conference site: www.bei.org/femip/conference).

For this 1st FEMIP Conference, the topic of Euro-Mediterranean economic integration in the transport sector was an immediate choice, the aim being to create the conviction that it is now essential to think regionally, avoid redundancy and go beyond political borders and psychological boundaries. The conference fulfilled the wish expressed by the FEMIP Ministerial Council at its meeting in Tunis on 25th-26th June 2006 and was a follow-up to the Conference of Transport Ministers in Marrakech on 15th December 2005. Thus the Monaco Conference allowed reflection on the integrating effects of transportation networks, investment priorities and the means of raising both public and private funds for implementing a global transport strategy in the region.

The Integrating Effects of Transport Systems

Over the past 25 years, the partner countries on the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean Basin have benefited little from globalisation. This situation can primarily be attributed to the absence of regional integration, both in political terms and

It is therefore necessary to launch a process of ‘in-depth’ regional economic integration involving the liberalisation of trade and services, the integration of markets and the implementation of reforms to improve the business climate
in terms of available infrastructures, structural reform or upgrading of administrative capacities. It is therefore necessary to launch a process of 'in-depth' regional economic integration involving the liberalisation of trade and services, the integration of markets and the implementation of reforms to improve the business climate. The challenge is to provide the partner countries with a means of attaining a growth rate 2 or 3 times higher than in the European Union Member States, which they need in order to create 2.5 million new jobs every year for 15 years, modernise their economies and successfully enter the globalised world.

Since its creation in October of 2002, FEMIP has committed some €5.5 billion to financing infrastructures of regional scope in partner countries. Despite convincing results (such as the works underway to construct an electrical and natural gas transport network in the Mashreq, or the development of national railway and road networks in the Maghreb), partner countries are far from having constituted the regional cooperation infrastructure necessary for South-South integration. Hence, the quality and capacity of North-South transport networks remain substandard, weighing heavily on transport and logistics costs, which represent over 20% of the final value of transported merchandise. Nonetheless, the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area is expected to increase transport flows in the region far beyond the already elevated growth rate of international traffic. This is why the creation of an efficient transport network is essential for meeting the transport demand under acceptable economic and environmental conditions. In this perspective, a pragmatic approach focussing on the sectors that can most quickly be integrated should be given priority. Beyond ambitious cross-border land infrastructures (such as the "High-Speed Railway of the Sands" connecting Casablanca and Cairo, a project long in maturing and whose implementation is conditioned by slow political evolution), maritime and air transport would appear to be the priority sectors on the shorter term.

Maritime and Air Transport, Priority Sectors

The region annually produces some 720 million tons of international maritime freight (of which 270 million are hydrocarbons), handled by 45 ports with traffic of more than 1 million tons per year distributed thus: 40% in intra-Mediterranean trade and 60% in trade with the rest of the world. Hence, in tonnage, the maritime sector represents nearly 90% of international freight trade in the region. Estimates indicate that these flows should double over the next 20 years, whereas containerised freight should increase eight-fold. Policy in this sector should therefore be global and cover a variety of aspects: technical and administrative interoperability, control of the entire logistic chain, organisation of supply routes around pivot-ports or hubs, and the intermodal connection of ports with their hinterlands.

The air transport sector represents 90% of the 100 million international passenger trips of the southern and eastern Mediterranean Partnership Countries: concentrated at 24 airports, half of these trips involve European Union Member States. These flows are also estimated to more than double over the next 20 years.

The air transport sector would thus seem to be one of the means for regional integration to be prioritised insofar as human mobility

The air transport sector would thus seem to be one of the means for regional integration to be prioritised insofar as human mobility: it is in keeping with the geographic dimensions of the region, requires proportionally less infrastructure than other forms of transport and has significant development potential (generated by tourism, business travel and, potentially, travel by expatriate populations). Examples of "single airspace" agreements (in both Europe and other regional blocs, as, for instance, the Andean Community of Nations or Southeast Asia) demonstrate that the diversification of traffic and the consequent lower costs quickly produce positive economic results.

By way of example, consider the “Open Sky" agreement recently concluded between the European Union and Morocco which will soon allow airline companies from both the EU and Morocco
to freely use the routes connecting the 26 countries involved, transit flights included. In anticipation of this agreement, Morocco has just granted two licences to 'low-cost' European airlines, leading to a significant drop in prices for connections between the UK or Germany and major Moroccan cities, going from some € 250 to € 50 for one-way tickets – a very concrete illustration of the benefits of Mediterranean economic integration for the public opinion concerned.

Perfecting Financing Methods

Creating a regionally-integrated transport and logistics system will require substantial investment. By way of example, the infrastructure projects being defined by Partner Countries would call for an investment of over € 20 billion if they were to be put into motion in the next five years.

On the Threshold of an Ambitious Process

The Conference has thus revealed that we are on the threshold of an ambitious process that cannot succeed unless all parties involved – that is, States, their public opinion and their economic actors – become engaged in meeting a double challenge: for Europe, the challenge of resolutely committing to the free circulation of people, goods and services; and for the Partner Countries, the challenge of explaining to public opinion that South-South regional integration could generate advantages that they can no longer ignore. Debate has demonstrated that the intelligence is there and that the political will demonstrated at the Conference of Transport Ministers in Marrakech can be mobilised. In other words, we have a pre-eminent need to rely on one another in the Euro-Mediterranean region: South-South integration will be achieved with the help of Europe and North-South integration cannot be achieved without the Partner Countries. The Conference likewise underlined that the point is not only to constitute a regional transport network, but also to create a transport system in the Euro-Mediterranean region. To this end, it is not enough to simply have a series of adjacent national infrastructure plans; an overall perspective is needed, embracing a variety of aspects: the concept of network in defining priorities; the integration of the notions of interoperability and logistics into the project conception stage; and the association of private investors with their accomplishments in order to accelerate the modernisation of the sector. This modernisation is certainly necessary, but above all, it represents a tremendous economic opportunity: the Euro-Mediterranean region not only represents 20% of the world’s GDP, it is also one of the regions most densely endowed with historical and cultural heritage in the world, where – due to the absence of regional integration – great economic potential is waiting to be exploited.

The implementation of mixed economy or delegated management formulas implies the adaptation of a legislative and macro-economic framework by Mediterranean Partner Countries

The debate at the Conference, above all in the 3rd Session, demonstrated that there is an intermediate option between the fully public and the fully private, but that the implementation of mixed economy or delegated management formulas implies the adaptation of a legislative and macro-economic framework by Mediterranean Partner Countries to facilitate risk-taking by private investors. Morocco and Turkey are well down the road towards such adaptation. FEMIP is prepared to support such evolution in all countries of the Barcelona Partnership: it can not only mobilise significant financial means, but above all, considerably improves the efficiency of investment decisions through an appropriate selection of viable projects and the contribution of technical assistance, with the support of three local offices in Cairo, Tunis and Rabat. Nonetheless, keeping in mind the broad spectrum of needs to be met, FEMIP has set itself the objective of increasing the involvement of the private sector in the creation of infrastructures and services of public utility. To this end, it has established a “special FEMIP envelope” (ESF), whose parameters allow FEMIP to react to the constraints burdening the capacity of the private sector and keeping it from undertaking major commercial risks. To this end, it intends to reserve its public aid resources for
In late 2006, the Heads of State and Government at the European Council Meeting, considering the broad scope of Euro-Mediterranean financial cooperation, granted FEMIP the means to assist development of MPCs from 2007 to 2013 via two important decisions:

• Whereas the 9 Mediterranean Partner Countries were granted approximately 4.5 billion euros in loans from 2000 to 2006, FEMIP will be entitled to grant at least 8.7 billion euros from 2007 to 2013, in other words, nearly double the resources. This sum is comparable to that allotted to countries preparing to accede to the European Union and represents nearly double the amount of loans to eastern EU neighbours.

• As a result of a major agreement with partnership countries concluded at the last FEMIP Ministerial Council in Tunis last June, the European Council has likewise ratified the strengthening of FEMIP in order to eventually attain a genuine “Euro-Mediterranean Economic Community.”

On this basis, FEMIP will be able to:

• Strengthen institutional dialogue, which will hereafter be done on three levels: on the ministerial level through the FEMIP Council; on the senior official level through a new FEMIP Committee in charge of discussing investment strategies; and on the economic actor level through FEMIP Conferences.

• Develop new financial products for risk management and support to investment made by businesses; primary among these new products is the development of loans in local currency, contingent on the success of the discussions underway with certain Partner Countries in opening capital markets to EIB loans.

• Make knowledge sharing a focal point of the Partnership: Through its external offices and the regular organisation of its Conferences, FEMIP will be attentive to input from its operators in order to be more efficient and strengthen the sense of a common future for the Mediterranean region.

It is in this spirit that FEMIP would like to demonstrate, in conjunction with its partners, that the Mediterranean is just as important for Europe as its eastern neighbours. Thus, our action is specifically orientated towards the improvement of development conditions in the Mediterranean Basin. For instance, we will dedicate the next FEMIP Conference, to be organised in conjunction with the European Banking Federation (EBF) and slated to be held on 22nd-23rd March 2007 in Paris, to improving the conditions for migrant financial transfers and use of financial flows in the Euro-Mediterranean area. Thereafter another FEMIP Conference in 2007 will examine the development of micro-finance, a sector whose expansion in Morocco and Tunisia we have aided. Finally, we will propose that the Ministers to attend the FEMIP Council choose from among the following two topics: using environmental protection in the Mediterranean region as an opportunity to add value to project financing; or fostering investment in the sustainable tourism sector.

In this spirit, the FEMIP Conference 2006 recommended:

1. Enhancing the knowledge partnership in the Euro-Mediterranean region in order to gain a better control of regional economic development imperatives and foster institutional reform;
2. Promoting the concept of network in the definition of new infrastructures and granting priority to lacking interconnections (“Motorways of the Sea” and access to hinterlands);
3. Integrating international norms of technical and administrative interoperability into projects;
4. Strengthening the capacity of international financial institutions to take risks in financing infrastructures or even setting up guarantee structures covering the ‘legislation risk’; and
5. Facilitating access to financing in local currency for financial institutions and operators (whether private or mixed-economy).
This paper focuses on recent port developments in the Southern Mediterranean and in particular on the perspectives of the future Moroccan port, TangerMed, located in the Strait of Gibraltar. In the containerised transport market in the Western Mediterranean, the two Spanish ports of Valencia and Barcelona seem to be registering the most significant growth at present, whereas Gioia Tauro (Southern Italy) is experiencing a notable decline and Algeciras (Spain, Gibraltar) is approaching saturation with its current facilities. The forthcoming inauguration of TangerMed (July 2007 for the first terminal) should challenge this state of affairs.

For some twenty years now, the evolution of containerised maritime transport has allowed deployment of new container ports in the Mediterranean, yet one can legitimately wonder whether TangerMed, to become a hub port absorbing the growth of containerised maritime traffic from Asia, marks the starting point of the modernisation of ports along the Western Mediterranean’s southern coastline or is simply an isolated initiative due to its geographic location and its strategic commercial position.

**Containerised Traffic and Mediterranean Port Dynamics**

A quick review of the mechanisms underlying port renewal in the Mediterranean area could be useful. As the ships used for containerised transport have gradually grown in size, the conditions for their operation have been reorganised with a view to improving productivity. The reduction of the number of ports of call for larger ships, the introduction of shorter, feeder ship services to regional ports, the generalisation of interlining at hub ports, the emergence of technical partnerships between shipping companies (alliances or joint operation of services) have produced significant gains in productivity for the maritime shipping industry (see diagram below). The use of very large ships (having gone from 5,000 TEUs in the past to 11,000 TEUs today, where TEU stands for a unit of measure equivalent to twenty feet) has thus been enabled and has allowed absorption of the historic growth experienced by world commerce since the year 2000, in particular with regard to trade with Asian countries.

**The evolution of containerised maritime transport has allowed deployment of new container ports in the Mediterranean**

These innovations in the container shipment industry have likewise encouraged the development of hub ports dedicated to transhipment between mainline ships (interlining) and between mainline ships and feeder ships (feedering). These hubs are located on major maritime transport routes or at the peripheries of semi-enclosed seas or archipelagos. Hence, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Atlantic European ports and the majority of the islands in the Caribbean Sea are supplied essentially by feeder ships from a few hub ports, which are employed by intercontinental lines and therefore large ships. Certain hub ports are likewise dedicated to transhipment of containers from one mainline ship to another, and are therefore located along the most frequented maritime corridors, which in the great...
Interlining
One ship departs from Port A and the other from Port B, both exchanging part of their cargo according to the destination ports into which they will call: they offer six ports of destination for each port of departure, actually only serving three each. Their time of call to port is lowered, as are their fixed port costs.

Feeder
ing
Mainline ships needing to bring containers to regional or insufficiently equipped destination ports employ smaller ships called “feeders” for this finer service. Mainline ships only directly supply the major ports.

majority of cases consist of an East-West route: Asia – the Americas – Europe.
In this context of rationalisation, new ports have emerged in the Mediterranean to carry out the two transhipping activities: feeder- ing and interlining. The first of these ports was Algeciras, on the Strait of Gibraltar, which was then followed by Gioia Tauro, Marsaxlokk in Malta and Cagliari in Sardinia for the Western half of the Mediterranean, whereas Port Said, Damietta and the new port of the Suez Canal in Egypt are the primary transhipment ports in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The advent of these Mediterranean ports has not had an impact upon Northern European ports. The latter have retained their function of local redistribution to regional ports as well as their role as inter-oceanic ports for the continent. The containers handled in Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg, for instance, are thus partially redirected to Swedish, Irish and Baltic ports, among others, but also supply an extensive hinterland ranging from Western Europe to Poland, Hungary and Romania.
In contrast to hub ports, these Northern European ports are “main ports” or “gateway ports” and combine the functions of regional maritime redistribution (feeder- ing and interlining) and hinterland supply.
The rise in containerised traffic has thus not only benefited new hub ports: Valencia and Barcelona, the main Spanish ports, have consolidated their role as hubs for the Western Mediterranean and maintain transhipment traffic at approximately 30% of the containerised volume handled. On the other side of the Mediterranean and on a lower scale, Beirut and Istanbul (Ambarlı) have acquired a similar position by combining the functions of hub ports for the Eastern Mediterranean with those of intercontinental ports for their respective hinterlands. In Egypt, Port Said, Damietta and the recently created Suez Port remain hub ports very similar to their counterparts in Algeciras and Gioia Tauro.

Marginalisation of Maghreb Ports
A great number of ports and even entire coastal stretches are absent from these hub port and main port networks. Thus in the Mediterranean Region, the growth in containerised traffic has certainly not benefited the many ports equally. Maghreb ports are today particularly marginalised.
The majority of ports along the Maghreb coast have largely insufficient and at times obsolete infrastructures: their depths limit their capacity to ships of medium draught, the handling devices are not always adapted and the conditions of merchandise processing (in
particular controls) defer time spent in port and even cause congestion at terminals. In sum, they are served nearly exclusively by feeder ships, which increases the total transit time even more.

The majority of ports along the Maghreb coast have largely insufficient and at times obsolete infrastructures

In Algeria, the port of Algiers, the country’s premiere port for containers and roll on/roll off (RoRo) cargo, suffers from chronic congestion despite the implementation of dry ports in Rouiba, in the vicinity of Algiers. The port of Algiers, originally conceived for conventional traffic, has had to be adapted to containerised cargo without displacing other types of traffic: roll on/roll off cargo, passengers, various bulk items and the fishing catch are still handled at the Algiers terminals. The main railway station of the capital encroaches upon roadways and the railway infrastructure is therefore underused: the existing rail line dedicated to port freight cuts across a coastal motorway. Railway traffic is only possible at night, as it interrupts road traffic. The platforms contain storage depots where some of the imported containers are controlled and stored; the terminals are not computerised and the containers are stocked in various port zones.

The infrastructure situation is a great deal better in Casablanca: the container terminal was planned expressly for container traffic, has enough depth to allow efficient organisation of storage, the handling equipment – gantry cranes and straddle carriers – is appropriate and container storage management is computerised. Yet container stripping/stuffing as well as verification and customs controls are generally effected within the port area, the dematerialisation of these procedures remaining largely incomplete. In the case of Casablanca as in that of Algiers, the cities have expanded considerably and port infrastructures are now hemmed in by metropolitan areas with millions of inhabitants. The possibilities for expansion are limited or even non-existent. Moreover, the premises of these ports are now considered strategic areas for urban development: they occupy a significant amount of surface area in the centre of the city, with good transport infrastructure and they offer excellent perspectives for major real estate operations. In addition, the central location of these two ports, the most important ones in these countries, each handling 500,000 containers per year, is a continuous source of nuisances associated with road traffic. This series of factors indicates the need for the displacement of certain types of maritime traffic and an in-depth reorganisation of port facilities in Casablanca and Algiers.

The port of Tunis has somewhat different problems. The historic port of Tunis which reached the sea via a long channel from the Lake of Tunis quickly proved insufficient and too costly to maintain. A new port in Radès-La Goulette was built on both sides of the channel and the route leading to Tunis. Originally designed for roll on/roll off ships, its facilities are not ideal for containerised traffic and it is clearly under-equipped. In addition, port depth is insufficient and dockyards are too small. Yet in contrast to the port of Algiers, it is not yet experiencing significant problems due to insufficient capacity. It is located on the periphery of the Tunis metropolis and this location constitutes a considerable advantage. The Port of Radès thus has a limited yet extant possibility for expansion at its current site for terminals handling a diversity of merchandise: the conversion of the quays now dedicated to bulk cargo and good management of the facilities should allow the port to handle the increase in containerised traffic for a number of years without running up against situations of congestion that would be detrimental to Tunisian trade. New road infrastructures currently in the last phases of construction will facilitate access to the port and should eliminate the current transit route through the centre of Tunis.

Though the situation of the Tunisian port may seem less difficult, the site is nonetheless highly constrained. The Port of La Goulette is soon to be transformed into a yacht harbour, whereas urban developers have been awarded licences to develop land along the lakeshore that will supposedly be given over to tourist infrastructures. At the same time, environmental regulations have become stricter and the creation of new land by reclamation from wetland areas is (fortunately) no longer allowed. Hence, in the immediate future, the growth perspectives for the Port of Tunis / Radès are greater than for ports in neighbouring countries, but on the long term, large-scale development of the site is not conceivable. Sooner or later, the lack of port capacity thus threatens to asphyxiate the economies of the Maghreb countries and despite the relative overcapacity of Western Mediterranean ports in
general, the shortcomings are evident on the local Maghreb scale.

**TangerMed, More than Just a Port**

Morocco made an early diagnosis that has led to deep reflection on the country’s role in Mediterranean trade and the possibilities for economic and industrial development offered by improved organisation of transport. The location of the Region of Tangiers on the Strait of Gibraltar and at the crossroads of north-south and east-west maritime routes immediately made it the obvious choice. At the same time, Morocco has benefited from a new dynamic following the arrival of the latest administration. The need for economic development of North-Western Morocco, deliberately marginalised over the past thirty years, has given rise to a project for overall economic and social reorganisation. The future TangerMed port is the cornerstone. Due to its geographic location, the diversity of facilities and infrastructures planned and the support it has from the Moroccan Authorities, the TangerMed port should certainly be considered a particularly innovative and ambitious operation.

**TMSA**

The agency in charge of developing the special North Area and the TangerMed port, TMSA, has been granted exceptionally broad authorisation. As a public planning agency, it is responsible for the project’s content and implementation. It is therefore the main authority granting operating licences for the various facilities and logistics areas to private companies. In charge of planning and development of the different logistics and activities areas relating to the new port facilities, it also has the status of planner / developer for these areas. As such, it can grant land areas the status of public utility and is therefore entitled to expropriate such land. As the authority in charge of operating, enhancing and developing the port terminals, it gains the de facto status of port authority for the implementation of the new port.

**The TangerMed Port Project**

The project for this special economic zone can be divided into several facets: a port facet, of particular interest to us here, and an industrial and logistics

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**MAP 4**

*The TangerMed. 1 Part, Provisional Plan*

**Container Terminal**
- 2,100 m of linear quay with 2 container terminals operated by APM Terminals and Eurogate-Contship
- Depth of up to ~18 mwh
- Nominal capacity of 3.5 million TEUs
- 95 hectares of reclaimed land

**RoRo and Passenger Terminal**
- Potential for 8 RoRo stations
- Connected to the passenger train station
- Large parking area
- Capacity for 5 million voyagers, 1 million cars and 500,000 lorries

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Source: Medhub/TMSA.
The TangerMed port should certainly be considered a particularly innovative and ambitious operation

facet comprising several areas in the Region of Tangiers. Certain facilities are yet to be built, whereas others already exist and are to be integrated into the new project.

The port premises proper, Tanger I since the announcement of the forthcoming Tanger II (2008-2012), comprises a bulk terminal for cereals, an oil terminal, a terminal for various merchandise, three container terminals with a logistics area and a rolling stock terminal. Since the initial stage of the project, the perspectives for obtaining operating contracts for the container terminals have aroused vivid interest on behalf of major private operators. The different tendering processes for operating the TangerMed port facilities have resulted in an unusual collaboration between the largest port operators of the Arab and European regions. Initially, two container terminals were envisaged, a third one being added to the project more recently. The quays have a depth of 18 m and offer a potential handling capacity of over three million containers.

The different tendering processes for operating the TangerMed port facilities have resulted in an unusual collaboration between the largest port operators of the Arab and European regions

The first contract was awarded in 2004 to the joint-venture, APM Terminal (Maersk)-Akwa (a Moroccan group). The world’s leading shipping company and its port operation subsidiary have been present at the Algeciras terminals since the early 1990s. In 2006, the management of the second terminal was adjudicated to a consortium involving Eurogate, a European stevedore (40%), and the following three maritime operators (at 20% each): CMA-CGM and MSC, two world-scale European containerised shipping companies and Comanav, a former national Moroccan shipping company today taken over by CMA-CGM. As in the first case, this second contract comes with a certain number of conditions (particularly in terms of minimum investments to be made over a specific period of time) and was awarded for the duration of 30 years for the development and operation of the terminals. Nonetheless, it contains a particular stipulation the other does not: the second consortium has committed to create regional maritime companies and organise feeder services from its terminal. Indeed, one of the fears of the Moroccan Authorities was that the facilities would be entirely employed for transhipment operations involving containerised Asian traffic without regional repercussions, in particular for local maritime companies.

A second way of preventing this possible diversion of positive port investment repercussions consists in creating logistics and activities areas primarily in free port zones. The first free port zone – located directly behind the container terminals – is the Medhub area, jointly managed by TMSA and Jebel Ali Free Zone International (Jafza), the operator of the Dubai logistics area. It is dedicated to logistics and post-production of goods on their way to European markets. After being processed, these flows are distributed in Europe directly at the place of sale or to regional distributor warehouses via truck from the rolling stock terminal of TangerMed. All passenger ferry line and RoRo (roll on/roll off) traffic currently at the Tangiers city port is to be moved to the TangerMed rolling stock terminal. New development is expected in the Strait on the Algeciras side to absorb the foreseeable growth of rolling stock traffic between the two ports. Other zones are located beyond the mountainous shoreline area and will be developed either for industrial production activities – here also, the European markets are the target – or for logistics operators targeting the Moroccan market.

TangerMed is an attempt to successfully implement a difficult equation: creating added value for Morocco while attracting containerised traffic without infringing upon the market share held by extant Moroccan ports, Casablanca foremost. In other words, the aim is to create economic activity based on goods flow without links to the Moroccan hinterland. To this end, and in order to protect the activity of other ports (which are, moreover, under another port authority, the new ANP, or National Port Authority), the portion of TangerMed traffic destined to the national market has been voluntarily limited to 15% of the total, but the operators and TMSA are already
calling for increasing this percentage. And finally, for the oil terminals, the contract was awarded to a consortium consisting of a Moroccan company, a Kuwaiti operator and an operator from the United Arab Emirates for a duration of 25 years. The last contract awarded to date was that of towage, going to Bourbon SA, a French tug company with a particular presence in Le Havre.

The implementation of the TangerMed project was entrusted to a special ad-hoc agency and not to the ODEP (the Moroccan Ports Office), which at the time (2002) combined the attributes of port authority and port services provider (monopolising ship handling). The creation of TMSA and TangerMed introduced, in effect, a certain competition on Moroccan territory and certainly accelerated the port reforms undertaken at the same time by the Moroccan Authorities. In December 2006, the ODEP was split into two entities – the ANP, or port authority, and SODEP, the port operating company, which would thenceforth be exposed to the competition of other operators for handling services. Though the two events should not be confused, their concomitance can be celebrated as a positive occurrence.

**Geo-strategic Positioning: A Challenge that Has Nearly Been Met**

Located on the Strait of Gibraltar where the distance to Europe is the shortest, the TangerMed port enjoys an exceptional position:

1. It is located at the crossroads of a number of maritime routes: all ships navigating from a Northern European or Eastern Atlantic port to Asia, the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean must use the Strait of Gibraltar and pass the TangerMed port. This seems like an ideal location for a hub port as discussed earlier. The precocious development of Algeciras along these lines confirms this idea.

2. A 30-minute crossing suffices to cover the 16 km separating it from the Spanish mainland: it is the short maritime link in a nearly uninterrupted route between Northern Africa and Europe.

The port of TangerMed may seem the exact replica of the Spanish port of Algeciras on first glace. Nonetheless, a more in-depth examination will reveal that the two ports cannot be compared insofar as hinterland service. Indeed, the port of Tangiers is designed to combine the functions of hub port and main port: it will partially supply Morocco, it also has the ambition of attracting the logistic and industrial activities for an extensive Western European clientele, but it is primarily designed as a transhipping port at the crossroads of East-West and North-South lines and is in a good position to provide regional service to the Maghreb and Western Africa.

**The Project’s Weak Points:**

The project has remarkable qualities and the preceding paragraphs confirm the solid grounds of the arguments justifying it. Nonetheless, despite brilliant development perspectives, TangerMed also raises some doubts concerning its consequences.

**The Environment:**

The port site is particularly constrained due to the lay of the land. The creation of terminals has entailed large-scale construction work: the mountainous coastline was literally razed and terraced so as to house the infrastructures and surfaces necessary for a major rolling stock port and a likewise major container port. The rock extracted during this work was obviously thereafter used to create the land for the terminals. Future expansion of the original terminals would certainly involve work on a similarly large scale. The impact of this development work on the surroundings is far from neutral: the coastline’s configuration will never be the same, the erosion of the massif and water runoff will certainly increase due to the creation of terraces and road infrastructures.

Slightly inland, activities and logistics zones threaten to begin expanding in an uncontrolled manner along the new road infrastructures, rendering the organisation of urban services difficult. Another problem is the increase in road traffic that the port could cause on both the local level (trade between
local areas will most certainly increase) and the national level, as the main labour and population reserves of Morocco will be partially supplied by TangerMed.

Road traffic should also increase significantly in the direction of Europe since the direct supply of European markets (France, Spain, Portugal, Italy) is one of the project's core development concepts. Will the European Union accept more heavy transport in transit on its roadways, especially if this traffic is associated with a delocalisation of its logistics activities beyond its territory? One could hope that the Moroccan and Spanish road transport agencies will manage to create innovative intermodal services along the lines of those existing between Istanbul and Austria, which combine maritime and railway transport.

Security:

The TangerMed complex could eventually channel an essential amount of Morocco’s commerce with Europe and a significant part of its trade with the rest of the world. The convergence of flows towards TangerMed could paradoxically make access to Morocco more fragile by creating a heavy dependence on a single gateway.

The Strait of Gibraltar is currently one of the main crossing points for illegal immigration influx to Europe from Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa as well as for the illicit distribution of products derived from cannabis. This situation, which has prevailed for a number of years, has led to a tightening of controls on port transit and greater surveillance of vehicles and other cargo units going to the EU countries. Despite the pressure placed on them by the police, people attempting to emigrate, at times spending months waiting, do not seem discouraged. The situation remains uncomfortable and tense in Northern Morocco and one can legitimately wonder whether the precautions taken to organise secure port traffic will be enough to guarantee an uninterrupted connection across the Strait.

Collateral Socio-Economic Damage:

The creation of manufacturing zones in the vicinity of TangerMed, the displacement of port activities from the city of Tangiers proper and the partial taking over of Morroccan intercontinental containerised traffic by TangerMed will certainly have an impact on the region: relocation of existing activities should be assisted as should the creation of new activities. The city of Tangiers will clearly be the most affected but certain industrial cities such as Casablanca should also be concerned.

What Opportunities Are There for Other Ports?

Despite its exceptional location, TangerMed will most likely not attract freight from far beyond Morocco’s borders. The attraction of Tunisian freight, considering the road distances as compared to maritime routes, does not seem very feasible. The situation of Algeria is different: Algerian ports are doubtless under-equipped, but the distances are great. Nonetheless, the improvement of road infrastructures, in particular the start of construction work on the Trans-Maghreb Motorway, opens perspectives for TangerMed, if not for European freight, at least for maritime containers.

At present, the container hubs of the Western Mediterranean are operating at overcapacity. Numerous ports have seen their traffic stagnate for several years now in this part of the Mediterranean while hinterland-supplying ports are being equipped with the latest technology. This situation should not go on much longer. One can definitely assert that containerised maritime transport has a significant growth capacity, though it is uncertain whether a threshold will be reached on the short or medium term.

Nonetheless, are there future opportunities for similar ports in neighbouring countries? Will the forthcoming container hub ports in Tunisia – the Enfidah Project is now being studied – and Algeria – the former steel port of Djen-Djen is being considered, as it already has quays and road and rail connections – gain a similar position to that of TangerMed? Certainly not with regard to geographic location, so advantageous in the latter case. A thorough examination of the real positive effects that a hub port could have on the local economy with respect to the often colossal development such a facility requires is called for.
Culture and Society | Development and Cooperation

The Influence of Arab Information Channels on Arab Identity

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Arab Information Channels: The Phenomenon

Over the past decade and a half, Arab audiences have witnessed the mushrooming of trans-border Arabic TV stations. Characterized by the ease with which they are able to reach Arabic-speaking communities regardless of geography and borders, this ‘new media’ has increasingly become a powerful socio-cultural and political institution that influences public attitudes and perceptions. This media has succeeded in appealing not only to those within the Arab region but also to the Arab Diaspora throughout the world.

Apart from foreign policy pressures, Arab news channels are perhaps the principal shaper of perceptions and identity(s) within Arabic-speaking communities nowadays (Benhalla, 2005). The first trans-territorial Arab station, the partially Saudi-owned Middle Broadcasting Centre (MBC), started its transmission from London in 1991. MBC station coverage was kept within a Saudi-sensitive editorial line, offering broad, pan-Arab yet ‘un-challenging’ coverage of news and analysis. The real revolution in the coverage of hot regional issues came with the launch of Al-Jazeera from Qatar in 1996, which daringly raised the ceiling of freedom-of-expression in the Arab context. Numerous Arab trans-border TV stations have since mushroomed in the region, creating a phenomenon that has become a salient feature of the socio-political and cultural landscape of the area. These channels can be grouped into a number of categories based on different criteria. They could be classified according to content material: news; variety; entertainment or religious channels. Ownership is obviously a criterion too. There are state-owned, semi-state owned and privately owned stations. Also, there are foreign-owned Arabic-speaking TV networks (such as the American Al-Hurra, the Deutsche Welle and the Russian Russia Today, and the soon-to-come Arabic versions of the BBC and France24 channels). Obviously, owners’ agenda and policies are reflected directly or indirectly in the programming and output of these channels. But they can also be classified in terms of coverage and outreach: national and transnational (or local and pan-Arab media) channels, each of which aspires...
to appeal either to domestic national audiences or beyond. Pan-Arab news channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya occupy the leading position in outreach and influence. They specifically try to free themselves from local colouring in order to attract broader Arab communities everywhere. Because of the relative freedom they enjoy compared to their national counterparts, they are widely watched and contribute strongly to the shaping of dominant perceptions among Arabs on any given issues. (Lynch, 2006 and Hroub, 2006.)

But What Is ‘Arab Identity’?

The notion of identity exhibits problematic dimensions when analysed in a specifically Arab context. 'Who is the Arab' and 'what is Arab identity' are perennial questions that have challenged Arab thinking for a long time. The diversity of Arab identities and sub-identities manifests itself at various levels: Muslim identity, pan-Arab identity, national identity, regional identity, religious identity, sectarian identity, ethnic identity and so forth. What connects all these groups of people and makes them feel a part of a bigger whole is what could be called the 'Arab identity'. It is this sub-conscious loyalty to a set of sentiments, language, past and shared histories, present dreams and aspirations and fragments of commonalities. Presently, and at times historically, it has also been a collective sense of being on the defensive against what is perceived to be an existential (and chiefly Western) military and cultural threat to this fluid notion of an ‘Arab identity’.

Characterised by authoritarian modes of politics and the control of national resources by narrow circles of either ethnic, partisan, ideological, sectarian or tribal elites, the independent Arab states have failed to produce coherent national identities, while allowing fragmented if embattled identities to stay alive.

Trans-national Arab media, in all its guises, parallels both internal and external influences. It has had a great impact on the various evolving Arab identities, in giving differentiated access or weight to this or that identity, to its portrayal of events and issues.

Creating Primordial and Binary Identities?

The diversity of Arab satellite media noted above makes it difficult to coherently assess the influence(s) of these media on 'Arab identity(s)'. Various forms of identities and sub-identities emerge and re-emerge according to political context but are always greatly influenced by the current form of media. The underlining argument in grouping the binaries outlined below is that current Arab trans-border broadcasting has facilitated the surfacing of dormant identities, sharpened already existing ones and provided a unique platform without which the present crowded scene of identities and sub-identities would most likely have not shaped out.

However, the reshaping of Arab identities over the past two decades certainly extends beyond the realm of media. Conflicts, wars, political and economic impasses, and state failure to establish national identities grounded in equality, citizenship and rule of law have all alienated, marginalised and dislocated under-privileged groups. These groups have subsequently receded into further sub-identities searching for refuge and stronger identification.
Islamic, Pan-Arab or Regional Identity?

Arab information channels have furthered the never-ending debate in Arab societies over their identity. Since the days of Ottoman rule over the Arab peoples, the question of whether Arabism or Islamism constitutes the defining feature of identity of the people in the region has never been settled. By and large, both constructs have experienced periods of waxing and waning in connection with the dominance of Arab nationalism or political Islam. At the present time, the eminent influence and popularity of religious movements, either political or apolitical, have conjoined with the unprecedented spread of trans-border Arab broadcasting. It is a time of waxing, it seems, of more elements of 'Islamic identity'.

A full spectrum of religious channels—Saudi Wahhabi, Salafi, Sunni, Shiite, politicised andapoliticised, militant and moderate, local, national and trans-national—are beaming media material in Arabic into any household in Arab countries and beyond. Religious programming and media star preachers are projecting discourses of Islamism that further complicate Arab self-awareness, identity and belonging. With its chief advocacy being ‘the ultimate authority and source of identification is the divine power’, all other forms of earthly belonging and constructs are not only challenged but also ridiculed. While the tension between a secular outlook and a religious one has existed in Arab societies for a long time, it is the scope, the outreach and the intensity of the transmitted material by current TV channels that presently give this tension unprecedented ramifications.

Pan-Arab TV media is more powerful than at any other time in its brief past. Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and to a lesser extent Abu Dhabi TV are most watched by pan-Arab audiences. The impact of these channels toward forging a collective sense of ‘Arabism’ is immense. These TV stations have raised the level of discussion of many taboo subjects connecting Arabs around common issues. Live broadcasts, especially in times of conflict and war coverage, and also talk shows have made these channels an integral part of present Arab culture. It could be safely said that the level of connectedness among various and dispersed Arab communities has never been as extensive as it is now. Never in any other period of history has the speed, flow and detailed knowledge being communicated between Arab areas and societies been as it has been in this present age of Arab satellite broadcasting. Discussion of various issues can include participants onsite or via satellite links from across various Arab countries. Individual faces and views of Arab intellectuals, politicians, and commentators have become familiar across a wide spectrum of Arab audiences. This intensive outpouring of news and live debate creates a shared feeling of belonging and certainly enhances a pan-Arab identity. (Zayani, 2005.)

This intensive outpouring of news and live debate creates a shared feeling of belonging and certainly enhances a pan-Arab identity

Another identity formation that has been influenced by the spread of Arab TVs pertains to what could be called ‘regional Arab identity’. Broadcasting focuses on a specific group of Arab countries which have more similarities among themselves than with the rest of the Arab world. Many TV stations in the Gulf (mainly in Dubai, but having varied Gulfan ownership) broadcast material that targets Arab audiences in the Gulf area. The interest, language, taste and commercials focus mainly, if not exclusively, on those audiences. The same could apply to TV stations based in North African Arab countries, where the taste, Arabic dialects and concerns are tailored to this Maghreb region. Mashreq area broadcasting, transmitted from, and directed to, countries such as Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine again uses regional Arabic dialects, and the agenda followed is more regional-focused than a pan-Arab one. In these three distinctive geographical areas, such specific broadcasting creates and encourages a sense of ‘regional identity’ within the Arab world, which operates at a level below pan-Arab identity.

National Identity versus Sectarian or Ethnic Identity

A seriously disturbing new tension within Arab identity has emerged since the second American invasion of Iraq in 2003. This American intervention was perceived by many Arabs to favour Iraqi Shiites at the expense of Iraqi Sunnis. Subsequent numerous resistance groups as well as many terrorist groups
have all been grounded in Sunni communities. Thus, the Shiites have been considered by many Sunnis to be collaborators with the foreign occupier. Equally, the Shiites have depicted many Sunni’s as supporters of the terrorism that has been targeting Shiite civilians, which has been largely committed independent of both by Al-Qaeda. Subsequently, the Iraqi national identity, however incoherent it might have been prior to the invasion, has experienced degeneration into the sectarian sub-identities of Shiite and Sunni and also into ethnic sub-identities as in the case of the Kurds.

One of the tragic results of the situation in Iraq is that Iraqi (and Arab) airwaves are now crowded with information channels (exceeding twenty stations) that reflect the sectarian reality on the ground and exacerbate it. On these opposing sectarian channels that ostensibly function in the name of the ‘Iraqi nation’, most events are reported and perceived completely differently. What is reported as a ‘resistance’ act on Al-Sharqia or Al-Zawra TV is vehemently condemned on Al-Fayah and Al-Iraqia as a terrorist act. A leading Shiite or Sunni imam would be highly praised on one screen, but depicted as an outright traitor on another screen, depending on the sectarian leaning of the station. Mutual vilification on a sectarian basis has never been experienced as publicly as it is expressed on emerging Iraqi TV stations at the present time. Many secular Iraqis are devastated at the deterioration of the Iraqi national identity and the fact that one’s own religious affiliation has become a socio-political and cultural identification of everyone. A ‘benign’ form of sectarianism has always been a feature of Iraqi society, but it had always been outweighed by a higher national identity which superseded any particular interest in religious or sectarian backgrounds.

More worrying is the fact that this ‘sectarian war’ taking place on Iraqi airwaves has already spilled over onto neighbouring Arab screens. Iraqi Shiites working at reconstruction with the Americans are described as traitors to the Arab cause. Thus, unfortunately, the political stance for or against the occupation has gradually slipped into religious positioning. The situation on the ground, however, is clearly much more complicated than that. But this simplified representation of pro-US Shiites versus anti-US Sunnis has been the version promoted by sensationalist and sectarian TV networks in the region.

The political spring from which this media sectarian war, and its subsequent perpetuation of sub-sectarian identities flows, is the Iranian-Saudi rivalry over regional leverage and influence. Both countries play the ‘sectarian card’ in exploiting loyalties in the region, and the media, particularly TV broadcasting, has proven to be one of the most effective weapons in this process.

Another form of identity tension that has been exacerbated by the plethora of Arab TV venues is between national and ethnic (non-Arab) identities.

Another form of identity tension that has been exacerbated by the plethora of Arab TV venues is between national and ethnic (non-Arab) identities.

Arab Media and Arab Communities in Europe

Global Arab trans-border broadcasting has succeeded in creating rapid and strong connectedness between the Arab Diaspora and their origin countries. This has contributed to an ‘Arab and Muslim’ identity awareness. Yet, along with this strong connectedness and identity awareness, a process of further isolation of these communities within their host societies has occurred. Glued to Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Al-Manar, Abu Dhabi, LBC and The Future from the Mashreq and the Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan channels from the Maghreb, these communities have become more globalised beyond their borders but much more segregated within those borders.

Trans-border Arab TV networks have become the source of information and entertainment for millions of Arabs who live in the West, and have greatly helped them to maintain their Arab and Muslim identity. But these channels have equally hindered
the process of integration of Arab and Muslim communities in the West.

In recent years and with the tense atmosphere that has been engulfing the relationship between Arab and Muslim communities in the West and their host societies after 9/11, Arab TV networks have offered a comfortable refuge for the increasingly alienated Arab audiences. Their anxieties, problems and complaints against a sharp perceived rise of hostile sentiment in the West against them have found expression on these TV channels. But this has provided only a temporary and perhaps self-eluding comfort, because mere talk on Arab media about the difficulties of Arab communities living in the West has actually accomplished very little to improve their situation. Instead of facing the coldness of Western media and lobbying them to listen to their demands, they have lingered in the warm confines of Arab TV channels which have offered them a comfortable and familiar, but hardly effective, platform. (Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 32, No. 6.)

In parallel with the burgeoning of Arab news stations, there has been a noticeable trans-national process both of globalisation and, ironically, of fragmentation of Arab identities.

By way of conclusion, it could be said that the continuous expansion of ‘open skies’ broadcasting and the growth of their trans-border channels have surely encouraged embattled minority groups to disentangle themselves from the perceived tyranny of sweeping or grand identities imposed on them by higher political structures, primarily the state and its ideologies. Thus, in parallel with the burgeoning of Arab news stations, there has been a noticeable trans-national process both of globalisation and, ironically, of fragmentation of Arab identities, with moderate and radical, ethnic and national, secular and religious, local and pan-Arabs all finding a place for themselves on Arab screens. What would give primacy to a certain cohesive form of identity over these fragmentary others in the near future is a combination of positive political and social developments in the Arab countries along with radical change of Western foreign policies implemented in the region.

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Contradictions of International Cooperation in the Mediterranean Region

The year 2005, the Year of the Mediterranean, which was to allow commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, closed with the failure of the Barcelona Summit. Marked by the absence of nearly all Arab leaders and any Final Declaration whatsoever, the November 2005 Summit illustrated the difficulties and contradictions of international cooperation within the Mediterranean region remarkably well. These lukewarm results became known and heralded a renewal for 2006. Nonetheless, though certain meetings in 2006 did achieve limited progress in each of the three baskets of the Euro-Mediterranean Process (i.e. economic and financial; political and security; and social, cultural and human), the contradictions of international efforts involving this region have continued to handicap its development, causing disappointment.

2006: Small Steps Forward in Each of the Three Baskets

The 5th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Trade Ministers in March 2006 provided the opportunity to launch negotiations on liberalisation of services and the investments necessary for establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010. This was an important step forward in the economic facet of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

With regard to the financial dimension, the replacement of MEDA and TACIS by a single European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) allocating 8.9 billion euros to the Mediterranean region represented a turning point, equipping the European Union with a significant means to implement its neighbourhood policy. Nevertheless, the very conception of this new instrument was once again defined without the sufficient political dialogue.

By the same token, the first Europe-Mediterranean-Gulf States Cultural Workshop in September allowed progress in the long-neglected social, cultural and human basket of the Barcelona Process. This intercultural dialogue event, organised in exclusive collaboration with non-government organisations and the new Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue among Cultures, can be perceived as promising with respect to the participation of civil society in the cooperation process, a key element for the region’s development.

Finally, with regard to the political basket, the year 2006 was, after the shift of government in Italy, marked by a strong European will to cooperate on the Lebanese crisis. The strengthening of the UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, the major European diplomatic success of 2006, was made possible by the coinciding views of Rome, Paris and Berlin. This operation of aid to stabilise Lebanon represented a concrete advance insofar as security, reflecting the will to reduce instability in the region.

Illustrating just how useful these small steps were, the Eighth Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Tampere resulted in a joint declaration on the progress and work to be done on the Process in 2007, signed by the 35 countries attending. The undersigning of this commitment thus illustrates the progress made since the failure of the November 2005 Summit; it also brings to light the road left to travel before attaining the “global and solidary cooperation” that these same States had declared as a goal in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995.
... And a Few Steps Backward

Despite these elements of progress, the year 2006 is far from having brought the renewal needed for international cooperation with the Mediterranean region. In fact, the international community was divided on the Palestinian issue after the election of Hamas in January, once again missing the opportunity for joint action. The Middle East Quartet (USA, Europe, Russia and the United Nations) was paralysed by the different approaches taken by its members and the prompt criticism of the new Palestinian government prevented any attempt at political dialogue whatsoever. Immobilised by the diverging positions of its Member States, the European Union was for a good many months unable to dispatch aid to Palestinian populations. The difficulties of this early financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority contributed to the greater fragmentation of this community, today on the brink of civil war.

Along Europe’s southern borders, moreover, the record influx of illegal immigrants during the summer of 2006 bore witness to the existence of a common Euro-Mediterranean area as well as the patent absence of an effective regional partnership to manage it. The French-Spanish discrepancies on regularisation of illegal immigrants moreover demonstrated the need for coherent migratory policies within the Schengen area.

The year 2006 is far from having brought the renewal needed for international cooperation with the Mediterranean region.

The Persistence of Transatlantic Difficulties

United States – Europe – Mediterranean cooperation suffers in the first place from discrepancies on the manner of perceiving this region. Whereas the immediate proximity of the Mediterranean Basin countries represents a major direct challenge for Europe in terms of population exchange, economic growth and security, the US, profoundly marked by the events of 11th September 2001, views the region through the prism of terrorism, progress of democratisation and the securing of raw materials. This strategic perspective has led the Americans to consider the Maghreb and Mashreq countries as elements of a ‘greater Middle East’ extending from Rabat to Islamabad.

This discrepancy of perception leads to disagreement on the policies to be conducted. While the US has chosen the path of quick imposition of democracy coupled with the implementation of free trade agreements, the EU has prioritised long-term partnership based on economic, political and socio-cultural cooperation. Within the American administration itself, the ‘greater Middle East’ policy has not met with consensus and the difficulties of ‘nation building’ in Iraq are dampening enthusiasm. And finally, political timetables are in dissonance. The US elections as well as the war on Iraq have long led the Bush Administration to neglect the ailing Middle East peace process, whereas the rejection of the European Constitution in 2005 plunged the European Union into a prolonged period of crisis little conducive to strong foreign policy initiatives. At no time was the Quartet able to muster the political dynamism necessary to reactive the roadmap.
**Persistent European Contradictions**

Though international cooperation efforts suffer from strong transatlantic divergence, the most urgent task is to remedy the contradictions of European development policy in the Mediterranean region. Indeed, Europe does not enjoy the influence to which its financial efforts would entitle it in this crucial region, for both institutional and operational reasons. A Europe equipped with a coherent, effective neighbourhood policy would be in a position to engage in dialogue on a par with its American partner and to contribute to the reorientation of international policy regarding the region. Yet the establishment of this policy is slow.

The first difficulty is inherent to the cooperation instrument consisting of the Barcelona Process. The latter continues to be handicapped by the difficulties of the political basket of the Partnership. Whereas the required interrelation of the three baskets of the Process displays the importance attached by Europe to progress in each of them, this strategy has in fact led to a deterioration of the whole programme. The absence of progress on the Palestinian and Western Sahara issues and the rivalries among Arab countries render the regional dimension (South-South) of the programme difficult to put into practice, delaying economic cooperation initiatives. Moreover, conflicts in the region are at times reflected at annual summits, as was the case in 2005. Partnership Countries still display great reticence today in cooperating in the political sphere, fearing European interference in their internal affairs.

The European Neighbourhood Policy involves resource allocation choices that have generated battles between the Commission Departments and Member States. The issue of the amount of aid to be allocated to our Eastern European Partners and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Countries, respectively, has given rise to numerous debates, as if these two regions were ‘in competition.’ Nevertheless, these two processes are in reality part of the same policy, whose aim it is to build a well-structured, growing neighbourhood space along the borders of the European Union. This is why we must applaud the decision to create a single European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) at the service of this policy. Contributing exclusively to the acceleration of economic development of Eastern Europe and the Balkans would entail the risk of aggravating the North-South gap in the Mediterranean Basin. The Euro-Mediterranean region continues to register one of the greatest development divides in the world, greater than that prevailing between the United States and Latin America. Whether in terms of migration or trade, the Euro-Mediterranean region cannot afford to watch as the inequalities between the Northern and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean areas continue to grow. These struggles to influence the development aid budget have a great deal to do with the institutional fragmentation of our cooperation system and the redundancy of its decision processes. Matters of development fall under the jurisdiction of the Council, the Commission and the EU Commissioner for External Relations in Brussels. The complexity of this institutional panorama is heightened by the arbitration effected within the different Commission Departments and among Directorate Generals, as well as negotiations among Member States and even among different Member State Ministries. The EU will be hard put to establish a coherent cooperation policy if it does not manage to gradually simplify the decision-making procedures of its institutional system.

... That Weigh upon the Efficiency and Visibility of European Aid

This institutional state of affairs has weighty consequences on the operational level. The notorious difficulties of disbursement of aid from the MEDA Programme (a technical and financial assistance instrument) proved this in practice: in 1999, at the close of MEDA I, only 30% of the funds allocated had been disbursed. Though MEDA II (2000-2006) allowed an acceleration of disbursements, this was primarily achieved by increasing quick-disbursement budget programmes, while the quality of certain
Partnership administrative measures continues to raise doubts. These operational limits particularly affect the visibility of European aid and the regional influence this visibility would bring about. It is striking to see how the leading lessor to the Palestinian Authority and the second provider of financial support to the State of Israel exercises but marginal political influence on the Middle-East peace process.

Progress on the Horizon

Nevertheless, not all is lost. The pending construction of the Neighbourhood instrument can, if there is a political will, allow the institution of genuine European cooperation between the Commission instruments on the one hand, and the aid organisms and development banks of the different Member States on the other. The latter are present throughout the Mediterranean, and the European Union would gain greatly by fostering synergy between the two. Such a road will most likely be followed. In fact, it is not only advisable but also probable that priority will be given to investments with an integrating effect on the Mediterranean region. This would allow structural impacts that could only improve the perception of this policy by both northern and southern parties. In this regard, interaction with civil society organisations could be usefully increased as well. In sum, the logic of economic and territorial impact could substitute the mindset of concern for the amount of expenditure. This would mean specifically cooperating to build a region rather than financially compensating its disparities. These orientations are characteristic of development aid in general, especially that given to ACP countries (African, Caribbean and Pacific States), where coordination is increasingly becoming a catchword. Even though the contexts are very different, the operational progress of EuropeAid tends towards optimisation of the various processes of upgrading. It would not be far-fetched to envisage improved coordination of the different EU structural policies: why not consider improving competitiveness in all of these aspects on a Mediterranean-wide scale? This is probably the only way of preventing the polarisation of all public policy in the area due to conflicts in the Middle East.
The year 2006 ended with a Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on “Strengthening the Role of Women in Society” held in Istanbul in November, quickly followed by the publication of the 2005 Arab Human Development Report, which came out in December 2006, entitled “Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World.”

In both the Mediterranean and Arab perspectives, the position of women is on the agenda for regional and international institutions and, in this regard, seems to confirm for these women the imperatives of general change and democratisation of societies and more specifically, the crystallisation of civil society.

In this perspective, central to establishing good governance in the Euro-Mediterranean order and checking religious resurgence in the Arab order, women are called upon to play an active, leading role. Yet do these concerns, which crowned the year 2006, correspond to a tangible reality? In other words, are women so concerned and involved in current affairs? To what degree do they see themselves in a role of fostering imperatives and acting as barriers in the face of socio-economic and cultural sluggishness?

**Shifting Yet Constant Divisions**

The dividing lines between the male and female universes have certainly shifted. Whereas earlier, these lines separated the public and private spheres, they are now slowly but surely moving. Nevertheless, these shifts do not mean the end of the divisions but their reproduction in the public sphere itself. Two lines of discrimination are most visible: discrimination between marginalised or socio-economically devalued sectors and leading or profitable sectors, on the one hand, and between the lower and upper echelons of the hierarchy, on the other.

Hence, girls practically everywhere have taken the educational system by assault and, in a number of Arab countries, their enrolment rate surpasses that of boys at all school levels. Though the amount of girls enrolled in school is less than the total possible number of girls eligible to go to school, the fact remains that access to education for them has become a fact, as the average school enrolment rate for girls in Arab countries is 77%. In the Arab mindset, it is becoming more and more difficult to conceive of girls not having this basic asset to ensure minimal chances of success in life. One could even speak of a reversal of the traditional image, as educational establishments seem to have become places for girls.

In fact, just as in the 19th Century it began to be considered imperative for girls to be initiated into the profession of being a good wife and good mother by acquiring the elementary knowledge to such an end, at the turn of the 20th Century, the diploma or degree has become a female attribute as well. This can be clearly seen when considering the two parameters mentioned above: the higher the educational level, the less the number of girls enrolled; and the more the market value of the diploma or degree depreciates, the more it is

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FEMINISM, ISLAMISM AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS

EuroMeSCo was asked by the European Commission to participate in preparing the EuroMed Ministerial Conference on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society, held in November 2006. The main goal of the resulting report, entitled Women as Full Participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States – issued in Arabic and French as well – was to provide a comprehensive assessment of the situation of women’s rights in the Mediterranean region and, more importantly, to propose concrete steps to enhance gender equality within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The premises underlying the Report is that the issue of women’s rights has been omitted or only marginally addressed within the Barcelona Process to date, and that this omission must be corrected. The leitmotiv is that enhancing the role of women is essential for the emergence of a democratic Euro-Mediterranean region.

The Report recognises that the legal status of women in many southern partner states remains exceptionally discriminatory as a result of family laws or personal status codes, in spite of recent improvements in some countries. Furthermore, women are often barred from specific professional areas, have less access to justice than men, and are often de facto denied the right to vote or to stand for election despite being entitled to those rights by law. Based on empirical data about the enjoyment of specific civil and political rights in the region, the Report notes that concrete obstacles to women’s full exercise of the rights recognised in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women exist in all areas of life. Similarly, in Europe, even though women’s legal status is by and large comparatively better, they are still faced with deeply rooted discriminatory practices. All in all, the lack of equality for women at all levels, both in the law and in practice, is a common problem to countries on both sides of the Mediterranean and therefore can only benefit from a common approach within the EMP.

Among other issues, the Report posited that full democracy cannot exist where half the population does not have equal legal, political and socio-economic rights and opportunities: “Equal status of all citizens is a defining feature of democratic life, as is the principle of non-discrimination. However, granting women their rights cannot be equated with the existence of democracy. Democracy is about equality and non-discrimination for all persons, in legal and substantive terms.” It also noted that EMP states have failed to recognise that women’s rights must be addressed as an integral part of both political and socio-economic transformation, and not merely as a secondary cultural or religious issue. A further issue stressed by the Report is the need to make the crucial distinction between Islam on the one hand, and political Islam on the other, and to take into account the diversity of Islamism and its various interpretations of women’s rights. With respect to the growing importance of Islamist feminist organisations, it argues that they “are now an undeniable part of the growing movement for gender equality in the south, and part of the wider transnational effort of women’s groups to combat the negative effects of patriarchy and intolerant religious groups on gender equality, not just in the Muslim world but also in Europe and beyond.”

