Med.2006

2005 IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN SPACE
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In what had been declared by the European Union as the year of the Mediterranean, and a decade after the Barcelona Summit of 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean project has faced one of its biggest challenges. The celebration in Barcelona in November 2005 of an extraordinary conference gave an incentive to evaluate the process and, at the same time, encouraged the holding of an interesting debate about the methods and even the objectives of the project.

The “Barcelona+10" Summit ended with two important decisions: the adoption of the Code of Conduct against Terrorism, and the Working Programme for the next five years. Thus, the Mediterranean partners renewed their commitment to establish a shared area of peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean region by means of continuous dialogue, exchange and cooperation.

In the light of the significance of the Barcelona Process in 2005, the third edition of the Mediterranean Yearbook has tried to contribute to this process of mutual dialogue and knowledge among the Mediterranean societies by focusing from different perspectives and viewpoints on the tenth anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as being one of the key topics/issues of the year.

Apart from the Barcelona Process, Med.2006 also highlights other key topics/issues of the past year. Firstly, the situation in the Middle East, the eternal geopolitical context that defines the future of the Mediterranean and the rest of the world. Secondly, a subject with a significant impact on the future development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: the debate concerning European frontiers and identities in the context of the relationship with Africa, the position of Turkey, or the role of Islam in Europe. The Yearbook’s assessment of the year, as in previous editions, gives a vision based on a diversity of authors and viewpoints which reinforce the analysis of the various sectorial topics. These are in turn complemented by the addition of more purely informative elements through box paragraphs and through the very extensive information provided in the form of chronologies, graphs and statistics.

The thematic dossier of the year was centred/based on the subject of democracy and governability in the Mediterranean. The Yearbook’s special dossier seeks to go beyond the merely conjunctural factors by presenting a series of different articles that lead to a deeper analysis of one of the most complex and profound topics/issues that the Mediterranean region has to face, and which will mark the direction of its future development.

For the Fundació CIDOB and the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), this third edition of the Mediterranean Yearbook confirms its role as a means of extending knowledge of the region both to those specifically interested in the Mediterranean and to the general public. It is a tool for the diffusion of knowledge that is continuing to grow with the inclusion of its contents on its website. Med.2006 represents the desire of both institutions to offer a useful product for helping to feel the pulse of a region that is constantly searching to define itself.
Perspectives
Building Bridges Across the Mediterranean

Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Prime Minister of Turkey

The word “Mediterranean,” once called sea of light brings up various connotations. It is a conglomeration of strength and weakness; of welfare and poverty; of concord and dissention; tolerance and extremism; peace and conflict. Throughout history, as an important passageway, the Mediterranean has been vital in all strategic equations. Some segments of the region have become stronger, while others have weakened. It has become in the course of history a milieu which is ethnically, culturally, socially complex and always extraordinary.

The region’s creativity and common sense of the people of the sea of the light gives us hope against all difficulties. One should never forget that all contemporary values have their roots in the Mediterranean. We are the descendants of those who built most of the civilizations in the history of humanity like the Egyptians, the Romans, the Greeks, the Carthageniens, the Arabs, the Andalusians and the Ottomans. In our common geography we have created values on which everyone could converge irrespective of his or her religion, language or ethnicity.

Indeed, the Mediterranean culture has developed in the course of history thanks to myriad exchanges and meetings among its people. It is because of this very dense interface that some call it the sixth continent rather than a sea.

As it has always been the heart of the world, issues and perspectives of global scale also have their ramifications in the Mediterranean. Global problems such as terrorism, intolerance, environmental degradation, spread of weapons of mass destruction, confront the Mediterranean too. Democracy, good governance, economic development, security, fair distribution of income and resources, tolerance, respect to cultural differences, eradication of illiteracy are common demands in the Mediterranean as anywhere else in the world.

At a time when the most immediate need of humanity is tolerance and respect to each other’s differences, the Mediterranean should be nothing else than a source of inspiration. It is there where the three monotheistic religions were born and established. It was Arab scholars who translated Aristotle into Arabic and Latin. Toynbee followed the footsteps of Ibn Khaldun in analyzing our societies. Voyages, trade, episodes of war and peace, marriages and the consequent cultural amalgam in music, painting and culinary arts: such is the Mediterranean civilization that it was so interwoven through centuries.

Unfortunately, this spirit of exchange and commonality that was woven by the thick ropes of time has started to degrade. It would be astonishing for our forefathers of ancient times to witness some of the level of incomprehension which lies across the Mare Nostrum.

Instead of strengthening and promoting our common values, we invented a hypothetical “clash of civilizations”. We centred on this hypothesis in the past ten years. We turned our linguistic, religious, cultural and ethnic richness into dividing lines. Some among us adopted the contemporary values while some were delayed in taking the required steps in transparency, democracy and human rights.

In sum, too much time has been wasted in speculation about a clash of civilizations. The real threat is a clash of ignorance. Therefore, we must seize every opportunity for dialogue and promotion of mutual cohabitation.

We should also not forget that the gap between the levels of development among the two shores of the Mediterranean entrenches a gulf between the South and the North. Root causes of many problems lie in this gap.
The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 launched a very important initiative eleven years ago uniting the two shores of the Mediterranean with the aim of extending peace, stability and prosperity to the whole Euro-Mediterranean region.

A year after the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, unfortunately, we have not yet reached the desired level of consensus on many issues in the Mediterranean region. The priorities of the North and the South vary considerably. In bringing the North and the South closer the dialogue frequently falls victim to the political issues, particularly the developments in the Middle East. If not addressed with a constructive frame of mind, the chronic problems which we face today may aggravate and can become source of further instability. The answers are not easy. Before we take steps for the solutions we need to have a better understanding of the problems.

The Mediterranean is also an inalienable element in Turkey’s policies, economic relations, culture and history. We have close ties with all the sub regions in the Mediterranean which emanate from history and are shaped today on the principle of cooperation and mutual benefit. We take part not only in intra regional cooperation, but also cooperation between Mediterranean and its neighbouring regions. Turkey will continue to conjoin the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean once it accedes to the EU. There lies the significance of Turkey’s membership to the EU as it will demonstrate to the whole world that different cultures can co-exist and could indeed live together in peace under the same political and economic Union. This will seriously challenge the philosophy of the radicals from all faiths.

Everyone in the Mediterranean may have his or her dream for the Mediterranean of the future. No matter how different means everyone may suggest to achieve it, the concepts for the future are similar: We all want to have political stability. We all want to live in security, with an end to hostilities. We all want a prosperous life. We all want economic cooperation. We want to live free from terror and discrimination on the basis of language, religion or ethnic origin. We want to have our say in the world of science and technology. We do not want to fall behind innovation, but pioneer it.

We want to achieve it by sharing burdens and benefits, thus creating a region where prosperity is distributed evenly. Bottlenecks should not be the destiny of the South and the North is not the only one to prosper. We all know that this will serve to the long term interests of both shores in the Mediterranean. Thus, the Mediterranean of the future requires a great breakthrough from us. It does not tolerate further delays in carrying out our responsibilities to coming generations. The Mediterranean of the future expects us to act not with our memories but with our common sense.

In this respect, it was not a coincidence that from two ends of the Mediterranean together with H.E. Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero we have been the co-sponsors of the Alliance of Civilizations. We are both determined not to let this common heritage speak of mutual incomprehension.

With this understanding, I invite you all to contribute to this common effort for a better future by promoting peace, tolerance, mutual respect and understanding in our region and beyond.
Keys
All roads led to Barcelona at the end of November 2005. The Euro-Mediterranean community assembled in this historic city for the Partnership’s first ever Summit, taking the opportunity of this tenth anniversary milestone to look back at what our valued partnership has achieved and to map out the future direction. Amid the diverse celebrations and cultural events that marked the occasion, discussions between presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers of the 35 countries aimed at forging a stronger, more secure future for the Partnership. I am very happy with the outcome. I believe we now have the confidence and capability, set out in our jointly agreed work programme, to help us fulfil our common ambitions.

Not an Event, but a Process

The Euro-Mediterranean Summit in Barcelona on 27th/28th November in a way mirrored the Barcelona process itself: the results were better than its reputation. Media attention tended to focus on the attendance and participants list, ignoring the Summit’s two notable achievements: first, a 5-year work programme which will allow the further development and deepening of the partnership; and second, a Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism which underlines our common commitment to fighting terrorism in all its dimensions. That a consensus was attained by all 35 partners – Arabs, Israelis and Europeans – on these two agreements eloquently illustrates the abiding principles of the partnership: common dialogue and joint ownership. While the general media reaction could best be described as tepid, not all media reports and commentaries were negative. Many pointed out that though there was a failure to live up to expectations (almost inevitable in anniversary-driven events), the whole process (Barcelona) should not be viewed in the same light. On the contrary, the fact that such major dislocations as the Iraq war, the Middle East Peace Process and the war on terrorism had not thrown the whole process off course was a sign of the partnership’s maturity, value and ability to deliver positive results. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is, by definition, a process. It is not an event. In many ways its ethos and evolution can be compared to the construction of the European Union. Robert Schuman, one of the founding fathers of the European family once said: “Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity”. The same applies to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Never a headline grabber, it has developed slowly but surely, sealing and strengthening relations through a series of confidence and capacity building activities.

The merits of interdependence

If the Barcelona process didn’t exist we would have to invent it. In such fast-changing times, working together is vital. The past fifteen years have witnessed enormous changes in the international system. We have seen greater instability, ideological radicalisation and terrorism and the emergence of failed states which act as incubators for regional crises. Major cities around the world, in Europe and the Mediterranean, have been hit by appalling terrorist atrocities. Poverty and environmental degradation are global problems that do not respect frontiers. These multiple challenges mean that the distinction between
foreign and internal policy is becoming less relevant by the day. These challenges cannot be dealt with by one country alone.

In this context, the Mediterranean is an absolute priority for Europe. We face big challenges: peace, development, human rights, the environment, sustainable growth, education (particularly for women), and migration.

It is also a question of mutual interest. Europe cannot guarantee its own stability, security and prosperity without helping our neighbours achieve similar levels of security, stability and prosperity. That is the central tenet and driving philosophy of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, bolstered by the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The European Neighbourhood Policy has already had its first successes, with the adoption of Action Plans for deeper political cooperation and economic integration between the EU and five Mediterranean partners (Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia).

Based on the recognition of our common values such as democracy and the rule of law, and concrete steps towards them, the EU will focus its funding and know-how on closing the development gap between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean.

The tenth anniversary of the Euromed partnership allowed us to come together and take stock of our achievements and the challenges that lie ahead. By returning to Barcelona, the birthplace of the Declaration that launched this unique partnership, we gave not just a symbolic, but also a substantive impetus to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

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It is now time, we believe, to bring the partnership closer to the people. The Barcelona process has, to a large extent, been an inter-governmental process. It is now time to focus more specifically on questions of most concern to our citizens. That is why our new 5-year joint work programme targets critical areas: human rights and democracy (including gender equality); sustainable economic growth and reform; the free circulation of people and migrants’ rights; migration and social integration; freedom of expression; and education.

Democracy and good governance are essential for stability and prosperity. This is a fundamental principle of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. However, in order to be successful, political reform must come from within. It cannot be imposed from outside. If the desire is not there, no amount of external assistance or pressure will build sustainable reform. The European Neighbourhood Policy reflects this approach through the Action Plans which contain reform objectives jointly agreed with each country. The 5-year work programme adopted in Barcelona included a proposal for a new ‘governance facility’ that from 2007 will give financial support to those who want to move towards greater political reforms.

In our economic relationship, the creation of a free trade area by 2010 is more than just a symbolic gesture. The jobs and wealth it will create are essential to the prosperity and stability of the whole region. We need to encourage south-south integration. Creating a truly regional market will boost investment and growth and reduce the wealth gap between Europe and its neighbours. Five million new jobs a year are needed to provide employment for the Mediterranean region’s young population.

One third of the population of our Mediterranean partners is under the age of fifteen. This is a powerful resource for the future. But with 8 million children not attending primary school, we must do more to harness this human capacity. Eradicating illiteracy is crucial, which is why we are setting a target date of 2015 to end this scourge once and for all. We are also seeking equal provision of education for boys and girls; and the enrolment of all primary school age children. We want to ensure equality of access to quality education at all levels for all students by 2015. By that same date all children should be completing at least primary education.

**Towards an All-inclusive Partnership**

Civil society has a crucial role to play in our efforts towards a more inclusive partnership. It was neglected in the early days of our relations, but the past few years have witnessed the emergence and mobilisation of civil society throughout our partnership. This has been a very significant evolution and shows our determination to make this an all-inclusive partnership. President Barroso stressed this point in his
address to the Barcelona Summit and outlined two new priority sectors: women and the media. In the five-year work programme the respective roles of women and the media in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership will be explored to ensure their full and active participation in that programme and in the partnership.

We have the institutions and networks to develop and help nurture the participation of civil society in the Partnership. The Euromed NGO platform continues to thrive and made a valuable intervention at the Barcelona Summit. Meanwhile, the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures and Civilisations is ideally situated to encourage and engage the vast array of NGO networks throughout the Euromed region. Much has been already accomplished, but much more remains to be done. Despite our successes, we have not yet exploited the full potential of the Partnership and there are areas where we need to progress. However, I am confident that the Barcelona process, reinforced by the European Neighbourhood Policy, provides the necessary frameworks and instruments to deal with those deficits. Our work programme, with its pragmatic and practical approach, offers a genuine opportunity to bring real value to the lives of the people.

Our partnership is a road that unites, not divides. It is a road with a common destination for the Euro-Mediterranean travellers. We have covered a lot of distance in our journey over the past ten years. As Winston Churchill once said, “only by looking back can we see how far we have come”. Our journey has still some distance to go and the way ahead may contain new challenges and difficulties. But our ambition is true, our step is steady and our partnership primed to go all the way together.
From the point of view of Euro-Mediterranean politics, 2005 was almost entirely marked by the Barcelona Summit and its preparation. During the last twelve months, the Neighbourhood Policy was analysed and discussed, from the need to attain Barcelona’s objectives. During the Mediterranean year the most important issue was that of political reforms even though the Summit did not come to an agreement – and was far from it – on necessary measures to take in order to establish a Community of Democratic States. Nor any measure was taken towards the resolution of conflicts in the area which cause enormous distress and complicate the inclusion process. In the Palestinian-Israeli case, the Barcelona Summit even assumed deterioration with respect to previous declarations made in common. The objective of making the Summit the turning point from which to relaunch the Barcelona Process and overcome the enormous difficulties which it was going through was not achieved, mainly due to the absence of almost all State leaders from Southern countries and to not having approved the common declaration on the Partnership’s future. Despite this, the Summit took a step in the right direction, since it reinforced the community dimension of the Barcelona Process as a long-term experience and increased its multilateral legitimacy thanks to the approval of a five year work program as well as that of an Anti-Terrorism Conduct Code. Paradoxically, it could be that the most meaningful aspect of the Summit was its preparation process and the debates it caused both at political and civil society level – these have to be maintained.

Political Reforms at the Centre of the Debate

Barcelona’s Summit took place seven months following Syria’s departure from Lebanon and five months after the Lebanese elections, at the time when the Equity and Reconciliation Commission in Morocco was debating the human rights violations committed during the regime of Hassan II. The central issue discussed then was not, as in 1995, how to reach economic stability and development, but how to encourage political reforms and democracy. Let’s not forget that the Mediterranean is at the centre of a worldwide strategic debate. Since the 11th of September, the Mediterranean region remains the priority of the United States Government causing the tragic consequences which everyone is aware of. Edgar Morin defines the region as “the tinderbox of the world”, where the crisis in Iraq and its transformation lured by radical movements, has to be added to the Palestinian issue, which still does not seem to resolve itself. Paradoxically, the United States Government, which previously contributed in placing political reforms on the international agenda, by subsequently justifying its intervention in Iraq in the name of democracy, cast a dark shadow of incoherence and unilateralism on the support measures for transition processes. Given the context, the Summit intended to find a common path to encourage the democratic transformation process in Southern countries, resolve the conflicts that prevent the attainment of the fixed peace and inclusion objectives and to face the problems deriving from social inequalities. This basically meant demonstrating that it was possible to extend the use of soft power to the South in order to include diversity, which lies at the base of the success of the European Enlargement Policy, including Turkey. The EuroMeSCo report’s proposal, which considered it necessary to attribute maximum priority to achieving the democratic objective of the Barcelona
Process, was pointing precisely in this direction. The proposal was accepted by various countries, but the scepticism of some European States and the opposition of a great number of Southern countries, prevented the definition of a clear goal in order to concretise the project involving the creation of a Community of Democratic States. Nevertheless, despite everything, today the democratic issue is part of the Euro-Mediterranean agenda. The work program approved in Barcelona includes the establishment, by the European Union, of a financial body responsible for providing a significant support to political reforms. And, although with respect to this mechanism no clear reference to democracy was made as the European Union wished, following the Barcelona Summit the EU holds multilateral legitimacy to support those political reform processes which comply with the democratisation objectives. This is, without doubt, one of the Summit’s most important achievements, if not the most important. Now this mechanism needs substantial resources; this will depend on the quotation assigned to it by the new Union Budget and on the number of Southern States interested in its task. Moreover, it is important to point out that the work program sets dialogue on human rights as a priority and that the Code of Conduct binds the fight against terrorism to the protection of fundamental rights. Despite this, the program promoting democratisation, which includes free elections taking place and the protection of human rights, lacks concrete objectives – *benchmarking* – which is not what the EuroMeSCo report was suggesting. This was not possible due to some Arab countries’ objection, as they continue privileging the stability and development strategy.

**Civil Society Involvement and Intentions to Conduct it**

The procedure leading to the Summit allowed attainment of further insights into the Barcelona Process, which became the object of analysis and interest for different sectors of Northern and Southern societies. One of the most significant aspects of this process was the collaboration of a great number of civil society organisations in preparing the Summit. Throughout 2005, numerous articles, studies and reports were published and dozens of congresses took place on how to relaunch the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This debate contributed in defining an intellectual *acquis* which, essentially, was trying to answer the question: Is it possible to extend the area of peace and democracy to the South through inclusion? The EU Council of Ministers commissioned EuroMeSCo and FEMISE to elaborate two reports which were discussed by senior officials and were the object of many observations.

As for the role of civil society, 2005 leaves behind a contradictory overview. On one part, it made clear that one of the best practices of the Barcelona Process is to reserve a role for civil society, an objective crystallized in the organisation of the Civil Forum under the Luxembourgian presidency of the EU and the creation of the non governmental platform Euro-Med. Moreover, the importance of civil society was also promoted by the majority of governments on both shores, which, in April 2005, supported the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation. However, the emergence of civil society and the increase of its level of autonomy were accompanied by some countries attempting to interfere in the appointment of its legitimate representatives; this practice worries some analysts and civil society representatives, who christened it *top down*. A good example of *top down* is represented by the Anna Lindh Foundation’s election process, in which some countries’ official bodies stole the role of leaders of civil society’s national networks. Nevertheless, there is still reluctance to accept that the independence of civil society is one of the keys to its success in the Euro-Mediterranean inclusion process. Moreover, the country’s image and its ability to take advantage of the opportunities offered by globalisation are increasingly dependent on civil society’s autonomy. Some countries do not realise that for the successful and peaceful accomplishment of political transition process it is necessary to open up public space to civil society without restricting it in any way for any ideological reasons. The need to affirm the autonomy of civil society and its role within the Barcelona Process was one of the main subjects of negotiation reported on the final documents of the Summit. However, as some Southern States managed to impose a restrictive definition of civil society by including the expression “in accordance with national legislation” – a legislation that, as is known, in some countries difficults the creation of independent institutions – maybe it would have been better not to make any reference to civil society at all. Given the circumstances, the issue of civil society and its role within the Partnership comes at a critical time, which requires our best care.
European Union: Is this the Beginning of the End of the Status-quo Policy?

Despite the failure to reach a broad agreement in order to concretise the Partnership’s democratic objective, the development of the European position has to be reported. At the start of 2005, a great number of European governments were still reluctant to take on a democratic agenda and clung onto their old policy of maintaining the status quo. Although this was a burden for the Barcelona Process, in the second semester of 2005 the awareness of the need to carry out political reforms prevailed. Amongst the facts favouring the EU’s change of opinion was that various countries on the Southern Mediterranean shore started abandoning authoritarianism and opening up public space to Islamist movements.

During the meetings preparing Europe’s position within the Ministerial Conference in Luxembourg, there were contrasting opinions on whether it was appropriate to state very bluntly that, in order to succeed, the Partnership has to be a long-term alliance between democracies. A considerable number of states supported the proposal – laid out by EuroMeSCo – to emphasise the potential objective of the Barcelona Process: the establishment of a Community of Democratic States; for others this was an utopian and “even dangerous” practice, while a third group believed that the task involved a financial commitment which they were not prepared to take on. Finally, the most conservative participants feared that an ambitious integration program with the South would oblige them to open their borders to immigration. Because of the European hesitations and the opposing position of some Southern governments, the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg ended up reintroducing the old strategy, which prioritised the objective of establishing an area of peace, security and stability. The European Commission issued a Communication against this old strategy; here, for the first time, it affirmed clearly and unequivocally that “advancing political reform towards human rights and democracy is key to achieving sustainable security and stability”. With this Communication the Commission abandoned the strategy the EU has followed for a decade, which was based on the idea that the most effective means to achieve security and stability was development. Moreover, the fact that the Commission pointed out the need to take into consideration the Islamic political activity, is unprecedented in EU documents and is highly significant.

Finally, the Commission was questioning the basis of the policy preserving the status-quo: the fear of the Islamist alternative. In tune with the Commission, the European Parliament issued a resolution underlining the need to pay more attention to human rights’ violations. It is worth mentioning that amongst the tasks of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, established in 2005, there is that of encouraging dialogue on human rights and democracy.

During the British presidency of the EU, as a consequence of the development of the European attitude, the objectives to encourage democracy and the Rule of Law and specifically, the need to guarantee judicial independence, were reflected clearly and perceptibly in a Common Declaration proposal – named “common vision” – which ended up being rejected. However, despite the scepticism of some, in the second semester of 2005, the EU finally developed a new approach: prioritise political issues and, in particular, within the framework of the Barcelona Process, political reforms and respect for human rights. During the Barcelona Summit, some European government leaders, such as President Zapatero for example, stated these priorities clearly and unequivocally. Also, the importance that European countries assigned to the Euro-Mediterranean sector was reflected in the great attendance of State leaders and European Union government officials at the Summit.

However, the Union was not the only organisation introducing – although timidly – support for democratic reforms on its agenda. Some member states, such as France for example, maintained a firm attitude towards Syrian policies in Lebanon, especially after the murder of the former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, which forced Damascus to end an occupation which lasted since 1976. This firm policy caused the alienation of President Assad, who received unequivocal signs that he was not welcome in Barcelona. The tougher attitude of some countries in the Union is particularly evident in their way of approaching the nuclear crisis caused by Iran. In fact, the anti-European reaction expressed by some Arab countries – Syria and its Lebanese allies in particular – during the cartoon crisis, was in response to the EU’s change of attitude. In Gaza, the attack on the office representing the European Union was not perpetrated by Hamas, but by the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, a radical group associated to Fatah, which was largely defeated in the last Palestinian elections. On the other hand, is the fact that, before Hamas’ victory, the Union would have ended up adopting an
approach very similar to that of the United States. In particular, Javier Solana declared that “one cannot expect European contributors to finance violence”, which anticipated the suspension of aid coming from Brussels even if this contradicted the idea that it is necessary to hold elections in order to guarantee peace. In any case, Hamas’ victory should help Europe to perceive that Islamist movements are inevitable interlocutors. In this framework, the increasing Turkish interest for the Partnership since the beginning of the process to gain EU membership, is of particular significance; this was crystallized by the presence of its Prime Minister in Barcelona. The Turkish example, whereby an Islamist party rose to power and contributed to the country’s democratisation, is being studied with interest by the entire region.

The Triumph of Positive Differentiation

In the most positive overviews carried out for the 10 years of the Barcelona Process, it is accepted that, until today, there has not been much cooperation in terms of politics and security. The main cause is the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially the Israel-Syria-Lebanon axis. However, it is worth mentioning that in 2005 there have been timid signs of it opening up: Lebanon regained its autonomy and Syria did not systematically stop all debates concerning security issues. It allowed to begin a discussion on the possibility of organising a congress on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to establish the first steps for laying out a European Security and Defence Policy. A signal of this development is represented by the approval of the Anti-Terrorism Code of Conduct during the Summit. However, despite this new climate, no cooperation initiative was suggested with regards to security during the Summit. Also, it was confirmed that the rhythm and scope of political reforms during 2005, presented enormous variations from one country to the other. For this reason, it has been long argued, both in the North and in the South, that the only way to over come the political blocking was, to combine common objectives with different path for its materialisation. In other words, slower countries cannot have the option to veto decisions made by those wishing to intensify their relations with the Union and undertake the necessary reforms for this purpose. The Neighbourhood Policy recognises differentiation and institutes a multi-bilateralism which favours those countries prepared to implement a program of reforms. In 2005, within the Neighbourhood Policy framework, Action Plans were agreed with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia and, in Eastern Europe, Ukraine and Moldavia. The EuroMeSCo report informed on the need to integrate these plans’ objectives in/with the Partnership, and more specifically that the Partnership should introduce as its own objective that Southern States should receive access, even if only partial, to the European single market. This issue was not resolved in Barcelona, and the EU’s decision to include its Mediterranean and Eastern European neighbours in the same budget quotation, increases the risks of fragmenting and dissolving the multilateral Euro-Mediterranean project. Multilateralism, at the same time, can turn relations with the European Union, in a necessary alternative for regional cooperation in Maghreb and the Middle East. However, whatever happens, positive differentiation represents a step in the right direction and has already been approved by most states in the region. This is demonstrated by the inclusion of a democratic mechanism, which has a significant differentiating character and, therefore, from the neighbouring policy, within the five years work program.

Summit’s Overview Summary

The Summit was organised through a collaboration – which is unusual for events of such importance – between the British Presidency and another Member State, Spain. The experience provided positive results in many aspects, as it allowed to combine British pragmatism with the sensitivity, the commitment and the friendliness of Spain in the Mediterranean. In front of the Summit, the British suggested declaring education as the main objective within the social sector, and this is, in fact, the only area in which clear aims were set: the eradication of illiteracy by 2010 and the guarantee of equal access to education for boys and girls and access to primary education for everyone by 2015. Nevertheless, this collaboration did not manage to attract State leaders from Southern countries to the Summit. Some believe this absence is due to the irritation present in some countries’ public opinion against Tony Blair, because of the British Prime Minister’s policy in Iraq. However, regardless of this, even though there could have been a certain contagious effect, each case is independent and the main reason for the absences appears to be the
disagreement of many Southern governments with respect to the content of the European Union proposals. This could have been because of its clear affirmation of the democratic objectives of the process or even its negative aptitude towards adopting a firmer position with regards to Israeli policy in the region. During the Summit, the intransigence of the Israeli Government was almost total, to the point of preventing the realisation of a common declaration. The representatives of the Tel Aviv government – at the time Israel was undergoing an electoral campaign – adopted a particularly firm position and would not accept that the common declaration included the recognition of the importance of the UN resolutions on the Palestinian issue or the need to accept the borders established before 1967, which both come down to the same thing. This is even though these conditions were already approved during the Ministerial Council in Luxembourg. At a certain moment, Tony Blair’s government believed that the necessary conditions were not met in order to adopt the Anti-Terrorist Code of Conduct and the common declaration, which caused the irritation of the Spanish government. Fortunately, the Summit was finally saved, mainly thanks to Mahmoud Abbas and to the Arab intention of avoiding the failure of a Summit, in which Spain was involved. In order to avoid the failure of the Summit, the Arab governments ended up accepting an Anti-Terrorist Code of Conduct, where there is no mention of the right to resist (referring to the Palestinian people).

The Summit did not resolve the institutional deficit of the Partnership, this was reflected in the press briefing which presented the conclusions made. This was attended by Blair, Zapatero, Barroso and Solana but there was no leader from the Southern countries.

With regard to political cooperation and the ability to face the short-term crisis, the political and security problems which affect the Mediterranean, the Summit’s overview is quite poor. The same can be said for immigration, where priority was once again given to controlling flows policies. The proposal presented by Spain, France and Morocco pointed in this direction; there was no alteration in order to introduce policies centred on what emigrants could offer to the economic and political development of the area. As for long-term policies, which could be referred to as the community dimension of the Barcelona Process, a program was approved for the next five years which is clearly pointing in the right direction and is legitimised by the existence of a multilateral context. Progress is expected in the areas of south-south integration, justice, internal security and support to political reforms. As it has been proved in the past ten years, the problem is that political and security issues and, more specifically, south-south conflicts make the Euro-Mediterranean integration process difficult and put the possibility to reach in 2010 the goal of creating a free trade area and the even more ambitious project of establishing a Community of Democratic States at risk.

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Challenges and Opportunities of the Working Programme from the Algerian Point of View

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During the Euromed summit in Barcelona, Algeria circulated a document evaluating ten years of dialogue and cooperation. This document reflected the current mood prevailing in civil society and among the leading players in the political and economic spheres. This in fact represented a very necessary exercise of self-assessment which in order to better underline the relevance of the Barcelona I strategy.

It may well be the case that too much had been expected of a process of rapprochement that has found it difficult to develop its true potential. It is also undoubtedly true that we had overestimated politicians’ ability to forge a spirit of trust between the two shores of the Mediterranean, to generate development, growth, stability, democracy, security, and closer ties between civil societies, all of which constituted a very wide range of objectives to be achieved against a geopolitical background of potential breakage.

The northward shift in the EU’s centre of gravity together with its successive phases of enlargement, the constant deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, and the differing perceptions held by the South relating to Europe, are all factors which have led to the modification of the original vision and have sent off-course the overall strategy that emerged from the fragile consensus achieved at Barcelona II.

Suddenly, however, a new, more globalized approach has entered the debate surrounding the Barcelona Process, with the aim of moving towards the full integration of the partners into the Single Market over an unspecified period of time. This represents a proposal to reinforce ties between countries that is in theory much more ambitious than the proposal first drawn up in 1995.

All this constitutes a real mood change in the Barcelona programme. US strategies towards the Arab world are of course not unrelated to the changes that have taken place. Given the balance of power that could be perceived at the Barcelona summit, in November 2005, it was only to be expected that this new agenda of cooperation should arouse a certain number of suspicions within Arab public opinion, which had already been asked to accept the European impotence in the face of Israel’s devastating recourse to unilateral action.

Future perceptions of cooperation within the Euro-Mediterranean framework will inevitably differ from one country to another. Is it necessary to try to consolidate what has been achieved so far – for things have indeed been achieved – by reinforcing existing structures and by further regionalizing the cooperation process? Is it better to make the effort of developing an agenda for political and cooperation-related questions while relying on the strengths of the structures for multilateral cooperation already in place, according to the widely-accepted principle of highlighting differentiating factors?

It was then necessary to assimilate the lessons of the past, both in relation to the method and to the real consequences of a cooperation which inevitably comes to be seen in terms of national challenges to be met in an atmosphere that is more and more competitive, both in political and economic terms, and in terms of the national model and image to be projected.

A new parameter appeared in December 2005, when it became necessary to evaluate the compatibility of the multiple poles of reciprocal interest existing between Euro-Mediterranean partners. The tendency among the Southern countries to give importance to the praise received by partners in the framework of political reforms, or for the degree of liberalization or of dynamism of civil society, has now been taken over by a desire to ensure that governments and public opinion in the Southern countries share common,
coherent goals, and that the wishes expressed by public opinion, whether they be expressed indirectly or in very clear terms, reach the ears of government. While it may well be true that the European partners consult public opinion in their countries about the key stages of the European construction process (and even so, not always), one of the advantages of the Barcelona Process, which is moreover easily overlooked because only too frequently overshadowed by the counter-productive militancy of both institutional and individual participants, is that it reflects this growing importance of public opinion. If this message has not been correctly interpreted in Barcelona, it becomes even more important to continue along the path of mutual understanding.

From this perspective, the normal inception of the Association Agreement between Algeria and the EU, rather than being an early or rushed start (according to viewpoint), would be seen as being anti-democratic and clearly anti-constitutional on the Algerian side, whilst being perfectly legal on the community side thanks to the separation of powers between the Commission and the member States. Since this accelerated procedure consists of bringing into force only the commercial chapter of the agreement, before this has even been examined and debated in Parliament, it could apparently be considered as having infringed the general principle of respect for the rule of law endorsed in the text of the agreement itself. It is also claimed that in commercial terms the benefits of the agreement are not equally distributed on both sides.

The ratification of the Agreement, which came into force on September 1st 2005, has likewise been much talked of on both sides. In fact, for practical reasons it was preferred that the Mediterranean partner should ratify first and as soon as possible in order to “give a signal”. On the European side, the passage of the text through all the national, federal and often regional parliamentary institutions would take a much longer time. This ratification can however trigger off an internal political debate or be a cause of controversy in the European Parliament. In either case, the EU’s partner country suffers the consequences. It is often also reduced to lobbying in order to accelerate the ratification process and emerge from the situation while limiting the damage as much as possible, including in relation to its own public opinion.

Following a certain number of precedents, the coming into force of the association agreement between Algeria and the EU went through the normal political and institutional channels, with the result that at the Commission’s request, the member States accelerated their internal procedures, enabling the agreement to come into force on 1st September, i.e., within the normal time period and in a spirit of mutual respect and common interests.

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**Official Events and Texts by Institutions and countries:**

- Spanish document to prepare the Tenth Anniversary of the Barcelona Process (7th January 2005).
The postponement of the holding of the first Association Council meeting which was originally planned for last March, following an Algerian request, is evidence of a desire to build a partnership in a spirit of mutual respect, the basic principle enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration and in the agreement itself. For under the constant pressure of events and the proliferation of EU deadlines, the importance of the first Council, which undoubtedly conserves a certain political symbolism, nevertheless tends to suffer from the phenomenal demands of the calendar. The distance taken in this way will no doubt be beneficial. This will be especially true as far as Algeria is concerned, since the principles and priorities within which the strengthening of dialogue and cooperation should take place had been jointly agreed. When Mrs Benita Ferrero-Waldner made her first visit to Algeria in June 2005, the first made by a European Commissioner since 1996, she agreed with Mr Mohammed Bedjaoui to give priority to the setting up of the agreement, to agree on the 2007-2009 levels of cooperation for the economic and social assistance foreseen in the agreement, and that an effort should be made to recover lost time. On this occasion, the minister of State and minister for Foreign Affairs handed the European commissioner a programme of action indicating these priorities.

The ambition was to consolidate the stage just passed through by setting an agenda concentrating especially on the country’s national priorities, including the following areas: the impact of the gradual ope-
ning up of the national market; better access for Algerian products to the European market; aiding the free circulation of individuals; cooperation in the scientific sphere; and reviewing the conditions of work and of residence of Algerian citizens in Europe. In order to give a framework to this process of cooperation, it has been proposed to the European partner the setting up of seven working sub-committees, including the political dialogue and terrorism, human rights and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

This Algerian perspective has again been explained to the President of the European Commission, Mr. José Manuel Durão Barroso, by the Head of the Government, Mr. Ahmed Ouyahia, who also explained the Algerian partner's desire to develop the energy question as part of the process of high-level dialogue.

Basing its request on the principle of differentiation, the Algerian government has likewise informed the Commission that it would like both parties to respect the calendar for renegotiation of the agricultural basket, fishing and service areas as foreseen in the association agreement, since the new target dates established in the context of the Barcelona 2005 action programme were of such an anticipatory nature that they could easily penalize domestic producers. The parliamentary aspect has also been given a new boost. Mr. Josep Borrell Fontelles has in fact recently completed the first visit by a president of the European Parliament to Algeria, which demonstrates the serenity of bilateral relations, and indicates the importance acquired by parliamentary diplomacy in the laborious process of building trust on a EuroMediterranean level.
At last, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) published its code of conduct against terrorism. I have to say I was slightly disappointed. I was expecting a more vigorous and authentic document. Instead, we have witnessed a general statement that lacks direct suggestions or a clear course of action to be adopted and implemented in ‘its’ fight against terrorism. With this disappointment gradually affecting my opinion of the entire EMP as a viable and feasible institution, two questions come to the forefront and need to be addressed before any judgment is made: why should we expect more from the EMP in this regard? What do we expect from the EMP?

Why should we expect more from the EMP?

As far as the first question is concerned, it is elemental and expected that the EMP agenda against terrorism goes beyond ‘condemnation’ and ‘determination’, to that of strategizing and planning, (in the long and short term) the Partnership’s vision and policy to fight this dangerous phenomenon. In other words, it has been almost five years since the beginning of the war on terrorism, five years in which a huge number of events have occurred. Thus it is more pertinent and worthy to see a more detailed action plan by the EMP, than a piece of document that consists of 21 clauses, which have all been redrafted from previous UN documents. Notwithstanding, the appreciation of the EMP’s willingness to cooperate with international bodies and extra-regional organizations in the field of counter terrorism, and notwithstanding the appreciation of its endorsement of human rights and the necessity of ensuring that the fight against terrorism must be implemented in accordance with international humanitarian law, it is imperative that the EMP comes up with a ‘regionally-tailored’ response to the issue of terrorism. In other words, although an international response on terrorism is a crucial necessity, a regional one that takes into consideration the parochial conditions of the Mediterranean region is crucial, if not a priority.

Meanwhile, this question also brings to the forefront the issue of the EMP and the so-called Barcelona Process as a viable and useful inter-regional organization that addresses certain major developments and issues that are of great concern for all countries on both flanks of the Mediterranean. This becomes imperative when we notice that only very recently we celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, and with anniversaries we usually take the liberty of assessment and contemplation. With the voices that question the effectiveness and feasibility of the Partnership on the increase, the EMP officials must make sure that they don’t present ammunition to the ‘enemy’ on a silver platter. Specifically, many would suggest that it is immature and unrealistic to expect a common policy on such a sensitive issue from an organization that consists of 35 countries, which are already struggling in principle to acquire and achieve a unified foreign and security policy, whether within the premises of the European Union or the Arab League. Despite the immense weight this line of argumentation shows at face value, a deeper look at it clarifies how shallow and insubstantial the argument it is. There is no single country in the partnership that has not yet suffered directly or indirectly from terrorism. It has always been an issue of consensus in the EMP com-
munity. Indeed, it is quintessential to protect the critical infrastructure of the EMP member states, primarily the economic infrastructure such as transport, telecommunications and energy, but also food and water, and medical infrastructure. In other words, there are a whole series of sectors that could be severely disrupted by well-targeted terrorist attacks, particularly if they were to happen in several member states simultaneously.

What exactly do we expect from the EMP?

The second question to be addressed is what exactly should we expect from the Euro Mediterranean Partnership? My attempt to answer this one-million dollar question will occupy a large part of this article. If the EMP is to succeed in enabling its governments to stop terrorism, it needs to address all terrorism’s causes. It must recognize the link between stability, development and justice. In particular, action plans that do not consider reducing poverty, fighting oppression, ending occupation and ensuring respect for religions, would render any effort or work against terrorism futile. This paper argues that EMP could best deal with terrorism when it dissects it on multiple levels. In other words, while the EMP’s document acknowledges the need for terrorism analysis to be conducted on various levels, it does not specify strategies that could systematically analyze occurrences of terrorist acts on all levels. The document does not even attempt to develop an integrated framework for the analysis of the causes of terrorism. Accordingly, the important question becomes: what elements, levels or lines of action should form the basis of the EMP’s counter-terrorism strategy?

There are three lines of action. First, in the fight against terrorism national agencies should continue to lead, that is to say, national governments and EMP member states should keep full control over their police forces, their security and intelligence agencies and their judicial authorities. Second, these national agencies must work across borders to be effective. This means we must have a vast programme of practical action plans at the EMP level to facilitate cooperation between member states. Examples could include organizations where police forces cooperate; where investigating judges and prosecutors do likewise; where intelligence and security services jointly analyse the terrorist threat both outside the EMP and within; and where border forces in EMP cooperate more and share experience and best practices. On that basis, we have adopted a long-term programme of action plans to combat terrorist financing and one in which travel across borders is made more difficult for terrorists.

Our third main line of action is to strengthen cooperation between the EMP, on the one hand, and other regional organisations in the Middle East, Europe and elsewhere in the world. First and foremost, the United Nations, but also NATO, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The EMP should also work increasingly closely with the United States, Russia, the Balkans, as well as with countries in the immediate vicinity to our east, trying to provide counter-terrorism assistance to countries such as Iraq and Iran. The more they protect themselves, the better that will be for EMP security.

A New Operational Pattern

I want to take the liberty of elaborating on one specific line of action that I believe would be very useful to begin with. Let me explain. The EMP should develop an experimental networking system and a new operational pattern that improves intelligence-sharing to enable all Mediterranean countries to exchange information more effectively. Once approved and implemented, our understanding of the extent of illegal activities, and therefore our ability to control terrorism, will be improved. In the same context, the EMP must develop a concept of information and intelligence-based operations through the sharing of data gathered by Mediterranean-rim countries. A high level of information-sharing process could provide a sound foundation upon which to build in the future. The aim is to develop a much more effective information collection and analysis system and to create an operational system that is intelligence-driven. The main tool for this concept will be a Joint Information Agreement that aims to promote a common information collection and reporting strategy, to provide analysis and warning, and to advise on deployment of assets. Its establishment would encourage the widest sharing of information and ensure that the output is passed in a timely manner to the countries or agencies most likely to be able to make use of it.
Concluding Remark

All these suggestions require cooperation in the EMP to be further intensified. In this regard, it must be noticed that the model of the EMP is bottom up. The central role in the fight against terrorism is with national authorities. The more they do to improve internal coordination in national governments (for instance, between police forces, intelligence agencies, the physical authorities, the border authorities and prosecutors) and the more they improve their internal coordination, the easier regional coordination will become.
The decision by the government of Israel to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and its 17 Jewish settlements, and from four West Bank settlements in the autumn of 2005 represented a moment of historic importance in the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Both conceptually and practically, it was a major departure from Israeli policy since 1967. Disengagement has re-shaped Israeli politics, setting in motion processes which have ended the generation-long domination of the Israeli political scene by the Likud Party. Indeed, the emergence of a new Israeli strategy based on unilateralism has re-shaped the basic parameters of the Israeli discussion, which since 1967 had been divided between supporters and opponents of the idea of land for peace. This article will discuss the emergence of the idea of unilateral disengagement, its adoption as policy by the government of Ariel Sharon, the implementation of the Gaza disengagement and events since the implementation.

The Idea of Unilateral Disengagement

The Disengagement Plan from the Gaza Strip and from four settlements in the West Bank was approved by the Israeli Cabinet on 6th June, 2004, and by the Knesset on 25th October, 2004. The idea had emerged publicly, however, a year earlier. In October, 2003, then Industry and Trade Minister Ehud Olmert made a series of speeches in which he first floated the notion that if Israel became convinced that progress through negotiation with the Palestinian Authority was impossible, then it might feel it incumbent upon itself to take unilateral action. Olmert in these speeches laid emphasis on the ‘demographic issue’: i.e. the fact that the rapidly growing Palestinian population in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea might eventually, in the absence of diplomatic progress, make the continued maintaining of a democratic, majority-Jewish state unfeasible. Since this was the case, he argued, the status quo did not work in Israel’s favor. An alternative way forward, Olmert suggested, would be for Israel to unilaterally withdraw from areas it felt were not essential, or which would in any case be ceded during future peace negotiations. This might lead to the de facto emergence of the Palestinian state with provisional borders envisaged by the Road Map, to which Israel remained committed.

This idea was further explained, and began the path to becoming Israeli policy, with the speech by Prime Minister (PM) Ariel Sharon, at the fourth Herzliya Conference on 18th December, 2003. PM Sharon expressed his advocacy of unilateral disengagement in the following terms: “We are interested in conducting direct negotiations, but do not intend to hold Israeli society hostage in the hands of the Palestinians. I have already said: We will not wait for them indefinitely. The Disengagement Plan does not prevent the implementation of the Roadmap. Rather, it is a step Israel will take in the absence of any other option, in order to improve its security. The Disengagement Plan will be realized only in the event that the Palestinians continue to drag their feet and postpone implementation of the Roadmap.”

Details of the Plan

The precise provisions of the Disengagement Plan, as accepted by the Israeli Cabinet in June, 2004, laid
out a blueprint for the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces and civilians from the area of the Gaza Strip, and the evacuation of civilian residents from four West Bank communities. According to the Revised Disengagement plan the settlements to be evacuated were divided into four groups:

- **Group A** – Morag, Netzarim, and Kfar Darom in the Gaza Strip.
- **Group B** – the villages of Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur, and Homesh in the northern West Bank.
- **Group C** – the towns and villages of Gush Katif in the Gaza Strip.
- **Group D** – the villages of the northern Gaza Strip (Elei Sinai, Dugit, and Nissanit).

It was made clear that territorial contiguity would be assured for the Palestinians in the areas to be evacuated, and that no permanent Israeli military presence would remain.

In the course of 2005, the Disengagement Plan was revised and finalized. It also became integrated into the broader picture of relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

**The Plan Becomes Policy, in the Face of Determined Opposition**

At a summit meeting held in Sharm al-Sheikh on 8th February, 2005, the Disengagement Plan was discussed and endorsed by representatives of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Egypt and Jordan. The summit also witnessed the brokering of a ceasefire between Israel and the PA which effectively brought to a close five years of overt hostilities between the two sides which had resulted in heavy loss of both Israeli and Palestinian life.

The Sharm summit was followed by the final endorsing by the Knesset of the Disengagement Plan on 16th February, 2005. The first months of 2005 witnessed a determined campaign of opposition to disengagement waged by Israeli residents of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and their supporters. This campaign began with a strong sense of confidence among its adherents that the Disengagement could be prevented. Public support for the Disengagement Plan, however, remained consistently high in the months leading up to implementation. Polls revealed a rate of support of around 70% among the Israeli public for the plan.

The opposition campaign notwithstanding, on 16th February, 2005, the Knesset passed the final version of the Disengagement Plan Implementation Law. This law represented the penultimate hurdle that the plan was required to pass on the road to implementation. It laid down a series of practical measures for the relocation and compensation of Israeli residents of communities in the Gaza Strip and in the four West Bank communities slated for dismantlement. The law allocated the sum of NIS 3.8 billion ($884 million) for the relocation and compensation of residents. It was passed with 59 in favour, 40 opposed, 5 abstaining. A proposed amendment to submit the plan to a referendum was rejected.

The Plan, as modified and amended by the Knesset, was then presented before the Israeli Cabinet on 20th February. The Cabinet approved it, completing the progress of the Disengagement Plan from an idea floated by senior politicians to the approved policy of the Government of Israel.

On 28th March, the Knesset rejected a bill to delay the implementation of the disengagement plan by a vote of 72 to 39. The bill was introduced by a group of Likud MKs who wanted to force a referendum on the issue.

On 17th March, Israel Defensive Forces (IDF) Southern Command issued a military order prohibiting Israeli citizens who did not reside in the Gaza Strip settlements from relocating to the area. The domestic campaign against disengagement did not cease at this point. But for the remainder of 2005, it would take the form of a series of public events and demonstrations which sought – through massive public pressure – to delay or frustrate the carrying out of the dismantling of settlements, and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

On 7th August, just a week before the commencement of Disengagement, Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu resigned his Cabinet post, prior to the final Cabinet ratification of the first phase of Disengagement. This vote was carried in the Cabinet by 17 votes to 5. Netanyahu explained his reasons for resigning as deriving from his fears of a surge of terrorism following the Disengagement. He considered that this would take place both because Israel would no longer be able to control events in Gaza, and because the withdrawal would be perceived by Palestinian rejectionists as a vindication of their violent tactics. “The withdrawal,” Netanyahu said in a statement following his resig-
nation, “endangers Israel’s security, divides its people and sets the standard of the withdrawal to the 1967 border.”

The implementation of the plan

The implementation of Disengagement began on 15th August, 2005. The Gaza Strip and the area surrounding the four West Bank settlements were closed to visitors, and the process of evacuating all those individuals who had not already left, and demolishing the infrastructure of the communities began. In the event, the disengagement proceeded far more smoothly and speedily than had been predicted. There were nevertheless anguished scenes in all the communities slated for destruction, as the settlers and their allies protested their removal. Some protestors threw substances at Israeli security forces personnel. The substances included, paint, turpentine and in one case acid. But there were few serious acts of violence, and no fatalities as a result of the disengagement. (With the exception of one female opponent to the disengagement who set herself on fire and later died of her injuries.)

Israel’s conduct of regular security operations continued during the course of the implementation of disengagement. An IDF force killed five members of the Islamic Jihad organization on the week of the Disengagement.

The removal of settlers and protestors from Gaza was completed by 24th August, 2005. On 31st August, the Knesset reversed previously stated Israeli intentions, and voted to withdraw from the Gaza-Egypt border. Egyptian security personnel would now be deployed along the demilitarized Egyptian side of the border. Israel had previously maintained its intention of retaining control of the border in the hands of the Israeli security forces.