The Report then makes a series of legal, political, socio-economic and cultural policy recommendations focussing on lending women a more prominent role in the Partnership and promoting their political and civil rights, taking into account the indivisibility of all human rights. Key among these recommendations are the establishment of an EMP Women’s Rights Council to propose mainstreaming and rights promotion policies to be adopted by governments, as well as benchmarks and time frames for the achievement of established goals. Although the EuroMed Ministerial Conference failed to take on some of the key recommendations of the EuroMeSCo Report, its conclusions proposed a set of measures to enhance the role of women at all levels and suggested a “EuroMed ad hoc meeting at expert senior official level” be held at least once a year to review their application.

Not surprisingly, the Report’s section on the role of Islamist feminists was the one that stimulated the most discussion, in particular at the meeting held in Rabat in June 2006 in preparation for the EuroMed Ministerial Conference on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society. Many, in particular secular feminists, feel that Islamist feminists hold conservative views on the role of women in society and are consequently criticised for being detrimental rather than helpful to the cause of women’s rights. The Report contends, however, that although this may be true, the role of Islamist feminism (a contentious term which is clarified in the report) in promoting the political participation of women cannot be discounted or ignored.

The issue of women’s empowerment has been addressed in a variety of EuroMeSCo activities, namely in the network’s Annual Conference, held in Istanbul in October 2006, which drew attention to the need to firmly place the EMP debate on women’s rights in the political arena where it belongs – i.e. beyond the religious or cultural sphere to which some would like to see it confined – and called for the gender-specific impact of EMP programmes to be taken into account. Women’s rights were also identified as one of the key areas for benchmarking democratic development within the EMP.

The issue of Islamist feminism will be the topic of a EuroMed seminar to be held in Brussels in late 2007, in preparation for which a EuroMeSCo report dealing with the paradox of individual conservatism and political activism will be drafted.

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relegated to the female population. Hence, according to the AHDR, if the number of girls effectively enrolled at the primary school level represents more than 3/4 of the girls eligible for school, this proportion falls to little over half at the secondary school level and becomes negligible at the higher education level. Returning to the male population, the enrolment rate of girls in the primary school level is nearly equivalent to that of boys but remains lower on higher educational levels. The statistics in certain Gulf States (Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates), however, indicate that there are more young women than young men at the higher levels. Nonetheless, this figure is deceptive since young men are much more likely to leave the country to pursue studies abroad. By the same token, the apparently primarily female composition of classes or lecture halls is likewise deceptive, insofar as these classes are in
The apparently primarily female composition of classes or lecture halls is deceptive, insofar as these classes are in fields rather abandoned by young men, who flock to so-called disciplines ‘of excellence’.

Fields rather abandoned by young men, who flock to so-called disciplines ‘of excellence’, which remain their exclusive preserve.

Generally speaking, there is an increasingly greater disjuncture between the possession of degrees and the possibilities for gain since it is not the jobs requiring degrees that are currently the most lucrative. It is primarily for this reason that teaching is relinquished to women while men turn to networking and memberships to ‘get in on business.’ The professional environment will thus be divided by extension of this initial state of affairs.

Globally, and in contrast with access to education, women’s access to employment in the Arab world remains minimal and, by regional comparison, according to the AHDR, can even be considered the lowest in the world with a female economic activity rate of 33% as compared to the world average of 56%.

Thus, contrary to the aspirations of women receiving degrees but in accordance with the market logic, doubly selective according to both references and genres, the acquisition of education by women does not open the doors of employment to them. Women constitute the majority of young unemployed graduates.

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Within the workforce, we can find the same discrepancies: sectors largely comprised of a female workforce as, for instance, (once again) teaching, and a primarily female presence at the bottom of the hierarchy, including in the field of teaching. The higher one moves up the ranks, the greater the male composition of the workforce.

Although the business sphere is also hostile to female presence, a certain progress can be noted, with women who have managed to organise and coordinate amongst themselves, organising forums and meetings on an Arab-wide level (a Tunisian woman is the Vice-President of the Council of Arab Women Business Leaders and was elected President of the World Association of Women Entrepreneurs in 1998). In Tunisia, for instance, the number of women business leaders went from 200 in 1998 to 500 in 2005.

Political and public life is characterised by the same ebb and flow. Although progressing, the proportion of women in elected positions remains symbolic. Thus in Morocco, the statistics went from 1% women elected to Parliament in 1995 to 11% in 2003. In Tunisia over the same period, female representation went from 6.8% to 11%. By the same token, Maya Jribi was elected in the latter country in December 2006 as the head of an opposition party, the second woman to occupy such a post in the Maghreb after the Algerian, Louisa Hanoun. In Palestine, women won 17% of the posts at the municipal elections of 2004. In Egypt, on the other hand, they only hold 2% of the seats in Parliament. Another significant event was the election in April of 2007 of the Tunisian woman, Souhayr Belhassen, as head of the International Federation of Human Rights Associations (FIDH).

Apart from quantitative under-representation, qualitative discrimination is a significant factor in official posts where, as soon as women are appointed ministers, for instance, they are restricted to portfolios considered “in accordance with their nature.”

Finally, it is in the field of literary and artistic creation that real breakthroughs have been made in feminist expression. Although the media remains a vehicle for a stereotyped and traditional conception of women, if not a reactionary one, literature and cinema have given rise to certain productions that depart from this perspective, often causing ‘scandal’ in the Arab world. This is the case with the film by the Egyptian director, Inès el Degheidi, “Al Bahethat an al Horeya” (Women in Search of Freedom) as well as the novel L’Amande (The Almond), published in France under the pseudonym of Nedjma. If such precautions are taken, this means that at the same time, the artistic and intellectual scene is extremely
restrained by religious revival and subject to the Islamistsystem of beliefs and social practice. Women on Arab television, whether they are hosts or actresses on TV series, do not hesitate to appear in a head scarf, just as the "repentant" older stars. More generally and outside of cultural circles per se, the mentality of the population at large is strongly impregnated by religious culture and women play an important role in reproducing this state of affairs and disseminating it by wearing the headscarf, which has become prevalent in certain societies such as that of Egypt.

By Way of Conclusion: Internal or External Mechanisms for Women’s Liberation?

Thus, one could deduce that women not only hardly feel concerned by feminist liberation strategies but that, in addition, they act en masse in opposition to these strategies, causing members of the pre-Islamist generation to declare that their societies are experiencing an alarming regression. Women’s success in the educational field has hardly been followed by incontestable victories in the ensemble of the public domain nor in the society’s mentality, with the exception of a few personal success stories in the economic, political or cultural spheres. The expansion of education to include women could thus be understood more as the product of ‘objective’ socio-economic changes than as the result of deliberate action by women themselves. Indeed, although in many Arab countries, women’s movements have a historical presence and female and/or feminist associations are active, despite the numerous political and cultural obstacles they face, their influence on women and society at large remain limited if not marginal. For this reason, Western partners on all levels (States, regional and international organisations, foundations, etc.) increasingly commit and invest more generously to provide support to these associations and foster women’s empowerment in societies of the developing world.

The Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference worked to define a joint action framework for the next five years, placing particular emphasis on three areas: civil and political rights, economic and social rights and rights in the cultural sphere.

This is reflected in the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society, which worked to define a joint action framework for the next five years, placing particular emphasis on three areas considered essential: civil and political rights, economic and social rights and rights in the cultural sphere and the role of communication and the media. Independently of the evaluation that could be made of this approach, mainly focusing on rights rather than on women’s real situations, the areas emphasised, on the one hand, indicate that these domains are those with obvious shortcomings hampering women from becoming stakeholders in social change, but on the other hand, they also inform us of the priorities officially designated for women.

This latter remark is not entirely innocuous, as it refers us to the terms of new polemics attacking women’s associations and reiterating in a different light, i.e. that of sources of funding, the label they have always been tagged with, which associates women’s emancipation with Westernisation.
Clandestine Migration in the Mediterranean in 2006

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University of Sussex

The energy, resources and attention devoted to the relatively small number of individuals who attempt to cross the Mediterranean without the correct documentation reached new levels of intensity in 2006. A total of three international conferences on issues of migration and development took place at ministerial level around the Mediterranean and all three devoted very significant attention to clandestine movement (indeed, that was arguably their principle concern). Within the European Union, the Commission had identified Africa-Europe migrations as a priority for the year, which was reflected in regular communications, the Council, under the Austrian and Finnish presidencies, gave very significant weight to issues of migration control in the Mediterranean in conclusions to the major summits and 2006 was the first full year of operation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX), which carried out a number of high-profile coordination operations in the Mediterranean and Atlantic. At the national level, Spain completed the largest amnesty for undocumented migrants around the Mediterranean in recent years, regularising almost 600,000 individuals, and France and Italy both announced more modest amnesty programmes. New national immigration legislation was passed in France (and further from the Mediterranean, in the UK) and proposed in Italy.

The very limited empirical evidence that exists on clandestine migration does suggest that the total number of migrants attempting to avoid border control operations in and around the Mediterranean was greater during 2006 than 2005, although the very significant increase in migration to the Canary Islands masked a more widespread fall in apprehensions around the Mediterranean. There was also an apparent fall in clandestine migration across the Mediterranean in 2005, compared to previous years, so, with the exception of the Canary Islands, the image of ever-growing numbers of "illegal migrants" is highly questionable. In contrast to this unprecedented political heat focused on clandestine migration in a very general sense, there was considerably less light shed on individual migration events in 2006 than has been the case in previous years. For example, the removal of hundreds of migrants to the remote desert border between Morocco and Algeria at the end of December did not provoke the degree of international outrage that greeted identical events in 2005.

Considerations of ‘clandestine migration’ refer only to the practice of deliberate avoidance of migration controls. This is typically labelled "illegal migration" in policy and media discussions but illegal migration is a much broader term that also applies to the use of forged documents or overstaying of visas, where individuals pass through legal migration channels. Clandestine migration is distinguished by the avoidance of those channels and it is precisely the need to avoid official migration control that makes clandestine migration such a hazardous activity and increases the vulnerability of clandestine migrants to exploitation and victimisation. This vulnerability has been exacerbated as the methods of migration control across the Mediterranean have extended the reach of control from the traditional points of migration control at ports and airports to the extensive control along entire borders, exemplified by Spain’s Sistema Integrado de
Vigilancia Exterior (SIVE) and more recently to large areas beyond European borders, such as those coordinated by FRONTEX. For purposes of migration control the Mediterranean now begins across the Sahel region and control operations are now targeting clandestine migrants in North Africa (Collyer 2006) pushing them back to West Africa, the new site of departures for the Canary Islands during the year. This review begins with a consideration of the significant migration events of 2006 and goes on to examine policy developments and consider the trajectories of international debates during the year. Despite growing evidence of the limited significance of clandestine migration, established policy debates seem likely to lead to the even greater significance being lent to migration in the Mediterranean through 2007.

**Clandestine Migration in 2006**

The growth of arrivals in the Canary Islands was the main focus of attention during 2006 and reports of boats carrying as many as several hundred individuals from as far south as Senegal and later Gambia appeared regularly, particularly during the summer months. Any figure of the overall number of individuals to have arrived is inevitably extremely politically charged and carries a great deal of uncertainty. Information on the number of people apprehended is the only reliable basis on which to base such estimates. Available data for the four most significant points of arrival in the EU reveals that overall the number of individuals apprehended increased very considerably in 2006. However, the enormous rise in apprehensions in the Canary Islands was sufficient to mask a gradual fall in apprehensions on the Mediterranean routes since 2004 (Table 36; it should be noted that 2006 figures for Malta and Italy cover only the period up to August). These figures offer at least a partial explanation for the continued rise in the political importance of clandestine migration during the year. However, the ways in which these figures have been interpreted is at least as significant as the figures themselves in influencing the political response.

There is no direct relationship between the number of people caught and the number who successfully avoid controls, so the meaning that should be attached to these data is notoriously uncertain. In 2005 the Spanish Ministry of the Interior interpreted the fall in the number of migrants apprehended as an indication of the success of their migration control policies, the logic presumably being based on the assumption that the efficiency of border control had not declined, so fewer people caught meant that there were fewer people migrating. FRONTEX use a slightly different logic and greet the dramatic rise in the number of apprehensions in 2006 as an indication that their work has been successfully carried out and is vitally important. A substantial increase in the resources devoted to migration control, such as the HERA operations coordinated by FRONTEX around the Canary Islands will likely lead to an increase in apprehensions, even in the absence of an increase in the number of migrants. Given the tremendous increase in resources in 2006, the dramatic rise in apprehensions obviously does not imply a corresponding rise in the number of migrants, though it is frequently suggested that this is the case in policy documents, such as the Commission document COM (2006) 733 final: Reinforcing the Management of the European Union’s Southern Maritime Borders where these statistics are referred to as “undocumented arrivals” rather than “apprehensions”. Even so, given the relatively small size of the Canary Islands, it is reasonable to assume that the number of people who evade controls and then disappear into the local community is relatively small and apprehensions provide a reasonably good indication of the total migrant population.

**Table 36**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apprehensions of clandestine migrants at four significant EU arrival points</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canary Islands</td>
<td>8,426</td>
<td>4,715</td>
<td>33,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straits of Gibraltar</td>
<td>7,249</td>
<td>7,066</td>
<td>6,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>1,822</td>
<td>1,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (Sicily/Lampedusa)</td>
<td>22,939</td>
<td>14,567</td>
<td>14,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,355</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,542</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,177</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Spain APDHA (2007); Malta (Foreign Office); Italy (European Commission 2006). 2006 data for Malta and Italy refer only to the first 8 months.

The increase in migration has been accompanied by a sharp increase in the number of reported fatalities of migrants. The Moroccan Association des Amis et Familles des Victimes de l’Immigration Clandestine (AFVIC) estimates that clandestine crossings of the Mediterranean from Morocco have resulted in the deaths of as many as 5,000 individuals from 1995 to 2005 (no similar statistic is available for the other regions of the Mediterranean). The longer open sea crossing to the Canary Islands is far more hazardous than the shorter Mediterranean crossing and rather than the small, wooden pateras, containing 10 to 15
The increase in migration has been accompanied by a sharp increase in the number of reported fatalities of migrants. People, as in the Mediterranean, the crossing is made on large specially constructed boats that may carry several hundred people. In these circumstances, when accidents occur the loss of life is very much greater. The Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (APDHA) has documented the deaths of 1,049 people on the crossing to the Canary Islands alone during 2006 and a further 118 migrants at various other crossing points or along the route to the Spanish coasts. However, they estimate that the true number of fatalities may be as high as 7,000 for the year. Elsewhere in the Mediterranean, information is less systematic. PICUM documented 84 fatalities of clandestine migrants in the seas around Greece and ten in the region of Lampedusa, although fatalities in both areas are likely to be much higher.

As in previous years, the vast majority of these fatalities have been due to drowning, although perhaps the most worrying are the small number that resulted more directly from the activities of border control agents. On 3rd July, two more migrants were killed at the fence surrounding Melilla, in circumstances very similar to the deaths of 14 migrants in October 2005. However, coming so soon after the Euro-African Summit in Rabat, the international response was particularly muted. Even at the end of the year no publicly available information had emerged from the enquiry into the deaths in 2005 and the climate of impunity will only have been reinforced by these later fatalities (Amnesty International 2006). Mass removals occurred from Morocco in August, when a reported 53 individuals were removed across the Western Sahara border to Mauritania and at the end of December when several hundred individuals were once again removed to the remote areas of the Algeria-Morocco border (Valluy 2007; APDHA 2007). Although criticism remained fierce, removals also continued to and from Libya, but detailed information on the number, origins or locations of individuals is particularly hard to obtain (Hamood 2006).

Despite the clear increase in the number of individuals attempting to migrate to the Canary Islands, the overall number of migrants selecting clandestine routes to cross the Mediterranean remains relatively small. The Spanish Police Union (Sindicato Unificado de Policía) reported that only five percent of undocumented migrants to Spain arrived by boat in 2006, compared to 80 percent who arrived at Madrid or Barcelona airports (El País 4/1/2007). Similarly, an unsourced study cited by the Financial Times found that only 10 percent of undocumented migrants in Italy had entered the country by sea (Financial Times 7/9/2006). The total number of apprehensions for the year also appears less significant when compared to the number of undocumented migrants resident in Europe who have been given status during the year, or in programmes that finished during the year (Table 37). This perspective has been largely absent from policy discussions of clandestine migration, which have tended to view it as an isolated ‘problem’ distinct from the context within the broader movement of people.

### Table 37: Undocumented migrants who applied for and were granted legal status in operations finished during 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Granted</th>
<th>Applied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6,924</td>
<td>33,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>573,275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Policy Trajectories: ‘A Year of Agenda Setting with Africa’?

Mediterranean migration in 2006 cannot be understood without reference to the 14 migrants who lost their lives at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla at the end of September and beginning of October 2005. Although they were neither the first nor sadly the last migrants to have been killed by border control officials these events had an unprecedented impact on thinking about migration. A wide range of Moroccan and European NGOs issued press releases and reports related to the events, the European Commission and European Parliament both despatched expert teams to the area to investigate and the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the EU, meeting in London a few weeks later, called on the Commission to make Africa-Europe migration a priority for 2006. As a result, these events were used as the justification for a whole variety of policy dialogues throughout 2006. The “Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean” was passed at the final European Council of 2005, on 16th December and will continue to influence the trajectory of EU policy for some time to come.
At the end of 2006, the Commission released an assessment of the developments in this “Global Approach” agenda over its first year (COM 2006 735 final). This review referred to 2006 as “a year of agenda setting with Africa” and the policy dialogues and conferences that took place receive most emphasis. The Euro-African conference on migration and development in Rabat held in July certainly received the most significant coverage at the time, but the subsequent meeting held in Tripoli in November was in many ways more significant. In April, Algeria hosted an expert meeting of the African Union on migration and development and the lack of representation from Algeria at the Rabat conference was therefore an even more obvious gap than it would otherwise have been. Algeria, along with Southern African countries also absent from Rabat, was represented in Tripoli, making the November conference the first truly Euro-African meeting on migration and development. Issues discussed were very similar at both and countering illegal migration in general and clandestine migration in particular were common themes. There was some discussion of opening up legal channels for labour migration, but these appear very limited. Though it was never explicitly stated, making development assistance conditional on cooperation in migration control emerged as a favourite theme with regular references to article 13 of the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement (2000) and to the conclusions of the Seville European Council (2002).

The coordinated control of migration was also cited in the Commission’s review as one of the successes of the year.

Illegal migration in general and clandestine migration in particular were common themes. There was some discussion of opening up legal channels for labour migration, but these appear very limited. Though it was never explicitly stated, making development assistance conditional on cooperation in migration control emerged as a favourite theme with regular references to article 13 of the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement (2000) and to the conclusions of the Seville European Council (2002).

The coordinated control of migration was also cited in the Commission’s review as one of the successes of the year. Several operations were coordinated by individual member states and funded under the ANEAS programme; for example the Spanish government established “Seahorse” and “Atlantis” for joint control operations with a variety of West African states. 2006 was also the first full year of operation of FRONTEX, set up to organise pan-EU coordination and solidarity in response to particular ‘migration crises’. A wide range of operations were established around the Mediterranean. These were most often short pilot activities lasting only a few weeks, such as ‘Poseidon’ in the Eastern Mediterranean in June-July and NAUTILUS, south of Lampedusa, in October, but the patrolling operation HERA II around the Canary Islands was established in August and is still going on in February 2007. In a very short space of time, the agency appears to have succeeded in making its mark at the political level and despite some difficulties it has established a solid organisational reputation. These political successes, combined with the degree of institutional inertia that comes from the establishment of its Warsaw offices, its presence in a range of international contexts and its not inconsiderable budget mean that FRONTEX is likely to be a significant force in setting the agenda of migration control around the Mediterranean for the foreseeable future. Given the agency’s particular expertise it appears set to shape the international agenda in very particular ways, leading to and justifying more rather than less control.

In contrast, 2006 also provided a clearer reminder than ever before that “agenda setting” can never be an exclusively top-down process and the year was full of successful dialogues which dissented from the official state-based arguments. These included the bold initiative of the counter summit to the Rabat conference, organised by a wide range of migrant and community-focused groups, and the World Social Forum on migration in Madrid. These large and extremely well attended transnational events illustrate how dissenting collectives are now able to mobilise transnational networks as speedily and effectively as state-based institutions in order to raise the profile of unrepresented voices. They are matched by the locally focused protests in which many of the participants are also involved, such as regular protests at detention centres around the Mediterranean. The impact of these events on the official “agenda setting” is already clear in the way in which the more unpalatable suggestions to emerge from the ministerial conferences are carefully couched in agreeable language, and the deliberate emphasis on the balance between control and possibilities of greater free movement, however small these might be. The pace of international dialogue and discussion is set to continue in 2007 with a Euromed meeting focused on migration in Lisbon and the first meeting of the Global Forum for International Migration in Brussels. The various protest movements have a range of agendas with regard to these meetings (including disrupting them entirely) but the success of these new initiatives will be measured significantly by the extent to which the official agendas that emerge take
On 10th and 11th July 2006, the Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development was held in Rabat, Morocco. It brought together the countries of the European Union with 27 African countries (Algeria absent) and fifteen international organizations to address the management of migration flows between the two continents. A joint Spanish-Moroccan initiative, the conference was prompted by the dramatic events surrounding recent sub-Saharan migrations and the incidents in Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, which called for urgent measures. It should be seen as part of global efforts to manage migration flows through immigration policy, bilateral and multilateral border control agreements, sectoral trade agreements that allow the movement of persons, security and information measures, and agreements on immigrants’ rights.

Topics addressed at the Euro-African summit include fundamental aspects of development (economic and demographic issues, conflicts, sustainability and human rights) and cooperation in managing legal migration flows and combating irregular immigration, with a focus on the sub-Saharan migratory routes toward Europe via the countries of the North African Mediterranean coast.

These concerns were laid out in the Action Plan prepared by Spain, Morocco and France and presented for debate at the summit. The concluding document, the Rabat Declaration, recognizes the need for joint action by the countries of origin, transit and destination of migration flows, in the conviction that the management of migration between Africa and Europe must be situated within the framework of the fight against poverty and the promotion of sustainable development. It also stresses the need to optimize migration management through the sharing of responsibility among the countries of origin, transit and destination.

The summit was held against the background of a clash of priorities within the EU as regards migration management in general and border management in particular. Areas adjacent to the EU’s land and sea borders share the problems of irregular inflows of immigrants and so try to draw attention to their predicament and attract the necessary resources. This summit may therefore be interpreted as an attempt to turn the management of Spanish borders into a European issue. The significant increase in the number of immigrants from Senegal and Mauritania arriving in the Canary Islands aboard cayucos suggests that these migratory routes, too, should be included in the European agenda, with all their complexity.

The conference may also be understood as an attempt to influence the agenda of the EU-Africa Joint Strategy, developed by the European Union and the African Union. In the Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development, issued following the ministerial summit in Tripoli in November 2006, this Joint Strategy is established as the framework for cooperation between the EU and the whole of the African continent. In its overall strategy it incorporates the Rabat agenda, together with other important initiatives and processes currently under way, such as the Barcelona Process, the ministerial conference on migration to be held in 2007 within the framework of the EU strategy known as The Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean [Conclusions of the European Council, December 2005 and COM(2006) 735 final], the EU Strategy for Africa [COM(2005) 489 final] and the results of the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development.

More information:
EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa’s Development:

account of the concerns of migrant and community focused organisations.

References

Traditionally, the new Central European EU Member States have not been the targets of migration in general and of Mediterranean-MENA migration in particular. The movement of people in the region has been much more related to the traditional ethnical and political realities of the region on the one hand, and to the systemic changes that occurred in 1989-1990, including the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, on the other.

The relationship of the new Central European member states with the Mediterranean in general, and with the southern and eastern shore in particular, have traditionally been scarce and sporadic, if not non-existent, and they were directed by the Soviets during the Cold War. This is reflected in the very small number of Muslim communities, among others.

In the post-Cold War era, Central European-Mediterranean relationships went back to historically low levels. While European Union membership has proven to be a driving force for the new Central European members to (re-)establish Mediterranean relations, they still have to adjust to regional EU policies and to policy-making as part of a supra-national body: the EU. While migration data clearly reflect the status of historical relations, EU membership has so far failed to prove a significant magnet for migrants.

Migration in Central Europe

The new Central European members of the European Union appeared on the migration "market" at the beginning of the 1990s not as a result of an organic development, but as a direct consequence of the collapse of authoritarian regimes (Tóth, 2002). The regime change initiated migration from Central Europe and much less—if at all—to Central Europe. However, the opening of the borders created a favourable situation for transit migration, especially from Asia to Western Europe. As a new phenomenon, which is characteristic of the region, the regime change introduced migration within Central Europe, especially following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. A special case was Hungary, which is surrounded by its own ethnic groups as a result of the Trianon Treaty of 1920. (Some 1.5 million Hungarians live in Romania, 500,000 in Slovakia and 290,000 in Serbia, but there are also ethnic Hungarians in the Ukraine, Croatia and Austria. Source: HTMH.)

Migration to Central Europe has remained relatively low, basically comprising asylum-seekers, “transiters” on their way via the region toward another target country—primarily old EU members or the United States—and immigrants who arrive with a view to settling in the region. The number of asylum-seekers in the new Central European Member States has dropped after EU accession. Central Europe is still mostly a transit region, mainly because of the ongoing economic transition and transformation, although methods have been changing, with migrants increasingly applying for visas to the Central European states and trying from there to get into other EU member states. The dissolution of Yugoslavia created a special case in that many Yugoslav citizens—not just Hungarians—came to “stay the war out” and would then either leave for western Europe or go back to their homes. On the one hand, immigration to Central Europe follows

1 New Central European members are those Central European states that joined the EU on 1st May 2004. Romania and Bulgaria are referred to separately under the term “newer members.”
Central Europe is still mostly a transit region, mainly because of the ongoing economic transition and transformation

Previous patterns, such as marriage to Central European citizens. On the other, it originates from typically Central European history: people who fled from the Communist regimes and took refuge in Western Europe or the United States moved back in significant numbers. Immigration to Hungary following the regime change is uniquely characterised by the vast number of ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries who are not foreigners in the sense that they speak the language, belong to the same culture and their ancestors used to live in historical Hungary. Of those who received Hungarian citizenship between 1990-2000, 91.8% had formerly been ethnic Hungarian citizens of the neighbouring states, 70% of which had come from Romania (Toth, 2002).

Central Europe and the Mediterranean

While the new Central European member states are usually considered one homogenous group, they are different in many respects, one example being their relationship with the Mediterranean. However, while Slovenia, Hungary and today’s Slovakia had sometimes been directly or indirectly involved in developments around the Mediterranean, mostly through the Habsburg Empire/Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Ottoman Turkey, the other Central European states did not even have that kind of relationship with the Mediterranean region and/or countries until after the Second World War. During the Cold War, Central Europe, being part of the Soviet Bloc, pursued a foreign policy directed by Moscow. In accordance with the practice of the Soviet Union, ideologically based “socialist type” relations were established with the “friendly Arab states” on the southern shore of the Mediterranean (Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria), which proved an important and reliable market for Central European products and provided much needed hard currency. Most of these relationships were practically terminated after the regime change. However, this framework created the only possible source of immigration into Central Europe: many students from the “friendly” Arab states were studying in Central Europe, which resulted in a number of mixed families. Central Europe also received many who fled the “friendly” authoritarian regimes under the pretext of studying or training. However, most of these people applied for and were granted Hungarian or some other Central European citizenship.

Islam, which has been one of the main determinant civilisations of the Mediterranean, is another such element: while Muslim communities had historically lived in the present territory of Hungary even before the Hungarian tribes moved to the area, and Hungarian history was determined by the fight against Muslim Ottomans for several centuries, other Central European states had had no Muslim “experience” before the Soviet relationships were established. (The Polish and Lithuanian Muslim past is connected to the Tartars and the Karaite community in Lithuania, which is in many ways distinctly different from the Islam practised around the Mediterranean.) As a consequence, the new Central European members (with the exception of the latest newcomer, Bulgaria, which has some 10-12% Turks) have no sizeable traditional Muslim communities. Present-day Muslim inhabitants have either arrived in the framework of the Socialist period relationship (which means that most of them are Arabs from the “friendly Arab states”), are generally secular and integrated into society, or are businessmen, diplomats etc. staying in the region temporarily. Although freedom of religious practice following the regime change led to the establishment of Muslim communities, among others, very few “natives” converted to Islam. Therefore, Muslim communities are very few and very small in number. For instance, in Hungary the approximately 15,000 practising Muslims belong to three different organisations (according to Muslims, the figure is higher at 25,000). However, the very small number—and in some cases the practical non-existence—of Muslim communities in new Central European EU members is increasingly in contrast with the social realities and composition of most old EU members and may cause serious trouble. The increasingly surfacing tensions among the native and Muslim communities—for instance the events in France at the end of 2005, the cartoon crisis and the campaign against Turkey’s EU membership by some NGOs—are fully represented in the Central European media, inciting hatred against a community which in Central Europe is practically non-existent. At present, Central
European societies on the whole are not unfavourably biased against Muslims in general, but Islamophobia may also spread there very quickly. The other community that has historically been present in Central Europe, but has a state of its own in the Mediterranean, is the Jewish community, which contributed significantly to the political, cultural, economic and scientific developments of the region. While in the Second World War they were persecuted and many were killed in the holocaust, the remaining Jewish communities experienced an unprecedented opening during and following the regime change. Diplomatic relations with Israel were established (with Hungary in 1989) and there has been a lively and close connection between Israel and the “native” countries, supported by the consular practice of dual citizenship. The Israelis of Central European origin, therefore, cannot be considered immigrants. In fact, in recent years there has been an increasing re-settlement from Israel into Central Europe, partly during periods when the security situation in Israel has deteriorated, and partly due to the increasing presence of Israeli companies in Central European economies.

Central European Migration Trends in the EU Context: Mediterranean-MENA Migration?

Relations between Central Europe and the Mediterranean have been (re-)established in the framework of the EU-Mediterranean Partnership. While Central Europeans were initially excluded from the process, during their accession negotiations they received an observer status, which upon their accession automatically became full membership in the EMP. It was widely expected that in the near future the new Central European member states would evolve from transit countries to migration targets. The very low figures representing Mediterranean-MENA migrants in the table below suggest that the Central European states have not yet become desirable migration targets.

While Central European economies are still in a transitory phase, there might be another very specific barrier to Central Europe becoming an inviting migration target: the new Central European states—with the exception of Poland—are small countries (each with a population of 1-1.5 million to 10 million inhabitants) and they all have their own native languages, which are barely spoken outside the country.

So far, the migration dimension of EU membership in the context of new member states has offered another perspective. On the one hand, old EU members were afraid of opening their labour markets to the new members, which led most to introduce restrictions on the free movement of labour from the new members. On the other, new members are already experiencing the exodus of some professions to the old members due not only to higher salaries, but also to better working conditions, especially for doctors. Interestingly, the new members are acting in a similar vein towards the even newer members (Romania and Bulgaria), trying to restrict the free movement of the Romanian/Bulgarian labour force (for example, by designating professions in which they do not accept workers), and in the meantime they are calling for professionals in fields in which...

### TABLE 38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>B 366</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>2101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>B 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>B 216</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>181</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>B 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>B 259</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>259</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
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<td>766,966</td>
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<td>111,261</td>
<td>1,634,986</td>
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<td>69,703</td>
<td>358,269</td>
<td>265,472</td>
<td>5,788,331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

they need extra personnel (the Czech Republic calling for Romanian/Bulgarian physicians, for instance). A very specific migration case occurred within the EU context in November-December 2006: some 60 Hungarian Roma went to Sweden seeking social benefits and a better life, and asked for asylum there. (Some years ago a similar movement occurred, but the destination of the Hungarian Roma was Canada, rather than other EU members.) The issue became so serious, threatening with a further flow of Hungarian Roma communities, that the Swedish embassy had to visit Roma population centres and leaders to explain the impossibility of such an exodus. In the end most of the Roma returned.

Conclusions

EU membership has expanded the traditional and historical sphere of interests of the new Central European Member States, offering new possibilities and demanding new obligations. In the process of adjustment to EU policies, an increasing awareness of the Euro-Mediterranean region has started to take shape and relevant policies are being formulated.

Patterns of migration, therefore, are not expected to change in the short term, but cannot be excluded in the medium to long term

However, movement of labour force from the new Central European members is still restricted by some old members, while the new members themselves introduce restrictions on the movement of Romanian and Bulgarian workers. Simultaneously, the new members are also experiencing an increasing shortage of workforce, which they are trying to attract from Romania and Bulgaria. Hungary has the advantage of having ethnically Hungarian communities in its surroundings. The new Central European members have no significant Muslim communities and, since most have no historical memory of confrontation or coexistence with Muslim peoples, they are as yet unaffected by Islamophobia.

The lack of strong direct relations between Central European and Mediterranean-MENA countries, the small number of Muslim communities and the as yet transitory phase of Central European economies have so far counterbalanced EU membership in the eyes of possible migrants. Language barriers may prove to be another such factor. Patterns of migration, therefore, are not expected to change in the short term, but cannot be excluded in the medium to long term.

References


Europe, the Mediterranean and Migration: New Paradoxes

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The situation created over the course of the past two years by the arrival of increasingly persistent migratory flows at Europe’s borders resulted in 2006 being what we could qualify as a “pilot year” with respect to the different policy proposals put forth by Europe. While we wait for some of these measures to take effect, measures that seem as necessary as they are desperate, what is true is that new reference frameworks have been established, with interesting connotations moving towards a more complex approach and greater involvement of exterior cooperation policies. Nevertheless, and precisely because of this, certain apparently contradictory paradoxes have emerged and they could set forth new criteria for migration management in Europe.

It can certainly be said that, with the initiatives launched in 2006, the Mediterranean area, with Africa in the forefront, has attained the category of strategic region for the implementation of European migration policies. In fact, the latter were largely premonitory of other strategies that were subsequently applied to other European Neighbourhood areas. In any case, the fundamental issue on the horizon is whether, with regard to the vast debates that are being developed in this global policy area, Europe will be capable of making its different action plans effective and lend them the flexibility required for the different levels of action involved, whether national, regional or multilateral.

What is certain is that, as a consequence of all of this, we are witnessing a multiplication of initiatives that will primarily result in input from the highest levels over the next period, as, for instance, the launching of the European Commission’s Thematic Programme for Cooperation with Third Countries in the Areas of Migration and Asylum (2007-2010), which has a budget of 205 million euros, or the organisation of the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference on Migration, to be held under the Portuguese Presidency in November of 2007.

Human Security as a Detonator and Development as a Priority

The Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development held in Rabat in July of 2006 on initiative of the Spanish and Moroccan governments and with the support of the EU was certainly one of the first attempts and, at least on a symbolic level, the most obvious and visible one, to show European priorities for the forthcoming period: the inclusion of the development issue as a priority and the presence of African countries in external EU policy on migration. The Rabat conference brought together fifty-six countries involved in the migratory routes of Africa and triggered other initiatives. The absence of Algeria, whose borders the majority of migrants cross on their way to Morocco, forced the subsequent organisation of another EU-Africa ministerial conference, held in Tripoli in late November. The assertion of poverty and underdevelopment as essential causal factors to consider and the need to draw up specific action plans were the main conclusions of these conferences. The condition of country of transit was also added to that of country of origin and reception, expanding

The Rabat conference brought together fifty-six countries involved in the migratory routes of Africa and triggered other initiatives
the dimensions of collective responsibility and solidarity for African actors. In this regard, the Maghreb countries are simultaneously forced to adopt proactive positions, which will most likely lead them to modify their country’s legal and institutional mechanisms. By the same token, the sum of 2,500 million euros per year offered by the Europeans in Rabat is not negligible. It is important to keep in mind that this entire diplomatic initiative arose due to a desperate situation relating to evident circumstances of human security. In Spain and Italy alone, between 400,000 and 600,000 immigrants have allegedly arrived over the past three years. Although individuals arriving by skiff or dinghy ("patera" in Spanish) constitute a minor percentage of the influx, estimated at less than 10%, the explosive human dimension of the situation is illustrated by the figures: in 2006, over 31,000 immigrants from Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea Bissau were intercepted off the coasts of the Canary Islands as compared to only 5,000 the previous year. This situation, partially due to the shift in immigration flows away from the Morocco-Andalusia route, has multiplied the risks for these migrants due to the greater distances to be covered by boat. It has also given rise to a new word in Spanish vocabulary and in the press – “cayuco”, a new type of boat used to cross the stretch of ocean as opposed to the more fragile, traditionally used “patera”.

The approach to migrant flow control with a security priority through the implementation of Frontex in late 2006 coexists with the irruption of the human dimension of the phenomenon, which aggravates the fragile balance of migration issues caused by illegal flows, a circumstance that has marked the rhythm of this area on the European agenda. Efforts to establish a comprehensive framework for external action in order to rise to the situation have not sufficed over the course of this year to demonstrate Europe’s capacity to go beyond national efforts and coordinate quick responses in the humanitarian sphere.

An important aspect for prioritisation has been demanded by the civil society. The civil society conference of Alicante convened during the Mediterranean Forum in October 2006 precisely mentioned the need to place the protection of immigrants at the heart of migration policies.

The civil society conference of Alicante convened during the Mediterranean Forum in October 2006 precisely mentioned the need to place the protection of immigrants at the heart of migration policies.

event in this period was the reference to the agreements on readmission and detention in countries of transit. In this context, the debate on fundamental (protective) human rights even led to the discussion of the need to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Charter on Migrants’ Rights.

This coexistence of political priorities regarding strategies to be developed is also reflected in the agendas of forums traditionally dealing with topics of security and interior affairs, as is the case with the 5+5 Forum. At its meeting in Algeciras in late 2006, the Spanish Presidency of the Labour Ministers Conference set the pace for a coherent strategy. The concept of expanding dialogue to encompass certain Sub-Saharan countries was introduced, thus including the concept of countries of transit as interlocutors and introducing all elements of integration and development as priorities for this period. This entailed the intention of making countries of migrant origin and transit collectively responsible for solidarity and integration. It is highly interesting to note how the lead role played by topics such as economic and social integration, formal and informal remittances or the importance of labour circulation acquires a strategic importance that forces regional and multilateral frameworks to rapidly react to issues of institutional governance (training of officials, establishment of appropriate legal frameworks, shared information systems for the labour market).

The lead role played by topics such as economic and social integration, formal and informal remittances or the importance of labour circulation acquires a strategic importance that forces regional and multilateral frameworks to rapidly react.
Framework for a Comprehensive Approach: The Danger of Europeanisation and Externalisation of Policies

As a result of the invitation made by the European Council to the Commission in late 2005, the Commission advanced in its global approach to exterior relations, development and employment, and justice and security. It also suggested including new political areas that were not part of the initial global approach, such as legal measures regarding migration and integration, also mentioning the need to lend greater efficiency to EU decision-making in this area. Certainly this innovative approach will bring new frameworks of coherence with respect to the dynamics mentioned above.

The idea of a global approach means combining aspects of border security and protection with socio-economic and development aspects. Thus, at the Mediterranean Forum (Foromed) in Alicante/Alacant in October 2006, the need was mentioned for "a border management system based on cooperation ensuring an adequate balance between real security requirements and the need to facilitate the circulation of goods and people." An interesting tension has emerged from this new situation along with two of the main paradoxes faced by the European strategy in the region during this period: on the one hand, the matter of the limits of European policy externalisation; and on the other hand, the Mediterranean nature of this policy issue.

We would be facing the paradox of a rhetoric of openness to development and cooperation issues while in reality implementing a Euro-centric perspective based on the prioritisation of border management.

With respect to the former point, the ultimate will to externalise European migration policy can certainly be felt. If this means prioritising European interests at border controls, we would be facing the paradox of a rhetoric of openness to development and cooperation issues while in reality implementing a Euro-centric perspective based on the prioritisation of border management and the need for control of illegal flows. In a report in June 2006, the European Parliament (EP) alerted about this circumstance and the serious consequences that pressure in this regard could exercise on the countries of the Southern Mediterranean Basin vis-à-vis citizens in transit (with regard to internal EU affairs, see the resolution in the EP’s April 2006 report on refugee camps in Malta).

In the second place, there is tension between European and regional dimensions. The development of global policy in its early stage in 2006 was within the framework of the Mediterranean Region. Nonetheless, the idea of multilateral involvement that began with Barcelona in its relations with Mediterranean Partner Countries and the numerous initiatives witnessed reveal a contradictory dynamic during this period whereby the desire for relations among equals in the political sphere contrasts with the fact that the priorities and interests are actually European. The paradox is that we could have active, increasingly European policies shared by continental partners without this being ultimately synonymous with a true dialogue of shared interests. Nonetheless, despite limitations, 2006 has brought splendid opportunities for jointly directing mobility. The first step has been taken and European interests should not only be broadly shared but also debated throughout the different platforms created to such an end. Perhaps the greatest challenge we face is to make the multilateral, Euro-Mediterranean framework an arbiter for finding the solutions to our shared problems.

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Communication from the Commission on policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of
Today, the number of international migrants has reached approximately 200 million people throughout the world, that is, more than the population of Brazil. That’s approximately 3% of the world’s population. In addition, with climate change and the ecological refugees it could create, this number could double in the very near future. All States are thus concerned with migratory phenomena, whether as countries of origin, countries of transit or host countries. This is one of the greatest challenges of globalisation. The concentration of capital and transfers of wealth that it produces cannot but incite more and more workers to migrate in order to survive. This is aggravated by the democratic deficit of countries in the southern hemisphere, which reveals that migrants are not only seeking a better livelihood, but also thirsting for liberty!

The UN acknowledged this phenomenon by creating a specific legal instrument for defending the rights of migrants. The General Assembly of the United Nations thus adopted, on 18th December 1990, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. This convention constitutes a fundamental international treaty for protecting migrant rights, establishing a link between migratory phenomena and human rights. It is a legal and moral “standard” towards which every State on the planet should strive.

Hence, the United Nations adopted this convention with the primary objective of ensuring and improving respect for the human rights of migrants, who are not only workers, but first and foremost human beings. Yet, though the majority of migrants live in the United States and Europe, it is curious to remark that none of these countries, which moreover often use a highly moralising tone when referring to human rights, has ratified said convention.

For thirteen years now, France and all countries of immigration, in particular Western ones, have been avoiding its ratification. Even worse, many of them are moving away from the objectives stipulated therein. There is certainly no denying that since the 90s, the state of migrants’ rights has been made increasingly precarious. The European Union allows its nationals free circulation, for instance, while ceaselessly tightening the regulations for granting asylum and residency to non-nationals. In the Treaty of Amsterdam, however, the principle of non-discrimination, naturally excluding discrimination based on nationality, is written in black and white.

Though the right to leave one’s country and move to the country of one’s choice is recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it remains but an illusion, since the freedom of circulation is not acknowledged by International Law, the obligation of taking in these migrants being the responsibility of the individual States. The ostracism of migrants and foreigners is part of a generalised policy of making society precarious. This increase in precariousness likewise translates into layoffs and unemployment, the marginalisation of stable employment, the calling into question of social statutes and social protection systems, etc. Progressively, successive categories of rights are called into question. No policy resting on injustice and discrimination of some can ensure social and democratic progress for others. A first exclusion always leads to a phenomenon of a chain reaction of exclusions!

Because denying the rights of a sector of the population, in this case foreigners, makes the whole of society more fragile, we must struggle to defend the rights of migrants.

Hence, in France and Europe in general, fostering the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families is a fundamental battle to be placed at the focal point of the political agenda for improving peaceful coexistence and therefore the future of our countries and our democracy. Unfortunately, I fear that once again, demagogy will prevail over the necessary considerations of the difficult global context involving increasing precariousness of migrants’ rights.

Alima Boumediene-Thiery
Senator, Paris

The Rights of Migrants, A Fundamental and Decisive Struggle:

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One of the striking features of 2006 was the way in which religion apparently obtruded into the political debate within Europe. The issue had begun to emerge in the previous two years as public discussion over the European Union’s constitutional treaty became mired in complexities of definition over Europe’s essential nature – as a Christian space or a secular environment of democratic governance and respect for individual rights in a climate of “inclusion within diversity”. The mobilisation of religion as a key cultural identifier of European identity was, however, a new contribution to the debate in which organised religion in Europe took an active part.

The introduction of Christianity into this debate, partly because of Enlargement in 2004, began to polarise other debates as well, especially those concerned with the inclusion of minority communities of other faiths, particularly Islam, underneath the European umbrella. For the littoral states of both the North and the South of the Mediterranean, the debate had particular resonance, given the Mediterranean’s role as the “forgotten frontier” between Christianity and Islam. And the majority of Europe’s immigrant minority communities are, of course, Muslim.

**Past Conflict**

This was not the first time that this issue had emerged into the public debate, of course. The Salman Rushdie affair, when the author of the *Satanic Verses* found himself facing death threats from Iran in 1989 because of comments about the Prophet Mohammed contained in the book, had highlighted the growing problems of minority communities and religious sensitivities in Europe towards the end of the 1980s. In 2002, the flamboyant Dutch politician, Pym Fortuyn, had been assassinated as a result of his attacks on migrants in Holland and his desire to limit immigration because of his intense distrust of Islam. Two years later, the Dutch film-maker, Theo Van Gogh, was killed by a Moroccan after he had made a film with a Somali immigrant politician, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, highlighting discrimination against women allegedly sanctioned in the Qur’an.

Then, at the end of 2005, the “cartoons crisis” erupted in Denmark, after a local newspaper, claiming to support freedom of speech, published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed deemed offensive by the local Muslim community. As with the Rushdie affair, the “cartoons crisis” soon generated a powerful resonance in the Muslim world, admittedly with some judicious help from Muslim leaders in Europe. The crisis stretched into 2006 with boycotts of Danish products in the Middle East and a growing diplomatic crisis set against European irritation at an issue that seemed to threaten innate European values by setting religious values against those of secular and tolerant European society. The issue was underlined in Britain, already sensitised to these issues by the bombings in London on 7 July 2005, where the prime minister, over a year later, expressed a majority view when he supported multiculturalism, provided that tolerance was also accepted by all those who made up the multicultural society. “Our tolerance,” he said in a major speech in December 2006, “is part of what makes Britain, Britain. So conform to it; or don’t come here.” His comments came in the wake of comments by the former foreign secretary, Jack Straw, who had decreed the *hijab* as a factor for division, not integration, within Britain’s – and by extension, Europe’s – complex multicultural society. His arguments recalled the bitter struggle in France over *laïcité* and Islamic dress in
March 2004 and similar concerns in Germany and Italy in the same year.

The Role of the Pope

Yet the issue was not quite as one-sided as it appeared, as Pope Benedict XVI was to demonstrate in the autumn of 2006. In an address at Regensburg, the university where he had studied before becoming a teacher in Bonn, the pope made a statement that seemed, inter alia, a direct challenge to Islam. Citing a fourteenth-century Byzantine emperor, he highlighted the concept of violence inherent in Islamic revelation. Although he recognised the extremism of such views, he did not dissent from them, as he sought to demonstrate the innate rationality of the Catholic vision, against both the crude rationalism of scientific secularism and the unrestrained commitment of revealed belief.

There was, of course, a storm of protest, both from the secular left and Muslims in Europe and from the Muslim world, particularly the Middle East and North Africa. The Vatican claimed to be “surprised” and the pope himself avowed he was “saddened” by the reaction. Little was done, however, to correct the impression his words had created and a not insignificant number of church leaders – both Catholic and non-Catholic alike, including Lord Carey, a former archbishop of Canterbury – sprung to his defence, thus incidentally confirming the view that, despite decades of interfaith dialogue, Christians really did believe that Islam encouraged, even promoted, violence as well as lacking the rationality of mainstream Christianity.

The pope’s comments were not, however, quite as coincidental as the hurt reaction from the Vatican implied. Pope Benedict XVI seems to be far more sceptical about the utility of interfaith dialogue, as it has been practiced in the past, than was his predecessor. He has downgraded the department and the officials in the Vatican responsible for it and has argued that any dialogue can only operate on the basis of “reciprocity”. In other words, Islam as a corpus of belief and articulated doctrine should mirror the values and principles that have come to characterise Christianity in the contemporary era of secular society and politics.

The offending citation, buried inside a complex argument about the role of rationality in religion, when seen in that context, served a coded political purpose, too. It highlighted where reciprocity appeared to be lacking – in an explicit and overt condemnation of religious extremism, similar to that implied by Mr Blair some months later. It also implied that the outrage over the cartoons crisis was misplaced within the context of European tolerance and that radical Islamist projects within Europe and beyond required systemic and sustained condemnation from within Islam itself. Not least, it implied the need for a far more overt disavowal of the kind of violence seen in Holland from the Muslim hierarchy inside Europe.

The Political Implications

Taken alone, no doubt, these strictures are unexceptional and, for most European moderates, self-evident. Tolerance and freedom of speech are at the core of the European experience and are, in themselves, essential guarantors of minority rights within a secular, multicultural society. The idea of violence as a means of resolving political and cultural differences is something which the past fifty years of the construction of the European project has explicitly outlawed. If, indeed, Islam is a religion dedicated to peaceful co-existence, Muslims should have no problem in endorsing such objectives.

Muslim sensitivity over issues linked to religion may reflect something very different from simply the extremist exclusivism that Europeans usually perceive.

Yet it appears that they do, not simply because they are adherents of extremist creeds that demand cathartic violence as the mechanism of resolving difference, which cannot therefore be tolerated within the sphere of European tolerance. Defining and then resolving the contradiction that this represents is clearly of crucial importance if Europe is to achieve the ideal of “inclusion within diversity” and fulfil Jacques Derrida’s concept of “hospitality” – the need to recognise communalities not differences within a set of shared values in seeking to integrate European society. Ironically enough, that can only occur when “difference” is recognised and accepted!

In other words, Muslim sensitivity over issues linked to religion may reflect something very different from simply the extremist exclusivism that Europeans usually
HOW THE MOHAMMED CARTOON CONTROVERSY WAS PERCEIVED IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

EuroMeSCo conducted a survey on the cartoon crisis in eighteen countries that form part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in September 2006. These countries were France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel. The European Institute of the Mediterranean was asked to prepare a report summarising the different reactions in different countries according to ten areas, described below.

1. Official Reactions
Denmark took a radical position concerning freedom of speech (influenced by the Danish People’s Party, which has a xenophobic undercurrent). The other countries in the European Union also defended the right to freedom of speech but with more undertones. France, for example, highlighted the need for responsibility and caution (due to the large Muslim community in France), Germany, Estonia and Hungary gave equal importance to the freedom of religion and the freedom of speech, and Italy and Spain, for political reasons, called for moderation and dialogue.

All the countries in the south of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership area condemned the cartoons and stressed the need for respect and moderation, claiming that freedom of speech had its limits.

2. Political Debate
The political debate was dominated by the same priorities as those that dominated the official reactions. In the European Union, unlike in the southern countries, all the political parties defended the right to freedom of speech, but each country added individual priorities such as respect for religions in France and Estonia, responsibility and tolerance in Italy and Lithuania. Different priorities also existed within individual countries for political or religious reasons. The cartoon controversy had no impact on political programmes or debates following the crisis.

3. Religious Debate
The cartoons were condemned by Muslim authorities in all countries, without exception. Even in countries with a Muslim majority, the condemnation was in most cases accompanied by an attitude of moderation and rejection of violence by the religious authorities, although there were certain groups that wished to limit relations with Denmark. Other religious communities (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish) in all the countries, including Israel, coincided with the Muslim position by calling for respect.

Finally, it is interesting to note that there was a debate within the Muslim community in Denmark itself, where the controversy originated. Numerous Muslims considered that the debate was monopolised by the Imams and, feeling that their position was not represented, created a new organisation called Democratic Muslims.

4. Attitudes Among the General Population
The general population in certain European Union countries (such as France) disapproved, almost unanimously, of the cartoons, finding them aggressive. The public opinion, however, in several countries (such as Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania and Spain) was relatively moderate and even divided in some cases (especially among Catholics), with one side against the discrediting of religion and another in favour of the freedom of speech. These feelings were at times more mixed and were accompanied by a poor image of Islam throughout the different levels of society. The demonstrations organised by the Muslim communities were peaceful and did not draw large crowds.

In the southern countries, there was a widespread feeling of religious offence, reflected by mass demonstrations, some of which included scenes of violence against the Danish and Norwegian embassies.

5. Foreign Communities
There was unanimous condemnation of the cartoons and of the lack of respect for Islam in European Union countries with Muslim communities. This condemnation was even stronger in certain countries where these communities already felt that they were victims of social discrimination and prejudice. In Belgium, in contrast, the positions taken during the controversy were more moderate, which is possibly a reflection of the integration of Muslims into the country’s structures. Finally, in the majority of cases, the cartoon controversy did not give rise to political measures with respect to foreign communities, except in Italy where the Council for Italian Islam was created during the crisis.

6. The Debate in the Media
While newspapers in certain countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Hungary, etc.) decided to publish the cartoons, or at least some of them, to defend the right to freedom of speech and information, other newspapers (in Estonia, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, etc.) explicitly refused to do so. There were also countries in which several newspapers published the cartoons despite this having been banned by their government. This was the case of Jordan and Algeria, in particular.

In several countries (including France, Germany, Denmark and Spain), the controversy was given different coverage by television/radio and the written press. While the former tended to be more sensationalist, the latter took a more analytical approach.

7. Cultural Debate
There was only a debate among artists and writers in certain countries such as France (about freedom of speech and blasphemy), Germany (about freedom of speech), Morocco (about inappropriate violent reactions), Algeria, Jordan and Egypt (about the limits of freedom of speech and respect for religious sensitivities). Other subjects debated were the theory of the clash of civilisations, the conflicts in the Middle East, Islamophobia, and the political instrumentalisation of religion. Writers in Denmark were also active and issued a manifesto reminding people that ethnic minorities had been discriminated against for years. In several countries (Italy, Spain, Lithuania, Algeria, the Palestinian Authority, etc.), however, there was no debate in artistic circles, or at least the members of these were not invited to participate in the media debate (as they were in Tunisia).

8. Academic Debate
Debates in academic circles only had an influence on public opinion in very few countries (Germany, Spain and Egypt).

9. Role of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
and the European Union
Hardly any countries in the European Union or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership made reference to this partnership. The European Union was perceived by all the countries as weak, divided, and absent from the controversy.

10. Implications and Solutions for the Future
Of the different suggestions proposed by those interviewed, particularly worth mentioning are: the need for greater unity and efficiency within the European Union in matters of foreign policy; reflection on the concept of freedom of speech and its possible limits; interreligious dialogue between the ‘west’ and countries with a Muslim majority; combating stereotypes and racism and the design of relevant school and television programmes; and the media’s ethical duty.

Alain Blomart
The outrage that greeted both the Rushdie affair and the cartoons issue was undoubtedly partially stoked up for sectarian reasons – a struggle for influence between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Rushdie case and a desire by local imams for active support from the Middle East in the cartoons crisis. However, the consequent degree of anger said much more about the sense of isolation and humiliation that Muslims as a group – whatever their adherence to Islamic religious practice – felt in and towards Europe than it did about the manipulation of the issues by militants and extremists.

The same seems to have been true in the case of the pope’s comments, except that there, no external militantism was necessary to make an issue of them. The citation he used was explicit enough in itself when it argued that all novelty that the Prophet Muhammad brought in Islam was “evil and inhuman”. In fact, the insult was all the greater since the pope’s core point – that Catholicism is unique for its rationality, achieved through the marriage of Hellenistic philosophy with divine revelation – also applies to Islam! The Mutazilite tradition and that of the later falsafa movement reflect precisely the same happy marriage and St Thomas Aquinas appears to have been profoundly influenced by both!

In short, it is very difficult to see the pope’s apparently unintended intervention into the European debate as unintended or even as theological in intent. It was really a profoundly political intervention in a political debate, to do with both the issue of political extremism couched in doctrinal terms and the issue of socio-cultural cohabitation within the context of multiculturalism. Yet, if this is the case, it is, perhaps, necessary to recall that there are two sides to the debate implied by such confrontations!

The European Problem

One of the main Muslim complaints in all three incidents – the Rushdie affair, the cartoons crisis and the pope’s comments – has been the apparent European indifference to, ignorance of and even dislike towards Islam. With greater sensitivity, they argue, the offence and antagonism that all three incidents generated could have been avoided. The standard European response has been that Muslims have demonstrated an intolerance towards criticism and satire that is in essence a challenge to freedom of speech. Moreover, such intolerance has bordered on violence, with the death threat against Salman Rushdie, which still stands, and the murder of Theo Van Gogh for a cultural statement that was seen as a desecration, not to speak of those who died in protest demonstrations in the Middle East and Pakistan as a result of Muslim inability to tolerate criticism, however it was voiced.

In that process of reconciliation, there is a need to consider, not only the position of the Other, but also one’s own

What seems to be shared between these two stands is that neither really has much to do with religion. Instead both are statements about cultural interaction and about the political process of reconciling points of view that appear to be diametrically opposed. And, in that process of reconciliation, there is a need to consider, not only the position of the Other, but also one’s own. It seems to be no accident that the two countries in which the most acute confrontations have occurred in the past five years have been Denmark and Holland, two countries that prize themselves on their traditions of tolerance and liberalism; yet two countries which have the most stringent immigration policies of any country in the European Union. Similarly, it is hardly fortuitous that it is a pope who was previously in charge of the Holy Office who is least indulgent of Islam as he tries to find accommodations with secular Europe.

Perhaps part of the problem manifested by the intensity of the sense of hurt anger manifested by Muslims of all kinds in Europe over issues that strike most Europeans as too innately insignificant to justify such reactions has to do with the nature of the European reaction as well. We tend to forget that we also have our cultural sensitivities as well – Holocaust denial, for example, which in some European countries is a criminal offence, a constraint that is, arguably, an interference in the freedom of speech over an issue which we may also find morally offensive, quite apart from being historically inaccurate. Similarly, Europeans cannot understand why Muslims are loath to recognise Holocaust Day. Yet they did not participate in the European construction of the Holocaust and tend to feel that one of its consequences has been unfairly visited upon them.

Beyond that, however, is the problem of tolerance itself. In its most dogmatic form, it becomes a kind of intolerance for it insists on the acceptance of matters
that others may also find morally offensive. As such, it then becomes a conscious act of imposition that serves to alienate, not reconcile, the components of contemporary European complexity. In so doing, it amplifies cultural difference and political confrontation, worsening the alienation and humiliation that Muslims frequently feel, denying them the possibility of entering into the European experience upon their own terms. As Sami Zubaida has pointed out, there was a time when that process was eased by indifference, rather than by tolerance, by the inclusive sense that such distinctions were irrelevant and thus not differences. Tolerance, as practiced in our most liberal societies is, in reality, exclusive and has thereby led those who do not share its values to be excluded and thus vulnerable to attacks on their own values by its exclusiveness. Hence the violence of their reactions, which if they cannot be excused should at least be understood. That is, after all, surely the responsibility that tolerance implies.

And responsibility does indeed appear to be part of the answer for, even if the principle of freedom of speech cannot be undermined in contemporary Europe, the way in which it is articulated can be adapted; adapted not just to spare Muslim sensitivities but to demonstrate their inclusion within European complexity. That may well be a greater challenge for Europeans as the aggressive assertion of individual freedoms becomes an end in itself. Yet, unless it is done, the confrontations and mutual distrust will worsen and will feed the extremism that tolerance is supposed to resolve.

Responsibility does indeed appear to be part of the answer for, even if the principle of freedom of speech cannot be undermined in contemporary Europe, the way in which it is articulated can be adapted; adapted not just to spare Muslim sensitivities but to demonstrate their inclusion within European complexity.

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The year 2006 witnessed a number of youth events in the Mediterranean Region. These meetings organised by Euro-Mediterranean foundations in charge of intercultural dialogue prove that there is hope for the renewal of genuine dialogue among civilizations. Considerable efforts were made to bring together young people from all over the Mediterranean Basin, the ultimate aim being to mitigate certain chronic conflicts in the world by placing our hopes on youth.

Overview of Euro-Mediterranean Meetings

In June 2006, the European Commission, in collaboration with the SALTO-Youth EuroMed Resource Centre (located at the National Institute for Youth and Non-Formal Education –INJEP, in France), organised the EuroMed 2006 Meeting, convening the different actors of the EuroMed Youth Programme. The participants unanimously expressed their wish to consolidate cooperation and partnership among the European Youth Programme agencies and the EuroMed Youth Units (EMYUs). Furthermore, they proposed creating a think tank comprised of said agencies and units, in order to come up with influential strategies and measures for cooperation among youth on both the northern and the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. They also discussed the importance and role of the Programme in their respective countries, as well as future projects and initiatives.

In August, after the controversy raised by the caricatures of the Islamic Prophet Mohammed, the Danish government hosted a cultural festival, “Images of the Middle East,” in several Danish cities to restore the image of Denmark in the Arab world. Denmark took the initiative of organising the Images of the Middle East Festival to foster mutual understanding, part of which was a conference convening Islamic religious leaders and Danish specialists to engage in religious and cultural dialogue.

In September of 2006, the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures hosted the awards ceremony for the EuroMed Journalist Award for Cultural Diversity in Alexandria, Egypt. The laureates were four young journalists from Egypt, Italy, Belgium and Israel, respectively, who were chosen for their articles on other societies. In October, the Dialogue 21 Workshop was also held in Alexandria, with the participation of 40 young people ranging in age from 18 to 25 and from 28 different Euro-Mediterranean countries, who came together to engage in dialogue on mutual respect in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

The Importance of Intercultural Dialogue for Young People

The fact that the EuroMed Journalist Award for Cultural Diversity was awarded to young people from different Euro-Mediterranean countries contributes to fostering the image of culturally diversified societies and
consequently causing rapprochement between different communities. The young people who participate in such activities to promote intercultural dialogue can share their experiences with fellow citizens. An Egyptian, Italian, Belgian and Israeli meeting and engaging in dialogue helps to change certain preconceptions. Direct, individual dialogue with people from other cultures is just as important for young people as their general role in cross-cultural dialogue. This type of intercultural conversation helps youth with lower levels of education or who have never had the opportunity of meeting people of other nationalities to realise the importance of getting to know the ‘Other’, even if they consider them their enemies. Cultural events or meetings on cultural diversity allow participants to learn about others’ viewpoints and at times gain a greater understanding of a society considered an enemy, possibly contributing to eventually transforming the word ‘enemy’ into ‘friend’ and arriving at reconciliation. Furthermore, the organisation of trips such as those offered to the four journalists as part of their award incites young people to discover other communities and compare cultures in person.

Like the EuroMed 2006 Meeting, the Dialogue 21 Workshop also provided the opportunity to exchange knowledge and ideas. There, youth were invited to put forth their proposals for overcoming the current crisis in North-South relations. The participants from different countries felt free to ask one another questions. They also formed groups to participate in a game on knowledge of other cultures. In addition, the Anna Lindh Foundation allowed each young person to ask questions of someone from a country on the opposite Mediterranean shore. All questions and answers were to be published and the proposals presented to the 35 governments of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Increased Tension between the West and Muslim Communities

Although the Danish festival was not well received by the Muslim world, at least it transmitted the intention
of Copenhagen to restore friendly relations with Muslims. The Euro-Mediterranean community is divided on the crisis of the caricatures offensive to Islam and its Prophet. Some believe that liberty of expression has no limits, even when religion is involved, whereas others feel it is imperative to respect religion, above all since Islam is singled out by the Western World. The Danish Government made efforts to ameliorate the crisis by apologising but this was unfortunately insufficient due to the indifference displayed by young Danes, who did not realise the importance of containing such a situation in order to prevent commotion from lodging itself between the two shores of the Mediterranean and preserve its image as an intermediary zone.

The foundations concerned with youth of the Mediterranean Basin should continue to play the role of catalyst for cooperation among young people from both the North and the South and East. They should also continue to participate in the dialogue between governments and civil society youth organisations. A common language must be devised to bring differences to light and not just express the common values shared by both shores. Understanding and respecting differences is more important than delving into shared aspects, as it contributes to establishing a climate of respect and rapprochement. Good organisation of youth events is essential and success can be ensured, for instance, by allowing everyone to have a say and expanding spoken participation without giving preference to any one nationality.

The Role of Youth

It remains to be seen how young people can really help to strengthen dialogue among cultures (on the condition, of course, that they believe in its effectiveness). In the face of the hostility prevailing in the world and the clashes between Muslims and the West, in addition to terrorism, from which no country is safe today, dialogue among youth has become the best means of overcoming this crisis. Young people today are more extraverted than their forbears and could succeed where their governments have failed. To be successful, any dialogue among young people must abide by certain criteria, without which it would be better to save the time and money spent on organising such events:

- A young person should not discuss a subject with someone from another culture if he or she is not in a position to do so or is not ready to answer questions or listen to criticism. For instance, a Muslim who does not know her or his religion well should not take part in an interreligious dialogue, knowing that he or she could confuse others and convey false images and ideas.
- Participants must not line up against opinions but rather accept all ideas, even if they disagree with them. The most important thing is to understand others and open ourselves to other societies.
- People must not enter into dialogue with the idea of convincing others, but rather to ascertain their opinions. "No civilization by itself can claim to represent all humanity or to assume full responsibility for it; nor can a single civilization claim exclusive rights to provide an ultimate and universally valid vision of how to be a human being and how to live wisely in today’s world." (Valdas Adamkus, President of the Republic of Lithuania).

With regard to intercultural dialogue, there is still a great deal of cultural shock and gaps existing between cultures and societies. Words and slogans are constantly being uttered by policymakers and leaders only to serve their interests without making the least effort to establish conditions for rapprochement among humanity. It is through meetings with young people from the Mediterranean Basin that we can overcome these obstacles of ignorance and misunderstanding, as well as gain an understanding and learn about the religions, thoughts, viewpoints and traditions of others. It is important to hold meetings between young Palestinians and Israelis, Israelis and Arabs, Syrians and Lebanese, non-Muslim Danes and Muslims, and Jews, Muslims and Christians, with the presence of other young people from Europe and Mediterranean countries to express their opinions objectively and impartially in a relaxed atmosphere free from tension. These young people can be the agents in a process of reconciliation via intercultural dialogue.

Through the consolidation of cooperation and friendship among young people from both shores of the Mediterranean, a new form of rapprochement will doubtless emerge among future generations. Youth represents a force for peace capable of fostering a culture of non-aggression, human rights education, civic behaviour, gender equality, the struggle against discrimination and xenophobia, intergenerational dialogue and the universal values of dialogue.
The Difficult Construction of a Mediterranean Cinematic Area

Michel Serceau
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Each Mediterranean country has its cinema. Nevertheless, each country must assert its existence in the face of globalisation and must struggle against the hegemony exercised, particularly, by the USA in this sphere. The issue is not just economic. Hence the idea of a 'cultural exception.' After giving rise to a good number of debates, particularly in France, this idea was set down in writing in the UNESCO Convention on Diversity of Cultural Expression in March of 2006. Ratified by the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, it has not yet been accepted by the Maghreb and Middle East countries.

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Francophonie (the International Organization of French-speaking countries), the Arab Maghreb Union... there is no dearth of structures to strengthen ties in the sphere of cinema, as well as in other fields, among countries on both the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. Yet the Mediterranean being at the intersection of broader regions – i.e. the Euro-Mediterranean, African-Euro-Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Regions, and so on –, spheres of action often simply no more than coincide or overlap. Though the multiplication of festivals in the region bears witness to the will to create a Mediterranean cinematic area, it largely remains to be built.

The Vicissitudes of Production and Co-Production

On the European side of the Mediterranean, the results for 2006 were rather encouraging. Whereas Spanish production set the pace, Italian production rose by 2%. A bill for the organisational reform of the sector announced by the Ministry of Culture could lead to substantial progress. In France, over 200 films were produced. Although experiencing a growth of 7.5%, box office sales in France did not reach the 2004 level.

The results were mixed in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean area. The Cairo Festival, which granted the award for the best Arab film to Djamilah Sahraoui for Barakat, rightly rewarded Algeria: with the return of security, Algerian filmmakers are making a comeback. Tunisia, on the other hand, only produced 5 feature films and 15 shorts in 2006. All things considered, it was in Morocco that film production flourished the most. The number of films produced rose 15-fold after an amendment to the financing law allowing 5% of television publicity revenue to be allocated to a cinema support fund. The French system has created a following here. It is not surprising that Tunisian filmmakers are calling for the creation of a National Centre for Cinema modelled after the CCM (Centre Cinématographique Marocain, the Moroccan film centre). If Tunisia is lagging behind, this may be because the State does not have a sufficiently aggressive policy. The principal problem is that the country suffers from structural distortions. Although it has no less than 500 producers (this is the official number, though there are actually few professionals among them), since the SATPEC (Société des Artistes Tunisiens Producteurs, or Association of Tunisian Producers) went under in 1990, Tunisia has lacked the technical means for creating ambitious films. Will the establishment of a post-production laboratory in Gammarth in November of 2006 by the company, Quinta Communications, in which Tarik Ben Ammar is in partnership with Silvio Berlusconi, suffice to improve the situation?

The number of co-productions with Europe is
decreasing, though agreements do exist; Italy, for instance, has agreements with Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Yet co-production has been one of the goldmines of Mediterranean cinema. The number of French-Algerian co-productions can be ascribed to the fact that the directors have dual nationality, though it is difficult to gain an accurate overview of this complex situation. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the "Fonds Sud Cinéma" (South Cinema Fund) in 1984, and it is increasingly providing support to Asian and South American cinema projects to the detriment of projects from Maghreb and Middle East countries.

The Part Played by the European Union

The EU Media Programme concerning the distribution of European audiovisual works has been renewed. The first programme expired on 31st December 2006, after 6 years in operation, after which the European Union adopted the MEDIA 2007 Programme in November 2006. Also launched by the European Union, the EuroMed Audiovisual II Programme seeks to provide support for the structures of the audiovisual industry in the southern Mediterranean countries, which the European Union has become involved in. The first programme expired on 31st December 2006, after 6 years in operation, after which the European Union adopted the MEDIA 2007 Programme in November 2006. Also launched by the European Union, the EuroMed Audiovisual II Programme seeks to provide support for the structures of the audiovisual industry in the southern Mediterranean countries, from the production to the operative stages, and to combat the threats it faces, in particular piracy. Hence, new legal instruments have been posted on the EuroMed Audiovisual II website. By the same token, aid projects were launched in January 2006 that will be rolled out on a staggered basis until late 2008. They are led by either public or private organisms of the Mediterranean countries. A cog in the wheel of the European Union, these countries have been entrusted with carrying out and handling the budget of one of the programme initiatives. Morocco has taken the lion’s share here, not so much for the number of projects managed – after all, there were only two – as for the financial sum they represent: 15 million euros, that is, a third of the overall EuroMed Audiovisual II budget. Most likely Morocco owes this to the significant progress made in infrastructures. Two of the programme’s four areas (the Development Area and the Promotion Area) are designed to provide support for production and encourage co-production. The Mediterranean Film Business School project, launched by Spain’s Fundación Cultural Media, seeks to create a network of professionals operating in the public and private spheres in order to step up cooperation and exchange. 20 producers and projects were involved in 2006. Even more pragmatic, the Media Films Development initiative, led by Ali n’Productions and the Audiovisual Attaché of the French Embassy, shall assist – on an annual basis until 2008 – 10 producer-screenwriter tandems in preparing films that will be shot, in principle, in Morocco. The projects under the programme area, Support for Distribution and Screening, are designed to enhance the conditions of distribution and screening for films produced within the European and Mediterranean regions. This is quite pertinent, as the southern Mediterranean countries suffer from a blatant lack of movie theatres, in particular functional ones. There are probably no more than 30 movie theatres and 14 screens considered functional in Tunisia. By the same token, their number has fallen in Algeria, though a few rehabilitation initiatives have been undertaken by certain city councils. A second goal of the Mediterranean Film Business School project is also to enhance distribution. Projects such as “The Caravan of the Euro-Arab Cinema,” led by the CCM and scheduled to extend until July 2008, is, moreover, the only one that embraces the entire Mediterranean Region and aims to foster the circulation of Mediterranean films” in addition to the presence of European films in the MEDA area.

The Multiplication of Training Initiatives

No promotion, distribution or screening is possible without the professionals capable of making it happen. It is therefore not surprising that over half of the projects under the aegis of the programme (7 out of 12) fall under the category of “Training”.
European institutions invest more in this area than in promotion. Therein lies the profound significance of the Mediterranean Film Business School project. Even more pragmatic, the project “Generation Big Screen 2006,” an initiative of CICAE (International Confederation of Art Cinemas), aims to increase the audience for Mediterranean and European films in 10 countries of the MEDA region (Algeria, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). It has allowed 45 young or future distribution professionals, including film club operators, to undergo training in 2006. Its two training courses took place at the Venice Film Festival in Italy and the Carthage Film Festival in Tunisia. In addition, the Mediterranean Films Crossing Borders workshops, managed by Madrid-based Iberantar, were held in Cannes and San Sebastian/Donostia. The European Institutions, which in 2006 provided support for 18 events in 6 Mediterranean countries, deliberately chose to locate these events in Carthage, Cannes, San Sebastian/Donostia, etc. The EuroMed Audiovisual Programme will therefore have directly reached 40,000 spectators in the Mediterranean region. All in all, in 2006, the programme will have provided training for 250 professionals in 10 countries of the MEDA area. Yet this number must grow. Private initiatives can contribute to such growth, such as Cinéma international. Created in 2001 and based in Cannes, it works with the local region, Europe, Mediterranean countries and Africa. Its aim is to foster the fields of filmmaking, events organisation and continued training. To this end, it offers archives containing film materials and documents for rent or sale. Associations can also be highly useful bridges. By way of example, Ecumes is a reference in the sphere of decentralised cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean region. This association is at the head of a large network of cultural actors in fifteen countries, coordinating international cooperation networks established within institutions of higher education in the arts. Not content with simply adding the 7th art to that of music and drama, Ecumes is working to create a network of cinema schools.

The Vitality of Festivals… and the Risk of Globalisation

Festivals continue to weave networks in the Mediterranean countries. The biennial International Mediterranean Film Festival of Tetuán, Morocco, which has only existed as such since 1999 (when it replaced the Rencontres cinématographiques de Tetuán, created, in its turn, in 1985), was not held in 2006. It was nonetheless a hallmark year: the establishment of a Foundation for the International Mediterranean Film Festival of Tetuán on 14th April 2006 should effectively allow this event to gain a professional nature. Once the foundation is consolidated, the festival could become annual as of 2007. The Montpellier International Festival of Mediterranean Film, which held its 28th edition in 2006, in which 22 Mediterranean countries were represented, remains, in the meantime, the festival of reference. Nonetheless, Montpellier’s reputation should not overshadow the high quality work done elsewhere. In Italy, for instance, the Mediterranean Film Festival (Giornate del Cinema del Mediterraneo) of Cagliari was held from 26th October to 4th November 2006, as well as the 11th MedFilm Festival of Rome, which focused on exile. Although somewhat beyond the Mediterranean geographic area, Brussels asserted its role here as well. At the 9th edition of the Mediterranean Film Festival of Brussels, from 23rd November to 2nd December 2006, films on emigration and a selection of documentaries were screened, in addition to the Yacoubian Building (Egypt) and a variety of Moroccan films. Documentaries were in the foreground at the 4th edition of the Mediterranean Short Film Festival of Tangiers, from 11th to 16th September 2006. 37 films from 17 countries were presented there, in the same city where a cinematheque has been functioning since the month of December 2006 (the inauguration was to take place on 24th February 2007). Documentaries were also an important facet at the festivals of Cagliari as well as Civitavecchia, where the 11th edition of the International Award for Mediterranean Documentary Filmmaking and Reporting was bestowed. The emergence of these specialised film festivals is a significant adjuvant for consolidating a Mediterranean cinematic area. Take, for instance, the Agadir Cinema and Immigration Festival in Morocco, organised by the association "Initiative culturelle". At its 4th edition, from 12th to 16th December 2006, the topic of migration was
explored from the cultural as well as the political angles. The Festival of Amazigh Film, launched in Algiers in 1999 and gaining official backing from the Ministry of Culture in 2005 will hold its 7th edition in Tlemcen in January of 2007. A likely means for establishing ties among the different Maghreb countries and even serving as a bridge between the northern and southern Mediterranean countries (the 2002 edition was held in Bobigny, on the outskirts of Paris), this initiative should by all means be pursued.

In 2006, the Institut du Monde Arabe (Arab World Institute, Paris) organised the 8th Biennial Festival of Arab Film (from 7th to 29th May), fortunately expanding to include Marseille as a location for the third time thanks to the Aflam association. In the Southern Mediterranean, on the other hand, the 13th European Film Festival of Lebanon and the 7th Film Festival of Tripoli took place from 30th November to 10th December 2006, despite the very difficult political climate in Lebanon. Yet, as the titles indicate, none of these events has the direct, primary goal of fostering Mediterranean cinema. Whether it is the Biennial of Arab Film or African Film Festivals taking place in the northern Mediterranean (Festival of Milan, now joined by the Festival of Tarifa, with the mission of fostering and disseminating African film in Spain and Latin America), or the European Film Festival of Lebanon, the focus is one-way and the Mediterranean region is not the important factor. Even though Tarifa, where the Arab-Berber invaders once disembarked on the Iberian Peninsula, is a highly symbolic location.

Isn’t the Mediterranean Region simply neglected at times? The least one can say of the creation in 2006 of the Festival of Rome, which will act as rival to that of Venice, is that it has not contributed to creating a more conducive climate. The Presidency of the Languedoc-Roussillon Region and the Montpellier Conurbation Community having declared that fostering Maghrebi cinema would not suffice to make the Festival of Montpellier a “major, internationally recognised festival,” we can even speak of an attitude of closure. Though the festivals of Cannes and Venice are making room for films from the southern Mediterranean in some of their sections, we mustn’t delude ourselves: it is a time of globalisation and internationalisation rather than regionalisation. As a sign of the times, two festivals whose scope goes well beyond the Mediterranean region took place almost simultaneously in southern Mediterranean countries. The Marrakech International Film Festival held its 6th edition from the 1st to 9th December 2006, while the Cairo International Film Festival celebrated its 30th anniversary from the 30th November to 8th December. In addition, the Carthage Film Festival, a highly emblematic, long-standing event which celebrated its 40th anniversary in 2006, created parallel sections dedicated to Asian and Latin American films, announcing their intention of turning towards these “cinemas of the south,” which the European Union is now supporting.
Appendices
Map A.1 | Montenegro Referendum on Independence (21st May 2006) and Ethnic Composition


Ethnic Composition
- Serbs
- Montenegrins
- Bosnians
- Other (Muslims, Croats and undeclared)
- Albanians

In the plebiscite held on 21st May, 55.5% of the population was in favour of Montenegro’s independence, which was proclaimed on 3rd June 2006.
Map A.2 | 2006 Lebanon War: Israeli Targets and Refugee Return

[Map showing Israeli targets and refugee return during the 2006 Lebanon War.]
Map A.3 | 2006 Lebanon War: Israeli Bombings (12th July - 13th August 2006)

Own production. Source: SAMIDOUN
**Map A.4 | Water Use and Cross-Border Water Resources**

In the Mediterranean Basin, water is a scarce resource subject to elevated use. The complexity of the situation increases when the resource is shared among several countries. The management of cross-border resources has become one of the major present and future challenges and can be approached in a variety of ways. The use of the Nile River Basin is an example of joint management, though not exempt of difficulties, among the ten countries through which it extends, a partnership having been created to this effect. On the other hand, the unequal distribution of water from joint Israeli-Palestinian aquifers reflects the asymmetrical power relations in water management, which contribute to the fact that Palestinians suffer one of the highest levels of water scarcity in the world.
Map A.5 | Happy Planet Index (HPI)

Happy Planet Index (HPI) is an index that measures the ecological efficiency with which human well-being is delivered around the world. Developed by nef (new economics foundation), a British think tank, in collaboration with the Friends of the Earth, the index uses three indicators: life expectancy, the degree of satisfaction with life, and the ecological footprint to rank countries.

- POOR: Life-Satisfaction < 5.5, Life Expectancy < 60, Ecological Footprint > 3.6
- MEDIUM: Life-Satisfaction 5.5 - 6.7, Life Expectancy 60 - 75, Ecological Footprint 1.8 - 3.6
- GOOD: Life-Satisfaction > 6.7, Life Expectancy > 75, Ecological Footprint < 1.8

Legend:
- Two of the three components are poor, or one is poor and the ecological footprint is critical
- One of the three components is poor
  - One of the three components is poor and the other two are medium
  - One of the three components is poor and one good
  - One of the three components is poor and the other two good
- All three indicators are medium
- One indicator is good and the other two medium
- Two indicators are good and one medium
- All three indicators are good
- No data available

Own production. Source: nef and Friends of the Earth, www.happyplanetindex.org
Map A.8 | Legislative Elections in Palestine per District (25th January 2006)

Number of Votes Cast per District
- < 20,000
- 20,000 - 40,000
- 40,000 - 60,000
- 60,000 - 80,000
- 80,000 - 100,000
- 100,000 - 120,000
- 120,000 - 140,000

Top Six Parties per District (% of Votes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change and Reform</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP**</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Alternative</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Palestine</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Third Way</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of Votes Distribution of Seats per Party List
- Change and Reform: 29 seats
- Fatah: 28 seats
- PFLP**: 3 seats
- The Alternative: 2 seats
- Independent Palestine: 2 seats
- The Third Way: 2 seats
- Others: 1 seat

Seats per District
- Total seats: 132

*Hamas **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Voter turnout 74.6%

According to Article 3 of Elections Law No. 9 of 2005:
1. The Palestinian electoral law shall be based on the mixed electoral system evenly (50%-50%) between the relative majority (multiple constituencies) and proportional representation (list system) considering the entire Palestinian territories as one electoral constituency.
2. The number of the council members shall be 132 and distributed as follows:
   a. 86 members elected on the basis of relative majority (multiple constituencies) and distributed in the 18 constituencies according to the population of each constituency,
   b. 66 members elected on the basis of proportional representation (lists) considering the entire Palestinian territories as one electoral constituency.

Own production. Source: www.elections.ps
Map A.9 | European Neighbourhood Policy: Opinions of EU Citizens (Eurobarometer 2006)

For each of the following countries, please tell me if you consider it to be a neighbour of the European Union. Percentage of affirmative replies per Mediterranean EU Member States and Mediterranean EU Candidate States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Syria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Importance of Aquaculture with Respect to Overall Fishery Production*

- 0-10%
- 10-20%
- 20-30%
- 30-40%
- 40-50%
- No data available

* Including marine and continental capture production and marine and continental aquaculture production.

Aquaculture Production Volumes per Region

- Asia-Pacific: 21.32%
- China: 63.57%
- Latin America and the Caribbean: 2.29%
- North America: 1.27%
- Near East and Northern Africa: 0.88%
- Central and Eastern Europe: 0.43%
- Sub-Saharan Africa: 0.16%

World Aquaculture Production Trends: Major Species Groups

Major Species Groups in Aquaculture Production (mt)

- Cages and other cyanophytes: 18,063,847
- Oysters: 4,815,127
- Clams, cockles, arkshells: 4,156,839
- Miscellaneous freshwater fish: 3,789,943
- Shrimp, prawns: 2,476,023
- Salmon, trout, smelt: 1,978,105
- Mussel: 1,660,224
- Tapias and other clams: 1,823,746
- Scallops, pectens: 1,166,736
- Miscellaneous marine molluscs: 1,046,191

Note: Data does not include aquatic plant culture.

Marine and Continental Aquaculture Production

- Continental Production
- Marine Production

Own production. Source: FAO.
Map A.11 | Information Technology in the Mediterranean Region

Price Basket for Internet ($ per month)
- 0-9
- 10-19
- 20-29
- 30-39
- ≥40

Internet Users per 1,000 Inhabitants
- 2000
- 2004

Broadband Subscribers per 1,000 Inhabitants (2004)
- 0-49
- 50-99
- 100-199
- ≥200

Personal Computers per 1,000 Inhabitants
- 2000
- 2004

Own production. Source: World Bank
Map A.12: Knowledge Economy Index (KEI)

The Knowledge Economy Index measures a country’s potential to develop knowledge as well as its capacity to use it effectively for economic development. It is an aggregate index that represents the overall level of development of a country or region towards the Knowledge Economy. The KEI is calculated based on twelve variables comprising the four pillars related to the knowledge economy, it ranges in value from 0 (lowest value) to 10 (highest).

The Four Pillars of the Knowledge Economy and their Variables:
- **The Economic Incentive and Institutional Regime**
  - Tariff & Non-Tariff Barriers
  - Regulatory Quality
  - Rule of Law
- **The Innovation System**
  - Researchers in R&D
  - Patent Applications Granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office
  - Scientific and Technical Journal Articles

- **Education and Human Resources**
  - Adult Literacy Rate
  - Secondary Enrollment
  - Tertiary Enrollment

- **Information and Communication Technology (ICT)**
  - Telephones per 1,000 people
  - Computers per 1,000 people
  - Internet Users per 10,000 people

Own production. Source: World Bank
Map A.15 | Trade in Natural Gas in the Mediterranean Region (2005)

Map A.17 | Foreigners in the EU and Distribution by Place of Origin

Own production. Sources: For DE, AT, BE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, NL, IE, IT, LU, PT, GB, SE and CY, data taken from national statistics offices. For ES, data taken from the Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración. For BG, SK, SI, HU, LV, LT, PL, CZ and RO, data taken from Eurostat. Latest data available used in all cases.
Chronologies

General Chronology of the Mediterranean

January 2006

On 21st January, the President of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, passes away at the age of 61. Aníbal Cavaco Silva becomes the first centre-right wing Portuguese president since the end of the dictatorship. The first outbreaks of the H5N1 avian influenza virus are detected in Europe (Cyprus and Turkey), killing 4 people in Turkey. Turkey presents a new initiative for reconciliation with Cyprus, poorly received by the Greek part of the island. In France, the President announces the end of the state of emergency imposed after the rioting in November. In Tunisia, the opponents of the regime headed by President Ben Ali organise and establish the “Democratic Coalition.” Austria takes up the revolving Presidency of the European Union for the first semester of 2006, whereas the President of the European Commission presents a project to relaunch the Lisbon Strategy.

Portugal

• On 22nd January, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, the candidate for the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the centre-right wing opposition party, wins the first round of the presidential elections. He becomes the first centre-right president to govern the country since the establishment of democracy in 1974. He engages in controlling the deficit and reviving the economy and advocates cooperation with the Socialist Part (PS) to ensure political stability.

Spain

• On 10th January, 20 presumed Islamists, suspected of recruiting radical Muslims for the insurrection in Iraq and raising funds to finance Al-Qaeda, are arrested. Omar Nakhcha, the leader of the group, is arrested on 12th January.
• On 17th January, the Supreme Court prohibits a meeting of Batasuna, the political wing of the organisation, Euskadi ta Askatasuna, i.e. “Euskadi and Freedom” (ETA), and prolongs a court order prohibiting the party from being active for a period of two years. On 18th January, the Supreme Court orders the leader of Batasuna, Arnaldo Otegi, to be retried because it considers that the judge sentencing him in 2004 was not impartial.

France

• On 4th January, President Jacques Chirac announces the end of the state of emergency imposed in November 2005 following riots in the suburbs.
• On 9th and 12th January, Nizar Sassi and Mourad Banchellali, two French citizens who had been handed over to the French authorities in July 2004 after being held at the US military base in Guantánamo, are released by the French authorities.
• On 19th January, President Chirac announces that France is willing to use its nuclear weapons against States attempting to use “terrorist means” or weapons of mass destruction against France. “The new French nuclear strategy” is strongly criticised by the left-wing and the Greens in France.
• On 26th January, the European Commission gives France one month to justify a decree passed on 31st December 2005 aiming to protect strategic French industries from acquisition by non-EU companies.

Italy

• On 14th January, thousands of Italians take to the streets to protest against government plans – backed by the Catholic Church – to amend a 1978 law legalising abortion in the first three months of pregnancy and against the growing interference of the Catholic Church in government affairs.
• On 16th January, Mario Draghi is appointed the new Governor of the Bank of Italy, succeeding Antonio Fazio, who resigned after being accused of favouritism in a public takeover bid for a bank, which had tarnished Italy’s image.

Slovenia

• On 5th January, the Slovenian government passes a decree including the entire Bay of Piran (in the northern Adriatic) in its fishing zones, thus reopening the territorial dispute between Slovenia and Croatia, which qualifies the Slovenian decree as violating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Croatia

• On 13th January, the Minister of Home Affairs, Ivica Kirin, signs a strategic and operational cooperation agreement with Europol.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

• On 5th January, during an operation by the EU-led Forces (EUFOR) to arrest Dragomir Abazovic, sought by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for war crimes, the wife of Dragomir Abazovic is killed and he and his son are wounded.
• On 11th January, an Argentine judge approves the extradition of Milan Lukic, a member of the paramilitary group, “White Eagles,” convicted in absence to 20 years of prison by the ICTY in September 2003.

• On 26th January, the parliament of the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) shows a loss of confidence in the administration of Prime Minister Pero Bukijevic, of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), in a vote on his economic policies.

Serbia and Montenegro
• On 21st January, the President of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, dies of cancer. Negotiations on the final status of Kosovo – a United Nations initiative – that were to begin on 25th January are postponed to the month of February. On 30th January, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) appoints Fatmir Sejdiu to succeed Rugova.

Albania
• On 27th January, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approves several three-year agreements with Albania within the framework of its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and its Extended Fund Facility with a view to providing support for the government’s economic reform and poverty reduction programmes.

Greece
• On 30th January, Georgios Papandreou, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and leader of the Greek Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) party (in the opposition), is elected President of the Socialist International (SI).

Cyprus
• On 24th January, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, receives the new Turkish initiative to reunify the island positively, as opposed to the Greek Cypriot President. The initiative consists of opening Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot boats and planes in exchange for a lightening of commercial restrictions on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

• On 29th January, the authorities announce the detection of an outbreak of the H5N1 avian influenza virus on the island.

Turkey
• On 2nd January, prosecutors initiate legal proceedings against 9 people, including journalists and human rights activists accused of fostering the cause of Kurdish separatists.

• On 4th January, Turkey announces the deprecere of its first human victim of the H5N1 avian influenza virus. Two sisters of the first victim die several days later, followed by another child in the same village, Dogubayazit, in the eastern area of the country. On 8th January, the death of three people in Ankara is announced. By the end of the month, 21 people have caught the virus.

• On 23rd January, a court of first instance in Istanbul discontinues proceedings against the novelist, Orhan Pamuk, being tried for having insulted the “Turkish identity” (Article 301 of the Penal Code). The court allegedly suspends proceedings after having received a letter from the Ministry of Justice declaring that it lacks the jurisdiction for intervening. This trial serves as a test to verify Turkey’s commitment to European norms in the sphere of human rights and freedom of expression, essential criteria for accession to the EU.

Syria
• On 16th January, the government announces that a law allowing opposition parties to challenge the Ba’ath Party, which monopolizes power, will be adopted in February.

• On 18th January, Mamun al-Homsi and Riyad Sayf, 2 eminent Members of Parliament arrested in September 2001, are released. Three activists opposing the regime are likewise released.

Lebanon
• On 2nd January, the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri announces that it wishes to question the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, and his former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fourak al-Shara. On 13th January, the Syrian Information Minister declares that the Commission will not be authorised to meet with the President for inquiry purposes.

• On 11th January, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, officially appoints the Belgian, Serge Brammertz as Commissioner of the Inquiry Commission, Detlev Mehlis not wishing to extend his term for the next 6 months.

• On 13th January, the television network, Al-Jazeera, declares that the military court has decided to institute proceedings against 13 prisoners suspected of belonging to Al-Qaeda and planning terrorist attacks against Iraq and Israel.

Jordan
• On 5th January, the National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR) publishes a report asserting that a third of the incarcerated population of Jordan was never formally charged with any crime nor tried, and it denounces the poor quality of prison medical facilities and overcrowd population of prisons. The report reveals a decrease in the accusations of ‘torture and inhuman treatment’ made by prisoners.

Egypt
• On 18th January, the United States announces that it suspends negotiations with Egypt on a trade agreement in response to the imprisonment of Ayman Nur, an important politician of the opposition party, Al Ghad.

Libya
• On 17th January, Libya purchases 10 Agusta helicopters from the Italian firm, Finmeccanica, for non-military surveillance of Libyan borders. The contract is the first obtained by a Western defence and aerospace group since the international sanctions against Libya were lifted two years ago.

• On 25th January, Human Rights Watch (HRW) publishes a report on Libya entitled “Libya: Words to Deeds – The Urgent Need for Human Rights Reform”. HRW commends the significant progress made in Libya in the sphere of human rights, while appeal-
An exodus of tens of thousands of Algerian government forces in the region of Tizi Ouzou, where the men were killed, have created tensions in the region. The immediate dismissal of the Interior Minister, while denying any association with Islamist groups.

European Union

- On 1st January, Austria takes up the Presidency of the European Union. Among the priorities of the Austrian Presidency are the adoption of the 2007-2013 budget by the European Parliament and the establishment of a new agenda for the adoption of the European Constitution, rejected by the populations of France and Netherlands in 2005. On 9th January, the Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel expresses support for a German proposal to add an annex to the European Constitution dealing with the EU’s social values.
- On 18th January, the European Parliament rejects the draft directive put forth by the European Commission concerning the liberalisation of port services.
- On 25th January, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, presents his annual report on the progress made in the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, which seeks to make the EU the most competitive economy in the world. Barroso appeals to Member States to concentrate on two key objectives of the Lisbon Agenda: allocate 3% of its GDP to research and development, and attain an overall employment rate of 70%.

February 2006

The H5N1 avian influenza virus spreads through the Mediterranean region, with outbreaks in France, Italy and Egypt. The publication of caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad in European journals inflames Arab and Turkish public opinion, giving rise to protests and attacks against European embassies, resulting in several casualties in Lebanon and Libya. Fatmir Sejdiu becomes the new President of the Province of Kosovo and negotiations on the future status of Kosovo begin. A terrorist attack in Turkey, for which the organisation, Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, has claimed responsibility, causes one death. In Lebanon, the Ministers of Hezbollah and Amal decide to return to government after seven weeks of boycott. The European Parliament adopts a ‘soft’ version of the Bolkenstein Directive.

Spain

- On 14th, 17th and 22nd February, the organisation, Euskadi ta Askatasuna, i.e. “Euskadi and Freedom” (ETA) sets off three bombs in the towns of Urdazubi/Urdax, Barakaldo and Bilbao, respectively, only causing material damage. On 19th February, the Spanish government and main political parties reject ETA’s request to relaunch peace negotiations with a view to arriving at a permanent cease-fire, insisting that the cease-fire must be a prerequisite for starting negotiations. On 25th February, over 100,000 people participate in a protest in Madrid organised by the Association of Victims of Terrorism, which is against a peace agreement between the government and ETA.
- On 15th February, the London Court of Appeal authorises the extradition to Spain of Hedi ben Youssef Boudhiba, accused of having assisted in the kamikaze terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001 in the United States.

France

- On 1st February, the newspaper France-Soir publishes the 12 caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed that had initially appeared in the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-posten. On 8th February, the French newspaper Charlie Hebdo also publishes the caricatures. The immediate dismissal of the France-Soir editor, Jacques Lefranc, by the newspaper’s French-Egyptian owner, Raymond Lakah, revives the debate on freedom of expression. On 8th February, President Jacques Chirac condemns any open provocation that could inflame the situation.
- On 2nd February, in the face of accusations of protectionism made, among others, by the European Union, the French Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry, Thierry Breton, denies that racist and protectionist considerations motivated the government’s opposition to the take-over of Arcelor (primarily French-owned) by Mittal Steel, based in the UK and the Netherlands and presided by Lakshmi Mittal, of Indian ethnicity.
- On 9th February, the government discloses the new immigration law that it had committed to pass after the riots of late 2005. It imposes harsher condi-
tions for immigration by non-qualified individuals and for family reunification. New immigrants will likewise have to sign an 'integration contract' upon arrival stipulating that they agree to learn French, respect the principles of the French Republic and actively seek work.

- On 27th February, the companies Gaz de France (approximately 80% public) and Suez agree to merge, thus becoming the second largest energy group of Europe. The Italian Ministers condemn this merger, adducing that it aims to prevent a potential offer by Enel.
- Over the course of February, several outbreaks of H5N1 avian influenza virus are detected. By the end of February, 20 countries have banned imports of French poultry and by-products.

**Italy**

- On 11th February, the Italian Parliament is dissolved, marking the start of the election campaign in which Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi will go up against Romano Prodi, leader of the centre-left opposition coalition, which groups together 11 parties.
- On 11th February, the Minister of Health, Francesco Storace, announces the detection of an outbreak of H5N1 avian influenza virus in the south.
- On 17th February, the Minister of Reform and Devolution, Roberto Calderoli, appears on television wearing a t-shirt with the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed, leading to deadly riots in the Libyan city of Banghazi. On the next day, the minister resigns, at the request of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.

**Croatia**

- On 9th February, Prime Minister Ivo Sanader relieves Vesna Skare-Ozbolt of his post as Minister of Justice for having criticised the government. On 10th February, the Chamber of Representatives (lower house) accepts the appointment of Ana Lovrin to this post.

**Bosnia-Herzegovina**

- On 4th February, the President of the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic), Dragan Covic, appoints Milorad Dodik, of the opposition party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) to the post of Prime Minister. On 28th February, the National Assembly approves his appointment as well as the new administration.

**Serbia and Montenegro**

- On 10th February, Fatmir Sejdiu becomes the President of the Province of Kosovo.
- On 20th and 21st February, the first round of negotiations on the final status of Kosovo is held, under the supervision of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoyé, Martti Ahtisaari. Lutfi Haziri, representative of the Kosovo delegation and Slobodan Samardzic, representative of the Serbian delegation opposed to the independence of Kosovo, take part in the negotiations.
- On 20th February, a new party emerges in Montenegro, the Bosnian Party (BS), resulting from the merger of various Muslim parties. Rafet Husovic is the president.
- On 27th February, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) begins the first trial accusing a State of genocide. On this day, Bosnia-Herzegovina accuses Serbia-Montenegro of having tried to massacre the Muslim population of Bosnia during the Yugoslav Wars from 1992-1995.

**Greece**

- On 14th February, Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis begins a process of cabinet reshuffle following the affair of the illegal interception of a hundred or so Greek politicians’ telephone calls, including the Prime Minister, in June 2004, before the Olympic Games in Athens (held in March 2005).

**Cyprus**

- On 9th February, the Greek Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs, Giorgos Lochoumou, condemns the statement made by the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Jack Straw, before the House of Commons (the lower house). Straw had declared that the approach of the Greek Cypriot government went against the reunification of the island.

- On 11th February, Huseyin Ozgurgun is elected head of the National Unity Party (UBP), the main opposition party in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

**Turkey**

- On 6th February, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the President of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, issue a joint declaration condemning the caricatures of Mohammed and declaring that the freedom of expression should respect different beliefs. They likewise call for restraint in Arab countries. On 12th February, thousands of people in Turkey protested against the caricatures.
- On 7th February, the EU Chair of the Joint Parliamentary Committee with Turkey, Joost Lagendijk, warns Turkey that its accession to the EU could be at risk if five journalists, accused of having insulted the nation’s courts by criticising the decision of a court to prohibit a conference in September 2005 on the death of over half a million Armenians between 1915 and 1923, are sentenced to prison. The trial, which was to begin on 7th February, is finally adjourned to 11th April after two nationalist lawyers who had demanded the hearing openly criticised the presence of observers from the European Parliament.
- On 9th February, a bombing in a cybercafe near a police station in Istanbul causes one fatality and 16 wounded. Responsibility for the bombing is claimed by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), presumably having close ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Fifteen people are wounded in another attack in Istanbul on 13th February.

**Syria**

- On 4th February, protests break out in Damascus against the publication of the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper, leading to assaults against several Nordic embassies, acts condemned by the Grand Mufti of Syria, Sheikh Ahmad Badruddin Hassoun, and the Minister of Religious Affairs, Al-Ayyubi. On 8th February, the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice accuses the Syrian and Iranian governments of inciting vi-
violence against Westerners and inflaming public opinion to serve their own interests.

- On 11 February, President Bashar al-Assad reshuffles his cabinet, appointing the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Farouk al-Sharaa, to the office of Vice-President, where he takes charge of implementing foreign and public relations policies.
- On 15th February, Prime Minister al-Itri signs a decree ordering the government bodies and the public sector to substitute the euro for the dollar as currency.

Lebanon

- In early February, Hezbollah and its Shia coalition partner, Amal, announce that their ministers are returning to office after seven weeks of boycott.
- On 3rd February, Israel attacks Hezbollah positions near the Shebaa Farms area in retaliation for rockets fired by Hezbollah following the assassination of a 17-year-old man from Shebaa. The UN peacekeeping forces declare that the young man was killed on Lebanese territory, contradicting the Israeli version.
- On 5th February, the Sunni religious authorities and the Sunni conservative party, Islamiyya, organise a demonstration to protest against the 2005 publication of caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper. Protesters set fire to the Danish embassy, killing one person and wounding 28 others. Large crowds flood Christian quarters of Beirut and attack churches. These violent riots lead the Minister of Home Affairs, Hassan Akif al-Sab, to resign.
- On 6th February, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, a pro-Syrian Shia movement, and General Michel Aoun, the former Deputy Prime Minister and the pro-Syrian speaker of parliament, Nabi Berri. Rice does not meet with President Lahoud, suggesting that Lebanon needs a president who will defend its sovereignty.

Jordan

- On 2nd February, Jihad al-Momani is dismissed from his post as Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper, Shihan, for having published the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed originally appearing in the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten. On 4th February, the Public Prosecutor, Sabri Rawashdeh, announces that Momani and Hisham al-Khalidi, the Editor-in-Chief of Al Mahwar, who had also published the caricatures, will be arrested and tried.
- On 15th February, the State Security Court imposes the death sentence on Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a native Jordanian and leader of the “Al-Qaeda in Iraq” organization, along with 8 of his collaborators. They are accused of having plotted a series of chemical attacks against Jordan in 2004. This is the third death penalty imposed on al-Zarqawi by the Court.

Egypt

- On 3rd February 2006, the Egyptian ferry, Al-Salam, sinks in the Red Sea, with a resulting death toll of 1,016.
- On 14th February, the People’s Assembly (bicameral) approves the government’s decision to postpone elections for local council officials for two years. The Muslim Brotherhood condemns this decision, as it seeks to reduce their influence after their success in the legislative elections of 2005.
- On 17th February, an outbreak of H5N1 avian influenza virus is detected.

Libya

- On 17th February, in reaction to the behaviour of the Italian Minister, Roberto Calderoli, violent protests break out in the city of Benghazi, causing 11 casualties and 35 wounded. Protesters set fire to the Italian Consulate. The General People’s Congress (legislative assembly) condemns the attack against the Italian Consulate and dismisses the Minister of Home Affairs, Nasser al-Mabrouk Abdallah, for his poor handling of the situation.

Tunisia

- On 1st February, the former Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Habib Ben Yahia, becomes the new Secretary General of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). He is to serve a three-year term.

Algeria

- On 12th February, the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, meets with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika during a three-day visit to North Africa. Rumsfeld declares that the United States hopes to strengthen military cooperation with Algeria as well as cooperation on the struggle against terrorism.

Morocco

- On 15th February, King Mohammed VI appoints his supporter, Chakib Ben Moussa, to the office of Minister of Home Affairs, left vacant by Mustapha Sahel, who was appointed to the post of Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations.

European Union

- On 8th February, the European Commission (EC) publishes a report showing that Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the three countries that had authorised free movement of workers from the 10 new Member States since their accession (2004) demonstrate better economic performance than the 12 Member States imposing provisional restrictions.
- From 15th to 19th February, José Manuel Barroso becomes the first President of the EC to travel throughout the entire Balkan region, accompanied by the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn.
- On 16th February, the European Parliament (EP) adopts a highly amended version of the EC’s draft directive on the liberalisation of the services sector in Eu-
Europe (Bolkenstein Directive), with 394 votes in favour, 215 against and 33 abstentions. Among the most important amendments is the rejection of the “principle of country of origin” and the exclusion of a number of sectors, among them public healthcare, social services and public transport. The directive likewise allows countries to object to services provided by a foreign company on grounds of such “public policy” as national security or environmental protection.

March 2006

On 11th March, former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic dies from a heart attack in his cell at the detention centre of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. After 38 years of armed struggle, ETA announces a permanent cease-fire. In France, students flood the streets to protest against the government’s bill on “first employment contracts.” Bomb attacks in Turkey cause three deaths. For the first time, a radio station and two television stations broadcast programmes in Kurdish throughout Turkey. For the first time in Syrian history, a woman, Najah al-Attar, is appointed to the office of Vice President. The exiled opposition to the regime of Syrian President al-Assad organises, establishing the National Salvation Front. The H5N1 virus, which has spread throughout the Mediterranean region, causes its first victim in Egypt. The first legal environmentalist party is established in Tunisia. With the 50th anniversary of the independence of Tunisia drawing near, the President pardons over a thousand prisoners, among them, for the first time, Islamists. In Algeria, Islamists are released as part of the “Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation.”

Portugal

- On 9th March, Anibal Cavaco Silva officially takes up office as the new president of Portugal.

Spain

- On 21st March, Judge Fernando Grande-Marlaska institutes legal proceedings against 32 radical Islamists suspected of being involved in a terrorist organisation and having planned a terrorist attack against the Parliament in Madrid in 2004.
- On 22nd March, the organisation, Euskadi ta Askatasuna, i.e. “Euskadi and Freedom” (ETA), announces a permanent cease-fire, putting an end to 38 years of armed combat for the independence of the Basque Country. The relinquishment of violence was the Spanish government’s sine qua non condition for engaging in peace negotiations with ETA.
- On 30th March, the Congress of Deputies (lower house) approves a new Statute for Catalonia, lending it greater autonomy.

France

- On 6th March, Khaled Ben Mustapha, former prisoner of the Guantanamo Penitentiary Centre handed over to the French Authorities in March of 2005, is released, becoming the third French citizen to have been detained in Guantanamo and subsequently released.
- On 7th March, demonstrations against the first employment contract (CPE) are organised throughout the country and continue over the following days. On 18th March, a demonstration in Paris degenerates into confrontations with the police and several cars are burned. On 8th and 9th March, both the National Assembly and the Senate pass the CPE bill into law. On 28th March, a general strike takes place. Despite the protests, the Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, upholds this law, which aims to create greater flexibility in the labour market and decrease unemployment among the under 26 age group and among ethnic minorities.

Italy

- On 10th March, Public Prosecutors of Milan demand that Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and his former English lawyer, David Mills, be investigated for corruption. Berlusconi allegedly bribed Mills to bear false witness in corruption affairs dating back to 1997 and 1998. Berlusconi, who claims innocence, denounces the political interest behind the trial, only a month before the legislative elections.
- On 27th March, Berlusconi declares that he does not want Italy to become a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country. His statements are applauded by the former Minister for Administrative Reform and Devolution, Roberto Calderoli.

Malta

- On 6th March, some sixty illegal immigrants, primarily Africans, escape a detention centre in Safi and go to the island’s airport to protest against their arrest. On 24th March, seventy illegal immigrants escape from a detention centre near La Valletta during a protest against the conditions of their detention.
- On 12th March, the National Party (NP) in power in Malta suffers a serious setback in partial local elections, to the benefit of the Malta Labour Party (MLP).

Slovenia

- On 21st March, the Minister of Development, Joze P. Damijan, resigns, alleging personal grounds.

Croatia

- On 5th March, the former Serbo-Croatian leader, Milan Babic, commits suicide in his cell at the detention centre of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which had sentenced him in June of 2004 to 13 years of prison for ethnic cleansing of Croats living in Serb-occupied zones of Croatia from 1991-1992.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- On 15th March, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sentences General Enver Hadzhasanovic, commander of the 3rd Corps of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Colonel Amir Kubura, commander of the 7th Brigade of the same army corps, to 5 and 30 months of prison, respectively. The ICTY holds them responsible for the crimes committed by their subordinates.
- On 18th March, the leaders of Serbian and Croatian Muslim communities of Bosnia agree on a series of constitutional reforms seeking to strengthen the central government, among them,
the replacement of the three-party presidency with the post of president and two vice presidents.

Serbia and Montenegro

- On 1st March, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Bajram Kosumi, resigns. On 10th March, the Kosovo Assembly appoints Lieutenant General, Agim Ceku, former commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK or KLA), to the vacant post.
- On 11th March, former Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, dies of a heart attack in his cell at the detention centre of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). On 14th March, the ICTY officially closes the trial against Milosevic, who is accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. On 18th March, over 80,000 people attend his funeral in Belgrade.

Macedonia

- On 29th March, the Sobranje (unicameral legislative body), under European pressure, approves a series of reforms of the electoral law, including the appointment of a member of an opposition party as President of the Electoral Commission.

Greece

- On 15th March, Greek trade unions in the public and private sectors launch a twenty-four-hour strike in protest against the government’s economic reforms, paralysing the majority of the country. The reforms in question seek to liberalise the labour market and reduce the deficit in order to avoid sanctions by the European Union.

Turkey

- On 9th March, a bomb explodes near a supermarket in Van, causing 3 deaths and 18 wounded. Another bomb explodes in front of the HSBC bank in Diyarbakir, injuring one person.
- On 23rd March, radio Medya FM and the television stations, Gun TV and Soz TV in the south-east of Anatolia, broadcast programmes in the Kurdish language in full legality, for the first time in Turkey.
- On 25th March, 14 members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) die in struggles against police forces. At the funerals of these 14 individuals on 28th March in Diyarbakir, confrontations break out, causing seven more dead. In all, seven soldiers and one police officer die this month in confrontations with Kurdish separatists.
- On 25th March, President Ahmet Necdet rejects the nomination of Adnan Buyukdeniz by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to the post of Director of the Central Bank. The President declares that Buyukdeniz, CEO of an Islamic bank, is an “inappropriate” choice.
- From 28th to 31st March, 9 people die and 360 are wounded during protests at Diyarbakir, in the south-east, the majority of them children.