On Sunday, 11th September, the Israeli Cabinet voted to leave the synagogues in the Gaza Strip settlements intact. This enabled the withdrawal to proceed slightly ahead of schedule. The last IDF troops left the Gaza Strip on 11th September. On 12th September, the settlements were handed over to the Palestinians. The evacuation of the four northern West Bank settlements, meanwhile, was completed by 22nd September.

In a statement issued on the first day of the Disengagement, Ariel Sharon once more clarified the reasons for Israel’s unilateral turn. He expressed himself in the following terms: “We tried to reach agreements with the Palestinians which would move the two peoples towards the path of peace. They were crushed against a wall of hatred and fanaticism. The unilateral disengagement plan…is the Israeli answer to this reality. The plan is good for Israel in any future scenario. We are reducing the day to day friction and its victims on both sides. The IDF will redeploy on defensive lines behind the Security Fence. Those who continue to fight us will meet the full force of the IDF and the security forces.”

Developments since the Disengagement

In the days that followed the implementation of Disengagement, an immediate trial of strength developed between Hamas and the Israeli security forces. After an explosion at a Hamas ‘victory parade’ in the Jebalya refugee camp on 19th September, the movement began a Qassam bombardment of Israeli western Negev communities. A heavy Israeli response in the subsequent days ended the exchange. But a constant, steady rain of Qassams, now reaching the outskirts of the city of Ashkelon, has been a factor since the withdrawal from Gaza.

Agreement on the vexed issue of the southern crossing from Gaza to Sinai was not reached until 15th November, 2005. The Rafah Crossing, and the security arrangements there, remain an issue of concern for Israel. For Palestinians, meanwhile, the issue of the Karni border crossing – the main commercial crossing between Gaza and Israel – has been a point of frustration. The crossing has periodically been closed because of Israeli intelligence warnings of possible Palestinian attack. The effect this has on the Palestinian ability to conduct commercial activity is significant, and has caused damage to the Palestinian economy in the Gaza Strip.

The Hamas victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections of 25th January, 2006 has been cited by some as influenced to some degree by the perception that the movement’s violence had produced the Disengagement. Such a contention, however, remains open to question. Other issues – most importantly anger at the perceived corruption of the Fatah-led PA, and the general phenomenon of popularity of Islamist candidates wherever genuinely free elections have been held in the Arab world.
Conclusion

The implementation of the Disengagement from Gaza and part of the northern West Bank was viewed by those who formulated it, and by Israel’s security establishment, as a success. The perceived success of the move has brought the likelihood of further extensive unilateral moves by Israel on the West Bank onto the agenda. Crucial issues which remain as yet unclear include the precise contours and extent of further unilateral withdrawals, security arrangements in the areas to be evacuated, and the broader diplomatic significance and implications of such moves.

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Prior to exploring the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon as an essential event in 2005, both in this small country and in the entire region, it is imperative to speak of the months preceding the year of great events, which changed the internal geopolitics and external relations of Lebanon, while initiating a grand political scheme which is yet to be finalized.

A sequence of factors led to the inception of the paramount event, i.e. the Syrian withdrawal. They can be summarized as follows:

- The Security Council’s resolution 1559 of September 2nd 2004, which called for a “free and fair electoral process in Lebanon’s upcoming presidential election conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules, devised without foreign interference or influence” (to be held 2 months prior to the expiration of President Lahoud’s mandate on November 22nd). It also called on “all remaining foreign forces” i.e. the Syrian forces, “to withdraw from Lebanon”.

   However, pressured by Syria, the Lebanese Parliament convened with the Prime Minister Rafik Hariri who was to be assassinated shortly afterwards, and extended the mandate of the pro-Syrian president Lahoud by half a term. To this end, the Parliament amended the Constitution, which bans the President from staying in office beyond his 6-year term.

- The assassination of the former Lebanese Premier Rafik Hariri on February 14th 2005; a political quake whose main ongoing effects also expedited the Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon, a process completed by April 26th, 2005.

“Extension” of Syrian Administration

The year 2005 was riddled with the burden of the previous year, when Lebanon became the focus of the international community after a majority of Lebanese and international players rejected the extension of President Lahoud’s term. The extension was challenged because it was synonymous to extending the direct Syrian administration that had infiltrated every aspect of the Lebanese governance, banking on the authority that Damascus had slowly constructed over the years in Lebanon, since the Syrians’ entry in 1976, not forgetting the important security apparatus, which took an essential part in the rule and the political life in Lebanon, for it was an element of reassurance to Damascus. The influence was also felt inside the different religious rites in the Lebanese society and the political system that is based on coexistence and cooperation between these rites.

Damascus believed that the international community would be indifferent to the extension of Lahoud’s term, since, according to its own theory, the United States’ main concern in the region was only confined to the Syrian cooperation with it in Iraq. Syria underestimated the French stance and the rapprochement of Paris and Washington although it led to UN resolution 1559. However, things took a completely different course. The decision in fact energized Lebanese opposition, which grew and unified its forces to prepare for a new presidential election process, taxation Lahoud’s presidency as “unconstitutional”. It was thus defying the Syrian influence in Lebanon, while calling for a complete application of the clauses in the Taef agreement that ended the Lebanese war in 1989, which stipulated that the Syrians should gradually withdraw from Lebanon (up to the Bekaa valley as a
first step). Most of the opposition avoided reliance on the resolution 1559 (the resolution represented an issue of discord among the Lebanese for it stipulated a disbandment of all militias, i.e. of Hezbollah). The international community was intent on the implementation of the international resolution, and thus sent the United Nations’ special envoy on frequent trips to Damascus and Beirut. On another level, the international community kept a close watch on Syrian behavior, following the security and political pressure on the Lebanese opposition, the first manifestation of which was with the failed assassination attempt of the minister Marwan Hamade on October 1st, 2004. Damascus assembled its allies to face the opposition, following Hariri’s resignation. They brought their attention to the preparations of the upcoming parliamentary elections in May 2005. They sought to ensure their grip on the internal political decision, to curb the growing opposition’s chances of becoming a parliamentary majority, which would topple Lahoud and tip the balance of powers to their disadvantage. The Syrians had been assured, on the other hand, that the Karami government would not consent to the Syrian withdrawal as laid out in the international resolution. They also believed that the presence of its military and intelligence forces inside Lebanon during the elections would ensure Syria a continuing hold on the country.

Hariri and Syria

Whether direct or indirect (through ally proxies), the Syrian counter-attack relied on the following points:

- The Karami government would pass an electoral law that redistributes the electoral circumscriptions in such a way that Hariri and his allies would be unable to win a majority of seats
- Continuous media campaigns waged by Damascus’ allies as well as Syrian and Lebanese media against Hariri, accusing him of corruption and ridding Lebanon with debts.
- The tightening of the grip on Hariri’s partisans in Beirut, through the Syrian and local authority-controlled judiciary; the last related incident having only ended a few hours prior to Hariri’s assassination.
- The security grip on the leading Syrian opponent, the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt who had been adamant in opposing the extension, along with his parliamentary bloc and the Christian parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition.
- Last but not least was Hariri’s accusation of secretly engineering the Security Council’s 1559 resolution (Hamade was the object of the same accusation before his attempted assassination).

Nevertheless, the increasing pressure on Hariri had a counter-effect on Lebanese people, since it only increased the leader’s popularity. By this time, Hariri had reached the firm conclusion that it would be impossible for Lebanon to be ruled and for its problems to be solved under the continuing Syrian command of all aspects of its rule; a command he had become familiar with since 2000. Hariri thus took gradual steps to join the opposition forces (the “Bristol gathering”), in a way that would not bring on Damascus’ wrath against him prior to the elections. But he had not planned for as fast and quick a withdrawal as the one that occurred after his death. He repeated his famous quote: “Lebanon can neither be ruled against Damascus, nor from within it”. On the day of his assassination, the papers had published declarations in which he had assured that Damascus does not need a military presence in Lebanon to have an influence over the country.

On February 14th, a 1,000 kg of TNT detonated in Beirut, killing the former premier along with former MP Bassel Fleyhan and 18 other people.

Hariri’s fame and considerable importance were such that the event which shocked the Lebanese, the Arab world and the entire world alike, also triggered a series of unexpected developments. The public frustration that had been dormant for years exploded in an unprecedented street mobilization against the Syrian practices and the Lebanese government’s policies. Demonstrations and protests rocked the heart of Lebanon as never before, toppling the Karami government after defying the ban on protests as the army stood by and watched. The protest movement reached its paroxysm on March 14, when over a million demonstrators swarmed to Hariri’s tomb in downtown Beirut, crying out against Syria whom the opposition accused of perpetrating the assassination in cooperation with the Lebanese security apparatus, a mere few hours after the blast. Both Lebanese and Syrian high officials believed that there would only be a three-day mourning before life resumed its natural course. They believed in the tight control they had over Lebanon, both politically and in...
security matters. So much so in fact, that the Lebanese security forces had no qualms about manipulating evidence at the crime scene; an issue that was later to be a main concern of the international investigation of the crime.

Few hours prior to the Hariri bombing, the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad met with the Spanish foreign minister Miguel Angel Moratinos in Damascus. Diplomatic reports conveyed that President Assad said to his guest “tell your friend (the French President Jacques) Chirac that we shall maintain our influence over Lebanon, even if we withdraw and you get to watch the tanks crossing the border”.

Syria’s opponents produced many an interpretation to the assassination act. But the interpretation that linked it to the withdrawal stipulated that the Syrian leadership knew it would have to implement the resolution 1559, if after a while. Therefore, it wished to be rid of the hindrance to its ongoing power over the Lebanese authority after this eventual withdrawal. It sought to do so before the elections, to ensure the loyal majority on its side until 2008, which, given the 4-year mandate of the parliament, would help it to influence the election of a new president in less than 3 years.

In this respect, Syria would have an assured power over the 6-year long presidency mandate that ends in 2013, ergo a power that would extend well over the 3-year extension of Lahoud (expires in 2007). This interpretation became a headline that the international investigation committee tried to explore when looking for a motive to the crime within the political context. After all, it links the crime to the withdrawal. The ensuing developments from Hariri’s murder catapulted enormous changes in the shortest of periods. A week prior to the assassination, Roed-Larsen urged Assad to begin by “withdrawing a single soldier from Lebanon”. Assad found the request odd, and Larsen therefore clarified it: start with Rustom Ghazale. The latter being the head of the Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, Assad felt the enormity of the request. Major General Ghazale was in fact not only a personal representative of the Syrian President in Lebanon, but also the one responsible for running the country. After the Assassination, Washington, Paris, London and the European Union replaced their previous request for a withdrawal timetable with a firm demand for withdrawal. Presidents George W. Bush and Jacques Chirac first spoke of an immediate withdrawal in the shortest of delays possible. They then spelled out their demand: a non-negotiable Syrian withdrawal before the May elections. Arab and international players, along with the Lebanese opposition agreed on this same formula, which guarantees a minimum intervention of Syrians in the upcoming elections.

Then came the defining March 3rd Saudi-Syrian summit in Riyadh, for the Saudis conveyed to the Syrians Egypt’s and their own wish for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 1559, and not with the Taef agreement which Damascus was clinging to. On March 5th came the Syrian president’s speech in the Parliament announcing his decision to pull back from Lebanon. A pullback that ensures Syria’s implementation of its half of 1559, as he assured before repeating nonetheless that the Syrian influence in Lebanon will never wither. Immediately afterwards, the pro-Syrian political parties and forces in Lebanon, whose main foundation remains the Shiites and precisely the popular party in their midst Hizbollah, decided to show their loyalty to Syria through a massive gathering in downtown Beirut on 8th March. Four to five hundred thousand people held the banners of loyalty and gratitude to Syria for the help it gave Lebanon, its support of the resistance to end the Israeli occupation of the South and its support to end the Lebanese civil war. They also manifested their rejection of resolution 1559. This crowd spurred a reaction, which culminated in a demonstration of over a million people on March 14th to reject the direct Syrian tutelage over Lebanon. The protest comprised the main Christian powers, (whose active leadership had opposed Syrian influence since the early nineties of the last century before the Maronite Patriarch, head of the biggest Christian rites in Lebanon, became the head of Christian opposition in 2000), alongside the main Sunni and Druze leaders. This mass gathering was as much a surprise to pro-Syrian powers and Damascus officials as it was to the entire world and great powers, who marveled at its enormity. The gathering therefore pushed these powers to demand a faster Syrian withdrawal. On the other hand, however, these two big demonstrations lay the decisive foundation of an internal rift in Lebanon, whose signs had appeared during the previous year, accompanying each and every important political event.

The swift military drawback completed by April 26th, allowed for a settlement between the Shiite leadership and Damascus’ opponents, who agreed to hold the elections in May. Damascus’ allies had previously insisted these elections be postponed 2 years, and
then 6 months, for the opposition seemed so certain it would win the majority of votes and seats. But their insistence was met with another one by the United Nations, Washington and Paris to fill the "void" engendered by the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese territory and rule, and replace Syrians with an elect Lebanese administration.

International investigation

The international community thus pushed Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to persuade Damascus of holding the elections on time. Consequently, Syria's opponents and its remaining allies, namely the two major Shiite organizations, reached a settlement, by virtue of which the Muslim powers opposing Syria, i.e. the Sunni and Druze leaders refuse to refer the arms of Hezbollah to the international community, considering it a matter of "internal dialogue" instead. The newly elected majority took power, after Syria's opponents won for the first time since 1976, the year when Syrians entered the country. The Lebanese political map was altered, and Christians saw the return of two of their leaders, who were alienated during the Syrian hegemony: General Michel Aoun, who returned from exile and won the majority of Christian votes, and Dr. Samir Geagea, who was released from prison by amnesty of the new Parliament. This change came combined with other factors, spurring Syrian concern: the Security Council had issued resolution 1595 by virtue of which an independent international investigation committee was formed on April 7th to look into Hariri's murder. The committee had ample authority, which made for serious cooperation problems with Damascus that rose as early as last August (by the end of this month, four senior Lebanese officers, friends and proxies of the Syrian rule, were arrested). Syria was accused of failing to cooperate and the committee therefore published two reports. The second, published on December 15th, pointed to the involvement of senior Syrian security officers in the murder, a fact that Damascus continued to deny. Subsequently, the Security Council adopted two new resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (1636 on October 31st and 1644 on December 15th. The latter agreed on the Lebanese government's request to discuss the possibility of an "international court" to look into the assassination) requesting Syria to cooperate with the committee, if it wishes to avoid sanctions. The Syrian position on the committee varied between accusing it of "politicizing" the investigation and agreeing to its questioning of Syrian officers. The committee's renewable mandate expires in mid-June 2006.

On another level, President Assad voiced on November 10th his decision to face and oppose pressures on Syria.

Syrian cards

The deterioration of the Lebanese-Syrian relations was intensified by the Syrian media campaigns on the majority leaders on one hand, and by the majority's accusations of Syria of orchestrating the bombings (that began in April) and the assassinations. Verily, the killing and attempted killing-series had continued throughout the elections, targeting the journalist Samir Kassir on June 2nd, the former Secretary General of the Lebanese Communist party Georges Hawi, the minister Elias el Murr, the journalist May Chidiac and lastly the journalist Gebran Tueini on December 12th. These accusations divided the Lebanese, for the pro-Syrian forces rejected them, countering them instead with their own accusations of the majority of taking orders from international, and especially American, players.

This scene of division between anti and pro-Syrians mingled with the many regional factors was the closing act of 2005. Syria still has pressure cards in Lebanon. Indeed, Damascus resorted to its Lebanese options to defend the Syrian regime, targeted, according to it by the international investigation committee which sought a meeting with president Assad, foreign minister (now vice-president) Farouk al Shara'i and others from the tight ruling circle on one hand, and by former vice president Abdel Halim Khaddam's change of camp, and his siding with the anti-Syrian witnesses on the other hand.

Despite Washington's assurance that it only wishes to modify the regime’s attitude both in Lebanon and the region and not change the regime itself, and Paris's insistence on its complete disinterest in any change of this kind, Syria pursued its line and strengthened its alliance with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Iranian regime, as well as the armed Palestinian factions inside Lebanon and its allies there. Syria believes that this is an even better line now that Hamas won the Palestinian elections. In the end, all these factors make of Lebanon an ongoing battlefield.
The year 2005 was critical in Iraq’s post-regime transition. Historians may well look back on it as a turning point, the year in which a buoyant experiment in nation-building (witness, for example, the high turnout at the polls) not only failed to produce a strong and popular new leadership but set the country on a path toward sectarian violence and civil war. At the time of writing – April 2006 – the outcome of these developments was not yet clear, but the outlook was grim – for Iraq but also for the wider region, as civil war threatened to draw in neighbouring states and precipitate a crisis engulfing the entire region.

The year was bracketed by two sets of elections, in January and December, and additionally saw a referendum on the new constitution in October. In other words, Iraqis were asked to go to the polls on three separate occasions within the span of a year. Their attitude toward these polls, the voter composition, as well as the results, helps explain the overall outcome, one of growing polarisation, sectarianism and civil strife.

The 30th January Elections

The two most important observations that can be made about Iraq’s first popular election since the Baath regime’s ouster in April 2003 was that the results enjoyed popular legitimacy thanks to a turnout that was impressive, enthusiastic and spontaneous, but at the same time that a Sunni Arab boycott undermined this legitimacy, because the results were skewed dangerously in favour of Iraq’s other two principal communities, the Shiites and Kurds. This set the country on a course towards the Sunni Arabs’ institutional exclusion from key aspects of the reconstruction effort, most notably the drafting of a constitution.

None of this was preordained. In both timing and design, the elections resulted from political decisions taken in response to specific crises that occurred earlier in the post-war period; these crises could have been avoided, and different decisions could have been taken. Be that as it may (books can be, and are being, written about this), the elections were scheduled for the earliest date possible from a technical perspective and the latest date acceptable to the dominant political actors – representatives of the majority Shiite community. This date, 30th January, therefore became immutable. Moreover, the US government repeatedly hammered on the need to adhere to the tight timetable prescribed by the interim constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), that an unelected body, the US-appointed Interim Governing Council, had signed in March 2004 and which prescribed elections before the end of January 2005. When a Sunni Arab boycott threatened, lack of flexibility in extending the date resulted in the election being pushed through without them. Sunni Arab exclusion was compounded by the electoral system’s design, which resulted from the same time constraints: Given the agreement to hold elections no later than the end of January 2005, flexibility on their design was also limited. With this in mind, UN election experts insisted on a system of proportional representation in which Iraq was treated as a single district. This system favoured identity-based coalitions over smaller parties, and punished regional absenteeism: no seats were set aside for Sunni Arabs boycotting the elections or staying away fearing violence.

Unsurprisingly, the elections yielded an overwhelming victory for the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a coalition of Shiite parties that was cobbled together at
the request of the Shiites' foremost religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose intervention had led to the scheduling of the elections in the first place. The UIA walked off with 48% of the vote, or 140 seats in the 275-seat Transitional National Assembly. The Kurdistan Coalition List, an alliance of the main Kurdish parties, won 26%, or 75 seats. The secular list of Iyad Allawi took 40 seats, and Sunni Arabs (distributed over various parties) obtained only 17 seats.

Three months later, at the end of April 2005, the UIA and KCL formed a government, sprinkling it with positions for independent Sunni Arabs who, like UIA leaders, were predominantly former exiles and were considered tokens by many in the Sunni Arab community. This government accomplished little during its one-year reign (it did draft the electoral law for the December and future elections) and enjoyed little popular legitimacy, despite its emergence from a popular vote. It was strictly transitional, a virtual caretaker government during a particularly perilous period in Iraq's journey toward the restoration of its sovereignty.

**Constitution Drafting**

When Iraq's constitutional process commenced in May, it was meant to be both inclusive and deliberative, thus to help re-stabilise a country that was witnessing growing insurgency and endemic lawlessness. Two obstacles to these objectives presented themselves at once. First, Sunni Arab absenteeism at the polls led to significant under-representation in the new national assembly and, consequently, in the newly-established constitutional committee. Second, the interim constitution, the TAL, set an extremely tight timetable for Iraq's constitution writing, one that mandated a completion of the drafting process by 15th August, with the possibility of a single six-month extension.

In the event, the constitutional process was neither inclusive nor deliberative. Instead, at insistent US urging, it was rushed so as to prevent insurgents from taking advantage of the political vacuum arising from an extended transition, and also – an unstated US objective – to allow for a swift hand-over of power to Iraqis and subsequent US troop withdrawal.

In July, after the 55–member drafting committee had started its deliberations, fifteen unelected Sunni Arabs were added to protect their community's vital interests. Within a month, however, discussion of the knottiest issues was moved from the committee to an informal grouping of political party leaders, who tended to gather at party headquarters or leaders' homes, often without inviting Sunni Arab drafters. For all practical purposes, therefore, the latter were re-excluded from the drafting process from early August on. After about a month, they were presented with a document to which they had barely contributed, certainly its key provisions. They consequently decided to reject it as an unacceptable imposition likely to do irreparable harm to their community’s fundamental interests, and threatened to boycott the popular referendum scheduled for 15th October.

The process, moreover, was rushed by a US government intent on completing the transition as per the TAL-mandated timetable, the end point of which were parliamentary elections on 15th December. Although it became clear towards the end of July that the drafters, who had barely been at work for a month, were far from finished, and that there had been no time to seek public input, or even to brief the public about the proceedings and the difficult compromises that would have to be made, the national assembly decided not to avail itself of the option to extend the process by six months, a decision that, according to the TAL, would have had to be made by 1st August.

Exhortations by senior US officials to get the job done deterred those who either realised they faced an impossible task or saw folly in rushing the drafting of a document so fundamental to the welfare of future Iraqi generations. Having passed up the opportunity to gain extra time, the assembly then faced the obligation to approve a complete draft by 15th August. This deadline proved unrealistic, and therefore was extended several times by default, in flagrant violation of the TAL. In the end, a draft was approved by the Shiite and Kurdish parliamentary blocs in mid-September, printed, published, and distributed throughout the country only two weeks ahead of the referendum. No significant public discussion of its contents took place. Political parties did make efforts to educate citizens but, more frequently, simply urged them to vote either yes or no.

**The 15th October Referendum**

Facing a Sunni Arab boycott of both the referendum and parliamentary elections, and fearing that
this might bolster the insurgency, the US brokered a last-minute compromise between the parties in early October. The principal result was the insertion into the constitution, which had already been printed and circulated, of a provision mandating the constitution’s early review following the December elections. In exchange, Sunni Arabs agreed to participate in the referendum.

The referendum on 15th October saw a significant turn-out, including and especially among Sunni Arabs. According to the TAL, the constitution would pass if approved by an absolute majority of voters nationwide and if not rejected by a two-thirds majority in at least three governorates. In the event, it was overwhelmingly approved in predominantly Shiite and Kurdish areas and rejected in predominantly Sunni Arab areas. Yet Sunni Arabs managed to breach the two-thirds threshold in only two governorates, Anbar and Salahuddin, falling just 85,000 votes short of doing so in a third, Ninewa. Sunni Arab leaders immediately cried foul, claiming that only fraud had kept them from defeating the constitution. The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) ruled differently, deeming the constitution ratified by public approval.

On balance, the constitutional process was a disaster. It deepened rifts where it was meant to heal them, fuelled the insurgency when it was supposed to have taken the wind out of its sails, encouraged ethnic and sectarian violence, and yielded a text that in its ambiguity, internal contradictions, divisiveness, and numerous lacunae carries the seeds of future discord. Weak and lacking consensus, approved by only two out of Iraq’s three principal communities, the document that was meant to be a national pact threatens to be both the prescription and the blueprint for Iraq’s dissolution.

The 15th December Elections

It was thus that a violence-wrecked and highly polarised country headed to the polls for the third time in a year, on 15th December. The electoral system was now appropriately adjusted to be one of proportional representation on the basis of not a single country-wide district but eighteen provincial districts. This meant that Sunni Arabs went into the election realising that, regardless of any boycott or otherwise-informed absenteeism, a number of seats would be set aside for them in governorates in which they predominate. For this reason, as well as the pre-referendum agreement on the constitutional review, there were no calls for a boycott this time; to the contrary, there were even reports of insurgents urging Sunni Arabs to register and vote.

Turn-out was again high, including among Sunni Arabs. But perhaps even more than in the previous elections, Iraqis voted by their self-defined communities: as Kurds, Shiites, or Sunni Arabs (with some small minorities also collecting a seat). The secular “middle”, represented by Iyad Allawi’s National Iraqi List (NIL), almost vanished.

The UIA, now expanded to include the movement of the populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, won 128 seats in the 275-seat national assembly. The Kurdistan Coalition (this time without the Kurdistan Islamic Union which, separately, garnered five seats) came in second with 53 seats. The Iraqi Consensus Front, a coalition of Islamist Sunni Arab parties, was third with 44 seats. Allawi’s NIL had to suffice with 25 seats, and a secular Sunni Arab coalition, the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, with 11 seats.

These results led to total deadlock. Under the rules of the new constitution, no single list could dictate its will, forcing it to ally itself with other lists to obtain the two-thirds majority required to form a government. By the end of April 2006, there was still no government. For two months, the main stumbling block was opposition by a gamut of parties to the UIA’s choice for prime minister, Ibrahim al-Ja’fari, who had headed the government in 2005 and who was perceived as either incompetent or, in the case of the Kurds, as resisting Kurdish efforts to seize oil-rich Kirkuk through a reversal of the previous regime’s Arabisation policies. In mid-April, Ja’fari agreed to step back; he was promptly replaced by a colleague in his Da’wa party, Jawad al-Maliki – signalling a change of face but not of outlook or future policy.

The international community, the Bush administration in front, repeatedly called for a government of national unity, one that would include Allawi’s secular list. While such a government could still come about, hopes were fading in continued wrangling that it would have the strength and legitimacy to both govern and fight the insurgency. Iraqis were therefore faced with the prospect that either the absence of national unity, embodied in the dangerously divisive constitution, would lead to Iraq’s disintegration, or that even a national unity government, stitched together months after the December elec-
tions, would prove incapable of restabilising their country.

Bibliography


In 2005, the EU launched a Strategy for Africa: an ambitious plan to support Africa’s development, both south and north of the Sahara. The Strategy is focused around peace and security, good governance, economic growth and investing in people. In the coming years, our partner countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean will benefit substantially from this new momentum in the Euro-African partnership.

A new deal for Africa

In 2005, the world turned their eyes to Africa and to the need for more decisive action to end the poverty in which so many Africans live today. This continent, declared lost by many only some years ago, figures today on the front-page of many newspapers and is discussed in all important international fora. In recent years, Africa has also been showing new leadership for its own development: the African Union, with the support of New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which has given the continent a new vision of a continent strongly committed to breaking with the practices and habits of the past and taking a decisive new approach to economic development and peace and security.

Africa matters to Europe

The European Union provides 60% of the aid to Africa and is its main trading partner. Europe therefore has a special responsibility towards this continent. Moreover, many EU Member States also have close historical ties and cultural links with individual African countries, which reinforce the cultural links between the two continents. As the pace of globalisation and internationalisation of, for example, security threats, energy trading and migration flows accelerates, Africa has taken on an increasingly strategic importance for Europe.

But for too long, the EU’s relations with Africa have been too fragmented, both in policy formulation and implementation. Neither Europe nor Africa can afford to sustain this situation and in December 2005, the European Union made a decisive effort to define a more strategic platform for its relations with Africa, aiming at a mutually beneficial partnership. The purpose of this strategy for Africa is therefore to give the EU a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the African continent. It focuses on how EU Member States and the European Commission can best support Africa’s own efforts to promote sustainable development and reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Strategy was endorsed at the highest political level by the European Council in the December 2005, and both the Commission and the EU Member States are now moving to action, and hopefully, the next ten years will be a watershed in relations between Europe and Africa.

A comprehensive approach

As Kofi Annan put it, “we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights”. In this spirit, the EU Strategy for Africa relies on a three-pronged approach which sees governance, human rights, security, growth and the reduction of poverty and poverty-related disease as interlocking factors:
First, promote peace, stability and good governance. Africa has known more conflicts than any other continent in the world and wars have destroyed livelihoods, caused millions of deaths and stunted economic growth. In the Congo alone almost four million people died between 1998 and 2004 as a consequence of a murderous war involving most of former Zaire’s neighbours. Peace and security are essential prerequisites for development and the EU will help its African partners to break the vicious conflict cycle through, for example, the EU Peace Facility for Africa, which funds current African Union missions in areas such as Darfur.

Good governance is a second central prerequisite for sustainable development. And for Africa’s new leaders, good governance is no longer a vague concept imposed by some Western powers. Rather, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is proving to be both a just and effective tool for monitoring of Africans by Africans. A number of African states have also agreed to undergo regular monitoring in the framework of the APRM. The EU will soon launch a Governance Initiative providing support to African countries in the implementation of APRM-driven reforms and will in parallel launch a specific governance support facility for the northern Mediterranean countries.

Second, boost economic growth and trade. Although 2005 saw Africa’s overall annual growth reach a record 5.2%, the continent’s economies must grow 7% a year if poverty is to be halved by 2015. There are major problems to reach this goal: Africa’s investment climate is the worst in world and Africa lacks the essential infrastructural hardware making any economic transaction a complex and costly enterprise. Shipping a car from Abidjan to Japan costs $1,500. Shipping the same car from Abidjan to Addis costs $5,000. No wonder that Africa’s trade accounts for about 2% of world trade and that its share of global manufactured exports is almost negligible. Increased South-South trade and inter-African investments are key factors for economic growth and regional integration.

A number of parallel activities supported by the EU are under way to address these problems. Apart from supporting a development agenda in global trade negotiations, the EU is currently negotiating Regional Partnership Agreements with four sub-Saharan regions of Africa and aims to establish a Free Trade Area around the Mediterranean by 2010. To boost private sector development, there are plans for a Euro-African Business Forum in 2006, which would develop an Action Plan to revitalise the private sector. The EU will also establish a comprehensive Partnership for Infrastructure, covering a broad range of areas such as energy, water, and information technology, to support and initiate programmes facilitating interconnectivity, at a continental level and for the promotion of regional integration. Finally, the importance of boosting agriculture, food security and promote sustainable fisheries is underlined in the Strategy within the cluster of promoting regional integration and economic development.

Third, tackle poverty directly. Eradicating poverty remains the basic objective of the EU’s work with Africa. The EU will step up its efforts to contribute to making health, education and other basic services, such as access to drinking water, sanitation and energy, available to the poorest people in Africa. These measures will need to be adapted in view of a new challenge, namely Africa’s demographic boom and rapid urbanisation. This requires action first and foremost at country level and the EU will channel funding to individual countries via bilateral cooperation and the Community funding instruments. At Pan-African level, measures include replenishing the Global Fund for the fight against infectious diseases, setting up a student exchange programme modelled on the successful Erasmus programme in Europe and support twinning arrangements between universities, schools, companies and parliaments in Europe and Africa. The Strategy also launches the idea of creating a European Voluntary Service, through which young Europeans can make their contribution to development.

More ODA for Africa

The EU made important further commitments relating to aid in 2005, notably to provide an additional amount of money provided as Official Development Assistance (ODA). Compared to the volumes provided in 2005, this means an additional €20 billion of per year by 2010 and €45 billion extra per year by 2015. At least 50% of this increase shall go to the African continent and support the implementation of the new Strategy.

Migration

The Strategy also addresses the topic of migration, a phenomenon which affects the whole of Africa,
where no single country can claim it is not a country of origin, transit or destination for the hundreds of thousands of refugees and economic migrants who choose or are forced to leave their homes every year. EU proposals, outlined in depth in another 2005 Commission Communication, for example include making it easier, cheaper and safer for migrants to send remittances to their countries of origin and allowing African countries to tap into the potential available in diaspora communities in Europe through, for example, various types of circular or temporary migration, which allow migrants to return to their countries of origin without, for instance, losing their right to the social security benefits or pension funds they have paid for years. Both these proposals are also included in the final report published last year by the Global Commission on International Migration, a panel of international experts sponsored by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.

Africa’s ‘brain drain’, which sees the continent’s highly qualified individuals fleeing to Europe in search of a brighter future, is taking a heavy toll on many African countries’ budgets as specialists trained at great expense in Africa leave, and on African health and education systems. An oft-quoted statistic highlights how urgent it is to address brain drain and turn it into ‘brain gain’: every year over one hundred Malawian doctors register for work in the United Kingdom whilst there are only one hundred and twenty Malawian doctors actually working for their country’s twelve million inhabitants. Brain gain can be achieved through, for example, the establishment of exchange programmes for students within Africa and between Africa and Europe. The Nyerere programme, one of the key proposals of the EU Africa Strategy’s section on education, would facilitate exchanges of this kind and provide state of the art training and education for African students.

A single African Continent

With the Strategy, Europe takes a decisive step towards viewing Africa as a single continent, whose problems, as well as hopes and aspirations, echo from Cape Town to Tunis. Europe will therefore engage with interlocutors at all levels: Pan-African institutions such as NEPAD and the African Union, regional organisations and national authorities, and is currently strengthening ties with its sister institution on the African continent, the African Union. October 2005 saw the first official meeting of all European Commissioners and their African Union counterparts, headed by the African Union Commission (AUC) President, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konaré. The two sides have decided to produce a joint matrix for the implementation of the Africa Strategy and will meet regularly in 2006. The African Union’s fledgling structures need European support to bolster an ambitious strategy based on good governance and an end to human rights violations in Africa.

Partners for the Future, not Recipients of Aid

Almost 50 years of development aid has taught us that good intentions are not enough. More aid, debt relief or trade has not necessarily led to economic development, let alone pro-poor growth. Today, Africa shows remarkable signs that the continent is changing and finally occupies the place it deserves on the international agenda. With its new Strategy, Europe has seized the opportunity to set an ambitious, but also concrete and realistic agenda for its relations with Africa. As a European, I am proud of these decisions and believe that Europe is setting an example for the world.
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It appears self-evident in Turkey that the European Union is the final destination that the country is moving towards. Membership of the EU is seen as the last phase of Turkey’s slow but relentless journey towards the West, originally a geographical phenomenon from the time of the historical migration of the Turkish peoples, later acquiring a political dimension under the influence of Mustapha Kemal Atatürk. Joining the Union would thus be the last step in the process of modernizing Turkey. However, this apparent consensus patches over the profound underlying ambiguities that characterize Turkey’s complex relationship with the West. In the same way that Turkey’s application obliges European countries to examine their own conception of the EU, it also goes to the heart of the Turkish identity and requires Turks to define themselves in terms of their relationship with others. Whilst on the one hand an idealized picture of Europe is given as the model to be followed, particularly when it comes to modernizing the country, the image of Europe as the historic enemy is also very much present.

The All-conquering EU: The Ultra-Nationalist Vision

Over and above the left/right cleavage or the moderate/traditionalist opposition, nationalism, which transcends these differences, is one of the essential keys to understanding euroscepticism in Turkey. Extreme right-wing nationalist opinion coincides to a great extent with the position of certain extreme left-wing or pro-Kemal groupings on the question of European integration. The former see in membership of the EU the risk of a loss of cultural identity and national sovereignty, leading to large-scale political dependence. The latter denounce the neo-colonialist or imperialist character of the Union. Invoking historical parallels, the Copenhagen criteria or the treaty of Maastricht are compared to the treaty of Sèvres (which was signed in 1920 by Turkey and the victorious powers of the First World War, formally recognizing the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire). In short, Turkey is seen as being subject to a permanent and continuing Western threat.

The MHP (nationalist action party), representing the ultra-nationalist extreme right wing, does not define itself as anti-European. It nevertheless made maximum use of its presence in the coalition government from 1999 to 2002 to block any attempted reforms which were required in order to harmonize with EU regulations. Despite having been swept from power and losing much of its presence in parliament, the party nevertheless regularly continues to show its ability to mobilize its supporters. Thus on October 2nd 2005, on the eve of the opening of the meeting of EU Foreign Affairs Ministers called to establish a framework for negotiations, tens of thousands of demonstrators, brought from all over Turkey in 750 coaches, were summoned by the party to Ankara. Under a banner reading, “Neither European Union nor USA, but a fully independent and nationalist Turkey”, the Party leader, D. Bachedi, called on the Prime Minister not to go to Luxembourg, telling him: “the concessions you have made so far have plunged the country into darkness”.

Frontiers and Identities in Europe

Euroscepticism in Turkey: European Ambiguity Fuels Nationalism

Keys

Med. 2006

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The TKP (Turkish communist party) and the Partisi (workers’ party), both ultra-nationalist (ex-) Maoist parties, also protest regularly against the European Union. The TKP assembled hundreds of demonstrators on several occasions during 2005 to protest against “Turkey in the EU and the EU in Turkey”; “Turkey must not become a colony inside the European Union (EU) any more than it is one today outside the EU”.

These ultra-nationalist groups combine their opposition to the EU with a refusal to recognize the Kurdish community, to seek a solution to the problem of Cyprus, or to undertake any discussion of the Armenian question.

Ultra-Nationalism in Action

Some seventy publishers, writers and journalists have been prosecuted for “insulting the Turkish identity” or various national institutions (an offence under Turkish law). The most famous among them, the novelist O. Pamuk, was charged after stating in a Swiss weekly newspaper that “in this country (i.e., Turkey), 1 million Armenians and 30,000 Kurds were killed.”

Most of these court cases followed complaints lodged by the ultra-nationalist Association of the Union of Jurists (HBD), which has been able to find in the ranks of the country’s legal institutions staunch defenders, in the name of Kemal Atatürk, of the “secular unity of the Republic”. The Association also ensured the banning of a highly sensitive international university symposium on “The Armenians during the decline of the Ottoman Empire”. After denouncing in their columns the court decision banning the holding of the conference, five journalists were charged with insulting and attempting to influence the course of justice. The symposium was finally able to be held, with the participation of scores of Turkish intellectuals, in September 2005. The participants at the conference were met by demonstrators throwing tomatoes and eggs and shouting: “Traitors!”, “The Armenian genocide is a lie!”, or “The government must resign, this treason will not be left unpunished!”. A similar scene marked the opening of the trial of O. Pamuk on December 16th.

Despite their repercussions and the media coverage which they receive in Europe, the actions of these ultra-nationalist forces are not the last word on the relationship between Turkish society and the EU.

EU: A Love-Hate Relationship

In Turkey, speeches and articles in favour of European integration are plentiful. This impression is reinforced by the existence of a very widely-based consensus ranging from the “moderate islamist” government to economic circles (and particularly the world of big business), and including minority groups (Kurds, Alevi, etc.). Numerous opinion-polls have likewise shown that a very large majority of the population was in favour of membership (until recently, between 65% and 75%).

While being the longed-for destination on the horizon, the EU is nonetheless seen as a far-away and mistrustful land. Even before the emergence of the debate about the nature of the European identity, studies showed that the Turkish population considered Europe to be a Christian culture. Opinion-polls conducted from 2002 onwards likewise indicated that 45% of Turks were convinced that Europeans didn’t want them.

The controversy over the Turkish application for membership in certain EU countries and the shilly-shallying of various governments went down very badly in Turkey. The Turks came to the conclusion that, over and above the technical aspects of the question, the countries and peoples of the European Union were in effect denying the European character of Turkey, despite the fact that this was at the heart of Kemal Atatürk’s conception of the Turkish Republic.

The defeats in the referenda on the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands were interpreted as the result of the hostility shown by public opinion towards Turkish membership. The concept of a “privileged partnership” proposed by Angela Merkel and other European politicians; the decision of the French president Jacques Chirac (despite being himself in favour of Turkish membership) to make provision for a referendum on the question of whether Turkey should join the EU; Austria’s wish to revise the compromise reached at the European Council meeting in Brussels in December 2004 on the question of opening negotiations with Ankara – all of these developments were considered as marks of mistrust towards Turkey and the Turks. Against a background of an intensification of the debate over the question of European identity in the different member states, Turkish public opinion was unable to identify the domestic political issues to which the different stances were partly linked – whether it be opposition to Gerhard Schroeder, an ardent supporter of the Turkish
cause (once she had been elected chancellor, Angela Merkel certainly went out of her way to reassure Turkey by declaring that she had no intention of hampering negotiations); the need on the French side to handle the crisis provoked by opponents of the European Constitution and the increasing influence of Nicolas Sarkozy; or Austrian pressure in favour of opening negotiations with Croatia.

The Turkish identity is undermined

The questioning of the Kemalist conception of a European Turkey, despite the fact that it is considered self-evident by a large majority of the population, has undermined the Turkish identity and complicated the relationship with the EU. By late 2005 it was possible to detect an erosion of the Turkish people’s confidence in the European future of their country. A survey carried out in the 5 largest cities in Turkey after the opening of negotiations showed that only 55% of those questioned thought that Turkish membership of the EU would become a reality (compared with 61% the previous year). This pessimism reflects the “sense of unease of a country which sees both its political unity and its international projection as under serious threat” (BULUT, 2005).

The publishing success in Turkey of the novel Metal Storm is a particularly good example of this unease about national identity. First published in mid-December 2004, the book sold more than 400,000 copies in 2005 (or more than double the sales of The Da Vinci Code, which has become very popular in Turkey). A work of geo-political fiction, it describes how the Turks fight a desperate battle to repel the invading forces of the USA, the empire of evil. “A caricature representing the fears and tensions that have been felt by a large part of the population for many years, Metal Storm crystallizes the feeling of unease present throughout society. (...) Anti-Americanism is side by side with numerous other “antis”: anti-semitism of course, but also anti-Europeanism, anti-Islamism, anti-intellectualism or “anti-Kurdism”. All these incarnations of the enemy threatening the nation combine to renew and confirm the conspiracy syndromes which for the sociologist Serif Mardin constitute the basic philosophy of the history of contemporary Turkey” (ibidem). The world of sport also reflects Turkey’s ambiguous relationship with the EU. After the Galatasaray football club’s victory in the UEFA cup in 2000, the former President of the Republic S. Demirel proclaimed: “Now we’re Europeans!” On the other hand, defeats are taken as rebuffs and are linked to European reluctance to accept Turkish entry into the EU (POLO, 2005). The violent incidents at the end of the Turkey-Switzerland match on November 16th 2005, and the knee-jerk reactions which followed underline the importance given to such events and the incomprehension existing between Turks and Europeans. Both media commentators and the general public in Turkey constantly explained the violence as a reaction to the offence committed against Turkey’s national honour at the away match (when the national anthem had been whistled at by some supporters), whilst the (Swiss) president of FIFA, S. Blater, went so far as to contemplate a possible exclusion of Turkey from the World Cup in 2010!

In Turkey, uneasiness about the country’s identity reawakens the latent nationalism of a population that is nevertheless in favour of European integration.

A Society Prey to the Temptation of Nationalism

The procrastination of the EU member states concerning the future status of Turkey with regard to the Union provides the minority ultra-nationalist groups with an ideal platform from which to propagate their arguments, and thus contributes to the rise of nationalism in Turkey. Today we can see that the ultra-nationalists are no longer the only group to warn against the EU’s possible unspoken aims. Questions are increasingly being asked about the real objectives pursued by the European states. The reforms demanded by the EU, which require a veritable aggiornamento of the Kemalist project, are perceived as a threat since they pursue a “hidden agenda”.

Let us take the example of party politics. The AKP, the only party currently in power, has vigorously pursued the reforms requested by the EU. As the Turkish candidacy has come up against each successive difficulty, the nationalist wing of the party, fearing a loss of support in favour of the extreme right-wing ultra-nationalist party, has on several occasions disassociated itself from the Prime Minister’s position. Particularly noteworthy was its repudiation of the speech made by R.T. Erdogan in August 2005 while visiting the South-East of the country, in which he recog-
nized the existence of a “Kurdish question” in Turkey, up to then denied by all previous governments, and of his attempt to define a double concept of “high identity” (belonging to a common republican citizenship) and “low identity” (recognition of ethnic and cultural particularities). Meanwhile the only opposition party present in parliament, the CHP (the people’s republican party, founded by Atatürk), which aims to perpetuate its founder’s heritage and is on the left of the Turkish political spectrum, initially supported the government’s programme of reforms. During the course of the year 2005, however, the Party’s president, D. Baykal, has adopted an increasingly ambiguous attitude towards the EU. Being officially pro-European has not prevented him from militating against the Prime Minister’s “capitulations” to the European Union with regard to the Armenian, Cyprus and Kurdish questions. On the day after the opening of negotiations, he accused the EU of not being sincere, and declared that the reference to the Union’s “capacity of absorption” could be utilized to put a final stop to the Turkish candidacy. It might have been thought that the opening of negotiations for membership would put a stop to the tension reigning in Turkey today with regard to the EU. Unfortunately, the stormy diplomatic marathon of October 3rd has not made it possible to calm the situation. The tensions focused on the question of identity and its various nationalist channels of expression will doubtless mark the campaign for the legislative elections (foreseen for 2007, but which could well be brought forward) and for the subsequent presidential ones. The obstacles awaiting Turkey on its road towards membership of the EU are only going to get harder to overcome.

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Since the 1990’s it has been apparent that the process of implantation of Islam in Europe was following a pattern of growth that, although consistent, was far from being linear (Cesari & McLoughlin, 2005; Maréchal, Allievi, Dassetto, & Nielsen, 2003). It continues to suffer from internal tensions, and the years 2004-2005 have illustrated these trends.

The tensions within European Islam

Anti-terrorist police operations have intensified since September 11th and the attacks in Madrid and London, repeating the pattern already established at Casablanca, Jakarta, Sharm el-Sheikh and elsewhere. These operations have brought to light the existence of European networks aiding terrorist activities. Other incidents have followed, such as the murder of Dutch cinema director Theo van Gogh (in November 2004) or the participation of a Belgian Muslim convert in a kamikaze attack in Iraq (in November 2005).

These events have shown that a link has been forged between worldwide Islam and European Islam, that is to say between Europeans Muslims (whether they be second-generation immigrants or converts) and the Muslim realities elsewhere. We can reflect on the numerous networks that have been discovered with links to Pakistan and Afghanistan and, more recently, Iraq.

A militant tendency in favour of armed action has thus indeed been established in Europe. This tendency has generally been identified by the term *jihadist*, in view of the ideological justifications for such a stance made by Muslim authors like Abdallah Azzam or Omar Bakri and by the militants of al-Qaida (Kepel & Milelli, 2005). This tendency existing within European Islam, while clearly only supported by a minority, has had a symbolic impact on all Muslims. It also forces them to position themselves with regard to these troublesome fellow-believers. It likewise leads us to question the nature of Islamic terrorism, its sources and its structure. (Dassetto & Maréchal, 2005-2006)

It is especially the majority tendency within the community, and particularly within the younger generation, which has suffered most from these developments. This European brand of Islam, which seeks to establish its role in society at large through its religious identity, wishes to foster a close association with European values and culture. It wants to be both Muslim and European at one and the same time. While the groups belonging to the association known as Muslim Presence, founded and led by Tareq Ramadan, have received considerable publicity, numerous other associations also exist. In general these movements – which can be considered as “reformist” in view of their desire to engender a process of religious adaptation – are especially popular among the younger generation originating from the Maghreb region.

They co-exist and sometimes compete with other groups or other visions of Islam. In some cases they are even represented by Muslim dignitaries. They have however a particularly difficult relationship with existing groups that are implanted in Europe, but inspired by influences coming from outside Europe. We can think of the Deobandis, whose Islamic schools influenced those responsible for the London terrorist attacks. Or the numerous Turkish organizations, from the Milli Görüs to the Nurgiu, which continue to influence the population of Turkish origin, and whose identification with a spirit of “Turkishness” to a great extent hinders links with all other European Muslims, of whatever origin. In addition, the Turkish government’s organism of religious orientation – the Turkish
Directorate for Religious Affairs (Dyiânet Islam ırîslîği) – exercises its influence in a similar direction. Lastly, we come to a grouping whose influence both over the population of Arab origin and over converts to Islam has recently been revealed: the various groups which are described and describe themselves as Salafists (dawa salafyya), and which could more correctly be defined as neo-Salafists in order to avoid confusion with the Salafist movement of the early 20th century. They also identify their groups using the term as sunnah wa-l jamāa. This neo-Salafism originated from a strategy devised in Saudi Arabia in the 1980’s to direct doctrine and training so as the better to control the future development of Islam. Tarbyya (religious training) is in fact a key element in their methodology. Figures such as the Sheikhs Ibn Baz, Ibn Othaymine, or al Albani are the leading lights in the first generation of neo-Salafists who favour a brand of Islam which could be described as literalist and puritanical. Young Europeans have in fact attended training programmes at neo-Salafist universities in Muslim countries and are now starting to return to their homes to set up groups dedicated to training and spirituality. As can be seen, the emergence of a European brand of Islam with its own autonomy and specific identity is a slow and difficult process. Moreover the shortage of leaders, in terms of both numbers and quality, continues to have a negative effect on the evolution of European Islam (IEMed, 2005). Meanwhile European countries and European Muslims alike continue to hesitate about the strategies to adopt in order to form tomorrow’s Muslim elite. No progress has so far been made with the plan to open an Islamic faculty to form part of the University of Strasbourg, alongside the Protestant and Catholic ones. In Germany religious training is practically left under the control of Dyiânet. The only country to have taken any initiatives at all is the Netherlands, deeply traumatized by the murder of van Gogh. Amsterdam’s Vrije Universiteit has established a master’s degree course in Islamic Studies, and the University of Leiden is preparing to follow suit, helped by generous financing from the Government. Similar Government aid has also doubled the size of the Islamic Studies faculty in Rotterdam, founded in 1997 and set up at the initiative of the Muslim community.