Syria

- On 17th and 18th March, exiled opponents of the al-Assad regime, among them Ali Sadreddine al-Bayanuni, the Comptroller General of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the former Vice President, Abdel Halim Khaddam, who had resigned in June 2005 after having accused President al-Assad of being involved in the assassination of the former Lebanese president, Rafiq Hariri, meet in Brussels, where they announce the formation of a new National Salvation Front.
- On 23rd March, President Bashar al-Assad appoints Najah al-Attar to the post of Vice President for Cultural Affairs. It is the first time a woman occupies this post in Syria.

Lebanon

- On 3rd March, the leaders of the main political forces in Lebanon meet at a “Conference for National Dialogue” to reach agreement on the main issues of national interest, such as the Rafiq Hariri affair, Resolution 1559 of the Security Council and relations with Syria. The participants express consent with the government policy of creating a court “of an international nature” to judge those responsible for the assassination of Hariri and extending the prerogatives of the Independent Investigation Commission to other attacks committed since October 2004.
- On 14th March, Serge Brammertz, the Commissioner of the International Independent Investigation Commission into the Assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, publishes his report on the progress of the inquiry. It states that the Syrian government has stepped up cooperation with the inquiry and confirms that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has accepted to meet with investigators. On 29th March, the United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1664 (2006) demanding the establishment of an international court to try those responsible for Hariri’s assassination.

Jordan

- On 14th March, the Prosecutor for State Security finds Abu Misab Zarqawi and 10 accomplices guilty of participating in a series of suicide attacks against hotels in Amman in November 2005 that caused 60 casualties.

Egypt

- On 17th March, the H5N1 avian influenza virus takes its first human victim in Egypt, in the Province of Qaliubiya, near Cairo.

Libya

- On 3rd March, the Arab newspaper Al-Hayat announces the release of 130 political prisoners, the majority of whom are members of the Muslim Brotherhood.
- On 5th March, the General People’s Congress (GPC, the legislative body) reshuffles the General People’s Committee (the cabinet) and appoints Al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmudi to the post of Prime Minister.

Tunisia

- On 2nd March, in an amnesty before the celebration of the 50th anniversary of Independence, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali decides to release 1,259 prisoners and grant conditional discharge to 359 detainees. Nothing similar had occurred in over ten years, the Head of State even allowing 70 Islamists, members of the banned movement Ennadha, including Hamadi Jebali, Direc-
tor of the newspaper Al Fajr (Dawn), to benefit from it. On 6th March, six more prisoners, members of a group called the “Internauts of Zarzis,” after the name of a village in southern Tunisia, are also freed.

- On 3rd March, the Tunisian authorities legalise the Greens for Progress Party (PVP), the first environmentalist party to emerge in Tunisia. Mongi Khamassi is the founder.
- On 20th March, Tunisia commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of its independence. In his speech, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali announces his strategic goals for the future, among them, to double the per capita income over the next ten years and significantly decrease unemployment over the next few years.

Arab League

- On 28th and 29th March, the Arab League holds its 18th Summit in Khartoum. The Summit is marked by the absence of a number of key leaders, among them the President of Egypt and the King of Saudi Arabia. The Member States approve the concept of creating a Peace and Security Council to help settle conflicts among Member States, following the model of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council. The ministers likewise approve a new voting method to strengthen the weight of League’s decisions. Amr Mohammed Musa is reinstated for a second, five-year term as Secretary General of the organisation.

April 2006

On 24th April, the Egyptian resort town of Dahab suffers three successive terrorist attacks causing 21 dead and over 85 wounded. In Italy, Romano Prodi’s centre-left coalition, the Union, wins the legislative elections by a narrow margin. Turkey continues to face growing tension in the southeast, a primarily Kurdish area. The former Syrian Vice President, Abdul-Halim Khaddam, in exile in Paris, is convicted by the Syrian military court, accused of having encouraged a foreign attack against Syria and having conspired in order to take power. The Syrian president meets with the International Investigation Commission into the Assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, as part of the inquiry. In France, the students win their battle against the government’s bill on “first employment contract,” forcing it to relinquish the plan. The European institutions reach an agreement on the European Budget for 2007-2013.

Spain

- On 1st April, thousands of Basques take to the streets in Bilbao to demand the start of negotiations between the Spanish government and the organisation Euskadi ta Askatasuna, i.e. “Euskadi and Freedom” (ETA) and the return of Basque prisoners to the Basque Country, as well as self-determination for the region.
- On 7th April, the Minister of Defence, José Bono, resigns and is replaced by the former Minister of Home Affairs, José Antonio Alonso.
- On 25th April, the Popular Party (PP), in the opposition, submits a petition with 4 million signatures to the Congress of Deputies demanding a national referendum on the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. On 29th April, the Army Chief of Staff, General José Antonio García González is replaced by General Carlos Vilar Turrau, after the former declared that the army would be authorised to intervene should Catalonia become independent.

France

- On 10th April, after several weeks of student and trade union demonstrations throughout the country, President Jacques Chirac announced the repeal of the government’s bill on the “first employment contract” (CPE), which aimed to foster employment among young people by allowing employers to dismiss them more easily.

Italy

- On 9th and 10th April, Romano Prodi’s centre-left coalition, the Union, takes the legislative elections, with 49.8% of votes in favour and 49.7% in favour of the centre-right coalition headed by the outgoing Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, House of Freedoms. For the first time, Italian expatriates can vote from abroad. On 11th April, Berlusconi denounces voting irregularities and demands that the votes be recounted. On
19th April, the Court of Cassation confirms the victory of the Union.

- On 11th April, the Sicilian Mafia leader, Bernardo Provenzano, is arrested after being sought by the police for 42 years.

**Malta**

- On 6th April, the European Parliament (EP) votes in favour of a non-binding resolution criticising "the unacceptable living condition of migrants and asylum-seekers at administrative detention centres" in Malta. The EP likewise challenges an underlying principle of the European Regulation entitled 'Dublin II', according to which the first country reached by an asylum-seeker must take charge of said individual, and it demands greater distribution of responsibilities among all European Union Member States.

**Bosnia-Herzegovina**

- On 7th April, Bosnia's War Crimes Chamber delivers its first verdict since its creation in March 2005. Nedjo Samardzic, a Bosnian Serb, is condemned to 13 years of prison for crimes against humanity committed between 1992 and 1993.

- On 7th April, the Chief of Police of the Republika Srpska or Serb Republic, Dragomir Andan, resigns following complaints from the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Carla del Ponte, on his lack of cooperation with the ICTY.

**Serbia and Montenegro**

- On 3rd and 4th April, Serbian and Albanian delegations attend a new round of negotiations in Vienna on the future status of the Province of Kosovo, under the auspices of the United Nations.

- On 5th April, after several weeks of speculation on the circumstances of the death of the former Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, the Office of the District Public Prosecutor of the Hague confirms that he died of a heart attack.

- On 16th April, Serbia declares a state of emergency due to severe flooding of the Danube, reaching record levels for the century.

**Macedonia**

- On 10th April, Macedonia declares the abolition of compulsory military service.

- On 11th April, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, criticises the government’s inability to restructure the police.

- On 12th April, a bomb exploding before a restaurant frequented by diplomats and politicians takes one life.

**Greece**

- On 25th April, demonstrations organised by the Communist Party and anti-globalisation activists break out in Athens in protest against the visit by US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice.

**Turkey**

- Turkey suffers a number of terrorist attacks during the month of April: three people die on 2nd April in an attack on a public bus; on 5th April, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) sets off a bomb in the offices of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), in power, in the District of Esenyurt and on 16th April, 30 people are injured by a bomb exploding near a café in Bakirkoy.

- On 10th April, Rene van der Linden, Chair of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, accuses the PKK of encouraging violence in Turkey. On 11th April, the police arrest 20 people suspected of being Kurdish militants plotting bomb attacks.

- On 11th April, a new trial is instituted against the writer, Orhan Pamuk, at the instigation of 6 Turkish nationalists who accuse him of having insulted the Turkish identity.

- On 18th April, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer approves the government’s appointment of Durmus Yilmaz to the post of Governor of the Central Bank.

- On 19th April, the Grand National Assembly (GNA, unicameral legislative body) approves a series of social reforms seeking, among other things, to comply with the demands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

**Syria**

- In early April, a Syrian military tribunal announces the conviction of the former Vice President, Abdul-Halim Khaddam, in exile in Paris, of having encouraged a foreign attack against Syria and conspiring to take power.

- On 6th April, the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Walid al Moualem, rejects the demand of Lebanese leaders to reinstate diplomatic relations between the two countries, alleging that it would be a premature decision.

- On 7th April, a study carried out by the General Union of Syrian Women and funded by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) reveals that one of every four Syrian women are battered, usually by their husband or father. This study breaks the taboo on discussing violence against women in Syria.

**Lebanon**

- On 25th April, Serge Brammertz, the Commissioner of the International Independent Investigation Commission into the assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, meets with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to continue the inquiry. Brammertz likewise meets with the Vice President and former Prime Minister Farouk al-Sharaa.

- On 26th April, Terje Rad-Larsen, UN Special Representative for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) in Lebanon, submits his third semi-annual report to the Security Council, in which he asserts that, although there has been progress in implementing the said resolution, a number of demands have not been met, such as the dismantling of all Lebanese and foreign militia, the spread of government authority throughout the territory and strict respect for the country’s political independence. The report likewise calls Syria to cooperate with the Lebanese government in order to reinstate diplomatic relations and establish the coordinates of their shared borders.
Egypt

- On 14th April, attacks against three Christian Coptic churches in Alexandria result in one dead and some fifteen wounded. On 15th and 16th April, violent confrontations break out in Alexandria between Muslims and Christian Copts, who denounce increasing attacks against them by Islamist extremists.

- On 19th April, the Minister of Home Affairs announces the arrest of 22 Islamic militants, members of the Victorious Group under the leadership of Ahmed Mohammed Ali Grabr. They are suspected of planning terrorist attacks against tourist sites and Muslim and Christian religious personalities.

- On 24th April, the resort town of Dahab suffers three successive terrorist attacks resulting in 21 dead and over 85 wounded. On 26th April, although the attacks went unclaimed, the Minister of Home Affairs, Abib al-Adli, accuses the Sinai Bedouins, who had been responsible for similar attacks in 2004 and 2005.

- On 26th April, two suicide bomb attacks target the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), a peacekeeping force entrusted with ensuring compliance with the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979 and stationed in El Gorah. The MFO sustains no casualties.

Tunisia

- On 21st April, Tunisia and Syria sign thirteen cooperation agreements in Tunis, concerning, among other things, extradition of criminals and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

European Union

- On 4th April, the European Parliament and the European Commission agree to increase the European budget by 4 billion euros over the course of 7 years for the 2007-2013 period, raising it to 862.4 billion euros. The increase will be allocated, among other items, to research and development and EU external relations. The agreement likewise establishes that Parliament will be officially involved in the mid-term budget audit.

- On 30th April, the period of two years during which the majority of European countries had imposed restrictions on the free movement of workers from the 10 new Member States (acceding in 2004) comes to an end. Finland, Greece, Portugal and Spain decide to lift their restrictions, thereby joining Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which had opted to allow the free movement of workers from Eastern Europe since 2004. The other 8 Member States decide to maintain restrictions of varying intensity.

May 2006

On 21st May, Montenegro becomes independent. Giorgio Napolitano becomes the new President of Italy and the Prodi Administration is officially approved by the legislative branch. Thousands of Turks demonstrate, demanding the country’s secularisation after the assassination of a judge by a radical Islamist. The European Union decides to send reinforcements to the Canary Islands, which are having a hard time handling the significant increase of illegal migrant arrivals. The European Commission breaks off negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro on a stabilisation and Association Agreement. A number of political and human rights activists are arrested in Syria. In Egypt, the People’s Assembly accepts the government’s request to prolong the state of emergency for a period of 2 years. The United States decides to re-establish full diplomatic relations with Libya and remove it from its list of countries sponsoring terrorism.

Spain

- On 21st May, the President of Spain, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, announces at a Socialist Party (PSOE) meeting in Bilbao that peace negotiations with the organisation Euskadi ta Askatasuna, i.e. "Euskadi and Freedom" (ETA) will begin in June.

- On 23rd May, following an appeal by Deputy Prime Minister, Maria Teresa Fernández de la Vega, the European Union decides to send reinforcements to the Canary Islands, where nearly 7,400 immigrants have arrived since the start of 2006, 5 times more than the same period in 2005.

France

- On 1st May, Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the Front National, an extreme right-wing party, announces his candidacy for the 2007 presidential elections.

- On 9th May, France, along with 46 other countries, is appointed by the United Nations General Assembly as a three-year member of the new Human Rights Council (UNHRC).

- On 11th May, the FNLC-October 22, one of the branches of the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC), claims authorship for 11 recent terrorist attacks occurring on the island.

- On 16th May, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin survives a motion of censure concerning the Clearstream corruption affair, tabled by the Socialist Party (opposition) at the National Assembly. The Clearstream Affair has to do with the manipulation by a secret informant (the “canary”) of Judge Renaud Van Ruymbeke in his inquiry into the Taiwan Frigate Affair. In this affair, Villepin, by authority of President Jacques Chirac, allegedly sought to smear the reputation of his main political rival, Nicolas Sarkozy, Minister of Home Affairs and Regional Development and President of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP).

- On 29th and 30th May, the most significant demonstrations since the riots throughout the country occurring in October and November 2005 break out in the suburbs of Montfermeil and Clichy-sous-Bois, where young Arab immigrants set fire to cars and confront the police. The protests arise due to the arrest of a young immigrant who had an argument with a bus driver and the attempt of the Monfermeil Mayor to prohibit people from gathering in groups of more than three people in the streets.

Italy

- On 10th May, Giorgio Napolitano, Prime Minister Romano Prodi’s candidate, becomes the new Italian president. He takes up office on 15th May. The following day he authorises Prodi to form a new administration and on 17th May, Prodi and his cabinet, primarily consisting of members of the left-wing
Democratic Party and the Margherita (Daisy) coalition, officially take up office. On 19th and 23rd May, respectively, the Senate and Chamber of Deputies approve Prodi’s new administration.

- On 28th and 29th May, local elections are held for mayors. The Prodi government keeps its position in the country’s major cities, including Rome.

Slovenia

- On 16th May, the European Commission announces that Slovenia has attained a high degree of stable economic convergence with other EU countries and has fulfilled the conditions necessary for adopting the euro on 1st January 2007.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- On 8th May, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sentences the Croatian commander of Bosnia, Ivica Rajic, to 12 years of prison for his involvement in the attack on the village of Stupni Do, which led to the death of 31 civilians, and for inhumane treatment of 250 Muslims of the municipality of Vareš.

Serbia and Montenegro

- On 3rd May, the European Commission breaks off negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, in view of the government’s inability to arrest General Ratko Mladic, accused of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), by the deadline of 30th April. The Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla del Ponte, declares on the same day that the Serbian government found out where Mladic was no later than 24th April. The EU’s decision forces the Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Mirorjub Labus, who had led association negotiations with the EU, to resign. He describes his administration’s failure as a “betrayal of the Serbian people”.

- On 21st May, Montenegrins vote in favour of the independence of Montenegro in a referendum. The independents win by a narrow margin, with 55.4% of votes, the EU having established 55% as the majority needed for recognising independence. The participation rate was 86.3% of the voting population.

Greece

- On 10th May, the country is paralysed by a strike of public sector workers protesting against the government’s social security reforms and demanding a raise in salaries.

- On 12th May, Prosecutor Nikos Dagantis institutes legal proceedings against “unknown persons” within the framework of allegations of abduction and torture by Greek and English agents of 28 Pakistanis suspected of being involved in the London terrorist attacks of 7th July 2005. The opposition requests the Minister of Public Order of the time, Georgios Voulgarakis, to resign. On 30th May, a bomb explodes in front of the home of Voulgarakis, who had become Minister of Culture in February. The attack goes unclaimed.

Cyprus

- On 21st May, legislative elections on the Greek part of the island result in the continuation of the incumbent administration, headed by the Workers’ Party (AKEL). The Democratic Party of President Tassos Papadopoulos, opposed to the United Nations plan for the reunification of the island, wins two seats.

Turkey

- On 4th May, a bomb explodes at the passage of a military vehicle in the city of Hakkari, in the east, causing 21 wounded, 11 of them children. On 13th May, a bomb explodes in a garage in Ulalar, in the Province of Erzincan, also in the east, killing four children.

- On 10th May, Ibrahim Kaboglu and Baskin Oran, two professors accused of inciting hatred for having demanded greater rights for minorities in their report on “minorities and cultural rights,” are acquitted by a criminal court in Ankara.

- On 17th May, the Islamist lawyer, Alparslan Arslan, opens fire on 5 judges of the Council of State (the supreme administrative court), killing Judge Mustafa Yucel Ozbilgin, in response to a court decision against the promotion of a teacher because she wears the Islamic veil on her way to school. The following day, thousands of people flood the streets of Ankara to denounce the attack and in support of the secular State. On 19th May, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticises General Hilmi Özkök, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Turkey, for inciting Turks to pursue demonstrations in favour of the country’s secularisation. On 23rd May, Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), accuses Erdogan, who had criticised the court’s decision, and his party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), of encouraging radical Islam.

- On 23rd May, two fighter planes, one Greek and the other Turkish, collide, causing the death of the Greek pilot. With the aim of maintaining the progress made in bilateral relations, both countries downplay the incident.

- On 24th May, Yakin Ertürk, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, travels to the city of Batman to investigate the sudden increase in suicides of women, presumably forced. In 2005, reforms of the Penal Code assign a life sentence to those indicted for “crimes of honour”.

Syria

- On 16th May, the Financial Times reports that the authorities have arrested several political and human rights activists, among them the writer, Michel Kilo, as well as Fath Jamous, of the Communist Party of Workers, Nidal Darwish, member of the board of trustees of the Committee for the Defence of Civic Liberties and Human Rights in Syria, Mohmmad Mer’y, Rapporteur of the Arab Organisation for Human Rights in Syria, and Ali al-Abdallah, member of the Committees for Activation of the Civil Society.

Lebanon

- On 17th May, the UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1680 (2006), which “encourages the Syrian government to respond positively to the re-
quest made by the Lebanese government, in line with the agreements of the Lebanese national dialogue, to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border is uncertain or disputed, and to establish full diplomatic relations and representation.° On 17th May, the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs declares that the resolution constitutes interference in the internal affairs of his country and is an unjustified instrument of pressure that serves more to complicate matters than to settle them.

Egypt

• On 1st May, the People’s Assembly (unicameral) accepts the government’s request to extend the state of emergency for a period of 2 years. The state of emergency, which was introduced in 1981 after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, lends the authorities extended powers of arrest and detention. According to the Financial Times of 11th May, approximately 100 people, at least half of them belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood, were arrested after the protests against the extension of martial law.

• On 9th May, the Minister of Home Affairs announces that Nasser Khamis el-Mallahi, leader of Tawhid wal-Jihad, the group considered responsible for the deadly terrorist attacks in Dahab last April, has been killed by security forces.

• On 18th May, thousands of demonstrators gather in the centre of Cairo in support of two judges, Mahmoud Mekky and Hasham Bastawisi, who are being tried by the Supreme Judiciary Council for having publicly denounced electoral fraud during the legislative elections in November and December 2005. The demonstrators likewise protest against the Supreme Court of Appeals’ rejection of the appeal filed by Ayman Nur, an opposition politician sentenced to 5 years of prison in December 2005 for falsely registering his party, Al Ghad, for presidential elections. According to the Muslim Brotherhood, 500 of their members were arrested at the demonstration. On 25th May, some 300 judges protest in silence against what they consider government interference in the powers of the judiciary branch.

Libya

• On 15th May, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announces that the United States has decided to re-establish full diplomatic relations with Libya and has removed Libya from its list of countries sponsoring terrorism.

Tunisia

• On 9th May, the UN General Assembly appoints the 47 members of the new Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to serve a term of three years, among them Tunisia.

Algeria

• On 9th May, Algeria is appointed by the UN General Assembly, along with 46 other countries, as a three-year member of the new Human Rights Council (UNHRC).

• On 24th May, Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia submits his resignation. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika appoints his rival, Abdelaziz Belkhadem, until then Minister of Home Affairs and the President’s personal representative, to the vacant post. Belkhadem announces that his priorities will be to revise the constitution and raise workers’ salaries. Belkhadem’s party, the National Liberation Front (FLN) advocates the government’s project to reform the constitution, which seeks to prolong the presidential term from two to three years and increase the president’s powers, whereas Ouyahia’s party, the Democratic National Rally (RND), is against it.

European Union

• On 3rd May, the European Commissioner on Competition announces that 7 chemical industries have been fined, among them French, Italian and Spanish companies, for having operated illegal cartels engendering an increase in prices within the EU.

• On 17th May, the European Parliament provides its final approval of the 2007-2013 budget, as established at the inter-institutional consultation in April.

• On 30th May, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) gives the EU 4 months to bring its agreement with the United States – concerning the provision in advance of the personal data of transatlantic flight passengers for purposes of anti-terrorist and anti-criminal struggle – in line with European Law.

June 2006

The EU and Albania sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, while Croatia and Turkey take another step towards accession to the EU by opening negotiations on the first of 35 items that must be discussed. The Spanish government announces the start of peace negotiations with the organisation “Euskadi and Freedom” (ETA). Whereas the Catalans approve the new Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, in Italy, 61.7% of Italians oppose the project for constitutional reform designed to increase regional autonomy and strengthen the role of the Prime Minister. In Malta, demonstrations by illegal immigrants against their detention intensify. Macedonia experiences political violence less than a month from legislative elections. Serbian leaders declare a state of emergency in the Province of Kosovo. In Egypt, mass arrests of the members and sympathisers of the Muslim Brotherhood continue.

Portugal

• On 30th June, Minister of Foreign Affairs Diogo Freitas do Amaral resigns for health reasons.

Spain

• On 18th June, the new statute of autonomy for Catalonia receives 73.9% votes in favour. Catalonia is granted greater power in judicial and taxation matters and is hereafter officially considered a nation. The participation rate is slightly lower than 50%.

• On 29th June, Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero announces that his administration will begin peace talks with the organisation Euskadi ta Askatasuna, i.e. “Euskadi and Freedom” (ETA). Zapatero states that the negotiation process will be a long and difficult one, and that he will not make any concessions to ETA’s demands for independence from Spain. The Popular Party (PP) opposes the initiation of peace talks with ETA.
France

- On 14th June, a Parisian court sentences 25 Algerian members of the Islamist “Chechen Cell,” including its leader, Merouane Banhamed, to prison terms of up to 10 years for having planned chemical attacks on France against the Eiffel Tower, among other targets.
- On 17th June, 200 representatives of Muslim communities meet in Paris, where they found the Rally of Muslims in France (RMF). The RMF, chaired by Taoufiq Sebti, considers itself as "complementary to and not in competition with" the government-backed French Council for the Muslim Cult (CFCM).
- On 30th June, the law on tightening control of immigration, though controversial, is passed by the Senate after its adoption in May by the National Assembly. On 14th June, an amendment was adopted extending the clause on the revocation of residency permits for foreigners who are involved in confrontations with the police to include those who publicly insult the French flag or national anthem.

Italy

- On 9th June, The Independent reports that the EU Commissioner for the Environment, Stavros Dimas, had accused Italy of having the worst record insofar as environmental issues, with 80 incidents of violations of environmental regulations.
- On 11th June, 400 irregular immigrants disembark on the Island of Lampedusa.
- In a nation-wide referendum on 25th and 26th June, 61.7% of Italians reject the constitutional reform proposed by former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s Administration, which sought to increase the autonomy of Italy’s 20 regions and strengthen the role of the Prime Minister to the detriment of the President. The rate of participation in the referendum was 53.6%, which is considered a high turn-out.

Malta

- On 27th June, three police officers and two soldiers are wounded during an attempt to stop a demonstration by some 200 illegal immigrants from the Safi detention centre marching towards the offices of the Prime Minister. The group was intercepted at Paola, ten kilometres from La Valletta, by hundreds of police officers and soldiers, some of them in anti-riot gear. The immigrants are protesting against their condition as detainees.

Croatia

- On 12th June, the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs formally initiate talks on the first 35 chapters to be negotiated with regard to Croatia’s accession to the EU. The first chapter, concerning science and research, is the least controversial one.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- On 30th June, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) convicts Naser Oric, former commander of the Muslim Bosnian Forces in Srebrenica, to two years of prison. He is convicted of not having taken the measures necessary to prevent the assassination and mistreatment of a number of Serbian prisoners in the former United Nations "safety zone".

Serbia

- On 5th June, Serbian leaders in the Province of Kosovo announce that they have cut off all communication with the Albanian authorities of the province and declare a state of emergency following a number of armed attacks that they attribute to Albanian separatists.
- On 15th June, Serbia officially recognises Montenegro as a sovereign State. The Serbian government declares that the Montenegrins living in Serbia are entitled to Serbian nationality.

Montenegro

- On 3rd June, the legislative branch officially declares Montenegro’s independence. On 20th June, Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic is elected temporary Minister of Defence. On 23rd June, Slovenia becomes the first country to establish an embassy in Montenegro and declares its wish to assist the new republic in acceding to the EU.
- On 28th June, Montenegro becomes the 192nd Member State of the United Nations.

Macedonia

- A month before legislative elections, Macedonia experiences political violence, namely an armed attack against the Albanian leader of Macedonia, Abdulhalim Kasami, a member of the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) comprising part of the coalition government. The United States and the European Union warn Macedonia that this nearly daily violence linked to politics could undermine Skopje’s efforts to join NATO and the EU.

Albania

- On 12th June, the EU and Albania sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, an important step towards Albania’s accession to the EU. This agreement covers, among other items: political dialogue, regional cooperation, a free trade market, movement of workers and cooperation in the fields of justice, liberty and security.

Greece

- On 27th June, the Athens police uses tear gas to disband a crowd of students protesting against reforms of the educational system, injuring two people. The students are against the government’s intention to impose a time limit for obtaining a degree.

Cyprus

- On 8th June, President Tassos Papadopoulos effects a cabinet reshuffle following the re-election of his administration in the May legislative elections. Gorgio Lillikas becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- On 15th June, the UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1687 (2006), extending the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another 6 months.
Turkey

- On 9th June, Aydin Budak, the Kurdish Mayor of the city of Cizre, is sentenced to 15 months of prison for having praised the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan.
- On 12th June, the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers officially initiate talks on the first 35 chapters to be negotiated with regard to Turkey’s accession to the EU. The first chapter, concerning science and research, is the least controversial one.
- On 16th June, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Turkey prefers to break off negotiations for accession to the EU rather than opening its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and aircraft and that it will not comply with the EU’s demands unless the embargo on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is lifted. The EU leaders warn Turkey that it should not try to associate the lifting of the embargo with granting Greek Cypriots access to Turkish ports and airports. On 28th June, the EU decides to advance in access negotiations with Croatia instead of Turkey, alleging Turkey’s insensitivity to the EU’s position.
- On 30th June, Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, at a press conference to open Finland’s EU Presidency, warns Turkey that accession negotiations could be suspended in the following months should its differences with Cyprus not be resolved.
- On 19th June, a court in Van condemns Ali Kaya and Ozcan Ildeniz, two soldiers accused of attempting to kill Seferi Yilmaz, member of the PKK, in a terrorist attack in Semdinli in November 2005, to 40 years of prison. The attack had caused one death and 12 wounded. On 20th June, Yilmaz is arrested on the accusation of being a member of a terrorist organisation.
- On 23rd June, 11 militant members of the PKK are killed in confrontations with the Security Forces in Cukurca, in the southeast. Nearly 17 soldiers are killed in the course of the month in confrontations with militant Kurds.

Syria

- On 2nd June, an attack against the Syrian public television and radio stations causes 4 deaths, one of them a guard.
- On 4th and 5th June, the National Salvation Front (NSF), a movement in exile led by former Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, and the leader of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sadr al-din al-Bayanuni, hold their first meeting in London. The NSF decides on the composition of its general secretariat and issues a final declaration announcing that its goal is to change the regime, appealing to the Syrian people and the Armed Forces to join their struggle.

Lebanon

- On 14th June, Serge Brammertz, the Commissioner of the International Independent Investigation Commission into the Assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, submits an interim report to the Security Council, declaring that Syria’s cooperation with the inquiry was “generally satisfactory” and that of Lebanon “excellent.” Brammertz commends the considerable progress made in the inquiry but insists on the importance of focusing greater efforts on 14 other attacks that could be connected with this affair. On 15th June, the Security Council’s Resolution 1686 (2006) prolongs the Investigation Commission’s mandate until 15th June 2007.
- On 16th June, the Financial Times reveals that the Lebanese Authorities have uncovered an Israeli spy ring which acknowledges having assassinated several Hezbollah militants and militant Palestinians since 1999.

Egypt

- On 10th June the Women’s Summit begins in Cairo, focusing on the economic role of women and seeking to “make them advance in economy and business throughout the world.” This Summit likewise seeks to modify the traditional image of Muslim women as “veiled and silent.”
- A number of members and sympathisers of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt are arrested during the course of the month, nearly 200 of them on 12th June during a demonstration in support of a leader of the Brotherhood, Hassan Hayacouan, who was being tried in Zagazig for illegal possession of arms and belonging to an illegal organisation. According to the Muslim Brotherhood, 850 of their members have been arrested over the past three months.
- On 18th June, Wail Al-Ibrahi and Hoda Abou Bakr, of the weekly periodical, Sawt-al-Qumma (independent), Abdel Hakim Abdel Hamid, Editor in Chief of the weekly, Afaaq Arabiya (with affinities to the Muslim Brotherhood), and the lawyer, Gamal Tag el-Din, of the Muslim Brotherhood, appeared before a criminal court in Cairo for having denounced presumed fraud in the legislative elections of late 2005.
- On 26th June, the Egyptian Parliament, dominated by the incumbent party, adopts a controversial law on the judiciary branch’s powers, strongly criticised by the opposition led by the Muslim Brotherhood and judges in favour of reform.
- On 26th June, Ibrahim Eissa, Editor in Chief of the Egyptian opposition weekly, al-Dustoura, is condemned to one year of prison for defamation of the Head of State, Hosni Mubarak. In April, he had published an article describing a suit filed against the President by a lawyer and accusing him of selling off public enterprises for ridiculously low sums and squandering international aid. The lawyer was likewise sentenced to a year of prison.

Tunisia

- On 7th June, Belgacem Nawar, involved in the Al-Qaeda network, is condemned to 20 years of prison for his involvement in a suicide attack in Djerba in April 2002 that caused 21 deaths, 14 of them German tourists.

Algeria

- On 4th June, the historic leader of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Abassi...
Morocco

- On 1st June, three hundred Moroccan Islamists prisoners, arrested and tried after the terrorist attacks of 16th May 2003 in Casablanca and on a hunger strike since 2nd May 2006 to demand their release or retrial, announce that they have "ceased" their strike after negotiations with the Minister of Justice.
- On 18th June, the General Assembly of the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty begins in Casablanca. The aim of this two-day meeting is to delve into the state of evolution of the death penalty in the world and to examine the action to be taken in order to encourage countries to endorse the facultative protocol annexed to the pact on civil and political rights. Morocco, which has not applied the death penalty in 13 years, is represented by its National Committee against the Death Penalty.
- On 26th June, the Moroccan section of Amnesty International requests the Moroccan government to authorise visits by independent organisations to all detention centres in the country in order to prevent and put an end to torture.

European Union

- On 7th June, at the third Ministerial Session for Energy Dialogue between the EU and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Brussels, both parties decide to step up cooperation.
- On 15th and 16th June, at the European Council meeting in Brussels, the 25 Member States decide to prolong the period for reflection on the European Constitution, which began on 6th June 2005 after it was rejected by the French and Dutch, with the aim of reaching a decision on institutional reforms by the end of 2008.

July 2006

Israel launches a major land, air and sea operation against southern Lebanon after two Israeli soldiers are captured by Hezbollah. The Srebrenica massacre trial begins at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In Macedonia, the conservative coalition, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) wins the legislative elections following a campaign marked by violence and ethnic tension. A historical high-level meeting takes place between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians to discuss the future status of Kosovo. Turkey experiences escalating violence in the Kurdish southeast. In Egypt, members of the Muslim Brotherhood continue to be arrested. The H5N1 avian influenza virus now breaks out in Spain. On 28th June, Montenegro becomes the 192nd Member State of the United Nations.

Portugal

- On 3rd July, President Aníbal Cavaco Silva officially appoints Luis Amado Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nuno Severiano Teixeira is appointed to the post of Minister of Defence, replacing Amado.

Spain

- On 6th July, an unprecedented meeting takes place between Patxi López, leader of the Basque Socialist Party, and Arnaldo Otegi, leader of the Batasuna party. López reminds militant Basques that they will have to relinquish all violence before they will be allowed to have any influence on the region's future.
- On 7th July, the authorities confirm a case of H5N1 avian influenza virus in the Basque Country. It is the first case officially registered in Spain.
- On 24th July, The Spanish Supreme Court orders the release of Hamed Abderrahman, the only Spaniard to have been detained at the US military base in Guantánamo.

France

- On 4th July, a trial begins against 6 former prisoners at the US military base in Guantánamo. They are accused of criminally conspiring to terrorist ends. This is the first trial of former Guantánamo prisoners in the West.
- On 6th July, the Socialist Party (in the opposition) files an appeal with the Constitutional Court against the controversial law on immigration. The law, among other things, revokes the scheme for full regularisation after 10 years of residence in France and toughens family reunification regulations.
- On 28th July, the Minister of Home Affairs rejects the petition of the UN Committee Against Torture requesting that Adel Teboursky not be extradited to Tunisia during his prison term. Tambah had been condemned for his involvement in the assassination of the commander of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Masud.

Italy

- On 5th July, Marco Mancini and General Gustavo Pignero, two high-ranking members of SISMI, the Italian intelligence service, are arrested on suspicion of having assisted the CIA in July 2003 in Milan to abduct the Imam Hasan Mustafa Osama Nasr, who was subsequently brought to Egypt where he was allegedly tortured.
- On 7th July, the Milan judge, Fabio Paparella, opens legal proceedings against former Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, and 14 other individuals for fiscal fraud and laundering money through the company, Mediaset, belonging to Berlusconi.
- On 15th July, the Court of Assizes of Cremona condemns Imam Mourad Trabelsi to ten years of prison for international terrorism, namely for participating in a plot aiming to orchestrate attacks against the Cathedral of Cremona as well as the Rome metro.
- On 27th July, with the aim of remedying the overpopulation of the country’s prisons, the Chamber of Deputies (lower house) votes in favour of a controversial amnesty freeing 12,000 prisoners. In response, the Minister of Infrastructures, Antonio Di Pietro, threatens to withdraw his party from the government coalition under Prime Minister Romano Prodi if the measure is adopted.
Malta

- On 21st July, after a week-long wait, the Spanish trawler that had rescued a group of 51 illegal immigrants off the coast of Malta is authorised to dock at a Maltese port, after an agreement had been reached among several countries concerning who would deal with the illegal immigrants. Malta did not want to take charge of the migrants alone. The migrants in question were finally distributed among Spain, Italy, Libya, Andorra and Malta.

Slovenia

- On 11th July, European Finance Ministers approve the entrance of Slovenia into the euro zone on 1st January 2007.

Croatia

- On 9th July, a regional summit on the security and enlargement of the European Union begins in Dubrovnik, with the presence of several Prime Ministers of the region.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- On 14th July, the trial of the Sребенica massacre, which took the lives of thousands of Bosnian Muslims in 1995, begins at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Seven former Bosnian Serbian officers appear before the court. This historical trial is the largest one held by the ICTY.

Serbia

- On 10th July, proceedings begin at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to try 10 high political and military leaders of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including the former President of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, for war crimes committed in Kosovo in 1999.
- On 17th June, Serbian Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, in an attempt to re-establish good relations with the EU after the suspension of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement by the latter on 3rd May, explains to the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs his action plan to capture Ratko Mladic, indicted for war crimes by the ICTY.
- On 24th July, for the first time since the onset of negotiations fostered by the United Nations on the future status of Kosovo in February 2006, the delegations meet at the highest level. Serbian President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica officially meet with their Albanian counterparts from Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu and Lieutenant General Agim Ceku, for the first time. After the meeting, the United Nations Special Envoy to Kosovo, Martii Ahtisaari, states that very little progress was made, as both parties maintain their opposed positions.

Macedonia

- On 5th July, the conservative coalition, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), wins the legislative elections following a campaign marked by violence and ethnic tension. On 6th July, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) announces that elections have been effected democratically, despite several isolated cases of irregularities.

Greece

- On 21st July, the French Minister of Home Affairs, Nicolas Sarkozy, and the Greek Minister of Public Order, Viron Polydoras, sign an agreement in Athens to step up bilateral police cooperation, in particular in the struggle against terrorism and on immigration matters.

Cyprus

- On 3rd June, Greek Cypriot President, Tassos Papadopoulos, and President Mehmet Ali Talat, of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), meet for the first time since the Greek Cypriots rejected the island reunification plan proposed by the United Nations in a referendum in 2004. On 31st July, Greek and Turkish Cypriot governments exchange lists containing the subjects they would like to discuss in an effort to re-open dialogue on the island’s reunification.

Turkey

- Several bombs go off in the country over the course of July, causing one death in Diyarbakir on 6th July.
- On 8th July, Kurdish politicians and eminent figures announce the creation of a new party, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), which advocates democracy, freedom of expression, federalism and the pacific resolution of the Kurdish question.
- On 18th July, the Turkish government, following an escalation in violence in the southeast resulting in the death of 15 soldiers in one week, decides to launch a cross-border operation against the base camps of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq. On 22nd July, US President George W. Bush, against a unilateral Turkish operation, promises Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan US support in his struggle against the PKK. During the course of the month, 45 police officers and soldiers and 31 Kurds lose their lives in confrontations.

Lebanon

- On 12th July, following the abduction by Hezbollah of two Israeli soldiers, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, near Shtula in Israel, Israel launches a vast land, aerial and sea operation against southern Lebanon that is to last the entire month with the aim of recovering the two soldiers. The Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, declares that the abduction of the two soldiers is intended to draw attention to the situation of Lebanese, Palestinian and Arab prisoners in Israel. This is the first time that Israel crosses the border since its retreat from southern Lebanon in May 2000. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert describes Hezbollah’s attack as an “act of war” and accuses the Lebanese government of attempting to destabilise the entire region. The Lebanese government requests an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council and denies being responsible for the escalation in violence. Foreign countries organise the mass evacuation of their nationals. On 13th July, Israel imposes a general em-
bargo on Lebanon and kills 52 civilians in air raids over southern Lebanon and
in the bombardment of the Beirut airport. In reply, Hezbollah launches rockets hitting the cities of Nahariya and Haifa and killing 2 Israelis. On 13th July, the President of the United States declares that Israel “has the right to self-defence” and places responsibility for the crisis on Syria. The following day, the Europeans qualify the offensive as “disproportional” while condemning Hezbollah’s rocket strikes.

On 14th July, Nasrallah survives an attack against his home in Beirut. On 16th July, 8 Israelis die in Haifa rocket strikes. On 17th July, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan calls for the creation of an international stabilisation force to put a stop to the combat by reinforcing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Kofi Annan’s plan is received without a great deal of enthusiasm by Israel and the United States. On 18th July a United Nations delegation travels to Israel to propose a series of measures to arrive at a cease-fire, including sending an international force. On 19th July, 57 Lebanese civilians die in an Israeli air raid and two Israeli children are killed by Hezbollah rockets. On 20th July, Israel warns Lebanese civilians to leave southern Lebanon and move north of the Litani River. On 21st July, Israel mobilises thousands of reservists. On 22nd July, Israel launches a vast land operation against the city of Bint Jbail, a stronghold of Hezbollah resistance. On 23rd July, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, accuses Israel of violating human rights. On 25th July, 4 members of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) are killed by an Israeli airplane. On 26th July, the Israeli army experiences its most violent combat in and around Bint Jbail.

On 26th July, the international community meeting in Rome cannot agree to appeal for a cease-fire, the US demanding a preliminary agreement for lasting peace. The final declaration calls on the United Nations to urgently authorise an international force to come to the support of the Lebanese army. On 26th July, Iran calls for a cease-fire, accusing the US of wanting to redesign the political map of the Middle East. On 30th July, 60 civilians, 37 of them children, die in an Israeli air strike on the city of Qana, raising the pressure exerted by the international community on Israel to stop its offensive. Following the massacre, the Lebanese government toughens its position and publicly praises Hezbollah. It likewise declares that it rejects any negotiation unless there is a cease-fire, causing Condoleezza Rice to cancel her visit to Beirut. Israel announces a suspension of hostilities for 48 hours in order to allow civilians to flee from combat zones. Since the start of hostilities, over 600 Lebanese have lost their lives, as well as 19 Israeli civilians and 33 Israeli soldiers. Over 500,000 Lebanese people have had to leave their homes.

Jordon

• On 24th July, Amnesty International publishes a report accusing the Jordanian authorities of being accomplices to acts of torture and having participated in secret transfers of prisoners orchestrated by the United States. The report points in particular to Jordan’s General Intelligence Department (GID).

Egypt

• On 8th July, Security Forces arrest 27 members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Ras el Bar, a coastal city north of Cairo.

• On 9th July, independent and opposition newspapers suspend publication in protest against a new law prohibiting journalists from inquiring into corruption affairs upon pain of prison. On 10th July, the president revokes the part of the law establishing automatic imprisonment for journalists contravening the law, leaving it to the judges to impose a prison sentence or not.

Libya

• On 12th July, official Libyan sources indicate that the United States has lifted its restrictions on Libya with regard to aerial transport, including the sale of aircraft. In 1978, the United States had imposed a series of economic and military sanctions on Libya, particularly involving air transport.

Tunisia

• On 6th July, Aderrahmane Tili, a former opposition candidate to the presidential elections in prison since 2003, begins a hunger strike to protest against being deprived of medical attention.

• On 25th July, Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali asserts that his country has no lesson to learn with regard to respecting human rights, in allusion to a recent European Parliament (EP) resolution on the situation of these rights in Tunisia. The EP had demanded “explanations” of Tunisia on the banning of a congress organised by the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) and “acts of violence against Tunisian human rights activists and magistrates.”

Morocco

• On 10th and 11th July, the first Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development is held in Rabat, bringing together representatives from 57 European and African countries. The final declaration states that “the management of migration between Africa and Europe must take the form of a partnership aiming to struggle against poverty and promote sustainable development and co-development.” The participants likewise adopt an Action Plan to step up cooperation in the struggle against illegal migration, which combines security and development aspects. Algeria refuses to participate in the conference.

• On 11th July, at the presentation of its annual report, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) denounces the violation of freedom of expression in Morocco, in particular condemning the judicial “harassment” suffered by certain periodicals. AMDH moreover denounces the voting system adopted on 29th June by the Moroccan government, which, according to it, is designed to “brush aside small political parties” from the 2007 legislative elections, as well as “those that did not participate in the 2002 elections.”

European Union

• On 1st July, Finland takes up the rotating presidency of the EU for the fol-
Spain

• On 4th August, a number of forest fires ravage the Region of Galicia, in northern Spain. 70,000 hectares are burned and 4 people die. The police proceeds to arrest 30 people suspected of having intentionally set the fires. On 16th August, firemen manage to control the flames.

• From 18th to 20th August, over 1,000 illegal immigrants from Africa, primarily from Senegal, arrive on the coasts of the Canary Islands. On 24th August, Spain signs an agreement with Senegal allowing both countries to patrol the Senegalese coast.

• On 19th August, the organisation Euskadi ta Askatasuna, i.e. “Euskadi and Freedom” (ETA) declares that the peace process is in “crisis” and accuses the government of being “obstructionist” and “repressive” since the announcement of the onset of peace negotiations last June.

France

• On 9th August, an armed attack against a government building in Ajaccio, Corsica, is claimed by Clandestini Ribelli (Clandestine Rebels), a hitherto unknown group.

• On 17th August, 1,000 squatters are evicted from a former student residence in the Parisian suburb of Cachan by a judicial order from 2004. This is the largest eviction operation ever carried out in France. Those among them who are illegal immigrants are deported while the others are relocated to other lodgings.

Italy

• On 2nd August, the Chamber of Deputies (lower house) approves a series of measures aiming to reduce the deficit. The government aims to reduce the deficit to 2.8% of the GDP for 2007, after 4 consecutive years of deficit above the threshold of 3% of the GDP imposed by the EU.

• On 4th August, the Council of Ministers passes a bill into law reducing the residence period necessary for acquiring Italian nationality from 10 to 5 years and introducing the principle of “jus soli” (birthright citizenship), allowing children born in Italy of foreign parents to automatically acquire Italian citizenship.

• On 7th August, a European warrant of arrest is issued against 26 CIA agents suspected of being involved in the abduction of the Imam, Hassan Mustafa Osas Nasr, in Milan in 2003. The latter was allegedly transported to Egypt, where he was tortured.

• On 20th August, 70 illegal immigrants drown off the coast of the Island of Lampedusa. The Minister of Home Affairs, Giuliano Amato, calls for EU aid in the face of growing illegal immigration, with the number of illegal immigrants arriving on the island since the beginning of 2006 rising to 10,000.

Serbia

• On 14th August, it becomes known that the German citizen, Joachim Ruecker, has been appointed to succeed Soren Jessen-Peterson to the post of Chief of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

• On 14th August, the Financial Times reports that Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, President of the Serbian delegation to negotiations on the “final status” of the province of Kosovo, suggests a partition of the province should Albanians and Serbs not feel capable of living together. Ruecker opposes the partition of Kosovo.

• On 26th August, a bomb explodes in a bar highly frequented by Serbs in Mitrovica. The Serbian public television reports that the attack was committed by a young Albanian.

Montenegro

• On 30th August, Montenegro abolishes compulsory military service.

Macedonia

• On 28th August, the Sobranje (unicameral legislative body) approves the new administration under Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, leader of the conservative coalition called Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). The government’s priorities are to improve the standard of living and the employment rate, struggle against corruption, strengthen democratic institutions and improve inter-ethnic relations.
Turkey

- Over the course of the month of August, there are several bombings at tourist sites, beginning on 4th August, when two bombs are detonated in Adana, injuring 15 people. On 13th August, a bomb explodes in the District of Kınık, causing 5 wounded. On 21st August, one person is injured in Izmir by a bomb explosion. On 27th August, a bomb goes off in Bagcıl, causing 6 wounded. On 28th August, the explosion of a bomb in a shopping centre in Antalya results in 3 dead and a dozen wounded. That same day, three bombs detonate in Marmaris, one of them on a minibus, injuring 31 people. Also on the same day, another bomb attack is attempted in İzmir but foiled by the police, who are able to arrest a Kurdish suspected of being a separatist rebel. On 29th August, the Kurdish Freedom Falcons (TAK), an off-shoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), claim the bombings targeting tourist areas and warns tourists not to come to Turkey. TAK likewise claims authorship for a number of forest fires. On 30th August, a bomb explodes in Menzil, injuring one person. Six soldiers are killed over the course of the month in confrontations with Kurdish separatists.

- On 16th August, The independent announces that the EU has proposed a plan to transfer authority over the ports of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) to the United Nations in order to prevent the failure of negotiations for Turkey’s accession to the EU. Nonetheless, Turkey demands the economic embargo against the TRNC be lifted as a condition for opening its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels and aircraft.

- On 28th August, General Yasar Buyukanit, a fervent nationalist and secularist, becomes the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces. He declares that one of his priorities will be the defeat of Kurdish separatism.

Lebanon

- On 1st August, the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers fail to reach an agreement on a call for immediate cease-fire, under pressure from the United Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands and Poland. The EU27 issue a communiqué demanding an “immediate suspension of hostilities followed by a permanent cease-fire.” On 1st August, even before the 48-hour truce announced by Israel on 30th July is over, the Israeli Armed Forces launch a major operation in Bekaa Valley. The Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, announces that Israel has destroyed all Hezbollah infrastructures. Nonetheless, on the following day, Hezbollah launches over 200 missiles against Israel. One of these missiles covers a record distance, striking the city of Jenin. On 3rd August, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference appeals to the United Nations to demand an immediate cease-fire. On 3rd August, Israel resumes its aerial offensive against Hezbollah positions in Beirut, whereas the latter launches over 100 rockets against Israel. On 4th August, Israel intensifies its attack and destroys the last practicable route between Lebanon and Syria, thereby cutting off humanitarian aid to the over one million displaced citizens. On the same day, an Israeli air raid on the city of El Qaa in Bekaa Valley kills 28 farmers, while Hezbollah launches at least 195 rockets against Israel. On 4th August, Human Rights Watch publishes a report accusing Israel of war crimes. On 6th August, 9 Israeli reservists die under fire from Hezbollah missiles. A number of Lebanese soldiers who had not generally been involved in combat are killed. On 6th August, the Lebanese government rejects a French-US proposal for a United Nations resolution, alleging that it would legitimise Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. On the following day, the Arab League comes to the support of Lebanon and demands substantial changes in the French-US proposal. On 7th August, Israel intensifies its aerial offensive over southern Lebanon and Bekaa Valley. On 8th August, the Lebanese government votes in a seven-point plan aiming to foster a stable cease-fire and including, among other items, sending soldiers to southern Lebanon, disarming Hezbollah, extending Lebanese authority throughout national territory, a standing international demand, and resolving the Chebba Farms conflict. On 9th August, the Israeli Commander-in-Chief, Halutz, authorises the Israeli army to pursue its penetration of Lebanese territory to the Litani River in view of the escalating violence. Hezbollah launches over 160 rockets. On 10th August, Israel broadens its offensive against Hezbollah and Israeli troops enter the city of Marjayoun. On 11th August, the Security Council adopts Resolution 1701 (2006) calling for a complete stop of hostilities, demanding that the Lebanese government and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deploy their forces in southern Lebanon and demanding that the Israeli government unilaterally withdraw all its forces from southern Lebanon. The new UNIFIL has an increased mandate: it is authorised to take all necessary measures in the sectors where its forces are deployed, must ensure that its theatre of operations not be used for hostile activities and it must protect civilians exposed to imminent danger of physical violence. On 12th August, the Israeli offensive intensifies with the aim of maximising control over southern Lebanon before the cease-fire comes into effect. Twenty-four soldiers die. On 14th August, a fragile cease-fire begins, though some minor confrontations take place. This war has taken the lives of some 500 Hezbollah combatants, 119 Israeli soldiers, 44 Israeli civilians and 1,200 Lebanese civilians. In southern Lebanon, the Israeli army occupies a 15km strip of territory. The Israeli army calls on the Lebanese civilian population not to return to southern Lebanon before the arrival of the Lebanese army and United Nations peacekeeping forces. On 14th August, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, declares that his combatants have won a historic and strategic victory over Israel, whereas the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, maintains that Israel has eliminated a “state within a state.” On 16th August, France accepts command over the UNIFIL. France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Finland and Poland have decided to send troops to swell the ranks of the UNIFIL. On 17th August, the Lebanese army begins to move south of the Litani River. On 18th August, Israel launches an operation in Bekaa Valley with the aim of thwarting arms deliveries to Hezbollah from Syria and...
Iran. On 20th August, Israel declares that it does not accept the involvement of the UNIFIL of troops from countries not having diplomatic relations with Israel. On 31st August, the 51 States participating in the international meeting of donors for Lebanon in Stockholm pledge US$ 940 million in emergency reconstruction aid.

Jordan

• On 6th August, two Jordanian Islamist MPs are sentenced by a military court to serve prison terms for having commemorated the terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, killed on 7th June 2006 in Iraq.
• On 27th August, the Jordanian Parliament approves an anti-terrorism law authorising preventive arrest of suspects, despite the criticism put forth by Islamists and human rights activists, who rebuke the law for limiting freedom of expression and giving the police and prosecutors extensive powers over those suspected of fostering terrorist attacks.

Egypt

• On 5th August, Ayman al-Zawahiri, spokesperson for Al-Qaeda’s leader, Bin Laden, announces on the Al-Jazeera television station that Gamaat-i-Islamiya, the main Islamist group behind the insurrection in Egypt in the nineties, has joined the ranks of Al-Qaeda.
• On 28th August, President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak creates a Ministry for Local Development and a Ministry for Economic Development to replace the Ministry of Planning.

Libya

• On 29th August, the death sentence is once again imposed on the five Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor accused by the Libyan courts of having intentionally injected over 400 children with the AIDS virus. The verdict of the first trial was overruled by the Supreme Court.

Tunisia

• On 13th August, Tunisia commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of the promulgation of the Personal Status Code (PSC), unique in the Arab world, namely abolishing polygamy and the practice of repudiation.

Algeria

• On 28th August, the six-month period granted by the government to armed groups to end their armed activities and hand over their weapons in exchange for the cancellation of judicial proceedings against them comes to an end. This amnesty is part of the government’s “Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation,” approved by referendum in September 2005. According to the Minister of Home Affairs and Local Communities, Yazid Zerhouni, between 250 and 300 terrorists have handed in their weapons under this amnesty.

Morocco

• On 31st August, the MAP press agency reports that 56 members of the Islamist group Ansar el-Mahdi who were preparing attacks against Morocco have been arrested.

European Union

• On 16th August, the Home Affairs Ministers of Finland, France, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia and the United Kingdom meet in London and adopt additional measures for European cooperation in the struggle against terrorism.

September 2006

The Coalition for a European Montenegro wins the first legislative elections of Montenegro since its independence. The government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is dissolved and Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer forms a new governmental coalition with the new Freedom and Reform Party (ORP). The European Parliament’s report on Turkey’s progress towards accession to the European Union (EU) indicates “persistent shortcomings” in human rights issues, and the European Parliament calls on Turkey to recognise the Republic of Cyprus before the end of 2006. Israel ends its sea and air embargo of Lebanon and the UNIFIL is deployed in southern Lebanon. In two days, over 1,400 illegal immigrants reach the Canary Islands, leading the eight southern EU countries to unite in their struggle against clandestine migration. A series of unprecedented agreements are signed concerning Gibraltar.

Portugal

• On 14th September, the Minister of Justice announces that the State of Portugal officially recognises the Jewish and Muslim communities as religious organisations established in Portugal, granting them certain rights.

Spain

• On 3rd and 4th September, over 1,400 illegal immigrants disembark on the Canary Islands. On 5th September, the Minister of Labour and a number of NGOs reach an agreement to double the number of reception centres for irregular immigrants transferred from the Canary Islands to the Spanish mainland, while the Minister of Home Affairs sends over 450 police officers to assist in the struggle against illegal immigration. On 13th September, the authorities begin to deport hundreds of Senegalese nationals in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. On 21st September at an EU Ministerial meeting, the Commissioner for Immigration, Franco Frattini, and the French Minister of Home Affairs, Nicolas Sarkozy, accuse Spain of having encouraged illegal immigration by regularising over 600,000 illegal immigrants in February 2005. On 29th September, the eight southern EU countries agree to cooperate in the struggle against illegal immigration from Africa. These eight countries decide to reinforce maritime patrols, create a joint coastguard network and develop an electronic alarm system capable of detecting clandestine vessels leaving the African coast.
• On 22nd September, the newspaper ABC reports that the organisation Euskadi ta Askatasuna, (ETA) has threatened to reconsider its ceasefire should the government not make “significant progress” by 15th October.
France

- On 1st September, the Minister of Home Affairs, Nicolas Sarkozy, declares that 12,716 illegal immigrants had been deported between January and July 2006. On 18th September, he states that 6,924 illegal immigrant families had received a residency permit under the partial amnesty announced in June for families whose children were born and go to school in France.
- On 11th September, the fifth anniversary of Al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on the United States, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s second in line, directly threatens France in a video and appeals to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) to strike out at the “French crusaders.”
- On 13th September, the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica – Union of Fighters (FLNC-UC) claims authorship for 21 recent attacks and attempted attacks on the island.