Islam and integration

The difficulties facing Islam are real, and the radical or conservative groups have their influence. What also became clear however during the 2005 riots in the French suburbs is that, contrary to what was first claimed, these riots had nothing to do with Islam. They were provoked by young people on the margins of society, isolated in a ghetto culture, and trapped in a traditional logic of male honour transplanted into a contemporary context and which results in them becoming completely alienated from the society in which they live.

On the other hand, Islam quite often seems to provide solutions that lead to self-improvement. “Islamicized” youngsters – except for those caught up in sectarian rigidity – generally succeed at school, adhere to moral principles and acquire a code of conduct which prepares them for a European lifestyle in which they can live to the full their roles as young people, citizens, pupils and employees. These observations show the nature of the French paradox. There is of course a secular, integrated youth that follows along the path that leads to complete integration. The paradox is elsewhere. When we find on the one hand a non-Islamicized, marginalized youth of Muslim origin and on the other hand an Islamicized youth, which sometimes finds itself in conflict with the secular vision of the French republic and the difficulty it has in adapting to this new religious presence in society, as the question of the headscarf and the decision adopted in relation to it have demonstrated. The decision to prohibit the wearing of headscarves in educational establishments has led to some female students going to Belgium to continue their studies.

Having said that, it is also true that the wearing of the headscarf, which has become an almost obsessive symbol for many Muslims (with the additional voice of the neo-Salafists), is starting to become a subject of internal debate within the Muslim community itself and among Muslim young women. On occasions the latter have started to protest against the handicap that wearing a headscarf can represent for them, for instance when looking for work, and some “Islamic feminists” have begun to criticize, orally but not in writing, such obligations, devised by what they describe as doctrinaire males.

The Cartoons

The “cartoon affair” came into the headlines in late 2005. This incident reveals the slowness of the process of evolution of Islam in Europe.
Leaving aside the arguments presented in the different discussions for or against the cartoon images of the prophet Mohammed, this episode and the ensuing controversy can be interpreted from two basic angles.

The more pessimistic of the two would be to cite this controversy as yet another episode confirming the increasing disparities and tensions between the Islamic world and the West. According to this theory, we are involved in each camp in a phase of constructing the image of the enemy, with everything that involves: generalizations, stereotypes, total mobilization. In other words: we are creating a conflict for which we have even invented a concept, the conflict of civilizations.

The more optimistic of the two theories is that we should regard the affair of the cartoons as a moment of tension that is inevitable and inherent to all societies, especially when it is a question of relatively new phenomena which societies have not yet fully adjusted to or for which they have not yet devised methods of control. An even more positive approach could be added to this second view, if we say that the conflict is at the end of the day positive, since it obliges the two sides to clarify their viewpoint.

The numerous public comments on the affair in recent weeks have made at least two things clear.

First, dialogue has taken place only to a fairly limited extent. There has been little real debate. Second, it is difficult for such a situation to develop into a constructive conflict. On the contrary, left to itself, the debate can easily descend into mutual incomprehension, or be taken over by social groupings that could turn it in the direction of the first model referred to above.

This controversy demonstrates the importance of various factors.

**Globalization:** the controversy is a perfect example of the new relationship between local and global realities. An obscure local Danish incident is projected onto the world stage and goes far beyond the country’s frontiers. The newspaper concerned, *Jyllands-Posten*, thought it could ignore the fact that, whether it be through the presence of Muslims in Denmark or through the normal process of communications, it was in close proximity to the heart of the Muslim world. At the same time Muslims are learning what it is to come face to face with persons or groups who do not think like them, both in a European and in a world context. They are experiencing pluralism.

**Self-image:** in this affair, each side either rigidly defends its own position, or is led to modify its position when confronted with the image reflected back by the other camp. The European press is thus led to question the correct use of the basic principle of freedom of expression. More generally, society is led to question the sociological importance of respectful and disrespectful attitudes, and the selectiveness with which these attitudes are applied, depending on the context, the status and the social rank of those involved. The Muslims, for their part, are led to reflect on their attitude to the portrayal of the image of the Prophet, and beyond that, perhaps also to the figure of the Prophet himself. They will likewise reflect on the image that Muslim practices give not only of Muslim societies but also of Islam itself. For, together with an analysis of attitudes that centres on the question of lack of respect, there is also the basic question of the evolution of contemporary Islam, a subject which Muslims will no longer be able to avoid before they start worrying about how to defend themselves in the face of others.

**Leaders:** many community leaders have been disorientated by this affair, a fact which leads us to ask at least two basic questions. On the Muslim side the modern intellectual leadership is relatively fragile, especially compared with the technological capacity of the means of communication. The image of the majority of Muslim intellectuals, preachers, or journalists – or at least of those who express themselves in public – does not give the impression of being on a par with the presence of Islam in a globalized world. The gradual emergence of a European leadership is however confronted with the influence and the speeches of players on a globalized stage. We can also feel, moreover, the lack of the presence of intellectuals, whether Muslim or not, who could play the role of bridge or middlemen, because they have a good knowledge of contemporary realities and can easily interact, dialogue, debate, and mutually enrich each others’ interpretations of events.

**Politics of the imagination:** the evolution in recent years of the relationship between the West and the Islamic world has shown how the power of the imagination, particularly in religious and cultural terms, can be used politically to mobilize and even galvanize sectors of the population. While the written and spoken word were the great instruments used in both the 19th and in the first half of the 20th centuries, this role has now passed to the video image and multimedia communication. We are of course no better at using today’s tools in a critical way than we were at using the tools of previous centuries.
Relationships with others: we can soon see the limitations of the intercultural discourse: communication alone is not sufficient, if each side sticks to its own positions. It is not possible to build a society exclusively on the basis of communication between cultures, however indispensable this may well be. We can see that for such important subjects it is necessary to hold a debate, to seek a common path, founded on trust and on a genuine exercise of “mutual inclusion” by which each individual is able to define his identity by constructing it at the same time as he constructs his relationship with others.

When we observe this kind of mutual relationship we can see how arguments developed by one side or another do not easily withstand the other group’s critical questioning. We see the others’ powers of imagination mobilized, and sometimes their fabrications. We can see how past images from the collective memory are revived. We also see the strength of the others’ emotions and how they express them, which reflect an image of ourselves seen through the astonished eyes of the others. (Dassetto, 2004; Onghena, 2004).

Hostilities

It is not easy to predict the future evolution of non-Muslims’ attitudes to Islam inside Europe. Muslims claim that there is an increase in Islamophobia, which is moreover also shown in opinion polls. Nevertheless we often confuse the obvious anxiety felt by sectors of the population about the future evolution of Islam with the concept of “Islamophobia”. It is however clear that different leaders or political parties use these anxieties as an electoral tool. The Lega Nord in Italy, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium and other parties in Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are important examples. In the face of this we have seen the other parties act with tremendous caution, since they well know that they risk setting off fires that could be difficult to extinguish.

It should also be noted that in Muslim groups or among individual Muslims there has been a growth in anti-semitism, a sort of anti-Jewishness which attacks synagogues and is confused with hostility to the state of Israel. In the same way opposition to the Western presence in Iraq or to American policy leads to actions or arguments which are fundamentally anti-Western. We can see just how many local realities cross paths with developments on a global level, often producing websites as their vehicle of expression and principal show-place.

In other words, we can conclude that the tensions surrounding ethnic and religious questions are not about to disappear. This leads us to suppose that there will be a need for far-reaching action in Europe’s new multi-religious, multi-ethnic societies. Relationships are now taking shape in Europe which are only one expression among others of the new globalized, internationalized world which is being formed. It could well be that we have not yet understood the challenges that will have to be met and the dynamism that will be necessary to ensure that this new world is not trapped by a descent into catastrophic future conflicts.

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Dossier: Governability and Democracy
Governability and Democracy

The Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States

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The recent 10th anniversary of the 1995 Barcelona Conference that launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was the backdrop to a series of assessments of the state of relations between the two sides of the Mediterranean. Considering the high ambitions set by partner governments in 1995, most of the assessments seemed to converge on the idea that so far the EMP has neither been able to fulfil its objectives, nor to gain a strong visibility outside governmental and diplomatic circles.

However, part of the assessments have also concluded that no better framework for addressing demands of the public north and south has been created since and, therefore, the EMP should be reviewed in light of the changes that have occurred at the regional and international level since 1995 and be given a stronger impetus. In other words, the partners need to clarify the purpose of their common endeavour and justify its relevance, while at the same time stating new and ambitious objectives.

The EuroMeSCo network of Euro-Mediterranean foreign policy institutes published in April 2005 its own report (Barcelona Plus: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States, April 2005) assessing the Partnership ten years after its inception and putting forward a number of proposals for its reform. The drafting of the report aimed to reflect the nature of EuroMeSCo and in that sense resulted of a number of contributions from experts north and south of the Mediterranean. The various experts were asked to prepare short papers with an assessment and proposals for their respective area of expertise, while the final text was drafted by a team at the Institute for Strategic and International Studies in Lisbon, headed by Álvaro de Vasconcelos.

The key proposal that emerges from the EuroMeSCo Report is that of the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States. This article presents the various aspects related with the concept, as well as its implications for a renewed EMP. The basic argument is that not only is the proposal for a Community of Democratic States helpful in clarifying the central aims of the Partnership, it is also crucial for providing the latter with a concrete objective that will ensure its relevance in the future.

The Principles of a Euro-Mediterranean Community

The starting point for forging a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States can be found in the Barcelona Declaration agreed by Euro-Mediterranean Partners 10 years ago. In spite of important changes in and around the region – the deterioration of the situation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks, the US-led war on Iraq, but also the launching of the European Neighbourhood Policy initiative – the core principles of the Declaration are still valid today and should in fact be seen as the basis for the Community of Democratic States.

The Declaration set a clear objective of creating a regional group, mainly through the establishment by 2010 of a free trade area. The latter, however, is a means to an end: the expansion to the south of the integration model developed in Europe over the past 50 years, which basically consists of a system of interdependence that promotes peace and security through economic integration. The European integration model is visible in various aspects of the Declaration: its structure of three, mutually reinforcing baskets that provides the holistic approach of the Partnership; the direct reference to a security culture which rejects power-politics in inter-state relations and hence the resolution of conflicts through the use of force or the promotion of diversity by recognising the role of civil societies in multilateral issues. Most importantly, however, is the fact that in Barcelona the parties committed to ‘develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems’. A superficial assessment of the political development in the Mediterranean over the past 10 years shows that progress towards democracy has fallen short of expectations. In any case, the existence of such a commitment in the founding document of the EMP reveals its democratic and integrative nature.

At the same time, the commitment to democracy, as well as to the rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights and liberties, correspond to what the EuroMeSCo report described as the potential acquis of the EMP. It is an acquis because it includes a body of rights and obligations, but it is still only a potential one, because contrary to the acquis communautaire that candidates to EU membership need to fulfil prior to accession, the conditions for its full realisation are not yet in place. The creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States...
would, therefore, be the practical expression of a collective will to transform the potential acquis into a concrete one.

The Five Pillars of the Euro-Mediterranean Community

If the Euro-Mediterranean Community is supposed to be an affirmation of the Barcelona acquis, then governments must be very clear about two key issues:

First, the new and more complex focus on democracy must be strongly underlined, not just as the central element of the process, but also as the guarantor of the credibility of the project for both northern and southern publics. More concretely, this new emphasis on political reform and democracy should take advantage of an international environment that has brought these issues to the front of the agenda. Therefore, the EMP’s ability to integrate such concerns in its own gradual and consensual approach to democratic inclusion would be one of the main features of the Euro-Mediterranean Community.

Second, when presenting the goal of the Community of Democratic States, governments must give very clear indications of what southern partners will gain from engaging in democratic reforms: a stake in the Single Market and its four freedoms, including the freedom of circulation. This clarification would also establish a clear link between the Barcelona Process and the objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In other words, the EMP would incorporate the arrangements and methods of the Neighbourhood Policy and adapt them to its multilateral framework.

The priority areas for the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States correspond to those domains which the EuroMeSCo Report identified as having a stronger potential for promoting north-south, but also south-south integration. The so-called ‘five pillars’ of the Euro-Mediterranean Community are the following:

1. Democracy: The promotion of political reform with the participation of all the relevant actors (including civil society) should be the main pillar of the Community, the pre-condition for progress in the other areas. To fulfil this objective, the EMP should make use of existing commitments to democracy, good governance, rule of law and human rights, already contained in the Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans or in the Association Agreements. Putting those commitments into practice is the logic consequence of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration and should, therefore, bring the debate on political reform in the Mediterranean and the Middle East squarely into the EMP agenda. Because of its centrality for the Euro-Mediterranean Community, the debate should be as wide as possible and address issues such as the relationship between good governance and freedom and the role of political Islam as a component of democratic governance. A refusal to address such issues, as well as to allow the participation in EMP initiatives of civil society actors or the systematic violation of human rights commitments would constitute serious obstacles for partners to move towards the Community goal.

2. Inclusion within diversity: The principle is an alternative to the much-disseminated concept of a ‘dialogue of civilisations’. While promoting the ideals of tolerance and mutual understanding, the latter results from a Weltanschauung that establishes a fundamental religious divide between different civilisations. Instead, the Euro-Mediterranean Community should promote an approach that sees the ‘other’ as not intrinsically different but rather intrinsically similar. The notion of ‘hospitality’ transcends the civilisation boundaries and thus is more adequate for a project of a regional community based on the respect for cultural and religious diversity. To promote it, cultural pluralism should be put at the centre of cooperation within the Euro-Mediterranean Community. In practice, this means funding artistic initiatives based on their intrinsic artistic quality. It also implies providing more funding for cooperation in the field of higher education, for example through the promotion of exchange programmes and the establishment of universities’ networks. Facilitation of access to the internet and other information infrastructures would also provide an important impetus to mutual identification and knowledge amongst peoples.

3. Migration: The movement of people across the Mediterranean was always a central concern of the Partnership, as demonstrated by the Barcelona Declaration in 1995. At the time, the issue was approached essentially from a security perspective and reflected the widespread concern of northern governments with the consequences of migration pressures from the south. Since then, practical initiatives (outside the framework of the EMP) have shown the potential of migrants as contributors to the development of their countries of origin, but the general trend has been to view migration and refugee issues as security problems that indirectly legitimate anti-immigrant rhetoric in the EU.

A securitarian approach to migrations is incompatible with the notion of a Euro-Mediterranean Community, as well as with that of a single market where people circulate freely. A radical shift from the original Barcelona agenda is thus needed and the partners should start by recognising the importance of migrants as a driving force for integration, as well as for the promotion of democracy and social justice in their countries of origin. Practical steps that can be taken include the support to non-governmental immigrant associations or the improvement of visa regimes in Europe, especially for businessmen, students and tourists.

4. Citizen security: When evolving towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community, the EMP must be able to develop a concept of security that is compatible with its basic values. This implies avoiding a simplistic linkage between internal and external security or, even worse, expand the concept to a point that embraces every social question. At the same time, however, the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States should be able to deal with real secu-
rity problems that persist within and around the region. To avoid an all-embracing concept of security, governments should make sure that the protection of the individuals is the central concern of EMP security initiatives, since civilians are clearly the preferred target of violence in the Mediterranean. Promoting ‘citizen security’ requires a careful balance between security and justice and the reinforcement of the rule of law, which should continue to be supported by specific programmes. It should also include the progressive convergence towards a common ground on security issues, through the involvement of southern partners in the existing European frameworks for security and defence issues, namely those of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Finally, the identification of areas of mutual interest for practical cooperation can function as an effective confidence-building measure. Pilot initiatives have already been developed in the field of civil protection and should be extended to areas such as humanitarian aid, mines clearance and maritime safety.

5. Social solidarity and cohesion: The objective set in 1995 of establishing by 2010 a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (FTA) has an enormous potential for economic growth, but it also carries significant dangers for social cohesion in southern countries. If the EMP aims to promote inclusion, then it cannot ignore the

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SECOND MEETING OF THE FORUM FOR THE FUTURE

Manama, capital of Bahrain, was the venue for the second meeting of the Forum for the Future which took place on 11th and 12th November, 2005. The initiative was born within the framework of “The Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA)” in June 2004 (summit of the G8 at Sea Island in the presence of the Heads of State of the aforesaid region) and in accordance with the document entitled “G8 Plan of Support for Reform”. The Forum was conceived as a joint initiative between the member states of the G8 and of the BMENA region, to develop reforms at an economic, social and political level in the zone, in accordance with the principles of the Declarations of Alexandria (12th-14th March, 2004) and of Tunis (23rd May, 2004). It also represents an opportunity for government agents, civil society and the public sector to deal with fundamental issues such as the promotion of democracy or economic growth in the Middle East, following the example set by the countries of the OECD.

New developments arising from the 2005 Forum for the Future

The 2005 Forum opened on 12th November, three days after the terrorist attack in Amman, Jordan. During their speeches at the meeting, ministers and other participants did not fail to forcefully condemn all terrorism and to reaffirm their will to co-operate in promoting the true image of Islam and its message of tolerance. In the final document of the meeting, reference was made to other international events concerning the region in 2005, such as the disengagement from Gaza, whilst also encouraging the parties involved to respect international resolutions; the elections in Iraq in January 2005, without forgetting to emphasise the necessity of preserving its territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty; and finally, the tragedy of the earthquake in Pakistan, for which an appeal was launched to increase donations by planning an International Donors’ Conference in Islamabad on 19 November.

As far as the direct mission of the Forum and its proposals were concerned, the brand new initiative for 2005 was the decision to pay greater attention to dialogue with civil society and its organisations, followed by the creation of two new institutions. This arose from the consideration that reforms in the region must follow the particular characteristics of each country. Above all, for this to be possible, these need to begin within the societies concerned. The 2005 Forum was also characterised by the setting up of specific targeted initiatives, relating to the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), the Enterprise Initiative and the Literacy Plan.

More precisely:

- **DAD**: the participants agreed to continue to work for the ratification and implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption and to promote transparency in public financial management in order to support the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals. Delegations also showed approval for working toward these objectives with groups from civil society in order to jointly choose a legal framework of action. Particular attention was given to the situation of women, with the proposal to monitor respect for the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in those countries which have ratified it. Within the DAD framework, the most targeted and concrete initiative was the creation of the Foundation for the Future*, aimed at groups from civil society in general. This foundation, which will be probably based in Qatar from 2006 onwards, will be aimed at giving technical assistance to NGOs, academic institutions and professional associations working in the field of promotion of democratic reforms and civic awareness.

- **Literacy**: Whilst welcoming the decisions taken at the Summit of Education Ministers (Jordan, May 2005; the next being planned for Egypt in 2006) aimed at promoting access to education and improvement of teaching quality, the Forum decided upon the creation of an Education Task Force within the framework of the partnership, for the monitoring of initiatives and action concerning education. As well as this, Jordan, Japan, Egypt and Germany offered their support in the field of professional training.

(continue)
negative effects of the implementation of the FTA. To counter such effects, funds should be allocated for the mitigation of adjustment costs, on the basis of progress with political reform. Moreover, the Partnership’s holistic approach must guarantee that economic, social and political reform are handled in a coherent manner, which implies the rejection of the notion that economic development necessarily leads to political and administrative reform. Assessments of the political and economic situation of southern partners in the past ten years show that the link does not exist and that economic change can actually heighten social disparities.

Making the Euro-Mediterranean Community Work

The success of the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States depends to a large extent on the partner’s capacity to stick to commitments made and having the necessary tools to ensure that those commitments are met. The EuroMeSCo Report identifies three aspects which may prove crucial if the Community is adopted as the overarching goal of the EMP.

First, the project must be based on a ‘fixed dates’ model that has been used in the past in the European Union, for instance in the case of the Single Market or the Single Currency. Fixing a date for the beginning of the Community – for instance 2015, five years after the date set for the Free Trade Area – not only makes the end result more palpable, it helps in setting the pace for reforms that partner states will have to undergo. Such a clear-cut schedule must be accompanied by the regular monitoring of progress, with indicators and benchmarks defined and assessed annually by the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference. In a certain way, this is already the logic of the Neighbourhood Policy and of the 2002 Valencia Action Plan, but now integrated in a single process and with a stronger emphasis on the fact that goals and benchmarks are jointly defined.

Second, the issue of ownership and co-responsibility must be seriously addressed by the partners. This issue has been repeatedly raised over the past 10 years by the southern partners who accuse the EU of setting the agenda according to the national interests of its member states. Attempts to address this structural asymmetry have stopped short of satisfactory solutions, even if in the past few years the sense of appropriation of the Barcelona Process by southern partners has become stronger. Therefore, for the Euro-Mediterranean Community to work, a restructuring of the EMP institutional mechanisms that allows southern partners to be more actively engaged in the administration of the process must be undertaken.

The EuroMeSCo report does not propose the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Secretariat (as it would represent an extra bureaucratic burden and add to the already existing institutional complexity), but suggests the set up of a Pro-Med Unit with individuals from the southern partners working alongside the Commission and the Council Secretariat on Euro-Mediterranean issues. As for the co-ordination of the Community of Democratic States, a co-presidency system could be envisaged, ensuring an equitable representation of all partners. Decision-making should also be arranged in a way that avoids
constant blockades, either through the establishment of a system of reinforced qualified majority voting or via the adoption of a ‘consensus-minus-one’ principle (whereby one country cannot stop remaining partners from reacting when it breaches certain obligations).

Third, partners must reassess current visibility strategies to ensure that Euro-Mediterranean integration is known outside political and diplomatic circles. However, this goal is not attainable through the allocation of more funds for disseminating information about what the EMP does, but rather by ensuring that the latter’s agenda addresses the real concerns and needs of the people of the Euro-Mediterranean region, as well as by the consistent involvement of the public more directly. It requires a two-step approach to the management of the Partnership: first, identifying the issues; second, making sure that information reaches all of those directly and indirectly engaged by the EMP.

In summary, initiatives that stem from the Partnership should in the future be clearly branded as such; specific programmes should not be implemented exclusively by the bureaucracies; and the activities of EMP-related networks should be put to better use, for instance through the establishment of a ‘network of networks’.
Governability and Democracy

The ‘Spring of Arab Reform’ Has Yet to Bloom

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Numerous observers, particularly in the West, have lauded certain developments generated by social and political actions and reactions in Arab countries during 2005 and early 2006. Seeing such developments as important prologues to an Arab reform movement, they have bestowed upon them the romantic description, “The Arab Spring.”

This acclaim reflects a combination of two phenomena. The first is perhaps a sense of guilt in a number of Western circles stemming from long-term violations of freedom in the Arab nation – violations which are documented in Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) 3 – by the Western powers now dominating the international scene. The second consists of a kind of rush to count these developments among the “positive” outcomes which are claimed to have resulted from the invasion and occupation of Iraq by circles either responsible for, or sympathetic with, this violation of one of the most fundamental of freedoms in the Arab nation.

However, seen from the perspective of freedom and good governance outlined in AHDR 3 calls for popular choice of representatives in governance institutions. This, however, assumes that elections be free and honest, and that they be based on citizenship for all in a societal context which guarantees the freedom to make a well thought out choice among alternatives that the citizen has been able to test through discussion in the free public domain. Any elections within the Arab nation that fulfil these conditions are to be welcomed and celebrated.

However, good governance, according to AHDR 3, is not limited to the holding of elections, even if these are entirely sound. For the presumption here is that “democratic arrangements,” and particularly elections, can coexist with all manner of breaches of the model of freedom and good governance, and specifically with flagrant violations of freedom in the inclusive sense adopted in the report, especially in the realm of national liberation.

In occupied Palestine, elections were held to choose the president of the Palestinian Authority. These were not the first elections to have been held in Occupied Palestine; however, the Occupation Authority and its supporters, instead of respecting the popular will in the previous election, had worked to undermine the legitimacy of elected president ‘Yasser Arafat’ for a long time prior to his assassination. These last elections, which were the subject of close international scrutiny, saw more than one candidate run and were considered for the most part to have been fair; however, the Occupation Authority imposed major obstacles to individual campaigns, to the point of physically assaulting the second most important candidate at a checkpoint and preventing him from taking his campaign to Jerusalem. In addition, the elections were boycotted by the radical factions of the Palestinian resistance, while prominent leader ‘Marwan Al-Barghuthi’, whom the Occupation Authorities have sentenced to multiple life imprisonment terms, was repeatedly pressured to withdraw his candidacy.

In also-occupied Iraq elections were held under the shadow of occupation, with nearly 200,000 occupying troops, a government loyal to the occupiers, the activity of the largest U.S. Embassy in the world, and direct supervision of the military and security establishments, not to mention active interference by several semi-governmental American institutions in issues relating to the management and funding of NGO’s, influence on political parties and surveillance of the activities of every ministry.

The fact that the U.S. Agency for International Development allocated $80 million for political and election activities in “post-Saddam” Iraq to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute completes the picture of how these forms of intervention were realized. American university professor William Robinson describes these two institutes as “extensions of the U.S. State Department,” while Republican Representative Ron Paul has stated his belief that their aims would have been “entirely illegitimate” if the elections had been held in the United States (Liz Ashkenaz Crook and Brian Dominic, Al-Mostakbal alArab, in Arabic, February 2005).

A Wave of Flawed Elections in Early 2005

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Under a prior obligation to a State Administration Act laid down by the occupation authorities, elections were held for the National Assembly that was to be assigned the task of drafting the country’s constitution. The elections took place in the midst of a nearly complete breakdown of security and a violent terrorist campaign directed against both candidates and voters. In addition, the elections were influenced by powerful enticements offered to both groups, while rumours spread that anyone who failed to vote would be deprived of his or her rations, or even detained.

Holding elections had not been on the occupation authority’s original agenda, its own preference having been to choose whomever it wished from among the representatives of the country’s various communities. And indeed, the holding of elections represents a victory for those Shiite forces that stressed the need for them, as a means to obtain a majority in the Legislative Assembly. The average voter turnout was higher than expected; however, the elections were boycotted by sectors of the Iraqi people estimated to have numbered in the millions – that is, nearly half of those who had the right to vote. Those who did vote ended up electing lists with whose members were unknown to them and of whose political platforms they were ignorant, and without having had the opportunity to examine and discuss these as a basis for their choice. People’s selection of candidates was based on the positions of list leaders or sponsors, and took on, as a result, a sectarian and tribal stamp. In other words, the elections were played out on the basis of sectarian “identity,” thus entailing the possibility of division and disintegration, outcomes which would be among the most perilous imaginable for the new Iraq. As a result, numerous parties urged that a search be made for a formula that would guarantee to those groups that had not won seats in the Legislative Assembly the opportunity to take part in the process of drafting the constitution.

Those who won the elections could anticipate promises of security protection, armoured cars, and a hefty monthly salary. For those who were less fortunate, many of whom were women, their only share in the election spoils was to face the consequences of having their names (kept confidential until the conclusion of the elections) disclosed and of paying whatever price might be exacted from them by anti-election forces. This ugly fate was epitomized by the assassination attempt made on Mithal Al-Alusi, a member of the Iraqi Coalition List and a proponent of reconciliation with Israel, whose two sons died in the attempt on his life.

Given that the Shiites and Kurds together won nearly 80% of the seats in the Legislative Assembly (140 and 75 respectively out of a total of 275), the election results give reason to fear that the country will witness a swing of the political pendulum from tyranny under the former regime, which was often described as “Sunnite,” to a new tyranny which might be dubbed “Shiite-Kurdish” if no successful formula is arrived at to include in the political process the current boycotters. An even greater danger lies, however, in the perpetuation of the communal and sectarian factionalism and fragmentation that have the potential to throw both unity of citizenship and of Iraq itself to the winds. In April 2005, the new Iraqi president proposed that Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni militias be employed as peace-keeping forces, thus indicating a risk of dismantling the concept of Iraqi citizenship and to sanction communal and sectarian divisions. In August, ‘Shaykh Abd Al-Aziz Al-Hakim’, head of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, demanded that an autonomous entity be established in the central and southern regions of the country. Meanwhile, fears of the partition which could potentially result from the articles of the draft constitution relating to federalism continued to fuel the opposition of Sunnites taking part in the drafting process, and led in the end to the dominant parties in the National Assembly deciding, without this decision receiving full approval, to put the draft constitution up for a popular referendum.

The fact is, however, that these elections yielded a clear expression of the rejection not only of the occupation and its negative effects on the well-being of Iraqi citizens but of the occupier’s ideology as well. We find, for example, that the platform of the ‘United Iraqi Coalition’, which won an absolute majority in a prominent location, stipulates the “establishment of a timetable for the withdrawal of the multinational forces from Iraq,” a demand that the U.S. President has publicly refused to consider on more than one occasion. The question arises, then: Does the democracy sought by the current U.S. administration place no importance on popular will when it conflicts with the position taken by its own gurus?

In an even more powerful statement of the popular desire to see an end to the occupation and of how much at odds is the popular will with the conduct of the head of the transitional government, more than one hundred Coalition representatives in the Constituent Assembly objected to the latter’s request that the UN Security Council extend the multinational forces’ stay in Iraq.

In the social and economic realm, the election platform of the United Iraqi Coalition included “adoption of a social security system under which the State would guarantee work to every able-bodied Iraqi... and offer assistance to every Iraqi citizen with the building of a home...” Similarly, it called for “the use of Iraqi oil revenues in economic development.” These orientations are reflective of a social system which runs counter to the free market system adopted by the U.S. administration and which was imposed by former U.S. Administrator Paul Bremer. In fact, they may well be viewed as revealing “socialist tendencies” that are not inconsistent, in fact, with the social and economic orientations of the former regime.

Nothing serves better to demonstrate the fragility of the elections’ outcome than the difficulty encountered over the following three months in forming a government, as a result of which the new government was sworn into office incomplete. The process of drafting the constitution also faltered. Meanwhile, attacks by the resistance continued and even escalated, a retaliatory mindset spread throughout the country, random assaults were made on citizens, and there such was a breakdown of security that Iraq under the occupation was turned into fertile ground for what is termed “terrorism” – the very thing that its occupation was supposed to have helped combat. These developments, in turn, led the occupation forces to
support house raids, searches and collective punishment of entire Iraqi cities in search of those whom they dubbed “rebels.” Rather than being seen as means of preparing the citizenry to vote on a constitution whose last draft sacrificed both international legal standards for human rights and the abolition of gender discrimination, the joint assault launched by occupation troops and government forces on the city of ‘Tala’far’ in September 2005 (calling to mind the crimes and tragedies witnessed by Al-‘Fallujah’ the preceding year), along with the subsequent terrorist attacks on Shiite areas and the Iraqi defence minister’s threat to launch similar operations against four more Sunni cities (‘Samarra’, ‘Al-Qa’im’, ‘Al-Rawah’ and ‘Al-Ramadi’) are more correctly viewed as contributing significantly to the tension which is nourishing a spirit of strife, hostility and national fragmentation.

The fragility of the election results likewise became apparent in the difficult negotiations over the drafting of the provisional constitution. These nearly broke down over a number of issues, one of which was the excessive haste on the part of the current U.S. Administration to get the constitution out before the deadline it had set for itself, as well as, and even more importantly, the fear that the federalist formula proposed in the draft constitution would lead to the partitioning of the country.

From around mid-2004, statements by officials of the coalition indicated its insipient dissolution resulting from a combination of factors. These include escalating attacks by the resistance, a development concealed by a media blackout; rising popular opposition to the occupation both in Iraq and in the lead coalition countries (April 2005 witnessed anti-occupation demonstrations which began in the same Firdaws Square from which the statue of Saddam Hussein had been removed); and an accumulation of reports on the practices of the occupying authorities and the regime. These reports exposed human rights violations and corruption in the disposal of the Iraqi people’s wealth and resources.

Mounting evidence of the evils accompanying the occupation of Iraq may have reached the point where growing opposition to it has begun to wear away at the coalition, a group pieced together by the current U.S. administration for purposes irreconcilable with international law, much less with a victory for freedom. In Saudi Arabia, and for the first time in the history of the kingdom, municipal elections were held. These elections were tainted, in this writer’s estimation, by a fundamental flaw, namely, the exclusion of women. If we add to this the fact that voters were allowed to choose only half the members of the municipal council, it can be fairly said that they amounted to “one-quarter municipal elections.” There is still a long way to go before a national legislative assembly is elected in full by all of the citizenry.

A number of Arab and international human rights organizations have demanded the release of prisoners who have completed their terms (in March, 2005 the Arab Human Rights Commission published a list, which was not exhaustive, of 120 such prisoners). Several such organizations approached King Abdullah on the occasion of his accession to the throne, asking him to form a committee to follow up on the conditions of political prisoners, especially in view of the fact that on August 8, 2005, the king had issued a special amnesty which included the four reform pioneers. In addition, he called for a number of Muslim clerics to be assigned to open up discussions with prisoners accused of fomenting or practicing violence, with the aim of leading such individuals, through dialogue and rational persuasion, to renounce its use against their fellow citizens.

In Lebanon, those involved in what has been termed the “Cedar Uprising” were unable to make the transition to a Lebanese of one citizenship. There can be no doubt, of course, that for more than half the residents of Lebanon to come out and demonstrate peacefully in the streets of the capital and other cities, despite the fact that they belonged to many different and even conflicting persuasions and in the absence of any notable manifestations of unrest or violence, is a healthy phenomenon that deserves to be applauded. However, these demonstrations were tainted by sectarian divisions bearing within them the seeds of the fragmentation of Lebanese society, seeds which have led thus far to two civil wars, the most recent of them lasting nearly two decades. Western circles applauded what was termed the “Cedar Uprising”, and particularly its participation in the call for the end of Syria’s military and political presence in Lebanon, while a U.S. official resident in Lebanon during the “uprising” bragged that he had had a hand in the demonstrations. The chain of events was also not without acts of despicable violence, such as the assassinations of journalist Samir Qasir and progressive leader George Hawi and the assassination attempt on journalist May Al-Shidaq. Moreover, when it came time to hold the elections, politics in Lebanon appeared to have gone back to its old ways, with horse-trading among the various elements of the Lebanese political mosaic, accompanied by even more intense communal and sectarian polarization. The “Cedar demonstrations” seemed to have failed to have any lasting effect on the country’s politics.

Devastating internal violence has continued in a number of Arab countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Yemen), reminding us of the disturbing beginnings of the “Impending Disaster” Scenario against which AHDR3 warns. Given the foregoing, we should undoubtedly welcome, albeit cautiously, the wave of elections that have been held as a harbinger of an endorsement of the right to popular choice in the Arab countries, especially in those countries in which elections were once viewed as a kind of political heresy, if not outright blasphemy. Nevertheless, there are some who hold that “managed elections” simply represent the newest way of supporting regimes loyal to the West (Miller, 2005). What is certain is that there is still a long way to go before elections are reformed to the point at which they become a component of the society of freedom and good governance. The creation of such a society still requires a great deal of radical reform, particularly in legal and political structures, that goes beyond the holding of elections.

The Rising Tide of Protest against Government and Demands for Radical Reform

In Egypt, an opposition movement supported by thousands of public figures has
come together under the name of “The Egyptian Movement for Change.” The movement has an attractive slogan and a website on the Internet. Its slogan, “Kifaya! (Enough!) No to extension! No to hereditary succession!” has gained such popularity that it has become a recognized term in foreign writings on the political state of the country. By “extension” is meant the current president’s nomination for a fifth term, by the end of which, if he does not die in the meantime, he will have ruled the country for thirty years non-stop. “Hereditary succession” refers to the current president’s grooming of his son to succeed him in his position.

To achieve these goals, the movement is demanding a constitutional amendment which would open the door to competition for the positions of president and vice-president of the country. Movement supporters stipulate that the holders of both these positions must be elected by secret, direct ballot under complete supervision by the judiciary, that the presidential term be four years only, and that no candidate be elected for more than two successive terms. In addition, each candidate must be required to make a public financial statement upon nomination.

The Kifaya! movement has overcome the restrictions on the type of activities in which it may engage by communicating via the Internet. At the same time, it has also managed to engage in public demonstrations. One such demonstration took place in front of the Supreme Court building, while a subsequent demonstration was held at the Cairo International Book Fair, where approximately one hundred individuals belonging to the movement demonstrated, while the site was surrounded by thousands of security police. Since then, the movement has staged numerous demonstrations throughout the country.

Other opposition forces have followed the movement’s lead in staging demonstrations. Among these is the Muslim Brotherhood, which staged huge demonstrations that were attacked by the security forces and in which one person was killed. Movements calling for change and reform have emerged among university professors, lawyers, journalists, writers, and artists, while other forms of alliance have grown up among numerous factions of the forces opposed to the current regime, the most important of which include the National Alliance for Democratic Change and the National Alliance for Reform and Change.

There have been successive reports of echoes in response to the Kifaya! movement in other Arab countries, including Kafa! in Yemen and Khalas! in Libya.

Maligned Reform

Some Arab regimes, most notably those in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have announced political reform programs, in response in all likelihood to outside pressures. There is mounting evidence, however, that their intention to engage in reform is insincere, or so it appears, since the actual conduct of the ruling authority has given the lie to such intentions. Examples of such conduct include the introduction of reform initiatives which go only the minutest distance toward the pursuit of a reform agenda that would constitute a serious shift towards a society of freedom and good governance of the sort conceived of by AHDR 3. Still other reform initiatives have been emptied of any genuine content by the enforcement of restrictions and “rules” which guarantee a steady tightening of the noose around freedom. Meanwhile, the authorities in states which claim to be implementing reform continue to commit flagrant violations of the rights of those who call for it. In fact, the claim to be implementing reform now appears to be nothing more than a veil with which to conceal the perpetuation of the current structures of oppression.

In Saudi Arabia, for example, a court, which failed to conform to standards of justice and a fair trial, sentenced three intellectuals as well as the lawyer for one of them, to prison terms merely for having filed a petition with certain officials demanding political reform and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Even more unfortunately, the Riyadh District Court of Cassation ruled to uphold the lower court’s decision. After the coronation of King Abdullah, the individuals thus sentenced were released, though by royal favour and not by judicial acquittal.

In Egypt, the ruling regime made a huge fanfare over the request by the president of the republic that one article of the constitution, Article 76, be amended in such a way as to allow the president to be elected from among a number of candidates. The ruling regime touted this proposal as the beginning of political reform. However, “the mountain laboured and brought forth a mouse.” The amended article emerged from the bowels of the ruling regime in the form of a highly complex text that runs to more than three pages and which, in the view of legal scholars, is unfit to be included in any constitution. In its amended form, the article is weighted down with a huge number of restrictions which render it nothing more than an excessively formalized codification of the existing referendum system for choosing the president, at least so far as the upcoming round of elections is concerned. In addition, the amendment opens the door wide for the president’s son to be nominated in a future election, while placing all aspects of the presidential election in danger of complete domination by the ruling party and its government. In this “reformist” manner, then, Egypt is following in the footsteps of Tunisia, that pioneer of hollow pluralism in presidential elections. The amendment was put to a popular referendum which some opposition forces boycotted, while an independent judicial commission formed by the Judges’ Club concluded that the referendum was sullied by widespread forgery and manipulation. On the day of the referendum, gross violations were committed in the form of assaults by a combination of men belonging to the ruling party, thuggish party hirelings, and security forces on peaceful demonstrators. These assaults went so far as to include the sexual harassment of female demonstrators.

Moreover, rather than following through on the president’s promise at the previous National Party conference to rescind penalties aimed at the press, which rob people of individual freedoms, certain bills concerned with political “reform” actually rendered such penalties even harsher. We find, for example, that Article 48 of the Political Rights Organization Act stiffens the penalty (at least six months in prison, and a maximum fine of 5,000 Egyptian pounds) to be
The number of electoral subcommittees which were actually headed by members of judiciary bodies came to no more than 5% of the total, which numbered 54,350. As for the remaining subcommittees, they were headed by individuals employed in other capacities, with, in many cases, no consideration given to professional rank, educational qualifications or reputation. Subcommittees observed low voter turnout.

Many subcommittees had no voters whatsoever appear before them, while the average turnout before the remaining subcommittees was no more than 3 percent of those listed on their rosters. (According to official results of the referendum, the participation rate came to more than 50 percent!)

The chairmanships of 95 percent of the subcommittees were assigned to government employees who enjoyed no autonomy or immunity, and who were intimidated by members of the police force. Such subcommittees altogether escaped the oversight of the judiciary and became arenas for violations of the law and falsification of the facts relating to voter turnout and opinions.

And, even if Article 76 had had the good fortune to escape the influence of the ruling regime’s legislative experts and, consequently, could guarantee equal opportunities to a plurality of candidates in open competition, the question would remain: How can there be free and fair presidential elections under the Emergency Law which has been in force for all these years, restricting the key freedoms of opinion, expression and association?

Even more important from the standpoint of comprehensive reform is the fact that, even if there were to be pluralistic, free and fair elections for the position of president of the republic, the most likely outcome would be that whoever happened to win such elections would soon turn into a despot himself, since the existing constitution grants the president absolute powers and absolute powers, as we all know, corrupt absolutely.

Some licensed opposition parties boycotted the presidential elections, while the heads of certain other licensed parties, many of them marginal, took part. The list of candidates thus included the ruling president and nine others, each of whom was allocated 500,000 Egyptian pounds from the state treasury for campaign expenses. Of these nine candidates, two were heads of parties which are to some extent recognized, while the other seven were heads of parties that are extremely weak; one of these even announced that he would be casting his vote for his rival, the ruling president. An election campaign unprecedented in Egypt then ensued, in the course of which the president, in his capacity as a candidate for the ruling party, announced a sweeping reform program whose very proposal constituted a criticism of his rule. Nevertheless, the campaign, short though it was, was marked by an atmosphere of open competitiveness and a notable equality of opportunity among the candidates, particularly in the official media, though the latter was not, of course, without the usual hint of support for the current president. The apparatus of government also continued its wonted practice of urging the public to show support for the incumbent, primarily by hanging up pro-presidential posters. In addition, the Higher Committee on Presidential Elections was conspicuously inflexible, particularly in its refusal to allow civil society organizations to monitor the elections despite the fact that the Administrative Judicial Court had issued a ruling permitting them to do so.

The elections were held on 7 September, 2005, and some human rights organizations, as well as a number of the candidates, complained of flaws and cited evidence of manipulation of the electoral process. These problems included allowing a single individual to vote more than once and the mobilization of government employees or the labour sector to vote for the president by making use of voters resident outside the constituency, ploys that were also resorted to in the constitutional referendum. When the results were announced they revealed a landslide victory for the ruling president of nearly 90 percent of the votes, with his two most important rivals receiving less than 10 percent. However, the most notable aspect of the election results is that the participation rate came, according to official statistics, to no more than one-fourth of those with the right to vote. This figure shows a clear tendency among the majority of the Egyptian people to refrain from taking part in the official political process, despite all manner of attempts to encourage and motivate them to do so. There is nothing surprising about such a phenomenon after decades of successful efforts to destroy the society’s political vitality through the obstruction of key freedoms and rule by means of emergency law.

Subsequently, parliamentary elections were held in three phases in November and December, but they were marred by many flaws. The results of these elections, according to the monitoring judges, were forged to favour the ruling party candidates despite the results announced in at least 2 major districts, al-Duqqi and Dam-hanour. The details of such forgery were revealed in a courageous article published by a lady judge, ‘Noha Al Zeini’, one of the presiding judges supervising the elections in Damanhour.

Judges monitoring the elections and voters were assaulted by thugs who were allegedly protected by the police. This led the judges to call for a full monitoring of all the phases of the elections, the formation of an independent judicial police force and the protection of elections by the army, as provided for under Egyptian law.

In districts where ruling party candidates were most likely to lose, especially in the second and third phases of the elections, the security forces prevented voters from reaching designated ballot stations, which led in some instances
to violent clashes resulting in several casualties.

Moreover, bribes were used to purchase the votes of the poor, especially women, a phenomenon some called "Ballot Slavery".

As far as the women’s share in the Parliament is concerned, the ruling party had only 2 female candidates on its list of 444 candidates, none of whom were elected (it may also be noted that only 2 Copts were included in the lists of the ruling party). Whereby, the "Muslim Brotherhood" had a clear victory. In the final announced results, the ruling party did not, strictly speaking, obtain the sweeping majority it had previously enjoyed in Parliament (excluding the party’s independent candidates).

In Bahrain, authorities interfered with demonstrations seeking reform. A Political Organizations Act was passed which political and human rights organizations consider to be restrictive of freedoms and in violation of international charters and covenants, spurring six of Bahrain’s most prominent political organizations to announce the voluntary closure of their offices for three days in July, 2005.

In Tunisia, authorities forcibly put a halt to demonstrations which were being staged to criticise the government’s invitation to Israeli premier Ariel Sharon to attend the Data Acquisition Summit Conference in Tunisia. It bears noting that these demonstrations were not welcomed by Western circles, nor did their suppression receive the condemnation which it deserved, and attorney ‘Muhammad Abbu’ remains in detention for having written an article on the subject.

In addition, prolonged hunger strikes have been staged by ‘Nahda’ Party prisoners who have been in detention for a decade and a half under harsh conditions. Finally, the Arab Summit Conference (Algiers, March 2005) did not lead to the adoption of the reforms which Arab citizens have longed to see for so many years, and eight Arab leaders refrained from attending.

**References**


Governability and Democracy

Islam, Democracy and Secularisation

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At the beginning of the 1990s Olivier Roy (1992) had already predicted the failure of political Islam. Gilles Kepel (2000) reached the same conclusion in his book *Jihad, the rise and fall of Islamism*. For my own part, (Ferjani, 1992; 1996; 2005a; 2005b; 2006) I have not ceased to defend the theory that political Islam and, what is more, the reinversion by religion of the field of politics, are signs that democracy is failing. This theory is based on the conviction that a true democracy, which supports social links through the development of socio-economic and cultural rights backed up by public services, will allow Muslim societies to envisage an escape from the despotism which has hitherto assailed them by other ways than a radical Islamic experience. Many Muslim thinkers, some of whom are from a radical Islamic background, like the Tunisian H’mida Enneifer, have broken away from political Islam, regarding it as bound to fail. There are but few, such as François Burgat (1995; 1998; 2005), who constantly defend Islamism as leading directly towards a different modernity from the “Western model”, indeed towards an “Islamic democracy”. The elections experienced by Muslim countries over recent years, in particular those which took place between January 2005 and January 2006, seem to confirm Burgat’s theories and contradict those of his opponents.

The Electoral Success of Political Islam

Despite the disillusionment with regard to the experiences of political Islam in Iran, the Sudan, Afghanistan or Algeria, and despite the repercussions of the attacks of September 11 2001, Islamism does not seem to have lost its appeal among Muslims who are the principal losers in these exploits. As it happens, many radical Islamic movements and parties no longer reject in the same way the democracy they considered for a long time to be a Western system at odds with the teachings of Islam. They no longer snub the elections to which they once preferred recourse to weapons and uprisings; uprisings that were planned deep within the community through mosques and charitable and cultural organizations to increase membership among those excluded from globalization and the chaotic modernization which has shattered Muslim societies. Everywhere that they have been able to take part in local or national elections, radical Islamic movements and parties have presented candidates and led electoral campaigns which have revealed their capacity to mobilize supporters and their advance on the traditional parties and new democratic oppositions. This strategy seems to work in their favour and against the radical Islamic movements who continue to boycott elections, like the Islamic Jihad in Palestine, the Saadet Party¹ in Turkey, the Justice and Charity party in Morocco, the cluster of groups which advocate violent action in Egypt, Algeria, etc. and against those who are gambling on democracy weakening their influence.

Turkey, considered for a long time to be a beacon of modernity and secularism in the Muslim world, has become the reference point for all the radical Islamic movements who have chosen the same path. Despite the failure of their first attempt at participation, which led them to power and which was cut short by a new intervention by the Army for the so-called salvation of “secularism” and the “republic”, Turkish Islamic radicals persevered and ended up by regaining power, first in the large towns, then during the elections of 2002, in which they won 363 seats out of the 550 which make up parliament. The army’s coup de force against the Government of Erbakan did not curb the Islamic radicals’ influence; quite the contrary, it legitimized them and allowed them to refocus their efforts, stronger and better prepared.

Today, the experience of Turkish Islamic radicals, more than those in Iran, Sudan or Taliban Afghanistan, who saw political Islam reach the power by other means than through the ballot box, constitutes the most claimed example by Islamic radicals and by those who advocate alliance with Islamic radicals in Muslim countries, in Washington, or in European capitals which have been converted to the idea of an alternative, based on compromise with Islamists. The example of the AKP, the Islamist party holding power in Turkey, is valued highly by Moroccan Islamic radicals, whose party has the same name: The Justice and Development party (JDP), arisen from the fusion in 1996 of the Islamist or-

¹ The dissolution of the Islamist Refah Party (The Welfare Party), of Erbakan, declared illegal in 1998, gave rise to two parties: the Saadet Party (Happiness Party) and the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party), the AKP of the present Prime Minister, in power since 2002.
In Algérie, the interruption of the elections in 1992 which prevented the ISF (Islamic Salvation Front) from gaining power and the civil war which followed, did not curb the influence of political Islam. The results of the different elections which the country has seen since the end of the 1980s, beyond the irregularities, frauds and the conditions surrounding ballots, allow an estimate of the electoral weight of this political movement, considering all tendencies together, at between 30% et 40%; which in fact amounts to the main political force. It is this weight which explains the hesitations and the preparations that may exist regarding the reform of the family code and the demands of women, which President Bouteflika has promised to address at the beginning of his first term, or regarding the cultural demands of Berber movements (some of which supported him); and in relation to the political demands of civil society and democratic movements, sacrificed in the quest to form a difficult compromise with the Islamic radicals. The “national reconciliation” which has benefited Islamists to the detriment of their victims, illustrates this orientation of the power in Algeria under the influence and pressure of the Islamists.

In Egypt, the elections of December 2005 allowed an evaluation of the political importance of the Muslim Brother-
pects of the debate aroused by the electoral success of political Islam. It is for this reason that this reflection will limit itself to the examination of three questions directly concerning the relationship between Islam, democracy and secularisation:

- To what extent are (or are not) the electoral victories of Islamic radical movements a confirmation of the incompatibility between Islam, on one side, and democracy and secularisation on the other?
- Does the participation of Islamist groups in elections result from a democratic conversion or from a sort of duplicity of these movements?
- Are the developmental conditions which gave rise to Christian democracy comparable to those experienced by the evolutions of political Islam during these days?

Democracy and Secularisation: is There Such Thing as an Islamic Exception?

Secular people of the Muslim world and foreign observers, more or less specialised in the different disciplines, have found in the electoral scores of political Islam an additional proof which supports their concern and pessimism as to the possibility of reconciling Islam and modernity. Their reactions follow the logic of the reductionist argument that postulates the existence of an “Islamic exception”. From this, some conclude that there is a necessity for a “secular dictatorship” to modernise Muslim societies and thus to ensure a “way out to religion” against their will, before allowing them access to democracy. Secularisation and the triumph of secularism in these countries would be a preliminary condition to the introduction of democracy. As long as this preliminary condition is not assured, any free election on Muslim soil would be a “democratic burial of democracy”. There would even be a danger of international interference which would justify keeping this part of the world private from democracy. The essayist and great reporter Alexander Adler sums up this concept perfectly when he says: “No, at the end of the day, I would prefer that the Muslim brothers be co-opted by the Egyptian military, who hold the essential power, rather than see them win free elections and appointing a Tariq Ramadan as Minister of Culture. By the same token, to me it seems more desirable to keep the princes of the Saudi royal family on the throne, even the ones who maintain contact with Al-Qaïda, than to see Islamist parties, like those who exist in Pakistan, take control of the Saudi Kingdom. Therefore support the idea of maintaining the most enlightened dictatorships possible – even those not enlightened at all – in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, rather than the application of democratic principles in these areas of the world, which in the immediate future would not be anything but bringers of disorder and violence”.

(Adler-Sorman, 2004) When you remind the proponents of this argument that it is precisely this route which has allowed political Islam to triumph in Turkey and in countries where democracy has been adjourned in the name of prioritising modernisation, of making up for lost time relative to the West, or to overcome under-development, they reply that the experiments had not the time to bear fruit and that it was necessary to prolong them before implementing “democratic overtures” which would have provoked its failure. This argument is akin to those of the authoritarian regimes which present themselves as indispensable bastions against Islamist obscurantism in order to justify their refusal of every democratic overture, their violations of human rights, their exploitation of the machinations of the state to maintain the monopoly of the oligarchies which they represent over all the areas of political life, from economic to media. This argument is also very similar to the choice of certain powers which consider that political democracy is not yet the main concern in countries where the priority should be economic development, in order to create jobs, resolve housing problems, allow a greater number to have access to education and to medical care, to prevent immigration and contain the threat of terrorism. This is why these powers continue to support regimes worn down by negligence and corruption, leading them to envisage new alliances if the Islamists cease to take on their interests and presence in a region vital for their economy.

A variant of this attitude consists of asking the regimes which are the primary obstacle to democracy, and which do not hesitate to resort to religion to draw from it a pseudo legitimacy, to make democratic overtures excluding the expressions of political Islam in accordance with the famous adage “no liberty for the enemies of liberty”. Besides the problem posed even by the idea of a selective democracy, if one applies this principle, it would be necessary to begin by forbidding all political activity to parties and government who have presided for decades over the destinies of the countries concerned and to whom this question is addressed, just as to the movements of the left which have supported the different totalitarian regimes of the ex-Soviet empire, Cambodia, Albania, China, Vietnam, North Korea, etc, and which have never clearly given up the ideas in the name of which they aligned themselves behind these regimes. Yet it is often from the ranks of these movements that comes this demand for exclusion which would be applied only to the Islamic radical movements. If one applies this rule across the board, it would be necessary to forbid groups of the extreme right and the extreme left, indeed many parties and groups capable of attacks upon liberty if not in their own countries at least with regard to other peoples in the East, the West, the South or the North. Who would have the right to decide where exclusion begins or ends? And in the name of which principle can the envisaged exclusion be reserved solely for Islamists?

For those who see proof of the incompatibility between Islam and democracy in the electoral success of political Islam, it would be important to remember that the first universal suffrage in Europe and in other countries was hardly favourable to democracy. The first elections which followed the revolution of 1848 in France brought a reactionary majority to power who straight away buried the 2nd Republic and plunged the country of the “rights of man and of the citizen” back into the days of being “Elder sister of the Church”. Likewise, it was via elections that Hitler and Mussolini arrived in power, only to drag Europe and the world into one of the darkest episodes of human history. One should fur-
thermore consider the election scores which the extreme right have achieved, very linked to religious extremism of a Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Jewish, Hindu (etc.) nature, before concluding that the electoral victories of political Islam are a sign of an Islamic exception, resistant to democracy and to secularisation, and for which it is consequently necessary to either maintain the ensemble of the Muslim world under authoritarian regimes or exclude political Islam from all democratic life. Where elsewhere has this type of exclusion been advocated? Have we to make an Islamic exception or rather make exceptional the treatment reserved for Islam?

A last point concerning this aspect of the debates arising from the electoral victories of Islamists, relates to the relationship between democracy and secularism. It should be remembered that the advent of political Islam, like that of political Christianity and other similar expressions with reference to all religions, is the product of a certain degree of secularisation: it is because politics has begun to distance itself from religion and the religious is no more the only mode of legitimization, that these movements advocating an unprecedented ideologicalization of religion appeared, which are no more than a reaction to modernity. However, in order that secularisation be complete and lead to secularism, that is to say to the official and real separation of politics and religion, it is necessary that democratisation crosses the threshold allowing politics to do without recourse to religion or any form of ideological mystification, from which all non-democratic power tries to draw a semblance of legitimacy. Moreover consider the election scores which the extreme right have achieved, very linked to religious extremism of a Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Jewish, Hindu (etc.) nature, before concluding that the electoral victories of political Islam are a sign of an Islamic exception, resistant to democracy and to secularisation, and for which it is consequently necessary to either maintain the ensemble of the Muslim world under authoritarian regimes or exclude political Islam from all democratic life. Where elsewhere has this type of exclusion been advocated? Have we to make an Islamic exception or rather make exceptional the treatment reserved for Islam?

Duplicity or Democratic Conversion of Political Islam?

The fact that Islamic radical groups accept participation in elections, after having long considered democracy as a political regime incompatible with Islam, and the fact that they denounce the authoritarian regimes in power in Muslim countries by demanding "free, transparent and honest" elections, and by calling for democracy and human rights, is interpreted in different ways. Some see in it a democratic conversion comparable to that which allowed the development of political Christianity at the beginning of the 20th century into Christian democracy in Europe, then into the theology of liberation of Latin America; others see multiplicity in it and a strategy aimed at attaining the same objectives that many Islamist groups continue to want to achieve by violence, ideological indoctrination, the invasion of all sectors of public life so as to impose an exclusive hegemony on society. Those of the first opinion only remember the reassuring declarations of certain Islamic radical leaders, such as the Moroccan Saadeddine Othmani; the Prime Minister and chief of the Turkish AKP, Erdogan; the Sudanese Hassan Turabi; certain figures from the Tunisian Al-Nahda groups charged with relations with human rights organisations (especially in Europe); Tariq Ramadhan, etc.; and leave out everything that contradicts these declarations in the actual discourse of these same leaders and hide past and present attitudes of groups to which they and other leaders of the same movements belong. They create the impression that they really want to reassure and convince themselves that the Islamists have become true democrats and true defenders of human rights that they make them out to have said on occasions when they want to hear them say. Knowing that the Islamists they promote accept the idea of referring to democracy and to human rights, but continue to oppose secularism with every last bit of energy, and refuse all ideas of secularisation which are incompatible with the political exploitation of religion, those that talk of the democratic conversion of Islam consider more and more frequently that democracy can be imagined without secularism or secularisation, and that it can express itself without problem in a religious context, whether it be that of Islam or any other religion. This is the argument defended by the Network of Arab Democrats, created in Casablanca in December 2005 on the initiative of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Democracy in Washington – under the aegis of the United States – and with the participation of Islamists known as moderates, – such as Saadeddine Othmani et Mohamed Yatim from the JDP, and the "secular democrats" – so moderate that they have accepted the shelving of their secularism in order to work with those Islamists who have not given up maintaining a religious reference. This is also the position defended by certain protagonists of the alliance which was born out of the hunger strikes in Tunis in October and November 2005, during the World Information Society Summit. François Burgat in France, Nathan Brown in the United States and plenty of other researchers fascinated by political Islam, brought their scientific caution to the argument.

2 See the text of this network’s declaration on the website of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Democracy, based in Washington, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID), www.csidonline.org and the articles published on this site pertaining to this question.

3 See the platform of this alliance and the debates which it has encouraged on the press pages of the opposition (notably Attariq Aljadid in the month of May and Al-Mawqif) and on sites such as those of the Committee for the Respect of Freedom and Human Rights (www.cridht.org) et www.aloufok.net.

Once again the example of “Christian Democracy” was invoked to give credence to the idea of a democratic conversion of political Islam: Why is something that was possible in Christian terms not possible in Muslim terms?

Those of the second opinion insist on the duplicity and treachery of Islamic radicals by promoting everything which contradicts the profession of democratic faith in figures and trends, presented as an example of the democratic conversion of political Islam: the absence of self-critique regarding antidemocratic ideas and practices contrary to human rights (like the support for the regimes of the Taliban, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the crimes of the Sudanese State when Turabi was Minister of Justice, and where M. M. Taha was condemned and executed as a renegade for the same ideas that are demanded today by the same Turabi, etc.), the silence over what is being said and done by other Islamists who continue to reject democracy and human rights, the persistence of hostile attitudes towards freedom of conscience (notably for Muslims who are forbidden to change religion), towards the rights of women (it is important to recall on this subject that many Islamists known as “moderate”, like Tariq Ramadhan and the Tunisian Rachid Ghannouchi sit beside Y. Qaradhawi in the European Council of the Fatwa, which defends polygamy) and towards secularism. They suspect that the Islamists are sharing out the roles: some playing the democracy and human rights card to reassure the United States, the European States and those powers ready for certain democratic overtures, to win the sympathy of the defenders of human rights; the others continue to defend an orthodox Islamist line, demanding the introduction of a Muslim theocracy faithful to the teachings of A. Mawdudi, H. Al-Banna, S. Qutb, Khomeini, etc. There is no lack of examples on the sharing out of roles: The AKP in Turkey for the respect of republican and secular institutions – at the same time as maintaining their reference to Islam – the rapprochement with Europe and the moderation with which the Saadet party, the other branch of the Refah party, maintains a line faithful to the traditional demands of Turkish Islamists. Many of the deputies elected under the AKP banner defend the Saadet positions which hold power in several of the country’s large towns. The two parties refrain from attacking one another and keep their hostility for their secular adversaries. All the same, in Morocco, this distribution of roles is made at the heart, even at the direction of, the JDP. The Secretary General, S Othmani and a part of the leadership play for the respect of the institutions, democratic overtures and moderation whilst Mostapha Ramid, certain deputies and local executives maintain a line with allows the JDP to benefit from the vote of the Association of Justice and Charity of Sheikh A. Yassin and to keep contact with the radical expressions of political Islam. We will find the same distribution of roles, more or less mirrored, between Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood and the “jihadist” groups in Egypt and Jordan, at the heart of Nadhha and amongst these and other more or less moderate expressions in Tunisia, between the different expressions of political Islam in Algeria and everywhere where strong relationships and the political situation oblige Islamists to opt for this type of strategy, which is a double-edged sword. Beyond that which opposes them, these two viewpoints – democratic conversion and duplicity – have in common an overestimation of the unity and the strength of political Islam. The first considers it to be a force which from now on has to be reckoned with, and with which one must compromise and ally in the hope of gaining its friendship, or at least not attracting its wrath; the second sees it as a monster capable of calling all the shots without giving anything away, and that it is necessary to exclude it by every means in order to prevent harm. They also have in common not seeing the reality of political Islam other than from the angle which reinforces their own party view: for or against the opening up of the political arena to Islamic radical groups, for or against an alliance between democrats and the enthusiasts of political Islam? It seems to me that the question is more complex and needs to be tackled differently than from the exclusive angle of immediate political considerations.

Under What Conditions can Political Islam be Absorbed by Democracy?

The friction, the spectacular U-turns such as witnessed the recent stances of Hassan Turabi, the contradictory declarations and attitudes of leaders and of Islamist groups, must be interpreted as the signs of a crisis which has only just begun. In fact, if it is premature to speak of a democratic conversion in the ranks of political Islam, it is important not to hold on to a monolithic and reductionist vision of this movement. The contradictions which exist at its very heart do not only indicate duplicity or a well thought-out and controlled strategy. The disenchantments with relation to the Iranian, Afghan and Sudanese experiences; the consequences of the attacks of September 11th 2001 in New York, of May 16th 2004 in Casablanca and the other attacks perpetrated upon Madrid, London and in different countries, Muslim or not; the failure of the strategies adopted by the Algerian Islamists; being brought face-to-face with the realities of power after electoral successes, as in Jordan in the 1980s, in Turkey, in Palestine and elsewhere; the lack of support of Saudi Arabia and of certain financial backers, etc.; – all of these factors shook convictions, upset schemes, challenged plans, and divided the unity which the Islamic movement displayed, when it was still no more than a critical project playing on the failures and the difficulties of its adversaries. Today Islamists are held to account for their courses of action, to justify and assess, to give explanations on the actions for which they are responsible, and to answer questions concerning their attitudes. All of this cannot happen without effects, and U-turns are not unheard of, nor are prevarications, contradictions, omissions, silences over embarrassing subjects, double-speak and everything that is hidden by those who speak of a democratic conversion of political Islam and emphasised by those who insist upon the duplicity and deceit of Islamic radical leaders. These are the concrete manifestations of a crisis which will finish, sooner or later, by producing separation and division between those who are sincerely in favour of the democratic cause and those who will stay faith-
ful to the theocratic ideas of political Islam. But it will not be able to play a part until, on one hand, democratisation produces its effects upon Muslim reality, at an institutional level and in terms of social relations and peoples’ attitudes, and on the other hand, when Islamists come face to face with rational democrats capable of confronting them uncompromisingly and ready to defend them when they are unjustly deprived of their rights. Today, these conditions are far from being met. Democracy is threatened everywhere by the effects of globalisation or the economic liberalism calling more and more upon clericalisms, old and new, and prefers to lean on authoritarian regimes rather than on the development of democracy. In the majority of Muslim countries, it is still a demand made by associations and movements who have little influence upon society, confronted by the authoritarianism of reigning powers and the rise of political Islam. Often, their weakness drives them, simultaneously or one by one, to place themselves behind dictators who stifle them for fear of the danger of Islamic radicalism, or behind political Islam to show their rejection of the corruption and tyranny of the powers that be. We are very far from the conditions which allowed the passage from a political Christianity in Europe which arrogantly rejected democracy, human rights and all forms of secularisation to a Christian democracy which was made up of the established members of a modern, democratic and secularised society. This is why the urgent priority for democracy is not to make an alliance with political Islam in the name of a hypothetical democratic conversion, total or partial, of its supporters, nor to play along with authoritarian powers who want to exclude arbitrarily from political life the adversaries which they fear to be a threat to their hegemony over society and the state. The urgent priority is to create a democratic pole capable of being a credible alternative to current powers, and to political Islam.

**Conclusion**

The electoral successes of political Islam are not the product of an adherence to its ideas of the world, social relations and politics. It is elsewhere very difficult to identify a coherent and common project for all the groups of the movement. Outside the demand for an “Islamic State”, which is more a standard than a clear vision of what it ought to be, of the rejection of what Islamists attribute, by and large, to “Western influences” – secularism, the total respect of freedom of conscience, and complete sexual equality – on all the other questions, political Islam has nothing specific and the groups which comprise it are very divided. It is the vagueness of its policy documents and the radicalism of its arguments against hegemony, as well as the arrogance of Western powers and their allies – including corrupt and authoritarian Muslim regimes – which explain political Islam’s success, coupled with the absence of another credible, sufficiently organised alternative to these regimes. It would therefore be improper to conclude from this any specificity of Islam which would make it a religion particularly incompatible with democracy and secularisation, as the supporters of a certain reductionist cultural simplification and the prophets of cultural wars like to relate. Even if it is too soon to talk of an end to political Islam, either by a conversion to democracy of the groups which represent it, or by the arrival of an alternative secular democracy which has trouble in asserting itself, the total triumph of these groups does not constitute a fatal destiny from which the Muslim world will not be able to escape and with which it is necessary to compromise, in the hope that it will be, “a fertile regression”. There exists in Muslim societies a profound hope of modernity, freedom, equality and dignity, an associative movement which carries forward these aspirations, and democratic forces which, if sufficiently united, recognised and aided, can help to make such a regression totally unnecessary.

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5 Views of L. Adddi on the subject of the electoral victory of the FIS in Algeria at the beginning of the 1990s.
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In recent decades Arab countries have seen several periods in which liberal political reform has occupied a central position in public debate and governmental proceedings. In all cases, there has been a strong overlapping between internal and external factors. At the end of the eighties, reform dynamics were initiated that led countries such as Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Jordan to advance towards the threshold of democratisation boosted by the feeling of growing vulnerability experienced by their governmental elite. Faced with important social opposition movements and a large deficit of legitimacy due to its authoritarianism and failure in the social-economic management of its States, they also observed how in the international framework a period of great uncertainty was opening up, as a consequence of the collapse of bipolar order. The combination of both factors favoured the reformist option for a short but very intense period. These liberalising dynamics, which could have evolved towards democratisation, were left shattered by the Gulf War and its subsequent consequences.

The new monopolar order, which will allow the USA to develop a hegemonic policy in the Middle East, marked an in-volutionist tendency in which the advances that had been made a few years earlier were either held back or stopped completely. Washington went on to guarantee the governmental Arab elite their authoritarian survival in exchange for them adopting the new American strategic project (military agreements, accepting the situation of ostracism and embargo which Iraq was subjected to and supporting the Palestinian – Israeli peace negotiations in accordance with the rules established by the superpower). The new Pax Americana was limited to presenting the minimalist reform as a democratising achievement that Saudi Arabia carried out in 1992, through which the duties of the Saudi Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) were increased.

The irruption of the 11th September 2001 attacks will strengthen the authoritarianism of the Arab States to re-evaluate itself as a strategic weapon for the “war on terror” that Washington started. Far from joining the promotion of democracy and the rule of law with the fight against terrorism, it has strengthened abusive and arbitrary legislation that, in exchange for yielding to all the criteria of Washington regarding terrorism and the sometimes illegal means used to combat it, is also used as an instrument of political repression and an obstacle for civil and individual liberties.

However, since 2004, promotion of democracy in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East has been acquiring growing relevance in international diplomacy. This issue centred the agenda of the G-8 summit on 9th June by means of the initiative presented by the USA under the name of Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa, as well as in the European Council 17th – 18th June which saw the approval of the latest version of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Strategic Part-nership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In both cases, while not always sharing the same views, the need to promote democracy started to occupy a prominent position. However, these initiatives present serious lacunae. Both the USA and Europe, assert that the promotion of democracy is a crucial factor for their security and the stability of the region but have not formulated a clear strategy of application. They place the need for reform in the tendency of governments to promote change, given that they do not show a sustained commitment in the use of conditionality as an instrument of reform. Given the voluntary aspect of the proposed plan, it is difficult to see how governments will be encouraged to apply the said reform.

In actual fact, the discourse on the need for democratisation, attempts to respond, especially on the part of Washington, to an enormous challenge: that of the growing anti-North American feeling in the Arab and Muslim region, as well as compensation for the unsettling situation of insecurity and anarchy that has arisen from the military intervention in Iraq. That is to say, the initiative lies more in its function than in its content. Nevertheless, the public presentation of the North American proposal has had a positive effect in opening up debate and discussion on democratisation in the countries concerned and numerous declarations and opinions regarding the need for reform have arisen in the Arab public sphere, both on the part of governments and non-governmental entities, as well as in the media. Furthermore, this action has also managed to raise two important issues. Firstly, the great importance of building a credible political process that satisfies the
great aspirations of democracy and the rule of law that exist in the populations of the Middle East; and secondly, having to take on the participation of the Islamist parties in the above mentioned process. The inevitable reality happens to be that at present democratization is combining with Islamism in this part of the world. The Islamist reformist parties must be interpreted as political actors called on to participate together with the other parties in the process of democratic transition, among other reasons because they carry important credibility and social weight, to such an extent that without their participation the democratic process would not be credible. The really important issue is the process and not the actors. That is to say, to reinforce the smooth running of the structures and institutions instead of selecting a priori the actors or leaders. The issue is not about trying to form the perfect, pro-Western and secular Arab man that, in an almost caricatural way, often prevails in the wishes of political proceedings. This is an interference that has always brought disastrous and counterproductive results. The real issue is about promoting transparent and competitive government mechanisms and administration subject to democratic laws, regardless of whether the representing actors belong to secular or Islamist groups. It is the citizens of these countries who have to trace out their own destiny by choosing their own representatives.

“Liberal Authoritarianism”

The Arab regimes reacted against the external initiatives labelling them as an imposition of Western values and perspectives. However, aware that certain changes were being asked of them that would be adapted to the reform discourse that Washington defended, in the summit of the League of Arab States, 22nd-23rd May 2004, the matter was considered and the beginning of the reform was assumed but using, in a very instrumental way, the argument of the “home grown democracy”. Consequently, the ruling elite did not reject the start of the reform as long as it was applied in a limited, gradual and controllable way that widened the view of civil society, allowed margins of press freedom, extended the multiparty system and improved their image in other countries but without incorporating power sharing mechanisms. Thus, throughout 2005, a year of great electoral intensity, political reforms took place that advanced towards a “liberal authoritarianism” with signs of representation but not of competence. Saudi Arabia took a step forward in accepting for the first time the electoral event on a local level, even though the powers of these elected posts are very restricted. Furthermore, it is a process that, as occurred in 1992 with the enlargement of the Consultative Assembly, combines the institutional opening-up with a tightening of the control of movements and political groups that call for democratisation. It was very significant that the day after announcement of electoral reform, a peaceful march of demonstrators who were protesting about the slowness and limitation of the reform was violently suppressed with hundreds of arrests.

Egypt has tried to soften its authoritarian image by developing a process of political reforms throughout 2005. Thus, in September the first presidential elections took place thanks to a constitutional reform that modified its article 76 establishing universal suffrage in the presidential election, but imposing strict conditions that hinder the possibilities of the opposition parties (they must have at least 5% of the parliamentary seats to be able to present a candidate) and practically close the doors to independent candidates. However, the process did allow for a political dynamism that was expressed in a completely new way. Later on, in November, legislative elections took place with a greater margin of transparency than usual, particularly everything related to the judicial supervision of the process. In spite of being a declared illegal organisation, the Muslim Brothers presented themselves as independent candidates and the fact that on this occasion there was no resorting to mass detention of their candidates and representatives before the elections, as was habitual in previous elections, also gave a certain margin of credibility to the process. The first electoral round announced the significant success that the Muslim Brothers would achieve, higher than predicted by the governmental authorities (no more than 40 seats), so that in the successive rounds mass interference of the security forces took place resulting in 11 deaths and many injured, highlighting the intolerance of the symbolic success of the Muslim Brothers. At the end of the process approximately 1,300 militants and followers of the Islamist party had been arrested. Although the governmental party (National Democratic Party) retained a great absolute majority of seats (316, 73% of the total) these came from only 38% of the official party candidates, the rest being “independents” that were added to the seats of the governmental party. That is to say, although this great majority of representatives guaranteed the government the Egyptian legislative monopoly, technically it was not an electoral triumph.

The electoral success of the Muslim Brothers (88 seats) does not reflect their true popularity, but rather the reinforcement of their position by assuming active political participation and the growing weight of their youngest and pragmatic generation, in favour of democratising the election of the leader and of creating a political party that leaves the Association with its charismatic function of social work. After the elections, they launched a national and international campaign to transmit their commitment to democratic processes and their interest in focusing on political reform and not on the islamisation of Egypt.

The resistance of the governmental authorities to continue with this political process was revealed when it was announced that the local elections expected for 2006 were cancelled until 2008. From this it can be concluded that the “controlled reform” of Egypt can be scarcely reformist as the regime has proved that it has been insufficiently controlled.

Lebanon without Syria

The wave of peaceful protests that resulted from the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in Lebanon on 14th February
The POGAR programme was launched in 2000 by the Regional Bureau for the Arab States (RBAS) of the UNDP – whose headquarters is in New York – in collaboration with several institutions, at both a regional level (government ministries, research institutes, human rights groups, civil associations and business organizations) and an international level (such as the World Bank or the OECD, among others). Two years later, in 2002, the offices of POGAR were transferred to Beirut to enable work to be carried out directly in the field.

On its official website, it states that POGAR “was developed at the request of Arab governments and therefore specifically addresses national needs and concerns*. The programme is devoted to the promotion and development of good governmental practices and reform in the Arab states*, always from the viewpoint of sustainability. The approach adopted by POGAR in its activities is that of always working in partnership with local participants and not one which imposes unilateral and obligatory directions. Its objective is therefore to support the internal efforts of each Arab country and society, to achieve social, political and economic reforms through the acquisition of knowledge, whilst simultaneously encouraging good practice at state level, in civil society and in the private sector. Areas of activity revolve around three central concepts:

- **Participation** (with special focus on issues of gender and citizenship, civil society and the media, elections and decentralisation);
- **Rule of Law** (laws and constitutions, the judiciary);
- **Transparency and Accountability** (parliament and other public sector regulatory and management organisations).

The POGAR programme also represents a point of reference and consultation, thanks to the constantly updated database which has been made available by its experts, in collaboration with the partner organisations: on the website there is also a judicial database (concerning Arab banking legislation, judiciary systems and financial control and regulation), a section dedicated to statistics and indicators, the texts of constitutions and basic laws of government, as well as numerous publications on the programme’s areas of involvement (civil society, gender, corruption, etc) which are explored during seminars, meetings and conferences.

During 2005, in collaboration with the network’s institutions, in particular the OECD and the UNDP, POGAR organised numerous seminars and meetings at a regional level. The following are some of the most interesting and memorable:

- First Conference on National Human Rights Institutions in the Arab Regions, Cairo, March 2005;
- Regional Forum on Restructuring Government in the Arab States; Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in the Public Sector. Dubai, March 2005;
- Arab Parliamentary Conference on the UN Convention Against Corruption, Cairo, June 2005;
- Regional Parliamentary Conference on Empowering Arab Members of Parliaments. Algiers, September 2005;

Besides the above, also notable is the launch in May 2005 of the project “Strengthening the Rule of Law in Arab States: Modernization of Prosecutors’ Offices” (Cairo) and the operation to translate into Arabic the “Human Rights Manual for Prosecutors”.

For further information:
- POGAR’s website: www.pogar.org
- Partner Institutions: www.pogar.org/about/partners.asp
- Database: www.pogar.org/databases
- Activities: www.pogar.org/activities

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2005 and provoked the resignation of the government on 28th February seemed to convince the world that this country was facing up to a new era in which the terrible legacy of the long civil war between 1975 and 1990 was left behind. This impression was strengthened by the orderly and peaceful way in which the Syrian troops permanently abandoned the country assuming resolution 1559 of the UN Security Council, an initiative of the USA and France. The opposition constituted by well-known old Christian-Maronite, Druze and Sunni Muslim leaders and protected by the USA and France, aspired to pass the message that the Syrian “presence” had been the root of all the Lebanese problems.

It is an important fact that everyone in the country has accepted that the period of Syrian presence in Lebanon has finished, even the social sectors and pro-Syrian politicians, who are also representative. The mass demonstration that Hezbollah held in parallel with the anti-Syrian demonstrations, was an act to show its recognition to Syria for having helped Lebanon in holding back the Israeli aggression against the country and for guaranteeing the country the relative calm it has enjoyed since 1990, but it also called for national Lebanese unity.

Nevertheless, the Syrian interference was a symptom and not the cause of the deep crises that the Lebanese political system suffered. The legislative elections held after 29th May 2005, immediately after the Syrian withdrawal, showed the implications of the internal Lebanese challenge. The opposition, united in its demands for expelling the Syrians, fragmented and divided into opportunist alliances with the so-called pro-Syrians in order to defend their inalterable interests. The elections called to start a new democratic process were a reproduction of the strength of sectarianism and the traditional status quo, demonstrating that Lebanon as a State has not resolved key issues relating to international identity, inter-communal conflict, accountability for the atrocities committed during the civil war and the construction of the nation.
Processes under Occupation: Iraq and Palestine

The Iraqi case is very exceptional given that the political process is being led and established by a foreign occupying force against the 1907 Hague Convention, signed by the USA, which prohibits that the occupying power make any permanent changes in the government of the occupied territory. Nevertheless, on 30th January 2005 the Iraqis chose 275 representatives to form a National Assembly that chose a president and two vice-presidents, who in turn, chose a prime minister who appointed a new government. The Assembly had the fundamental task of drawing up a Constitution for Iraq that after being passed in a referendum, opened up a new electoral process for choosing a new Assembly in December of the same year. The way in which this process has been organised and developed has given rise to a deep sectarian division and has encouraged communitarian feelings against the citizens. The problem originated from the identification that the Americans made from the beginning between Arab Sunnis and Baathism/Saddamism, collectively classing them as their number one enemy in Iraq. Consequently, they took the brunt of the military repression and marginalization in the political process. Firstly, with an electoral system in the 2005 January elections in which they were the worst affected in favour of the Kurds – to which they responded by boycotting the elections – and afterwards when the drawing up of the Constitution turned into a process in which the Kurd and Shiite parties in the government openly looked out for their own interests, transmitting to the Sunnis that they were going to be the great losers in the new recomposition of the Iraqi State.

Faced with the lack of consensus in all these basic issues, fulfilling the agenda became the greatest sign of success from an American perspective. Consequently, the process itself prevailed over the results, in such a way that the most significant of the new constitutional text is the omissions and not its content. To evade the manifest reality that no agreement was reached concerning the key issues in dispute it was decided to transfer the decision concerning the same to the Parliament that was going to be chosen on 15th December. In actual fact, if one considers the difficult situation of Iraq, that of developing a constitutional draft in just two months leaving aside the required need for consensus, the only way of beginning to settle the national stability of the country, and abandoning the idea that it was the Constitution that established the level of decentralization of the State instead of subsequent laws, made more vulnerable as a result of amendments by different governments, it shows the irresponsibility and improvisation in which a process is being carried out whose consequences are determinants not only for Iraq and the whole region of the Middle East but also for the world in general.

At the beginning of 2006, the Palestinians voted democratically for an historic change in their political leadership. The PLO, and its main party Al-Fatah, were losing the monopoly of the Palestinian representation that they had held since the seventies. The origin of this alternation is found in the change experienced by Hamas that in recent years has been giving priority to its political action over its armed strategy. Firstly, it has assumed a cease-fire since January 2005, keeping out of the suicide attacks against Israel; it then decided to present itself in the local elections held in several stages in 2005, with notable electoral success, and finally, it participated for the first time in the second legislative elections that the National Palestine Authority was able to organise on 25th January 2006. For his part, Mahmoud Abbas needed Hamas in the political game so as to succeed in the imposition of order, both for holding back the attacks and for gaining credibility through a democratic electoral process in which the Palestinian society would not admit the marginalization of the Islamist party. The international community found itself imprisoned between his discourse in favour of democracy and his intolerance towards Hamas. Consequently it fell into a position that made no sense: accept and facilitate his participation but threaten against his electoral success.

The elections, with a very high level of participation, showed the energy and democratic adhesion of the Palestinians in spite of the toughness of the occupation since 2000. And Hamas won 74 of the total 132 seats that composed the Legislative Council. For the corruption and clanic fragmentation of Fatah, combined with its incapacity to improve in any way the draconian situation of occupation (to which Israel has contributed in a determining way by refusing to negotiate and maintaining the unilateralism of the consummate events), they made him pay. The success of Hamas comes from having known how to link nationalism with Is-
lam, as well as national liberation with social justice. United to this, it benefited from many votes that were a ‘punishment’ for Al-Fatah. The integration of Hamas in the Palestinian political system can be a positive factor. It is the best way of shunning the violent route because the Hamas leaders are looking for consolidation as political actors and for this they need international recognition. With this in mind, its discourse has been becoming pragmatic, leaving aside the most radical aspects of its constitutional charter. Cutting off dialogue with them, and not accepting the democratic results of the elections, could lead to losing the opportunity to condition and encourage a reformation of Hamas that would gradually leave behind its military strategy and accept negotiation with Israel. Obviously this would also mean firmly putting pressure on Israel to negotiate, and at the moment there is nothing to indicate that this could happen.
Governability and Democracy

The European Democracy-promotion Policy in the Mediterranean Region

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In only a few years the promotion of democracy has become a full-fledged objective of the European Union’s foreign policies. In May 2001, the Commission published its first communication on “The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries”, demanding a greater consistency between community politics and the integration of human rights in all sectors of relations with third countries. In the same year a resolution of the Development Council confirmed this new will to place the promotion of democracy and human rights more systematically at the heart of European external actions.

The aim of democratic promotion is essentially pursued through the community cooperation policies. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has thus theoretically, since 1995, encouraged good governance, democratic reform and respect for human rights in the Mediterranean. The current framework of cooperation between the EU and the “Mediterranean Partner Countries” (MPCs) adds a political dimension to the trade agreements of the preceding generation, notably establishing a form of democratic conditionality. This democratic dimension has become a priority in the post-9-11 context. While the American administration alternates between pressure and cooperation offers to accelerate the process of reform in the Arab world, the Europeans endeavour henceforth to make their intervention instruments more effective.

Democracy: A Basic Commitment at the Heart of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Since 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has provided a stabilising framework for relations between the European Union and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. Despite a strong economic element, it must be essentially understood as being a project of a strategic nature: for the last ten years the pacification of the region has been the task at hand, through reinforced cooperation in the political, economic and cultural domains.

The Partnership depends on a dynamic of reforms in these three domains. From the political point of view, the spread of democratic institutions and values has been presented since the start, as a condition of regional stabilisation. The Europeans thus give way to the plan of democratic peace, brought back into fashion after the fall of the Berlin wall; in accordance with this vision of international relations, the risk of war between democracies is very low. To guarantee peace in the Mediterranean, it would therefore be essential to establish a sort of democratic fraternity there, by encouraging political reform in authoritarian regimes. The judicial arsenal for the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean seems at first glance to be quite full. The Declaration of Barcelona, on the 28th of November 1995, the founding text of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, mentions the necessary respect for democratic values and the constitutional state. The bilateral Association Agreements signed by each one of the MPCs include a suspensive clause linked to the respect of democratic principles and human rights, which theoretically introduces a strong political conditionality (article 2 of the Association Agreements). Finally the MEDA regulation, which organises bilateral Euro-Mediterranean financial cooperation, sets as a condition for the awarding of aid, “the progress accomplished in terms of structural reforms”, an expression which can take on a political meaning.

In practice, however, the European Union has shown itself to be very cautious up to now towards political questions. The method chosen to activate reforms in the Mediterranean is very indirect and works above all through economy. In the Partnership, the Europeans pursue a liberal economic project, which has political implications: The conversion of the MPCs to free trade and market economy, along with the improvement of governance, are supposed to lead full term/eventually to a political aperturereopening. A few programmes targeted at encouraging democracy have been implemented; from now on, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) applies to all countries within the Partnership.

The European approach is in reality neither very political nor very restrictive; the Council has never expressed explicit condemnation against an MPC for breaching the principles of democracy, and the political conditionality contained in the bilateral agreements has never been used. Until very recently, one might wonder if the democratic issue was not in fact a taboo within the Partnership.

New Political Tensions Surround the Democratic Issue

It is in the after September 11th context that the democratic issue has been re-
ally essential in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The debate on the legitimacy of external intervention to hasten political reform in the Arab world is not over; tensions are developing around the question.

**The Renewal of the Debate on Demosocratisation in the Mediterranean**

The aim to promote democracy has returned in force since 2003, to the point of becoming today a central issue in the reform of the Partnership. This development results from a number of factors. Let us first note that, though a certain number of economic reforms was undertaken, internal political balance did not fundamentally grow in most of the MPCs since the launch of the Partnership. But the preoccupation of exterior backers over the issue of democratic governance in the Mediterranean has crystallised over time.

The publication in 2005 of the UNDP’s first report on human development in the Arab world constitutes a first stage. This essential document, drafted by Arab researchers, brought to light three principal elements responsible for the delay in the region’s development: a shortage of freedom, a shortage of knowledge, and an unacceptable status for women. The new report published in 2005 insisted again that Arab regimes had failed to reform internally, evoking the “black hole of the Arab State” and concluding that there was an urgent need for strong and immediate political and judicial reforms, to promote the respect of fundamental freedoms.

Once the debate opened, the European Commission seized the subject to clarify its intentions in the Mediterranean. The “Human Rights” section of the Directorate General for External Relations set out a first working document, transformed in 2003 in a communication by the Commission on “Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners”. This communication, the first to deal exclusively and in depth with human rights in a particular region, included operational recommendations. Some of them are going to be implemented shortly within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): let us quote the EU’s systematic inclusion (mainstreaming) of questions linked to human rights and democracy in all the dialogues which develop on an institutionalised basis; the establishment, within the context of the Association Agreements, of working groups on human rights; the development of national Action Plans for human rights with each MPC; or also more direct integration of the promotion of good governance, human rights and democracy in MEDA programmes.

The debate on regional democratisation became heated after the American intervention in Iraq. Since 2003, the George Bush administration explicitly displayed its objective of furthering democracy in the Arab-Muslim world, primarily *manu militari*, before converting it to a gradual and cooperative approach. The “Wider Middle East” project, published in Spring 2004, explains the basis of the American policy in promoting democracy. Here, economic development, the promotion of education, the role of civil society are held to be important. American views, in fact, show many similarities to the Barcelona strategy. Moreover, the United States have made many attempts to win over the European Union to their project of democratic promotion. Up to now they have clashed with some reluctant member states, like France, that accept the need to keep up a transatlantic dialogue on these issues but refuse to be enrolled under the American banner. In any case, from then on the American pressure has forced the Europeans to clarify their position. The progressive implementation of the Neighbourhood Policy seems today to be paving the way for a renewed political dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean context.

**The Political Partnership in 2005**

2005 has been a rich year for political events in the Mediterranean. Amongst symbolic advances and political tensions, the climate of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has evolved remarkably. The year was punctuated with political crises as well as experiencing some democratic advances; its overview is therefore full of contrasts. The Palestinian transition has continued with the holding of free elections in the Territories under European surveillance, to the satisfaction of the international community. The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza during the summer has upset the balance of the area, confirming the difficulties of the Palestinian Authority in asserting its power over a divided territory. A genuine crisis has taken place on Lebanese soil: public demonstrations, supported by joint Franco-American pressure, led to the open retreat of Syrian occupying forces, but without entering into a lasting process of political dialogue. In Egypt, the electoral process leading to the re-election of President Mubarak, disappointed analysts; the organisation of the official campaign demonstrated, above all, regimes’ growing ability to play with democratic rhetoric, which is so dear to Western powers. In Morocco, on the other hand, the pursuance of legislative reforms and the opening of public debate provoked the general approval of observers.

With the exception of the Palestinian case, the European Union has never appeared to be a front line interlocutor. The only action that seems to be directly linked to European efforts, is the pursuance of the internal reform process in Turkey; but the country has entered into negotiations in order to become a member of the EU, and this places it in a very exceptional situation. For the other Mediterranean partners, the political status and the intentions of the Union remain blurred and the launching of the Neighbourhood Policy makes the European objectives even more difficult to understand. The resistance of the member states sometimes causes an obstacle to the community processes and complicates the perception of European policies. In the Lebanese affair, France chose to go it alone by directly agreeing with the American ally; in democratic issues, Paris likes to keep some room for manoeuvre, nationally speaking. The strengthening of the American presence in the Mediterranean, in diplomatic terms as well as in financial matters, confuses the issue still further. Therefore, in 2005, the ten years anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was celebrated in an exceptional political climate. Amongst transatlantic tensions, regional crises and uncertainties over its own institutions, the Euro-
pean Union appeared to be strangely powerless. From the Mediterranean partners’ perspective, having had their fingers burned by American activism, they mistrusted all the forceful views put forward on reform. The Euro-Mediterranean climate of confidence seemed to be eroded; the failure of the Barcelona summit in November 2005 finally signalled the re-politicisation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, but in a conflictual way. The partners were not able to agree on a symbolic radical reform of the Partnership. To encourage the democratic dynamics in the region, the Europeans must henceforth convince the MPCs that the Neighbourhood Policy is built on strong foundations.

**The Prospect of Reforms Reinforced by the Context of Neighbourhood**

Since 2003, the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy heralded a political refocusing of Euro-Mediterranean relations. If the prospect of Neighbourhood was not destined at the outset for Mediterranean countries, they have nevertheless entered the field of play quite rapidly, and this could provide for some interesting developments. The initial goal of the ENP is above all to settle the question of the EU’s external frontiers: this entails offering countries that are geographically close, a positive alternative to membership. But the ENP is also inspired by the worry over security: the Commission calls for the establishment of a “circle of friendly countries”. From an economic viewpoint, the ENP anticipates extending the unique European market to the ensemble of neighbour countries, to create a vast “pan-Euro-Mediterranean” zone of prosperity. The general political objectives that have been set out are similar to those of the Partnership: strategic stabilisation in a peaceful relational context. Cross-border cooperation must be reinforced, political and cultural relations must become more intense and a shared responsibility must be established with regard to preventing conflicts. The implementation of this zone of harmony, supposes a harmonisation of the rules and values following the European model. The ENP sees itself as being refor- mist, as much from an economic point of view as from a political one. Its official watchwords are modernisation, opening of markets, strengthening of the constitutional state, of good governance and human rights.

From a practical point of view, Neighbourhood is achieved via a reinforcement of the bilateral relationship with each of the targeted countries. Action Plans, which set the priorities of short and medium term reforms, must be negotiated with each of them, on a voluntary basis. Specific Action Plans to improve democratic institutions and the human rights situation will be conceivable, just like the creation of sub-committees dedicated to human rights within the monitoring framework of Association Agreements. The Commission has even suggested the possibility of strengthened conditionalities.

The transition towards Neighbourhood is now underway, without anyone knowing yet where they stand as to the possible results of this reorganisation. The slogan of Romano Prodi, “Everything except institutions”, seems *a priori* attractive to certain countries who are satisfied with the opportunity of intensifying their relations with the EU. The Palestinian Authority, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have quickly negotiated bilateral Action Plans, made public in 2004; intermediary finance plans have been adopted pending the creation of a unique instrument. In view of past practices, the capacity of the ENP to activate processes of political reforms remains uncertain. The democratic issue of negotiation is evidently very different for each one of the countries concerned and the principle of an “à la carte” membership reduces the Union’s capacity to use pressure effectively. In addition, the question of financing the ENP and of sharing out resources between neighbour countries is still not settled. In these conditions, the incentive to change remains quite weak.

**Encouraging the Dynamics of Democracy: The Example of the Relationship Between the EU and Morocco**

The example of the relationship between the EU and Morocco, provides an opportunity to follow the development of methods used by the European Union to promote democracy in the Mediterranean. Morocco maintains an old and close relationship with the European Union; the country has been one of the first to sign a new generation Association Agreement and it is today the first beneficiary of MEDA funds. Morocco responded positively to the launch of the Neighbourhood Policy and has quickly entered into powerful dialogue with the Europeans. With regard to reforms, the Sherifian Kingdom is supposed to personify the ideal model, extolled since 1995, which brings together economic modernisation and political opening.

It is true that the wind of freedom blows across the Morocco of Mohammed VI. Symbolic and important reforms have been successfully achieved (notably the reform of the status of women) while the political climate is calming down (pluralist elections). 2005 has been an extremely rich year from this point of view: the publication of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission’s (IER) report, which looked into human rights violations during the reign of Hassan II, the detailed report on the fifty years of the Kingdom’s independence, or even the launch of the national initiative for human development, all these bear witness to a certain political excitement. Taking advantage of this particularly favourable situation, the European Union is attempting to take the lead with regard to democratic promotion in Morocco. The EU has adopted an opportunistic strategy of encouragement. It is attempting to get on top of the dynamics in progress, by taking the Palace at its word, in order to urge it along the road to reforms.

The Action Plan adopted at the end of 2004 within the Neighbourhood framework, was largely given over to issues of democracy and human rights. The Programme of national interest 2005-2006 is reserving a special fund for the promotion of democracy; the Commission hopes to dedicate a part of these funds to the implementation of IER’s recommendations. A specific Action Plan for human rights is under negotiation with the Moroccan government and a sub-committee dedicated to human rights should shortly be set up within the fra-
framework of the EU-Moroccan Association Committee. Morocco has in addition restored the zone eligible for the EIDHR, which will allow direct support to be given to civil society.

The European Union is at this moment the first external contributor towards the promotion of democracy and human rights in Morocco. The difficulties remain numerous. Inertia and dispersion are the two major obstacles to the definition of a coherent strategy. But the need also remains to test the reality of the Palace’s democratic intentions and to target European efforts in Morocco where they will be most useful.

The Moroccan example demonstrates, however, that a concerted approach is possible when circumstances are favourable. In any case, assumptions still cannot be made on the capacity of the Europeans to activate a democratic process when the partner’s authority is opposed to it.

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Let them Democratise themselves? The Common dilemmas in the Mediterranean Regarding the Processes of Democratic Deepening and Social Transformation

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We are used to observing countries along the south shore of the Mediterranean with critical eyes regarding the effective working of their democratic institutions. We know that elections take place in those countries. We know that they have parliamentary institutions. We know that a plurality of parties that operate in the respective territories exist. But, in spite of everything, we doubt that all this is not, on many occasions, more virtual than real, more nominal than effective.

And these comments often originate from the conviction that the countries on the north shore already have consolidated democracies, with full exercise of liberties and rights, with highly institutionalised representative assemblies, and with party systems that are capable of including the whole range of political options and which interaction also guarantees periodical processes of alternation in power.

In this context, the relatively recent elections in Morocco or those held in Egypt in 2005, have been useful in demonstrating the limits of democratisation processes in the region, but also their encouraging progress.

In this article, we are not trying to dig deeper into these electoral processes, neither do we want to ponder over the complications of the system of parties' evolution and the electoral chicanery that characterises the specific developments within this or that North African political regime. Instead, we want to concentrate on the aspects that both shores of the Mediterranean have in common regarding the need (undoubtedly different, but nevertheless shared) to examine in greater depth the respective situations and evolution of democracy in each region.

To this end, we will look instead at the current inadequacies of Western democracy in relation to the values it brings, the limitations carried by an exclusively regulatory conception of this democracy, and the possibilities of confluence between both shores in relation to potential in-depth processes in a perspective that recovers the transforming aspect of democracy.

Democracy in a Change of Era

From a European or Western perspective, it is probably not advisable to enter into the debate on political representation channels’ improvement, the necessity or not to modify the running of institutions of representative democracy, or to give greater or less value to experiences of social participation in such and such a place, without socially and historically contextualising the issue.