Italy

- On 4th September, Prime Minister Romano Prodi upholds his plan to reduce the budget and reform pensions before the parliamentary leaders of his coalition as well as before the leaders of the three major Italian trade unions in order to defuse growing agitation among the trade unions and the left wing of his coalition.
- On 6th September Silvio Berlusconi, after losing the immunity enjoyed as a Prime Minister, can be included by Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón in the inquiry on fiscal fraud involving the Spanish TV Station, Telecinco.
- On 18th September, Romano Prodi’s economic advisor resigns in the aftermath of the controversy regarding Telecom Italia. On 28th September, Prodi declares before the Chamber of Deputies (lower house) that he refuses allegations made by the House of Freedoms, Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right coalition in the opposition, according to which he allegedly interfered in Telecom Italia’s change in strategy.
- On 19th September, Senator Sergio De Gregorio retires from the Italy of Values party (IDV) that is part of the government coalition to form a new movement called Italians in the World. As a consequence, the government coalition only maintains a majority by one seat in the Senate.

Croatia

- On 5th September, the organisation for the defence of human rights, Human Rights Watch (HRW), warns Croatia that its accession to the EU will be delayed due to problems regarding violation of the human rights of Serbian refugees having fled their country during the war of 1991-1995. HRW declares that the Croatian government must demonstrate greater commitment to improving the conditions of life for this community if they wish to progress in EU accession procedures.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- On 27th September, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) condemns Momcilo Krajesnik, Serbian member of the collective presidency of Bosnia from 1996 to 1998, to 27 years of prison for persecution, extermination, murder, deportation and forced relocation of non-Serbian civilians during the conflict in Bosnia.

Serbia

- On 19th September, the President of the Kosovo Assembly, Kole Berisha, declares that revolts by citizens of Kosovo can be expected if the region does not gain independence.
- On 29th September, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Carla del Ponte, declares that she is not satisfied with Serbia’s plan of action for arresting and extraditing General Ratko Mladic, convicted of war crimes by the ICTY. The Commissioner for EU Enlargement, Olli Rehn, declares that nothing encourages him to relaunch the negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement suspended in May.

Montenegro

- On 10th September, the Coalition for a European Montenegro, dominated by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) headed by Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, wins an absolute majority at the first legislative elections since the country’s independence. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) ratifies the elections. Voter turnout reaches 71.4%.

Albania

- On 6th September, the European Parliament ratifies the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between Albania and the EU, the first stage towards eventual accession to the EU. This agreement is designed to progressively establish a free trade area and bring Albania closer to European values and norms through financial and political support.

Cyprus

- On 5th September, the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus, Phivos Klokkaris, resigns for health reasons. On 8th September, the Minister of Home Affairs, Andreas Christou, resigns with the aim of running in the local elections in December. Neokolas Silikiotis takes up the functions of Minister of Home Affairs.
- On 7th September, an MP of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), in power in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), along with three MPs from the National Unity Party, in the opposition, resign and together they form a new, right-wing party called Freedom and Reform Party (ORP). Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer accuses the Turkish government of having encouraged these resignations, which followed a meeting with the Turkish Minister for Cypriot Affairs, Saban Desli. On 11th September, the government of the TRNC is dissolved after the Prime Minister, Ferdi Sabit Soyer, withdraws his party, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), from the coalition formed with the Democratic Party (DP). The collapse of the government is, among other things, the consequence of a disagreement concerning the island’s reunification. Soyer accuses the leader of the DP, Serdar Denktash, of holding a nationalist position and opposing concessions in favour of the Greek Cypriot government despite European demands. On 13th September, Soyer forms a new government coalition with the ORP. On 25th September, the president approves the new administra-
The new government commits to finding a solution to the division of the island and the isolation of the TRNC.

**Turkey**

- On 3rd September, a bomb explodes in Catak in the southeast, causing 2 dead and 10 wounded. On 12th September, the Turkish Revenge Brigade (TII) sets off a bomb at a bus stop in Diyarbakir, killing 10 people and wounding 17. On 23rd September, the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) explodes a truck in front of a police station in Igdir, killing 17 people. Twenty-five soldiers and 14 Kurdish rebels lose their lives during the course of the month in confrontations.

- On 6th September, Amnesty International declares that unfair trials are taking place under anti-terrorism laws and that confessions obtained under torture are still used as proof in Turkey. On 22nd September, a mission of the European Parliament travelling primarily through the southeast of the country reports an increase in allegations of torture and abuse.

- On 21st September, the novelist, Elif Shafak, is acquitted from the charge of denigrating the Turkish identity, as per Article 301 of the Penal Code, in her novel, “The Bastard of Istanbul,” which deals with the Armenian question. The Head of the European Commission delegation to Turkey, Hansjörg Kretschmer, declares that Article 301 hampers the freedom of expression and should be amended or suppressed.

- On 26th September, 56 Kurdish mayors go on trial accused of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation. They had asked the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, not to shut down the Denmark-based Roj TV radio station, which the Turkish Authorities believe serves as a mouthpiece for the PKK.

- On 27th September, the European Parliament approves a report on the progress of Turkey towards accession to the EU, revealing Turkey’s “persistent shortcomings” in such spheres as freedom of expression, the rights of religious and other minorities, relations between civilians and the armed forces, women’s rights, trade union and cultural rights and the independence of the judicial branch. The report likewise warns Turkey that if it does not comply with the EU’s demand to lift the blockade against traffic from the Republic of Cyprus, accession negotiations could be suspended. The Parliament likewise calls on Turkey to recognise the Republic of Cyprus before the end of 2006 under pain of suspending said negotiations.

**Syria**

- On 12th September, Syrian security services foil an attack against the US Embassy in Damascus. The United States thanks Syria for having intercepted the attack and declares that it hopes Syria will become an ally in the struggle against terrorism.

**Lebanon**

- On 1st September, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan announces that Syria has committed to institute an embargo on weapons to Lebanon and is not opposed to international personnel contributing technical assistance for enforcing the embargo. On 3rd September, 1,000 Italian marines disembark in southern Lebanon to reinforce the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). On 4th September, Annan announces that Israel and Hezbollah have accepted mediation by the United Nations to negotiate a possible exchange of prisoners. On 5th September, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey consents to contributing to the international force. On 7th September, Israel lifts its air blockade against Lebanon and on 8th September, it lifts its sea embargo. On 13th September, the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, takes the historical decision of sending 2,400 aerial and naval troops. On 13th September, the Israeli armed forces declare that 80% of the territory they occupy in southern Lebanon has been handed over to the UNIFIL but that they reserve the right to pursue their secret surveillance, as the two Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah have not yet been released. On 13th September, Amnesty International accuses Hezbollah of war crimes for deliberately targeting civilian populations in their attacks. On 20th September, UNIFIL announces that it now has a force of 5,000 troops after the arrival of the French, Italian and Spanish contingents. On 22nd September, some 500,000 people gather in Beirut to celebrate the historic victory of Hezbollah against Israel. Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah declares that Hezbollah will hand in its weapons once a fair, strong government is in place in Lebanon. On 26th September, Chris Clark, Head of the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre in southern Lebanon, declares that nearly one million unexploded cluster bombs are scattered throughout southern Lebanon, possibly delaying the return of the 200,000 displaced civilians. Since the cease-fire, the cluster bombs, the majority of which were fired by Israel on the last days of combat when the cease-fire was imminent, have already caused 15 fatalities and 83 wounded, many of them children.

- On 5th September, Lieutenant Colonel Samir Shehade, Deputy Chief of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF), narrowly escapes an assassination attempt near Rmeileh. Shehade had been involved in the arrest and interrogation of 4 high security force officials suspected of having orchestrated Hariri’s assassination.

- On 25th September, Serge Brummertz, the Commissioner of the International Independent Investigation Commission into the assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, publishes his third interim report, in which he claims to have found links between the assassination of Hariri and 14 other political assassinations in Lebanon. Brummertz states that Syrian cooperation with the inquiry remains “generally satisfactory.”

**Jordan**

- On 4th September, Nabil Ja’urah opens fire on tourists visiting the Roman amphitheatre in Amman, killing a British tourist and wounding three others. On the following day, Iraq’s Mujahideen Shura Council applauds the attack in a message posted on Internet.

- On 22nd September, Sajida Mubarak Atroun al-Rishawi is sentenced to death for his involvement in the terrorist attack in Amman in November 2005, which had caused 60 dead.
• On 19th September, Gamal Mubarak, the son of President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, makes a speech at the annual conference of the incumbent National Democratic Party (NDP) fostering growing speculation on his aspiration to succeed his father. In his speech, he criticises US politics in the Middle East and declares that Egypt should consider developing nuclear energy. On 22nd September US Ambassador Francis Richardson declares that the United States is willing to contribute its assistance to Egypt for developing a pacific nuclear programme. On 24th September, the Minister of Energy and Electricity, Hassan Younes, declares that the construction of a 1,000 MW nuclear power plant on the Mediterranean coast could be completed by 2016.

Libya


Algeria

• On 11th September, to mark the 5th anniversary of the terrorist attacks in the US, Al-Qaeda’s second-in-line, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announces by video the official incorporation of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) into Al-Qaeda.

Morocco

• On 18th September, the newspaper Aujourd’hui reports that the writer and dissident, Abdelmoumen Diouri, has returned to Morocco after 35 years of exile in France, declaring that things have changed in Morocco, which has become a democracy based on rule of law.

European Union

• On 12th September, the European Commission finalises the EU budget for rural development for the financial period of 2007-2013. The sector will be allocated 77.7 billion euros, with Poland being the greatest beneficiary, followed by Italy, Germany, Spain and France.

• On 26th September, the European Commission concludes in a report that Romania and Bulgaria have made enough progress in their internal reform programmes to accede to the EU in January 2007. The European Commission imposes stricter safeguard clauses than for previous member state accessions.

October 2006

The last Israeli soldiers withdraw from southern Lebanon and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) grows to 9,509 peacekeepers. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announces a unilateral cease-fire while the European Parliament gives its support to the Spanish government in peace negotiations with the organisation Euskadi ta Askatasuna, i.e. “Euskadi and Freedom” (ETA). Haris Silajdzic (Bosnian), Nebojsa Radmanovic (Serbian) and Zeljko Komsic (Croatian) are elected to the tripartite presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a referendum, the Serbs approve a new constitution describing Kosovo as an integral part of the country. The Commissioner for Enlargement gives the Turks an ultimatum to put an end to their blockade against maritime and aerial traffic from the Republic of Cyprus and implement substantial reforms in the sphere of human rights. The strength of Romano Prodi’s government coalition is put to the test.

France

• On 19th October, Christophe de Margerie, the Director General of the Exploration-Production Division of the oil company, Total, is placed under judicial investigation, suspected of having paid bribes within the framework of the UN Oil-for-Food programme in Iraq in the 1990s.

• On 26th October, Karim Mehdi is sentenced to 9 years of prison for conspiring to support terrorism. He was an accomplice to Ziad Samir Jarrah and Ramzi bin al-Shib, both implicated in the 11th September terrorist attacks on the United States.

Italy

• On 2nd October, the authorities report that they have arrested the members of an Islamist cell having links with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria and which aimed to finance attacks in Algeria. On 8th October, 4 Islamists connected with the GSPC are condemned to prison sentences of up to 6 years for having organised attacks against the metro in Milan and the cathedral of Cremona.

• On 3rd October, Prime Minister Romano Prodi’s coalition government experiences its worse crisis since it entered into power in May, when Italy of Values
(IDV), a minor party in the coalition, withdraws its support for one of the provisions of the government law on judicial reform when said law is put up to vote in the Senate. On 25th October, the coalition loses another vote in the Senate due to the absence of a number of centre-left senators.

- On 26th October, an espionage scandal breaks out following the discovery by the office of the Milan Public Prosecutor that the tax police (Guardia di Finanza) as well as other civil servants illegally accessed the fiscal data of the prime minister and his wife on several occasions.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- On 1st October, presidential elections take place, as do elections for the House of Representatives of Bosnia, the House of Representatives of the Croat-Muslim Federation, the People’s Assembly of the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic), the president of the Republika Srpska and the Cantonal Assemblies. On 3rd October, the observation mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) qualifies the elections as “generally complying with international norms” and representing an “improvement and progress in consolidating democracy and the rule of law.” On 18th October, the Electoral Commission announces the election results: Haris Silajdzic (Bosnian), Neboja Radmanovic (Serbian) and Zeljko Komsić (Croatian) are elected to the tripartite Presidency of the State; Milan Jelic of the Independent Social-Democrat Party (SNSD) becomes President of the Republika Srpska; the Democratic Action Party (SDA) takes the greatest number of seats in the House of Representatives of Bosnia and the House of Representatives of the Croat-Muslim Federation; the SNSD wins the elections to the People’s Assembly of the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic).

Serbia

- On 1st October, the liberal party, G17 Plus, withdraws from the government coalition in protest against the government’s inability to arrest General Ratko Mladic, sought for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). G17 Plus demands the election date be advanced to before 17th December.
- On 13th October, it becomes known that the Serbian Prosecutor for organised crime has instituted proceedings against 35 people, among them judges, lawyers, bankers, and businesspeople in what could possibly be qualified as the largest anti-corruption inquiry of the country’s history.
- On 28th and 29th October, a new constitution is approved by referendum. The new constitution, following upon Montenegro’s independence, describes Kosovo as an “autonomous province of Serbia with a significant degree of independence.” The National Assembly of Serbia had approved the constitution on 30th September.

Montenegro

- On 4th October, the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), the main party in the Coalition for a European Montenegro, which recently won the legislative elections, appoints Željko Sturanovic to the post of Prime Minister.

Macedonia

- On 30th October, the Macedonian Parliament adopts a law on the police force demanded by the EU by slim majority, though the former Albanian-speaking rebels deem it insufficient. The main element of this law is that it increases the Albanian-speaking minority’s involvement in selecting police officials.

Greece

- On 25th October, the EU announces that it will proceed to a thorough verification of the country’s economic figures for 2005. In September, Greece had increased its estimates of the 2005 GDP by 25%.
- On 25th October, 30,000 teachers flood the streets of Athens to demand an increase in wages and protest against educational reforms. In their support, civil servants organise a general strike.

Cyprus

- On 6th October, Nikos Symeonides is appointed Minister of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus.

Turkey

- On 1st October, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announces a unilateral cease-fire following appeals by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan.
- On 3rd October, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn gives Turkey three months to lift the blockade against traffic from the Republic of Cyprus and implement substantial reforms in the sphere of human rights, upon pain of having its EU accession negotiations thwarted. On 4th October, Olli Rehn asserts that the dynamism of reforms in Turkey is jeopardised by “irresponsible” European leaders who wish to exclude Turkey from the EU and opt for a “privileged partnership” with the country. On 4th October, Turkey draws European criticism by cancelling a visit by the European Parliament’s Environment Committee because it includes a Greek Cypriot member, Marios Matsakis, whom Turkey accuses of anti-Turkish propaganda. On 15th October, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, warns Turkey that 20 years could pass before its accession, in view of the slowdown in the reform process.
- On 12th October, the French National Assembly (lower house) approves a law condemning the denial of the Armenian genocide of 1915 to 1923 under the Ottoman Empire. On 15th October, the French President Jacques Chirac calls on Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to apologise regarding the denial mentioned in the law.
- On 12th October, the Nobel Prize in Literature is granted to the novelist Orhan Pamuk, twice convicted of denigrating Turkish identity under Article 301 of the penal code.

Lebanon

- On 1st October, Israel withdraws last armed forces from southern Lebanon. On 6th October, the first Muslim contingent, from Turkey, joins the
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). On 15th October, Rear Admiral Andreas Krause of the German Navy takes command of the naval detachment of the UNIFIL. On 19th October, Human Rights Watch (HRW) accuses Hezbollah and Israel of having used cluster bombs. On 22nd October, the Israeli Minister without portfolio, Yaacov Edery, admits that the Israeli armed forces used phosphorus bombs during the war in Lebanon. The United Nations Environment Programme launches an inquiry to ascertain whether Israel also used uranium-based weapons. By 31st October, the UNIFIL consist of 9,509 peacekeepers from Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and Turkey, assisted by 53 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO).

Jordan

- On 18th October, the State Security Court sentences 8 members of the Al-Ta’ifah al-Mansurah organisation to prison terms of between 2 and 10 years for having planned terrorist attacks against US and Israeli targets and Iraqi police training centres in Jordan.

Egypt

- On 31st October, a military court convicts the nephew of the former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat of defamation of the armed forces for statements he made early in the month on the television station, Orbit. Talaat Sadat had stated that his uncle’s death was the result of an international plot in which his uncle’s personal guards and army commanders had participated. He likewise accused the United States and Israel of being involved in the assassination of Sadat.

Libya

- On 26th October, it becomes known that nearly 400 children infected with AIDS have recently been sent to Italy and France to be treated. According to Libyan prosecutors, these children were deliberately infected with the AIDS virus by 5 Bulgarian nurses and one Palestinian doctor.

Tunisia

- In early October, the Tunisian Authorities cancel the International Conference on Employment and the Right to Work in the Euro-Mediterranean Area, which was to take place in Tunis on 8th and 9th September, at very short notice. In a press release, the EU states that it regrets this decision and declares that it “is disappointed at a series of negative signals which have been given by Tunisia in the area of human rights and governance over the last few years.”
- On 18th October, on the first anniversary of the 18th October Movement, Tunisian activists from different organisations and political movements express their determination to pursue the struggle for liberty and in a press release, State that they deplore “the continuous deterioration of the country’s political situation.”

Algeria

- On 22nd October, two soldiers are killed near Delys in a bomb attack orchestrated by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). On 29th and 30th October, 3 people are killed and 24 wounded in two car bomb attacks taking place in Raghaia and Derghana, respectively.

Morocco

- On 28th October, the Socialist Party holds its founding assembly in Rabat. There, the Secretary General, Abdelmajid Bouzoubaa, declares that the party is “a socialist movement based on the values of Islam and justice.”

European Union

- On 6th October, representatives of the European Commission and the United States make a new agreement on submitting personal data of passengers on transatlantic flights. Certain members of the European Parliament believe that this new agreement, like the previous one that was overruled by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), also impinges on civil liberties.
- On 20th October, at an informal EU summit in Finland, the Member States discuss energy policy and illegal immigration, among other issues. The Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, urges the EU to act collectively against illegal immigration. The summit backs measures for joint action to combat illegal immigration and calls for cooperation on resolving the underlying causes of illegal immigration in countries of origin and transit.
- On 24th October, the EU Court of Audit refuses for the 12th consecutive year to certify large part of the EU’s budget expenditure, in this case from the 2005 budget. Shortcomings are found in the domains of agriculture and regional development, among others. The EU Commissioner for Administrative, Audit and Anti-Fraud Affairs, Siim Kallas, criticises the auditors, who blame the Commission for irregularities in expenditure made by national governments.

November 2007

In Lebanon, Hezbollah organises pacific protests to demand the creation of a government for national unity and 5 Ministers belonging to Hezbollah and Amal resign from the Siniora government. On 21st November, in a series of political assassinations in Lebanon, the Minister of Industry, Pierre Gemayel, is assassinated in Beirut, triggering demonstrations against Syria and Hezbollah. For the first time, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) refers legal proceedings to the Serbian justice system. The European Commission submits its report on the progress of EU candidate countries, in which it criticises Turkey’s shortcomings, in particular with regard to Cyprus. Military relations between France and Turkey are suspended following the adoption by the French National Assembly of a law condemning the denial of the Armenian genocide. Some fifty European and African countries meet in Tripoli in order to seek a solution to the problem of illegal immigration. A new constitution is adopted by referendum in Gibraltar, granting the area more power.

Portugal

- On 9th November, workers in the public sector begin a national strike, to last two days, against government meas-
Do not hallucinate.

Spain

- **On 1st November**, the conservative coalition, Convergence and Union (CiU) wins more seats in the legislative elections of the Autonomous Region of Catalonia. On 7th November, the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC) announces that it will renew the coalition with the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) party and the eco-socialists, Initiative for Catalonia-Greens (ICV), said coalition originally being formed after the previous elections in 2003.
- **On 9th November**, the leader of Batasuna warns Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero that there will be no peace process if the government and judicial branch do not stop instituting proceedings against members of both the organisation Euskadi ta Askatasuna, i.e. “Euskadi and Freedom” (ETA) and Batasuna. On 30th November, the head of ETA’s logistics machine, Zigor Garro Pérez, is arrested in France along with his companion, Marina Bernado, and other suspects. Pérez is suspected of being involved in the theft of arms in October.

France

- **On 9th November**, the Parisian Jewish school, Merkaz Hatorah, suffers arson, though the fire causes only minor damage.
- **On 14th November**, the EU Commissioner for Competition, Neelie Kroes, authorises the merger of the energy groups, Gaz de France and Suez, under certain conditions, among them the transfer of the shares held by the Suez Group in Distrigaz and by Gaz de France (GDF) in the Belgian company, Société de Production d’Electricité (SPE).

Italy

- **On 6th November**, the Egyptian Islamist, Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed, the mastermind of the terrorist attacks on Madrid in 2004, is sentenced to ten years of prison by a court in Milan for terrorism in relation with his activities in Italy. During the course of the month, he is extradited to Spain, where he is sought for murder, attempted murder and terrorist destruction with relation to the terrorist bombings in Madrid.
- **On 17th November**, 20,000 students, researchers and workers demonstrate in Rome against the budget for the 2007 financial year, which is approved on 19th November by the Chamber of Deputies. A number of politicians in the opposition criticise the increase in taxes and the reduction of expenditure.
- **On 20th November**, the government dismisses the Head of Military Intelligence (SISMI), Nicolo Pollari, suspected of being implicated in the abduction of the Imam, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, by the CIA in Milan in 2003. The Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy, Vice-Admiral Bruno Branciforte, is appointed in his stead.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- **On 24th November**, the creation of a new coalition called the United Left is announced. It is composed of 5 parties with no members in Parliament.

- **On 10th November**, forensic scientists discover a new mass grave in Snagovo containing the bones of over 100 victims of the Srebrenica massacre of 1995.
- **On 14th November**, the Court of the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina convicts Radovan Stankovic to 20 years of prison for crimes against humanity for acts committed in Foca in 1992. Stankovic was the first accused whose case had been transferred by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to a national court for trial. On 30th November, the ICTY Appeals Chamber sentences General Stanislav Galic, the commander of the Bosnian Serb forces during the siege of Sarajevo from 1992 to 1994, to life in prison. He is charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes.
- **On 21st November**, the UN Security Council extends the mandate of the EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR - Althea) by 12 months.

- **On 30th November**, the newly elected People’s Assembly approves the new government under the leadership of Milorad Dodik. The priorities of the new government are economic reform, social welfare and development programmes. The government likewise commits to fully cooperate with the ICTY.

Serbia

- **On 8th November**, the National Assembly of Serbia officially adopts the new constitution, approved by referendum in October.
- **On 9th November**, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Lieutenant General Agim Ceku, announces that he will unilaterally declare independence if negotiations on the final status of the province do not lead to the creation of an independent state. On 10th November, the United Nations Special Envoy for negotiations on the final status of Kosovo, Martii Ahtisaari, announces that he will postpone submitting his recommendations until after legislative elections in Serbia, to be held on 21st January.
- **On 9th November**, the National Assembly of Serbia accepts the resignation of the Minister of Justice, Mladjan Dinkic, member of the liberal party, G17 Plus, which had withdrawn from the government coalition in October.

- **On 17th November**, the first time, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) refers a trial, on this occasion that of Vladimir Kovacevic, to the Serbian justice system.
- **On 27th November**, the ultra-nationalist leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), Vojislav Seselj, refuses to appear before court at the start of his trial before the ICTY, alleging weakness. On 11th November, he had begun a hunger strike to protest against the tribunal’s lack of impartiality. In response, the ICTY denies him the right to choose his own defence council, assigning him a defence council. On 30th November, Seselj is hospitalised.

Montenegro

- **On 10th November**, the (unicameral) Parliament approves a new government led by Zeljko Sturancovic, member of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS)
Albania

- On 24th November, Albania, which presides over the Central European Initiative, hosts a meeting of prime ministers and high representatives from 18 central and south-eastern European countries to discuss political and economic cooperation.

Greece

- On 3rd November, demonstrations against university reforms continue in Athens, where students throw Molotov cocktails at the police, who retaliate with tear gas.

Cyprus

- On 2nd November, the Finnish Presidency of the EU cancels an emergency summit that was to take place on 4th and 5th November on the Cyprus issue, under the conviction that no agreement would be reached involving its proposition. The Finnish proposition consisted of convincing Turkey to open its airports and ports to Cyprus in exchange for lesser economic isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), by placing its Famagusta Port under EU control and thus allowing it to trade with the EU.
- On 22nd November, the Mine Action Centre (MAC) announces that Nicosia has been cleared of all mines for the first time since 1974.

Turkey

- On 5th December, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declares that he is ready to amend Article 301 of the penal code regarding “humiliation of the Turkish identity, of the Republic and State bodies or institutions,” a law highly criticised by the EU, which considers that it limits freedom of expression.
- On 8th November, the European Commission (EC), in a report on the progress of Turkey towards accession to the EU, reproaches it for discriminating a Member State insofar as it refuses to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and impedes the free circulation of goods on the island. The EC likewise reproaches Turkey for the slow progress of reforms in the spheres of freedom of expression, torture and the rights of women and minorities. On 21st November, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, rejects the EU Finnish Presidency’s request to make an effort to overcome the stalemate of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations due to the Cyprus issue by 6th December. On 27th November, the Finnish Presidency announces that it ceases all diplomatic attempts to reach a compromise on the Cyprus issue. On 29th November, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn recommends freezing negotiations on 8 of the 35 chapters due to disagreements.
- On 15th November, the Commander of the Turkish Army, General Ilker Basbug, announces that military relations with France have been suspended following the adoption of a law by the French National Assembly condemning the denial of the Armenian genocide.
- On 26th November, 20,000 people demonstrate in Istanbul against the arrival of Pope Benedict XVI on 28th November. The demonstrators rebuke him for having linked Islam with violence in a speech in September.

Syria

- On 21st November, Syria re-establishes diplomatic relations with Iraq, which had been broken off in 1980.

Lebanon

- On 1st November, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, calls a protest to demand elections be held early should the government under Prime Minister Fuad Siniora not accept the establishment of a government of national unity by mid-November. The White House spokesperson, Tony Snow, declares that the United States has proof that Syria, Iran and Hezbollah seek to overthrow Siniora’s government. On 6th November, pro and anti-Syrian parties initiate a week of national discussion organised by Nabbi Berri, the President of the (unicameral) National Assembly, in order to reach an agreement. On 11th November, the talks fall through and the 5 Hezbollah and Amal Ministers resign from government. On 12th November, President Lahoud declares that the government is no longer legitimate, making reference to Article 95 of the Constitution, which stipulates that all the religious communities should be fairly represented in the cabinet. On 13th November, Siniora rejects the resignation of the 5 ministers. That same day, the government reveals the discovery of an “Iranian-Syrian plot for a coup d’etat” seeking to put an end to the implementation of United Nations Resolution 1701. On 19th November, Nasrallah once more calls for pacific protest against the government, whom he qualifies as illegitimate, unconstitutional and controlled by the United States.
- On 13th November, Siniora’s government approves a United Nations project concerning the establishment of an international tribunal to try those responsible for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri. On 21st November, the UN Security Council officially endorses the plans for the international tribunal. That same day, the Syrian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Faisal Mekdad, states that it is for Syrian tribunals and not international jurisdiction to judge those responsible for Hariri’s assassination. On 21st November, the Minister of Industry, Pierre Gemayel, member of a powerful Christian family and anti-Syrian leader, is assassinated in Beirut, becoming the last in a series of assassinations or attempted assassinations of anti-Syrian politicians and journalists. On 21st November, the Syrian government condemns the assassination, whereas a number of anti-Syrian figures accuse the Syrian regime of being involved. On 22nd November, the Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, accuses Syria of wishing to overthrow the government to prevent the National Assembly from approving the creation of an international tribunal to try Hariri’s assassins. On 23rd November, 800,000 people attend Gemayel’s funeral, which turns into a demonstration against Syria and Hezbollah.

Jordan

- On 22nd November, King Abdullah II carries out a cabinet reshuffle, keeping Marouf Bakhet as prime minister.
Egypt

• On 21st November, the Financial Times reports that the Egyptian Authorities have prohibited the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood from leaving the country and have prevented its members from running in trade union and student elections.

Libya

• On 22nd and 23rd November, some fifty European and African countries meet in Tripoli, upon invitation of Colonel Gaddafi, in order to seek a solution to the problem of illegal immigration. African and European countries reach an agreement on an overall approach to immigration by adopting an unprecedented pact combining security with development.

Tunisia

• On 7th November, the Tunisian President, Zine ben Ali, in a statement on the 19th anniversary of his arrival in power, commits to reform the political system and open it to “fair competition.” He also promises to authorise unannounced inspections of penitentiaries. Twenty-nine Islamist prisoners are released as part of an amnesty.

Algeria

• On 12th November, Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem demands that France recognise the crimes it committed against the Algerian people during the colonial period.

Morocco

• On 1st November, Morocco becomes the 13th Member State of the Global Initiative for the Struggle against Nuclear Terrorism.
• On 22nd November, the governing majority agrees to relax the criteria for allowing small political parties, who have been protesting against their exclusion over the past few days, to run in the legislative elections of autumn 2007.
• On 28th November, Morocco does away with compulsory military service.

European Union

• On 8th November, the European Commission submits its report on the progress of candidates to EU accession. The report criticises Turkey’s shortcomings, in particular concerning Cyprus, and lauds Croatia and Macedonia for their progress.
• On 24th November, the EU-Russia Summit in Helsinki does not manage to overcome the differences between the two powers, among other things on energy issues.
• On 29th November, the EU Commissioner for the Environment, Stavros Dimas, announces a reduction of 7% in carbon emissions authorised for Member States in the second phase of the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), to run from 2008 to 2012. This system is the EU’s flagship instrument for struggling against global warming and meeting the goals established in the Kyoto Protocol, namely, to reduce CO₂ emissions by 8% by 2012 with respect to the 1990 level.

December 2006

The Spanish government puts an end to peace negotiations with the organisation Euskadi ta Askatasuna, i.e. “Euskadi and Freedom” (ETA) following the latter’s detonation of a bomb at Barajas Airport in Madrid, killing 2. The EU Foreign Affairs Ministers decide to partially suspend negotiations for Turkey’s accession to the EU in response to its refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic. In Lebanon, demonstrations called by the Shiite factions, Hezbollah and Amal, and backed by the Christian leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, General Michel Aoun, to demand the government’s resignation continue throughout December, increasing in scale. For the first time, a woman is appointed the head of a political party in Tunisia. Finlands becomes the sixteenth EU country to ratify the treaty instituting a European Constitution. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia join NATO’s Partnership for Peace.

Spain

• On 30th December, the organisation “Euskadi and Freedom” (ETA), after having warned the authorities, detonates a bomb in a parking at Barajas Airport in Madrid, ending a 9-month cease-fire. In response to the attack, which kills 2 and injures 26, Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero ends peace negotiations with ETA. On 31st December, thousands of Spaniards demonstrate throughout the country against ETA and demand Zapatero’s resignation. The leader of Batasuna, Arnaldo Otegi, blames the government for the return to violence due to its unwillingness to advance in peace negotiations.

France

• On 7th December, a new international, state-funded French network station, France 24, begins to broadcast in the hope of competing with BBC and CNN.
• On 20th December, 10 people are convicted in the “false voter” affair regarding elections to the Paris City Council in 1999 and 1995, which had ensured victory for the party led by Jacques Chirac, Rally for the Republic (RPR).

Italy

• On 2nd December, 700,000 people demonstrate, on instigation of Silvio Berlusconi’s opposition coalition party, the House of Freedoms, against the government’s proposed budget, which involves increasing taxes. The budget is nevertheless approved on 21st December.
• On 18th December, the coast guard intercepts a fishing boat with 648 illegal Egyptian immigrants on board.

Croatia

• On 1st December, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn asserts that Croatia is “next in line” in the future enlargement of the EU after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria on 1st January 2007.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

• On 14th December, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia join the
Turkey's proposal of opening a port and crossings points. of disappearances and open more border crossing points. of December, the EU qualifies Turkey's proposal of opening a port and an airport to Greek Cypriot traffic in exchange for a softening of trade restrictions against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as insufficient. On 11th December, the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers decide to partially suspend negotiations for Turkey's accession to the EU in response to its refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot transport. They also approve the European Commission's proposal to suspend 8 of the 35 chapters discussed due to disagreement, among them the commerce and transport chapters. On 12th December, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan qualifies the decision for provisional suspension as unfair and recalls that the EU has not fulfilled all of its promises, referring to the EU's promise in 2004 to put an end to the trade embargo on the TRNC. On 14th December, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the next EU President and previously in favour of a "privileged relation" with Turkey, changes positions and declares that she is not against Turkey's eventually joining the EU. On 15th December, British Prime Minister Tony Blair undertakes a diplomatic mission to Turkey to reassure the Turks on their perspectives for accession.

• On 19th December, the author, Ipek Calister, charged with insulting the Turkish identity by criticising the founder of the secular Turkish State, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in a biography of Atatürk's wife, is acquitted.

• At least 18 soldiers die in confrontations with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the People's Defence Forces (HPG) in the southeast.

Syria

• On 11th December, Syria and Iraq re-open embassies in their respective capitals after over twenty years of diplomatic rupture.

Lebanon

• On 1st December, nearly 800,000 people demonstrate in downtown Beirut, on the instigation of the two Shiite factions, Hezbollah and Amal, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora and his government. The protesters are joined by many Christian followers of General Michel Aoun, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement. On 2nd December, King Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia expresses his support of Siniora's government. On 3rd December, a Shiite demonstrator, Ahmed Ali Mahmoud, dies in the anti-government demonstrations. On 5th December, those attending Mahmoud's funeral call for Siniora's death. On 10th December, 2 million people gather in central Beirut, at the appeal of Hezbollah and its Christian allies. Aoun demands Siniora's resignation, stating that he will otherwise face action leading to early elections. Sheikh Naim Qasim, an important member of Hezbollah, tells the crowd that the protest will continue for months if necessary.

Jordan

• On 7th December, the State Security Court convicts 9 people involved in the rocket attack against two US warships stationed in Aqaba in August 2005.

• On 21st December, Nabil Ja'urah, who had opened fire against tourists in Amman in September, killing a British tourist, is sentenced to the death penalty.

Egypt

• On 14th December, the African Union and the African Development Bank organise the First African Conference of Ministers Responsible for Hydrocarbons in Cairo. The conference focuses on the rise in oil rates on the world market and its influence on the economies of African countries.

• On 26th December, President Hosni Mubarak requests that Parliament amend the Constitution to allow opposition parties to present candidates for the presidency more easily. Mubarak also proposes to ban parties based on religious obedience.

Libya

• On 19th December, the Benghazi criminal court sentences the 5 Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor accused with having infected over 400 children with the AIDS virus in the late nineties to the death penalty. Their case is yet to be brought before the Supreme Court.
Tunisia

- On 26th December, May Eljeribi is appointed Secretary General of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), becoming the first woman to lead a political party in Tunisia.

Algeria

- On 12th December, Algeria and Spain sign an agreement in Algiers on the extradition of criminals.

European Union

- On 5th December, Finland becomes the sixteenth EU country to ratify the treaty instituting a European Constitution.
- On 7th December, the European Central Bank decides to raise the interest rate from 3.25% to 3.50%, the highest it has been in 5 years, with the aim of reducing inflationist pressure in the euro zone.
- On 12th December, the EU Court of First Instance repeals the EU decision of May 2002 to freeze the assets of the Iranian group in exile, Mujahedeen-i-Khalq (MKO), alleging that they had not had fair hearings and valid reasons had not been put forth.
- On 14th and 15th December, the European Summit, under the Finnish Presidency, tackles the issue of the EU’s “absorption capacity” and decides henceforth to give no dates for accession until negotiations reach an advanced stage as well as to break the stalemate on the new constitution before considering any future enlargement. The summit also focuses on measures to combat illegal immigration. It is decided that priority shall be given to the study of a surveillance system for Europe’s southern borders.
- On 21st December, the EU-25’s Fisheries Ministers agree on the fishing quotas for 2007, including the reduction of codfish quotas by 14-20% and of fishing days by 7-10%. Nevertheless, scientists have advised banning fishing entirely.
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Gibraltar and Western Sahara

Gibraltar

- On 12th September, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) confirms the right of Gibraltar inhabitants to participate in European elections and rejects the claim filed by Spain asserting that only EU citizens can legally vote.
- On 18th September, the British Minister of European Affairs, Geoff Hoon, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, and the Chief Minister of Gibraltar, Peter Caruana, sign a series of historic agreements in Cordoba, Spain, opening Gibraltar airports to traffic from Spain and the rest of Europe, relaxing border controls in order to encourage trade, improving telecommunications between Gibraltar and Spain and allowing a Cervantes Institute (official Spanish Cultural Centre) to open in Gibraltar.
- On 30th November, 60.24% of voters approve the new constitution in a referendum. This constitution lends greater power to Gibraltar, including the establishment of its own judicial system. Voter turnout amounts to 60.4%.
- On 16th December, an airplane of the Spanish airline company, Iberia, lands at the Gibraltar Airport, renewing the airline connections between Spain and the British colony, which had been interrupted in 1954.

Western Sahara

- On 28th April, the UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1675 (2006), which extends the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara until 31st October.
- On 22nd April, the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) announces that the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, has ordered the release of 48 Sahrawi prisoners.
Chronologies

Chronology of events: Israel-Palestine

2006 is a year of legislative elections in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. Hamas wins an absolute majority at the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council in January and forms a government in March. The new Palestinian National Authority, refusing to give up violence and recognise the State of Israel as well as the agreements signed earlier between the Palestinian Authority and Israel – three prerequisites for recognising the Hamas administration imposed by the Quartet on the Middle East – faces international diplomatic isolation, a suspension of international aid and the freezing of the transfer of taxes and customs duties by Israel, plunging the Palestinian territories into a serious financial and humanitarian crisis, despite the Quartet’s creation of a “temporary international mechanism” in May. In Israel, elections to the Knesset mark the victory of Kadima and its leader, Ehud Olmert, who plans to establish the definitive borders of Israel, unilaterally if necessary, by 2010.

The financial and humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian territories is aggravated by a political crisis engendered by deadly internal struggles among Palestinians in the Gaza Strip beginning in April, namely between the advocates of the Hamas government and the followers of Fatah, the party led by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The non-payment of the salaries of civil servants for a number of months due to the international financial embargo heightens the internal tensions in Palestine. In May, Abbas announces that, in the absence of an agreement between Fatah and Hamas, he will hold a referendum on the issue of recognising Israel in order to put an end to the political and financial crisis. Despite the implicit recognition of the existence of Israel by Hamas in June and the start of talks in August to create a government of national unity, which promises to be a difficult task, internal Palestinian confrontations continue through to the year’s end, killing more than 300 people. On 16th December, Mahmoud Abbas calls early elections to resolve the situation in Palestine.

The internal problems in the occupied territories notwithstanding, violence between Israel and the Palestinian factions intensifies over the course of 2006. In early April, in response to the frequent rocket attacks by Palestinian terrorist groups, Israel launches the largest military operation against the Gaza Strip since the evacuation of Jewish settlers in 2005. In late May, Israeli troops enter the Gaza Strip for the first time since their retreat in 2005. The Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip gains in intensity with the abduction of an Israeli soldier by several Palestinian groups on 25th June. In response, Israel launches “operation summer rain” and arrests dozens of Palestinian representatives of Hamas, 9 of them Ministers, in June and the President of the Palestinian Legislative Council in August. On 26th November, a cease-fire begins between Israel and Palestinian militants and the Israeli Armed Forces withdraw from the Gaza Strip. On 23rd December, a glimmer of hope emerges with the first official meeting between the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, since the election of Hamas in January, the meeting aiming to renew the peace process in the Middle East.

January 2006

Israel

- On 4th January, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffers a severe stroke and goes into a coma. On the following day, Ehud Olmert, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, is appointed as acting Prime Minister. On 16th January, Kadima, Sharon’s political party, appoints Olmert as interim party president.

- On 11th January, 3 Ministers of the Likud party resign from government. On 13th January, the last Likud minister remaining in the government, Silvan Shalom, Minister of Foreign Affairs, resigns in his turn. The leader of Likud, Benjamin Netanyahu, had resigned in August 2005.

Palestine

- On 10th January, Israel announces that a limited number of Palestinians of East Jerusalem will be allowed to participate in legislative elections and that candidates, except for members of Hamas, are authorised to run for elections in East Jerusalem.

- On 25th January, the Islamist group Hamas wins an absolute majority in legislative elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, gaining 74 seats out of 132, as compared to the 45 seats going to Fatah, President Mahmoud Abbas’ party. Over 900 international observers supervise the elections. The Islamic Jihad had refused to participate in the elections and had called on its followers to abstain from voting. There was a turnout of 74.6% of the electorate. On 26th January, the government of Prime Minister Ahmed Qurie, predominantly belonging to the Fatah party, resigns.
Israel declares that it will not negotiate with a Palestinian government comprised by an armed terrorist organisation advocating the destruction of Israel. On 26th January, US President George Bush likewise declares that he will not negotiate with Hamas, which is on the US list of terrorist groups, insofar as it advocates the destruction of Israel. On 30th January, the Quartet meets in London and calls for Hamas to recognise Israel, relinquish violence and recognise all previous agreements, as, for instance, the Road Map for Peace, and adds that all financial aid to the new government will depend on Hamas’ acceptance of these conditions.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 19th January, in a suicide attack, a Palestinian detonates a bomb in a restaurant in Tel Aviv, wounding at least 22 people. Authorship for this suicide bombing is claimed by the Islamic Jihad, which states it is in retaliation for Israeli military action in the Gaza Strip.

February 2006

Israel

- On 1st February, confrontations take place between settlers and Israeli police and soldiers in charge of evacuating and destroying an illegal colony in Amona, in the heart of the West Bank. Over 200 settlers and 65 police officers and military personnel are wounded and 16 settlers are arrested.
- On 7th February, Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declares on Channel 2 TV that if Kadima wins the elections, Israel will continue to pull out of the West Bank while retaining control over the large settlements of Maale Adumim, Ariel and Gush Etzion, as well as over smaller settlements in the Jordan River Valley.
- On 14th February, the eldest son of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Omri Sharon, is sentenced to 9 months imprisonment without remission for violations of the party financing law committed during primary elections to the Likud party in 1999, won by his father.

Palestine

- On 1st February, the Chief of the Egyptian Intelligence Service and envoy for Palestinian affairs, Omar Suleiman, calls on Hamas to relinquish violence, recognise the agreements signed by the preceding government under Fatah and recognise Israel. On 9th February, Russia becomes the first member of the Quartet to establish contact with Hamas, inviting its representative to Moscow in order to discuss the Middle East peace process. On 10th February, France expresses circumspect support for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offer. On 18th February, the new Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), dominated by the Islamist group, Hamas, is sworn in. On 19th February Hamas appoints Ismail Haniyeh as Prime Minister of a predominantly-Hamas coalition government. On 19th February, in response to the formation of a Hamas-dominated government, the Israeli government decides to immediately freeze the transfer of tax proceeds and customs duties to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert qualifies the PNA as a “terrorist authority.” Israel likewise calls on international donors to suspend their aid to the PNA and announces an embargo on the transfer of arms and military material to the PNA security forces. Moreover, Hamas representatives on the PLC are refused the privilege of travelling between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank normally granted to Palestinian officials. On 20th February, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt launches an international campaign to raise funds for the PNA. On 22nd February, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, announces that Iran will provide support to the PNA so it can “withstanding US cruelty.”

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 23rd February, the Israeli Armed Forces kill five Palestinians in the Balata Refugee Camp in Nablus, in the most significant military operation since August 2005 in the West Bank. Among the casualties is Mohammed Shhtawi, a high official of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Until the end of February, Israel carries out military operations in and around Nablus. On 26th February, Israel kills two Palestinians, whom according to Israel were setting bombs along the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip. One of these two Palestinians is Zayan Dukhan, one of the sons of Abdel Fattah Dukhan, a Hamas member of the PLC.

March 2006

Israel

- On 9th March, Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declares in an interview to the Jerusalem Post that if Kadima wins the elections, the party commits to establish the definitive borders of Israel by 2010 and that the border will follow, either exactly or generally, the line of the West Bank security barrier. Olmert adds that he will expand the largest settlement of Maale Adumim to reach East Jerusalem. The Palestinians and the United States reject this expansion plan, known by the name of E-1 Development Plan. On 28th March, Kadima, the new party of Ariel Sharon led by Ehud Olmert since Sharon entered a coma, wins the greatest number of seats (29) at the elections to the Knesset (unicameral legislative body with 120 seats). Kadima starts negotiations to form a coalition with the Labour Party (holding 19 seats) and other minor parties. Likud only wins 12 seats whereas sectarian parties and those advocating specific interests take a third of the seats in the Knesset. Olmert qualifies the elections as a referendum demonstrating support of his plan for unilaterally establishing the definitive borders of Israel by 2010.

Palestine

- In early March, a Hamas delegation led by Khaled Mashal, Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau based in Syria, travels to Moscow upon invitation by President Vladimir Putin. On 3rd March Putin declares that Hamas should recognise Israel and relinquish violence if it wishes to avoid international isolation. On 29th March, the new Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyeh, and his cabinet, predominantly Hamas members, take up office. That same day, Canada suspends its aid to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The Quartet announces that
aid to the PNA is in jeopardy, given that Hamas refuses to recognise Israel, relinquish violence and recognise previous agreements. The Quartet adds that it commits to maintain its humanitarian aid to Palestine. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mahmud al-Ahhar, states that he will not submit to international pressure and that the new government does not intend to recognise Israel. On 30th March, the new Minister of Home Affairs, Said Siyam, states that Palestinian militants will not be arrested by Palestinian security forces but suggests that the new administration will attempt to convince the factions not to launch attacks against Israel.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 2nd March, Khaled al-Dahdouh, Chief of the Al-Qods Brigades, the Islamic Jihad’s military wing, is killed in the Gaza Strip when a bomb explodes in his car. The Islamic Jihad accuses Israel of the assassination, but the latter denies having had anything to do with it.
- On 14th March, Israeli military forces storm the Palestinian prison of Jericho in order to capture six people sought by Israel and who had been in prison for four years under US and UK control. Among the prisoners sought were the Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Ahmed Saadat, and a number of other activists involved in the assassination of the Israeli Minister of Tourism, Rehavam Zeevi, in 2001. The British and Americans had decided to withdraw for security reasons. On 15th March, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas condemns the Israeli operation.
- On 30th March a Palestinian suicide attacker detonates a bomb near the settlement of Kedumim in the West Bank, killing four Israelis. A faction of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claims authorship for the attack.
- On 31st March, Khalil al-Quqa, the commander of the Salah a-Din Brigades, the military wing of the Popular Resistance Committees, is killed in a car-bomb explosion in Gaza. The Palestinians accuse Israel, which denies any involvement. The Popular Resistance Committees accuse the Palestinian security forces of collaborating with Israel, causing rioting and the exchange of gunfire between the Palestinian security forces and members of the Popular Resistance Committees. Three people are killed.

April 2006

Israel

- On 11th April, Ariel Sharon’s mandate as prime minister is officially over when doctors declare him “permanently incapacitated” after being in coma for over three months, allowing Ehud Olmert to be officially appointed as prime minister. On 30th April, Olmert concludes negotiations on a coalition government consisting of his Kadima party, the Labour Party, the ultra-orthodox Sephardic Association of Torah Keepers (Shas) and the Pensioners of Israel to the Knesset (Gil).
- On 20th April, the Israeli government extends for a year the travel restriction imposed on Mordechai Vanunu, released in April 2004 after having served a term of 18 years for disclosing Israeli nuclear secrets, continuing to prohibit him from travelling abroad, as he is deemed to still represent “a State security risk.”

Palestine

- On 7th April, since Hamas has refused to comply with the conditions established by the international community for continuing aid to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), the United States announces the suspension of its aid to the PNA, totalling over 240 million dollars, in order to prevent this money from benefiting the Hamas government. The United States decides, on the other hand, to increase their humanitarian aid by 57% to reach an amount of 287 million dollars. On 9th April, the Israeli government under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declares that Israel shall have no contact with the PNA, which it describes as “a hostile authority,” while stating that it will maintain contact with Mahmoud Abbas. On 10th April, the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs likewise decide to suspend bilateral assistance as well as the European Commission’s aid to the PNA. The Ministers decide, nonetheless, to maintain certain contact with the members of the PNA. On 14th April, the US Department of the Treasury prohibits US citizens, US companies and companies operating in the United States from doing business with the PNA. On 17th April, Iran and Qatar promise the PNA aid amounting to 50 million dollars each to help it overcome its financial crisis.
- In early April, tensions surface between President Mahmoud Abbas, leader of Fatah, and the Hamas government on security matters. On 7th April, The Independent reports that President Mahmoud Abbas is attempting to take control of one of the Gaza border crossings, under command of the Minister of Home Affairs and National Security, Said Siyam, in order to avoid a pull-out of EU observers, who have been prohibited from having any contact with Hamas. The tension between the two factions grows even more acute when Abbas attempts to appoint Rachid Abu Shbak, a former official responsible for security in Gaza, as the chief of the internal security service. Abbas is obliged to relinquish the project, as Hamas expresses its opposition to the creation of “parallel offices.” On 20th April, Siyam announces the creation of a new security force under the authority of the commander of the Popular Resistance Committees. Abbas qualifies this force as “illegal and unconstitutional.”
- On 30th April, James Wolfensohn resigns from his post as the Quartet’s Special Envoy to the Middle East, explaining that the presence of a government under Hamas in the Palestinian Territories does not allow him to exercise his functions.

Conflicts between the Parties

- In early April, in response to a rocket strike by Palestinian factions from the Gaza Strip, Israel launches its most important military operation in the Gaza Strip since the withdrawal of Jewish settlers in August and September 2005. On 7th April, at least six Palestinians are killed, including a child and five presumed members of the Palestinian Resistance Committees, and on 10th April, a little girl is killed. By mid-April, the number of shells fired by Israel per day reaches 300. On 17th April, a Palestinian
Appendices

May 2006

Israel

- On 4th May, the Knesset (unicameral legislative body) approves the new government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, of the Kadima party. The new administration holds 67 of the 120 seats of the Knesset. Amir Peretz, of the Labour Party, is appointed to the post of Minister of Defence and Tzipi Livni to that of Vice-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs. In his address to the Knesset, Olmert reiterates his plan to establish Israel’s borders by 2010, unilaterally if necessary, and indicates that these borders will be different from the territories under his control today, meaning that isolated Jewish territories, which jeopardise State security, will be abandoned, as opposed to the large settlements, which will form part of Israel, with Jerusalem as capital. On his visit to the United States in late May, Olmert had received President George Bush’s support for his plan.

- On 14th May, the Supreme Court decides not to amend the law on citizenship that excludes family reunification between Palestinian and Israeli Arabs.

Palestine

- On 9th May, gunfire is exchanged between armed members of Hamas and the bodyguards of Samir Mashrawi, a Fatah leader, sparking confrontations between Fatah and Hamas factions that lead to three casualties and nine wounded. On 17th May, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), under Hamas, defies the veto imposed by President Mahmoud Abbas and deploys its new, 3,000-strong paramilitary security force in Gaza under the command of Jamal Abu Samadhana, Commander of the Popular Resistance Committees. On 22nd May, confrontations between the Hamas militia and the police forces loyal to Abbas near the premises of the Palestinian Legislative Council cause one dead and eleven injured. On 24th May, Nabil Hodhod, Head of the Preventive Security Service under Fatah control, dies in a grenade attack targeting him. On 24th May, Salem Khudeih, member of the Hamas militia, is killed in front of a mosque in Khan Yunis and Hamas accuses the Preventive Security Service of his death. On 26th May, Hamas withdraws its militia from the streets of Gaza in order to restore peace.

- On 9th May, the Quartet, meeting in New York, agrees to establish a “temporary international mechanism” allowing the arrival of aid to Palestinians without going through the PNA, so as to prevent a financial crisis in the Palestinian Territories. On 10th May, Israel announces that it will accept the new mechanism and on 17th May, the Israeli government orders the army to reopen the Karni crossing point.

- On 10th May, Palestinian leaders imprisoned in Israel, among them Marwan Barghouti (Fatah) and the Sheikh Abdel Hakel Natsh (Hamas), make suggestions for overcoming the crisis between Fatah and Hamas. The most significant ideas are the formation of a Fatah-Hamas coalition government, the end of attacks on Israeli territory and the creation of a Palestinian State within the borders established in 1967. On 25th May, President Abbas gives Hamas an ultimatum, giving it ten days to recognise Israel, after which a referendum will be organised on the document made public by the Palestinian prisoners, which implicitly recognises the State of Israel.

- On 18th May, the Chinese government invites the Palestinian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mahmod al-Zahhar, to Beijing to participate in the Forum on Arab-Chinese Cooperation. Israel denounces this invitation as contravening the conditions imposed by the international community for recognising the Hamas government, namely, Hamas’ recognition of Israel, relinquishment of violence and acceptance of previous agreements.

Peace Negotiations

- On 21st May, during the World Economic Forum, for the first time since Hamas’ election in January, high-level contacts are renewed between the two parties, with a meeting between President Abbas and the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tzipi Livni. After the meeting, Livni announces that the Israeli government will use 11 million dollars from the Palestinian taxes confiscated by Israel after Hamas won the elections to send medical aid.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 5th May, the new Israeli Minister of Defence, Amir Peretz, approves an air raid on Gaza that kills five members of the Popular Resistance Committees, thus continuing the policy of targeted assassination carried out by his predecessor. Peretz likewise pursues the Israeli policy of bombarding the Gaza Strip in response to rocket fire against Israel from the Gaza Strip.

- On 23rd May in Ramallah, the Israeli army arrests Sheikh Ibrahim Hamed, an important Hamas activist. According to Israel, Hamed is the Commander in Chief of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, and it accuses him of having orchestrated a number of suicide bombings that have taken the lives of over 60 Israelis. On 24th May, a secret Israeli operation to arrest Mohammed Shubaki, an important official of the Islamic Jihad, ends in an exchange of gunfire resulting in four Palestinian dead and 50 wounded.

- On 30th May, for the first time since Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in September 2005, the Israeli forces penetrate into the Gaza Strip and kill seven Palestinians in an operation to prevent rocket fire on Israel and to arrest the Islamic Jihad militants sought by Israel. On 26th May, the leader of the Islamic Jihad in southern Lebanon, Mahmoud al-Majzoub, dies in a bomb attack in the port city of Sidon. The Islamic Jihad immediately accuses Israel of being responsible for the attack and swears revenge. The Lebanese Information Minister, Ghazi al-Arudi, denounces the killing. On 28th May, the Israeli air force attacks bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine on Lebanese territory in response to rocket fire from southern Lebanon on northern Israel.
June 2006

Israel

- On 18th June, Lieutenant General al-Hayb, a Bedouin member of the Israeli army, is sentenced to 15 years of prison for espionage on behalf of Hezbollah.