Can we seriously discuss the matters mentioned here without trying to relate them to the great changes that our societies are undergoing? If we socially decontextualise the debate on representative democracy, are we not falling into the political “autism” that presently afflicts many of the democratic institutions in Europe?

These reflections attempt to position the debate on democratic innovation and citizen participation in the wider debate of social transformation, relating current deficits of the running of representative democracy in the general framework of the change of era that we are going through and the need to look for alternatives to the serious social problems caused after more than a decade of neoliberal dominance.

Many of the parameters which encompassed the institutions of representative democracy have changed considerably. The liberal rules of the game were changing (democratising themselves) in a way that opened up more opportunities of access to sectors and social levels that were not “inscribed” in the coordinates of the game. The political institutions of liberalism based themselves on a subsidiary relationship in relation to the demands of the liberal economic order, and in that design, as we know, the possibilities of political participation were limited to those fully considered as “citizens”, that is, owners, whose income threshold allowed them to participate or not in processes of political representation, according to whether the hegemonic political powers of the moment were more or less conservative, more or less liberal.

The preoccupation with political participation was not an issue that would appear on the institutions’ agenda for debate. It was an extrastitutional matter, raised precisely by those who were specifically excluded from political institutional life.

To talk about democracy at that time was to speak of a revolutionary and contradictory desire with the prevailing institutional logic, basically because to speak of democracy was to speak of equality.

The transformation itself of the economic system was accompanied, and not
without tensions and conflicts of all types and magnitudes, by the democratising transformation of the political system. We could say that in Western Europe, and after the overwhelming popular protagonism in the outcomes of the great wars, hitherto unknown heights of political democratisation are reached and, not by chance, of social participation in the benefits of economic growth in the form of social policies from 1945 onwards. Democratisation and redistribution appear connected once again. This model, in which coincided territorial scope of the state, population subject to its sovereignty, production system of masses, economic exchange market and rules that established all kinds of relationships, from a logic of citizen participation in its resolve, acquired dimensions of a canonical and apparently undisputed model. In recent years there have been many changes regarding this matter. The main socio-economic and cultural parameters that were used as the basis for the industrial society are rapidly being left behind. And many of the analysis instruments that we had been using to understand the transformations in Europe of the liberal state to the Fordist/Keynesian welfare state, are now clearly useless. This is not the time to repeat many of those elements of change, but we are tracing some of the brushstrokes. Economic globalisation and technical change have totally modified the coordinates of industrialism. Increasingly seldom are there productive situations in which great concentrations of workers produce vast quantities of products for massive consumption at affordable prices, on the basis of a Taylorist work organization and at the expense of a notable homogeneity in the range of goods produced. This was probably only true in a few parts of the world, but in such areas the impact of the changes has been tremendous. We can no longer talk of stability, continuity, unique professional specialisation, regarding working conditions increasingly more precarious and ever-changing. Changes in work (a job that is more and more intermittent, precarious, with neither scope nor strong ties) have changed and are changing peoples’ lives considerably, affecting and destructuring their social bonds, changing the way of understanding norms of reciprocity, or of implication in matters that go beyond the mere individual. The impacts of this transformation are not small in the field of social relationships. We have been moving away from relatively stable social orders, with known scales of inequality which allowed for relatively homogenous and collective redistributive treatments, which were established moreover with notable guarantees of continuity, to situations characterised by heterogeneity, fragmentation, and with complexities only explicable from a vertiginous process of individualisation. The inequality continues to exist, but its descriptors have changed considerably. There is no predominant core, rather, a multiplicity of cores of inequality and vulnerability. The historical accumulation of risks in certain social sectors, had enabled them to develop a wide variety of collective solutions, which looked for both the capacity to make themselves heard in a political scene designed for other collectives and problems, just as they also tried to find a specific solution to problems related to collective living and working conditions. Compared with the previous social structure of great groups and important continuities, today there is a mosaic, increasingly more fragmented and fluid, of situations of poverty, wealth, failure and success. The massive arrival of immigrants has also caused significant ruptures in the traditional dynamics of social reciprocity, fragmenting and diversifying to infinity conditions of life, work, citizenship, and hampering considerably the easy articulation of solutions which carry a collective sense of belonging and strategic perspective felt spontaneously and naturally. The area itself of primary coexistence no longer presents the same appearance that it had in the industrial era. And if that produces very positive changes of feminine emancipation through training and access to the labour market, it also has an impact on the debilitation of instances of primary socialisation and transmission of common implication criteria.

This series of changes and profound transformations in the productive, social and family spheres, has undermined the fundamental bases on which the public powers of European democracies rested. The market and underlying economic power have become globalised, while representative institutions, and the power that emanates from them, to a great extent continue to be anchored to the territory. Globalisation has imposed new logics of political relationship between economic power and institutions, noticeably reducing the political ability to condition an economic activity which is presented in an increasingly "naturalised" way. And it is in this context that the problems produced by economic globalisation and the processes of individualisation are evident on a daily basis. Institutional fragmentation increases, the state losing weight towards the top (supra-statist institutions), towards the bottom (processes of decentralisation, "devolution", etc.), and sideways (with a large increase in public-private partnerships, with private management of public services, and with increasingly greater presence of non-profit organisations present on the public scene). At the same time, the hierarchical logic that has always characterised the exercise of power, is no longer useful for understanding the processes of public decision, based more and more on logics of interdependence, of capacity of influence, of relational power, and less and less on organic statute or on the exercise of formal hierarchy. It is in this new context that we have to situate the debate which is arising in Europe on the possible deficits of representative democracy. Relating changes in the political system to changes in ways of living and working. Understanding that today the political dynamic moves in the context of a deregulated and dissociated salary earner, with serious material, family, educational and healthcare instability. And this is what we are not used to doing. We discuss the health of democracy, its vitality and ability to take up popular feeling, as if democracy was an undisputed and undeniable "acquis" from any territorial or collective sphere, and accessible to anyone.
And furthermore: as if everybody un-
understood the same thing when discussing democracy. It is precisely at this point of arrival for Europe that we can find many similar points to what is apparently happening on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, although from there it is seen as a point of departure.

**Democracy?**

It is not easy to enter into the debate on democracy and its significant past, present and future, without clarifying a little what it is we are referring to. Neither is this simple considering how much has been and continues to be written on the subject. We accept that there must be some minimum rules on which to base a democratic exercise. According to the most generalised convention (Bobbio, 1990) these formal rules would be: a representative assembly, chosen by the citizenship and with regulatory capacity; non-discrimination in the citizenship condition and voting equality for adults in any condition; freedom to choose between the different candidates and parties that compete with each other with various alternatives for forming national representation; decisions made by a majority, with respect and guarantees for minorities; principle of government responsibility regarding the people’s wishes/will expressed in the assembly or in the leadership of the State also elected.

But knowing that the existence of these rules does not imply the achievement of the ends that have always inspired the struggle for the democratisation of our societies. These are, not only legal but also social and economic equality. This aspiration has been the raison d’être of democratic movements since theocratic and authoritarian principles of power were altered. The “levellers” in England or the “egaux” of Babeuf, to go back to the origins, did not conform to the representative principle as a constituent element of new regimes, rather, they tried to make egalitarian aspiration, the democratic aspirations, a reality. What has been occurring in many North African countries (as well as in several Latin American countries), is that the hopes that had been waking up the democratising processes, have not been fulfilled. Large sectors of the population do not perceive that the growing institutionalisation of democracy understood as the incorporation of electoral rules, the competition between parties and the reinforcement of parliamentary institutions, has been accompanied by a fundamental improvement in their living conditions. They have democratic rules, but they do not see that the egalitarian power, that improves living conditions, accompanies this democratising effort. Corruption continues, poverty continues, and consequently scepticism regarding the transforming power of democracy increases. So that, understandably they end up thinking that the same dynamics continue as always, only that now they have a different appearance and “apparel”.

All over the world there seems to be a growing feeling that the great change of era we are witnessing, is increasingly draining our ability to influence government action. And this is the case, in spite of our formally keeping more or less intact, many of the formal elements of our condition as citizens that live and exercise their rights in a democratic state.

With this growing disempowerment in the Western world of the ability to influence and condition decisions, or with this lack of preciseness of democracy in living conditions in developing countries, a large part of the legitimacy of a democracy that only keeps open the doors of formal and institutional rites is lost.

Hirschman (Hirschman, 1991) says that a democratic regime achieves legitimacy when its decisions emanate from a complete and open deliberation among its groups, organs and representatives, but that is increasingly less certain for citizens and increasingly more certain for entities, corporations and economic lobbies that escape from the state-market-sovereignty logic, and take advantage of their new capacities of global mobility.

Public powers are less and less capable of conditioning economic-business activity, and instead, corporations continue to have influence and put the pressure on certain institutions that do not have the same mechanisms available for balancing the game as those they used to have (Crouch, 2004). The evolution itself, of liberal-democratic regimes in the West has always kept out of the political system those social sectors that did not have the minimum vital capacities and conditions to be able to exercise their citizenship fully. This political exclusion was carried out normatively (assigning the previously mentioned income thresholds that converted the vote and political life in the work of quite a few people; manipulating electoral districts; keeping out the young, women, or those who went around the country looking for work, prohibiting the existence of certain parties or making their operation difficult,...), or by means of actions, not bothering about those who, although able to do so, do not exercise their political rights, concerned as they are about more urgent matters, such as survival, where to shelter or find work. What has been happening in recent years, after the end of what is referred to in France as the “thirty glorious” (1945-1975), is that this sector of politically excluded has not stopped growing. And thus is the situation because circumstances of social exclusion are increasing (which always entails processes of reducing the exercise of citizenship), and because there is a growing feeling of the futility of democratic-institutional exercise in this “low intensity democracy”, by increasing awareness on the limitations of the real capabilities of institutions’ government on the new scene of economic globalisation or because the political-institutional actors are increasingly enclosed in their self-sufficient universe. The reserve of legitimacy of democracy is running out, just when its apparent hegemony as a “unique” viable and acceptable government system seems greater than ever.

In this context, this series of transformations and changes to which we have been referring, have contributed to democracy today being just a word, an expression, a term that seems to explain less and less. The use and abuse of the word, its apparent unattackability, make it more redundant and less politically defining. The great international organisations, the great world powers (apparently responsible on many occa-
would be: How can we progress towards a world in which ideals of freedom and equality can be achieved satisfactorily, while also maintaining the acceptance of diversity as a structuring element in an indefectibly globalised environment? The answer continues to be: democracy. A democracy that recovers the transforming, egalitarian, and participative meaning that it had years ago. And thus overcomes the view now held in many parts of the world: utilitarian, formalist, minimalist and concealer of grave inequalities and exclusions. A democracy as an answer to the new economic, social and political challenges we are facing. Let us remember that capitalism and democracy have not always been terms that have coexisted easily. The egalitarian power of democracy has been quite ill-matched with an economic system that considers inequality as something natural that inevitably has to be lived with, since any effort in the opposite direction will be seen as distorting the optimum operational conditions of the market.

By this we do not mean that democracy and market are incompatible, rather, that they cannot coexist without tension. A tension that arises from the eminently conflictive and antagonistic character of politics that cannot break away from social division, when instead on many occasions it is a question of minimising this conflict or silencing discordant voices with an apparent universal consensus with “democracy”. There may be consensus with those who defend the political-ethical values of freedom and equality for everyone, but there will still be political conflict on the specific interpretation of those values, and there will still be destabilisation of subordinate and unequal conditions from the start (Moufle, 2005).

We have to look for new formulas of economic development, recovering government capacities that balance and lay frontiers to that which today is an expansion without visible limits of corporative power on a global scale, with growing levels of inequality and despair for many people and groups. And for this we need different things. On the one hand, we need to strengthen the existing formulas of social economics and look for new ways of creating wealth and individual and group welfare. Taking the debate of democratisation to spheres that currently appear shielded: what is understood by growth, what we understand as development, who defines costs and profits, who wins and who loses up against each apparently objective and neutral economic option. On the other hand, looking for formulas that regulate-arbitrate-tax the international economic and financial transactions that presently follow roads and routes that make their supervision extremely difficult for governments, even in the hypothetical case of them wanting to really exercise that control.

Furthermore, exploring and promoting forms of social organisation that favour the reconstruction of ties, the coordination of collective senses of belonging respectful of individual autonomy. In this sense, the strengthening of rapprochement and community experiences in the processes of formulation and implementation of public policies, is something undoubtedly to follow and consolidate. Likewise, the organisation of frameworks and platforms that facilitate the linking together of local experimentation frameworks, enabling crossed fertilisations and reflections on the practices carried out in different places. Recovering the political and transforming sense of many social experiences that today seem merely “curious” or resistant to dominant individualisation. Understanding that there is a lot of “politics” in what could apparently simply be defined as “new social dynamics”.

From a more strictly political point of view, the first thing is to understand that politics does not end within institutions. And the second thing is that politics means ability to find a solution to collective problems. Therefore, it seems important to make progress in new forms of group participation and democratic innovation that do not separate from the specific change in the living conditions of people. There is little sense in continuing to speak about participative democracy, new forms of political participation, if we confine ourselves to working in the narrow institutional field, or on how we improve the channels of relation-inter-

Social Transformation

There is no reason why democracy should be considered as an end in itself. That which is at stake, that which could be the question to ask oneself...
action between political-representative institutions and society. Especially when these institutions are based on a principle that finds every day new verifications of its non-fulfilment. The principle according to which all citizens have the same conditions of access to any form of legally established political expression, when on the contrary, these conditions of access are socially determined and differentially distributed. To advance towards the universalisation of capacity and tendency to act and think politically we must universalise the real means that allow access to that historical preciseness of exercise of citizenship that we have called democracy (Wacquant, 2005).

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The Euro-Mediterranean Non-discourse on Political Participation of “Mediterranean immigrants” in the EU

As the European Union declared, 2005 was the “Year of the Mediterranean”, which also coincided with the tenth Anniversary of the Barcelona Process. Now it is time to take stock and make plans for the future. Our argument is that the Euro-Mediterranean framework has been characterised by an absence of discourse regarding the political participation of foreign residents. An absence which, in our opinion, is due to the unidirectionality of the process, which only looks towards the Mediterranean South – with economic aid for economic, political and social development of the region – without considering that these countries are present in the EU through residents originating from the South. Mediterranean immigrants of the EU are largely forgotten within the process. Apart from Turkey, which as we know, already has the status of candidate country for access to the EU, according to data from the Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) the reality fluctuates between 5,192,537 immigrants counted through statistics in the countries of origin and 3,133,610 according to sources of destination countries. According to data collected by the annual Report on asylum and migration (2001) in 2001, five million people originating from southern Mediterranean countries, members of the partnership, were living legally in European territory.

In accordance with the accepted definition in the field of political science, we understand as political participation a group of participation activities and channels, such as the right to vote, the right to protest and freedom of association, the right to take part to associations, interest groups or immigration forums, among others, that enable full development of the individual within society and whereby he or she can actively or passively participate in public affairs and various processes of political decision.

Beyond this definition, political participation, in our own context, can be understood from two different focal points. The first focuses on the presence of immigrants’ political participation in EU discourse; and the second focuses on seeing immigrants present in the construction of the Barcelona Process through participation channels of civil society.

In this article we are only dealing with the former, since available information on the second focal point is limited. As we already know, at present, the main channel for participation of civil society at a Euro-Mediterranean level is the Non-Governmental Platform Euro-Med, mediated by associations and networks of social actors from both shores of the Mediterranean.

Just as the European Commission defines in its Communication on immigration, integration and employment (2003), we start from the premise that political participation forms part of the integration process of nationals from third countries in the hosting society and that this is a key element for their recognition and equality with nationals from member States.1

We will take a look at documents during this period, paying special attention to the outcome of the first decade of the Barcelona Process and the proposals adopted for the coming years. Our objective is to identify the initiatives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in relation to the guarantee of political participation of foreign residents in the EU.

Firstly, we will review the documents issued in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Process with regard to social integration of immigrants and their rights in the hosting societies. We will deal with the idea of social integration of immigrants in a wide sense, in which political rights and political participation of foreign residents can be found. In many cases, social integration is linked with acknowledgement of political rights and political participation of immigrants. Secondly, we will analyse the main EU documents on political participation of resident immigrants as a complement to the works appearing in the first section. Finally, we will take stock of the situation and set out certain proposals for the future.

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1 The text says “integration must be understood as a bidirectional process based on corresponding mutual rights and obligations of legal citizens from third-countries and from the accepting society, that allows full participation of immigrants” (italics added).
The Euro-Mediterranean Process, Immigration and Political Participation

The contribution of documents issued in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership regarding political participation of foreign residents in the EU is practically non-existent. Our first argument is that discourse on political rights of immigrants is completely ignored within the Euro-Mediterranean Process. A quick reading of the key documents of the Barcelona Process shows us that the efforts of the partnership are aimed at economically promoting the Southern Mediterranean region, leaving aside other matters of particular importance such as the social and political dimension of immigrants originating from the Southern Mediterranean region who live legally in the EU. The fact that the Barcelona Process is being carried out without considering the integration of foreign residents in the EU who come from the South of the Mediterranean (the Mediterranean immigrants) is very significant. For the first 10 years of the Partnership, the question of the right to vote and political participation has not formed part of the political agenda of the process. Not even in terms of declarations and speeches, as it occurs with so many other matters within the process. Nevertheless, we will attempt to briefly go through the documents which have established the start of the process and those evaluating it at the same time of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Conference.

In the Barcelona Declaration, on November 27th and 28th, 1995, we can only see a weak reference, which acknowledges that immigrants play an important role, through relations between the society of origin and the hosting society. The States of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – and among them, the EU countries – “Are committed to guarantee the protection of all rights that current legislation acknowledges for emigrants living legally in their respective territories” (page 9). Thus, we can see that the rights of immigrants are left to the discretion of States, without a common focus and even less Regional, which started, as we know, at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Valencia, in April 2002 (Zapata-Barrero: 2006). So, the Barcelona Declaration does not show any explicit commitment to the general recognition of a combination of rights; it has no will to transform reality. We cannot find any reference to member States and their existing legislation, nor to the incoherence in their treatment of Mediterranean immigrants. All the demands for change are directed at South Mediterranean countries, without also dealing with the fact that in our European democracies the Barcelona Process could promote changes, especially as regards to the treatment given to Mediterranean immigrants and the lack of clear political rights. The Barcelona Process, as a deconstruction process, according to the focus proposed by P. Balta (2005), should also affect EU countries on this matter.

The rights of immigrants are mentioned by the European Commissioner of External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, in February 2005. During her appearance before the European Parliament, she stated that one of the objectives for the new stage of the Euro-Mediterranean process is to bring it closer to citizens. Beyond cooperation between governments, the Commission will explain, in the Communication on proposals for the future of the European Partnership, that involvement of society is necessary for improving the results in issues such as education, employment, gender equality, democracy, freedom to circulate and the rights of immigrants. Further on in this aspect, the Commissioner concludes that one of the four priorities for the coming months is centred on Immigration and Social Integration, and more specifically, on the integration of immigrants. This same stance is defended by Benita Ferrero-Waldner in her speech before the Political Committee of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (January 25th, 2005).

The Commission’s Communication on the Tenth Anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Association, on April 12th, 2005, sets out the priorities of the working programme for the next 5 years. The document shows the particular importance of social integration of immigrants coming from members of the South Mediterranean and states that some Association Agreements have been useful for making progress in this direction and for guaranteeing equal treatment (Section 2.4.). A Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs is planned for 2007, with the participation of local authorities, for the study of management of migratory flow and social integration. This would be a good opportunity for introducing the debate on political participation of residents from third-countries as an essential instrument for their integration.

The conclusions of the VII Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of External Affairs (May 30th–31st, 2005), prior to the Barcelona Summit held at the end of November 2005, state that efforts need to be concentrated on a group of activities that require a particular boost, as is the case of immigration and social integration of immigrants (Part three: Directions for the future). In the same way as the previously mentioned documents, they insist on the usefulness of Association Agreements in this area.

The Declaration of the Presidency of the Euro-Mediterranean Summit Barcelona+10 held in Barcelona (November 27th and 28th, 2005), and the heads of State and government, state their wish to create an area of mutual cooperation for immigration and social integration – together with justice and security – (section 8) and strengthen mutual management of legal migratory flow in the interests of both shores, guaranteeing the rights of immigrants. Bilateral relations between Southern Mediterranean countries and the EU are also a good source of information for finding out whether there is Euro-Mediterranean discourse on the political participation of immigrants. Some of the key documents refer to the Association Agreements – the basis of bilateral relations – as a framework for dealing with immigrants’ rights, as well as their social integration in the hosting country. Here a similar point is made: absence of discourse on political participation and political rights of Mediterranean immigrants living in the EU. Most of the Association Agreements dedicate a specific section – Social and cultural cooperation – to the situation of nationals from South Mediterranean countries living in the EU. In these sections, equal treatment, non-discrimination for reasons of nationality and social integration are defended as orien-
tating principles. But without any form of preciseness. We will now look at how the EU itself approaches the subject of political rights.

**Brief Overview of EU Discourses**

The situation of Euro-Mediterranean non-discourse regarding political participation rights of Mediterranean immigrants, obliges us to look more closely at the EU. This is not the place for presenting a comprehensive study of EU speeches but it is appropriate to pay attention to the important steps that have meant an innovation in the construction process of community discourse up to 2005 precisely. The commitment of the EU to the recognition of foreign residents’ rights (we are no longer referring solely to Mediterranean immigrants) in relation to political participation, is clearly evident through the concept of Civic Citizenship. The Communication on a community migration policy (2000), defines Civic Citizenship as “the collection of basic rights and obligations that immigrants progressively acquire over a period of several years, in such a way that they receive the same treatment as citizens of their accepting State, even though they have not been naturalised”. In this same Communication, the Commission states – as is maintained thereafter in all community documents – that integration is a bidirectional process that affects both the hosting society as well as the immigrants, and that it entails the recognition of immigrants rights along with their acceptance of responsibilities. The Communication states that the concession of civic and political rights to resident migrants in the long term promotes integration. The European Social and Economic Committee states it likewise in its report on the Commission’s text. What stands out here is the importance of the concession of the right to vote (Section 4.4.6), and even the concession of European citizenship to long-term residents (Section 4.4.7).

The Communication on immigration, integration and employment (2003) takes up the need for a holistic approach to the integration process, previously set out in previous communications [COM (2000) 757 and COM (2001) 387]. This approach is of particular interest when one considers the political participation of foreign residents because it means “applying a holistic approach that takes into account not only social and economic aspects of integration but also the problems related to cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, participation and political rights” (page 20). Out of all the integration global policies that the Commission is proposing, we are interested in that which refers to the need to facilitate political participation of foreign residents.

“Another important element of this concept [Civic Citizenship] is facilitating political participation. Various member States concede the right of local vote to all foreign residents under certain conditions. From the point of view of integration, it is obvious that the right of local vote should not be a result of nationality but of permanent residence. The Commission considers that, vis-à-vis the integration process, it would be valuable to concede political rights to long-term immigrant residents and the Treaty should constitute the basis for this” (page 25).

In this sense, several authors have defended civic citizenship as a project of citizenship open to immigrants (J. de Lucas, 2005) or as the starting point for the concession of European citizenship and as an instrument that acknowledges the immigrant as a political subject (Zapata-Barrero: 2005). The allusion to the concession of the right to vote at a local level forces us to go back in time and look closely at another key document that we must consider when we discuss political participation. It is the Agreement on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at a Local Level (1992), which was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1992 and came into effect in 1997. This Agreement has three main principles: i) to guarantee freedom of expression, meeting and association (Chapter A); ii) to facilitate the creation or, in the case that they already exist, the participation of immigrant residents in consultative bodies of representation at a local level (Chapter B); and iii) to concede the right to vote in local elections to those people who have lived permanently in a municipality for 5 years prior to the elections (Chapter C).

More tentatively, the Council defends a similar stance in the Basic Common Principles for the policy of integration of immigrants in the EU. These principles aim to be a simple, non-binding guide to “contributing to the formulation of integration policies by member States”. In this article, we are interested in principle 9 which states that “The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at a local level, favours their integration”. Likewise, the Council’s text explains that:

“Allowing immigrants to have a voice in the formulation of policies that affect them directly can lead to a more useful policy for immigrants that increases their sense of belonging. Whenever possible, immigrants must participate in all aspects of the democratic process.” (page. 23).

In this manner, the Council defends, on the one hand, the need for a “structured dialogue” between immigrant groups and governments (the forums that the Council of Europe’s Agreement proposed) as an instrument for immigrant participation and mutual understanding. On the other hand, and with greater discretion, it puts forward that, “if possible” it would be advisable to have participation in elections, concede the right to vote and the affiliation to political parties. However, one of the most committed documents is the Report on immigration, integration and the role of organised civil society, on the own initiative of the European Social and Economic Committee. This report states that non-concession of the right to vote to long-term resident nationals from third-countries implies that “in a certain way, [the immigrant] does not form part of this society, which hampers any approach towards social integration”. Therefore, it states that the comparison of rights and social integration cannot be approached without including the right to vote to permanent residents.

After this brief review, we can see that, as opposed to the Euro-Mediterranean process, the EU is in the process of constructing discourse (discourse-buil-
The focus of this discourse does this through proposing a civic citizenship, understood as a legal category that guarantees a collection of rights to nationals from third-countries who live permanently in the EU, equivalent to those that European citizens already have. Now we will reflect on three of the Basic Common Principles approved during 2005 that contribute to the discourse-building of the EU with regard to our topic of interest.

Firstly, the Commission’s Communication on the Common Programme for Integration. Framework for the integration of third-country nationals in the EU (2005). The text by the Commission proposes action measures on a national and community scale in relation to each of the Basic Common Principles approved by the Council. In the case of principle 9, which we referred to earlier on, the Commission proposes:

- On a national scale: to promote immigrants’ active citizenship, to strengthen immigrants’ participation in the democratic process, to reduce the obstacles in exercising the right to vote (for example, bureaucratic procedures or administrative taxes), to facilitate immigrant participation in general organisations or to create immigrants’ associations to advise those who have recently arrived.
- On a community scale: the creation of associations for immigrants representing their interests at an EU level or the development of the concept of civic citizenship (we recall the Communication of 2000) “as a means for promoting integration of third-country nationals, including necessary rights and duties for giving immigrants a sense of participation in society”.

Secondly, the Communication on the European Fund for Integration, establishes specific measures for implementing the Basic Common Principles proposed by the Council. Some of the points worth emphasising are that the European Fund for integration assumes as one of its objectives, to increase civic and political participation of third-country nationals [1.3. Objectives of the Fund, 3 (basic common principle nº 7)] or the reference to the need for a greater participation of immigrants in the European Social Forum.

Thirdly, the IV Report of the European Parliament on Union Citizenship (A6-0411/2005) defends the concession of the right to vote to resident third-country nationals. The report (taken from self-initiative) dedicates several sections to demanding greater inclusion in the formation process of political decisions of third-country nationals living in the Union (letter Q), calls for the concession of the right to vote in municipal elections (letter R and Sections 11 and 19), champions the acknowledgement of political rights of Union residents without any type of discrimination linked to their nationality of origin (Section 5), states that the concession of rights to extra-community residents facilitates their integration (Section 6) and bids for connecting citizenship with residency, overcoming the citizenship-nationality tie (Section 8).

In the framework of discourse-building regarding the political participation of immigrants, the community discourse of 2005 is characterised by a greater preciseness of the measures aimed at guaranteeing the political rights of immigrants and the need to recognise the category of citizen for third-country nationals who live permanently in the EU.

In the next phase, discourse-building should be characterised by a serious commitment of the Council, materialised in a directive that brings together all these aspects, connecting member States and summarising the proposals presented by the different community texts mentioned in this section.

Outcome/Balance Sheet and Proposals for the Future

The outcome of the Euro-Mediterranean discourse on political participation of immigrants is very clear: we are in a non-discourse situation. The documents analysed also confirm another parallel argument: The unidirectionality of the process. The initiatives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership seem to be solely directed towards South Mediterranean countries, without considering that their presence is increasingly wider on the European continent through nationals from these countries living legally in the EU. Without a change in the focus, and also demands for change to the consolidated democracies of the EU, it will be difficult to talk about a Euro-Mediterranean Region.

In relation to EU discourse, it is clear that since 2000 – especially since the Commission’s Communication on a community migration policy in which it presents the concept of Civic Citizenship – the process we refer to as discourse-building on political participation of foreign residents, has started. Since 2000, and within the framework of Tampere, there has been an increase in the community institutions’ initiatives aimed at adopting appropriate measures for social integration of long-term residents and at progressively equaling their rights with those of nationals from EU countries, including certain political rights. It is evident that the issue is being introduced onto the EU agenda.

The outcome of political participation of foreign residents in the EU can be set out in two ways. On the one hand, analysing it from the relationship between the Euro-Mediterranean Process and the process of European construction. In this sense, the progress made in terms of immigrants’ political rights in the community sphere could be applied to the Euro-Mediterranean Process.

However, there is another possibility: to present the Euro-Mediterranean Process as an opportunity for innovation and claim towards EU consolidated democracies holding 5 million Mediterranean immigrants without political rights. Regarding the future, we recommend adopting the second interpretation, and taking advantage of the continuity that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has experienced during 2005 in order to get immigrants’ political rights in their corresponding position on the political

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2 The Tampere Programme, adopted in October 1999 by the heads of State and Government in the heart of the EU Council, establishes the creation of an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. One of the pillars of this Area is the creation of a common policy of asylum and immigration.
agenda of both the Euro-Mediterranean and the EU agenda.
The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs planned for 2007, announced by the Commission, would be an ideal occasion for introducing all these issues into the debate and for taking political participation of permanent residents of immigrant origins seriously. Without full participation of peoples within the public life of the society in which these residents live and work, it is not possible to talk about integration, let alone the feeling of belonging to a community. We are more in the terrain of political wills than of democratic evidence.

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This has been a year in which the Mediterranean agenda has prevailed in Spanish external activities. In light of the various meetings and agreements that have taken place, we could speak of the “Year of the Mediterranean”, to coin the slogan that has been during this same period in European actions. The Spanish Government completed this process at the end of 2005 with two important meetings for the region: the meeting in Palma de Mallorca of the High-Level Group for the Alliance of Civilisations and the Euro-Mediterranean Summit in Barcelona. Both events involved the most important European and international projects for Spain and in which Spain has played a leading role, both in terms of setting them up and promoting them.

The importance of the meeting of the High-Level Group for the Alliance of Civilisations (26/27 November in Palma de Mallorca) lies in its constitution. Firstly, it involves normalising the project that Spain submitted in 2004 under the United Nations General Assembly, as well as allowing the project to materialise by giving a definitive impetus to the work that should be completed at the end of 2006 with the submission of the corresponding report to the United Nations. In this regard, the symbolism that this first meeting represents for Spain is especially important and it turns it, alongside Turkey, into the driving force behind the East-West dialogue in the framework of the international community. Mention should also be made of the Mediterranean’s leadership of the initiative on the part of Spain and Turkey, at a time when recent events give the Mediterranean a prominent place in these talks.

At this point, we should highlight one of the most important meetings between Spain and the Arab world. Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero’s participation in the Arab League Summit in Algiers at the start of the year (22nd March 2005) served to present the proposal as part of relations between the Islamic world and the West.

Although it was to be the last of this year’s meetings, we should stress the importance of the first Euro-Mediterranean Summit in Barcelona, to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process. Under the UK’s presidency of the EU, the Spanish and British Governments cooperated on organising the Summit, which saw an extraordinary participation from 35 Heads of State or Government, and on negotiating the contents. It is worth highlighting the fact that almost all the Heads of State or Government of the European member countries attended, except Luxembourg.

This shows a clear European interest and involvement in the development of the Euro-Mediterranean project that started in Barcelona in 1995, renewing Europe’s climate of optimism that reigned ten years ago, in spite of all the problems that have plagued the Mediterranean, and the doubts that have been harboured internally since the French and Dutch referenda paralysed the Constitution project. This participation is all the more remarkable if we consider the joining of new countries in the Euro-Mediterranean project since the EU enlargement process. However, as for the partner countries on the southern side, only Turkey and the Palestine Authority were represented at the highest levels. Beyond the political significance of the Summit and its level of participation, the results provided the Barcelona project with definition and operational capacity, two aspects intrinsically linked to Spain’s will to position and promote the Mediterranean agenda in Europe. We should also refer to the approval of the Five-year Plan of Action, which adds migration and the approval of the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism to the traditional areas of cooperation. Both of these aspects are sensitive ones from Spain’s point of view. Apart from these important developments, fresh impetus was given to pre-eminent items on the agenda such as the key role given to governance aspects to promote development and modernisation in the southern countries, as well as education, promotion of the role of women and employment, which are important to develop and improve the social and economic conditions in these countries.

If we look at the situation from the Spanish point of view, the Summit has probably marked out one of the most interesting challenges that external action in the Mediterranean will have to fight in the next stage: Spain’s leadership in the Euro-Mediterranean policy and commitments with the Plan of Action. This involves giving impetus to priority issues for Spain, such as migration. Secondly, the development and complementation of this Euro-Mediterranean policy with the implementation of the Neighbourhood Policy and its instruments, with a clear European dimension in terms of its projection to the East and South, and to which Spain is firmly committed. Finally, the maintenance of a privileged relationship that boosts relations between Spain and the Maghreb.
Although on the multilateral plane the Spanish external agenda started from these premises, the field of bilateral relations has also played an important part in meetings of extreme political significance. As part of priority relations with the Maghreb, this year the meetings with Algeria and Morocco have stood out.

The Hispano-Algerian High-Level Meeting (HLM) was held in Madrid on 24th February 2005, with the participation of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, as part of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation in force between the two countries. This showed explicitly the high level of political understanding that exists between the two countries and gave fresh impetus to economic relations. As Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero pointed out, “Algeria and Spain have a political association and are in a position to develop an intense economic relationship”. In accordance with highly important relations in the field of energy, which include the new Medgaz project, the aim is to make progress on extending business cooperation and Spanish investment in Algeria, with far-reaching prospects and considerable public financial support from Spain. The collaboration in the fight against terrorism was also a much-discussed issue at the HLM, as was Hispano-Algerian coordination on major issues on the international agenda, such as the conflicts in the Middle East, Iraq and the Sahara.

The relationship with Morocco has been marked by two major issues this year, highlighted by very important events: with respect to the control of migratory flows, mainly as a result of the events in Ceuta and Melilla during the Autumn; and with regard to the Sahara, as a result of the events in El Aaiún.

Following a considerable drop in illegal immigration during the first half of the year, in September we witnessed the first episodes of a constant avalanche-like migration flow. Since the events in Ceuta and Melilla, it is clear how the regulation of migratory flows between Spain and Morocco requires coordination between both countries, in relation to the joint reception of sub-Saharan immigrants. This situation was part of the focus of the Hispano-Moroccan High-Level Meeting, held in Seville-Cordoba on 29th September, with the participation of Prime Minister Driss Jettou and a broad representation of Moroccan ministers. The meeting involved a detailed review of the relations between the two countries, both in terms of international and regional political coordination and intense economic, cultural and cooperation relations.

As regards international political coordination, the Hispano-Moroccan agreement was fulfilled with a view to the agenda to be promoted for the Euro-Mediterranean Summit in Barcelona, with the inclusion of two new paragraphs on emigration and the fight against terrorism. Impetus was also given to coordination regarding regional issues, such as the 5+5 dialogue, Maghreb integration, including progress in the solution of the Sahara conflict, the Alliance of Civilisations under the UN and the conflicts in the Middle East and Iraq.

In the field of bilateral relations, a great many specific agreements were reached in different areas, especially in terms of cultural relations and cooperation (future Hispano-Moroccan university, preparation of the Year of Morocco in Spain), as well as extremely significant economic initiatives. Along these lines, we should mention the continuation of financial cooperation programs through the Development Aid Fund loans and the program to convert debt into public investments, as well as the participation of Spanish companies in the modernisation and development of various Moroccan economic sectors, such as telecommunications, the industrial sector, food and agriculture, etc. The meeting of Hispano-Moroccan directors that was held in Seville in November was a faithful representation of the economic exchange situation that turns Morocco into Spain’s fourth most important non-European market, with a considerable growth trend.

Moreover, migration is currently marked by the interest shown by both Governments in improving the conditions of the enormous Moroccan community that has already settled in Spain. Over and above important issues such as bilateral relations with these priority countries and with the other Mediterranean countries and the highly active participation in the Barcelona process during the “Year of the Mediterranean”, Spanish activities have been marked by Spain’s ongoing interest in solving conflicts in the area. In particular, the Middle East Peace Process and the consequences that the ongoing Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have had on the region have taken up a considerable part of the ability to act and Spain’s persuasion to improve the situation in the region. To this effect, Spain’s action has been targeted at participating positively and actively in setting up a joint European stance as regards these matters, in the context of the broadest international cooperation. Thus, a vast effort has been made to boost and put these actions into practice, which opens a new chapter in Spanish foreign policy, although intrinsically linked to the Mediterranean policy, by encouraging and collaborating on the different initiatives underway in the search for better opportunities for peace and stability in the Middle East conflicts and in the region as a whole.
The British Presidency of the European Union and the Mediterranean in 2005

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At the end of June 2005, Britain took over the presidency of the European Union for the last six months of the year. The European political atmosphere was already morose – France and Netherlands had both organised referenda on the proposed European constitution which the populations of both countries had rejected, thus effectively killing the constitution off, at least as proposed. Tensions were already rising over the start of Accession talks with Turkey in October 2005, with France and Austria, in particular, voicing reservations about the whole project. And looming in the distance was the problem of the European budget for the period from 2007-to-2013, in the wake of the collapse of Luxembourg’s attempt to settle the matter earlier in the year.

The new presidency opened well with a stirring speech from the British premier, Tony Blair, to the European parliament. He called on Europe to actively accept the embrace of globalisation and reconnect with its citizens, promising that the British presidency would itself actively engage with the European project. The only real achievement, however, was agreement, at the end of the presidency, over the 2007-to-2013 indicative budget; the Financial Perspective. Britain’s rebate was reduced by €10.5 billion, rather than the €8 billion first proposed by London, and the budget itself was set at 1.045 per cent of Europe’s GNP, rather than the original British proposal of 1.03 per cent – the Commission had sought 1.24 per cent! Britain’s contributions to the budget, in short, will rise by 63 per cent but France’s victory over the rebate has cost it a 116 per cent increase in its contributions!

In short, as is usually the case with British engagement with Europe, the publicity glitter turned out to be far more impressive than the substance itself. Despite the new Strategy for Africa and the Consensus on Development, or the successful negotiation of the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective, the presidency has turned out to be long on rhetoric and short on achievement. This has proved to be particularly the case as far as the Mediterranean is concerned, where Britain had to pilot the 2005 Barcelona ten-year review conference in November at a particularly difficult moment for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, just over a month after the crisis over Turkey’s planned accession to the Union. Although the increased Financial Perspectives might imply an increase in funding for the Partnership, from 2007 onwards it will be melded with the new European Neighbourhood instrument and its future is unclear (The funding available over the Financial Perspectives period of 2007-to-2013 will be €14.929 billion but will have to cover the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership States and ten others in the East and the Caucasus [Smith K.: 2005]).

British Attitudes towards Mediterranean Policy

Quite apart from the British management of the presidency – and by September 2005, the complaints in Europe about British lack of interest, administrative incompetence, and unrealistic ambitions were audible even in London (A. Browne and C. Bremner: 2005) – Britain has long manifested a sense of remoteness about Europe’s Mediterranean project. In part this stems from the growing Euro-scepticism that has increasingly pervaded the country since Mrs Thatcher’s notorious Bruges speech in September 1988. Euroscepticism, however, is not found only on the rightwing of politics but has also been reflected inside the ruling Labour Party ever since 1997 when it came to power.

Although Mr Blair put himself forward as the politician to bring Britain back into the leadership of Europe, alongside Germany and France, his apparent Euro-enthusiasm has always been hampered by the scepticism of the chancellor-of-the-exchequer and rival for leadership, Gordon Brown. Mr Brown was particularly sceptical over the single European currency, the euro, and invented his famous five tests to avoid British membership of it. Mr Blair has never challenged this view despite his occasional attempts to popularise the single European currency.

In any case, he himself has always been drawn towards a closer alliance across the Atlantic, although he tried to sweeten the implicit rejection of Europe by claiming that he wished to be a bridge between the world’s two great economic powers. It was a contradiction which reached its height in 2003 when Britain was instrumental in splitting Europe over the issue of Iraq. Even though most Britons did not support government policy, more atavistic sentiments did resent German and French attitudes over the issue, looking towards the pro-
American sentiments of rightwing governments in Europe and of the governments of the new Accession countries instead.

Furthermore, as far as the Mediterranean itself is concerned, there has always been ambivalence over the Union’s policy. Over a decade ago, it was British resistance at the Edinburgh summit in 1992 which restricted the Delors II financial package for the 1992-1999 period to 1.24 per cent of European GNP. This later ensured, again with British support, that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership itself was only funded at €4.85 billion under the MEDA-1 programme, despite the Commission’s desire for more generous financial support. In addition, there has also been a feeling in professional diplomatic circles that the Partnership was a “good idea” but uncertainty as to whether “its time had come”, as one senior Foreign Office official once remarked.

The British attitude is, perhaps, not uncommon amongst the more northerly members of the Union. Indeed, despite its long colonial association with the Mediterranean and its continuing presence in Gibraltar and Cyprus, Britons have progressively marginalised the region in their strategic calculations, looking instead westwards. It is only very recently that this attitude has begun to change, as migrants from the Mediterranean region begin to make their mark against the migrant majority from the Caribbean and South Asia and as terrorism has risen up the political agenda. Otherwise only commerce had seemed to be of interest although as terrorism has risen up the political agenda. Otherwise only commerce had seemed to be of interest although as terrorism has risen up the political agenda.

**Mediterranean Initiatives**

It is against this background that the role of the British presidency in the Mediterranean should be seen. Interestingly enough, unlike the previous British presidency where its Mediterranean initiatives were marked by efficiency and commitment, as outlined above, on this occasion the Blair government came in for considerable criticism over its commitment and organisational skills. The fault appears to lie in Downing Street, not at the Foreign and Commonwealth office, where Ambassador Frances Guy was highly effective in handling the diplomatic dimension and an assiduous participant in conferences and events about the region, attending the EuroMeSCo conference in Rabat in May 2005 and organising a presidency seminar in London at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in September.

Nonetheless, the British presidency did undertake some important initiatives affecting the Mediterranean. It piloted the difficult initiation of Accession negotiations with Turkey, alongside similar negotiations with Croatia. It also opened stabilisation and association agreement negotiations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro, as well as ensuring that Macedonia was granted candidate status. It also took the lead in negotiations resulting in control of illegal migration and migration flows.

The presidency also oversaw the provision of a European mission (the EU Border Assistance Mission) to monitor the Rafah crossing-point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt in the wake of the unilateral Israeli withdrawal there in August. It also ensured support to the Palestinian Authority with a Commission aid package worth €280 million. In Iraq, the presidency promoted EU support for the referendum and December elections, together with training provision for the new security forces and, in Iran, the presidency oversaw the activities of the troika negotiating over Iranian plans for nuclear power.

Other initiatives, such as the new EU-African strategy decided at Gleneagles in July 2005, may also have a marginal significance for the Mediterranean. They also include the new terrorism strategy promoted by London and proposed measures to control smuggling – of both people and drugs. The presidency also proposed discussions with North African states on these issues and on terrorism for 2006 (FCO: 2006).

**The November Conference**

The major initiative on the Mediterranean was, of course the first-ever Euro-Med Summit, held in Barcelona on 27th-28th November 2005. Despite the gloss placed on the event in the official report (FCO: 2006), it was also the presidency event which caused the greatest disappointment amongst those involved. The first disappointment was the question of attendance. In place of the full complement of the heads of state from the twenty-five European Union states and the ten Mediterranean Partner states, many were missing, particularly from the South Mediterranean. They included the presidents of Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, as well as the kings of Morocco and Jordan. In fact, given the absence of Israeli premier Ariel Sharon, the South was represented by only two leaders from Palestine and Turkey! Spain, the host country, was displeased, blaming the presidency for the poor showing.

The substance of the summit was described as “lacklustre” and the atmosphere as “fractious” after lengthy discussions and disagreements over one of the primary items on the agenda, a proposed agreement which the presidency had proposed as part of a joint action against terrorism. The final document was only agreed after a dispute over terrorism and national liberation was resolved by omitting all reference to both issues – the Arab world had insisted on a distinction between the two whilst European states insisted that national liberation could never be used as a justification for terrorism. There was a similar dispute over the presidency’s proposed “Common Vision” – a way forward towards Middle East peace and greater commitment to democracy and economic reform – because of differences over the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

Southern resentment over the Union’s concept of negative conditioning as enshrined inside the Association Agreements broke out when the Algerian foreign minister objected to the linkage between aid and reform. Nonetheless, the delegates were able to finally agree on the modified anti-terrorism code and on a five-year work programme which would extend the partnership into the fields of collective security and illegal migration. There was, however, considerable irritation that a lack of proper
preparation had meant that the conference, although reaffirming the principles of the Barcelona Declaration, had neither really addressed the ways in which the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership had fallen short of its goals nor been able to agree on an effective project for the future. It was hardly an auspicious end to a presidency premised on Britain’s promised return to centre-stage on the European arena!

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In order to find out the opinions held by the Euro-Mediterranean Association and the involvement of civil society in it, in 2005 the IEMed launched the Delphi survey entitled "Ten years of the Barcelona Process: The civil society’s views," to more than 2000 persons with knowledge about the region and the Euro-Mediterranean process. Bearing in mind the huge range of organisations and people who can claim they have participated in the Process over the past ten years (from a functional point of view) the assessment, according to a large number of people, is critical, but leaves room for optimism.

A Mobilization Exercise

As the following graph shows, the majority of the responses are from people belonging to civil society, followed by universities and research institutes. The least represented sectors are those that, judging by the responses, have been insufficiently involved in the Barcelona Process: companies and trade unions. However, an analysis of responses by sector only reveals a more critical stance held by these two sectors towards the Process than the others. Elsewhere, there are no substantial differences. One of the aims of the Survey was to produce an accurate representation of the countries in the south of the Mediterranean. Therefore, a special effort was made and the results were quite positive, since in spite of there being fewer countries in this group, overall they represent more than 40% of the final responses.

Apart from the quantitative results, we must also highlight the considerable volume of textual responses received. The people questioned did not only give their opinion through closed, quantifiable responses, the majority also added their own written comments. This sets the survey apart from others and allows it to be used as a tool to mobilise opinion, since in most surveys the number of people who add their own comments is minimal.

Ten years of the Process: Critical Optimism

Ten years on since Barcelona, the impression about the results of this initiative, original in its approach and unique in its conception, is somewhat critical. On a scale of 1 (= very negative) to 10 (= very positive), the participants give the Barcelona Process a positive, although very critical, rating, with an average score of 5.6. The homogeneity between the responses from the south of the Mediterranean and from the northern shore is worthy of mention.
As regards the question, What went wrong?, there is a first impression that relates to the level of involvement of Mediterranean society in the project. Although the survey was targeted at a majority who knew about and were involved to a certain degree in the Euro-Mediterranean project, this did not prevent them from being only moderately satisfied with the level of knowledge about the process: just over 5.4. In any case, visibility of the Euro-Mediterranean project in society, with a score of 3.6, is considered to be one of the subjects yet to be resolved. This situation will take on special significance in the immediate future due to the prospects of a new Neighbourhood Policy which may result in a dilution of the Partnership’s role in more global strategies. The project appropriation effort involves participation from critical agents such as the media. In this regard, the survey includes an interesting revelation, i.e. that these civil society agents are those who, judging by the responses, have been less involved in the process: only 10% think that this has been sufficient.

A second point refers to the project’s political dimension. The need to provide the projects with political efficiency and solutions in the field of security is highlighted in the results obtained. Although none of the results in the three agendas, i.e. political, economic and social, have been analysed in depth, the score given to the aim of setting up a climate of peace and stability is certainly the lowest (less than 4 out of 10). Of course, the dramatic situations due to conflicts in this region and the irruption of global projects such as the G-8, approached from outside the Euro-Mediterranean context, have probably been the case of this deficiency in terms of opinion.

However, the main causes of the failure to achieve the Process objectives include the deadlock in the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis, the slow implementation of reforms that should be introduced in countries on the southern shore, and the fact that, in the opinion of those polled, the Barcelona Process has not been sufficiently decisive so far in terms of democratic reforms or contribution to peace. On the other side of the coin, the perception of another project, Europe preoccupied by another geographic area, i.e. the East, stands out. Almost 45% of those polled think that this may have resulted in a lack of interest towards the Mediterranean region. We must ask how a project such as the Euro-Mediterranean one, designed precisely to balance the opening up of the EU to the East, can have converged with this. Of course, paradoxically this assessment may continue in the medium-term within the European project. Likewise, new strategies regarding its neighbouring countries to the East and South (neighbourhood policies) clash with the internal incompatibilities of its own project due to recent debates about the EU constitution or financial issues.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the shortcomings, agents and instruments aside, involved in the implementation of the process: almost half of the responses refer to the excessive opacity and complexity of mechanisms and work methods. This is an interesting response if we bear in mind that critical issues such as financial aid are considered to be much less problematic. In this regard, we should point out an example that reveals the need for mechanisms. In the section on the assessment of EuRoMeSCo proposals, two responses stand out: more than half of those polled point out the crucial need to set up result assessment mechanisms and a financing that is in keeping with the cohesion objective. Along the lines of distinguishing instrument mechanisms, we should mention that those polled view the MEDA programmes and association agreements as instruments that have significantly helped the Partnership.

The Human Dimension: a Key Contribution

If we start from the premise that the human dimension is present in all aspects of the Partnership, we will find an assessment that is positive in terms of interaction but poor in terms of measurable results. We must also highlight that most participants consider that the Barcelona Process is what it is, and is important in itself, largely due to the involvement of civil society.

The importance attached to cultural dialogue as a significant contribution of the EMP is clear. Those polled think that the Association has largely contributed to the setting up of networks of participants and consequently the reinforcement of civil society and their level of involvement in the Process. Therefore, the increase in exchanges has brought about greater knowledge regarding what is happening in Mediterranean societies, beyond the evolution of the political agenda.

Nonetheless, there is a feeling that the effective participation of these agents in the Association’s institutional mechanisms has been insufficient or non-existent. The highest percentage of positive assessments regarding their participation comes from NGOs, political and specific meetings, think tanks and cultural institutions and foundations. The “notable absentees” among the group of participants are trade unions and companies, as well as the media.
Public territorial entities are also among those with the lowest level of participation.

It is important to point out that the increasing complexity (and therefore wealth) of social coordination in the area and the needs of civil society agents who relate to each other through increasingly open and plural negotiation systems, require new instruments (conceptual and practical) for cooperation over the next few years (Solanilla: 2005).

**Future Intentions: Assets and Challenges of the Mediterranean Project**

To the credit of the Mediterranean project, there is an overall feeling of plans and future prospects. This, together with the success of mobilising agents and setting up a climate for relations in the broadest terms, are the assets that those polled most value. The setting up of networks, the mobilisation of civil society and the fact of having contributed to mutual talks and knowledge, are the most frequent responses to questions about the project’s most significant contributions. It is probably due to the same reason that the Partnership’s own instruments are so highly valued (especially the Anna Lindh Foundation and the MEDA Programmes). It is not surprising then that most responses referring to priority actions to be taken by the Anna Lindh Foundation in the future highlight actions focussed on young persons. Of course, the outcome over these past ten years is an impression of privileged relationships between partners, the setting up of a climate of trust and, above all, real contact.

This human and relations dimension is also clear in the assessment given by NGOs, foundations and thematic networks as participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Process. As a result, the setting up of social instruments such as the Non-Governmental Platform is viewed in a positive light and there is pressure for it to play an institutional role in the Barcelona Process.

What are the main challenges in order to make the Mediterranean strategy feasible? We must point out three important areas from the responses: education, reforms and employment. These are the areas to which those polled gave the most priority respectively within the Partnership’s three agendas: cultural and social, political and economic. We should also mention mobility, a sine qua non for a truly competitive environment in the future, which stands out transversally and in various responses.

Future scenarios mainly point to the need for a Mediterranean project that considers, in the long-term, diversity and social models shared by both sides of the Mediterranean Sea. Another aspect to be taken into account is the Neighbourhood Policy, considered to be a potential reinforcement for the Partnership by most of those polled, but which must also accommodate for the increasingly-popular idea of an internal Euro-Mediterranean policy and for the reinforcement of local powers. We should also mention the project’s centrality and the need to maintain an open regional structure, which in the case of the Maghreb mainly refers to the need to move beyond the bilateral context and establish subregional agreements.

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The Doctrine of Human Security in the Mediterranean

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Reviewing the Concept of Security

The doctrine of human security is gaining supporters. At a time when the topic is at the forefront of debates on security in the United Nations, a large part of the world-opinion supports its main postulates, even if it is just implicitly. Concurrently, Europe is making progress towards the establishment of a common foreign and defense policy. As of today, the EU is present in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, at the border between Ukraine and Moldavia, as well as in Palestine’s occupied territories, just to mention some of its foreign missions. However, since the European Security Strategy (ESS) was introduced in 2003 by the EU Council, it is necessary to make a step forward in its implementation. In light of these processes, we need to ask ourselves whether the Union’s policies, and especially those affecting the Mediterranean, comply with the doctrine of human security.

Currently, the main threats as well as the definition of security that are accepted by citizens are no longer those affecting whole states, but those that concern human beings. The new wars are fought in areas where states fail and where new privatised forms of violence arise. In the past 100 years, for example, more people died in the hands of security forces of their own government than due to foreign troops. Moreover, over 95% of current armed conflicts take place within the states themselves. Whilst in the first World War, 92 out of 100 casualties were soldiers, the tendency has reversed with civilians now representing 90% of the victims. Therefore, the concept of security has to be revised by taking into account the new nature of the challenges in this topic. If current threats are neither purely military, nor can they be tackled solely through military means – as the ESS recognises –, in order to face contemporary global threats, there appears to be a need to solve the lack of security associated with the security measures traditionally adopted.

The concept of human security, made popular as a result of the 1994 UNDP Report on Human Development, fills this gap by moving the central focus of security from states to individuals and communities. It also takes into account the links between security and development. Currently, most of the world population – threatened by poverty, hunger and natural disasters – lives in unsafe conditions and lacks the necessary freedom and capacity to choose its own lifestyle. The policies carried out to fight against this represent what is usually defined as “freedom from want”. This definition goes beyond the more restrictive concept of human security based on “freedom from fear”, on which this text will be based.

Mary Kaldor, in the report “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”, suggested a total of seven principles on which a human security policy for Europe should be based. Amongst these principles the following stand out: the primacy of human rights – taking into account that this is the concept that distinguishes state-centred security from security that is based on the premise of the responsibility to protect –; the establishment of a clear political authority; multilateralism – or the primacy of international legal order –; the bottom-up approach – which takes into consideration the needs of local populations –; and, finally, the need to focus security not only on the states, but also on the regions to which these states belong.

The Implementation in the Mediterranean

At this point, it is worth analysing whether the doctrine of human security is present in the design and implementation of the European Union’s foreign policy in the Mediterranean. On the one hand, one must acknowledge that the introduction of a focus on human security in the Mediterranean – but not only in this region – would allow the EU to show its commitment to global security, especially considering that Europeans cannot feel safe in an interdependent world where most of the international population lives under conditions of severe insecurity. On the other hand, the analysis of Europe’s current foreign policies in the region should allow us to verify whether the approach to security in the Mediterranean is already an approach based “de facto” on the premises of the human security doctrine.

The ESS identifies global threats that are particularly relevant to the Mediterranean. In specific, the Strategy recognises that, at a time when there are more diverse threats, as well as less obvious and
more unpredictable ones, the strategic objectives now include creating coherent policies at a regional scale and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism. Similarly, it recognises the need to promote good governance to fight against institutional weaknesses of states, to establish the supremacy of law and the need to protect human rights.

In our analysis of current policies tailored for the Mediterranean, we will concentrate on the Union’s foreign relations (see the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the new European Neighbourhood Policy [ENP]), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), as well as the foreign policies of the Union’s member States. In all cases we will observe to what extent they respond to the doctrine of human security.

Regarding the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership we must note, in the first place, that although it is divided in three main sectors (political and security sector; economic and social sector; and human sector), both the members of the Barcelona Process and its analysts are aware of the links between them. Hence, when the EU approaches the defense and security problem in the Mediterranean, it does so whilst taking into account political, economic and social factors. Regarding more specific issues, we observe that one of the original features of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration is that it assigned a significant role to civil society within Euro-Mediterranean relations, as was recently made clear in the Barcelona Summit. In the Barcelona Summit, representatives from the non-governmental platform were able to address their issues to the Euro-Mediterranean leaders. Dialogue with civil society represents, in fact, a fundamental aspect of the doctrine of human security. Moreover, we can confirm that some of the most recent advances in Euro-Mediterranean relations take into account the evolution of the security concept. Let’s take, for example, the Code of Conduct introduced in the 2005 Barcelona Summit to confront terrorism; this Code of Conduct specifies that the need to fight against terrorism cannot undermine citizens’ fundamental rights, the defense of which represents another of the fundamental elements safeguarded by the doctrine of human security. Moreover, the work program, that was also introduced in Barcelona, mentions the areas where it is necessary to intensify cooperation with regard to security and defense. These are: prevention of conflicts, crisis-management, civil protection and prevention of natural catastrophes. All these threats affect more the security of citizens than that of states.

In the last few years, a new policy was added to the EU foreign policy toward the Mediterranean: the European Neighbourhood Policy. One of the main features of this policy is its bilateral character, as it develops on the basis of different Action Plans per countries. In order to analyse the extent to which the concept of human security penetrated the ENP, we have to examine these Action Plans as well as the documents indicating the general direction taken by this policy. The European Commission Strategy Paper of May 2004, mentions on several occasions that the Neighbourhood Policy’s aim involves the resolution of conflicts. With respect to the Action Plans, these appear to direct judicial and control measures mainly towards the protection of citizens. Whilst analysing these plans, it is interesting to notice the change of approach depending on whether it concerns a Mediterranean country or one from the ex-Soviet area. Security issues are elaborated in more detail in former Soviet countries, while there are some significant omissions in the case of the Mediterranean Neighbours. For example, although the Action Plan for Moldavia includes a section on the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, in the Moroccan case there is no reference of the Saharan conflict. So, there is still a long way to go in terms of security and in terms of integrating human security in the Union’s new policy. Concerning the CFSP, and in particular the ESDP, 2005 represents a point of inflection with regards to its implication in the Mediterranean region. The European foreign policy has always been active in this region (presence of a special representative, the participation in the Quartet, etc.), but the EU security forces have never been deployed before on the Southern Mediterranean shore.

In Autumn, the EU decided to start-up two operations, one of border-control in Rafah (between Gaza and Egypt) and the other to collaborate with the police reform in the Palestinian territories (mission known as EUPOL COPSS, which should continue up to December 2008). The latter shows the importance that the Union assigns to not having an exclusively military perspective of security and to the need to consolidate a clear, legitimate and effective policy.

In order to conclude this review of the European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean, it is necessary to briefly refer to the States’ foreign policies. The Mediterranean saw new initiatives coming to light after being suggested by particular countries; once again, these new initiatives aim for human security. At the end of the 90’s Italy and Egypt presented a proposal to tackle natural catastrophes. Spain and Morocco also intensified their cooperation within the judicial sphere, as well as in the field of control and defense, through their joint work during a United Nations mission in Haiti. In these three cases it is clear that the citizen is acquiring importance as an object of protection for the States involved. Moreover, in the case of Haiti, the commitment of Madrid and Rabat to multilateralism was highlighted, as represented by their involvement in the United Nations. As in the case of the Euro-Mediterranean Association, of the Neighbourhood Policy, of the CFSP and the ESDP, in the countries’ foreign policies there is still a long way to go.

Conclusions

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the ENP will have to engage explicitly in human security matters, because this approach could point out new ways to confront the threats arising in this region in an effective and sustainable way. In specific, Action Plans should promote measures in the direction of human security; moreover, all efforts to revive the old project of the Charter for Peace and Security in the Mediterranean should take into account the transformation brought about in the concept of security in recent years. In addition, the EU, in its efforts
to be recognised as an important international actor, should strengthen the ESDP, which is still in development. In conclusion, without the mutual support between both areas – the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and the Neighbourhood Policy on the one hand and European security and defense on the other – it will be difficult to confront the threats posed to security in the Mediterranean with success.

All these issues cannot be left as a mere declaration, but must be put into practice. The document entitled “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe” can be used as a point of reference, as it is a good effort to lay out possible lines of implementation of the ESS. Upon analysis of both texts, it is clear that the most useful approach is not proceeding with the strict application of the doctrine of human security in Europe, but to fully put the 2003 strategy and all its potential in practice. The challenges are more a matter of individual political intentions than lack of instruments. The proper application of the ESS would help us highlight the options available for focusing the foreign policy of the EU – especially toward the Mediterranean region – in line with the postulates of a doctrine of human security.
Security

International Terrorism and Islamic Politics in the Mediterranean Region

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The year 2005 was, in some ways, a misleading one as far the incidence of terrorism in the Mediterranean region was concerned. For, on the basis of the most immediately relevant statistically evidence, of the kind used by the US Government or the RAND Corporation, 2005 saw a certain decline in violent actions by Islamist or other terrorist groups, be it on the European north-west side of the Mediterranean, or on the Balkan and Turkish north-east sides, as in Palestine, Egypt and North Africa. Indeed 2005 saw a number of positive or potentially positive developments in regard to political stability, notably the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, a sustained reduction in suicide and other attacks by Palestinians on Israeli civilians, and other targets, progress towards more long-term peace in the former Yugoslavia, and continued progress towards post-conflict consolidation and political liberalisation in Algeria. In what has come in recent years to be perhaps the most sensitive point of north-south interaction in the Mediterranean, the Spanish-Moroccan arena, 2005 saw a lull, in marked contrast to 2003, when Islamists killed dozens in the bombings of Casablanca, and 2004, when Moroccans resident in Spain killed nearly two hundred people in the Madrid atrocities of March 11th. This pattern of reduced terrorist activity in the Mediterranean is compatible with an apparent world-wide trend, according to which, and with the major exception of Iraq, terrorist actions on a global scale saw significant decline in that year.

Terrorism is not, however, something which, like oil prices or infant mortality, can be measured let alone evaluated on the basis of statistics alone. Terrorism is not a movement, or an environmental trend, but a tactic, used for political ends, and it is in that broad political context, as well as in a broad geographical context, that its development has to be assessed. Here 2005 yields a somewhat less reassuring picture. In the first place, and talking of terrorist acts in the strictest definitional terms, there were developments in 2005 that gave serious cause for concern. While there were no more attacks in Spain or the USA, London was attacked on two occasions in July. Casualties were much lower than in the two earlier metropolitan cases, but the pattern of sporadic, but lethal, unannounced Islamist bombings in major western cities, beginning in 2001, was thereby sustained. The evidence available suggests that the London bombers, while in some cases possibly inspired by events in Asia, and even trained in Pakistani camps, were individuals acting on their own behalf, without connections to Al Qaeda. The evidence produced after two years of investigation by Judge Juan del Olmo on the Madrid bombers suggested the same thing, despite earlier suggestions of ties to both Al Qaeda and ETA. However, while this allowed observers to discount the existence of a major organised terrorist network, linking Afghanistan and the Middle East to European cities and migrant communities, this very informality of the groups active in Madrid and London also showed how flexible, and easy to repeat, such operations are. Evidence from arrests in Britain in 2004 concerning training in Pakistan of British Muslims aiming to attack trains and public buildings in Britain, and material produced in del Olmo’s court in Madrid, centreing on a plot involving over thirty people to blow up the High Court, with the potential to cause hundreds of casualties, showed that relatively autonomous groups, similar to those which attacked Bali in 2002, were continuing to form and could cause major damage. They very fact that no formal command structure, no significant funding, no central training unit were needed indicated that such attacks could, and probably, would continue, albeit in sporadic form, for years to come. All of this is not, moreover, to discount the possibility that, parallel to the informal groups of Madrid and London, other more formal links to Al Qaeda do exist or may even be growing. Bin Laden’s warnings that more attacks from his organisation are to come should not, in this respect, be taken lightly.

Secondly, while the northern shores of the Mediterranean were free from major attacks in 2005, apart from some token explosions by ETA, there were major incidences of terror in countries on the south-east Arab side that gave cause for concern: the assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri in January 2005, following that of other Lebanese opponents of Syrian rule; the blowing up on 5th November 2005 of three hotels in Amman, Jordan, by units linked to the Al Zarqawi forces in Iraq; and the destruction of hotels in Sharm al Sheikh, Egypt, by forces hostile to the Egyptian Government’s policy on Israel. If the Palestinian arena was, in strict terms of terrorist incidents relatively quieter, apart from a series of suicide attacks on Israeli targets by...
members of Islamic Jihad, the underlying trend there was of continued tension and potential explosion, something made more real after the Hamas legislative election victory in February 2006. These events, and the growing tension in Palestine itself associated with the Israeli construction of their ‘Security Wall’, suggested that the potential for Palestinian-Israeli violence in the future remained strong. Above all, however, there was the course of events in Iraq itself. The whole justification given by the USA for the March 2003 attack on Iraq has been shown to be false and almost certainly wilfully falsified, in Washington and London, in the months prior to that attack. On the one hand, Iraq did not have significant stores of Weapons of Mass Destruction, to use itself or to hand on to third parties, other states or terrorist groups; on the other hand, the Ba’thist regime in Baghdad, while it maintained its own armed supporters abroad, was not in any significant way tied to Al Qaeda or other forms of ‘transnational’ terrorism. Indeed the reverse has proven to the case: the US invasion of Iraq has, if anything, spurred the arms race, including in nuclear and other weapons, in the Middle East, as other states, such as Iran look to deter such an attack, while the continued and provocative Anglo-US occupation of Iraq has itself served, in a way only matched by Afghanistan in the 1980s, the broader mobilisation of support for terrorist and other armed groups across the Muslim world and, to some degree, in the Muslim Diaspora communities of western Europe as well. In other words, the Iraqi invasion has produced exactly the effects, nuclear proliferation and mobilisation of terrorists that it was, mendaciously, supposed to eliminate. No-one can calculate the number of young men who have gone to fight in Iraq and who may later go on to fight in other conflicts, as Bin Laden’s supporters did from Afghanistan, and we are even less able to calculate the dimensions of the animosity to the USA and the west in general which this war, visible on TV screens across the world, has aroused among Muslims in different countries. We can, however, be reasonably confident that, unlike, say, the war in the 1990s in Algeria, or the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990, the war in Northern Ireland or the conflict in Western Sahara, this war in Iraq will prove to be not only a civil war, and a war involving calculated interventions by neighbouring states, but will also prove to be, like the Arab-Israeli conflict, one whose influence and shocks spread across the region in an uncontrollable manner. These events, and trends, need, however, to be placed in a somewhat broader analytic framework, in order to understand better where political violence in the Mediterranean has come from and where, and how, in the future, it may recur. Here there is a need to identify a number of different trends which, overlapping and reinforcing each other constitute the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern political situation of the mid-2000s. On the Middle Eastern and Muslim side, it is important to distinguish three separate trends: the incidence of ‘international terrorism’, or transnational jihadi actions, like Manhattan, Madrid and London, and, in the third world, Amman and Bali; secondly, in the narrow sense of the term, militant actions by Islamist or other forces within their specific countries, be this Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt or Algeria; and a transnational political process, the broader, authoritarian and socially repressive, but non-violent, spread of Islamism through political activity, participation in elections etc, seen in a range of countries from Lebanon and Palestine to Jordan and Egypt. The first is very much a minority activity even for jihadis, let alone Islamists, while in the second case a number of formerly violent groups have in recent years sought some accommodation with politics and the state – Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The prospect of a major victory in the Moroccan legislative elections of 2007 by the Party for Justice and Development indicates that this trend is spreading westwards as well, and with significant implications for the Moroccan community in France and Spain. In broad strategic and political terms, and in terms of the consequences for relations between Europe and the Middle East, the confident and apparently inexorable spread of political Islamism, from Iraq to Morocco, is of greater importance than the sporadic incidence of jihadi bombings. Yet while the spread of Islamism has its own dynamic, and political and social causes, it is also shaped and stimulated by the actions of the west, and in particular the USA. This is most obviously the case for the war in Iraq and the manner in which, since March 2003, the US presence in Iraq has not only brought that country to the brink of civil war, but also created a cauldron whose inter-state and regional repercussions will be considerable. Western policy also serves to antagonise Muslim opinion by an almost totally uncritical support for Israel, in its policies of denying a contiguous and independent Palestinian state, and by the way in which statements by some of its politicians, military leaders and some religious officials fuel a sense of inter-religious confrontation. In all of this Europe has a secondary role, yet remains very much in the forefront of regional politics and of the Middle East-West interaction. Sorely divided over Iraq, and playing a secondary, welfare, role in regard to Palestine, Europe can do little to influence the course of events in the Middle East, except in its ability to promote change in Turkey because of the latter’s wish to join the European Union. The outcome of months of patient European diplomacy with regard to Iran, the aim of which was to dissuade Iran from pursuing its nuclear enrichment policy, was that Europe failed in its endeavour, earning the scorn of both sides of the controversy, America and Iran itself. The conclusion can only be that, while in 2005, Europe suffered significantly less casualties from terrorism than in 2004, and than many observers had feared, the long-term prognostication for the strategic context in which Europe, and the Mediterranean as a whole, are located remains one in which many dangers and uncertainties persist.
Consolidation of the European Defence Policy

The 2005 European panorama will be remembered for the blockade of the European Constitution in the French and Dutch Referendums; with regards to the Mediterranean, for Gaza’s Israeli withdrawal, a decision led by Ariel Sharon; and in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, the Tenth Anniversary Conference in November will focus on these reports. In 2005 there wasn’t much news on European security and defence. There was no major war or crisis, including in the Balkans, there was no spectacular operation, nor even any disagreements like the disruption over in Iraq in 2003. That lack of was a good sign in itself, because it allowed the quiet consolidation of numerous means of action to take place regarding the European Union defence. Slowly, and without kicking up a fuss, the Union placed itself in the centre of the European security scene, and this took place in spite of the constitutional setback.

The year started with President George W. Bush heading up the second term of office, who a little time after, made a historic trip to Europe, in which for the first time he made an official visit to the Brussels institutions. The atmosphere on both sides of the Atlantic was positive, since nobody wanted a repeat of the public disagreements from two years before. This new atmosphere favoured reinforced cooperation in a crucial operation led by NATO in Afghanistan, in which numerous European forces are working alongside the Americans. Equal-ly, the institutional agreement between the EU and NATO made progress and the transatlantic relationship ran into specific questions with regards to different interpretations of some main principles, like for example, transferring prisoners through European airports, and once again problems in Iraq hindered an attempt to reach an adequate political agreement that would have permitted the involvement of all Europeans.

Different Types of Operations

Meanwhile, in Brussels, they continued working to establish one of the most evident successes on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the European Union: military and civil operations for crisis management and peacekeeping. In 2005, the tendency to diversify these missions was confirmed. Given that the Union covers a very wide spectrum of duties and has at its disposal a wide range of means of actions, as already pointed out in Javier Solana’s “European Security Strategy” in December 2003, it is logical that the Union carries out all different kinds of operations, which is very much appreciated by foreign spokesmen. Up to eleven operations of the European Union were in process during 2005, which can be classified in the following areas: (a) military, (b) police force, (c) security sector reform, (d) law, (e) financing, (f) observation and (g) border assistance.

The most important Military Operation was, of course, Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with more than 6,000 military forces from member states of the European Union and some foreign countries, Morocco and Turkey amongst some of them. This mission was carried out in cooperation with NATO. Two police operations also took place in the Balkans, Bosnia and in the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. In both cases, the forces under European command had similar assignments to carry out: to help establish a local police force taking into consideration a criterion of quality, fairness and respectfulness to basic human rights, and to contribute to fighting against organized crime. A European police force was present in another different kind of setting: in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, to help carry out different tasks, including organizing the elections. Lastly, within this area of police assistance in states in reconstruction, a new opportunity opened up with the mission of collaborating with the Palestinian Authority police force in Gaza (the so-called EUPOL COPPS). This operation, which counted on the Quartet Members’ consent and on the Israeli Government, set a very important precedent, since in the future the Middle East region will very much need similar support.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a new type of operation was initiated: the security and armed forces sector reform. By working together with the United Nation’s operations in this country, the European mission promotes the modernization of the Congolese armed forces, with the aim of integrating different splinter groups. Another means of action are the “law and order” operations, or legal assistance operations, which were directed towards Georgia (Eujust Themis) and to Iraq (Eujust Lex), where more than 700 Iraqi civil servants were
trained as judges, public prosecutors and legal investigators. In Sudan the European Union financed the African Union's efforts to maintain peace. The EU also decided in 2005 to go to Asia for the first time with an observation mission in Aceh, Indonesia, after the political agreement between the concerned parties, which the ex-Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari had managed to achieve. In the end, both border assistance operations took place on the Rafah crossing, between Gaza and Egypt, and at the border between Moldova and the Ukraine. All of these operations took place following, and in close conjunction with United Nation's orders, and in agreement with local government's requests.

Establishment of Civil and Military Capacities

The European Union continued its work in the following areas: Battlegroups and the acquisition of military and civil capacities necessary to carry out future operations. As we saw throughout 2005, the demand is growing, and this requires the reinforcement of capacities. On the horizon, a larger presence could be seen in Kosovo, the need to continue making progress in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the previous assistance to the Palestinian police, which can open the door to other operations in the Middle East region.

The military force's objectives for 2010 (Headline goal) are still being completed, and in 2005 the EU's Member States presented new offers of forces appointments. In November, a conference coordinating the battlegroups took place, which will be put into operation in January 2007. The new European Defence Agency started its work in Brussels, with its main function of advising Member States on the provision of defence assets, common needs and the investigation and development of this matter. Civil capacities, especially police forces, were equally objected to a continuous study and to advances to reach the threshold in 2008. In turn, the countries that rely on police forces of the gendarmerie kind (Spain, France, Netherlands, Italy and Portugal) created Euro-gendarmerie. The arrival of illegal immigrants on the southern coasts of Europe continued to be a problem throughout 2005, as the spectacular images showed of those native Africans from western Sahel jumping the walls of Ceuta and Melilla. Taking the Spanish initiative to deal with this problem, the EU prepared the establishment of integrated police and humanitarian Units.

Euro-Mediterranean Transparency

It is very important that the Mediterranean partners of the EU are regularly informed of all of these developments, by means of the Barcelona Process and through multiple contacts. The EU civil and military authorities in Brussels are committed to presenting information on the ESDP to the Mediterranean partners. As a member of NATO, Turkey has a special relationship with the European Security and Defence Policy. Numerous seminars and meetings with those in charge of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and the armed forces (like the meeting which takes place in Barcelona since 2002) took place during 2005, and the five-year Euro-Mediterranean working programme adopted in the Tenth Anniversary Conference insists on the importance of this transparency. Furthermore, the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue on cooperation regarding civil protection to face natural catastrophes like tidal waves was continued. Other possible areas of cooperation that were also addressed within the framework of the Barcelona Process were for example, the removal of land mines, monitoring sea space, the fight against terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the protection of the environment. Many point to the great potential of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the security sector reform and in the training.

To finish off, it is worth mentioning the successful initiative taken up by the Ministers of Defence of Group 5 + 5, launched in December 2004. During 2005, they continued to work within the framework of this initiative with meetings in Argel and in Paris. To summarize, in 2005 European security continued to concentrate on well-known threats as the fight against terrorism, spread, illegal flux and organised crime, without detecting military threats of a different kind. This allowed the Europeans to be able to concentrate on civil and military crisis management in its neighbourhood and beyond. The European Union adopted a main role in Crisis Management, since both the institutional structures and the capacities created to jointly support the Union started to prove their effectiveness in numerous operations. The problem that was foreseen in 2005 and which projects to the future is whether or not there will be enough resources to face the increasing foreign demand and the crisis in which solution Europeans consider they should be involved.
The European Union in 2005: Internal Crisis, Lack of External Projection*

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The internal crisis

The double, clear and ample “No” to the European Constitution in France and The Netherlands, in the referendums of 29th May and 3rd June has plunged the EU into a crisis of legitimacy. This crisis was starting to brew some time ago due to the lack of agreement on priorities between the citizens and the European elite. As the Eurobarometers were clearly showing, while the EU concentrated on institutional reform and the enlargement process, the citizens’ priorities were centred on unemployment, the economic situation, immigration and organised crime.

The opinion surveys and analysis undertaken after the referendum in France (Flash Eurobarometer 153, El “No” francés del 29 de mayo de 2005: comprender, actuar, ARI no. 150/2006 of the Elcano Royal Institute) show that the French voted almost exclusively on national issues and, above all, on economic ones. The French “No” came mainly from the left, as a punishment for the Chirac Presidency and the economic situation: up to 82% of those questioned said that economic considerations affected their decision to vote against the Constitution. This helps to explain the apparent incongruity of the behaviour of the French electorate, when the percentage in favour of the European Constitution at the beginning of the campaign was over 70%.

Whatever the reasons behind the negative vote, it is clear that the French “No”, followed by another just as strong in The Netherlands has sunk the European Union into complete disarray. The absence of an alternative or emergency plan, or a “Plan B”, is easily explained: Declaration number 20 of the European Constitution (in which it was established that if by October 2006, four fifths of the member States had ratified the text, but five or less States had “had difficulties”, “the European Council would meet to examine the situation”) implied that the 25 had counted on having some kind of rejection in some of the member States. However, it was taken for granted that it would be in countries, such as the United Kingdom, Denmark or the Czech Republic, which would allow the European Union to establish agreements that would permit the integration process to progress.

On the contrary, the “No” of a founding country, especially France, has had a paralysing effect because this country has had a key player in drawing up the constitution and the integration process could not continue without it. Therefore, in spite of the majorities laid out in Declaration number 20, the French and Dutch “Nos” have demonstrated that, at least with regards to the ratifying procedures, the European Constitution is an international treaty which means that the unanimity requirement is unavoidable.

What is evident is, that with or without the Constitution, any attempt to solve the crisis in the European Union after the French and Dutch “Nos” will continue to be ineffective until politicians undertake a fundamental review into how they operate and how they can manage to involve citizens more closely in debate on European policy.

However, in the very short term, the lack of consensus in the strategies for solving the crisis has demonstrated that it is difficult to isolate and has provoked a cascade effect over a series of European policies. The first victim of this situation has been the European budget, blocked in June 2005 by the British decision to take advantage of the lack of European leadership to try and knock down the European agricultural budget. The second victim, in spite of the opening of the adhesion negotiations with Turkey on 3rd October, has been the future enlargement. It seems evident that there will now not be any further enlargement than that already planned with Romania and Bulgaria, at least until the constitutional entanglement has been cleared up. The third victim has been European foreign policy, after having seen the existing political consensus questioned concerning the CFSP – ESDP capabilities and measures, especially with respect to the figure of the Union’s minister of Foreign Affairs and a European foreign service. The fourth has concerned the immigration policies, the fight against terrorism and, in general, everything relating to the Area of freedom, security and justice.

* This contribution is a reduced version of the piece written by the same authors for the Strategic Panorama 2005-2006, published by the Ministry of Defence. It is included with the permission of the editors.
They have been put into question by the paralysing of the implementation of the EuroOrder in Germany and caused great uncertainties with respect to future working methods.

The British Presidency: an unsuccessful new course

The British Presidency began marked by Prime Minister Blair’s decision to not allow a budgetary agreement to be reached in the Brussels Council on 16th – 17th June. This would have given the European Union the oxygen that it needed to move on after the “Nos” in France and the Netherlands to the European Constitution in May and June. The refusal of Blair to accept any of the successive compromises offered by the then rotary EU President, the Luxembourg leader Jean Claude Juncker, left it very clear that Blair, bolstered by recently winning his third term in office, had decided to set a new course and to take the lead in a European Union that was in crisis.

However, in the brief time period between Blair’s vibrant speech in June before the European Parliament and the Council at Hampton Court at the end of October, the British Presidency entered into crisis. Firstly, the attacks on London in June completely changed the UK’s priorities and agenda. Beyond the logical preoccupation concerning the problems of the coexistence of Islam and British society, London’s response was not the result of a European action (instigating common policies in the fight against terrorism and, more broadly, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice).

Secondly, the British Presidency’s objectives were hardly compatible with the objective of listening to the citizens proposed by Blair in the European Parliament: whether in reference to the opening of adhesion negotiations with Turkey, the proposals to reform the European social models or the liberation of trade within the framework of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), European public opinion showed itself to be hostile, and not favourable, to Blair’s policies.

Thirdly, the insistence on opening negotiations with Turkey has had a very high cost in various aspects. On the one hand, the decision was taken against the openly hostile European public opinion to the Turkish candidacy. Whereas, on the other hand, the link between the opening of negotiations with Turkey and Croatia raised by Austria has clearly shown that the adhesion conditions can be manipulated if one has “sponsors” who are sufficiently insistent (in this case, Austria). The opening of these negotiations has been at a high cost for the legitimacy of the enlargement process. Finally, the pressure to open negotiations with Croatia, added to the wave of pending decisions concerning the Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania candidacies, have generated a wave of scepticism with respect to expansion that will inevitably result in a generalised halt to the enlargement process.

The 17th December budgetary agreement

The financial perspectives for the 2007-2013 period are the first ones to be drawn up by the enlarged twenty-five member Union. The budgetary agreement reached on 17th December situates the level of expenditure for the enlarged 25 member Europe at 862,363 million euros for the period 2007-2013. The two largest parts of the European budget will continue being, as is customary, the direct agricultural aid, which approximately uses up 34.5% of the budget (293,105 million euros), and the cohesion and structural policies, which take up another 35.2% (298,989 million euros).

From the European perspective, the most important aspect of the budget is its global quantity. The 2004 enlargement added ten new members, all with large financial necessities in terms of cohesion and structural policies. We also have Romania and Bulgaria waiting for a new expansion and that would mean that in less than five years the European Union would have increased its population by more than one hundred million. A large majority of these people (practically 90% of the inhabitants of the new member States) live in regions with levels of income which are much less than the Community’s average, as well as 75% of the income that qualifies a region to receive structural funds. As a consequence, the differences in incomes are much greater in the enlarged Union: while the Union’s ten richest regions have an average income of 189% of the community average (EU 25 = 100), the ten poorest regions have an income of 36%. With millions of new farmers and thousands of kilometres of new external borders, the Union will have practically doubled its members. However, this immense task is being undertaken with a European budget similar to that of the European Union in 1985 (around 0.95% of GDP), before the admission of Spain and Portugal. Consequently, although the disagreements between the European partners have not stopped them reaching an agreement, they have directly affected its quality. Paradoxically, the European Union is expanding, while the budget is going to be reduced.

A Lack of External Projection

An adverse political context for foreign and security policy

At first, the prospects for 2005 were not very optimistic. The “Nos” to the European Constitution in France and The Netherlands, added to the failure of the Luxembourg Presidency in the final part of the budgetary negotiations, led to internal paralysis which inevitably translated to the areas of foreign affairs and security. Despite these omens, 2005 managed to produce an agreement on the European budget, as well as reach the necessary consensus amongst the 25 to approve initiatives, such as the European Strategy against terrorism.

In this context, situations such as the terrorist attacks in London in July, the deteriorating situation in Africa or the difficult situation at the European borders in the Maghreb, amongst others, demonstrate the pressing need for effective European action. As in other areas, the cost of the “Europe No” is high, and particularly negative for Spain, as it is especially vulnerable to situations of instability in its border regions, particularly in the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the delay in the application (or the erroneous transposition in the case of Germany) of some measures, such as the EuroOrder, hinders the advance of Spanish judicial investigations linked to acts of terrorism. These facts
demonstrate the negative consequences of the delay and the inability of the EU partners to endorse a common foreign policy, to elaborate a real internal security strategy for the European Union and to apply the European Security Strategy with the speed and forcefulness that events dictate.

At a time like this, dominated by a serious constitutional crisis which is reflected in a crisis of confidence with an important economic component (demonstrated by the adverse data relating to unemployment, deficits and economic growth in the Eurozone), the development of a solid security and foreign policy, based on a hard core of European interests and values appears to be one of the ideal elements to legitimise and bring the European project nearer to the increasingly sceptical European citizens.

Although one can not speak of a halt in the European Union in the development of the necessary instruments for a European security and defence policy, this area could be one of the most affected by the non-ratification of the European Constitution, as its text incorporated some new institutional features to give a greater impulse and substance to this policy. In particular, the delay sine die in creating a minister of Foreign Affairs could lead to negative recuperations for the CFSP/ESDP. During 2005, the European Union increased its responsibilities and operations in the area of internal and external security, however, the Secretary General of the Council, Javier Solana, had to work with a negligible budget, only similar to that for cleaning and maintenance expenses of the Commission’s buildings.

The external missions of the Union in 2005 and the question of abilities

There are three key regions which merit special attention from the EU during 2006: the Balkans, with the thorny question of Kosovo’s statute; the Middle East, considered the area where the EU must be more committed in the future; and finally, Africa.

The fight against terrorism: at the top of the European agenda

The coincidence of the terrorist attacks on London with the United Kingdom Presidency of the European Union opened a window of opportunity for making considerable progress in terms of security. However, the controversy surrounding the tensions between freedom and security, and national reluctance (especially in some countries where they do not perceive the terrorist threat as so great) have impeded a European coordinated approach advancing more quickly in the fight against terrorism.

The management of immigration and control of the borders

The area of Freedom, Security and Justice is one of the fields which had advanced most during the work on the European Constitution. This means that the uncertainty over the Constitutional Treaty will negatively affect the progress made in the European area of Freedom, Security and Justice, which had previously received a great impulse in November 2004 with the adoption of the “The Hague Programme”. This programme tries to give a European answer to the challenges of illegal immigration, organised crime and terrorism through a pluriannual programme (2005-2009), with a schedule for the adoption of each of the proposed measures. Furthermore, to make it more specific, the Council and the Commission drew up a complementary Action Plan in June 2005 that was adopted in the Council of Justice and Internal Affairs.

One should emphasise that Spain has been a constant supporter and promoter of the initiatives in this area. It recognised

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<td>Spain</td>
<td>Parliamentary + consultative referendum</td>
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<td><strong>Voted against Ratification</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Still to decide</strong></td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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Source: [http://europa.eu.int/constitut/on/ratification_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/constitution/ratification_en.htm)
early on the importance of European action in important questions, such as judicial cooperation in the fight against terrorism and the necessary collaboration in the fight against illegal immigration. In Spain, for obvious reasons, there is greater sensibility to these questions than in other member States that do not have such extensive external borders. Illegal immigration and the trafficking of drugs, arms, explosives and people are critical problems on a daily basis at the Spanish borders. This critical situation exploded at the border positions of the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla. It resulted in loss of human life as a wave of Sub-Saharan citizens without the required documentation tried to cross the security fences that separate them from Spanish territory.

These tragic and pressing circumstances impelled the Spanish Government to jointly present with France, an initiative to the informal summit at Hampton Court (27th October 2005), which was later adopted in the European Council in December. Thus, the European Council approved a declaration on the Mediterranean and the Middle East tied to the questions on migration. This declaration sanctions various measures orientated towards real practical cooperation between the member States through the European Borders’ Agency, at the same time as insisting on the need for greater dialogue and cooperation with Africa, etc. It should be emphasised that it reinforces the necessity to give increased priority to the financing of the questions linked to immigration and analyses the possibility of assigning up to 3% of the European Neighbourhood Instrument.

Conclusion

By way of concluding and looking at the general situation, 2005 has been a crisis year without palliatives for the European Union. Certainly, the year could have finished worse, if the budgetary agreement for the period 2007-2013 had not been reached. However, the budgetary agreement reached in December has little more merit than its mere existence: while Europe expands, the European Union’s budget is reducing to historical levels. Furthermore, only 5.8% of the budget will be dedicated to the creation of growth and employment, 1.1% to the policies relating to security and justice, and 5.8% to the international presence of the EU, three questions that embrace the main concerns of the European citizens. The Union also fulfilled its word and overcame the barriers of the opening of adhesion negotiations with Turkey. Although, once again, it was made in a climate of pressure and threats, against public opinion and left behind it a broad rejection of the enlargement process. Therefore, seen from a distance, 2005 was marked by the rejection of the citizens to the European Constitution and the economic stagnation of the Eurozone. This is in marked contrast to 2004, a year crowned with the success of the enlargement with the ten new members and the ratification of the Constitution. The expectations with which the Union closed 2004, which imagined a cohesive Union that was internally strong and outward looking, have not been satisfied at all. The consequences are, of course, worrying. Internally, the citizens have imposed a severe rebuke on the traditional political system in Europe and in the member States. Externally, its projection and credibility as an international actor and, consequently, its influence in global affairs has suffered.

In these circumstances, the pending tasks in the European agenda for 2006 are complex and the Union’s ability to satisfy them is in doubt. These include: restoring the citizen’s confidence, re-launching the European economy and renewing international credibility of the Union.
Violence in France: A Borderline Case

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For three weeks from the end of October 2005, France experienced a bout of urban violence which in its own way featured all the essential elements that I have described in this chapter. Sparked off by the announcement of the death of two adolescents who believed they were being chased by the police and hid in an electricity station, where they were electrocuted, and exacerbated by the unsubtle remarks of a Minister of the Interior who spoke of “rabble” and of “cleaning out the area with a high-pressure hosepipe” with regard to delinquency in working-class housing estates, the riotous conduct was the work of young men who set fire every evening not only to private cars, but also to public buses, as well as schools and nursery schools, firstly in the working-class suburbs of Paris, and then throughout the country. This violence shocked the whole world. In some cases, there was an element of jubilation in news commentaries, for example in the United States, where CNN, among other channels, reported the events with smugness, as if France was showing, through its misfortunes, that it was no better off than other major countries, and that it had had no right to think that it could preach to others, as it had done in recent years with more than a touch of arrogance. But more profoundly, the interest that these riots aroused abroad hit upon a decisive question, as overseas observers had understood only too well: the unrest clearly showed the major crisis affecting the French model of integration.

The Social and Institutional Dimensions of the Crisis

The urban violence of autumn 2005 in fact combined an immense array of difficulties which constitute a veritable phenomenon, a multi-dimensional crisis of confidence in what is sometimes called the “French model” affecting its social, institutional, cultural, political and intellectual aspects. The most obvious refers to the social register. Since the middle of the 70s, France has gone through a lasting period of social difficulties, associated with the consequences of the massive transformations brought about by an immigration which was for many years the product of a search for work, and later became a phenomenon of permanent settlement. Racism and discrimination, in fact, add further to the existing problems of unemployment, exclusion and lack of job security for many young people, most of them the children of recent immigrants, living in areas sometimes similar to ghettos. The so-called urban policies, implemented since the beginning of the 80s, and very often with considerable intelligence and generosity, have, however, obviously not helped them at all, and from this point of view, the violence is the voice of their rage, their despair, and also their inability to establish themselves as individuals in their own right, and to project themselves into the future. The crisis is equally institutional, and more precisely affects the institutions of the Republic. It is not the republican ideal itself which is at fault, but the growing difficulty to give it a concrete, tangible form. Institutions such as the police, the justice system, public services and furthermore the public education system, appear less and less capable of keeping their promises of “Liberté-Egalité-Fraternité”, (Liberty, Equality, Fraternity): as the proud motto of the Republic proclaims, and which politicians and “republican” intellectuals have repeated like a mantra since the mid 80s.

A Crisis which is also Cultural

The crisis is just as much cultural, in the sense that ever more numerous demands are being shouted out to the Nation – which in principle has the monopoly on cultural identity in the public domain – by groups defined by a particular identity, national origin, religious persuasion, ethnic or racial difference. According to the traditional model, in France you can be whatever you want in private, but in the public sphere there is only a place for individuals who are free and equal by right, not for minorities. It is thus that extremely fierce debates have been developing since the mid 80s, with regard to Islam on one hand, and the supposed ethnicity of young people on the other. The riots, contrary to what might be thought, were not in any way organised or structured from an ideological or religious viewpoint, neither did they express any claim, protest or affirmation, cultural, racial, ethnic or otherwise. But their irruption does belong in a general context where the question is posed. The fact that those responsible are often the children of immigrants, including sub-Saharan Africans, provided an op-
In short, a Political and Intellectual Crisis

This violence should be analysed equally in a context larger than that of a political crisis; it places us directly at the heart of the subject of political failure, not because it is in itself political, but because it encompasses a large body of social, institutional and cultural issues, which until now, politics has not known how to control.

More precisely, this failure must be interpreted on two levels. Primarily on the national level, since prior to the event, neither the party in power on the right, nor its predecessors on the left, had tried to tackle these questions realistically and directly, although they had been apparent to all for the last thirty years. A more particular responsibility is held, nevertheless by the current government, and more precisely by the two Raffarin governments (named after the prime minister from 2002 to 2005). Since 2002 and the presidential elections and subsequent legislative elections which brought it to power, this government has above all dismantled what little help that did exist in the districts concerned, and which had been holding their heads above water: they withdrew local police officers “on the beat” and opportunities for youth employment, and made massive reductions in subsidies to social work organisations operating in the housing estates. But on the second level, the political failure is also local. In the past, the districts concerned were often under the political control of the Communist party, and were known as “the red suburbs”. Furthermore, a rich network of associations existed in these areas, which assured that popular demands and expectations were transmitted from the lower to the higher levels of the system, organised social or cultural campaigns and mobilised the most dynamic elements of the population. Today, the Communist party has considerably declined and lost its impact in working-class districts. As for the associations which are found there, and which remain numerous, they are very different from those of the past, because essentially, they bring in help and assistance of a social nature from the outside, and are funded by public money. The only visible force, in certain cases at least, is Islam; when an imam is capable of suggesting diverse activities and educational support to young people, while at the same time taking them in hand from a religious standpoint. The paradox is that in Autumn 2005, these imams very often went out and asked the young people to return to their homes and not to surrender themselves to violence, in other words, they flew to the aid of republican law and order, and did not stir up the anger of the young people, contrary to what was said by uninformed ideologists.

Finally, the crisis is also an intellectual one. The traditional figure of the “great French intellectual” is in fact becoming rarer, even if some good examples still exist, like Alain Touraine or Edgar Morin. The intellectuals “of the left” have remained very silent with regard to the riots, embarrassed in certain cases by the decline of the workers’ movement as a defining player in reference to all collective action. They no longer have a figure of reference to put forward, and no better utopia to suggest, unlike in the “good old days” of Communism. As a result, some of them retreat into hypocrirical postures, carried along by the logic of suspicion and denunciation which allowed them to criticize the authorities, but not to properly understand the young people’s revolt. On the right, however, the best known intellectuals sink into either a sort of wild “Republicanism”, a purely ideological defence stemming from an extreme conception of the republican ideal, or into a more or less disguised form of racism – which explains the campaign of a great weekly newspaper to denounce the “neo-reacs”.

The French experience of urban violence has thus testified to a general breakdown in the French model of integration. Is this breakdown peculiar to France, as a manifestation of the French “exception”? In fact, a sole but central element, allows “exception” to be spoken of in this context. Everywhere in Europe in fact, unemployment, lack of job security, social difficulties and the phenomena of racism and discrimination can be seen. Everywhere in Europe particular identities are demanding recognition in the public domain. Everywhere, also, national political systems give the impression of being overwhelmed, from on high by the demands of globalisation and European construction, and from below by the pressure of ethnic identities that they do not know how to properly cope with. But what is unique to France, is the force of the republican ideal, this promise made to every individual, every citizen that they will attain equality, that they will benefit from liberty, and that they will see solidarity and fraternity at work. The specificity of France comes from the representatives of the State and the intellectuals, who make and ceaselessly repeat this promise, whereas it is not held for all. In other countries, less is expected from the state and its institutions, simply because they have not made such promises. The French exception is there, in the frustrations exacerbated by a republican ideal which is translated neither into reality nor into prospects for the future any longer.
A relevant part of the EU citizens observe with mistrust the possibility that Turkey may one day become a full member of the Union. This state of public opinion has had an impact on the progress of the membership negotiations begun by Turkey in October 2005. In order to judge what this impact has been, we need, first of all, to bear in mind the context. On a European, Mediterranean and global level the context is characterized by a retreat into communitarianism. A context in which the EU is immersed in a generalized sense of crisis or, maybe a feeling of impsase.

An EU in which both racist or xenophobic movements and protectionist attitudes are extending their influence is not especially inclined to welcome into its bosom a country that many see as too big, too poor and too different. Furthermore, this communitarianism is also making its mark in southern and eastern Mediterranean societies, no exception for Turkey. It takes shape through reactions of either a religious or a nationalistic nature, and the latter tendency is more pronounced in Turkey than in any other country in the region. This situation, with the risk of a widening gap between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, and with a Turkey on the defensive, is not particularly favourable to a quiet progression in EU-Turkish relations. If we also add that the EU and some of its main member states are not passing through a period of great political or economic enthusiasm, we can come to the conclusion that current conditions are not ideal for those defending Turkish entry.

One of the most serious setbacks so far to the process of European construction has been the freezing of the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty after the negative votes in the referenda in France (in May 2005) and the Netherlands (in June 2005). Once the results were known, some analysts were quick to establish a link between the rejection by a relevant part of European citizens of the possibility that Turkey might join the EU, and the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. It was said that there was a widespread discontent among EU citizens with regard to a process of enlargement orchestrated by the principal European leaders but ignoring the feelings (and fears) of European public opinion. It is in fact true that in France, for example, some political leaders campaigned against the referendum arguing that rejection of the Treaty would be interpreted as a rejection of the possibility of Turkish entry.