Palestine

- On 5th June, confrontations between Hamas and Fatah cause five deaths. On 6th June, President Mahmoud Abbas gives the Hamas government four more days to accept a political platform implicitly recognising Israel, after which he will opt for organising a referendum on the matter of granting recognition to Israel in order to overcome the political crisis affecting the Palestinian Territories since the election of Hamas in January. On 10th June, Abbas announces a referendum, to be held on 26th July. On 11th June, Hamas qualifies the referendum as a coup d'état against its government and announces it will boycott the vote. On 12th June, Hamas fires rockets against the headquarters of the Preventive Security Service controlled by Fatah, obliging Abbas to declare a state of emergency. On 27th June, Hamas agrees to sign a document of “national entente” implicitly recognising the existence of Israel.

- On 14th June, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mahmud al-Zahhar, announces that he has raised 20 million dollars during a trip to Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, China, Pakistan, Iran and Egypt. On 17th June, the Quartet approves a plan put forth by the EU to renew financial assistance for the Palestinian people, while continuing to boycott the Hamas government.

Peace Negotiations

- On 22nd June, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Abbas hold informal talks in Petra, Jordan, under the aegis of King Abdullah II and Elie Wilson, 1986 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. This is the first official meeting between the two since Olmert became prime minister. Both parties commit to accelerate preparations for a summit within the next few weeks.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 8th June, Jamal Abu Samhada, a leader of the Popular Resistance Committees and Commander of the Hamas paramilitary militia, is killed in an air raid on a Popular Resistance Committee training camp in Rafah.

- On 9th June, an Israeli shell explodes on a beach in Beit Lahiya, in the northern Gaza Strip, killing seven people from a single Palestinian family and wounding 30 other Palestinians. The Israeli Prime Minister apologises for the tragic event whereas on 13th June, the Minister of Defence, Amir Peretz, declares that the accident was due to a defective shell buried in the sand that had exploded and caused the deaths. That same day, Human Rights Watch confirms the theory that it was an Israeli shell.

- On 10th and 11th June, Hamas ends its truce, which had lasted since March 2005, when Hamas militants fire rockets against the Israeli city of Sderot. On 13th June, an Israeli missile targeting a vehicle transporting members of the Islamic Jihad kills eleven Palestinians, two of them children, near Gaza. On 15th June, Hamas offers to reinstate the cease-fire if Israel stops aggressions, a condition which Israel accepts.

- On 20th June, Israel kills three children during an air raid on the Gaza Strip intended to thwart rocket firing.

- On 25th June, a number of Palestinian militants, some of them from the armed wing of Hamas, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, as well as the Popular Resistance Committees, launch an audacious attack against an Israeli army control post near the kibbutz of Kerem Shalom. Two soldiers are killed and a third, Gilad Shalit, captured. The spokesperson of the Palestine Liberation Committees, Abu Mujahid, declares that the attack was committed in response to the assassination of Jamal Abu Samhada on 8th June. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert holds President Mahmoud Abbas and the Hamas administration responsible for the abduction. The government spokesperson, Ghazi Hamad, denies having any knowledge of the abduction and appeals to Palestinian factions not to kill Shalit, whereas President Abbas orders the mobilisation of forces to find him. On 26th June, the factions involved in the abduction demand the release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for information on Shalit. On 28th June, Israel launches a vast land and air offensive on the Gaza Strip, dubbed “Summer Rain,” with the aim of recovering the Israeli soldier. The Israeli forces destroy the only power plant for the Gaza Strip as well as a number of bridges connecting the northern and southern Gaza Strip area, as well as a Hamas training camp. On 29th June, the Popular Resistance Committees threaten to kill a 17-year-old Jewish settler if Israel does not stop its offensive against the Gaza Strip. On 29th June, in an incursion by Israeli forces into the West Bank, 64 Palestinian officials, all members of Hamas, are captured, eight of them ministers and 38 MPs. On the following day, they are brought before Israeli justice on charges of collusion in terrorist acts and incarcerated. On 30th June, Israel cancels the Jerusalem residency permits of four Hamas representatives. On 30th June, the Israeli air force launches a series of raids against the home of the Minister of Home Affairs and National Security, Said Siyam, and against the buildings of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.

July 2006

Israel

- Israel launches a vast army, air force and navy operation against southern Lebanon after two Israeli soldiers are abducted by Hezbollah. This operation is to last until mid-August. (see General Chronology of the Mediterranean)

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 2nd July, Israel increases pressure on the Hamas government to recover Gilad Shalit, the soldier abducted in June, by launching an air attack against the office of the Palestinian Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyeh, destroying it but causing no casualties. Under US pressure, in early July, Israel restores the sale of fuel to the Gaza Strip, which it had cut off after Shalit’s abduction. On 3rd July, the Popular Resistance Committees declare that Israel must release 15,000 Palestinian prisoners by 6AM on 4th
July or they will "close the case" of the Shalit abduction. Olmert's cabinet rejects the ultimatum. After the deadline, the Army of Islam, another faction involved in the abduction, decides to cut off all contact and "close the case." Prime Minister Haniyeh asks the abductors, among them members of his own Hamas party, not to kill Shalit. On 4th July, Palestinians make incursions into the cities of Rafah and Beit Hanoun and fire rockets at Israeli cities along the Gaza Strip. Israeli tanks and troops enter the city of Erez, in the northern area of the Gaza Strip, while shells are fired against neighbouring fields. Palestinian militants fire a rocket covering a record distance of 12 km, reaching the centre of Ashkelon. On 5th July, the Israeli forces continue to advance into the Gaza Strip and take up positions in the two former settlements of Nissamit and Eli Sinai, evacuated in August 2005. On 6th July, twenty Palestinians and one Israeli soldier die in confrontations in the northern Gaza Strip. Seven more Palestinians die on 7th July, while rockets continue to be fired at Israel. Earlier in the day, Hamas had declared that the Israeli soldier would be released in exchange for all women prisoners in Israel as well as 20 men sentenced to long prison terms. For the first time, the Israeli Minister of Public Security, Abraham Dicter, considers the possibility of releasing prisoners. On 7th July, the EU condemns Israeli military action in the Gaza Strip, qualifying it as "disproportionate" and as aggravating the humanitarian crisis. On 9th July, Olmert declares that there will be no negotiation with Hamas on prisoner exchange. On 12th July, Israel steps up its attack, killing twenty Palestinians, nine of them members of a single family, in a residential neighbourhood of Gaza. Israel states that it was aiming to kill Mohammed Deif, leader of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas. On 19th July, thirteen Palestinians are killed in the Maghazi Refugee Camp and Israeli tanks raze a number of buildings in the city of Nablus in the West Bank. On 26th July, The Guardian reports that the Palestinian factions, including Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, under the aegis of President Mahmoud Abbas, have come to an agreement to stop firing rockets and release Shalit in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners. According to the human rights observatory in Palestine, the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, 151 Palestinians have been killed in the course of July in the Gaza Strip, the majority of them civilians.

August 2006

Israel

• On 20th August, the Minister of Justice, Haim Ramon, resigns after being accused of sexual harassment. President Moshe Katsav also faces charges of sexual harassment and on 22nd August, the police confiscate computers and documents from his home.

Palestine

• On 14th August, the Holy Jihad Brigades, a previously unknown group, kidnaps two correspondents from the US television network, Fox News, in Gaza. The kidnappers demand the release of Muslim prisoners in US prisons within 72 hours in exchange for the release of the two correspondents. The US Department of State refuses and demands the immediate and unconditional release of the two journalists. On 27th August, the two correspondents are released.

• On 16th August, President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Haniyeh meet in Gaza to start negotiations on the formation of a government of national unity.

Conflicts between the Parties

• Throughout the month of August, Israel pursues its offensive against the Gaza Strip and Hamas. By early August, Israel had already arrested a third of the Hamas government and over 30 members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. On 6th August, Israel arrests the President of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Abdel Aziz Dweik, in his home in Ramallah and on 19th August, the Israeli army arrests the Palestinian Deputy Prime Minister, Nasser Shaer, at his home in Ramallah. On 31st August, an Israeli military court orders that Dweik and 15 other Hamas representatives in the West Bank be tried for belonging to an illegal group.

September 2006

Israel

• On 4th September, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert authorises the construction of 690 homes in Maale Adumim and Betar Illit, two settlements near Jerusalem.

Palestine

• On 1st September, the international community pledges 500 million dollars in aid to the Palestinians at a meeting of donors in Stockholm. In early September, Palestinian civil servants begin a strike to protest against the non-payment of their salaries by the Hamas government over the past few months. According to the UN World Food Programme, 70% of the people in the Gaza Strip can no longer meet their families' needs.

• On 11th September, President Mahmoud Abbas announces that he has reached an agreement with Hamas on the creation of a government of national unity. The negotiations continue throughout the month. On 15th September, the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers applaud the Palestinian decision. On 16th September, The Economist reports that Fatah and Hamas have reached an agreement on a new official policy based on the proposal adopted by the Arab League in March 2002 on "territories in exchange for peace" to put an end to the Middle East conflict. On 21st September, Abbas declares before the UN General Assembly that the government of national unity shall recognise Israel and endorse previous agreements, but on 22nd September, Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh declares that Hamas has no intention of forming part of a government that recognises Israel.

• On 12th September, an Israeli judge of the military court of Ofer Camp orders the release of 18 Hamas representatives, among them the President of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Abdel Aziz Dweik, and three Ministers, arrested by Israel over the course of the previous two months. On 25th September, a military court of appeals reverses the decision and continues judicial proceedings against the individuals in question. On 27th September, an Israeli mil-
On 21st September, the Financial Times reports that Abbas has launched a new, four-stage plan to renew the peace process with Israel.

Conflicts between the Parties

- The Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip initiated on 25th June continues throughout the month of September. According to The Independent of 8th September, 262 people have been killed, 64 of them children and 26 women since the start of the Israeli operation. On 12th September, a second Israeli soldier loses his life in confrontations with Palestinians. On 15th September, the Brigadier General Jad Tayeh, Head of International Coordination for the Palestinian Intelligence Service, is killed in Gaza.

October 2006

Israel

- On 6th October, the oil exploration company, Ginko, announces that it has discovered oil near the Dead Sea.
- On 15th October, the Minister of Justice and the police issue a joint statement recommending that President Moshe Katsav be prosecuted for rape and aggressions against women.
- On 23rd October, Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel, Our Home), a party that had gained eleven seats in the Knesset (unicameral legislative body) at the last elections in March, joins the government coalition, which now holds 78 seats. On 30th October, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert votes in favour of enlarging the government coalition. In response, the Minister of Science and Technology, Ophir Pines-Paz, member of the Labour Party, resigns, accusing the leaders of Yisrael Beiteinu of racism.

Palestine

- On 1st October, Hamas forces try to stop a demonstration organised by Fatah against the non-payment of the State’s civil servants, ending in confrontations between Fatah and Hamas followers resulting in 8 dead and 50 wounded. The confrontations break out when the Preventive Security Forces, associated with Fatah, attack a Hamas post in Gaza, leading to a counter-attack against the home of the local Fatah leader. These confrontations are the most severe since Hamas was elected in January. President Mahmoud Abbas, leader of Fatah, and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, of Hamas, call for serenity while the leaders from both factions accuse one another of stepping up the violence. On 2nd October, the Gaza Strip returns to tranquility. On 4th October, President Abbas admits having failed in his attempt to form a government of national unity with Hamas and issues a veiled threat to dissolve the government. On 4th October, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, affiliated with Fatah, declares that it aims to kill three high Hamas officials, including Khaled Mashal, Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, based in Damascus, and the Minister of Home Affairs and National Security, Said Siyam. On 6th October, Mohammed Dahlan, a key member of Fatah in Gaza, accuses Hamas of attempting to kill its political rivals and alleges that in the past few months, at least twenty people have been killed. On 10th October, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar goes to Gaza with the aim of forging an agreement between Hamas and Fatah. On 20th October, several armed individuals attack Prime Minister Haniyeh’s convoy on its way through the Nusseirat Refugee Camp, though there are no injuries. On 23rd October, Mohammed Shahadeh, the Commander of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade at the Bureij Refugee Camp, is assassinated. Fatah accuses Hamas.
- On 24th October, a Spanish photographer for the Associated Press is abducted by the Palestinian armed forces and released later in the day. On 30th October, a Spanish humanitarian worker is abducted in Gaza and released the same day.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 12th October, the Israeli forces intensify their offensive against the Gaza Strip. Between 12th and 15th October, 23 Palestinians are killed, including Hamas fighters, in an Israeli operation seeking to prevent rocket fire on Israel from the Gaza Strip and the entrance of arms from Egypt. On 19th October, the International Herald Tribune reports that Israel has discovered a number of tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt used for arms trafficking.

November 2006

Palestine

- On 10th November, Prime Minister Haniyeh, of Hamas, declares that he will resign from his post of it contributes to ending the embargo imposed by the West.
- At a meeting in Cairo on 12th November, the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Arab countries agree to break the international economic blockade imposed on the Palestinians since the entrance into office of the Hamas government in March and to send funds to the Palestinian National Authority.

Peace Negotiations

- On 16th November, France, Italy and Spain disclose a 5-point initiative for peace in the Middle East consisting of: 1) an immediate cease-fire; 2) the formation of an internationally recognised government of national unity; 3) an exchange of prisoners; 4) negotiations between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Olmert; and 5) the establishment of an international mission in the Gaza Strip to enforce the cease-fire.

Conflicts between the Parties

- From 1st to 7th November, the Israeli army launches a major offensive against the city of Beit Hanoun, in the northeastern Gaza Strip, killing at least 50 Palestinians, many of them civilians. Israel declares it has discovered a great number of weapons and destroyed nine rocket launchers. Palestinian agencies censure Israel for having also destroyed homes, orchards, water conduits and electrical cables during the raid. On 6th November, an 18-year-old suicide
bomber detonates himself near Israeli troops in Beit Hanoun, killing no-one. The Islamic Jihad claims authorship for the attack. On 8th November, 19 Palestinians, eight of them children and seven women, along with 13 members of a single family, are killed by an Israeli shell in the residential area of Beit Hanoun. The following day, Prime Minister Olmert announces that the blunder was caused by a technical error and starts an investigation. Abbas qualifies this act as an “ignoble crime” and declares that the Israelis do not seek peace and will therefore have to bear the consequences. On 12th November, the United States vetos a United Nations Resolution backed by the Arab countries calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and condemning the Israeli attack. On 15th November, an Israeli woman is killed by a Palestinian rocket in Sderot. On 20th November, Israel is obliged to cancel two attacks after Palestinian civilians form a “human shield” in Beit Lahia around the homes of Mohammed Baroud, local leader of the Popular Resistance Committees, and Mohammed Nawajeh, a Hamas member, both of whom had been given 30 minutes to evacuate their homes before bombardment. On 22nd November, Israeli tanks re-enter the Gaza Strip and two members of Hamas die in confrontations with the Israeli soldiers. On 23rd November, eight Palestinians die in Israeli military operations in the northern Gaza Strip. A 64-year-old Palestinian woman commits a suicide bombing claimed by Hamas in the Jabaliya Refugee Camp, slightly wounding two Israeli soldiers. On 26th November, a cease-fire begins between Israeli and Palestinian militants. Israel withdraws its troops from the northern Gaza Strip and Abbas orders the security forces to patrol the border of the Gaza Strip to prevent all rocket fire. Certain militants, among them the Islamic Jihad, declare that they do not accept the cease-fire. The Israeli Prime Minister calls for restraint when several rockets are fired on Israel from the Gaza Strip after the onset of the cease-fire. On 27th November, Olmert states that he is willing to release a number of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the Israeli soldier abducted in June and adds that there are several positive points in the Beirut Declaration of March 2002, which promised the recognition of Israel in exchange for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders.

December 2006

Israel

- On 11th December, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert inadvertently admits in an interview on the German N24 station that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, putting an end to decades of a “strategic ambiguity” policy.
- On 15th December, the UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1729 (2006), extending the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), stationed in the Golan Heights, for another six months.

Palestine

- On 3rd December, Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh undertakes his first trip abroad since his party, Hamas, won elections in January. On 8th December, he arrives in Iran, where he declares that Hamas will never recognise Israel and will continue to struggle until it liberates Jerusalem. On 13th December, Bassam al-Farah, a member of Hamas, is assassinated in Khan Yunis. Hamas accuses Fatah of being responsible for his death. On 14th December, the Israeli government refuses to allow Haniyeh to enter the Gaza Strip at the Rafah Crossing Point with a suitcase full of money raised on his visits to Syria, Iran, Qatar and Sudan. In response, hundreds of Hamas supporters turn up and confrontations break out between Hamas and Fatah security forces and thereafter between Hamas combatants and Egyptian security forces. Haniyeh is finally authorised to enter the Gaza Strip after having deposited the money in an Egyptian bank. On 11th December, tension between Fatah and Hamas intensifies when armed individuals kill the three children of Colonel Bahia Balousha, member of the intelligence services under Fatah. On 16th December, President Mahmoud Abbas announces that he would like to hold early legislative and presidential elections in order to end the political crisis causing strife among the Palestinian factions, but adds that forming a government of national unity remains his priority to end inter-party tension and international economic sanctions. Hamas leaders are opposed to holding legislative elections. Abbas’ proposals cause an increase in violence on 17th December and President Abbas and Ahmad Baher, President of the Palestinian Legislative Council, call for serenity following an attack against the Presidential Guard, the capture of two Ministers, an attack on Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahhar’s convoy and an attack on President Abbas’ home and office in Gaza. On 18th December, British Prime Minister Tony Blair expresses his support for Abbas. On 19th December, Prime Minister Haniyeh accuses the US government of trying to overthrow the Hamas administration. That same day, four Palestinians die in confrontations between Hamas and Fatah. On 29th December, Israel accepts Egypt’s delivering arms for Abbas’ Presidential Guard.

Peace Negotiations

- On 7th December, the United Nations and its partners make an appeal to raise 454 million dollars in order to deal with the humanitarian crisis ravaging the Palestinian Territories.
- On 29th December, the human rights organisation, Israeli B’Tselem, asserts that the number of Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip rises to 660 for the year 2006, 332 of them civilians and 141 minors, whereas the Palestinians have killed 17 Israeli civilians, one of them a minor and six members of the Israeli security forces.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 23rd December, Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas meet at Olmert’s residence in Jerusalem for their first official meeting. On 25th December, upon request of Abbas, Olmert approves the withdrawal of 27 of the 400 military control points in the West Bank and promises immediate measures to improve the circulation of goods to and from the Gaza Strip. Israel likewise agrees to release 30% of the Palestinian funds in its possession, but only for humanitarian ends. These Israeli measures are intended to support Abbas in his struggle against Hamas.

- On 26th December, the Islamic Jihad fires eight rockets at Israel, one of them striking the city of Sderot and wounding a young Israeli. On 27th December, the Israeli government orders the renewal of targeted strikes against the militants shooting rockets from the Gaza Strip, but declares that it will otherwise keep the cease-fire.
Chronology of the Barcelona Process

January 2006

12th January 2006
Austrian Presidency

Brussels: The priorities of the Austrian Presidency of the EU include the strengthening of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the consolidation of the Barcelona Process, as well as the implementation of the Association Agreements with Algeria and the continuation of dialogue with Syria.


12th/13th January 2006

Industrial Cooperation


16th/17th January 2006

Politics and Security

Brussels: Meeting of the Senior Officials of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership where they discuss the implementation of the Five-Year Work Programme adopted in Barcelona and of the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism. Other issues discussed are the follow-up of the three Media seminars concluded in Barcelona on November 2005 and the setting up of a Euro-Med Media Task Force.

16th/17th January 2006

Euromed Committee

Brussels: During the meeting the main priorities of the Austrian Presidency in Chapters I and II of the Five-Year Work Programme Plan are presented. The Committee deals with the activities and events planned for the first semester of 2006 and make an evaluation on the progress of the Anna Lindh Foundation.

16th January 2006

MEDA/Transport

Brussels: The European Commission launches the “Motorways of the Sea” project, financed with 4.8m euros and concerning Mediterranean partners. This project aims to encourage the development of intermodal transport in the region and intermodal integration through land connections and land-sea platforms.

16th/20th January 2006

Politics and Security

Malta: The EuroMed Police Regional Seminar on “The Fight against Money Laundering” aims at reinforcing Euro-Mediterranean Police cooperation on regional matters such as cross-border cash trafficking, the role of specialised police in fighting money laundering and alternative electronic money transferring.

20th January 2006

Neighbourhood

Athens: First Meeting of the Short and Medium-term Priority Environmental Action Programme (SMAP) Working Group on the future of the SMAP correspondents’ Network in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy and new developments such as the initiative for the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea. SMAP is a MEDA-funded regional programme for environment managed by EuropeAid and EC.

22nd/26th January 2006

Terrorism

Amman: EuroMed Police Regional Seminar on “The Fight against Terrorism”, organised in the framework of the MEDA-funded Regional Police Cooperation Project which aims at facilitating police cooperation on regional matters linked with terrorism such as radicalisation, recruitment, financing, prevention, repression and coordination among the various services dedicated to fighting terrorism.

26th/27th January 2006

Statistical Cooperation

Luxembourg: Launch of MEDSTAT II, a regional programme on statistical Cooperation which aims to improve the quality of statistical data in the Mediterranean Partner countries.

27th/29th January 2006

Higher Education

Catania: The third Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Higher Education aims to ensure greater convergence among the various university systems in the Mediterranean region. The conference approves a final Declaration in which education is recognised as a driving force for the development of human resources and dialogue among cultures.

30th January 2006

Parliamentary Assembly

Lisbon: Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs, Social Affairs and Education to exchange views on the measures in which education contributes to economic development;
February 2006

6th February 2006
MEDA Maghreb
Rome: The EU member States as well as the representatives of Maghreb countries eligible for MEDOCC (regional programme for the Western Mediterranean) meet in order to present the state of ongoing projects financed by MEDOCC and to discuss the next stages of the MEDA-Neighbourhood Programme aiming at financially supporting the participation of the Maghreb region in the INTERREG-MEDOCC Project.
www.interreg-medocc.org/fr/home.html

21st February 2006
Media
Brussels: Launching of the MEDA Regional Project dedicated to the training of MEDA journalists. The purpose of this project is to reinforce the capacity of the written press and electronic media journalists from the MEDA countries, and to help them increase their production of news and other materials on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

22nd February 2006
Politics and Security
Brussels: Meeting of the Senior Officials of the Euro-Mediterranean. During the meeting, the Senior Officials participating spend a long time discussing on the “cartoons controversy” and exchange their views along with the EU High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, who informs them about the organisation of the “Xenophobia and Racism in the Media” seminar.

22nd February 2006
Euromed Committee
Brussels: The meeting focuses on the “cartoons controversy”. The Commission presents a Decalogue of ideas to involve Euro-Mediterranean networks in the strengthening of intercultural dialogue. Spain and Turkey present an evaluation of the Alliance of Civilizations Project, while the Ministerial Conference on Trade, planned for March, is presented.

23rd February 2006
Education
Sibline: Launching of an education programme to improve access to employment for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The project, within the framework of the MEDA programme, is aimed at enabling access to employment by improving UNRWA’s education system through its network of primary and secondary schools.

27th February 2006
Ministerial Meeting
Brussels: The meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council expresses deep concern at the events that followed the publication of cartoons in European media. It backs freedom of expression and strongly condemns all violent acts and threats. At the same time, the Council acknowledges and regrets that they were considered offensive by Muslims all over the world. The Ministers will actively promote dialogue, mutual understanding and respect through the existing mechanisms including the Barcelona Process and the Anna Lindh Foundation.

March 2006

2nd March 2006
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA)
Brussels: Presentation of the final report for Phase 2 of the gradual establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. An independent sustainability impact assessment (SIA) study of EMFTA carried out by external agents is expected to help the EC and its Partners to examine the potential impacts of agreed trade measures on sustainable development. The commission will define priority areas on which the SIA should concentrate under Phase 3, with particular consideration for the most sensitive sectors.

7th / 8th March 2006
Neighbourhood
Rome: The EC launches a consultation process to discuss the future European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). This conference aims to present to the ENPI stakeholders the proposed programming framework and the main elements of the ENPI strategy for ENPI. The four future CBC programmes are: the Multilateral Mediterranean Programme, Multilateral Black Sea, Spain/Morocco and Italy/Tunisia. This event has brought together representatives of the Member States and the 14 countries of the Neighbourhood and Russia in order to discuss the CBC 2007-2013 planning.

9th/11th March 2006
Euromed Audiovisual
Rabat: Meeting of the EUROMED Audiovisual II Programme that aims at enhancing audiovisual cooperation between Europe and MEDA countries by developing, distributing and promoting Mediterranean movies in Europe and within the 10 MEDA partners.

14th March 2006
Politics and Security
Brussels: Presentation of the actions carried out under the EuroMed Civil Protection Programme. During the meeting, the Senior Officials in the Barcelona Process also present a more ambitious long-term programme that would enable support and improved information for the Mediterranean populations in the event of catastrophes of natural or technological origin thus developing a real civil protection culture in the event of a crisis.

15th March 2006
Euromed Committee
Brussels: The Austrian Presidency announces its decision to prepare a report presenting the different cultural initiatives. The meeting also deals with the implementation of the Five-Year Work Programme and the activities for promoting intercultural dialogue. Finally, a symbolic decision is taken from now on the Board of Governors of the Anna Lindh Foundation will be chaired by a representative from a Southern Partner State.
16th March 2006

Rule of Origin

Brussels: Fifth Meeting of the Pan-Euro-Med Working Group on Rules of Origin addresses a number of practical issues related to the implementation of the system of pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation of origin. Participants include representatives from the customs administrations and other relevant ministries from all Mediterranean Partner countries, as well as Romania, Bulgaria, the EFTA countries and the Faeroe Islands.

19th/22nd March 2006

Health

Cairo: European Union Experts visit Egypt to offer first-hand assistance to fight against bird flu which was officially declared in Egypt in February. Training sessions for Egyptian officers are organized on measures and policies implemented in the EU for avian flu containment, as regards avoiding human contamination and restricting the spread of the flu.

20th/21st March 2006

FEMIP

Vienna: During this preliminary meeting at expert level to prepare the 6th Ministerial Meeting of the European Investment Bank (EIB)'s facility for FEMIP, a think-tank has been set up, gathering delegates from finance ministries, technical ministries, public institutions, academic circles and private companies. The Experts' Committee is charged with the task of putting forward practical and operational recommendations on sectorial issues which FEMIP can help implement.

20th/21st March 2006

FEMIP

Vienna: In order to further develop a Mediterranean Energy Market, experts from EU and Mediterranean Partner countries encourage renewable energy and energy efficiency. Energy issues are of a geo-political and socio-economic nature. Sources are unequally distributed between countries; therefore, this situation represents a possible field for cooperation and a major threat to stability in the area.

22nd/23rd March 2006

Science & Technology Cooperation

Paris: The closing conference of the Euro-MEDANet/ Euro-MEDANet2 projects aims at reviewing the Euro-Mediterranean S&T cooperation and lay down the foundation for better coordinated cooperation in the future. The two projects will end with the inauguration of seven Information Points (InPs) on the eastern and southern rim of the Mediterranean that will disseminate information about the S&T cooperation and funding opportunities by the European commission.

www.euromedanet.gr

23rd March 2006

Health

Brussels: After the confirmation from Israeli authorities of an outbreak of avian flu in the country, the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health endorses a Commission proposal to ban imports of live poultry, poultry meat, poultry products and eggs from Israel.

24th March 2006

Trade

Marrakech: 5th Euro-Med Trade Conference to foster trade and economic relations across the Mediterranean. During the Euro-Mediterranean Trade Conference, the Trade Ministers reinforce their commitment to create the EMFTA by 2010 and to foster trade and economic relations across the Mediterranean with the formal opening of negotiations on the liberalisation of trade in services and investments between Europe and a first group of Mediterranean countries. Along with these topics, ministers also examine ways and means to reinforce south-south regional integration.

http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/euromed/pr240306_en.htm

26th/27th March 2006

EMPA

Rabat: The President of the EMPA, Josep Borrell, states that Europe’s major challenge in the years ahead will be its relations with the Muslim world. He also regrets the Danish cartoons incident and reiterates that freedom of expression is a central value of the Barcelona Declaration. Despite the "gaping wound" of the Israel-Palestine conflict, which has always been the Achilles' heel of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, he insists on replacing an atmosphere of confrontation with one of dialogue. The EMPA ends with a call to the future Palestinian and Israeli governments to respect past commitments regarding the peace process.

At the end of the Assembly, President Borrell hands over the gavel to the Tunisian parliamentary Mr. Fouad Mebazaa.

www.europarl.eu.int/president/defaulten.htm

27th/31st March 2006

Terrorism

Brussels: Closing Seminar of a regional police cooperation project financed by MEDA that aimed at strengthening the Euro-Mediterranean police cooperation on regional matters. The actions undertaken have dealt with terrorism, money laundering, narcotics, human trafficking, cyber criminality and the use of new communications technologies by terrorist groups. The seminar also presented developments in European legislation as regards to fighting terrorism.

29th March 2006

EuroMed Heritage

London: Closing stages of the EuroMed Heritage II Project and launch of the multilingual interactive website and database www.med-voices.org. During the event, the project showcases the films and documentaries that have been created in and about partner cities and presents some of the ongoing work from around the Mediterranean.

www.med-voices.org

30th March 2006

FEMIP

Beirut: The EIB participates with 10 million euros in the setting of the Euro-Mina Fund focused on investments in mid-market companies in the Mediterranean countries, aiming at sectors in which to build regional groups:


30th March 2006

Journalism

Alexandria: The Anna Lindh Foundation
and the International Federation of Journalists call for a journalist award that aims at encouraging journalism that contributes to the dialogue between cultures and people by spreading awareness of diversity.

April 2006

1st April 2006
Association Agreement: EU-Lebanon Brussels: The Association Agreement between EU and Lebanon enters into force. The Association Agreement, signed in 2002, sets out the principles governing political and economic relations. It is also considered a first step in Lebanon’s participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The EU-Lebanon negotiations on ENP Action start on 6th April.

6th/7th April 2006
Education
Turin: The Annual Forum of the MEDA regional project “Education and Training for Employment” (MEDA-ETE) provides a cooperation framework for Euromed partners, encourages the exchange of experiences and good practices in the fields of Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and employment, while it also facilitates network building for further cooperation among stakeholders in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

7th April 2006
Energy
Brussels: First meeting of the Maghreb Electricity Group as part of the regional Neighbourhood programme with the aim of creating an integrated electricity market between three North African countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) and the European Union.

10th/11th April 2006
Water
Amman: In the framework of the “MEDA-Water” programme, a two-day sectoral workshop for MEDA water projects is organised in Amman. The objective of the workshop is to exchange information on project methodologies and results and to discuss ways of strengthening cooperation on wastewater and/or wastewater reuse.

www.emwis.org/MEDA/meda_water.htm

20th April 2006
Lebanon
Brussels: The first EU-Lebanon Association Council is warmly welcomed by the Austrian EU Council Presidency and the Republic of Lebanon as a new era in their bilateral relations to deepen the existing political, cultural, social and economic ties. The Association Agreement entered into force on the 1st of April and will bring a significant contribution to Lebanon’s endeavours in reforming its economy and strengthening its democratic system.

20th April 2006
Euromed Cinemas
Rabat: Euromed Cinemas is one of the twelve projects implemented by the Euromed Audiovisual regional programme, managed by the Delegation of the European Commission in Morocco. The objective of the project is to encourage the promotion and distribution of Mediterranean and European films in the Partner countries, as well as Mediterranean films in the 25 countries of the EU
www.europacineams.com/fr/programmes/euromed/index.php

24th/26th April 2006
ENPI
Brussels: The European Commission organises a meeting to discuss the contents of the Cross-border Cooperation programmes. The CBC is a component of the ENPI, which aims at reinforcing cooperation with territories bordering the European Union and it will finance joint programmes bringing together Member States and Partner Countries sharing a common border. The CBC will be cofinanced by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).


24th/25th April 2006
EuroMeSco
Paris: The Euro-Mediterranean Network of Strategic Research and Foreign Policy Institutes holds its preparatory meeting on “Democracy and Inclusion” to address the influence of migrant communities on political reforms in the Mediterranean area. EuroMeSco’s main aim is to disseminate research done by the institutes affiliated to the network for the construction of peace and stability in the Mediterranean area.

www.euromescosnet/euromescosmatriz.asp

25th April 2006
Tourism
Malta: Within the EUMEDIS regional MEDA programme, the “MEDINA” project is aiming at promoting cultural tourism in the Mediterranean area through the development of a Portal and nine national sites (Algeria, Cyprus, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia).

www.medina-project.net

27th April 2006
Anna Lindh Foundation
Brussels: First Board Meeting of the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures. The Jordanian President calls upon the 35 Governments of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to support and activate the national networks of the Anna Lindh Foundation in order to develop a series of concrete and visible activities to build understanding and respect for differences.

www.euromedalex.org

May 2006

3rd May 2006
Fishery
Brussels: The Fisheries Committee gives the go-ahead to an EU-Morocco Agreement despite the reservations of some members of the European Parliament about its international ramifications regarding Western Sahara. The fishing agreement with Morocco covers 119 vessels, and includes a 60,000 ton quota for industrial pelagic fishing for several Northern European fleets. The Committee votes to add a paragraph ensuring that “in the event of evidence that the use to which the Agreement is being put is in contravention of international obligations, the Commis-
sion shall take immediate steps to suspend the Agreement." This addition refers to the relationship between Morocco and Western Sahara.

4th/5th May 2006

Security

Vienna: Representatives from more than 50 countries and international organisations including neighbouring Arab countries participate in the Ministerial Conference. The participants express their wish to develop a “Partnership for Security” and emphasize the coherent framework offered by the ENP for cooperation on security-related matters. Concrete measures and actions are identified in three priority areas: combating terrorism, organised crime and corruption and migration.

5th/8th May 2006

Training

Malta: The Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies leads the Information & Training Seminar for Euro-Mediterranean Diplomats belonging to the 35 partner Countries. The primary objective of the Seminar is familiarization with the Euro-Mediterranean Process; other areas are examined such as: the EU institutional setting and decision-making patterns, the question on how to deal with the EU in practical terms, presentations of the Euromed Partnership Five-year Work Programme, the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism and education and socio-cultural exchanges in the region.

www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/seminar20/programme.htm

6th May 2006

EMPA

Tunis: The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly reiterates its warning against the chaos which would result from cutting aid to Palestinian people, after the EU decision to suspend aid to the Palestinian Authority. The Bureau also engages in a wide-ranging discussion on human rights in which the President raises the status of the Tunisian Human Rights League, which continues to face severe restrictions in attempting to carry out its work.

www.europarl.europa.eu/president/default.htm

15th May 2006

Water

Nice: The 9th Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Information System on the Know-How in the Water Sector – EMWIS is held in the framework of the regional MEDA programme on local water management. During the Meeting the participants of 13 countries define the thematic priorities of EMWIS for the 2007-2010 period and the Terms of Feasibility of the Mediterranean Water Observatory.

www.emwis.org/documents/html/9th_s_c__06.htm

15th May 2006

EU-Egypt

Brussels: The EU expresses its concern following the prolongation of the State of Emergency in Egypt. The government of Egypt states that it won’t be used against political opponents but only to combat terrorism. The EU is also worried about the ongoing disciplinary proceedings against two Egyptian judges for criticism regarding the conduct of the Egyptian Parliamentary elections of 2005 and recalls the pledges of political reforms contained in the election programme of President Mubarak in 2005, especially the promise to lift the State of Emergency.

www.eu2006.at/en/News/CFSP_Statements/May/1505Egypt.html

16th May 2006

Association Agreement EU-Algeria

Brussels: First Association Council meeting with Algeria. During the meeting, the Council endorses the political decision to establish the work programme for implementation of the various sections of Association Agreement. The meeting identifies possible areas of cooperation: administrative reforms, economy, movements of persons, education, research, energy and the fight against terrorism. The Council notes the good conditions in which the trade section of the Association agreement is implemented and that since the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Algeria has received an overall amount of 560 million euros to finance technical assistance projects to support socio-economic development and structural adjustment.

16th May 2006

Euromed Market

Brussels: The Closing Conference of the Euromed Market Regional Programme brings together Euromed Market focal points, senior officials from ministries and representatives of the European Commission. Each of the ten Mediterranean Partners presents an evaluation of Euromed Market’s third phase, which saw a large number of regional and intra regional information and training seminars to continue preparation work for the EMFTA. The participants also select six priority areas in order to deepen and consolidate their knowledge during a continuation of the present programme under the ENP: customs, taxations and rules of origin; public procurement, free movements of goods, competition rules, intellectual property rights and protection of personal data and electronic commerce.

www.euromedmarket.org

www.epa.nl

18th May 2006

EU-Egypt Relations ENP

Brussels: The Egyptian authorities have requested direct co-operation with a counterpart in any of the 25 Member States in the areas of tourism and maritime transport. These two projects confirm Egypt’s willingness to reform and to approximate EU legislation and best practices. This is the first materialisation of the Neighbourhood Policy for Egypt, whose Action Plan will be approved soon.

19th May 2006

EU-Syria

Brussels: The EU regrets that the positive steps taken in January 2006 regarding the human rights situation in Syria have not been continued and expresses its deep concern about the recent widespread harassment of human rights defenders and peaceful political activists, in particular arbitrary arrests and repeated incommunicado detention.


22nd/23rd May 2006

Media

Vienna: Seminar on Racism, Xenophobia and the Media: Towards Respect
and Understanding of All Religions and Cultures". After the trilogy of regional conference in 2005 and the task force meeting during February 2006, during this seminar the participants discuss and suggest actions and activities to tackle the shared problem of racism or hate discourse and the issue of religious and cultural diversity in the media. The seminar has considerable domestic and international visibility. The need for intercultural and inter-religious dialogue is expressed both by the Austrian State Secretary, Hans Winkler, and the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who also calls for action urging the media to fully engage in the fight for mutual respect and understanding. Beate Winkler, director of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia stresses the importance of dialogue between media, civil society, faith groups and policy makers as the only way to eradicate racism.


29th /31st May 2006
Tourism
Tunis: Final Symposium of the MEDINA project aiming at promoting cultural tourism in the Mediterranean area. The Symposium is the occasion to present the activities carried out and the results obtained within the project.
www.imednet.it

29th /31st May 2006
Media
Brussels: First Activity of the "Europe for Mediterranean Journalists" Project. It aims to raise awareness of EU activity in the Mediterranean countries by empowering journalists to have greater, more informed knowledge when they present EuroMed Partnership-related information to their audiences. It also aims to create a network among journalists in the region. Sixty editors of the main Mediterranean media organisations have been invited and they participate also in a special session with leading journalists, broadcasters and publishers to discuss recent events and their impact on the work of the media in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

30th May 2006
Politics and Security
Brussels: The Senior Officials of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, during their 62nd Meeting, discuss the working methods of the EMP on the basis of Partners’ proposals. These proposals concentrate on enhanced co-ownership of the EMP, increased awareness of the EMP amongst public opinion, civil society and media.

31st May 2006
Twinning project EU-Lebanon
Beirut: launching of three institutional twinning projects, in the framework of the Association Agreement with Lebanon entered into force on April 1st 2006, involving the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy. The projects will deal with consumer protection, institution building and modernisation of petroleum warehousing operations.

June 2006

1st June 2006
Intercultural Dialogue
Brussels: The European Parliament welcomes the European Commission’s proposal to declare 2008 “European Year of International Cultural Dialogue”. MEPs are keen to bring intercultural dialogue into the mainstream of Community policies. The campaign should highlight the contribution of different cultures to Europe’s Heritage and lifestyles. 2008 should be concluded with an Intercultural Forum in the European Parliament bringing together civil society and political and religious representatives.


1st June 2006
SAFEMED
Brussels: The Regional MEDA programme “Euromed Cooperation on Maritime Safety and Prevention of Pollution from Ships” (SAFEMED) launches its new website: www.safemed-project.org. The primary objective of the project is to mitigate the existing imbalance in the application of maritime legislation in the region between the EU Member States and Mediterranean partners that are not members of the EU.

www.safemed-project.org

1st/2nd June 2006
Eurocities
Fes: The meeting of Eurocities EuroMed Working Group deals with the progress of the Group’s initiatives and new cooperation projects within the framework of the MED-Pact programme, training stages within the context of bilateral exchanges, and the promotion of dialogue in the Mediterranean region.

www.eurocities.org/main.php

6th/7th June 2006
Neighbourhood
Brussels: During the 10th Euro-Mediterranean Economic Transition Seminar, European Commissioner for external Relations and ENP, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, highlights how the ENP can bring neighbours closer and give them a stake in the internal EU market. She affirms that the core principle of the ENP is to extend the prosperity, stability and security enjoyed by the EU’s members to neighbouring countries and the jointly agreed Action Plans signed with each country offer the opportunity to build a qualitatively better relationship with the EU. The ENP complements the Association Agreements of the Barcelona Process by strengthening bilateral relations.


7th June 2006
EMPA
Brussels: MPs from Europe and the Arab world who are members of the Political Committee of the EMPA meet to call for the swift creation of the planned international fund to provide aid to the Palestinian people, based on the European commission blueprint, through a "temporary international mechanism." They argue that the decision to suspend direct aid to the Palestinian Authority was taken hastily.
8th June 2006
European Commission
Brussels: The European Commission adopts proposals in order to strengthen the Union’s role as a global actor. The president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Durão Barroso, states that the EU can have a greater impact by acting collectively. http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleaseAction.do?reference=IP/06/752&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

10th/12th June 2006
Health
Malaga: The Euro-Mediterranean Internet-Satellite Platform for Health, Education and Research (EMISPHER) is presented at the high level European eHealth Conference organised by Spanish health authorities and the Austrian EU-Health Presidency that gathers more than 900 experts, representatives from industry and authorities in the field of health, information and innovation technologies.

11th/12th June 2006
EUMEDIS
Alexandria: Final International Conference of the Euro-Mediterranean Information Society (EUMEDIS). The Conference takes place under the auspices of the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of Egypt that was created to facilitate Egypt’s transition into the global Information Society. The conference promotes pilot project outputs providing opportunities for continued efforts in the field. The 300 participants from 24 countries around the Mediterranean work together in 4 workshops dedicated to the ICT environment: the improvement of intercultural dialogue, benefits of this technology for the population, news aspects of intellectual property rights and collaboration with private actors.
www.eumedisconference.org

13th June 2006
EU-Egypt
Luxembourg: 2nd EU-Egypt Association Council. During the Council, the participants discuss the current state of EU-Egypt relations regarding the implementation of the Association Agreement and future prospects relating to the Action Plan.

13th June 2006
Med Committee
Brussels: The member states give a favourable opinion on national Financing Plans (NFP) 2006 for Morocco and Jordan, as well as part II and III of the Neighbourhood Regional Financing Plan (2006). The NFP for Morocco consists of four programmes for a total amount of 123 million among which 2/3 are dedicated to an ambitious support programme for fiscal reform.

13th/14th June 2006
Environment
Amman: MEDSTAT ENVIRONMENT II Final Forum puts the emphasis on three specific topics: air pollutant emission, biodiversity and the calculation of environmental indicators for sustainable development. During the Final Forum the 2005 regional compendium on environmental statistics in the Mediterranean countries is also presented.

14th/15th June 2006
Women
Rabat: The Preparatory Conference “Towards a Plan of Action on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society” brings together 130 civil society organisations, governments, parliaments and donors representatives of Euromed partner countries. The object of the conference is to review key aspects of women’s and gender issues under three themes: human rights and democracy, economic status and social participation and cultural issues. The aim is to contribute to the preparation of the plan of action to be endorsed by the Euromed Ministerial Conference of Istanbul.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external-relations/euromed/women/index.htm

15th June 2006
Human Rights
Brussels: The EU expresses its concern at the events surrounding the obstruction of the 6th congress of the Tunisian Human Rights League in May 2006. The EU hopes that the League will be able to resume its normal functions as soon as possible and regrets that European representatives have been subjected to harassment by the security forces. The European Parliament also adopts a resolution on the human rights situation in Tunisia; it expects explication for the ban imposed on the Congress of the League, which is considered to be the first Arab and African Human Rights League and one of the pillars of independent civil society in Tunisia, and reiterates its request to the Council and Commission to organise a meeting of the Association Council in order to discuss the human rights situation in Tunisia. www.eu2006.at/en/News/Press_Releases/June/1606Tunisia.html

15th June 2006
Syria
Strasbourg: The European Parliament adopts a resolution on human rights violation in Syria, where it calls for the immediate release of all activists still detained for signing a petition for improved Syrian-Lebanese relations, of all prisoners of conscience. The MEPs call on Syria to respect its commitments within the framework of the Barcelona Process and along the lines of the ENP.

15th/16th June 2006
Peace Process and Lebanon
Brussels: The European Council endorses the proposed temporary international mechanism drawn up by the commission; it also calls on Palestinian political forces to engage in a national dialogue and to establish law and order. The EC also calls on Israel to desist from any action threatening the viability of a two-state solution or contrary to international law. In its declaration on Lebanon, the European Council reaffirms the importance of sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and independence and reiterates its call for Security Council Resolution 1559 to be fully implemented. It also urges the Lebanese government to undertake the agreed economic and political reforms. The implementation of the action plan in the ENP framework will assist the reform process in the country.

17th June 2006
Quartet
Brussels: The Quartet (EU, US, UN and Russia) endorses a European Union proposal for a temporary international mechanism. The mechanism facilitates needs-based assistance to the Palestinian
people, including essential equipment, supplies and support for health services.

23rd June 2006
Palestine
Brussels: The European Commission announces that it will make a contribution of €105m to the Temporary International Mechanism for the Palestinians. This Mechanism was developed by the EU at the request of the Quartet and endorsed by the European Council; it will facilitate the delivery of assistance to the Palestinian people without the money passing through the PA government.


25th/26th June 2006
ECOFIN/FEMIP
Tunis: The joint 2nd Euromed ECOFIN/FEMIP Ministerial meeting takes place in Tunis under the Austrian Presidency hosted by the Tunisian authorities. The Finance Ministers of the 25 EU Member States and the 10 Mediterranean Partner Countries take part in the meeting as well as representatives of the European Commission and other international institutions dealing with economic and financial matters.

July 2006
6th July 2006
Euromed Market
Brussels: Representatives of the 10 MEDA partner countries and representatives of the EU Member States and EC services concerned, discuss the content of four main domains: Customs, Taxation and Rules of Origin, Public Procurement, Competition and Intellectual Property Rights.

www.euromedmarket.org

6th July 2006
Foreign Policy
Strasbourg: The European Parliament adopts three reports on three instruments laying down the provisions for the financing of EU foreign policy under the 2007-2013 financial perspectives.

10th/11th July 2006
Migration
Rabat: Euro-Africa Conference on Migration and Development. The EU and West, Central and North African countries discuss concrete ways to ensure migration flows are effectively managed and that migration positively contributes to the development progress of countries of origin, transit and destination. External Relations and ENP Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner underlines the need to intensify action and cooperation especially in border controls, legal migration and the rights of migrants and asylum seekers. The EU Council President Tuomioja notes the increasing link between migration and development and finally the Vice-President Frattini affirms the need for a common global strategy to tackle migration.

11th July 2006
Finnish Presidency
Brussels: The priorities of the Finnish EU Council Presidency are presented during the 63rd Euromed Senior Officials Meeting: Middle East crisis, the ENP, the Barcelona Process and migration. The Finnish Presidency became effective as of 1st July. The Council President, Erkki Tuomioja, says that the developments of the previous week complicated the launch of the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) but in response to an urgent appeal from the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, the TIM is providing fuel for hospitals in Gaza.


August 2006
28th August – 7th September 2006
Cinema
Venice: The first Training Seminar for Cinema Distribution and Exhibition Professionals from the MEDA countries takes place during the celebrated Venice Film Festival. The training included formal lectures on economics, digital technology and a wide variety of hands-on case studies. The profiles of the participants from Israel, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Morocco ranged from top executives of cinema consortia to entrepreneurs in the process of opening art-house cinemas.


September 2006
4th September 2006
Lebanon
Strasbourg: First Plenary Session of the European Parliament after the summer recess. The EP President Borrell recalls the Parliament’s call on the 20th July for immediate ceasefire of the war in Lebanon and the declaration agreed by the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly noting that it was “the first time that European and Arab political decision-makers had issued a joint declaration on the crisis”


5th September 2006
Environment
Brussels: The European Commission proposes a long-term environmental strategy for cleaning up and protecting the Mediterranean Sea. The major oil spill that occurred during the recent conflict in Lebanon has dramatically highlighted the vulnerability of the region’s environment. The proposed strategy aims to revitalise and strengthen cooperation between the EU, its Mediterranean neighbours and international organisations.

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/med/index.htm

6th September 2006
UNIFIL
Strasbourg: The European Parliament adopts a resolution welcoming the UN decision to send 15,000 troops to southern Lebanon. MEPs stressed that UNIFIL should have a clear mandate and rules of engagement.


7th September 2006
Euromed Fund
Milan: A new Euromed Fund is launched in Milan to encourage investment in small and medium-sized enterprises in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and other Mediterranean Partner Countries. The European Investment Bank (EIB) is participating in the launch of the Euromed Fund with €10m, under its facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP).

www.eib.org/site/index.asp?designation=med
11th/20th September 2006

Transport

Paris/London: Seminar/Study Tour on the Railway Acquis. During this week-long seminar organised in the framework of the Euromed Transport Project, MEDA representatives from transport Ministries and railway operators discuss EU legislation in the sector, as well as implementation issues and best practices. Participants in the seminar include officials from the EC, the Arab Maghreb Union and the World Bank.

www.euromedtransport.org

14th/15th September 2006

Environment

Brussels: Preparatory meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Environment Ministers’ conference. It includes a particular presentation of the “Environmental Strategy for the Mediterranean” prepared by the Commission as well as discussions on the “Horizon 2020” timetable and coordination mechanisms. The findings of an external evaluation of the SMAP, the regional MEDA-funded environmental programme, are also presented. The results and achievements of the programme are found to be positive.


15th September 2006

Refugees

Brussels: The European Commission announces that it will provide other €10m for the Sahrawi refugees living in camps in south-west Algeria. The aid is to be channelled through the Humanitarian Aid Department and represents the expression of European solidarity for the victims of this ‘forgotten crisis’.

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/field/algeria/index_en.htm

15th September 2006

Lebanon

Brussels: EU Foreign Ministers reiterate EU’s commitments to Lebanon and ask for a report on a possible EU contribution to implementation of UN resolution 1701 on the Lebanon-Syria border. The Foreign Ministers commit themselves to promoting progress towards the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/previousFocus.ASP?lang=en&focusID=135&1=go&keyWord

15th September 2006

Neighbourhood

Brussels: Meeting on the Cross Border Cooperation/ENPI Mediterranean Sea Basin Programme. All the participating countries decide that Sardinia will host the Joint Monitoring Authority of the programme with the establishment of one antenna in Valencia and another in a partner country (location to be confirmed).


18th September 2006

Politics and Security

Brussels: 64th meeting of the EuroMed Senior Officials. A political dialogue on the situation in the Middle East was the only point on the agenda. The Finnish Presidency presents a general overview of the EU positions in the Lebanon Crisis.

19th September 2006

Migration

Prolondval: First Meeting of the Commission’s Task Force on Migration. The president José Manuel Durão Barroso states that the issue of illegal immigration calls for an urgent and strong answer from the whole EU because it is a European challenge and requires a coordinated European response. According to him “the Task Force provides a real opportunity to demonstrate the ability of the EU to deliver concrete results in complex policy areas”.

20th September 2006

Quartet

New York: The Quartet members meet to discuss developments in the Middle East. The Quartet stresses the “urgent need to make progress towards a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East” and expresses its concern at “the grave crisis in Gaza and the continued stalemate between Israel and the Palestinians”.


21st/22nd September 2006

Industry

Rhodes: Sixth Euromed Conference of Ministers responsible for Industry. The Ministers confirm their commitment to establish a mutually beneficial Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010 and explore how to take advantage of the ENP and the ENPI, which will have a higher budget than previous instruments. Finnish Minister and EU Council President affirms that one of the key objectives over the coming years will be deepening economic integration between EU and the Mediterranean countries alongside south-south regional integration. The energy sector is an example of this cooperation. Regarding the challenges of globalisation for the textile industry, the EC Vice-President responsible for Enterprise and Industry, notes that there has been a decrease of textile imports from the Mediterranean Partners adding that EU policy makers’ goal will be to ensure them the right framework for business.


21st September 2006

Migration

Brussels: The European Commission adopts the Aenas Work Programme for co-financing initiatives to support third countries in their efforts to ensure a more effective management of migration flows. €45m will be allocated this year to initiatives supporting dialogue and cooperation on migration and asylum issues with countries bordering on the enlarged EU and in other regions were asylum issues are acute. ENP Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner says “Aenas is a very useful instrument to strengthen cooperation between the EU, third countries and international or-
organizations dealing with migration.”

21st September 2006
Justice and Home Affairs
Tampere: EU Interior Ministers discuss EU border management strategy and measures against terrorism and organised crime. Finnish Interior Minister and EU Council President, Kari Rajamäki, calls for a collective action to assist southern EU member states facing illegal immigration, as well as for the introduction of measures enabling the EU to tackle illegal immigration. Really effective measures require countries of origin to cooperate, either by discouraging illegal movement or at least by readmitting their own citizens and citizens of other countries transiting the country concerned.

21st September 2006
Energy
Brussels: The Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum meets in Brussels at the level of Directors General. Participants discuss the results achieved for the period 2003-2006, based on the orientations provided at the Energy Ministerial Conferences held in Athens and Rome in 2003. The Forum welcomes the achievements in developing regional energy actions aiming at convergence of energy policies between the Mediterranean Partners and the European Union, thus contributing to enhanced energy security in the region. Over €55m from the MEDA budget have been allocated to projects in the region over the past eight years to support the gradual integration of the Euromed energy markets. The participants also agree on the three main priorities for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 2007-2010 period: integration of the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Markets, development of energy projects of common interest and sustainable energy development.
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/regional/euromed/energy/forum_en.htm

27th/28th September 2006
Euromed Heritage Forum
Istanbul: The Forum presents the achievements and best practices of the programme, as well as the Draft strategy paper on Cultural Heritage in the Mediterranean within the European Neighbourhood Policy (2007-2013), and it hosts the ceremony for the Euromed Heritage Journalistic Award 2006.
www.euromedheritage.net/forum/

28th/29th September 2006
FEMISE
Marseille: Annual Conference of the Euro-Mediterrean Network of Economic Institutes. The network presents 12 studies on issues identified as priorities for the future of the region: agriculture; development and reduction of poverty; health and labour policies; education training and the role of women in the society; integration and cooperation among the countries of the Southern Mediterranean and the role of the state. A draft of FEMISE 2006 Annual Report as well as the report on “The Role of Women in the Economy” is presented. Both reports are available on the network’s website.
www.femise.org

29th September 2006
Agriculture
Strasbourg: 2nd Euromed Conference on Agriculture. Agriculture and Rural Development Commissioner, Mariann Fischer Boel, outlines the opportunities and challenges of a Euro-Mediterranean agricultural policy recalling that the EU is the largest buyer of agricultural products from the Mediterranean, while 37% of the Mediterranean area’s agricultural imports come from the EU.