Nevertheless, subsequent opinion surveys demonstrated that the link between the two rejections was not so clear. Two Eurobarometer Surveys indicated that those who had voted against the Treaty because of the Turkish issue represented a tiny minority in both countries: no more than six per cent. Anyway, the situation that had been created gave strength to those who argue that the EU is suffering from “enlargement fatigue”. They propose that the process should be halted so that there can be calm reflection on the way to reconcile on one hand, the deceleration in membership negotiations and, on the other hand the promises made and the expectations generated in recent years. It should be remembered that not only have Turkey and Croatia began negotiations, but also to the western Balkan countries has been promised that they could form part of the EU in the future.

As we shall see, the fact that citizens’ discontent has been attributed to the process of enlargement has caused damage to the negotiating context in which Turkey has to conduct its candidacy. Before analysing these effects it would be useful to note a certain number of details concerning the state of European public opinion with regard to this question. First of all, it should be noted that it is not always explained to what extent European public opinion is divided on this subject. There are in fact notable variations when we compare the state of public opinion on a country-by-country basis. Whilst Turkish membership is rejected by more than 70% in Austria, Cyprus, Germany, France, Greece and Luxembourg, in other countries like Poland, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain or Ireland this is the case for less than 35% of the electorate. In general terms we can see that the rejection is strongest in the countries of central and Eastern Europe, which are those that receive the largest number of Turkish immigrants, whilst there is less opposition to Turkish candidature in the peripheral European countries, except in the case of Greece and Cyprus. In fact, in many of these countries it is not that there is enthusiastic support on the part of their citizens but rather a high degree of indifference.

Despite these differences, the latest Eurobarometer Surveys allow us to note certain common tendencies. The first of these is that the candidature of other countries generates less opposition than that of Turkey. This is obviously the case for rich countries like Norway, Switzer-
land or Iceland, but what is more intriguing is that those countries with a lower average income than Turkey, such as the Ukraine or the Balkan countries, also receive more support. Moreover, since 2005, the Eurobarometer Survey has included a question dealing with the feelings and impressions provoked by the question of Turkish entry. If we look at the results of Eurobarometer no. 63 (Spring 2005) we can see that, strangely, there are more people who consider that Turkey is geographically (55%) and historically (42%) European than who are attracted by arguments such as Turkey’s contribution to European security (38%) or to the rejuvenation of Europe (29%), topics so frequently raised by European leaders and by their Turkish counterparts. On the other hand, these sources also show us that the point creating much consensus is that Turkey must make significant progress in the next few years in terms of respect for human rights (84% of those polled). More than half of those that were surveyed also showed anxiety about a possible increase of immigrant flows that could be caused by Turkish entry (63%), as well as about cultural differences between Turkey and the EU (54%). There is no doubt that these concerns are likely to be exploited in electoral contexts, and in fact this has already been the case in different elections such as those for the European Parliament in 2004, the legislative and regional elections in Germany, the constitutional referendum in France, etc.

As indicated above, this state of public opinion had an effect on the negotiating context in which Turkey started membership negotiations, whose most controversial aspects had already been announced at the conclusion of the European Council meeting on December 17th 2004. We can see its impact on two remits. Firstly, in the insistence on the part of the EU that it cannot guarantee the satisfactory outcome of the negotiations. Secondly, in the announcement that Turkey would be excluded from certain EU policies. Let’s give a more detailed look.

The defining framework for the negotiations states explicitly that, although the common objective of the negotiations is Turkish membership, there is no fixed time limit for the negotiations to be completed, and, furthermore, a positive outcome cannot be taken for granted. It is further declared that “if Turkey is not able to assume completely the responsibilities that its membership would involve, it should be ensured that Turkey is fully linked to European structures”. This veiled reference to the possibility that in the end Turkey could be offered the status of privileged partner was the result of the insistence of certain countries, and especially of Austria, which threatened right up to the last moment to prevent the initiation of negotiations. This is not an accident, since as we have just seen it is the country where there is the smallest support for Turkish membership, with only ten per cent of citizens in favour. The negotiating framework also covers the possibility that the EU may break off membership negotiations unilaterally, at the request of the Commission or of a third of the states member, if there should be serious and persistent violation of the principles of freedom, democracy, the respect of human rights, of fundamental freedoms or of the rule of law. This clause shows
that European leaders, like European citizens, consider that Turkey still needs to perfect the democratic nature of its political system, and that there is a risk that there could be a regression. Finally, although this does not enter into the negotiating framework, we should point out that another effect of the negative state of public opinion was the announcement in France and in Austria that they would hold a referendum so that citizens could make their voices heard before Turkish membership took place.

We can also see the consequences of this climate of opinion when it is mentioned that permanent safeguards could be applied against Turkey in connection with certain policies, such as agriculture or structural policy (i.e., those that receive most money), or the free circulation of people. Many observers doubt that these permanent safeguards could really be applied, since they would be equivalent to a violation of the guiding principles of the EU, and the Commission, as guarantor of the treaties, would have to prevent this. It can be interpreted, then, as a way for governments to reassure public opinion, especially in the case of those countries in a more fragile economic situation and which are already host to a larger number of workers of Turkish origin.

In short, the fear that the Turkish candidature provokes for a significant proportion of European citizens has given arguments to those member states which are not enthusiastic supporters of Turkish membership, and has manifested itself in the framework that regulates the context of the negotiations for membership that Turkey initiated in 2005. As we have seen, there are also countries which have promised to consult their citizens before Turkey joins the EU. Thus, if we wish successfully to conclude a process which commenced more than four decades ago, it is necessary to take into account the state of public opinion that we have described above and act accordingly. Turkey and those in the EU who support its membership must convince, persuade and even seduce at least a part of those who are currently reluctant.

The Commission has announced the launching of a financial programme to increase mutual contacts and awareness. Although this is a positive step, this type of action cannot in itself produce a significant change of tendency. To achieve this we would need to take action on the one hand against structural elements such as Islamophobia or the rejection of immigration. Turkey on the other hand should make an effort to improve its image, through a campaign of public diplomacy stressing the potential for change in the political, social and economic aspects that the entry negotiations and ultimate membership would bring about.

Finally, a revival of the economic expectations of some EU countries would be of crucial importance, since this would allow them to look with greater ambition and optimism towards the future, and at the same time the future construction of Europe.
Western Sahara: A Difficult Crisis to Resolve

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In 2005 the Sahara’s conflict entered its thirtieth year, without anybody being able to talk of victory or defeat on either side. The status quo which has lasted for so many years, and which resembles in so many ways a state of lethargy, has no doubt made it possible to avoid a clear and definite victory of one of the two official antagonists who continue to dispute the sovereignty of the former Spanish Sahara.

During the last year, however, events of varying importance have disturbed this apparent tranquility. Firstly, from May 2005 onwards there were numerous demonstrations at Laayoun and Smara, involving Saharawis demanding independence for the Sahara. Secondly, in August, an American diplomatic initiative brought about the release of the four hundred and four remaining Moroccan prisoners held by the Polisario Front. Finally, after the successive resignations of James Baker and of Alvaro de Soto, Kofi Annan appointed a new special envoy to the Sahara, Peter Van Walsum.

Do these events represent a change in the evolution of this conflict, or are we going to come back to the above status quo because of the lack of a better solution?

Demonstrations in Saharan Towns

Since May 2005, there has been an increasing and repeated number of secessionist demonstrations in the Sahara’s two main towns, with a continuation on the Rabat’s campus. Their violent repression produced an explosive atmosphere, especially at the end of October, with the death of a young demonstrator: Hamdi Lambarki.

In reality, this is not the first time there have been demonstrations. In September 1999 Laayoun had in fact experienced a week of police violence towards Saharawi students calling for an increase in their grants and an improvement in their transport facilities. It may be recalled that the revolt was violently suppressed by the Moroccan police, who at the time was under the command of Driss Basri, the minister of the Interior. These incidents, which were the first of their kind, were soon taken in hand by the Moroccan monarchy. Whilst the 1999 demands were of a social nature, six years later, however, the unrest had taken on a fundamentally political character. Although they had no particular links with the Polisario Front, the demonstrators burned Moroccan flags, threw Molotov cocktails and chanted slogans in favour of independence.

The authorities’ response to the social demands formulated six years before may have been considered insufficient, and added to the status quo, it is quite possible that this was enough to cause a hardening of the attitude of some Saharawis towards Rabat. But should we read into these demands a real desire to obtain independence for the region? If so, it may well be asked why the demonstrators had not joined the ranks of the Polisario Front, which logically wanted the movement to join its cause?

In fact another interpretation of the events in Laayoun and Smara seems possible. After the Green March, Hassan II granted various privileges to this first generation of Saharawis who had helped him to take control of the territory peacefully: some individuals were appointed as “His Majesty’s advisers”, others were given posts as civil servants, or granted licences to import products from the Canary Islands. In this way an elite was formed which contributed enormously to the integration of the Saharawi people. Thirty years later, these community leaders have no doubt fewer resources to redistribute to the younger generations who are aware that they enjoy fewer privileges than their elders. Some observers consider that a crisis has arisen because of problems of resource management on the part of the ageing Saharawi leaders. According to this theory, the ambitions and needs of the young Saharawis in the towns governed by Rabat could then in some ways be compared to those of the unemployed graduates in Morocco, with the significant difference that the Saharawis have a formidable “secret weapon” in terms of extra negotiating weight with the authorities. By airing their demands for independence, they certainly raise the stakes high enough to make their voices heard. In so doing, however, they implicitly put themselves on a footing of “ruled people” in opposition to the “rulers”, acting as part of a national entity.

Be that as it may, even if their demonstrations have the same basic rationale as those of the unemployed Moroccan graduates, by putting the independence issue to the forefront, burning the Moroccan flag and violently attacking the symbols of the authorities in power, they are indirectly appealing to the international community, by giving the impression that this territory for which the United Nations has not yet decided the
A Self-government Difficult to Establish

Faced with this crisis situation, and whichever way it is interpreted, Rabat is obliged to seek a solution for what can be seen directly or indirectly as an unresolved conflict. Whilst proposing “extensive autonomy” for the Western Sahara, Morocco does not specify what this would cover. This reticence could be explained by the political change that such an option would require, involving a new institutional structure and a revision of the Constitution. If autonomy were granted to this region, Morocco would be obliged to reconcile the formal sovereignty of the country, and the actual autonomy of a population that feels the need to affirm its own right to independence. In this case it is not a question of granting a greater or lesser degree of liberty to a region of Morocco, but to Saharawis who have not been subdued even after thirty years of conflict, and who, when it comes to the critical moment, will want to negotiate their sovereignty avidly.

This negotiation will inevitably concentrate on the value of any autonomy offered in terms of administration of the region’s natural resources, maintenance of public order, representation of the Saharawi people, and the relationship to be established with the central power, as well as in the field of education and the preparation of school curricula. Suffice it to say that such a degree of autonomy, frequently presented in Morocco as an ideal solution, is not easy to apply. Moreover, this solution does not seem to be unanimously accepted: The Istiqlal Party, which has the impression of having lost its natural role as defender of the national territory’s integrity (unity), contests the principle of autonomy, and prefers to envisage a move towards a regional structure within which the Sahara could be included. Other political groups such as Alliance et liberté (Alliance and Freedom) think that the search for a solution to the Saharan issue represents a chance to open up the political situation in Morocco. For the younger generation in Laayoun and Smara, “the Saharawi people have the right to choose their own destiny”. (Le Monde, 19-20 February, 2006)

The New American Interest in the Region

Faced with these difficulties, many people in the Maghreb hope that Washington’s new interest in the region may help find a solution to a Saharan crisis of which the local populations are in general heartily tired. It certainly seems to be true that the Americans are showing an interest in many different aspects, whether it be security, military, economic or even political issues. Since it has combined political reforms with economic liberalism, the U.S. looks on Morocco in a favourable light, and wishes to encourage good governance there. Washington could moreover possibly wish to rely on its traditional ally in the region if it were decided to enlarge the sphere of operations of the Atlantic Alliance, reserving the option of using the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces as a factor in a strategy of regional stabilisation.

In addition to this, many American companies have invested in the development of Algeria’s oil and gas resources, and would like to see a lowering of tension in the region. American intentions are however especially concentrated on controlling the situation better in the Sahel region, which in their eyes has become a sort of “refuge” for Islamic terrorists, whom Saharawis from Tindouf looking for guidance and motivation might be tempted to join. For all these reasons the resolution of the conflict in the Sahara is a necessity, always supposing that a solution acceptable to all those involved can be found. Not having had colonial links with the countries and the populations of the Maghreb region, the U.S. may well be able to succeed where the Europeans have got into deadlock.

If such is to be the case, they will need to take into account the aspirations of the Sahara’s populations, and show considerable imagination when it comes to finding a strategy to resolve the crisis adapted to the time and context. It would certainly not be helpful to confine themselves to envisaging the two solutions currently proposed by those involved: self-determination in the case of the Polisario Front and Algeria, and autonomy in the case of Morocco.

Unlike the European countries which, under the cover of a supposed neutrality, desire a victory for Morocco and hope that the Algerians will be obliged to change their stand, the Americans could introduce a greater element of pragmatism into the search for a solution. They could do this by abandoning the two extreme options that have proved so difficult to attain, and which by definition each imply the legitimisation of one of the parties involved, and the delegitimisation of the other, such is the extent to which each country has identified its own political system with this conflict. Morocco has constantly presented the inviolability of its national territory as a sacred principle, and Algerian politicians endlessly inflame their oratory on the subject of self-determination. The first step towards ending this deadlock is therefore to stop considering as sacrosanct things that have no reason to be so, in other words, the inviolability of the national territory in the case of Morocco, and the right of peoples to self-determination in the case of the Saharawi supporters of the Polisario Front and Algeria. The priority should become not to win a victory over the neighbouring country, but to undertake a real search for a solution to a conflict which also involves men and women who sooner or later will decide their own destiny, and not necessarily through the ballot-box. At this point in time, the Americans seem better equipped than the Europeans to bring about the resolution of this conflict, and to propose intermediate solutions which would allow the parties involved to avoid the feeling of being on the losing side. This obviously depends on whether the parties to the conflict will be ready to accept solutions to the crisis other than self-determination or autonomy.
At the beginning of 2005 there was an air of optimism in Algeria and in western Ministries of Foreign Affairs for the reforms being made by the Algerian Government. One of these projects has been taking shape during this year, the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. It was put to a referendum on 29th September and is intended to leave behind one of the most serious civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War.

At First, Caution and Scepticism

From the beginning of the year there was much speculation about the national reconciliation project that was going to be proposed by the Presidency. The caution in not releasing its details was on a par with the rejection to the idea of a general amnesty, a possible absence of the project. However, amongst people not directly affected, indifference predominated to this new legal move which was not greatly different to the first one, the 1999 Law of Civil Harmony.

At the same time, the government presented the results of the missing persons’ investigation commission, the Ks entini Commission. The commission issued a report which recognised a total of 6,146 missing people. However, these disappearances are not considered to be deliberate acts by the State, but extortion by some individuals taking unauthorised action that was not the responsibility of the State.

An Improved Security and Financial Situation

On the other hand, the economic and institutional reforms to improve governance are continuing and the currency reserves quickly increased (from $40 billions in January to 60 billions at the end of this year). These reserves meant that President Buteflika could announce a quinquennial plan to re-launch the economy, directed at modernising agriculture, infrastructures and the economic fabric.

The security situation had improved on two fronts. At the beginning of the year the dismantling of one of the Islamist terrorist groups, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and the partial break up of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) was announced. At the same time as the violence decreased, sectors of the Arouch movement – a protest movement created as a result of the death of a young person from Kabylie in a local police station in April 2001 – reached a new agreement with the government.

Acceleration

With respect to the referendum, the process quickly got under way in the summer. The national reconciliation plan was presented and in the same presidential decree on 14th August, which was published the following day in the Official Bulletin, the President summoned a national referendum to decide on the subject. The time given for reflection and debate was brief and the citizens were called to vote on 29th September.

The Campaign

The official campaign in favour of the yes vote was straightforward and used the slogan “From concord to national reconciliation. For Algeria”. It basically transmitted the idea that there was not any alternative to the Charter (see Laurence Thieux, “La carta para la reconciliación nacional en Argelia”. 5-10-2005 www.iecah.org). However, the social and political forces that opposed the text were not able to adequately communicate the arguments for a “no” vote. One of the few exceptions was the piece signed by a list of personalities that appeared in the Algerian press. Meanwhile, the President managed to organise successive meetings in 10 of the country’s most populated provinces.

The low key nature of the debate during the short campaign also favoured the President and the government successfully used the controversial French law for the historical memory to generate national sentiments and gain affection. In February, the approval in France of a controversial law on repatriation, which evoked the “positive aspects of colonisation” and its doctrine, provoked great indignation in Algeria, as well as in other French ex-colonies and overseas territories. The Algerian authorities repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the text as a prior condition to the signing of the French-Algerian Treaty of Friendship. It was expected to be approved during 2005 and will now be delayed until at least 2006.
Is it Really an Amnesty?

An amnesty consists of partly or completely pardoning a punishment or not persecuting a crime, normally political, to the benefit of a sector of the population after a change of circumstances, such as the end of a war or a change of regime. However, in Algeria’s case we find that there are amnesties for other crimes alongside the political ones, or even other crimes apart from political ones. Also there has not been a particular change of circumstances, but rather a reduction in the level of violence. Finally, the Algerian Charter neither calls itself an amnesty nor mentions the word, although legally it contains provisions for political and penal crime amnesties. Why? It is partly because it is a term that provokes rejection and partly because the law is looking for a way of exonerating the security forces of their collective and individual responsibilities. This exoneration is outside of the habitual framework of an amnesty. The Charter has caused various legal objections to be raised. According to Algerian national law, before an amnesty can be awarded the facts should be juridically qualified and then followed by a contradictory judicial process that at least dictates a symbolic sentence (see Daho Djerbal, “Le référendum du 29 septembre 2005 pour la paix et la réconciliation. Un double déni”, 3 October 2005, English version at www.mafhoum.com/press9/253P1.htm). In conformance with international practice, international organisations (AI, HRW, etc.) maintain that the amnesty processes can not impede the disclosure of the truth or the responsibility of the State to undertake judicial investi-
gations in the cases of serious violations of human rights (L. Thieux, op. cit).

Contents of the Peace and National Reconciliation Charter

The Charter is divided into 5 parts, apart from the prologue, that are as follows: 1) recognition of the security forces and their work, clause guaranteeing and protecting these institutions (it is prohibited to cause damage to the republic’s institutions or the honour of their agents), 2) peace consolidation measures, 3) national reconciliation measures, 4) measures regarding the missing persons and 5) measures to reinforce national cohesion.

The Reconciliation Charter is broader than the Law of Civil Harmony as it reduces the cases for exclusion from 4 to 3 and widens the amnesty and penal advantages provisions. Furthermore, as we have already mentioned, the Charter introduces sections on the security forces and socioeconomic, political and moral order measures, such as the call for individual pardon.

One of the issues not directly dealt with in the Reconciliation Charter is the disarmament of the local militia groups (Groupes de Légitime Défense, GLD) that operate all over the country and are a danger to lasting peace. They assume tasks that the State should not really delegate and have been justified because they carry out, amongst other things, self-defence missions in isolated areas. Their dismantling was announced as an element to reinforce the reconciliation, although it is still pending the development of the application texts.

The Results

The referendum’s question was worded in the following way: “Are you for or against the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation project that the government has proposed?” With a participation of 79.76%, the official percentage of voters in favour of the Peace and Reconciliation Project was 97.36%. The percentage of the vote against was only greater than 5% in five of the 49 electoral districts: Oran, Constantina, Annaba, Alger and the electoral district that is made up by the Algerian voters abroad and in two it exceeded 10%: Tizi Uzu and Beyaia (Small Kabila).

However, other unofficial information collected locally from the ballot boxes by various journalists, indicates a much smaller participation level and the use of tactics that were believed to have now been banned from the electoral colleges. One of the authorised Algerian correspondents observed in one of the capital’s colleges that attendance at the ballot box was less than 25% and was forced to leave when a recount of the voting slips was needed (see Meriem Ouyahia, Le Soir de l’Algérie, 30 September – 1 October 2005, p. 4). What is certain is that there were not any international observers at the referendum, as there were for the 2004 presidential elections.

The Efficacy and Consequences of the Charter

It seems clear that the weariness of the population led to the real participation being low and a general “yes” to the end of the violence. This remains, according to the approved Charter, in the willingness of the remaining resistance movements (basically the GSPC) to surrender, although this group had already announced its rejection of the project. It is likely, however, that there could be individual or partial desertions. It could also result in the definitive defeat of an armed group that is not only on the list of organisations linked to al-Qaeda, but has also threatened France with attacks, for which it will no doubt be subjected to particular questioning.

The negative side of the Charter is that although it provides for indemnifications and help for the victims, it closes the door to the clarification and judicial processing of the people responsible for the slaughters and disappearances, preventing the families having access to the information on the whereabouts of their loved ones.

It is too soon to judge the impact of the measure. The Charter will require application regulations, just as the 1999 Law of Civil Harmony did in its day. And it will surely establish requirement and validity periods for the penal advantages. In any case, it is useful to remember the thoughts of an Algerian anthropologist who urged caution. “Forgiveness, unlike an amnesty, can not be decreed. It is an individual act that implies recognition and the possibility of punishment. It requires strength of mind – not to forget, but to stop wishing to settle old scores – and it is this strength that determines whether the collective memories can facilitate or block the process” (see Abderrahmane Moussaoui, “Pertes et fracas. Une décennie algérienne meurtrière”, Naqd. Revue d’études et de critiques sociales, Autumn/Winter 2003, no. 18, pages 133-150).
On 7th January 2004, King Mohamed VI created the Justice and Reconciliation Commission (IER), to investigate human rights violations which have taken place since the country’s Independence in 1956 leading up to 1999. On 30th November 2005, the IER handed in their final report to his Majesty after 23 months of activity, and considered their work to be completed.

The work realized by the IER can be assessed on two levels. In the first place, according to its capacity and efficiency to carry out the mandate, as it is formulated in the Dahir n. 1.04.42 of the 19 safar 1425 (10th April 2004), by which they pass the IER Statutes. In Article 9, the IER’s mission is defined according to the following 7 points which can be summarized in this way: to establish the nature and degree of serious human rights violations taking into consideration the context in which they took place; to continue previous investigation work on those who have disappeared; to determine the official entities responsibilities or other roles; to work on the victim’s compensation; to write a report with conclusions and recommendations; and, finally, to develop and promote a culture of dialogue and lay down the bases for a national reconciliation process.

With respect to this mandate, it should be remembered that:

- The Commission is an advisory-type institution which was summoned by the King and whose mandate has reached a consensus with the Presidential Palace. Out of its 17 members, 9 come from the Advisory Council on Human Rights (ACHR), another advisory-type commission chaired by the same person, Dris Benzekri, an old political prisoner.
- Its work is of an extra-judicial nature. Furthermore, publication or public mention of the names of those accountable for human rights violations is prohibited. Likewise, no mechanism to judge these people has been envisaged. Just as those responsible declare: The “Moroccan Authority opted for a restorative judicial appeal and not for an accusatory appeal, and for historical truth in place of legal truth, because the restorative law is not limited only and exclusively to the courtroom, as it also extends out to the public sector covering social, cultural and political actions.” The objective is: “To determine the State’s responsibility instead of the individual’s responsibility.”
- In the final report’s summary, it hereby states the general responsibility of the state with regards to the facts, but it does not explain in a systematic way those bodies which are more involved in repression, nor does it ask old torturers to leave their posts, so they could continue to stay active in their jobs, as different human rights associations denounce them. In the case of repressing demonstrations, for example, it is stated that the diverse security bodies which intervened in the demonstration made it difficult to determine the responsibilities.

It can be concluded that the IER has been relatively successful in implementing their mandate. “Success” with respect to:

- The IER’s experience constitutes a novelty in the Arabian world and it also includes new aspects, if you compare it with similar experiences in other countries, for example the fact that they can grant compensations to the victims directly.
- It has given a voice to the victims, to the suffering of various generations who suffered abuses in silence due to an autocratic regime. And it has especially been able to reach far away regions from the capital, and which have been traditionally separated from the processes of claim and compensation.
- Their work has had a prominent symbolic, educational and pedagogical aspect. The work has led to the occurrence of seven public auditions in six regions of the country, and the television broadcasting of some victim’s testimonies that had been previously chosen. This task of raising awareness does not only affect society, but also the state concerning the emphasis on respecting human rights and contributing to solidifying the obligation of preserving and promoting human rights.
- It has allowed the advancement in the establishment of truth. A total of 742 cases of missing people have been...
In some cases their conclusions are clearly insufficient and even incorrect. This is the case of the “forced disappearances” of Sahrawis, estimated at 211 cases, a significantly lower figure to the one considered by the human rights organizations, from the Rif events, or from the Casablanca demonstration repression in 1981.

The report has not been able to throw light on the circumstances of some especially emblematic cases, like the disappearance and killing of the Socialist leader Mehdi Ben Barka in 1965. The IER has justified its inability to have gone further in investigations than what it has already done in all of these subjects due to a lack of time in carrying out its work (23 months).

Lastly, the IER has not been able to obtain an official apology for the victims on behalf of the King in the name of the State.

The Court can also be assessed on a second level: as an institution with a decisive role to play in the Moroccan democratization. According to an analysis of their prerogatives and mechanisms it can be declared that the Court does not have either the jurisdiction or, even in the case of claiming it, the power to carry out this role; although it can contribute effectively to advancing in this direction. Despite of not playing a main role, the IER’s vision as a main character in the democratization of the system has been supported by different factors.

In the first place, the quite extensive vision of the process of Moroccan liberalization started during the last decade of Hasan II’s reign is in reality a process of transition towards democracy, and therefore, all initiatives which affect the arena of civil and political rights (whether that being the Mudawana reform or the IER work) becomes interpreted as proof that Morocco moves in that direction. Maybe this idea seems altogether crazy or totally dismissible, but a serious analysis of the political reform processes should be put into process in order to verify that the power structure in Morocco today has an enormous resemblance to the lead years existence, and that the regime’s autocratic behaviour is undeniable. From here one should analyze which effective steps by those in power have been taken to dismantle the current system and promote a “change in regime.”

In second place, this IER vision, as a mainstay for a future transformation in deepening the system has been supported above all in official speech, and by the very own IER – in their documents, in their member’s declarations, especially during the international tour to publicize their work. Their work forms part of a link in the transition process. According to what the final report says: “An initial process of reconciliation was started at the beginning of 1990” by introducing reforms in the final years during Hasan II’s reign (legislative reforms, changing government in 1988, etc.). For the IER: “These changes formed the basis of the process of reconciling the Moroccans with their history.” Morocco finds itself at an advanced stage of the transition phase to democracy. The IER’s contribution to this objective will be carried out thanks to:

- The work carried out will have a catalytic effect which will trigger, by itself, new processes, in this way allowing “things to move.” Once the “truth” is expressed, it follows its own path.
- And once the final elaborated recommendations have been put into practice by the Court with regards to structural character reforms which are necessary so that there will not be a repeat of revealed abuses and that “the reform process is consolidated in the corresponding country.” The proposed program is of a very expansive and ambitious nature and, on applying it, will constitute a true democratization program. These recommendations include four aspects:
  1. The consolidation of human rights’ constitutional guarantees. This point includes the reinforcement of the separation of powers principle, and the constitutional prohibition of all executive power interference in the organization and the operation of judiciary power.
  2. The adoption and the putting into practice of an integrated national strategy to fight against impunity by the application of public politics in legal sectors, security sectors, law
and order, education and permanent training sectors.

3. The consolidation of the law’s state through reforms in the area of security (governing most security force agencies); of law (like the revision by means of the organic law of the Statute of Magistrate’s Superior Council), the update of legislation, and the improvement in criminal law.

4. The follow up of the IER work concerning decisions relating to compensation and other modalities, forms of damage, on establishing the truth in cases which are still not clear, the application of the recommendations laid out by IER and the preservation of its files and of public files.

Without denying the positive aspect a Court stand-in manifests on questions as necessary as the constitutional reform, there’s still a way to go before it has a real impact on the elite leader. It is worth considering why the Presidential Palace and the surroundings needed of an institution like IER (or its extension, the CCHR) in order to develop the reforms, in as far as that the Court recommendations are not so new and have been protesting from within and outside the country since, at least, the 1970s. And why we need to rest the weight of these reforms on an institution which has not been moulded out of the urns, and furthermore, is not of a consulting character. The thesis of the needs of a democracy “granted” by some reformist elites opposing some incompetent political parties, proves to be very doubtful and, above all, anti-democratic, and loses credibility before those repressive methods used against the Islamic opposition, the control of the elections or the legal and economic siege of the independent press which are all in process of disappearing, are just a few examples to name.

The work carried out by IER is without a doubt a necessary element, but not sufficient in the running of a true democracy. But all democratization processes rely on the citizen’s participation in the election of a good representative government with power to rule with a true separation of powers and in which there is a clear decision-taking process in use. Some of these conditions are not being currently fulfilled in Morocco.

Web of interest:
www.ier.ma
The Coup d’Etat in Mauritania and the Repercussions on its Relationship with the EU

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The coup d’Etat overthrowing President Ould Taya on 3rd August 2005 went beyond the classic format of a coup, already experienced in Mauritania – a peaceful Putsch with the consensus of the military, and constituted a specific case in terms of its objectives and political ramifications.

This method of change of government implemented by the military, although frequently used in Africa, is in fact considered as unconstitutional and illegal by the international community. This viewpoint has, since the end of the Cold War, become an institutionalized diplomatic policy.

The European Union in particular, in its agreements signed with different partners, demands the respect of democratic legality and reiterates its firm refusal to ratify unconstitutional changes. In this context the coup d’Etat of 3rd August 2005 was heartily condemned from the very beginning by the European Union, which expressed its reaction through the voice of the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, who deplored “the taking of power by force” and called for the respect of democracy and the legal institutional framework.

The Commission stressed that it will continue to follow the evolution of events very closely and at a future time “will assess the situation with regard to the provisions applicable according to the Cotonou agreement of which Mauritania is a signatory” (an explicit reference to the provisions of article 9 of the Cotonou ACP-EC Agreement).

The main European partners of Mauritania (France, Spain) followed the Commission in their strong condemnation of the Putsch.

However, once the first declarations of the military council had been made, the reaction of the different local and unofficial political forces was one of qualified appreciation for the change, which, although certainly formally illegal, could not be condemned in its aim of reform, seeking to rectify a politically untenable situation and clean up a democracy in deep crisis (political deadlock, drift towards authoritarian rule, exploitation of the administrative and judicial systems during the electoral process, and growing instability since the successive previous Putsch attempts in 2003 and 2004).

The crucial question which arises in this context is as follows: how should we view a coup de force which draws its legitimacy from a genuine popular following and global political consensus, rather than from formal judiciary procedures?

If the democratic ethos is the criteria for the evaluation of the legitimacy of a method of political change, should we not consider the coup d’Etat of 3rd August to be a salutary action, establishing the unbiased and necessary conditions for a peaceful, democratic alternation of power?

It is thus that Mauritania’s different partners have begun to revise their attitudes towards the transition government, ever since the first speech of the President of the Military Council to the nation on 2nd September 2005. This stipulated, among other points, a substantial constitutional reform, which guaranteed a genuine alternation via the introduction of important constitutional amendments.

Those concerned the election of the President of the Republic (eligibility with a mandate of 5 years renewable only once and the non-compatibility of the position of Head of State with any other political function).

The President of the Military Council also granted an amnesty to political prisoners, and made a commitment to strengthen political freedom during the transition period, which had been reduced from 2 years to 18 months.

Consultation days, extended to include all elements from the field of politics and civil society, were organised in November 2005. As to the outcome of these days, a large consensus emerged from the consultations concerning the main lines of change, particularly provisions for regulating the electoral process. Within this context an independent commission for the supervision of elections was set up, in direct consultation with the politicians concerned.

These initiatives were welcomed and encouraged by the European Union, which opened consultations with a large Mauritanian delegation in Brussels on 1st December 2005.

Whilst reiterating its constant position of condemning the taking of power by force, it has nevertheless noted its satisfaction as to the promises kept by the transition government in the memorandum presented to the Brussels meeting.

The Mauritanian authorities made a commitment to provide periodic reports on the state of evolution of the transition process. On the basis of this agreement, the European Union showed its support for the political reforms recommended by the Mauritanian party and welcomed “the full cooperation of the Mauritanian authorities, which is of capital importance in enabling the Union to...
continue to assist that country in its development efforts”.

The Brussels meetings were followed by a number of evaluation missions, which allowed European delegations visiting Nouakchott to assess the efforts taken by the Military Council and the transitional government in the context of the aforementioned commitments.

To this end a parliamentary delegation of the joint ACP/EU assembly, presided over by Mrs. Glenys Kinnock, stayed in Nouakchott, from 23rd to 24th February 2006. After this mission the European Union decided to provide financial support for the election budget (6 million Euros).

A number of representatives of European civil society, including Mrs. Kim Campbell and Mr. Cassam Vteen from the Club of Madrid, visited Nouakchott and declared support for the transition. These different initiatives and meetings made it possible to resume economic cooperation between Mauritania and the European Union from the beginning of May 2006.

In a press conference held in Nouakchott, on 4th May 2006, the MEP Luisa Fernanda Rudi Ubeda declared the European Union to be satisfied with the transition measures and the efforts to rectify the economy accomplished by the Mauritanian government. It decided to re-establish its regular aid to Mauritania, and to support and sustain the electoral process in its future phases (referendum on constitutional amendments on 24th June 2006 – legislative and municipal elections on 19th November 2006 – Senatorial elections on 21st January 2007 – Presidential elections on 11th March 2007).

This decision could be considered to be the realization of an alliance which gradually substituted the first hostile European reaction to the changes of 3rd August.
Palestinian Municipal Elections: a Gradual Change

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After boycotting the Oslo Accords, which were signed in September 1993 as part of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Islamic resistance movement, Hamas, decided to seize hold of the Palestinian political system via municipal elections. Ahmed Qureï, ex-Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority, declared 2004-2005 to be election year for Palestinians, due to the fact that in the course of the year several types of elections had to be held: municipal, legislative, presidential, and political elections for the Fatah movement, the party in power at the heart of the PLO, and the Palestinian Authority.

The question of elections was infinitely exploited, sometimes hoped for, even demanded by the USA, notably with the declaration of President Bush in June 2002, according to which the organisation of elections and the emergence of new leaders were a sine qua non condition for the creation of The Palestinian State. This idea of Hamas was abandoned when President Yasser Arafat, surrounded by Israeli tanks since January 2001 in the Mukataa at Ramallah, decided to organise general elections.

It should be remembered in this context that in 1976, when Israel wanted to discredit the PLO representative of the Palestinian people in Palestine, it allowed the organisation of municipal elections hoping to see emerging personalites hostile or at least distant from the PLO The effects produced were quite the opposite the majority of those who won the municipal elections being very close to the Palestinian centre.

At this point the Israeli authorities resorted to the exile or imprisonment of its elected mayors, eventually allowing groups of fanatic Israelis to attack those elected by the Palestinians. Since then no election has taken place in the Palestinian territories other than those involving syndicates.

Since the return of the PLO in July 1994, a new dynamism has been developed, to the point that for the first time in the Palestinian territories, presidential and legislative elections were held in January 1996. But at municipal level, things were handled differently, through the nomination of municipal councils in the whole of the West Bank and Gaza territories. These nominations were controlled according to a system of regional and tribal balancing inserted in the Palestinian political system.

But this question of municipal elections was always at the centre of Palestinian internal political and social struggles and demands. Thus the first law passed by the Palestinian legislative council was precisely one for local communities. Nevertheless, President Yasser Arafat has always preferred to shelve this question for political reasons, which notably reveal the fear of the possible arrival of Hamas candidates at the head of municipal councils. But finally President Yasser Arafat was obliged to give in to the demands of the political parties and associated movements. This is how the Palestinian Authority decided, after the Legislative Council passed the law of proportional elections, to organise the first phase of municipal elections on 23 December 2004. This date was scrupulously adhered to, despite the death of President Yasser Arafat.

Election phases

The law on local elections passed in December 1996 allowed the election of municipal council members to take place with voting for a single member in one round. The number of seats on the municipal council depends on the number of inhabitants entered on the electoral roll. As far as the voters are concerned, the law indicates that every person residing in the municipal territory is a citizen, whether it is their place of permanent residence or their place of work. But it did not give any explanation about the votes of refugees. An implicit agreement was made on this subject between the minister of local government and the associations for the defense of refugees in July 1997, which established a distinction between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Amendments to the electoral law of 1996 were introduced by the government shortly before holding the municipal elections of 2004/2005. The most important was that one establishing a minimum quota for the representation of women on municipal councils. This stipulated the election of at least two women per council, whatever the size of the considered conscription. A presidential decree of March 2005 equally established a denominational quota for some localities which were historically or in the majority Christian. For the poll of May 2005, this involved Bethlehem (where 8 out of 15 councilors had to be Christian) Beit Jala and Beit Sahour (7 councilors out of 13).
Furthermore, the high central committee of municipal elections decided to adopt a 5 stage process of elections across all of the Palestinian territories. The reason given for this progressive method was the stable state of public security in each Palestinian locality, in relation to the Israeli occupying forces. Thus, according to this logic, the elections had to take place for the first time in each locality under Palestinian control and not under Israeli military control.

**Rise of Hamas**

The first phase was developed in two stages: a first election took place on 23rd December 2004; it involved 26 West Bank municipalities. A second election took place on 27th January 2005; it involved 10 Gaza Strip municipalities. It should be noted that this first election took place 40 days after the death of the President Yasser Arafat and a month before the presidential elections of 9th January 2005.

The second important factor in this Palestinian political scene was the participation for the first time of the Islamic resistance group, Hamas, even though this movement had been listed as a terrorist organization since September 2003. The other organizations opposing the Oslo Accords also took part in this election, with the exception of the Islamic Jihad movement.

In the first stage of the first phase on the West Bank, the Fatah movement won in 14 municipal councils, whilst Hamas took control of 9 councils. This was therefore the first penetration of the Islamic movement, which was to be followed a month later by a very significant victory by Hamas in the second stage on 27 January 2005, when Fatah only gained 2 out of 10 councilors in the Gaza strip.

The second phase of the municipal elections took place on 5th May 2005; it involved 84 municipalities (municipal councils, local councils, village councils) and villages in the West Bank (76) and the Gaza Strip (8). More than 400,000 electors were called to vote to elect 906 members of local councils. The level of participation was 82% of some 400,000 people aged over 18 years and eligible to vote. Fatah won 55% of the 906 available seats compared to 34% obtained by Hamas. This result allowed Fatah to control some 50 municipal councils, compared to the 28 of Hamas, the rest going to independent or less important groups. However, in this election, Fatah instigated court proceedings over the proper conduct of the elections in certain polling stations and this led to the court’s decision to nullify the results of 4 polling stations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

The third phase was held solely in the West Bank, on the 29 September 2005, and the fourth, the most important one, was also held in the West Bank on the 15th December 2005, just a month before the second legislative elections when Hamas officially announced its participation.

In this fourth phase, which was held in 4 main towns in the West Bank, such as Ramallah, (centre of the Palestinian Authority) Hamas won a net victory of 73% of the electoral voice, which allowed the Islamist group to take control of 13 out of 15 municipalities.

It could be said that this stage was in some way a first snapshot of the Palestinian political landscape, since a month later the Palestinian people elected a strong Hamas majority to the legislative council, on 25 January 2006.

It should be noted that there was an important participation of international observers in the whole electoral process (there remains a 5th phase, which must take place in the month of August or September 2006, which will involve the rest of the large towns in the West Bank and Gaza, such as the towns of Hebron and Gaza).

All the reports of international teams indicated that the whole of the Palestinian election process, both the general and the municipal level, was carried out under democratic and transparent conditions despite all the difficulties, due mainly to the presence of the Israeli occupying forces.

It remains only to say that the results of these elections are the fruits of a certain number of factors, linked simultaneously to the Palestinian system itself, but also to the pursuit of the Israeli occupation, and the powerlessness of the international community to have international law respected.
Egypt: The Year of the Elections and Elusive Political Reforms

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The year 2005 was a momentous, yet turbulent one for Egypt. The country witnessed two major elections, presidential and parliamentary, a vibrant movement towards political reform, and a remarkable political mobility. All this came against a background of internal domestic pressures on the regime to expand the scope of pluralism, and amidst concerns that President Mubarak would run for office for a fifth term, thus ruling Egypt for 29 years. The increased interest of external actors, particularly the US and the EU, in political reforms has also prompted the regime to introduce a series of measures that allowed the country, for the first time since it became a republic, to have a multi-candidate presidential elections and a relatively more contested legislative elections.

It is uncertain, however, whether these measures will allow Egypt to embark on the threshold of a genuine democratization. As it seems, Egypt presents a classical case of an authoritarian or a semi-authoritarian regime that suffer from a clear erosion of its legitimacy and popularity, low capacity to address the economic and social problems of large segments of society, a crisis of political succession, and an increasing opposition to a possible Syrian-style hand-over of power to Mubarak’s son, Gamal. All these issues have emboldened various groups and segments in the society during 2004 and 2005 to articulate publicly their protest against a further extension for Mubarak and the grooming of his son to possibly take over power after him.

In a relatively short time, several protest movements emerged including Kifaya (Enough), the National Rally for Democratic Change, in addition to tens of pro-change groups. The country’s main Islamic movement, the Muslim Brothers, joined the pro-reform movement and staged a number of massive demonstrations across the country, calling for a faster pace for the reforms and expanding public freedoms. The judges also joined the pro-reform movement and pressed the regime for certain demands that would ensure the independence of the judiciary in return for their supervision over the presidential and parliamentary elections, scheduled to take place in September and November, respectively. All these pro-reform forces seem to have reached an agreement on a clear list of demands that included ending the state of emergency (in effect since Mubarak assumed power in 1981); freedom of association; holding free and clean elections, changing the Constitution, limiting the powers of the president; granting more authority to the parliament; and enhancing the independence of the Judiciary. To circumvent the growing demands for reform, the regime engaged the licensed opposition parties in a closed dialogue, for which it has set and controlled the re-form agenda. It dismissed any discussion of the possibility of amending the constitution, changing the rules of the presidential elections, or lifting the state of emergency. It allowed for minor changes in some of the existing restrictive laws that regulate the formation of political parties and the electoral system.

The Amendment of Article 76: Conditional Contestation

President Mubarak’s announcement in February 2005 to allow for an amendment of Article 76, which dealt with the rules for the selection of the president, came as a surprise. After all, the licensed opposition parties had already accepted during their dialogue with the regime to drop this demand for the time being. Several factors could explain Mubarak’s decision to change this article. The way the article was amended clearly served Mubarak to boost his legitimacy through low-risk competitive elections and would pave the way for his son to take over power in a seemingly more “democratic” way. The amendment allowed for more than one candidate to run for the presidency. However, it introduced elaborate conditions that make it almost impossible for a non-National Democratic Party member (NDP, the state party), particularly independents, to stand a chance of being eligible to become a candidate. To stand for election, the amended article allows only candidates of political parties that had won 5% of the seats in the Parliament to run. It requires independent candidates to secure 250 signatures of elected officials in the Parliament, the Shoura Council, and local councils. Despite the reservations of the opposition parties, the amendment was approved by almost 83% in a popular referendum on May 25th, a day that was marred by state brutality against protesters who opposed the way the amendment was legally drafted. State-backed thugs sexually molested and beat several female protesters. The violence triggered a wide domestic
anger, as well as criticism from the outside world.

The Presidential Elections: New Form... Same Results

Ten candidates contested the presidential elections that took place on September 7th. This was preceded with public election campaigns, in which the state media maintained some degree of neutrality. For the first time, Egyptians were exposed to different views attempting to address their domestic problems. Mubarak, who was projected in a new look, made expansive campaign promises focusing on the creation of new jobs, providing housing and introducing further political reforms. It is clear from the results of the elections that what changed was the form, but not the substance of this particular aspect of Egyptian politics. Despite the fact that this was the first competitive elections in post 1952 Revolution Egypt, voters turn-out was strikingly low, reaching only 23%. The majority of voters (77%) demonstrated a high level of apathy, perhaps sending a message of no confidence in the whole process. Mubarak still won more than 88.5% (6.3 million) of the valid votes (7.3 million); Ayman Nour, the leader of the newly formed Ghad (Tomorrow) Party, came second with 8% (540,000); Noman Gomaa, the head of the historic Wafd Party, came third with less than 3% (200,000). A careful reading of the results shows that Mubarak won only 19.6% of the 32 million registered voters; and less than 12% of the eligible voters (48 million). Ayman Nour emerged as the major challenger to the president, and a possible future threat. The results also reflected the profound structural weaknesses of the opposition parties in the country. Typically, the political parties were divided and failed to back a single opposition candidate to run against the incumbent president. Some opposition parties, like the leftist Tagamu and the Nasserites, boycotted the elections; while the Muslim Brotherhood allowed its members to vote, but did not favour a particular candidate. Seven party leaders who ran against the president received a total of only 2% of the votes, reflecting the lack of popularity of the political parties. Though his victory came as no surprise, the results of the presidential elections could hardly enable Mubarak to claim a new legitimacy.

The Parliamentary Elections: The Limits for the Reforms

The Parliamentary elections of 2005 clearly showed the limits to political reforms, as they were marred by state violence, intimidation of voters, and rigging. The elections were held over three phases to ensure complete judicial supervision. Mubarak promised a clean and transparent election. Nonetheless, the second and third phases were characterized by severe irregularities, vote-stuffing, thuggery, and state violence that resulted in seven deaths and tens of causalities. The state party, NDP, won 314 out of 454 seats (70%). The Muslim Brothers made a strong showing as they captured 88 seats (20%) – the highest number of seats an opposition group has captured over the past 50 years. The rest of the opposition parties combined won only 12 seats (3.4%); and the independents captured 6% of the seats. Though still in control with a two-thirds majority in the Parliament, the NDP’s performance was astonishingly poor. In reality, the party candidates who ran on the NDP’s lists won only 33.5% of the seats (they lost 287 out of 432 contested seats). The NDP was rescued only by allowing the winning party members, who were not originally nominated by the party and had to run as independents, to re-join the party, thus bringing its seats in the Parliament up to 314. The Parliamentary elections have been revealing in many respects. They clearly show how far the regime would go with reforms. The Egyptian regime will allow reforms only as long as they do not alter the structures of power in the country. It is not willing to share power or allow for meaningful reforms that would weaken its grip over the system, the reform agenda, and the reform process. The poor performance of the state party equally proves that the overarching process of the NDP that Gamal Mubarak has undertaken over the past years has been meaningless. It has not enabled the party to gain popularity or connect with the ordinary people. The elections highlighted the place of the Muslim Brothers as the main opposition force in the country and allowed them to run on a broad pro-reform platform. As with regards to the secular and liberal opposition parties, the elections once again underscored their weaknesses in society and their inability to mobilize a sizable popular support.

The Aftermath of the Elections: Can't Teach an Old Party New Tricks

Following the elections, several secular and liberal opposition parties began to disintegrate due to internal power struggles, as well as to regime intervention. Ayman Nour’s newly established party, al-Ghad, split into two factions. Nour himself, a major contender against Mubarak during the September Presidential elections, was sentenced on December 24th to five-years in prison for allegedly forging membership signatures. The Wafd Party underwent a major rift, as members of its High Committee fired the party’s leader, Noman Gomaa, because of his authoritarian leadership style, triggering a potential split and the possibility of a freeze on the party’s activities. The leftist Tagamu and the Nasserite Parties experienced major internal dissonance and increasing calls for overhauling, after their poor performance in the Parliamentary elections. The NDP too undertook a major reshuffling within its highest structures, as President Mubarak dismissed prominent elements of the party’s old guards, expanded the membership of the General Secretariat, and appointed new members known to be close to his son Gamal. This move has been interpreted as marking the victory of the new guards, led by Gamal, within the party and as further consolidating Gamal’s influence.

The Muslim Brothers, who appear to be coherent and to have their own vision of change, seem to adopt a pragmatic attitude. To avert a potential crackdown or down-sizing by the re-
gime, they have maintained a low profile since the elections. Their strong showing in the elections has raised concerns. They tried to address the concerns of the country’s secular intellectuals and the Copts. They have continued to focus on a broad pro-reform agenda: limiting the powers of the president; removing restrictions on presidential candidacy; focusing on the monitoring role of the parliament; expressing willingness to join the opposition block in the parliament; focusing on domestic issues and the needs of their constituency.