October 2006
6th October 2006
Temporary International Mechanism
Brussels: The European Commission has begun paying social allowances to 40,000 of the neediest Palestinian families through the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM). Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner says that “to really tackle the economic gridlock in the Palestinian Territories, we need both parties to implement the Agreement on Access and Movement and the Israelis to resume transfers of tax and customs revenue that belong to the Palestinians.”

10th October 2006
ENP
Brussels: Presentation of the results of the Eurobarometer’s Special Report on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). According to 68% of Europeans cooperation will bring mutual benefits and they tend to have a positive perception of relations with neighbouring countries. Most Europeans also believe that supporting reforms in neighbouring countries will benefit them in terms of economic and social development as well as good governance. 64% of those polled believe that close collaboration with neighbouring countries would help reduce illegal immigration in the EU.

11th October 2006
Maritime Safety
Trieste: Vessel Traffic Monitoring and Information System (VTMIS) Information Day is taking place within the framework of the EU-funded MEDA Regional Project, “Euromed Cooperation on Maritime Safety and Prevention of Pollution from Ships – SAFEMED.” The main objectives of the VTMIS Info Day are to familiarise participants, around twenty government officials from the Mediterranean region, with the latest developments in VTMIS and enable them to benefit from the experience of the EU Member States and non-EU Member States that have already developed and implemented VTMIS. The primary objective of SAFEMED is to harmonize the application of maritime legislation in the region between the EU Member States and its Mediterranean partners.
www.safemedproject.org

14th /17th October 2006
Youth
Alexandria: Dialogue 21: Youth Workshop organised by the Anna Lindh Foundation with the Euro-Med Youth Platform and the Goethe Institute in Alexandria, as a follow up of the Youth campaign Dialogue 21 on Mutual Respect between Cultures and Reli-
regions in the Euro-Mediterranean Region. The campaign was launched to contain the "cartoons crisis," to strengthen dialogue and overcome cultural barriers. Almost 2,000 young people submitted their proposal on how to overcome the crisis. The outcomes of the workshop will be submitted to the 8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers in Tampere.

www.euromedalex.org

15th October 2006
Inter-religious Dialogue
Alexandria: Meeting organised by the Anna Lindh Foundation and the League of Arab States on "Major Misconceptions in Inter-cultural and Inter-religious Dialogue." The main Objective was to exchange views and examine ways and means of establishing a functioning Dialogue between cultures as well as creating mechanisms for advancing cultural relations.

www.euromedalex.org

17th October 2006
External Affairs Council
Brussels: EU Foreign Ministers recall the 'urgent need' for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the External Affairs Council, Palestinians were called upon to join the efforts of President Abbas for national unity and to form a government with a platform reflecting the Quartet principles. On Lebanon, the Foreign Ministers reiterated the EU's commitment to work towards the implementation of UN Resolution 1701.


17th October 2006
Neighbourhood
Brussels: The EU Foreign Ministers approve the regulation establishing the legal framework for the provision of assistance within the context of the ENP. A total of €11.18 billion will be allocated in the 2007-2013 period to support the European Neighbourhood Policy. Some 95% of the budget will be spent on country and multi-country programmes and the remaining 5% on cross-border cooperation.


19th October 2006
Environment
Brussels: The European Commission approves funding for 16 new environment projects on the Mediterranean and Baltic regions, under the LIFE-Third Countries programme 2006. These projects will be implemented in seven MEDA countries – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey – as well as in Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia and Russia. The projects address major environmental issues, from waste management and air pollution prevention and control, to river basin management and sustainable tourism, as well as promoting harmonisation with EU environmental regulations.

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/infoproducts/lifetycycompilation_06.pdf

20th October 2006
Tourism
The MEDINA portal goes online. This is one of the results of the MEDINA project co-financed by the European Commission in the framework of the EUMEDIS programme. The website includes the Tourist Guide as well as links with national websites (Algeria, Cyprus, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia). The objective of the MEDINA project (MEDiterranean by InterNet Access) was to support "cultural tourism". The MEDINA Portal highlights the common cultural background of the different countries and the contribution of the different civilization.

24th October 2006
ENP
Brussels: The European Commission adopts its work programme for 2007, in which it identifies a series of 21 strategic initiatives that will be the main focus of its work. In addition to strengthening the ENP, it also gives priority to implementing better management of migrant flows to the EU.


24th October 2006
FEMIP
Brussels: The European Commissionnotes in a statement that FEMIP has significantly contributed to investment and economic growth in the southern Mediterranean region, but it can do more to foster private sector development, especially of small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and to involve partner countries in its operation.

26th October 2006
FEMIP
Luxembourg: The EIB announces that under FEMIP it will be taking part in the Kantara Fund for private equity support in the Mediterranean region, with a budget of up to €10m. The EIB will collaborate with the Group Société Générale. This multi-sector private equity investment, which is expected to reach €120m, is aimed at private companies operating in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan.


28th October 2006
Press Freedom
Paris: Reporters without Borders present the annual "Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2006" making special reference to the consequences of the difficult situation in the Middle East on the region’s Media. Lebanon fell from 56th to 107th place on the Index as the country’s media continue to suffer from the region's political atmosphere while the inability of the Palestinian Authority to maintain stability in the territories and the behaviour of Israel outside its borders seriously threaten freedom of expression in the Middle East.

www.Rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19385

November 2006

7th November 2006
Human Rights
Copenhagen: The Euro–Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) issues a new report entitled "Achieving Gender Equality in the Euro–Mediterranean Region: Change is Possible and Necessary." The EMHRN also asks EU and Euro–Mediterranean Ministers meeting in Istanbul this month to confirm their commitment to the principle that women’s rights should be dealt with according to international standards and not to religious norms or
cultural traditions. www.euromedrights.net/pages/275/news/focus/20571

8th November 2006

Enlargement

Brussels: The European Commission adopts a strategy for EU enlargement, which includes a special report on the Union’s integration capacity, in which it concludes that the Union must be able to maintain and deepen its own development while pursuing its enlargement agenda. The Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn says that “the current enlargement strategy - based on consolidation, conditionality and communication - must be combined with better ways and means to ensure EU’s capacity to integrate new members.” The Commission also reviews the progress achieved in each candidate and potential candidate country; as regards Turkey, it concludes that the country has continued political reforms, but the pace of the reforms has slowed during the past year. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/reports_nov_2006_en.htm

9th/10th November 2006

Transport

Monaco: FEMIP Conference on Regional Integration in the Euro-Mediterranean Area through Transport Systems. The Conference brought together 250 experts and professionals in this sector. During the past 25 years the partner countries have only benefited to a limited extent from globalisation. The situation is due to inadequate regional integration in terms of available infrastructure; for this reason, the creation of an efficient integrated Euro-Mediterranean transport system is crucial for the development of socioeconomic stability in the region. http://www.eib.org/news/events/event.asp?event=157

14th November 2006

Peace Process

Brussels: EU Foreign Ministers express their “deep concern” over the escalating violence in Gaza and the West Bank and deplore Israeli military action in Gaza. In the conclusion of the External Relations Council, the EU recognises Israel’s right to self-defence but calls for restraint. The council urges the Palestinians to form a government of national unity in order to support the re-launching of the Peace Process. www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/91661.pdf

15th/17th November 2006

Economic and Social Council

Ljubljana: The Euro-Mediterranean Summit of Economic and Social Councils calls for policies and objectives aimed at raising the profile of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to be implemented in a more determined way. Participants examine four essential elements for the development of the Mediterranean region: combating poverty, supporting young people, gender equality and strengthening EU involvement through the ENP. http://eesc.europa.eu/sections/exl/euromed/events/index_en.asp?id=304001

20th November 2006

Environment


22nd November 2006

Fisheries


22th/23th November 2006

Migration

Tripoli: Conference on Migration and Development in which EU and African States participate. The conference adopts the Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development and the Plan of Action on Trafficking in Human Beings. They will provide a basis for cooperation between EU and Africa in
Anexos ingles ES07:00 Med. en cifrasgraf 13/9/07 11:19 Página 357

Ministers have been able to adopt conclusions, it is the second time that Foreign Ministers have been able to adopt conclusions unanimously. In view of the positive developments in the Middle East, participants envisage the resumption of aid to the Palestinian Authority.


26th November 2006
Euro-Med Award for Dialogue between Cultures
Tampere: The first Euro-Mediterranean award for dialogue between Cultures is accorded to the Syrian Monastery of Deir Mar Moussa el-Habachi (St. Moses the Abyssinian), located 80 km north of Damascus. The theme of the award “Mutual respect among people of different religions or any other belief” was jointly established by the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between cultures (ALF) and the Fondazione Mediterranea. The jury of the Euro-Med Award is composed of the heads of all 35 national Networks of the ALF, representing more than 1,000 institutions and organizations committed to concrete and sustainable steps towards dialogue, understanding and respect between cultures.

www.medalex.org

27th November 2006
EU-Arab Group
Tampere: Euromed Ministers of the EU-Arab Group troika meet in the margins of the Tampere Euro-Mediterranean Conference to discuss the current developments in the Middle East, being optimistic about the ceasefire in Gaza. The EU Council President says that the Arab Group has been of great support to the EU on the issue.


27th/28th November 2006
Foreign Ministers
Tampere: The eighth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers reviews the progress made in implementing the five-year work programme adopted in November 2005 and sets out guidelines for 2007. Other issues tackled are: inter-cultural dialogue, the ENP and the related financial instrument, funding issues and working methods relating to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Conference ends with the adoption of the Tampere Conclusion, it is the second time that Foreign Ministers have been able to adopt conclusions unanimously. In view of the positive developments in the Middle East, participants envisage the resumption of aid to the Palestinian Authority.


27th/28th November 2006
Arco Latino
Brussels: Seminar entitled “Which Mediterranean for 2010?” at the Committee of Regions, organised by Arco Latino, attended by representatives from various European Institutions, the Seminar will reflect on future prospects in the Mediterranean Region, thus focusing on six strategic topics: competitiveness, sustainable development, culture, women and relations of the Mediterranean, migration flows and relations with the countries of the Southern shore.


27th/30th November 2006
Rules of Origin
Rome: Regional Seminar on the Rules of Origin in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in the framework of the 4th phase of the Euromed Market Programme. The seminar aims to a deeper understanding and interpretation of the Pan-Euromed system of origin as one of the key elements of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area; to promote a common approach in the interpretation and implementation of Pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin among Euro-Mediterranean Partners; and to identify some of the difficulties which the customs administrations will be confronted with when implementing the new rules of origin.

www.euromedmarket.org

28th November 2006
ECOFIN
Brussels: Economic and Financial Affairs Council. The EU Finance Ministers propose improving the linkages of FEMIP with the ENP by a better integration of the European Investment Bank’s activities into EU country strategies and by better combining EIB loans and EU budgetary resources.


30th November 2006
Migration
Brussels: The European Commission presents two communications on migration: one reinforcing the framework for developing a comprehensive European migration policy and the second covering maritime border management.

December 2006
2nd December 2006
Trade
Cairo: At the 6th Conference of the Ministers of Agriculture from CIHEAMs' member countries Commissioner Fischer Boel, responsible for Agriculture and Rural Development, outlines efforts to strengthen agricultural trade relation and foster sustainable rural development. She states: “Our Mediterranean partners are more than just trade partners; you are also valued political partners in the search for common solutions to more general common challenges that we face.”

www.medobs.org/themes/default1.htm

3rd December 2006
Anna Lindh Foundation
Alexandria: The ALF signs a Memorandum of Understanding with the Permanent Conference of the Mediterranean Audiovisual Operators (COPEAM) in the context of both organisations’ interest in fostering relationships within the framework of the Euromed Partnership. The agreement concerns the preparation of the European Year for the Dialogue between Cultures (2008); exchanges and best practices, while envisaging joint initiatives among the main audiovisual operators and women's projects as promoters of intercultural dialogue in the media.

www.euromedalex.org/En/News/3dec2006.htm

11th December 2006
Neighbourhood Policy
Brussels: General Affairs and External Relations Council. EU Foreign Ministers believe significant progress has taken place in the first 18 months of implementation of the first seven ENP Action Plans. The Council welcomes the Commission’s proposal on “strengthening the ENP” and invites future Pres-
idencies to take the work forward.


11th/12th December 2006
Palestine
Brussels: General Affairs and External Relations Council. ENP Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner proposes to extend the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) for aid to the Palestinian people for another three months. TIM support was provided since June 2006 for the uninterrupted supply of public utility services, social allowances to public sector employees, social hardship cases such as female-headed poor households, unemployed women, widows, orphans, disabled and handicapped persons, elderly people in need, as well as farmers, Bedouins and daily wage earners.


11th/15th December 2006
Migration
Florence: Thematic Session on International Migration and Cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean Area in the framework of the Euromed Migration I regional initiative. The aim of the project is to create an instrument for observing, analysing and forecasting migration flows, their causes and impact. The thematic session will review and discuss the various aspects of international cooperation that can help to make migration a win-win process, profitable to countries of origin as well as those of destination, and to the migrants themselves.

12th December 2006
EU-Morocco
Brussels: Signature of two new EU-Morocco Agreements. The first one on aviation opens up markets and approximates the legislation of the two parties. The other, for cooperation on the European satellite radio navigation programme GALILEO, covers joint activities in the field of scientific research and training, industrial cooperation, trade and market development.

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/international/pillars/common_avionation_area/morocco_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/newsletter/dg/2006/nl206-2006-12-15_en.html#t08

15th December 2006
FEMIP
Tunis: The Minister of Development and International Cooperation of Tunisia and the EIB Vice-President, responsible for the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), sign a contract for a total amount of € 154m to be destined to energy production (the construction of a natural gas-fired, combined-cycle power plant) and environmental protection (to finance investment in wastewater collection networks and treatment plants).


21st December 2006
FEMIP
Paris: The European Investment Bank under the FEMIP is investing the equivalent of 5.6m Egyptian pounds in a 9% shareholding in Beltone Capital, an Egyptian investment company. The EIB, with its representation on the Board of Directors of Beltone Capital, will support the development of private equity in Egypt and widen sources of funding available to local private enterprises. Together with loans and technical assistance grants, risk capital is one of the main instruments used by FEMIP to help the Mediterranean partner countries meet the challenge of economic and social modernisation.

Chronologies

Other Cooperation Initiatives in the Mediterranean

1. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

In January 1994, in view of the positive results of the Peace process in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the heads of state and government taking part in the Brussels NATO Summit called for a new initiative geared toward Mediterranean countries that were not NATO members. The main objective of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was, and still is, to contribute to regional stability and security, improve the mutual understanding between NATO and its Mediterranean Partners, eliminate distorted images, prejudice and stereotypes of the participating countries and strengthen regional relations. In February 1995, NATO invited Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia to participate in the Dialogue, which was expanded to Jordan in November 1995 and Algeria in 2000. This initiative also complements other international regional initiatives such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the OSCE Euro-Mediterranean Initiative and the 5+5 Dialogue. The Mediterranean Dialogue consists of a political dialogue combined with participation in specific activities. Political consultations are conducted on both a bilateral (NATO+1) and multilateral (NATO+7) level, and on an ambassadorial level as well as by working groups. These meetings provide an opportunity to exchange points of view on a variety of issues related to Mediterranean security, as well as on the development of the Dialogue in political and cooperation terms. NATO+7 meetings usually follow the summits of NATO Heads of State and Government or are held in the event of exceptional circumstances.

This occurred, for instance, in October 2001 following the September 11 attacks and in 2004 to celebrate the ten years of the MD. The political dimension of the Dialogue includes visits by senior NATO officials to MD countries to meet with their authorities and become more familiar with the objectives and priorities of each country. The practical dimension includes activities aimed at planning for civil emergencies, crisis management and border security, in addition to a military programme. The latter includes the possibility for Mediterranean Partners to observe NATO’s military exercises in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework, to attend seminars and workshops and visit the Atlantic Alliance’s military installations. Another tool for consolidating the practical dimension of the Dialogue is the possibility of establishing Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) between NATO and each country. So far, only Israel is participating to the individual programme, while Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan have expressed interest. From the outset, the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue was progressive in terms of participation and content. As a result, the number of participant countries and the initiative’s contents have changed over the years. The relationship between NATO and its Mediterranean Partners is conceived as a joint ownership: the Alliance does not aim to impose anything but instead offers its experience and competence in security. During the Madrid Summit in 1997, the Heads of State established a new political body comprising NATO political advisors: the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG). The MCG is responsible for the Mediterranean Dialogue under the supervision of the North Atlantic Council.

Since 1997, the measures of practical cooperation for enhancing mutual trust are laid down in an annual Work Programme that comprises a wide range of security-related activities. At their Summit meeting in Istanbul in 2004, NATO leaders committed to work towards making the MD a true Partnership and individualising priority areas in the document, “A more Ambitious and Expanded Framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue” aimed at enhancing political dialogue; developing defence system reforms and contributing to the fight against terrorism. In the context of change in relations between NATO and its Mediterranean partners, the alliance is ready to start up a new initiative to contribute to peace and security in the broader Middle East. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) promotes bilateral cooperation with interested countries in the Gulf area, beginning with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These countries must subscribe to the initiative’s aims, including combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Four countries are currently members of the ICI: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and United Arab Emirates. The ICI and MD are separate yet complementary programmes, serving the same purpose, namely to build increasingly strong cooperative ties with countries in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Both programmes are based on common principles: non-discrimination (MD and ICI partners are offered the same purpose, namely to build increasingly strong cooperative ties with countries in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Both programmes are based on common principles: non-discrimination (MD and ICI partners are offered the same basis for cooperation and negotiation with NATO), the possibility of adapting the level and intensity of participation to the specific needs of each country, non-imposition by NATO and...
non-interference in the domestic affairs of its partners.

Chronology January 2006 – December 2006

• 16/18 January, Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Germany): Second Mediterranean Dialogue Conference hosted by the Marshall Center, over 50 politicians examine the progress of the MD and the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism.
• 9/10 February, Taormina (Italy): First meeting of Defence Ministers from the 26 NATO countries and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Among other issues, they discuss NATO’s political and military transformation and the implementation of the expeditionary NATO Response Force (NRF), which should be fully up and running by the end of the year. The ministers examine the different cases of possible intervention of the NRF and the means of financing its deployment.
• 13/14 February, Cairo (Egypt): Conference on the dialogue between NATO and Egypt co-sponsored by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and the Egyptian Council of Foreign Affairs. The conference brings together officials, journalists, opinion leaders and military officers from Egypt to discuss NATO’s transformation following the 2004 Istanbul Summit and Egypt’s contribution to the enhancement of Mediterranean Dialogue.
• 6/7 April, Rabat (Morocco): Under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, the North Atlantic Council and representatives of the seven Mediterranean Dialogue countries meet to discuss the state of their cooperation and the initiative’s future prospects. The political consultation is held in a Mediterranean Dialogue country for the first time. The high-level meeting represents a further step in the enhancement of the political dimension of the MD.
• 2/3 May, Istanbul (Turkey): 12th Mediterranean Dialogue Seminar organised by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The seminar gathers 50 parliamentarians from NATO countries and partners from the Middle East and North Africa. The debates focus on the Parliament’s role in Arab countries and relations with Islamic parties and movements.
• 2/3 July, Naples (Italy): Middle Eastern Conflicts Burden Dialogue between the West and the Arab-Muslim World. Mediterranean Seminar organised by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and Italian Parliament. The meeting gathers 45 parliamentarians and a number of government organisations, officials and journalists. The seminar focuses on the Iraqi and Palestinian-Israeli conflict, although one seminar session is entirely dedicated to migration, given its strong link with security issues.
• 11th September, London (United Kingdom): NATO, the Mediterranean and the Broader Middle East: The Future. Conference sponsored by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) to evaluate the Alliance’s strategy in the region through the MD and ICI.
• 23rd October, Herzliya (Israel): NATO’s Transformation, the Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO-Israel Relations, conference co-sponsored by the NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and the Atlantic Forum of Israel. The Deputy Secretary-General of NATO celebrates the conclusion with Israel of the first Individual Cooperation Programme (ICP) in the framework of the MD. NATO officials, opinion leaders and policy makers from Israel take part in the conference.
• 12th December, Kuna (Kuwait): Facing Common Challenges ThroughICI. Second International conference of NATO and Gulf Countries (GCC) to examine the state of security cooperation and implement the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).
More information: www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html

2. Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation in OSCE

The OSCE maintains special relations with six countries on the Mediterranean Basin, the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation (MPCs): Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan (since 1998), Morocco and Tunisia. This relationship goes back to the Helsinki Process (1975) and the Helsinki Final Act, which included a Mediterranean chapter stating that security in Europe is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean as a whole. In December 2003, with decision 571, the OSCE Permanent Council decided to explore new avenues of cooperation for sharing OSCE norms, principles and commitments with its Mediterranean Partners.

Relations between OSCE and its MPCs include invitations to take part in regular meetings with OSCE bodies, organising seminars on issues that are of particular concern to the region, regular meetings of the Mediterranean Contact Group with OSCE member countries and Mediterranean partners and the annual Parliamentary Forum on the Mediterranean. They are also invited to participate in important OSCE meetings that address politico-military, economic and environmental, and human issues.

Belgium has held the OSCE Presidency in 2006 and Spain will do so in 2007. The Mediterranean Seminars are attended by high-level representatives from the Member States of the OSCE, the Mediterranean Partners and international organisations. The main objective of these meetings is to encourage the exchange of ideas and recommendations.

Mediterranean Seminar 2006

6th/7th November, Sharm el-Sheik (Egypt): The OSCE Mediterranean Partnership: From Recommendation to Implementation. Thirty-five OSCE member states and two Asian Partners for Cooperation (Japan and Korea) take part in the Seminar. At the opening session, the OSCE Secretary General, Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, recalls the importance of a multidimensional and comprehensive approach to the themes of immigration, integration and tolerance, underlining the beneficial effects of migration and intercultural dialogue. The Ambassador of Spain, José López Jor-рин states that understanding the issues of immigration and integration is a challenge in itself that should be considered as affording opportunities for mutual enrichment for the countries of origin, transit and destination. Intercultural and interfaith dialogue are factors of long-term security, while education on human rights
and tolerance is an important tool for tackling these issues, together with the strengthening of legislation and data collection as effective tools for combating hatred, crime and intolerance.

**OSCE Contact Group**
During the Budapest Summit in 1994, the Contact Group was established to facilitate the interchange of information of mutual interest. Despite the informal character of these meetings, the OSCE countries and MPCs are represented by their ambassadors. Contact Group meetings are usually preceded by a series of gatherings to prepare the meeting agenda. In 2006, the Contact Group invites representatives of other international organisations, such as the Council of Europe, UNHCR and International Center for Migration Policy Development. In 2006, under the Spanish presidency, the Contact Group holds regular meetings on a wide range of topics belonging to the OSCE’s three security dimensions, including migration, anti-terrorism, tolerance and non-discrimination, trafficking in human beings and freedom of the press.

**OSCE Parliamentary Assembly**
With its 317 members, it constitutes the parliamentary dimension of the organisation. Founded in 1990 during the Paris Summit, its main task is to facilitate interparliamentary dialogue. The MPCs attend the Parliamentary Assembly sessions. The existence of a Special Representative for the Mediterranean clearly demonstrates the interest in the region. The Representative’s functions include: reinforcing the Mediterranean dimension of the organisation, maintaining relations with MPCs and considering the tools required to promote the organisation of the Mediterranean Forum under the auspices of the Parliamentary Assembly. The Forum is a response to the desire to strengthen ties between the Parliamentary Assembly and Mediterranean partners in order to jointly address the issues of security and stability in the Mediterranean. The forth Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum is held in Malta (19th November 2006) and is primarily centred on the Middle East. In addition to the conflict, other issues dealt with include freedom of association, social development and the environment in the Mediterranean.

More information:
Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation: www.osce.org/ec
OSCE Seminar: www.osce.org/ec/documents.html?lsi=true&limit=10&grp=322

3. Mediterranean Forum (Foromed)
In the framework of various proposals and initiatives for establishing long-lasting cooperation in the Mediterranean region, the Mediterranean Forum was created on 4th July 1994 in Alexandria (Egypt) as a result of a Franco-Egyptian initiative. Eleven countries take part: Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey. It has a flexible structure and comprises three working groups in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres. It is an independent initiative that aims to support and promote the Barcelona Process. At the outset, no new participating members were added and the Foromed countries decided in 1995 that only countries on the Mediterranean Basin accepted by consensus could become members. The FOROMED has a regional structure of inter-governmental dialogue. It has a rotating Presidency and at the end of each Presidency a Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting is held. Every year there are three or four high or expert-level meetings, as well as seminars and workshops addressing issues of common interest. There is also the possibility of holding extraordinary ad-hoc meetings such as those held in Agadir (Morocco) in October 2001 following the events of September 11 and on 22nd April 2006 in Cairo. The extraordinary Forum meeting addressed the crisis of the caricatures, as well as intercultural dialogue, the Alliance of Civilisations, education, youth and the press but, above all, it was an occasion to evaluate the results of the Barcelona 2005 Summit.

The Forum has no funds of its own and activities can only be carried out through the engagement of each state. The Forum constitutes a framework for dialogue and negotiation between member countries and serves as a “laboratory of ideas” for the Barcelona Process. Like the 5+5 Dialogue (which only groups Western Mediterranean countries), Foromed aims to become a gathering point that facilitates agreements and exchange of ideas thanks to its smaller size. Spain holds the Forum Presidency in 2006.

This year’s most important activity was the Ministerial Meeting of the Mediterranean Forum in Alicante (Spain) on 27th/28th October, by invitation of the Spanish Government and with the presence of Libya as special guest of the Presidency. The eleven countries were determined to develop “specific proposals” to promote the Peace Process in the Middle East, which should involve all the parties in achieving a global, long-term solution. The text of the Declaration of Alicante will be forwarded to the “Quartet” members (European Union, USA, Russia and United Nations) and gathers the commitments of its signatories “to a two-state solution agreed between Israelis and Palestinians resulting in a viable, contiguous, sovereign and independent Palestinian State existing side by side with Israel in peace and security, within recognised, secure borders established on the basis of the 1967 borders.” The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Angel Moratinos, declared that the Spanish Presidency has made a priority commitment to cooperation and development (a monothematic meeting on these topics has been planned in Portugal to this effect), and explained that Foromed countries have decided to promote the launch of a Euro-Mediterranean energy market and explore the possibility of creating a Euro-Mediterranean bank to attract public and private investment and create employment. They also considered the possibility of launching initiatives such as a Euro-Mediterranean satellite TV channel and promoting a university fabric for the exchange of Arab and European university students that could be called Aristotle – Averroes.

More information: www.mae.es/NR/drdonlyres/240A9E8F-09DC-427A-AA10-77197F1D0FF7/0/DECLARACIONESoctnov.pdf
4. 5+5 Dialogue

Complementary to the Barcelona Process, the 5+5 Dialogue, or Forum for Dialogue in the Western Mediterranean, is an informal forum for collaboration between the ten countries of the Western Mediterranean Basin: five countries from the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya, and Tunisia) and five members of the European Union (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta). The first meeting was held in Rome in 1990. However, the situation in Algeria and the embargo imposed on Libya led to an interruption of the meetings. The informal structure of the 5+5 Dialogue, as well as the small number of countries and geographical constraints, helps to determine the common interests. The working method is based on informal meetings of Ministers for Home Affairs, Defence and Social Affairs. The Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting has been postponed to 2007.

Main meetings during 2006

• 5th May, Hammamet (Tunisia): First meeting of the Tourism Ministers ends with the Hammamet Declaration where-by the ministers agree to make the forum a place for reflection and concertation and to launch a project to promote sustainable Euro-Mediterranean tourism that is respectful of environmental resources and values Western Mediterranean civilisations. www.infotunisie.com/2006/05/050506-6.html

• 11th/12th May, Nice (France): 12th Conference of Interior Ministers of the Western Mediterranean (CIMO). The main objective of the conference is to consolidate cooperation in the fight against terrorism, organised crime (particularly drug trafficking), illegal immigration and civil protection (to create a common contingent for monitoring and rapid intervention in the event of natural or human catastrophes). www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.asp?liste=20060515.html#Chapitre11

• 27th November, Rabat (Morocco): Third meeting of the 5+5 Parliamentary Presidents in the country presiding the 5+5 Dialogue in 2006. The issues on the meeting’s agenda are: terrorism, illegal immigration, economic differences between the two shores, etc. The President of the Chamber of Representatives, Abdelwahad Ridi, says that the Mediterranean stands out as the most unequal border in the world. www.maec.gov.ma/fr/default.asp

• 11th December 2006, Paris (France): Meeting of the Defence Ministers. The main issues of the meeting are maritime surveillance, air security and the contribution of armed forces in civil protection. Throughout 2006, 15 major activities have taken place including high-level seminars and manoeuvres, and the project to set up an Officer Training School has been materialised. New work themes include environmental protection, military medicine and cooperation between armies in the fight against illicit activities.

• 12th/13th December, Algiers (Spain): Under the slogan “Towards a Global Approach to Migration Processes”, the Ministers of Social Affairs meet for the fifth Ministerial Conference on Migration in the Western Mediterranean hosted by Spain. Having verified that migration policies require a global, comprehensive and agreed approach that encompasses all stages of the migration process, the Conference discusses the necessary cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination to manage migration flows, reception processes and integration in the society of destination (the appropriate integration of the immigrant heightens his/her capacity to act as a development vector for his/her country) and the economic and human benefits of emigration for the countries of origin (in the form of remittances and non-financial transfers, that is, training and competence gained). The ministers observe that the informal nature of the Dialogue facilitates exchange, the identification of common interests and the sharing of ideas and solutions. www.mtas.es/destacados/es/declaracion_algeciras.pdf

5. Euro-Arab Relations

The discussion forum between the European Community and the League of Arab States arose out of a French initiative and was launched during the Copenhagen Summit in December 1973, shortly after the “October War” and oil embargo. As the Europeans saw it, it was to be a forum to discuss economic affairs, whereas the Arab side saw it rather as one to discuss political affairs. Both sides decided that the dialogue should focus on cooperation efforts for industrialisation, infrastructures, agriculture and trade, in addition to scientific, technological, cultural and social cooperation. The Dialogue comprises the General Committee, the Ministerial Troika and the working committees (in the economic, technical, social and cultural realms). The General Committee is the central body of the Dialogue and meets at the discretion of the two sides. The Dublin Compromise enabled the PLO, which until then had not been recognised by the EC as representative of Palestine, to take part in the Committee. The Troika deals with the political side of the Dialogue, organising an annual ministerial meeting that is alternately held in either a European or an Arab capital. The activity of the Dialogue was suspended in 1979 upon request of the League of Arab States, following the Camp David Agreements. Other obstacles also slowed down the initiative, such as the assassination of President Sadat, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987. In December 1989, on initiative of France, a Euro-Arab Ministerial Conference was convened to reactivate the Dialogue which was again blocked as a result of the Gulf War. The First Forum of the Euro-Arab Dialogue was held in Paris on 26th-28th April before an auditorium of over seven hundred participants and with the presence of French Foreign Minister Blazy and the Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa. The Forum is held every year in a European or Arab capital with the purpose of benefiting from the different experiences presented in the framework of the dialogue and such cooperation as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Dialogue between the EU and states belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council. The main sessions of the Forum focused on the role of the private sector in social development, youth and education, the economy and Euro-Arab partnership, and the role of Europeans of Arab ori-
gin in supporting cooperation on both sides of the Mediterranean. The conclusion of the Forum is represented by the publication of the “Paris Declaration” that emphasises the need to adopt the Forum as a permanent instrument that strengthens rather than replaces other instruments of dialogue and cooperation. This document essentially states the need for an honest, open dialogue in order to overcome the negative stereotypes spread by the media on both sides of the Mediterranean. Other issues concern the self-determination of peoples, particularly regarding government elections, the fight against foreign occupation, and the need for the Middle Eastern region to become free from weapons of mass destruction. Another significant moment during the Euro-Arab Dialogue was the intervention of the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, at the League of Arab States Summit in Khartoum on 28th March.

More information: 
www.arableague.org
www.forumeuroarabe.org

6. Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AlI)

The Adriatic-Ionian Initiative was launched in May 2000 during the Ancona Conference attended by the Heads of State and Foreign Ministers of the coastal countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Serbia and Montenegro, and Slovenia). The worrying rise in organised crime and illegal immigration flows led to a reflection on the need to build a cooperation network between the region’s countries. The AI1 is a tool geared toward achieving political and economic stability in the region, enhancing and consolidating cooperation in the areas of economy, maritime transport and the fight against crime, as well as environmental, cultural and interuniversity cooperation. UNI-ADRION (www.uniadrion.unibo.it), a network of universities and research centres from the Adriatic-Ionian region, was set up in 2000. This organism is only the first stage of an initiative that aims to create a virtual university for the entire Adriatic-Ionian Basin.

At present, the AlI has no permanent bodies. Its decision-making body is the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative Council of Foreign Ministers whose agenda is prepared at periodic meetings attended by senior officials or national coordinators from each country. European Union representatives also participate in the AI1 Council meetings. In addition to cooperation among member states, the AI1 aims to assist in ensuring its member states an efficient integration in the EU. Activities are usually organised in six round tables that cover the following issues: fight against organised crime, environmental protection and sustainable development, economy, tourism and small and medium-sized enterprises, transport and maritime cooperation, culture and education, and interuniversity cooperation. The round tables are held at least twice a year in the presiding country that also organises the six round table sessions. The Council has a rotating Presidency that lasts a year (starting in May) and follows the alphabetical order of its member states beginning with Croatia, followed by Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania in May 2005, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

During its six months’ presidency, Albania convened five round tables on 26th/27th January in Durres (no quorum was reached in the case of interuniversity cooperation). At the end of its Presidency, the eighth Adriatic-Ionian Initiative Council is held on 27th May in Tirana (Albania). Participants agree on a number of issues including the need to provide the Initiative with a legal framework and, above all, to create a permanent Secretariat to expedite communications among members. A number of weak points are identified such as the lack of implementation and scarce public participation. The synergy between the activities and conclusions of the round tables will serve to improve the results of the AlI.

More information: 
Declaration of Ancona: www.uniadrion.unibo.it/Documents/AnconaDeclaration.pdf

Declaration of Tirana: www.mfa.gov.al/english/print.asp?id=4181

7. Informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers of European Union Mediterranean Countries

At the end of the informal meeting held on 13th and 14th October 2006 in Lagonissi (Greece), the Foreign Ministers of the eight European Union Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Spain and Portugal) express their will to work together on Mediterranean and other common issues and draw up a working document on the Middle East to be presented at the Mediterranean Forum in Alicante.

These gatherings are an opportunity to undertake informal negotiations on issues that are of paramount importance for these countries’ citizens and affect the Mediterranean region and the European Union in general. In fact, in their concluding remarks, the eight countries agreed on the usefulness of these informal consultations and decided to continue to meet periodically at different levels.

During the meeting in Lagonissi, two working groups were set up, one focusing on Mediterranean issues and another on the Middle East. The latter resulted in the establishment of a working group at an ambassadorial level to discuss developments.

Another issue tackled is illegal immigration, and in this context the possibility of implementing a European coastguard to strengthen cooperation and protect the maritime borders of Southern Europe.

The meeting also discusses the Mediterranean aspect of the Neighbourhood Policy. The next meeting will be held in Malta in February.

More information: 
This chapter describes, in circum-Mediterranean order, the results of the Presidential and Legislative elections that took place in 2006 in independent states. The list also includes calls for referenda and those elections held in autonomous entities or in any other relevant territories that are of particular political significance.

**Portugal**

**Presidential Elections**

22nd January 2006

Previous elections: 24th January 2001

Parliamentary Republic. The President receives a mandate of five years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aníbal Cavaco Silva</td>
<td>50.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Social Democratic Party)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Manuel Alegre (Independent)</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario Soares (Socialist Party)</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerónimo de Sousa (Portuguese Communist Party)</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Louça (Bloc of the Left – BE)</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation: 62.8%

**Italy**

**Legislative Elections**

9th – 10th April 2006

Previous elections: 13th May 2001

Parliamentary Republic with a bicameral legislature. The Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati) has 630 members elected for five-year terms, and 155 elected through party lists with proportional representation from the regions. The Senate of the Republic (Senato della Repubbli-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber of Deputies</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Union (DS, social democrat)</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Democrats (Democracy and Liberty - The Daisy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Refoundation (RC, communist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Greens (socialist ecologist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Italian Communists (PDCI, communist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Social Democrats (social democrat)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Radicals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy of Values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party - UDEUR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist and Pensioners Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House of Liberties (Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition)</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Italy (FI, conservative, personalist party)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Alliance (AN, national-conservative)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern League (LN, regionalist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Christian and Centre Democrats (conservative)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Socialist Party of Italy (NPSI, conservative)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Republican Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Reformists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democracy for the Autonomies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Others</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation: 83.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation: 83.6%

**Bosnia-Herzegovina**

A Federal Parliamentary Democratic Republic comprised of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (also known as the Croat-Muslim Federation) and the Serbian Republic (Republica Srpska). The Presidency and the 42 representatives of the House of Representatives are elected by universal suffrage. Both entities elect their own legislators simultaneously, while the Serbian Republic additionally appoints President and Vice-president. 14 organisations sent electoral observation missions to the elections. According to the OSCE and Council of Europe’s electoral observation missions the elections were conducted in line with international standards. These were the first elections held without foreign supervision since the 1995 Dayton Accords. According to Freedom House, the country’s civil and political rights system rates the country as only partially free.

**Legislative Elections**

1st October 2006

Previous elections: 5th October 2002

Elections to the House of Representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The federal legislature is comprised of two chambers with 4-year terms of office. The People’s Chamber (Don Narodu) has 15 members elected indirectly – five for each of the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian communities – by the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (10 members) and by the Parliament of the Serbian Republic (5 members). The 42 members of the House of Representatives (Zastupnički Dom) are elected by proportional representation: 28 seats are assigned to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 14 seats to the Serbian Republic.

Seats for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties and Districts</th>
<th>Part %</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SD (Bosnián nationalist)</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA (Serbian nationalist)</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP (Bosnian nationalist)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ (Croatian nationalist)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČD (Serbian nationalist)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS (Bosnian-Hercegovinian right)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSR (Nationalist)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seats for the Serbian Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties and Districts</th>
<th>Part %</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SNSD (Serbian nationalist)</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS (Serbian nationalist)</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP (Progressive)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDN (Nationalist)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA (Serbian nationalist)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSR (Nationalist)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBN (Bosnian nationalist)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDRS (Serbian nationalist)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elections to the House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has 98 members elected by direct vote for four-year terms of office.

Presidential Elections

1st October 2006

Previous elections: 5th October 2002

A three-member presidency (one for each of the ethnic communities) which rotates every eight months and has a four-year term of office.

Serbian Candidates %

- Nebojša Radmanović (SNSD) 53.2
- Mladen Bosić (SDS) 24.2
- Zoran Tešanović (PDP RS) 4.9
- Jugoslav Jović (SDP BiH) 4.1
- Redislav Kanjerić (SRS DR) 3.6
- Ranko Bakic (NSRzB) 3.4
- Nedo Đurić (DEPOS-DPS) 3
- Slavko Đadić (PB BOSS) 1.9

Bosnian Candidates %

- Haris Silajdžić (SBiH) 62.8
- Sulejman Thic (SDA) 27.5
- Mirnes Ajanović (BOSS-SDU BiH) 8.1

Croatian Candidates %

- Željko Komšić (SDP) 39.5
- Ivo Miro Jović (HDZ BiH) 26.1
- Božo Ljubić (HDZ 1990) 18.2
- Mladen Ivanović-Ljanić (NSRzB) 8.4
- Zvonko Jurdić (HSP BiH) 6.9

Participation: 54.5%

Serbia Referendum

28th October 2006

Following the separation of Serbia and Montenegro into two independent republics in May, a referendum was called to approve a new constitution. Under the new charter, Kosovo (a province under UN administration since 1999) is defined as “an autonomous province of Serbia with significant autonomy.” The new Constitution was approved with 53% of votes in favour and 54.9% voter turnout.

Montenegro Referendum on Independence

21st May 2006

A referendum was called to vote on the independence of the Republic of Montenegro from Serbia. A minimum turnout of 50% is required and at least 55% of votes must be in favour of independence in order to validate the referendum. A number of EU, US and OSCE
representatives and observers regarded the electoral process to be free and fair.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation: 86.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legislative elections**

10th September 2006

Previous elections: 21st October 2002

Parliamentary republic with a unicameral legislature. The 81 members of the Montenegrin Parliament (Skupština Republike Crne Gore) are elected by proportional representation for four-year terms of independence. These were the first elections held in the Republic of Montenegro since independence. According to the OSCE, the electoral process was in line with international standards.

**Parties % Seats**

- Coalition for European Montenegro (social democrat) 48.6 41
- Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS)
- Social Democratic Party (SDP)
- Croatian Civic Initiative (HGI)
- Serb List (conservative) 14.7 12
- Serbian People’s Party (SNS)
- Serbian Radical Party (SRS)
- Coalition of SNP/NS/DSS 14 11
- People’s Party (NS)
- Democratic Serbian Party (DSS)
- Movement for Changes (Pzp, reformist and pro-European) 13.1 11
- Liberal–Bosnian Coalition
- Montenegrin Liberal Party (LPCG)
- Bosnian Party in Montenegro (BS)
- Democratic League of Montenegro and Party of Democratic Prosperity (DSCG–PDP Coalition, Albanian minority) 1.3 1
- Democratic Union of Albanians (DUA) 1.1 1
- Albanian Alternative (AA) 0.8 1

Participation: 71.4%

**Macedonia**

**Legislative Elections**

5th July 2006

Previous elections: 15th September 2002

Parliamentary republic with a unicameral legislature. The 120 deputys of the Assembly (Sobranie) are elected for four-year terms of office. The OSCE’s electoral observation mission deemed the elections valid insofar as they were conducted in line with international democratic standards, although some irregularities were also reported on Election Day. According to Freedom House, the country rates as only partially free.

**Parties % Seats**

- Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for National Union (Christian democrat) 32.5 45
- Liberal Party of Macedonia (LPM)
- Socialist Party of Macedonia (SPM, Albanian minority)
- Democratic Union (DS)
- Party of Turkish Movement of Macedonia
- United Party of the Roma in Macedonia (OPRM)
- Party of Democratic Action of Macedonia
- Together for Macedonia (social democrat) 23.3 32
- Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM)
- Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
- Turkish Democratic Party (DPT)
- United Party of Romas in Macedonia (OPRM)
- Democratic Party of Serbs (DPS)
- Vlachs Democratic Union (DSV)
- Peasant Workers Party
- Socialist Christian Party Macedonia (SCPM)
- Green Party of Macedonia (ZPM)
- Democratic Union for Integration (BDI) 12.1 17
- Democratic Union for Integration (DUI, Albanian minority)
- Party for Democratic Progress (PDP, Albanian minority)
- Democratic League of Bosnians (DLB)
- Democratic Party of Albanians (PDS, Albanian minority) 7.2 11
- New Social Democratic Party (NSDP) 5.8 7
- Revolutionary Organisation – People’s Party (VMRO-NP, conservative) 5.8 6
- Democratic Renewal of Macedonia (DOM) 1.7 1
- Party for a European Future (PEF) 1.3 1

Participation: 73.5%

**Cyprus**

**Legislative Elections**

21st May 2006

Previous elections: 27th May 2001

Presidential democratic republic with a unicameral legislature. 59 members of the House of Representatives (Vouli) are elected by proportional representation for five-year terms of office, with the exception of the three representatives of the Maronite, Roman-Catholic and Armenian minorities. The 24 seats assigned to the Turkish Cypriots of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus remain vacant, as they refuse to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Cypriot Parliament. These are the first elections held since the Republic of Cyprus voted against the UN reunification plan in a referendum held in 2004. Voting is compulsory.

**Parties % Seats**

- Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL, socialist) 31.1 18
- Democratic Coalition (DISY, conservatives of the liberal party) 30.3 18
- Democratic Party (DIKO, liberal) 17.9 11
- Movement of Social Democrats (EDEK) 8.9 5
- European Party (EVRO.KO, centre) 5.7 3
- Green Party (ecologist) 1.9 1

Participation: 89%

**Israel**

**Legislative Elections**

28th March 2006

Previous elections: 27th January 2003

Parliamentary democratic republic with a unicameral legislature. The Parliament (Knesset) has 120 members that are elected by proportional representation in anticipated elections for four-year terms of office.

**Parties % Seats**

- Kadima (centre) 22 29
- Labour Party (centre left) 15 19
- Sephardi Religious Party (Shas, conservative) 9.5 12
- Likud (conservative) 9 12
- Yisrael Beytenu (Russian minority) 9 11
- National Union–National Religious Party 7.1 9
- Pensioners of Israel to the Knesset (GIL) 5.9 7
- United Torah Judaism (conservative) 4.7 6
- Meretz–Yachad (social democrat) 3.7 5
Palestine
Legislative Elections

25th January 2006

Territory not internationally recognized as a State. The Palestinian National Authority administers the government nominally in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Parliamentary elections are held to appoint 132 seats in the unicameral Legislative Council (Majlis al-Tashri'i) for a four-year term of office, and through a mixed election system that combines the majoritarian system (by district) and the system of proportional representation (by list). Over 900 international observers attended the elections. According to the EU observation mission, the electoral process was conducted in an efficient manner under the fair and professional administration of the Central Electoral Commission. According to Freedom House, the country rated as only partially free.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change and Reform – Hamas (conservative Islamist)</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah (secular nationalist)</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, socialist)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Alternative (socialist)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian People’s Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine Democratic Union Independents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Palestine</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian National Initiative Independents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Third Way (centre)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents and others</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation: 63.6%

Sources:
Adam Carr’s Electoral Archive: http://psephos.adam-carr.net
African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com
CNN: www.cnn.com/WORLD/election.watch
CIA World Factbook: www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook
Elections Around the World: www.electionworld.org
Freedom House: www.freedomhouse.org
IFES Electionguide: www.electionguide.org/index.php
Keesing’s Record of World Events: www.keesings.com
Parline Database: www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp
European Union Cooperation

**TABLE A1**

Official Aid to Mediterranean Countries Financed by the European Commission Budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**GRAPHIC A1**

EU Cooperation 2005

![EU Cooperation 2005](image_url)

### TABLE A2  MEDA Programme 2004-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Bilateral MEDA</strong></td>
<td><strong>562</strong></td>
<td><strong>627</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional MEDA</strong></td>
<td><strong>135</strong></td>
<td><strong>174</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (2004)</strong></td>
<td><strong>698</strong></td>
<td><strong>801</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (2005)</strong></td>
<td><strong>735</strong></td>
<td><strong>781</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### GRAPHIC A2  Evolution of the MEDA Programme (1995-2005)

![Graph showing the evolution of MEDA Programme commitments and payments from 1995 to 2005](image-url)


### TABLE A3  CARDS Programme 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Commitments*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Bilateral</strong></td>
<td><strong>395</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional cooperation</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>539</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The European Commission has not published data on payments by country for 2006.*

### TABLE A4 Mediterranean Candidate Countries for Accession to EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHARE programme and pre-accession financial assistance 2005</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj.1: Democracy and Rule of Law</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj. 2: Human rights and protection of minorities</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj. 3: Economic criteria</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj. 4: Internal market and trade</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj. 5: Sectoral policies</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj. 6: Cooperation in justice and home affairs</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj. 7: Supporting programmes</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj. 8: Economic and social cohesion</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>277.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-accession financial assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj.1: Copenhagen political criteria and justice, freedom and security issues</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj.2: Economic and social cohesion</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj.3: Harmonisation with the Acquis</td>
<td>82.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj.4: Civil society dialogue and support for European integration</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A5 European Investment Bank Loans to the Mediterranean Countries in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans by sector</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of urban by-pass near Split</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of air traffic control infrastructures</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of roads and bridges</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of eight pre-university schools and modernisation of special needs schools</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale ventures</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair and upgrading of 70 km road between Fier and Tepelene on Albania’s north-sound corridor</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of tunnel including submarine section under the Bosphorus and upgrading of rail network</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of wastewater treatment plant and rehabilitation of networks</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation of new float-glass line in Yenisehir</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of company specialising in medium-term financing of SMEs</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading and rebuilding of rural roads</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of the Settat-Marrakech motorway</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale ventures</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of five regional technology parks combining research, training and production activities</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale ventures</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of second natural gas liquefaction train at Idku plant</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of two natural gas pipelines between El Tina and Abu Sultan and between Dashour and El Kureimat</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of equity and quasi-equity participations in private companies</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a combined cycle power plant</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of fixed line telephone network in rural areas</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a motorway section linking Beirut and Damascus</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of wastewater treatment plant</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale ventures</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza-West Bank</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading and reinforcement of power grid</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation and operation of credit guarantee fund for small and medium-sized enterprises</td>
<td>10</td>
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</table>

### TABLE A6: European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in Mediterranean Countries: Funds Allocated for Executing Micro Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(in euros)</th>
<th>Campaign 2 Fostering a culture of human rights</th>
<th>Campaign 3 Promoting the democratic process</th>
<th>Campaign 4 Advancing equality, tolerance and peace</th>
<th>Campaign 2 Fostering a culture of human rights</th>
<th>Campaign 3 Promoting the democratic process</th>
<th>Campaign 4 Advancing equality, tolerance and peace</th>
<th>Allocations in total 2005 (in EUR)</th>
<th>Allocations in total 2006 (in EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Balkans and Candidate Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>185,000</td>
<td>525,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>152,500</td>
<td>402,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>575,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>855,000</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>235,000</td>
<td>615,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>745,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>535,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>280,000</td>
<td>515,000</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>515,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>765,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>460,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>515,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>765,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>280,000</td>
<td>855,000</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>235,000</td>
<td>615,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>460,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>515,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>765,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>150,000</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>250,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>300,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>275,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>575,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,275,000</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,180,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A7: European Agency for Reconstruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2005 projects (in millions of euros)</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Contracts</th>
<th>Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>152.8</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>34.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Own production. Source: [www.ear.eu.int/agency/agency.htm](http://www.ear.eu.int/agency/agency.htm)*

### TABLE A8: EU Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO)

#### Financial Decisions for Humanitarian Aid to Mediterranean regions in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>MENA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria (Western Sahara)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<td>Middle East</td>
<td>36.5</td>
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</table>

Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE B1</th>
<th>Budget Implementation by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maghreb and Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahrawi Refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Programmes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central and Eastern Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries (ICS-CEEC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Total</td>
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</table>

Source: AECI Deputy Director-General of Cooperation in Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRAPHIC B1</th>
<th>Distribution of Spanish Cooperation in the Maghreb and the Middle East by Sector (2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: AECI Deputy Director-General of Cooperation in Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects/Programmes</th>
<th>NGDOs</th>
<th>Food and Emergency Aid</th>
<th>Budgetary Support/ SWAP/Global Funds</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Cultural DGs</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maghreb and Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6,850,914</td>
<td>5,485,482</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>1,905,247</td>
<td>14,491,643</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>4,976,883</td>
<td>3,416,793</td>
<td>3,790,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>14,733,777</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2,144,118</td>
<td>2,219,918</td>
<td>18,349</td>
<td>1,685,000</td>
<td>195,776</td>
<td>6,263,162</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1,249,177</td>
<td>1,008,340</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>708,640</td>
<td>3,021,158</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,086,643</td>
<td>430,961</td>
<td></td>
<td>458,754</td>
<td>1,976,359</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sahrawi Refugees</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>1,257,757</td>
<td>4,216,514</td>
<td></td>
<td>174,453</td>
<td>5,948,724</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,262,634</td>
<td>278,270</td>
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<td>623,888</td>
<td>2,164,592</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>645,491</td>
<td>365,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>219,951</td>
<td>1,280,442</td>
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<tr>
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<td>529,416</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>153,077</td>
<td>982,493</td>
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<td>143,054</td>
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<td>123,431</td>
<td>266,485</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>320,591</td>
<td>3,334,130</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>434,783</td>
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<tr>
<td>RegionalProgrammes</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,908,218</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Maghreb and Middle East</strong></td>
<td>20,805,509</td>
<td>14,712,521</td>
<td>8,024,863</td>
<td>4,434,783</td>
<td>5,793,287</td>
<td>56,805,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>36.63%</td>
<td>25.90%</td>
<td>14.13%</td>
<td>7.81%</td>
<td>5.34%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Central and Eastern Europe

| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 1,771,707 | 1,616,402 | 113,000 | 120,118 | 3,621,228 |
| Serbia and Montenegro | 517,366 | 813,026  | 198,924 | 1,529,316 |
| Albania             | 478,883   | 676,151   | 55,000  | 27,817  | 1,237,851 |
| Other Countries (CIS-CEEC) | 107,641 | 459,330  | 591,304 | 1,790,514 | 2,948,790 |
| **Total**           | 2,875,398 | 3,564,909 | 591,304 | 168,000 | 9,336,984 |
| Percentages         | 30.80%   | 38.18%    | 0.00%   | 6.33%   | 100.00%    |

Source: AECI Deputy Director-General of Cooperation in Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries.
Migrations in the Mediterranean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Foreigners</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>EuroMed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Belgium (2006)</td>
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<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
<td>42,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (2001)</td>
<td>254,294</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3,263,186</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (2007)</td>
<td>235,352</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2006)</td>
<td>1,938,209</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia (2000)</td>
<td>274,495</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (2002)</td>
<td>224,261</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (1999)</td>
<td>3,263,186</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (2005)</td>
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<td>1,015</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>144,031</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia (2004)</td>
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<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>144,031</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg (2002)</td>
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<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (2005)</td>
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<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2006)</td>
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<td>144,031</td>
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<td>Austria (2001)</td>
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<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (2002)</td>
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<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
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<td>2,563</td>
<td>144,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (2005)</td>
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<td>2,563</td>
<td>1,003,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia (2005)</td>
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<td>1,003,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia (2005)</td>
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<td>1,003,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (2006)</td>
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<td>2,563</td>
<td>1,003,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (2006)</td>
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<td>1,015</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>1,003,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>2,563</td>
<td>1,003,399</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Total: 27,855,719

Own production. Source: For DE, AT, BE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GB, NL, IE, IT, LU, PT, SE and CY data from the National Statistical Offices. ES data from the Permanent Immigration Observatory. For BG, SK, SI, HU, LV, LT, PL, CZ, and RO, data by Eurostat. Last data available for each source.
### TABLE C2
**Workers’ Remittances by Region of Destination and Reporting Country in 2000 and 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td>1.2</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,161.3</td>
<td>3,233.8</td>
<td>481.8</td>
<td>2,010.5</td>
<td>318.6</td>
<td>647.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: European Commission. DG of Economic and Financial Affairs: Second EU survey on workers’ remittances from the EU to third countries, 2006

### TABLE C3
**Major Destinations of EU Remittances by Country of Destination, (2004)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country of destination</th>
<th>Country of destination (€ million)</th>
<th>% of total remittances</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country of destination</th>
<th>Country of destination (€ million)</th>
<th>% of total remittances*</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,193.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>761.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>664.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>16.5</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>290.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>239.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>177.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>120.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total remittances to non EU countries

Source: European Commission. DG of Economic and Financial Affairs: Second EU survey on workers’ remittances from the EU to third countries, 2006
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

### TABLE D1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Negotiations Started</th>
<th>Agreement Concluded</th>
<th>Agreement Signed</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>June - 1997</td>
<td>December - 2001</td>
<td>April - 2002</td>
<td>September - 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>March - 1998</td>
<td>October - 2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Interim agreement signed between the EU and PLO (to the benefit of the Palestinian National Authority)

• The Association Agreements need to be ratified by the European Parliament, the parliament of the member country and the parliaments of the twenty-five EU member states to enter into effect.

• The Association Agreement between Lebanon and the European Union came into force on 1st April 2006, replacing an interim agreement that only dealt with the commercial aspects of the association and had been in effect since 1st March 2003.

• Turkey will be governed by the customs union that came into force in January 1996 and is based on the first generation agreement of 1963, until its accession to the EU.

• Since its participation at the 1999 Stuttgart Conference as the special guest of the EU Presidency, Libya has taken part as an observer at some of the Barcelona Process meetings.

### TABLE D2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Negotiations Started</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
<th>Agreement Signed</th>
<th>(Interim Agreement)</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>January - 2003</td>
<td>June - 2006</td>
<td>December - 2006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
<td>November - 2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>November - 2000</td>
<td>October - 2001</td>
<td>March - 2002</td>
<td>February - 2005</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>March - 2000</td>
<td>April - 2001</td>
<td>June - 2001</td>
<td>April - 2004</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>October - 2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>October - 2005/July - 2006*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*A referendum was held on 21st May 2006 that approved the independence of Montenegro from the Federation it formed with Serbia.

• The EU’s relations with Western Balkan countries are located in the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The SAP is the framework for various instruments and helps countries to implement the political and economic transition that prepares them for a new contractual relationship with the EU: the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) to advance towards a stronger association with the EU.

• On 3rd May 2006, the European Commission decided to suspend the SAA negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro due to their insufficient collaboration with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). On 24th July, the EU Council issued a mandate for the negotiation of a SAA with Montenegro after consolidating its independence, based on the previous mandate issued in relation to the now dissolved federation with Serbia.

• In March 2003, Croatia submitted an application to join the EU. In October 2005, the European Council approved the opening of negotiations. On 8th November 2006, the European Commission published its first assessment report, which valued the progress achieved by Croatia very highly.

• In November 2005, the European Commission gave the go-ahead for the conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations with Albania, which was signed in Luxembourg on 12th June 2006. Since December 2006, an Interim Agreement is in force that only deals with the commercial aspects of the association.
## Signature of Multilateral Treaties and Conventions

### TABLE E1  
**Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights and Penal Matters**

|------------------|------------------|---------------|------------|-------------|-----------|------------|---------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|

### TABLE E2  
**Multilateral Treaties on Labour Rights**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
<th>Freedom of association and collective bargaining</th>
<th>Elimination of forced or obligatory labour</th>
<th>Elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation</th>
<th>Abolition of child labour</th>
<th>Rights of immigrant workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Source
- A. Ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession.  
- B. Signature.  
- D. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
- F. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.  
- G. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  
- J. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  
- L. On 23rd October 2006, Montenegro, as an independent state, notified the accession of the above treaties.
**TABLE E3**  
**Multilateral Treaties in the field of the Environment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Strategy for Sustainable Development</th>
<th>Number of municipalities involved in Agenda 21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of adoption</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of adoption</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE E4**  
**Multilateral Disarmament Treaties**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>National Strategy for Sustainable Development</th>
<th>Number of municipalities involved in Agenda 21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of adoption</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** UN UN UN UN CITES UN UN UN WRI

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**Notes:**

- a. Framework Convention on Climate Change. b. From the Framework Convention on Climate Change. c. Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity to the Convention on Biological Diversity. d. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna. e. Convention to Combat Desertification. f. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. g. Ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession. h. Signature. i. The national strategy on sustainable development can be found at different stages which range from lesser to greater commitment, from the absence of data, to the setting up of various components of sustainable development, the progress of the strategy, approval by the government and ending with its implementation. j. Year of update. k. Year of update. l. On 23rd October 2006, Montenegro, as an independent state, notified the accession of the various disarmament treaties. m. Serbia and Montenegro, as independent states, notified the accession and succession, respectively, to the Biosecurity Protocol.
The Mediterranean in Brief

### TABLE F1: Human Development Index (HDI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate ≥ age 15</th>
<th>Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio</th>
<th>GDP per capita 2004 PPP $</th>
<th>Human Development Index 2004</th>
<th>Position in HDI ranking 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data</strong></td>
<td><strong>years</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>PPP$</strong></td>
<td><strong>UNDP</strong></td>
<td><strong>UNESCO</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Portugal</strong></td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>19,629</td>
<td>0.904</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>79.7</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25,047</td>
<td>0.938</td>
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<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>29,300</td>
<td>0.842</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>87</td>
<td>28,180</td>
<td>0.940</td>
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<td>97.9</td>
<td>82</td>
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<td><strong>Bosnia-Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>67*</td>
<td>7,032</td>
<td>0.800</td>
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<td><strong>Serbia and Montenegro</strong></td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>75*</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Macedonia</strong></td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>6,610</td>
<td>0.796</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4,978</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Greece</strong></td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>22,205</td>
<td>0.921</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>Cyprus</strong></td>
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<td>96.8</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22,805</td>
<td>0.903</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
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<td>87.4</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>65</td>
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<td>24,382</td>
<td>0.927</td>
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<td><strong>Palestine</strong></td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>2,331</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>76*</td>
<td>4,211</td>
<td>0.702</td>
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<td>91</td>
<td>7,570</td>
<td>0.798</td>
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<td><strong>Tunisia</strong></td>
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<td>74.3</td>
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<td><strong>Algeria</strong></td>
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<td>4,309</td>
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<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: UNDP. 

* UNDP data for 2006. (..) Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F1: HDI Trends (1975-2004)

Graph showing the trend of HDI from 1975 to 2004 for a selection of countries, including Norway, United States, Mexico, Russian Federation, China, India, Mauritania, and Niger. HDIs range from 0.00 to 1.00.

Own production. Source: UNDP.
TABLE F2  Population: Demography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total population 2005 (millions)</th>
<th>Total population 2005 (per 1,000 people)</th>
<th>Crude birth rate per 1,000</th>
<th>Crude death rate per 1,000</th>
<th>Average annual population growth rate 1990-2004 %</th>
<th>Fertility rate per woman</th>
<th>Net annual average number of immigrants 2004 (thousands)</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
<th>Net number of migrants 2000/05 (thousands)</th>
<th>Net migration rate 2000/05 per 1,000 people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>764</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>43.1</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4,790</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>405</td>
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</tr>
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<td>France</td>
<td>60.5</td>
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Own production. Source: UNPOP

a. UNICEF. b. WHO. c. Net annual average in emigrants: the annual number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants. d. Net number of migrants divided by the average of the population of the receiving country for the period.

GRAPHIC F2  Population and Demographic Trends

Own production. Source: UNPOP.
### TABLE F3  Population: Structure and Distribution

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Own production. Source: WB and UNDP.

### GRAPHIC F3  Population Age Composition: Children and Adults (2004)

Own production. Source: WB and UNDP.
### TABLE F4: Education and Training of Human Capital

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 Own production. Source: UNESCO.

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#### GRAPHIC F4: Students Abroad (2004)

Countries with highest student mobility

Own production. Source: UNESCO.
### TABLE F5  Health and Survival

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Infant mortality rate</th>
<th>Maternal mortality ratio</th>
<th>People living with HIV/AIDS (age 15-49)</th>
<th>Prevalence of smoking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>per 1,000 live births</td>
<td>under-five per 1,000 live births</td>
<td>per 100,000 births</td>
<td>low estimate</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>19,000-53,000</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>84,000-230,000</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>4</td>
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 Own production. Source: WHO, UNFPA, UNAIDS, WB.


[Life expectancy graph showing trends over time for different countries in the Mediterranean region, with data for 1970-75 and 2004 highlighted.]

Own production. Source: UNDP.
### TABLE F6 Nutrition and Food Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dietary energy consumption</th>
<th>Cereals trade</th>
<th>Children under weight for age</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kcal/person/day</td>
<td>imports</td>
<td>exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>3,630</td>
<td>1,428,564</td>
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<td>9,916,430</td>
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<td>189,110</td>
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<td>501,439</td>
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<td>1,807,429</td>
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Own production. Source: FAO. *Latest data available for this period.*  (..) Data not available.

### GRAPHIC F6 Cereals Trade (2004)

*Own production. Source: FAO.*
TABLE F7  Access to Health Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population with sustainable access to an improved water source</th>
<th>Population with access to improved sanitation</th>
<th>Births attended by skilled health personnel</th>
<th>Contraceptive prevalence rate</th>
<th>Adolescent fertility rate</th>
<th>Public health expenditure</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population per physician</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>77</td>
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Own production. Source: UNDP, UNDP, UNDP, UNFPA, WB, WB.
a. Latest data available for the period. b. Mainly women aged 15-49. c. Including all methods. (..) Data not available.

GRAPHIC F7  Health in the Mediterranean (2000-2004)*

Own production. Source: WB and WHO.
a. Latest data available for the period.
### TABLE F8  Gender: Social Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Adult literacy ≥ rate age 15</th>
<th>Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio</th>
<th>Year women received right to vote</th>
<th>Year women received right to stand for election</th>
<th>Year first woman elected or appointed to Parliament</th>
<th>Seats in Parliament held by women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>women: years</td>
<td>men: years</td>
<td>women: %</td>
<td>men: %</td>
<td>women: years</td>
<td>men: years</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
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<td>80.8</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>1944</td>
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<td>87</td>
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<td>82</td>
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<td>99</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>81.0</td>
<td>75.7</td>
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<td>98</td>
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<td>72.2</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>65</td>
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</table>

Own production. Source: UNDP. 

a. Referring to the first year appointed in the current parliamentary system. b. 2003 data. c. The date refers to the first year in which a woman was nominated in Parliament. d. First partial recognition of the right to vote or stand for election. e. Situation on 31 December, 2006. f. Latest data available for this period. g. 2001 data. h. The data are for the Parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro respectively. (..) Data not available.

---

### GRAPHIC F8  Life Expectancy by Gender (2004)

![Life Expectancy by Gender (2004)](image_url)

- **5 countries with the biggest differences**
  - Spain
  - Malta
  - Greece
  - Bulgaria
  - Romania

- **5 countries with the smallest differences**
  - Portugal
  - Belgium
  - France
  - Germany
  - Switzerland

Own production. Source: UNDP.
TABLE F9  Technology and Communications

| Country             | Daily newspapers per 1,000 people 2000 | Daily newspapers per 1,000 people 2001/03 | Television sets per 1,000 people 2000 | Television sets per 1,000 people 2001/03 | Telephone mainlines per 1,000 people 2000 | Telephone mainlines per 1,000 people 2001/03 | Outgoing international calls per 1,000 people minutes per capita 2000 | Outgoing international calls per 1,000 people minutes per capita 2001/03 | Incoming international calls per 1,000 people minutes per capita 2000 | Incoming international calls per 1,000 people minutes per capita 2001/03 | Mobile phones per 1,000 people 2000 | Mobile phones per 1,000 people 2001/03 | Personal computers per 1,000 people 2000 | Personal computers per 1,000 people 2001/03 | Internet users per 1,000 people 2000 | Internet users per 1,000 people 2001/03 | Annual investment in telecommunications technology expenditures millions $ 2000 | Annual investment in telecommunications technology expenditures millions $ 2001/03 | % of GDP 2000 | % of GDP 2001/03 |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Portugal            | 102                                      | 413                                       | 404                                     | 404                                       | 51                                        | 85                                        | 981                                       | 133                                       | 281                                       | 1,975                                     | 4.3                                       | 4.3                                       | 4.3                                       | 4.3                                       | 4.3                                       | 4.3                                       | 4.3                                       | 4.3                                       | 4.3                                       |
| Spain               | 98                                        | 560                                       | 416                                     | 416                                       | 80                                        | 40                                        | 905                                       | 257                                       | 336                                       | 5,103                                     | 3.5                                       | 3.5                                       | 3.5                                       | 3.5                                       | 3.5                                       | 3.5                                       | 3.5                                       | 3.5                                       | 3.5                                       |
| France              | 142                                       | 629                                       | 561                                     | 561                                       | 79                                        | 126                                       | 738                                       | 487                                       | 414                                       | 5,472                                     | 5.6                                       | 5.6                                       | 5.6                                       | 5.6                                       | 5.6                                       | 5.6                                       | 5.6                                       | 5.6                                       | 5.6                                       |
| Italy               | 109                                       | 556                                       | 523b                                    | 523b                                      | 55                                        | 167                                       | 700b                                     | 270b                                      | 303b                                      | 57                                        | 57                                        | 57                                        | 57                                        | 57                                        | 57                                        | 57                                        | 57                                        | 57                                        | 57                                        |
| Malta               | 168                                       | 366                                       | 407                                     | 407                                       | 54                                        | 871                                       | 353                                       | 476                                       | 170                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       |
| Slovenia            | 134                                       | 245                                       | 82                                      | 82                                        | 96                                        | 575                                       | 190                                       | 293                                       | 182                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       | 4.0                                       |
| Croatia             | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                      | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina  | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                      | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Serbia and Montenegro | ..                                    | ..                                        | ..                                      | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Macedonia           | 54                                        | 259                                       | 31                                      | 92                                        | 383                                       | 69                                        | 78                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Albania             | ..                                        | 319                                       | 82                                      | 20                                        | 130                                       | 356                                       | 12                                        | 24                                        | 32                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Greece              | ..                                        | ..                                        | 499                                     | ..                                        | 466                                       | ..                                        | 86                                        | ..                                        | 89                                        | ..                                        | 2,158                                     | 4.2                                       | 4.2                                       | 4.2                                       | 4.2                                       | 4.2                                       | 4.2                                       | 4.2                                       | 4.2                                       | 4.2                                       |
| Cyprus              | ..                                        | 366                                       | 688b                                    | 464                                       | 212                                       | 580b                                     | 215b                                     | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Turkey              | ..                                        | 402                                       | 267                                     | 14                                        | 18                                        | 484                                       | 52                                        | 142                                       | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Syria               | ..                                        | 177                                       | 143                                     | 11                                        | 27                                        | 126                                       | 32                                        | 43                                        | 147                                       | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Lebanon             | 63                                        | 346                                       | 178                                     | 27                                        | 251                                       | 113                                       | 169                                       | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Jordan              | 74                                        | 172                                       | 113                                     | 43                                        | 57                                        | 293                                       | 55                                        | 110                                       | 84                                        | 306                                       | 5.3                                       | 5.3                                       | 5.3                                       | 5.3                                       | 5.3                                       | 5.3                                       | 5.3                                       | 5.3                                       | 5.3                                       |
| Israel              | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                      | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Palestine           | ..                                        | 141                                       | 102                                     | 11                                        | 21                                        | 278                                       | 48                                        | 34                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Egypt               | 31                                        | 248                                       | 130                                     | 4                                          | 17                                        | 105                                       | 32                                        | 54                                        | 513                                       | 1.4                                       | 1.4                                       | 1.4                                       | 1.4                                       | 1.4                                       | 1.4                                       | 1.4                                       | 1.4                                       | 1.4                                       | 1.4                                       |
| Libya               | 14                                        | ..                                        | 133                                     | 9                                          | ..                                        | 24                                        | 36                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Tunisia             | 19                                        | 207                                       | 121                                     | 20                                        | 40                                        | 359                                       | 48                                        | 36                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Algeria             | 27                                        | 169                                       | 71                                      | 7                                          | ..                                        | 145                                       | 9                                          | 28                                        | 96                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        | ..                                        |
| Morocco             | 29                                        | 81                                        | 44                                      | 9                                          | 39                                        | 313                                       | 21                                        | 117                                       | 8                                          | 5.5                                       | 5.5                                       | 5.5                                       | 5.5                                       | 5.5                                       | 5.5                                       | 5.5                                       | 5.5                                       | 5.5                                       | 5.5                                       |

Own production. Source: WB, UNCTAD, WBTU, ITU. (*) Represented by the number of times in which an increase in subscribers was recorded for both periods.


Own production. Source: UNCTAD, WB, ITU.
(*) Represented by the number of times in which an increase in subscribers was recorded for both periods.
TABLE F10  Security and Military Expenditure

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<th>By country of asylum</th>
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<th>Conventional arms transfer</th>
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Own production. Source: IDMC UNDP UNDP UNDP SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI


GRAPHIC F10  Armed Forces with Respect to Population and Borders (2006)

The Mediterranean: twice as militarized as the world's average (2005)

- Armed forces (millions troops)
- Population (millions)

Number of troops / 10,000 inhabitants
Number of troops / km along border

Own production Source: UNPD, UNPOP and CIA.
### TABLE F11  Economic Structure and Production

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Own production. Source: WB.


- **Agriculture**
- **Industry**
- **Services**

Own production. Source: WB.

(*) Numbers show the percentage by sector.

World average: 68% Agriculture, 28% Industry, 4% Services.
### TABLE F12  Agriculture

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Land area</th>
<th>Agricultural area</th>
<th>Arable and permanent crops</th>
<th>Permanent pastures</th>
<th>Irrigated land</th>
<th>Land under cereal production</th>
<th>Cereal production</th>
<th>Cereal yield</th>
<th>Fertilizer consumption</th>
<th>Agricultural population</th>
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Own production. Source: FAO.  

Agricultural area is divided in "arable land and permanent crops" and "prairies and permanent pastures". (%) Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F12  Cereal Production: Area, Yield and Production (2005)

*Cereal yield (a selection of countries) (kg/ha)*

*World average*

*Cereal production (thousands mt)*

*Production (thousands mt)*

*Land area (thousands ha)*

Own production. Source: FAO.
### TABLE F13  Livestock

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<th>Live animals</th>
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<th>Live animals trade$</th>
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<td>bovine, caprine and ovine$</td>
<td>pigs</td>
<td>poultry$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>thousands</td>
<td>thousands</td>
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Own production. Source: FAO. 

$a$ Includes bovine, caprine and ovine livestock and buffalos. 
b Includes chickens, ducks, turkeys and geese. 
c Includes horses, donkeys, mules and camels. 
d Includes all the above categories and other unspecified animals.

### GRAPHIC F13  Beehive Distribution (2005) and Natural Honey Trade (2004)
### TABLE F14  Fisheries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total catch marine mt</th>
<th>Total catch freshwater mt</th>
<th>Mediterranean and Black Sea catches mt</th>
<th>Aquaculture production mt</th>
<th>Trade in fish and derivative products</th>
<th>Average annual supply of fish and fish derivatives</th>
<th>Fishers</th>
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<td>70,179</td>
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Own production. Source: FAO and WRI.

Data not available.

### GRAPHIC F14  Fishing and Fishers of the Mediterranean (2004)


- **China**: 16.9
- **Peru**: 9.6
- **United States**: 5.0
- **Chile**: 4.9
- **Indonesia**: 4.8
- **Japan**: 4.4
- **Ireland**: 3.6
- **Russian Federation**: 2.9
- **Thailand**: 2.8
- **Norway**: 2.5

Average catches per fisher (mt)

Number of fishers
### TABLE F15  Employment and Unemployment

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<th>Employment by economic sector</th>
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<td>% labor force</td>
<td>% female labor force</td>
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<td>2002/05*</td>
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<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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*Latest data available for the period. n.d = no data.

### GRAPHIC F15  Unemployment in the Mediterranean (2002-2005)*

Overall unemployment rate
- Middle East and North Africa
- Eastern Europe and Central Asia
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- European Monetary Union
- South Asia
- East Asia and the Pacific

Total unemployment rate (% labor force)  Women unemployment rate (% female labor force)  Youth unemployment rate (% labor force ages 15-24)
### TABLE F16  Distribution of Income

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of Income or Consumption</th>
<th>Survey year</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Richest 10 % to poorest 10 %</th>
<th>Gini Index</th>
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<td>48.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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*Own production. Source: WB. (Data unavailable.)*

### GRAPHIC F16  Share of Income (1995-2003)* (%)

*Latest data available for this period.*
TABLE F17  Gender: Economic Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Female economic activity rate ≥ age 15</th>
<th>Employment by economic activity</th>
<th>Estimated earned income</th>
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<td>% of male rate</td>
<td>% of female employment</td>
<td>% of male employment</td>
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</table>

Own production. Source: UNDP.

*Latest data available for the period.
*France and Malta data correspond to the period 1995-2003 (UNDP, 2006) and are therefore not comparable to the rest. 

GRAPHIC F17  Economic Inequality by Gender (2004)

The diagonal line shows an ideal equitable income distribution between genders. Own production. Source: UNDP.
### TABLE F18  Energy Production and Consumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Energy production</th>
<th>Energy use</th>
<th>GDP per unit of energy use</th>
<th>Net energy imports</th>
<th>Energy consumption by source</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>thousands mt oil eq</td>
<td>thousands mt oil eq</td>
<td>kg oil eq</td>
<td>% of energy use</td>
<td>% fossil fuels</td>
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Source: WB

a. WRI. (..) Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F18  Energy Consumption, Dependence and Efficiency (2003)

Own production. Source: WB.

Algeria -- with 395% net energy imports -- is not included in the graph for space reasons.
### TABLE F19  Production, Consumption and Access to Electricity

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electricity Sources of electricity</th>
<th>Population with access to electricity</th>
<th>Electricity production</th>
<th>Electricity consumption per capita</th>
<th>Nuclear power</th>
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Own production. Source: WB and WRI.

### GRAPHIC F19  Electricity Consumption (kWh per capita) (2003)

- **Middle East and North Africa**
- **World average**
- **European Monetary Union**

Own production. Source: WB and WRI.
### TABLE F20  CO₂ Emissions

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<th>CO₂ emissions by sectors</th>
<th>Motor vehicles(^b)</th>
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</tr>
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</table>

 Own production. Source: UNDP/UNPOP UNDP UNDP UNDP WRI WRI WRI WRI Bleu Plan.
\(^a\) Latest data available for the period 1999-2002. WB. \(^b\) Not including motorbikes. \(^c\) 1999 data. \(^d\) WRI. \(^e\) 2000 data. Includes Monaco. \(^f\) Includes San Marino. \(^g\) Includes San Marino. \(^h\) 2002 data, WRI. \(^i\) Less than half of the unit shown. (\(^n\)) Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F20  Mediterranean Contribution to Climate Change (2003)

- **Share in world CO₂ emissions (%):**
  - 2.1% Sub-Saharan Africa
  - 4.8% Arab States
  - 5.3% Latin America and the Caribbean
  - 7.2% Southern Mediterranean
  - 8.5% Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
  - 12.2% OECD countries

- **CO₂ emissions (millions mt):**
  - 60
  - 150
  - 300

- **CO₂ emissions (mt per capita):**
  - 2
  - 4
  - 6
  - 8
  - 10
  - 12

- **Population (millions):**
  - 0
  - 10
  - 20
  - 30
  - 40
  - 50
  - 60
  - 70
  - 80

Own production. Source: UNPOP and UNDP.
TABLE F21  Water

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Own production. Source: FAO

GRAPHIC F21  Water Dependency (2003-2007)*

*Latest data available for this period.
Own production. Source: FAO
### TABLE F22  Environment

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<th>Deserts and dryland areas</th>
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<td>thousands m²</td>
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**Own production. Source:** FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO WRI WRI WRI IUCN WWF

- Includes 200-meter deep continental shelf.
- According to categories I-V of the IUCN.
- Includes only mammals and birds.
- Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F22  Forest Fires in Mediterranean Europe* (1980-2005)

*Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece.
### TABLE F23  International Trade

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Own production. Source: WB

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### GRAPHIC F23  Foreign Direct Investment (Inward Flows 2004) (% of GDP)

Selected countries and regions (in millions $)

**Own production. Source: WB**
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<th>fuels</th>
<th>ores and metals</th>
<th>manufactured goods</th>
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Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

a. French data includes Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique and Réunion. (..) Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F24  Exports in the Mediterranean (2002-2004)

[Graph showing exports distribution across Mediterranean countries]

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

(1) 1990 data.
### TABLE F25 Imports

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Own production. Source: UNCTAD

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![Imports in the Mediterranean (2002-2004)](image)

Own production. Source: UNCTAD

(1) 1990 data.
TABLE 26  Tourism in the Mediterranean

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<th>International tourism expenditures</th>
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Own production. Source: UNWTO. UNWTO. UNWTO. UNCTAD. WB. WB. WB. WB.

a. Latest data available for this period. (..) Data unavailable.

GRAPHIC 26  Inbound Tourists (2003-2005*)

Own production. Source: UNWTO. (*) Latest data available for this period.
## Official Development Assistance (ODA)

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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: OECD.  

---

### TABLE F27

Official Development Assistance (ODA) in DAC Countries (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ODA from non-DAC donors (millions $ 2005)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>153</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>146</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>255</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1,734</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Saudi Arabia data are of 2004. China also provides aid, but does not disclose the amount.

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### GRAPHIC F27

Official Development Assistance in DAC Countries (2005)

Own production. Source: OECD.
### TABLE F28: External Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>External debt</th>
<th></th>
<th>Debt service</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>millions $</td>
<td>% of GNI</td>
<td>$ per capita</td>
<td>millions $</td>
<td>% of GNI</td>
<td>% of exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>31,548</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>6,858</td>
<td>4,787</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>3,202</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>15,882</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2,044</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
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<td>- -</td>
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<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>161,595</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2,208</td>
<td>30,397</td>
<td>11.3</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>21,521</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>22,177</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>6,160</td>
<td>4,473</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>8,175</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>30,291</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>18,700</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>1,999</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>21,987</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>5,204</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>17,672</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>2,861</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: WB, UNPOP and OECD.

* Own production with data from WB and UNPOP.

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Countries with the largest debt service (% of GNI) (2004):

- 21.2: Kazakhstan
- 18.1: Lebanon
- 16.1: Hungary
- 15.8: Guinea
- 15.8: Croatia
- 14.2: Palau
- 13.8: Estonia
- 13.7: Burundi
- 13.6: Palau
- 13.5: Guinea
- 9.1: Kazakhstan

Own production. Source: WB, UNPOP and OECD.
Definitions

Adolescent fertility rate
Number of births per thousand women aged between fifteen and nineteen.

Adult literacy rate
Percentage of people over fifteen years of age who can read, write and understand a short, simple text about their daily life.

Agricultural land area
Land surface area made up of arable and permanently cultivated lands and by permanent meadows and pastures.

Agricultural population
Persons who depend on agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry for their subsistence. This category includes all those who carry out an agricultural activity and everything this entails without official employment.

Annual population growth rate
Exponential change in the growth of the population during the period indicated.

Aquaculture production
Includes marine, freshwater and diadromous fish, molluscs and crustaceans cultivated in marine, inland or brackish environments.

Arable lands and permanent crops
Agricultural surface area that groups the data on arable or farm land and land used for permanent crops. Arable and farm land is land given over to temporary crops (those giving two yields are only counted once), temporal meadows for cutting or grazing, land dedicated to commercial gardens or orchards and land temporarily fallow for a period of less than five years. The term does not include land that has been abandoned as a result of migratory cultivation. Land destined for permanent crops refers to land dedicated to crops that occupy the terrain during long periods and that do not need to be re-planted after each harvest, such as cacao, coffee and rubber. It includes land occupied by bushes destined to flower production, fruit trees, nut trees and vineyards, but excludes land planted with trees destined to the production of firewood or wood.

Armed forces
Strategic, land, naval, aerial, command and support forces. It also includes paramilitary forces, such as the gendarmerie, the customs services and the border guard if they are trained in military strategy.

Average annual supply of fish and fish derivatives
Calculated from the disposability of fish and its derivatives for human consumption, divided by the total population within the geographical borders of any given country. Nationals living in other countries are excluded, although foreigners living in the country are included.

Births attended by skilled health personnel
Percentage of births attended by health personnel (physicians, nurses and midwives) that are trained in the care, supervision and counseling of women during pregnancy, birthgiving and puerperium, and who can also deliver babies and assist them on their own.

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions
The emissions of carbon dioxide produced in the burning of all fossil fuels used by a country.

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions by sector
Shows the proportion of carbon dioxide emissions produced by the burning of fossil fuels in the sectors of transport, industry and electricity production. The transport sector includes emissions produced by all forms of transport by road, rail and air, including agricultural vehicles travelling by road. International journeys by boat or aeroplane are excluded. The industrial and construction sector includes emissions produced by all types of industry and construction. The electricity sector includes emissions produced by the generation of electricity for public use, including thermal power stations.

Carbon intensity
Average quantity of CO₂ emitted per unit of income generated by a particular economy.

Cereal production
The figures for cereal production only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage or used for grazing are therefore excluded.
Cereal production yield
The outputs per hectare have been calculated using the data on surface area and production.

Cereal trade
The figures obtained by the FAO, are supplied by the respective governments in the questionnaires sent out by the FAO.

Children underweight for their age
Percentage of children under five whose weight and height for their age is less than twice the standard deviation in comparison with the average for the relevant age group. The population of reference is the child population of the USA, which is assumed to be well nourished.

Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools
Number of students registered in the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education, regardless of age, as a percentage of the population having the official age to receive education at the three levels.

Consumer price index
Reflects changes in the cost, for an average consumer, of the acquisition of a basket of goods and services that can be fixed or can change at specific intervals; for example annually. The Laspeyres formula is normally used.

Contraceptive prevalence rate
Percentage of married women (including couples living together) between fifteen and forty-nine years of age, who use, or whose partners use, contraception of any type, modern or traditional.

Conventional arms transfer
Refers to the voluntary transfer of weapons, on the part of the supplier (excluding, therefore, captured weapons and weapons obtained from deserters), with military purposes destined for the armed forces, paramilitary forces or intelligence services of another country. They include conventional weapons or large scale systems, classified in six categories: ships, aircraft, missiles, artillery, armoured vehicles and guidance and radar systems (excluding lorries, services, munitions, small arms, support items, components and component technology and towed or naval artillery under 100 millimetre calibre).

Coverage ratio
Relation between the exports and imports of an economy, expressed as a percentage.

Crude birth rate
Number of births per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

Crude death rate
Number of deaths per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

Current account balance
The sum of the net exports –exports minus imports – of goods and services, incomes and net transfers.

Daily newspaper circulation
Refers to those newspapers published at least four times a week.

Debt service
The sum of the main payments and interest payments made in foreign currencies, goods or services for long-term debts, interest paid on short-term debts and repayments (redemption and charges) to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Desalinated water production
Amount of water produced by elimination of salt from salt water using a variety of techniques, including inverse osmosis. Most of this water is used for domestic purposes.

Deserts and dryland areas
Total area of semiarid land (dry lands), barren and desert lands that make up a country.

Dietary energy consumption
Availability of food for human consumption, expressed in kilo calories per person and per day. A national level of foods for human consumption is calculated, after deducting all the non food consumption (exports, fodder, industrial use, seeds and waste).

Duration of compulsory education
Number of years, within a determined age group, that children and young people are legally obliged to attend school.

Earned income
Approximate calculation based on the ratio of female non-agricultural salaries to male nonagricultural salaries, the proportion of women and men in the economically active population, the total of the female and male population and the GDP per capita (PPP in USD).

Ecological footprint
Measurement of the use of renewable natural resources by humanity. For a given population it is defined as the total area of biologically productive land and water required produce the resources consumed, maintain energy consumption, make way for infrastructures and to absorb the waste generated by the population. The unit used to measure the ecological footprint is the global hectare and is defined as a hectare of biologically productive space, equal to the world average.

Economic activity rate
The proportion of the population over fifteen years of age that contributes, or is able to contribute, labour in the production of goods and services.

Electricity consumption per capita
Refers to the gross production per inhabitant and includes the consumption of auxiliary stations and the losses in the transformers considered an integral part.
of the central station. It also includes the total electricity produced by pumping stations, without deducting the electricity absorbed by the pumps.

**Electricity production**

Measured in the alternating equipment terminals of electric power stations. Also includes hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear energy sources and generation by geothermal, solar, wind, tidal and marine energy, as well as renewable residues and fuels.

**Electricity sources**

Refers to the energy sources used to generate electricity: hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear.

**Employment by sector**

According to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), the Agriculture category also includes hunting, fishing and forest exploitation; the Industry category includes mining, extraction activities (including oil production), manufacturing, construction and public services (electricity, water and gas); the Services category includes the wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage services, communications, financial services, insurance, real estate and business services, as well as community, social and personal services.

**Energy consumption**

Consumption equals the local production plus imports and changes in stock levels, less exports and fuel destined to boats and aeroplanes used for international transport. Shown is the consumption per inhabitant, as well as the origin of the source. By origin, the fossil fuels include the power consumption of petroleum, natural gas, coal and its derivatives. In the case of nuclear energy, an efficiency of 33% is assumed (European average). Hydroelectricity excludes consumption from pumping. The modern renewable sources include: wind, tidal, waves, photovoltaic and thermal solar, biogas and geothermal and fuels from biomass, such as ethanol; and traditional ones include: solid biomass, including wood, vegetable and animal waste, among others.

**Energy production**

Primary energy forms—oil, natural gas, coal and its derivatives and renewable fuels and residues—and primary electricity, all converted into equivalents of oil. The renewable fuels and residues refer to solid and liquid biomass, biogas and industrial and municipal residues.

**Export/Import concentration index**

The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is used in a normalised version to obtain values between zero and one (maximum concentration). It measures the degree of market concentration and the calculation takes into account the different product groups exported, according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).

**Exports**

The value of all goods supplied by an economy to the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income from property, as well as transfer payments.

**External debt**

The sum of the national debt with public guarantee, private unsecured long-term debt, credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and short-term debt.

**Fertility rate**

Number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates.

**Fertilizer consumption**

Amount of vegetable nutrients used per unit of cultivatable land. The fertilisers considered are nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium. Consumption is calculated as production plus imports minus exports, and traditional nutrients (animal and vegetable fertilisers) are not included. The data obtained is the result of dividing the consumption of fertiliser of each country by the surface area of arable and permanently cultivated land.

**Fishermen**

Includes people employed in commercial and subsistence fishing (personnel both on land and at sea), who work in fresh water, brackish water, the marine area or in aquaculture activities.

**Foreign direct investment**

Net direct investment that is made in order to acquire a lasting management interest in an enterprise operating in a country other than that of the investor. It is equal to the sum of the equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings and other long term and short term capital.

**Forest area**

Understood as all land with natural or artificial plots of trees, whether productive or not.

**GDP (see Gross Domestic Product)**

**GDP growth rate**

Measurement of growth of an economy, obtained through the change in GDP over a period of time, calculated at constant prices.

**GDP per unit of energy use**

Indicator of energy efficiency. The temporary differences and entire countries partly reflect structural economic changes, changes in the efficiency of particular sectors and differences in the use of fuels.

**Gini index**

Measurement of inequality in the distribution of income and consumption. A value of zero represents perfect equality and a value of one hundred total inequality.

**GNI (see Gross National Income)**

**Gross Domestic Product (GDP)**

The sum of the added value by all the re-
Resident producers in an economy, plus any tax on the product (without taking into account the subsidies). The added value is the net profit of an industry after adding together all the profits and subtracting the intermediate contributions.

**Gross Domestic Product by sector**
The contribution of the distinct economic sectors to the GDP is determined according to the added value established by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).

**Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita)**
Using the official exchange rates to convert the figures in national currency into US dollars does not measure the relative internal acquisition powers of each currency in each country. The International Comparison Project (ICP) of the United Nations and the World Bank develop measures of the GDP on an internationally comparable scale using as conversion factors the Purchase Power Parities (PPP) with respect to each country.

**Gross National Income (GNI)**
The sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. The added value is the net profit of an industry after having summed up all profits and deducted internal contributions.

**HDI (see Human Development Index)**

**Human Development Index (HDI)**
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) calculates the Human Development Index (HDI) by relating three indicators: level of incomes (GDP per capita), health (life expectancy at birth) and level of education (literacy rate and combined enrolment in primary, secondary and higher education).

**Immigrants**
Refers to the people born outside of a given country at the mid-point of the year. The data is given in absolute figures and as a percentage in respect to the population of the receiving country.

**Imports**
Value of all goods received by an economy from the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income relating to property, as well as transfer payments.

**Inbound tourists**
Number of tourist who travel to a country other than that in which they have their usual residence, for a period not exceeding 12 months and whose main purpose in visiting is other than an activity remunerated from within the country visited.

**Infant mortality rate**
Shows the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per thousand live births.

**Information and communications technology expenditures**
Includes internal and external spending on information technology, as well as telecommunications and other office infrastructures.

**Internally displaced people**
As a result of armed conflicts or human rights abuses, some 25 million people live as internally displaced population. These people were forced to flee from their homes for fear of losing their lives, but unlike refugees, they were displaced within their country’s borders. Even though internally displaced people are twice as many as refugees, their situation receives less international attention.

**International tourism expenditure**
The expenditure in other countries of travellers from a given country, including the payments to national freight companies for international freight. It can include the expenses of single day travellers. The percentage it represents in respect of the exports is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

**International tourism receipts**
Income received in a given country from visitors, including payments made to national freight companies for international freight. It also includes the prepayment of goods and services received in the destination country. It can include the income from single day visitors. The percentage it represents in respect to exports is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

**Internet users**
Defined as the computers within an economy that are directly linked to the worldwide web. These statistics are based on the country codes of the addresses of the users and do not always correspond to the physical location of the computer.

**Investment in telecommunications**
Includes expenses associated with the acquisition of telecommunications equipment and infrastructures (including land, buildings, intellectual property and others). These expenses refer both to the initial installations and to all the reforms undertaken in the existing installations.

**Irrigated lands**
Irrigation data refers to the areas equipped with hydraulic infrastructure to supply water to crops. Areas with partial or total control of the distribution, surface areas irrigated by diversion of rises in level and low and flooded areas where available water is controlled are included.

**Known species**
Refers to the total number of species in a given country. Only mammals and birds have been taken into account.
Land area
Refers to the total surface area minus the surface covered by inland waters. Inland waters are defined in general as rivers and principle lakes.

Land under cereal production
The figures related to cultivated crop surface areas generally refer to the area harvested, although those corresponding to permanent crops can refer to the total planted area. The figures for the cultivated cereal area only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage or used for grazing are therefore excluded.

Life expectancy at birth
The number of years that a new-born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.

Live animal stock
The data on stock covers all domestic animals regardless of age, location or final purpose. Estimates have been made for countries that have not supplied data, as well as for countries supplying partial statistics.

Live animal trade
Enormous quantities of unregistered animals cross the borders of some countries. In order to obtain more representative international trade figures of live animals, the FAO has incorporated estimates of the unregistered trade.

Maternal mortality ratio
Annual number of deaths of women owing to causes related to pregnancy, for every 100,000 live births.

Mediterranean and Black Sea catches
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in the Mediterranean and/or the Black Sea.

Military expenditure
Total of expenses effected by the Ministry of Defence and other ministries on the recruitment and training of military personnel, as well as the manufacture and acquisition of military supplies and equipment. Military assistance is included in the expenses of the donor country.

Mobile phones
Mobile telephone users subscribed to a public, mobile and automatic service providing access to the public telephone network using cellular technology.

Motor vehicles
Includes cars, buses and loading vehicles, but not mopeds or motorcycles.

National protected areas
Areas of land or sea specially reserved for the protection and maintenance of the biodiversity and the natural and associated cultural resources and managed through legal and other instruments. According to The World Conservation Union (IUCN) it includes the total area of all natural reserves, virgin areas, national parks, natural monuments, management areas of habitats and species, as well as protected land and sea areas in each country.

Net energy import
Shows the degree of energy use by an economy and to what extent it exceeds its domestic production. High-income countries are often the net importers while the majority of energy-supplying countries are middle-income.

Net enrolment ratio
Number of students enrolled in a level of education who are of the official school age for that level, as a percentage of the total of the population of official school age for that level. The figures are shown for primary and secondary education.

Net migration rate
Net number of migrants divided by the average population of the receiving country within the period considered.

Net number of migrants
The entry of immigrants into a given country minus the outgoing emigrants of the same country. The data is estimated and represents the total net number for the 2000-2005 period.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)
The net payment of donations and loans granted under advantageous financial terms by official boards of partner countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as international organisations, with a view to promoting economic development and wellbeing, including co-operation and technical assistance.

Oil equivalent
All the values of energy production and consumption presented in this classification are calculated and published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) which uses the equivalent metric tonne of oil based on the calorific content of the energy products as the unit of measurement. An equivalent metric tonne of oil is defined as 107 kilo calories or 11,628 gigawatts per hour (GWh). This amount of energy is practically equal to the amount of energy contained in a tonne of crude oil.

Permanent pasture
Refers to land used permanently (five years or more) for herbaceous fodder, whether cultivated or uncultivated (meadows or uncultivated land for grazing).

Personal computers
Independent computers in use, intended for use by one single user at a time.

Population density
The result of dividing the average annual population of a country by its land surface area expressed in square kilometres.

Population in urban agglomerations of more than one million inhabitants
Population living with HIV/AIDS
Estimated number of people of any age infected with HIV or AIDS. Includes the whole living infected population at the end of 2003, regardless of whether or not they have developed the disease. It shows the actual figure and the percentage in respect of the population of the country.

Population per physician
The figure is obtained by dividing the number of inhabitants of a country by the number of physicians in its health system.

Population with sustainable access to an improved water source
The percentage of the population that has reasonable access to any of the following sources of drinking water: household water connections, public stand-pipes, bore holes, protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater deposits. Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least twenty litres per person per day, from a source located within a radius of one kilometre from the home of the user.

Population with access to electricity
Refers to the number of people with access to electricity as a percentage of the total population.

Population with access to improved sanitation
Percentage of the population with access to adequate installations for the elimination of excrement, such as connection to drains or systems of septic tanks, flush latrines, pour flush latrines or ventilated improved pit latrines. A system of elimination of excrement is considered adequate if it is private or shared (but not public) and if it allows the efficient avoidance of people or animals entering into contact with the excrement.

Population within 100 km of the coast
Refers to the estimations of the percentage of the population that lives in the coastal area, based on the 1995 population data.

Prevalence of smoking
The percentage of men and women who smoke cigarettes. The age range varies between countries, but in general it is fifteen years of age or above.

Primary pupil-teacher ratio
Number of pupils enrolled in primary schools divided by the number of teachers in primary schools.

Public expenditure on education
Composed of capital expenses (construction, renovation, major repairs and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) and running costs (goods and services consumed during the current year and need to be renewed the following year). It covers expenses such as salaries and rendering of services, contracted or acquired services, books and educational material, social welfare services, furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, insurance, rent, telecommunications and travel.

Public health expenditure
Refers to the recurring and capital expenses in government budgets (central and local), loans and external concessions (including donations by international agencies and non-governmental organisations) and social or compulsory medical insurance funds.

R & D expenditures
The current and capital expenses of creative and systematic activities that increase the stock of knowledge. Includes basic and applied research and experimental development work that leads to new devices, products or processes.

Refugees
People who have been forced to flee their country for fear of persecution owing to reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinions or membership in specific social groups and who are unable or unwilling to return. The asylum country is the country in which the refugee has requested asylum, but has not yet received a response, or where he or she has been registered as an asylum seeker. The country of origin refers to the nationality of the seeker or to the country in which he or she is a citizen.

Rural population
The estimated population at the mid point of the year in areas defined as rural, as a percentage of the total population of the country.

Scientists and engineers in R & D
Professionals that have received further training to work in any scientific field.

Sectorial distribution of the active population
The percentages of the workforce employed in the different economic sectors: agriculture, industry and services.

Share of income
In the questionnaires carried out in homes in diverse countries to determine the distribution of income, they make five divisions (or quintiles) from the lowest to the greatest incomes. The two lower quintiles (40%) are considered the poorest. A comparison is also made between the richest 10% and the poorest 10%, in order to establish the degree of inequality in incomes.

Surface area
Refers to the extension of the country in its totality, including the surface area occupied by inland waters.

Telephone mainlines
Telephone lines that connect the client’s telephone equipment with the public telephone network exchange.

Television sets
Data on the number of televisions in use.
Trade in fish and derivative products
Expresses the value associated with the exports and imports of live, fresh, frozen, chilled, dried, salted, smoked and tinned fish and derivative products. Includes fresh and salt water and aquaculture fish, molluscs and crustaceans.

Under-five mortality rate
Probability of death between birth and the onset of the fifth year of life, expressed per thousand live births.

Unemployment rate
Percentage of the active population without work, but available for and seeking employment.

Urban population living in slums
A place of precarious settlement is a group of individuals who live under the same roof and lack one or more of the following conditions: secure tenure (state protection against illegal eviction), access to drinking water, access to basic healthcare, structural dwelling quality, sufficient vital space. In accordance with the situation of the city in which the precarious settlement is found, this concept can be locally adapted.

Water consumption
Total water used by humans in a year, without taking into account the losses due to evaporation from reservoirs. Includes water from non-renewable underground sources, from rivers coming from other countries and from desalinated plants.

Water dependency
Percentage of water available in one country coming from another.

Women in parliamentary seats
Refers to the percentage of seats occupied by women in a lower or single chamber, or in an upper chamber or senate, according to each case. In the case where there are two chambers, the data refers to the weighted average of the participation of women in both chambers.

Wood fuel production
Includes wood from trunks and branches used as fuel for cooking, heating or producing energy.

Workers’ remittances
According to the definition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments Manual, workers’ remittances are goods and financial assets transferred by immigrants living and working in an economy (where they are considered residents) in favour of the residents of their former country of residence. An immigrant must live and work in the new economy for more than one year to be considered a resident there. The transfers made to the immigrants’ own accounts abroad are not considered transfers. Moreover, all those derived from the possession of a business by an immigrant are only considered to be normal transfers to the country of origin.

Year when women obtained the right to stand for election
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to stand for election was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to stand for election.

Year when women obtained the right to vote
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to vote was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to vote.
List of the Organisms Consulted for Drawing Up of the Tables, Graphics and Maps

CEC, Palestinian Central Elections Commission
www.elections.ps

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
www.cia.gov

CITES, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
www.cites.org

EUROSTAT, Statistical Office of the European Commission
europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat

FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
www.fao.org

Friends of the Earth
www.foe.co.uk

FRONTEX, European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States
europa.eu/agencies/community_agencies/frontex/index_en.htm

ICMPD, International Centre for Migration Policy Development
www.icmpd.org

IDMC, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
www.internal-displacement.org

ILO, International Labour Organization
www.ilo.org

IPU, Inter-Parliamentary Union
www.ipu.org

ITU, International Telecommunication Union
www.itu.int

IUCN, World Conservation Union
www.iucn.org

nef, new economics foundation
www.neweconomics.org
Nile Basin Initiative
www.nilebasin.org

OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
www.oecd.org

Plan Bleu
www.planbleu.org

Referendum Commission of Montenegro
www.rrk.cg.yu

SAMIDOUN
www.samidoun.org

SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
www.sipri.org

Statistical Office of The Republic of Montenegro
www.monstat.cg.yu

UNAIDS, Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
www.unaids.org

UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
www.unctad.org

UNDP, United Nations Development Program
www.undp.org

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
www.unesco.org

UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund
www.unfpa.org

UNHCR, United Nations Refugee Agency
www.unhcr.ch

UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund
www.unicef.org

United Nations Treaty Collection
untreaty.un.org

UNPOP, United Nations Population Division
www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm

UNSTAT, United Nations Statistics Division
unstats.un.org

UNWTO, World Tourism Organization
www.unwto.org

WB, World Bank
www.worldbank.org
References: Reports and yearbooks consulted for drawing up the tables, graphics and maps

2006 Report on the Global Aids Epidemic (UNAIDS)
BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2006
Handbook of Statistics 2005 (UNCTAD)
Human Development Report 2006 (UNDP)
International Migration 2006 (UNPOP)
SIPRI Yearbook 2006 (SIPRI)
State of World Population 2005 (UNFPA)
The 2006 State of the World’s Children (UNICEF)
UNWTO World Tourism Barometer 2006 (UNWTO)
World Development Indicators 2006 (WB)
World Health Statistics 2006 (WHO)
World Resources 2005 (UNDP, UNEP, WB, WRI)
Country Abbreviations Used in Graphics and Maps

AL Albania
AT Austria
AU Australia
BA Bosnia-Herzegovina
BE Belgium
BG Bulgaria
BR Brazil
CA Canada
CH Switzerland
CN China
CS Serbia and Montenegro
CY Cyprus
CZ Czech Republic
DE Germany
DK Denmark
DZ Algeria
EE Estonia
EG Egypt
ES Spain
FI Finland
FR France
GB United Kingdom
GR Greece
HR Croatia
HU Hungary
IE Ireland
IL Israel
IT Italy
JO Jordan
JP Japan
LB Lebanon
LT Lithuania
LU Luxembourg
LV Latvia
LY Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
MA Morocco
ME Montenegro
MK Macedonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
MT Malta
NL Netherlands
NO Norway
NZ New Zealand
PL Poland
PS Palestinian Territory, Occupied
PT Portugal
RO Romania
RU Russian Federation
SE Sweden
SI Slovenia
SK Slovakia
SY Syrian Arab Republic
TN Tunisia
TR Turkey
UK United Kingdom
US United States
ZA South Africa
### Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<tr>
<td>AECI</td>
<td>Spanish Agency for International Cooperation</td>
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<td>AFII</td>
<td>Invest in France Agency</td>
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<td>AFVIC</td>
<td>Friends and Families of the Victims of Clandestine Immigration (MA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHDR</td>
<td>Arab Human Development Report</td>
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<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (TR)</td>
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<td>AMDH</td>
<td>Moroccan Association for Human Rights</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>ANIMA</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Network of Investment Promotion Agencies</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>National Port Authority (MA)</td>
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<td>APDHA</td>
<td>Asociación pro derechos humanos de Andalucia (ES)</td>
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<td>ASCAME</td>
<td>Association of Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce and Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARDS</td>
<td>Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization</td>
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<td>CARIM</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration</td>
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<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cross-Border Cooperation</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Moroccan Cinema Center (MA)</td>
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<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Countries</td>
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<td>CFCM</td>
<td>French Council for the Muslim Cult</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (US)</td>
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<td>CICAE</td>
<td>International Confederation of Art Cinemas</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIHEAM</td>
<td>International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
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<td>COPEAM</td>
<td>Permanent Conference of Mediterranean Audiovisual Operators</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoR</td>
<td>Committee of the Regions</td>
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<td>CORCAS</td>
<td>Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (MA)</td>
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<td>CSIC</td>
<td>Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (ES)</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument (EU)</td>
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<td>DFLP</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<td>DPS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (ME)</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Convention on Human Rights</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMFTA</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>EMPA</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembl</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EPUF</td>
<td>Euromed Permanent University Forum</td>
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<td>ERDF</td>
<td>European Regional Development Fund</td>
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<td>ERGEG</td>
<td>European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Euskadi and Freedom</td>
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<td>ETF</td>
<td>European Training Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUISS</td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMEDIS</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Information Society Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROMED</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURO-MED PACTE</td>
<td>Partnership, Action, Cooperation, and Transfer of Experience for the Development of the Mediterranean and Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLT</td>
<td>Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties (TN)</td>
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<td>FEMIP</td>
<td>Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEMISE</td>
<td>Forum of Euro-Mediterranean Economic Institutes</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIDH</td>
<td>International Federation for Human Rights</td>
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<td>FIS</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Framework Programme for Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCI</td>
<td>Global Competitiveness Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Armed Islamic Group</td>
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<td>GICM</td>
<td>Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
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<td>ICTDAR</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies for Development in the Arab Region</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defense Forces</td>
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<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEHL</td>
<td>Instituto de Estudios Hispano-Lusos de Rabat (MA)</td>
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<td>IER</td>
<td>Justice and Reconciliation Commission (MA)</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INJEP</td>
<td>National Institute for Youth and Non-Formal Education (FR)</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance</td>
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<td>IRMEP</td>
<td>Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy</td>
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<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunication Organization</td>
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<td>JEI</td>
<td>Jordan Education Initiative</td>
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<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>K4D</td>
<td>Knowledge for Development</td>
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<td>KAM</td>
<td>Knowledge Assessment Methodology</td>
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<td>KAP</td>
<td>Podgorica Aluminium Plant (ME)</td>
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<td>KEI</td>
<td>Knowledge Economy Index</td>
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<td>LDK</td>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo</td>
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<td>LIGF</td>
<td>Libyan Islamic Fighting Group</td>
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<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied natural gas</td>
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<td>LSCG</td>
<td>Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (ME)</td>
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<td>LTDH</td>
<td>Tunisian Human Rights League</td>
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<td>MAB</td>
<td>UNESCO's Programme on Man and the Biosphere</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Mediterranean Action Plan</td>
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<td>MBC</td>
<td>Middle East Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Muslim Clerics Council (GB)</td>
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<td>MCSD</td>
<td>Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>MDF</td>
<td>Mediterranean Development Forum</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MEDOCC</td>
<td>Regional Programme for the Western Mediterranean</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
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<td>MEPI</td>
<td>Middle East Partnership Initiative (US)</td>
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<td>MGK</td>
<td>National Security Council (TR)</td>
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<td>MIPO</td>
<td>Mediterranean Investment Project Observatory</td>
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<td>MIX</td>
<td>Microfinance Information Exchange</td>
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<td>MoCo</td>
<td>Monitoring Committee of Euro-Mediterranean Scientific Cooperation</td>
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<td>MPCs</td>
<td>Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NCHR</td>
<td>The National Centre for Human Rights</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NOC</td>
<td>Libyan National Oil Corporation</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>OAPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>OME</td>
<td>Observatoire Méditerranéen de l'Énergie</td>
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<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJD</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (MA)</td>
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<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
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<td>PLC</td>
<td>Palestinian Legislative Council</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing power parity</td>
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<td>PSD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (PT)</td>
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<td>PSI</td>
<td>Pan-Sahel Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>R &amp; D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>RBAS</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for Arab States (UNDP)</td>
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<td>RELEX</td>
<td>Commission for External Relations (EU)</td>
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<td>REMEP</td>
<td>Rome Euro-Mediterranean Energy Platform</td>
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<td>RENPA</td>
<td>Andalusian Natural Spaces Network (ES)</td>
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<td>RMF</td>
<td>Rally of Muslims in France</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
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<td>SADR</td>
<td>Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
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<td>SDP</td>
<td>Socialdemocratic Party of Montenegro (ME)</td>
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<td>SDS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMC</td>
<td>Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIBE</td>
<td>Sites of Biological and Ecological Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIVE</td>
<td>Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior (ES)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIWI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Water Institute</td>
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<td>SMAP</td>
<td>Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental Action Programme</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises</td>
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<td>SNSD</td>
<td>Independent Social-Democrat Party (BA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SODEP</td>
<td>Port operating company (MA)</td>
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<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to the Community of Independent States (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIM</td>
<td>Temporary International Mechanism</td>
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<td>TMC</td>
<td>Third Mediterranean Countries</td>
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<td>TMSA</td>
<td>Tangier Mediterranean Special Agency</td>
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<td>TRNC</td>
<td>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
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<td>TSCTI</td>
<td>Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>Value-added tax</td>
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