When it comes to reforms, the year 2005 will be remembered as a year of both great hopes and enormous frustrations. The pro-reform movement seems to have built a momentum; there seems to be an agreement on a clear list of reform demands; the election process energized the whole political spectrum. On the downside, the regime is still in control of the agenda, pace, and boundaries of reform; its ability to circumvent the domestic and external pressures remains unabated; its propensity to use force is high; and willingness to change the structures of power is remarkably low. At any rate, 2005 has brought in a clear political vitality that will have a long-term impact on Egypt’s political life.
Political Evolution and the State of Reforms in Syria

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If one had to identify turning points in Syria’s politics after the death of Hafiz al-Asad in 2000, no doubt the events of 2005 top the list. In one seemingly endless year for the country’s political elite, Syria endured a number of fundamental political blows. Internationally, its isolation is on the rise, regionally, its influence and prowess have been relatively compromised, and locally, its “patriotic” domestic opposition has been reinvigorated. The political bright light for the Syrian regime is a dim one at best for most Syrians: the new regime of Bashar Asad, the giant’s son, was finally consolidated in the summer of 2005 when the 10th Regional Ba‘th Conference rid the regime of trouble-makers and Stafford its top rungs with loyalists.

Economically, growth has been dismal amidst dwindling oil reserves, with slight advances in some sectors, mostly due to factors such as a better rainfall season and exergetic deals and transactions that involved dominant economic and political figures. Significant reforms have been confined to the eruption of private banks that still do not satisfy the spectrum of functions that neighboring countries’ banks do. All the while, Syria’s developmental crisis – rendered “invisible” or insignificant by the regime – is developing fast, with a poor productive capacity in terms of skilled labor and infrastructural power, rising unemployment, and a disturbingly high poverty rate for a self-proclaimed socialist republic.

Nonetheless, it is a mistake to assume the impending demise of the Syrian regime, as many analysts are rushing to proclaim. The factors that are at work in the direction of regime sustenance have to do more with the mistakes, failures, and misguided adventures of those who are considered to be Syria’s opponents, locally, regionally, and internationally. Moreover, these mistakes have fed an unprecedented rise in Syrian nationalism of which the regime has been the unintended beneficiary. The temporary harmony that the events of 2005 have created between the regime and the people in Syria have helped the country to withstand the crises described above. The question is whether that harmony is likely to be furthered or undermined by the regime’s domestic policies. The mounting number of critics and opposition members arrested towards the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006 are more likely to counteract the benefits for the regime of this temporary loan on a longer life. I will discuss the main events that shaped the year 2005 for Syria, beginning with the big picture that defines the regime’s challenges and the pivotal 10th Regional Ba‘th conference, and ending with the dismal state of the economy and the older tactics that the regime resorted to once it (re)consolidated its power.

The Big Picture

For Syria’s political elite, the shocks of 2005 were not unusual. Nor was it beyond the capacity of the awkward, yet maturing new leadership around President Bashar al-Asad to deal with this adversity. What has changed rather decisively is the world around Syria’s co-concoon. Coupled with domestic woes, this change does challenge the abilities of the regime. Violent regime change in Iraq, the humiliating loss of Syrian control in Lebanon, and a strident Israel emboldened by a duplicitous “war on terror” have combined to isolate Syria and to diminish its regional influence. The results of negotiations with the European Union to bring Syria into the EU’s “Association Agreements” of Euro-Mediterranean economic integration have been disappointing. To make things worse, the Bush administration, backed by Congress, persists in pursuing an unprincipled anti-Syria campaign whose point of reference remains elusive.

In 2005, Syria finds itself bereft of the foreign policy tools whose advantages it has enjoyed for over 30 years. Between 1970 and 1990, the Syrian regime benefited from the superpower competition of the Cold War. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1990, Damascus relied on playing a regional role, beginning with its participation in the US-led coalition to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1990. Now, the international and regional fronts are both closed, and the Syrian regime is left with a lone front on which to fight for its viability: at home. The domestic front is where the regime has historically been most vulnerable.

Consolidating the Regime’s Power

The 10th Regional Ba‘th Conference, held in early June 2005, was housekeeping in preparation for an entrenchment par excellence. It saw the apparent consolidation of Bashar al-Asad’s rule at a time when significant external and in-
ternal tensions and threats are coinciding for the first time since the 1960s. According to Ibrahim Hamidi, perhaps the most informed and incisive journalist in Syria today, "The message that the Regional Ba'th Conference wanted to send at the end of the conference to public opinion, the opposition and foreign actors – especially America – is that the Ba'th Party will remain the ruling party in Syria." (Al-Hayat, June 19, 2005)

Very little was said at the conference about foreign policy, beyond affirmation that peace will remain Syria’s “strategic choice” and the regime will work to enhance its bargaining position vis-à-vis Israel. Indicating the regime’s domestic focus, Bashar emphasized that “any decisions or recommendations made during the conference should express our internal needs only, in isolation from any other considerations aimed at pushing us in directions that contradict our national interest or threaten our stability.” (Al-Hayat, June 7, 2005)

The conference was not without positive developments, though these were hardly far-reaching reforms. Expanding space for political participation was a recurring theme. For the first time, there were serious recommendations that the state should review the Emergency Law in place since 1963, with an eye toward “narrowing the scope of state security matters.” (Hamidi, 2005) A new “political parties law” is likely to take effect soon, (Al-Hayat, June 7, 2005) though Article 8 of the constitution, designating the Ba'th Party as the “leader of state and society,” will remain untouched (Moubayed, 2005).

The Heart of the Regime

It is no secret that Syria’s real strongmen sit at the helms of General Security, Military Security, and the Republican Guard. Perhaps the most visible development at the Regional Ba'th Conference was the replacement within the Regional Command of what remains of the “old guard” that surrounded Bashar’s father with a “new” team. A charter member of the old guard, 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, “resigned” as vice president and as a member of the Regional and National Command Councils after sensing the isolation of the “older” Ba'thists. As Khaddam is perhaps the second most visible icon of the Ba'th regime after Hafiz al-Asad, the nature of his exit – which was not “honorable” – bespeaks the end of an era. Khaddam’s public denouncement of the regime (from afar, in Paris) ushers in a new era.

Two competing outcomes may be in store for the regime’s consolidated new team: on the one hand, its unquestioning loyalty will make for a less erratic policy. On the other hand, the new Command leadership lacks vision and, many say, competence. It remains to be seen which edge of the sword will strike. If the new team is a short-term fix to rid the leadership of troublemakers, then it could enable a smoother and surer decision-making process in the future. However, if the desired end is to surround the leadership with complacent figures in perpetuity, then it is probable that Syria will return to square one, with the leadership approaching a stifling absolutism of sorts. Unfortunately for most Syrians, the latter scenario seems to be gaining ground.

State of the Economy

The state of the Syrian economy remains dismal. It is unclear whether the deliberations at the Ba'th Regional Command Conference or the rhetoric about “modernization” reflect the sophistication that is required to deal with the crisis. Optimists continue to debate whether this or that liberalization measure is likely to improve the economy as though the missing link is a “good plan.” The announcement by the chief of the State Planning Commission in 2004 that Syria will adopt the principles of a market economy by 2010 brought relief to optimists (Al-Hayat, April 16, 2004). So did the announcement at the Ba'th Regional Conference that Syria will adopt a “social market economy.” But what about the elephants in the room?

Syria’s economy stagnated between 1996 and 2004, with an estimated average growth rate of 2.4 percent [Interview with ‘Isam al-Za’im, former minister of industry, Damascus, July 26, 2005]. Meanwhile, the population is growing at a rate of 2.7 percent, (Al-Hayat, December 1, 2004; interview with Za’im) spelling disaster for development. Economic growth reached 3.4 percent in 2003, but that unusually high rate reflected the sale of Iraqi oil through Syria and then the rise of oil prices as a result of the Iraq war. In 2004, economic growth dropped to 1.7 percent, showing the danger of depending on oil rents [According to Za’im, government statistics show higher levels of growth for 2004]. Final official figures for 2005 are usually published in the summer of the following year, but the reading of independent analysts is not a positive one. Oil production reached 591,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1995 but declined to 450,000 bpd in 2005. According to one estimate, Syria will become a net importer of oil for the first time in 30 years by 2012 (N. Sukkar, 2005; for more optimistic estimates, see al-Iqtisadiyya, July 24, 2005). The good news for the Syrian regime is that the rise in natural gas production is likely to compensate for a substantial part of the decrease in oil production. Gas reserves are estimated at 240 billion cubic meters [Interview with Za’im]. Much depends on the transit revenues that Syria will receive from the Arab Gas Pipeline linking Egypt with Turkey and eastern Europe (N. Sukkar, 2005). Ultimately, rent income from oil or gas will only buy time. Unemployment, poverty, investment and the dilapidated public sector firms require immediate attention.

Syrians are suffering from an alarming decrease in their standard of living. In 2003-2004, 5.1 million people (or 30.1 percent of the population) were living below the poverty line, with 2 million Syrians unable to meet their basic needs (UNDP, 2005; pp. 1-6). By most estimates, there is 20 percent unemployment in the country, with at least 300,000 new workers entering the job market each year (Interview with Za’im, see also Sukkar, 2005). Accoring to former State Planning Commission chief and current Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs ‘Abdallah al-Dardari, an average annual growth rate of 7 percent will be necessary to provide employment for job seekers. Where will this growth come from? There are very few reasonable answers in sight under the current and medium-term view.

With oil income tapering off, Syria’s public and private sectors must do the heavy lifting, but do not have the where-
withal to do so. To generate growth in those sectors, the regime appeared to be counting on the trade benefits of an association agreement with the EU. But after the assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, the EU withdrew its promises of an (expedited) agreement that was nearly reached earlier. In any case, for the time being, the idea that an EU association agreement can provide the cure for Syria's economic ills is incommensurate with the political and institutional requirements of such an agreement.

The Balance Sheet

According to Nabil Sukkar, a seasoned economist and business consultant, "There is a need for a 'Great Leap Forward,' not an incremental progression." Syria's economy remains captive to the country's brand of centralized politics. Economic rationality remains severely fettered by a political logic that prevents the very idea of a comprehensive reform plan, without which incremental measures are ineffective at worst and reversible at best. Problems of low investment, an inhospitable environment, a weak judiciary and idiosyncratic state intervention are not economic, but political through and through.

Politically, the regime has been reverting more steadily to the old(er) tactics of silencing dissent in a less subtle manner, arresting and jailing critics on grounds of "incitement" of sorts, none of which are considered legitimate by the wider public. But the regime seems to have reached the point where it is comfortable with such reversion. In the final analysis, this comfort might shorten the life of the regime because it camouflages the growing political and economic crises that have been fermenting, locally, regionally, and internationally. The outlook for 2006 is not radically different, but 2007 is likely to usher in some unforeseen surprises on various fronts.

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2005 was a year of great change in Lebanon with events triggered by the assassination of former Prime Minister (PM) Rafic Hariri and popular protests leading to the withdrawal of Syrian troops after what became known as the ‘Cedar Revolution’. The country is left with several unresolved problems, but also with great hopes for a fresh start. The regional and international context is that developments in Lebanon in 2005 are part of the fallout from the US invasion of Iraq and the transformations in the strategic environment that accompanied it. Thus Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, which was established with international blessing largely as a recompense for Syria having joined the first Gulf War coalition against Iraq in 1990, is being dismantled as a consequence of the second invasion of Iraq in 2003. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1559, sponsored by France and the US, is seen as a resumption of protection by the two main powers who burnt their fingers in Lebanon in the early 80s and withdrew from Beirut together with the rest of the existing Multi-National Force. What they left behind then are all the problems that they are trying to resolve now. In 1990 the international community was happy to have Syria restore stability in Lebanon and put a lid on all the problems and, now that the lid is off, it is many of these that have resurfaced and which it is trying to address.

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Crisis in Lebanese-Syrian Relations

The greatest challenge is how to re-establish Lebanese-Syrian relations and on what basis. The main reason for this tension is that the revolt in Lebanon was against a joint Syrian-Lebanese system dominated by the security establishments in both countries. This revolt in Lebanon poses a threat to the same establishment in Syria itself. At the same time Syria holds the key to many of the problems that were left behind after its withdrawal from Lebanon. Syrian troops entered Lebanon in June 1976 and left it in April 2005. The two countries had established ‘special relations’ after the end of the civil war and signed several agreements. Most importantly, in the last fifteen years, Syria has had almost total control of Lebanese security institutions, and together they built a security services-dominated state. This order of things brought stability in Lebanon to the extent that 2004 had been a good year by all measures. But stability came at a great cost: a compromise on certain freedoms and a measure of repression, as well as a heavy economic cost brought about by corruption that left the country heavily in debt. The system broke down when the Syrian regime felt that it was under increasing pressure from the US, and the Lebanese saw this as an opportunity to decrease Syrian influence in the country. The straw that broke the camel’s back was Syria’s insistence on amending the Lebanese constitution and extending the mandate of President Emile Lahoud in the summer of 2004, which triggered the crisis about international intervention that the Syrian regime saw as being encouraged by former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.

The assassination of Rafic Hariri, in February, brought people out into the streets, and the various demonstrations both pro – and anti – Syrian in March of 2005 involved close to half the population of Lebanon. The two societies are too close to each other, and developments in one are bound to influence the other. In Lebanon the shock produced an absence of fear, and if this caused the same effect in Syria, the regime of the Baath party rule would also be under threat. The example of Iraq means that it is feared that a regime collapse in Syria, whether triggered by internal or external forces, would result in Iraqi-style chaos, with civil war and religious extremists coming to power.

International support came in the form of several UN Security Council resolutions. UNSC resolution 1595 on April 7th established a United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) on the murder of former PM Rafic Hariri headed by the German prosecutor Detlev Melhis. The commission presented its reports on the 19th of October and on the 10th of December. These were followed by UNSC resolutions 1636 on 31 October and 1644 on 15 December. Resolutions were passed unanimously and were strongly in support of Lebanon, but were watered down because of indecision and disagreement between the main powers on how far the international community can go in dealing with Syria. The dilemma is influenced by the example of chaos in Iraq. Amongst the regional powers, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, there is
also great reluctance to provoke further instability by weakening the Syrian regime to the point of no return, and they are eager to mediate in order to end the crisis. Thus one of the main concerns in Lebanon is about the sustainability of international support, given all the other problems in the region, and this is again linked to the Iraq situation and talk of an exit strategy for the coalition forces from that country.

There are various mechanisms to mend the relations between the two countries in the long run. But until the matter of the stalemate in the investigation is resolved, it is unlikely that any measures would be effective. Serge Brammertz has been appointed to head the investigation after Mehlis’s departure. In the meantime Lebanon is likely to suffer both politically and economically until this situation is resolved. There have been several border closures and restrictions on Lebanese merchandise transiting through Syria to such destinations as Iraq and other Arab Gulf countries, resulting in loss of trade. Lebanon also benefits from Syrian labour and informal trade activity over the borders. The security situation in Lebanon has deteriorated with further assassinations and explosions. Most importantly, bad relations with Syria are likely to exacerbate internal divisions within Lebanon, paralysing the political process and causing further difficulties in implementing policies. Syria still holds the key to the major unresolved issues, both internally and in UNSC resolution 1559.

Security Concerns

Disengagement from Syria meant the dismantling of the complex web of the Lebanese-Syrian security apparatus that pretty much dominated most aspects of political and economic life in Lebanon. This left the country exposed and the security situation deteriorated. A series of explosions and assassinations at regular intervals targeted at areas and people seen as opposed to Syria in Lebanon. In addition to former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and the Minister of the Economy Bassil Fuleihan, two prominent journalists Samir Kassir and Gibran Tueni and the former leader of the communist party George Hawi were assassinated with car bombs; there were two other unsuccessful attempts, one of a TV presenter May Chidiac, and the other on Minister of Defence Elias el Murr. Altogether 15 explosions in Beirut and its suburbs aimed at spreading terror and creating instability. This was accompanied by rumours of a hit list including many of the political leaders and media personalities at the forefront of opposition to Syria, some of whom had taken refuge abroad.

Instability over the border with Israel, with exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah, continued at regular intervals throughout the year. This is linked to the discussions over the disarmament of Hezbollah and the issue of the Israeli occupation of a border area called the Shebaa farms. The Israelis claim that they took this land from Syria in 1967 and thus consider it as Syrian territory. Syria has issued ambiguous statements that do not resolve the ownership of the area and the Lebanese government is calling for a demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian border largely in order to resolve this issue.

Another security concern is the armed presence in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The camps are semi-autonomous areas with Lebanese state authority absent. A struggle between the mainstream Fatah organisation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and several radical organisations, ten of which have been organised under Syrian tutelage as a front opposed to the PLO’s Oslo accord with Israel. It is mainly these organisations that are supposed to be disarmed according to UNSC resolution 1559. There has been many threats and declarations issued by such organisations. The Lebanese government of PM Fouad Siniora has opened a dialogue with them and with representatives of the PLO, and the situation so far seems to be under control.

Adjusting the Political Process

The political upheaval in the country was the equivalent of a peaceful internal coup, with the dismantling of one order and replacing it with another, but the process is not without problems and is not complete. The country has seen massive popular demonstrations, three governments, one general election, the return of exiled politicians General Michel Aoun, and the release of former prisoners like Christian militia leader Samir Geagea. There is also a crisis with the presidency of pro-Syrian General Emile Lahoud, whose mandate extension last year provoked the present crisis. Hezbollah and Amal, the two main Shiite parties, remain loyal to Syria, and the process of avoiding a direct clash with them by other parties threatens to create paralysis in the government and institutions. The disarmament of Hezbollah remains one of the thorniest items to be implemented in UNSC resolution 1559.

After the assassination of former PM Hariri on February 14th, the government of PM Omar Karami resigned due to public pressure on February 28, this was replaced by the government of PM Najib Mikati, which was an interim government whose main task was to run the elections. This was then followed by the government of PM Fouad Siniora, a close aid of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. Parliament is now composed roughly of three blocks: one is the coalition around Saad Hariri, composed of Christian, Druze and Sunni MPs; this has control of over 70 seats out of 128. The rest is divided between the two Shia parties, Amal and Hezbollah, and the bloc of General Aoun. The government contains for the first time official Hezbollah representation but excludes the bloc of General Aoun. The decision making process is thus weak, because it has to compromise between different factions represented in the government. A serious crisis has been averted over the decision to call for the formation of an international tribunal. This resulted in the Shiite ministers walking out of the cabinet meeting, which sparked a debate on whether to take decisions by consensus (which may spell paralysis), or by majority rule (which may spell crisis). In short, the choice is between confrontation and paralysis, and the Lebanese chose paralysis.
On the positive side, there is a huge impetus for reform driven by civil society and popular demand and followed by the politicians with them. On the negative side, the country is still divided over the issue of relations with Syria, and until this is resolved the paralysis it creates is likely to hamper any advance on in the reform agenda. There are preparations for a conference of support to the Lebanese economy, called ‘Beirut I’, following the Paris II meeting of November 2002 convened by president Chirac. The success of this conference rests on the government’s ability to present and implement policies of economic and social reform that will convince donors that supporting the Lebanese economy will put its debt servicing on a sustainable path. Lebanon entered into negotiations with the EU over an Action Plan within the European Neighbourhood policy. The Association Agreement under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership will also enter into force in early 2006. Lebanon regards such agreements and strengthening of relations as a form of additional protection, a concept heavily ingrained in the foreign policy doctrine that governs the external relations of the country, and will determine whether it sinks or floats.
EU Relations with Croatia in 2005

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The start of negotiations on the European Union (EU) membership was the most important achievement of the Croatian Government in 2005. Croatia is the first Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) country that started negotiations with the EU and therefore this event was also important for the region.

It could motivate the other countries to follow the example and build stable democratic structures, capable of meeting the membership criteria. Croatia is also a Mediterranean country with very strong Mediterranean identity and its steps towards EU membership could help Croatia to play the bridging role in linking the Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe with the Mediterranean basin.

Reaching the level of internal readiness for the EU integration by the end of 2007 and full membership in 2009 is a target of Croatian Government. The objective is to become fully prepared to assume all membership rights and obligations and to successfully take position of a new member state. Croatian Government estimates that it might need less time for negotiations than the former candidates, having in mind the achieved level of preparations combined with the possibility of using the already existing knowledge, experience and the institutional memory of the previous enlargement.

According to the opinion of Olli Rehn, member of the European Commission responsible for enlargement (Croatia & EU, Privredni vjesnik, special issue. July 2005.), Croatia looks well prepared as seen from the organisational point of view. However, a lot of work remains to be done.

Key Developments in 2005

The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and Croatia entered into force on February 1st, 2005. It provides the legal framework for relations with the EU. Consequently, first meetings of Stabilisation and Association Council and SA Committee were held in April and July 2005, while the first meeting of the EU-Croatia Joint Parliamentary Committee took place in Zagreb in March. Seven subcommittees have replaced the former five subcommittee structure of Interim Agreement.

The meetings confirmed that Croatia has implemented a significant part of the obligations envisaged by the SAA, although stronger efforts will be needed in the area of competition policy and supply of services.

In 2005, several important strategic documents for the EU Accession were adopted. The third National Programme for Integration of the Republic of Croatia into the EU was confirmed by the Croatian Parliament in January 2005, as the main strategic document for bringing the political, economic, legal and administrative system in line with the EU standards. The second Pre-accession Economic Programme 2006-2008 (PEP) was adopted by the Croatian Government in December, followed by the Communication Strategy. The aim of the Communication Strategy is to inform Croatian wider public on all relevant issues regarding Croatia’s accession to the EU as well as on its positive and negative consequences.

Croatia’s Preparations for Negotiations

The scheduled opening of accession negotiations was postponed by the Council in the absence of the common agreement. Negotiations did not start as envisaged in March 2005, due to inadequate level of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). With the purpose to mobilise all efforts to fulfil the remaining criteria, the ad-hoc Task Force has been established on 23rd March to examine the progress of Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY. It prepared the Action Plan, defined in six points in order to make progress regarding the fulfilment of this particular condition.

The final decision to start negotiations was brought on October 3rd (Council decision, IP/05/1222), based upon a positive report of the main prosecutor and the ad-hoc Task Force. The negotiations have been opened with the bilateral intergovernmental conference and started with screening. It is the formal process of analytical examination of the EU legislation and standards, their explanation to Croatian authorities and assessment of Croatia’s level of preparation for opening negotiations in each particular chapter. In 2005, the exploratory part of screening covered seven chapters (Science and Research; Education and Culture; Public Procurement; Market Competition; Free Movement of Services; Free Movement of Capital; Agriculture). The procedures and principles of negotiations were agreed on the first meeting of the Intergovernmental
Conference (Brussels, 28th November 2005), and the programme of screening for 2006 was adopted.

Regarding the EU conditionality, the most significant progress was achieved on December 7th, when the former general Ante Gotovina, accused by the ICTY, was arrested in the Spanish Canary Islands and was transferred to The Hague. Thus the final remaining condition for negotiations, full cooperation with the ICTY, was fulfilled.

**EU Steps Towards Negotiations**

The Negotiation Framework with Croatia was adopted by the European Council in June 2005 and it confirmed that the objective of negotiations was accession. The substance of negotiations was broken into negotiation chapters. However, the EU legislation was divided into 35 instead of 31 chapters. The Negotiation Framework envisaged the possibility of considering transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses. Negotiations will be based on Croatia’s own merits and their pace will depend on Croatia’s progress in meeting the requirements for membership. The progress will be measured by compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, which continue to be the basis for overall reforms in Croatia. However, the accession negotiations could be suspended “in the case of serious and persistent breach of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect of human rights and freedoms, and the rule of law on which the Union is founded.” Although the mentioned suspension clause was not explicitly underlined in pre-accession documents of former candidates, it could be understood as the outcome of the experiences of the previous enlargement. The European Commission prepared the first Progress Report for Croatia on November 9th [SEC(2005)1424]. Regarding the EU political criteria, the Report states that Croatia “faces no major difficulties” in meeting them. Progress has been made in the field of the judiciary and in regional cooperation; the position of minorities continued to improve. However, progress in implementation of key laws has been slow. Croatia can be regarded as a functioning market economy and should be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term, provided that it continues with the reform programme.

Croatian economy has achieved a considerable degree of macroeconomic stability with low inflation and a stable exchange rate; significant budget and current account deficits have been reduced. Major macroeconomic indicators place Croatia far at the helm of the SAP countries, but also in mid-range of the new member states, with the GDP per capita of 6,220 euro. State interventions in the economy are still significant and limited progress has been made in restructuring of large state-owned enterprises. Low competitiveness of economy remains the key challenge. Croatia made progress in legal harmonisation, particularly in the area related to the internal market, but further efforts are needed in law enforcement and administrative capacity building. The Commission welcomed the overall progress made by Croatia but urged the Government to speed up its structural reforms.


**Implementation Bodies for the EU Accession**

Croatia made preparations for negotiations before they were formally opened: the main negotiating structures were established in late 2004 and 2005; the Chief Negotiator and the Head of the National Delegation have been nominated. Negotiators for particular chapters were appointed and the negotiating groups were set up to deal with all 35 chapters.

The Ministry for European Integration was merged with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2005, thus establishing a single coordinating body for the process of the EU integration.

Regarding the establishment of negotiation structures and bodies, the Croatian Parliament adopted the Statement on the joint Activities of the Government and the Parliament; Declaration on the Fundamental Principles of Negotiations; and Decision on the Establishment of a National Committee for Monitoring the Negotiations (January 2005). The National Committee for Monitoring the Negotiations encompasses representatives of all parliamentary parties, social parties, trade unions, and employer’s union and academia with the aim to make the preconditions to supervise the negotiations process and keep it transparent. Even before (November 2004), the National Forum on Accession to the EU was established with the aim to in-
form citizens on the advantages and drawbacks of the EU integration.

Public Support

Regarding the integration into the EU, Croatia recorded a period of strong initial Euro-optimism (early 2000), followed with a period of decline in support for the EU (2004/05), due to different reasons and, finally, strong growth of support after the negotiation with the EU started. Namely, most of the public opinion surveys carried out since 2000 on a six-month basis by the Ministry for European Integration, showed that the support for membership ranged from 72-79%, with only 8-20% of the population declaring itself against it. In June 2004, support suddenly dropped to 51%, and declared opposition rose to 39%, and the situation did not change significantly until the start of negotiations with the EU. The results of the opinion poll by the independent firm Puls in mid 2005 show that 53% of the population did not support Croatia’s membership, with only 36% in favour.

The survey carried out in late 2005 by the independent daily newspaper Novi list (October 6th), showed that 54% of citizens supported integration into the EU while 25% were against it. However, their attitude regarding negotiations with the EU was still divided: the slight majority of surveyed citizens responded negatively on the question whether Croatia will be able to defend the interests of its citizens in negotiations (36%) while 34% believed it would be possible.

Participation in Pre/accession Funds

In 2005, Croatia became eligible for the pre-accession funds. Namely, the Pre-accession strategy opened the door for the access to the PHARE and ISPA in 2005, and SAPARD in 2006. In 2005 euros 105 million was available for Croatia, rising to 140 million euros in 2006. The mentioned programmes will be available for Croatia until 2007. The new Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 envisage that the new Pre-Accession Instrument (IPA) should supersede the existing instruments for the candidates (Turkey, Croatia) and potential candidates (remaining Western Balkans). In 2005, Croatia is focused on developing institutions and strengthening capacities to absorb the expected additional support from the EU funds. Preparations were undertaken for the effective use of EU technical assistance as well as for the effective implementation of projects within the PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD programmes.

Concluding Remarks

Croatia made significant progress on the path towards the EU in 2005, and started negotiations on full membership. Efficiency in implementation and continuation of reforms will be the most relevant factor for success, having in mind the very tight schedule for achieving the target date 2007/09. The stage of achieved implementation of the SAA, progress in adopting the principles of the acquis, together with the overall macroeconomic picture of the country and the stage of reforms (economic, judicial and administrative one) make a good starting point for fulfilling the remaining Copenhagen criteria. In the coming period it will be crucial to continue implementing the reform programme in the same speed, in order to remove remaining weaknesses.

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The long-lasting Turkey-EU relationship faced a major challenge in the year 2005. It was a year in which it would be tested whether the EU and Turkey would be able to go ahead with their relationship. It was challenging because this time there was a need for a “qualitative” leap to find a way to continue the relationship. For Turkey, it was no longer possible to continue as a permanent candidate country in a non-negotiating status. Turkey had to finally enter into the negotiating phase to maintain the long-lasting relationship with the EU. The European Council of 16th – 17th December 2004 had already decided that the EU would start negotiations on 3rd October 2005, but in the EU and also in Turkey there were contrary opinions and as the deadline was approaching it remained quite ambivalent whether Turkey would be able to start negotiations with the EU. As the long-lasting pattern in the relationship reflected the Turkish case was a contested one even as the European Council convened on the 3rd October 2005.

The Defining Moment

The European Council meeting of 3rd October was therefore a defining moment in nearly half a century long relationship. In this long period, Turkey and the EC (EU) faced several ups and downs in their relationship. The early years in their relationship in the 1960s when Turkey was an associate member of the EC were quite harmonious. The Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963 within this climate and aimed to prepare Turkey for a customs union arrangement with the EC. There was more convergence of Turkish and EU patterns within the context of the Cold War as economic and political stability of Turkey was perceived significant for the strengthening of the Western Alliance (Eralp: 1993). The relationship entered more difficult periods in the 1970s and 1980s as the EC and Turkish dynamics started to diverge rather than converge. In addition to difficulties in the customs union arrangement there were also mounting tensions in the respective understanding of democratization in Turkey and the EC (Eralp: 1993). Within that context, Turkey was not able to become part of the enlargement process of the EU initially in the post-Cold War context when the EU focused on a “big-bang” process of incorporating a large number of countries (Eralp: 2000). It took until the Helsinki Summit of the EU in 1999 to formulate a more inclusive policy towards Turkey as the EU started to realize that inclusion of Turkey would contribute more to the zone of stability, security and peace in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean. This shift in the EU policy encouraged reform-oriented forces in Turkey and we witnessed the building of a coalition of domestic groups focusing on a process of Europeanization, the core of which was the issue of democratization in Turkey. The Helsinki framework, however, required a major mental shift on orientation in the attitudes of both the EU and Turkish officials to create a more cooperative relationship (Önis: 2003). This mentality shift was not easy because Turkish and EU officials have long been geared towards an adversarial relationship and treated each other in bilateral “us-them” terms. Consequently, Turkey’s reform process has been somewhat “slow” compared to the other accession countries (Eralp: 2003). It has been slow in comparison to other countries primarily because of the ambivalence of the EU regarding Turkey’s accession coupled with domestic anti-European and Euro-sceptic political tendencies even among the then governing coalition forces in Turkey (Eralp: 2003). As a result, Turkey for a long time remained the only country which has not fulfilled the political expectation of the EU and without a clear time-table on its accession process. The time-table of accession was clarified a “little” when the European Council in the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 decided that the European Council would make a political assessment of Turkey’s reform process at the end of 2004 and that if the European Council at that point reached the decision that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would open negotiations without delay. This “limited” clarification of the time-table was quite important in the acceleration of the reform initiatives in Turkey in the last years. In the aftermath of the Copenhagen Summit, the Turkish government formulated several crucial “harmonization” laws to meet the challenge of meeting the Copenhagen political criteria, which focused on the more sensitive issues of the reform process such as the civilian-military relationship and cultural minority rights (Önis: 2003). Within that
context, the European Council of 16th – 17th December 2004 declared that Turkey has met the Copenhagen political criteria “sufficiently” and decided to open negotiations with Turkey on 3rd October 2005. The Turkey-EU relationship was at another historical crossroads in 2005. While the European Council in December 2004 decided that EU would start negotiations with Turkey on 3rd October, it remained unclear whether the EU would be able to take this historical decision to start negotiations with Turkey. On the Turkish side, there were high expectations; it was believed that Turkey had done whatever it could in terms of the reform process. Therefore, a negative decision by the EU would not only harm the EU as a credible partner but would also lead to the rise of the anti-EU feelings in Turkey. The offer of a “special” relationship to Turkey would not counterbalance the damage inflicted to the relationship. It was too late to offer this status to Turkey, as the Turkish public opinion was geared to the start of negotiations at the end of 2005. For the EU, the timing of the decision on Turkey had come at a difficult moment.

Difficulties in the European Union

The EU was facing a moment of "crisis" as the long-lasting Turkey-EU relationship was at historical crossroads in 2005. The Constitutional Treaty was not ratified in two member states, France and the Netherlands, and there were mounting criticisms elsewhere. The budget for the EU for the 2007-2013 period also remained undecided because of frictions among the leading members of the EU. In all these moments of crisis the issue of enlargement of the EU was at the centre of debates; there were rising criticisms of the incorporation of new countries as the EU was unable to solve its problems. The resentment of the EU public opinion was increasingly directed to newcomers or candidates as they became the scapegoats of the EU’s unsolved problems. Enlargement, which was one of the most successful policies of the EU, was under a enormous pressure and the Turkish accession was at the centre of these criticisms. From the Turkish perspective, this context was quite unfortunate; as Turkey was getting ready to start negotiations after a long period of waiting, the enlargement policy was under severe criticism and it was getting difficult to continue this successful policy of the EU.

This context of "crisis" within the EU reinforced those tendencies in Europe which argued for an exclusionary attitude or a "special partnership" towards Turkey. These tendencies had the upper hand in the European Council Luxembourg Summit of December 1997 when Turkey was put in a special "European strategy" and excluded from the normal accession process of the other countries. At that point these tendencies based their arguments on cultural, religious or geographical essentialist grounds and pointed out that Turkey did not belong to the EU as a member state. These tendencies lost the upper hand when the EU Council adopted an inclusive attitude in the Helsinki Summit of 1999 as it decided to treat Turkey according to the same "Copenhagen criteria" and made Turkey part of the same accession-partnership relationship as in other candidate countries. The resolutions of Helsinki regarding Turkey were drastically different from the Luxembourg decisions; they were more open, inclusive and less discriminatory. They were based on the understanding that Turkish accession should be treated like other cases on economical and political values and criteria rather than on essentialist cultural and religious considerations (Nicolaïdis: 2001). This Helsinki framework was quite important in the establishment of a working relationship between Turkey and the EU. It was this Helsinki inclusive attitude towards Turkey which was under severe criticism within the "crisis" context of the EU. The more conservative forces in Europe were activated by the resentment of the masses and targeted their attention on a more exclusionary policy towards Turkey.

The 3rd October European Council meeting was consequently a challenging moment not only for the Turkey-EU relationship but also for the EU itself. Within an intense climate of debates, as the Turkish case became a domestic issue all over Europe, the European Council decided on 3rd October 2005 that Turkey had met Copenhagen political criteria sufficiently and the EU was willing to start negotiations with Turkey. The inclusive attitude towards Turkey was able to exert its influence once again at a historical moment over various kinds of tendencies ranging from more exclusionary to ones arguing for a "special partnership" with Turkey. Amid intense debates, the European Council came to the resolution that the exclusionary attitude was not to the benefit of a long-lasting Turkey-EU relationship. It was realized that in an international system in which there is an increasing polarization between West and Islam and between United States and Europe, Turkish inclusion would help in creating more cooperative relations in the critical regions around her. Turkey's inclusion in the EU would help the EU to be an attractive model and an agent to lessen tensions in an increasingly turbulent international system.

Contentious Issues in the Relationship

The European Council on 3rd October, while adopting a predominantly inclusive attitude towards Turkey, also took into consideration the different shades of attitudes towards Turkey. Consequently, the European Council adopted a framework of negotiations in the Turkish case which was different from the other accession countries. The framework of negotiations regarding Turkey stated explicitly that the accession process was an open-ended one and the outcome of negotiations would depend both on Turkey’s adoption and implementation of the EU acquis, as well as on the EU’s absorption capacity of Turkey. These issues were also present in the previous enlargement processes, but in the Turkish case they were stated openly and made part of the negotiation framework. In addition to these general factors, the European Council also emphasized the possibility of permanent safeguards in some sensitive areas such as free movement of per-
The Cyprus problem has the potential to prejudice the enlargement process. The chapters, quite different from the Europeanization of many of the rather technocratic and discriminatory processes, as well as the increase of political factors. The emphasis by the EU on the “difference” of Turkey created a climate of resentment in Turkey; public opinion formers stated that the EU was not only treating Turkey differently from other accession countries, but also in a more discriminatory manner.

Amid all these problems, Turkey started the screening process on several chapters of the EU on 3rd October 2005 and is hoping to start negotiations in the first half of 2006. However, it should be mentioned that there is a possibility for the Republic of Cyprus to block the process of negotiation if not in this chapter then in other chapters, since the Republic of Cyprus has a say in the opening and closing of each chapter. As long as the Cyprus problem remains unsolved, there is a possibility for the “ politicization” of many of the rather technical chapters, quite different from the previous enlargement process. The Cyprus problem has the potential to hamper the long-lasting Turkey-EU relationship as long as the stalemate on the island continues.

Concluding Comments

As well-informed observers on the process of Europeanization indicate, this process is different and more difficult in the context of non-members and candidate countries (Di Quirico: 2005). The EU has mainly used the incentive of membership and formulated more specific financial instruments to implement its principle of “conditionality” in the last enlargement process. This package of incentives, together with conditions, was quite important in the acceleration of the reform processes in the accession countries. It helped the building of a reform coalition in these countries and decreased the political costs in the process.

As argued in this paper, the process of Europeanization in Turkey accelerated after the Helsinki Summit of 1999. The “limited” clarification of the timetable for Turkey after the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 was quite important in the further acceleration of the reform initiative in the last three years. The decision of the EU Council on 3rd October 2005 to start negotiations with Turkey was also critical in maintaining the incentive of membership for Turkey. However, the formulation of a different negotiation framework which emphasizes the open-endedness of this process for Turkey creates difficulties for the consolidation of the project of Europeanization in Turkey. As the accession process in other countries shows, the process becomes more difficult with the rise in the number of losers, as well as the increase of political costs with the start of negotiations. Governments faced with such difficulties were able to maintain their political will because of the clear incentive of membership in their cases. In the Turkish context, the process becomes increasingly difficult because of the ambivalence of the time table of negotiations and its open-ended nature.

It is extremely important for the project of Europeanization to be owned by domestic groups. If there is non-correspondence between the principle of conditionality and the incentives of the EU, there might be the dangerous image of Europeanization as a project imposed by the European Union. This could damage the project of Europeanization, the core of which is the issue of democratization. It could lead to the perception of democratization as something which is imposed from the outside. In the Turkish context, the process of democratization has a long history and a strong internal support base; it is not seen as a process imposed from the outside as in some other countries. The EU should be sensitive during the negotiations to the internal dynamics of this process. In this context, the implementation of the principle of "conditionality" should not be treated as a technical matter; it is a highly politicized matter and has important internal ramifications. It should always be matched with incentives and be sensitive to the internal dynamics of the country. To put it briefly, domestic ownership of the process of Europeanization is extremely important and the EU should give more consideration to this issue if it wants to deepen this process in the acceding countries. The acceding countries on their part should consider that the EU accession process provides many incentives to consolidate their attempts of democratization. This linkage between the EU accession process and the democratization drive is extremely important in the present turbulent international climate and this opportunity should not be missed.

Turkish accession is one of the most challenging cases for the EU. It seems that this process will be a long, contested and challenging for both Turkey and the EU. It will be challenging for Turkey, because Turkey will adopt the multilevel governance system of the EU and will act within the broader context of the EU. This process will also consolidate the project of Westernization pursued since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923. It is a challenging project for the EU, because it will include a country, which has been for a long time considered
as the “other” Europe. However, the EU has faced many challenges in the past and has been successful; it can also meet the present challenge.

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Female Employment in Mediterranean Arab countries: Much More than an Economic Issue

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In the Euro-Mediterranean Summit of November 2005, the Chairman’s Statement claimed that “only determined action will enable the region’s young people to fulfill their aspirations of a better future.” Half of those youngsters are women, and their aspirations for a better future presuppose their access to a job. Amongst the twelve objectives established in the Five-Year Work Programme approved jointly by the participants in the above-mentioned Euro-Mediterranean Conference regarding “Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform,” after proclaiming that “Euro-Mediterranean partners will take measures to achieve gender equality, preventing all forms of discrimination and ensuring the protection of the rights of women,” they proposed (letter h) “a significant increase in the percentage of women in employment in all of Euro-Mediterranean partner countries.” However, as far as the specific actions provided for with a view to contributing to the above objectives are concerned, they did mention specific actions to “expand and improve education opportunities for girls and women, as a basic right”.

In the Arab Mediterranean countries, there are 50 million women in working age (between 15 and 64 years old). They form half of the working age population, but less than a third of the labour force and less than a fourth of the employed population. Almost three quarters of working age women are excluded from the labour market, confined to under-valued domestic tasks, banned from the job market — and from any possibility of financial emancipation —, doomed to join the informal economy or unemployment or simply discouraged by the scarce job opportunities available to them in the market. It is common to address this question as a consequence of cultural, religious and even deeply-rooted legal discrimination against women, but in reality, it is the main cause of such discrimination.

Although more and more Arab women are accessing not only primary education but also higher education (with black spots like a rate of illiteracy of 62% among Moroccan women of more than 15 years of age and 56% in Egypt), their employment perspectives are not improving accordingly. Arab women barely participate in the job market (their rate of activity, that is to say, the percentage of working age women who belong to the labour force, is extremely low, barely above 30%, the lowest rate of all the regions in the world and more than ten points below the average of the less developed countries, 41%, as opposed to close to 80% of men; see Graph 7 and Table 2).

But furthermore, those women that participate in the job market suffer from a 60% higher rate of unemployment than men (see Graph 8) and, unlike the men,
As part of the celebrations organised for the anniversary of the Declaration of Barcelona, the business world and the private sector also took part in a debate on the record of these last years of partnership, with a meeting between the leaders of the business world and representatives from the private sector. This was the first official meeting of its kind, which brought together on the same platform private sector delegations from Mediterranean EU countries, organised by the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Navigation of Barcelona, the Association of Chambers of Commerce of the Mediterranean (ASCAME), and Eurochambers, among others. The meeting took place in Barcelona, 21-22 November 2005 and had been inserted in the official agenda of the European Commission. It was not solely aimed at analysing Euro-Mediterranean politics during the ten years of partnership, but also at debating obtained results, future prospects and challenges, whilst at the same time offering a new international viewpoint in order to create a favourable environment for economic relations in the region. The meeting served as a platform for comparing opinions, and for exchanging ideas and information. The participants put forward a series of propositions and recommendations which formed the basis of the final document issued at the conclusion of the proceedings. This took the form of a General Declaration, which was addressed and presented to Heads of State at the Summit of 27-28 November 2005. The recommendations aimed at improving the current situation and promoting the necessary future action to develop cooperation in the region, from a private sector perspective. Within the Declaration it is stated that "the involvement of the private sector in the debate has become, more than ever before, a necessity. The world of business has indeed proved its capacity to create wealth, to guarantee stability, security, peace and solidarity amongst the nations." The following are quoted from among the recommendations found in the Declaration:

- Increase the involvement of the private sector in defining the politics of the Process. This sector would like to play an active role in the decision-making process, rather than simply implementing existing decisions, given its status as a fundamental element for economic growth, job creation and development;
- Give more support to the private sector through political backup, promoting direct investment in order to facilitate also South-South economic integration;
- Provide small and medium-sized companies with access to finance, new technologies and innovation;
- Improve the region’s financial sector by establishing a homogeneous framework for legislation and taxation policy, the reform of banking institutions and the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Development Bank;
- Give more support to Research and Development;
- Increase the region’s competitiveness, via the liberalisation of product and service markets, economic and structural reforms in associated countries, the creation of a Pan-European Mediterranean protocol on the rules for the denomination of regions of origin, investment in infrastructure and encouraging the propagation of new technology, expertise and good business practices;
- Provide support for women employers;
- Create an integrated economic regional space;
- And finally, allocate extra resources to the MEDA III programme.

Final Declaration: www.iemed.org/documents/decBCN.pdf

VI Euro-Mediterranean Business Summit
The worlds of Mediterranean industry and enterprise came together in Valencia on 23 November 2005, to celebrate their sixth reunion and to take stock of the ten years of Euro-Mediterranean partnership from the point of view of economic growth. The summit, which followed on from those of past years in Marrakech, Athens, Tunis and Istanbul, was organised by the Spanish Confederation of Employers’ Associations (CEOE) in collaboration with the Mediterranean Union of Enterprise Confederation (UMCE) and the Union of Industrial Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE). The meeting evaluated the partnership’s impact on economic growth and job creation and fine-tuned the recommendations for presentation to Heads of State who met in Barcelona. The discussions of the three working sessions followed three main arguments: the choice of resources to increase economic growth and employment, the establishment of the free trade area in 2010, and technological and industrial cooperation.

With regard to the ten years of partnership, all those invited were in agreement in emphasizing that the Barcelona Process has still not achieved the results hoped for, at the very least from an economic point of view. In this regard, those representing industry called upon political leaders to refocus the Euro-Mediterranean strategy with a stronger and true political determination and appealed to the Southern Mediterranean countries to implement the initiated economic reforms. Among the key recommendations issued at the meeting, intended for the authorities, the following are especially noteworthy:

- Support for structural reforms in the South, directed towards private initiative and a market economy;
- Improvement of the banking system and financial markets in the South;
- Promotion of South-South economic integration;
- Harmonisation of standards and technical conditions in order to clear non-tariff barriers;
- Support for the launch of negotiations to liberalise the trade in services in the free trade area of 2010.

- Implementation of the Pan-European Mediterranean protocol of cumulation of origin;
- Implementation of the regional infrastructure action plan;
- Strengthen the activities of the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP) of the European Investment Bank to create a Euro-Mediterranean Investment Bank.

Websites:
Text of the Final Declaration: www.umce-med.org/site/eng/doc_detail.php?doc_id=64

For more information on the participating organisations: www.umce-med.org/site/eng/ www.unice.org/Content/Default.asp
growing rates of unemployment as their level of studies increases, although this largely reflects their increasing rate of participation in labour force as they become more educated (see Graph 9 for Morocco and Tunisia). Notwithstanding, young women in particular are not conforming to this state of affairs, and since the mid-1980s it is possible to observe a sustainable increase in the rates of participation in the labour force amongst young women between the ages of 15 and 29. The demographic projections anticipate that for 2020, the rate of activity amongst women will increase by more than ten points reaching up to 43%, which will make it necessary to create close to 8 million jobs in addition to the 34 which are necessary as a consequence of the general increase in the working age population at current activity rates (see Med.2003, Mediterranean Yearbook, p.151).

However, the current economic and political trends do not favour female integration into economic life. The two main sources of female employment in the majority of countries of the region, obviously apart from agriculture, are the State sector (where there is an almost equal participation of women, at least concerning the number of employees, although wage and promotion discrimination persists) and the manufacturing industry, especially in the textile and garment industry (for example, in Morocco, 68% of the workforce in the textile industry are women). Both of these sectors are suffering a decrease in jobs as a consequence of privatisation policies and the reduction of public expenditures in the former and a loss in competitiveness in European markets due to the expiring of the Multifibre Agreement as from the 1st January 2005 in the case of the textile industry, and the higher rate of temporary contract work prevailing amongst women as compared to men in the manufacturing industry makes women more vulnerable to this phenomenon.

On the other hand, as shown by various studies commissioned by the German GTZ (Agency for Technical Co-operation) on the gender impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and on the economic and social situation of women in Maghreb countries, the progressive implementation of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
The Euromed Trade Union Forum, created in 1999, groups together trade unions affiliated to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), to the Trade Union Confederation of Arab Maghreb Workers (USTMA) and to the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (CISA). This institution was created with the aim of defending and developing the social dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, giving particular attention to issues related to economic and social rights and democracy.

The Forum met for the third time in Barcelona on 6th and 7th November, 2005 in order to take stock of the tenth anniversary of the Partnership and analyse the future prospects for the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The conclusions of this analysis, which were published in a concerted Final Declaration, are neither positive nor heart-warming in terms of the objectives fixed in 1995. The following comments can be read in the Declaration: “The Forum notes that the Mediterranean has not become a peace zone; the economic situation has not improved; the Partnership has not made an effective contribution to the creation of employment; the question of migration continues to be a fundamental problem (...); little democratic progress has been observed and social dialogue continues to be non-existent”. Nevertheless participants also reaffirmed that the Partnership remains the only path to follow in an economic and political climate as sensitive as that of the Euro-Mediterranean area and that democracy is an indispensable pre-condition for the development of workers’ rights, social rights and social dialogue. The comments about renewal of the Partnership which emerged from the meeting concentrated especially on making an appeal to the authorities for the following actions: a more global and coherent development of the Partnership, by avoiding a confusing multiplicity of political initiatives; a reinforcement of the multilateral dimension and of regional integration, especially in the context of the new European Neighbourhood Policy, within which it is necessary to promote the logic of cooperation on an inter-regional and sub-regional (i.e., South-South) basis; co-development, while at the same time criticizing the creation of a Free Exchange Zone as the sole exclusive measure in relation to development, for this should be accompanied by other shared and complimentary institutional solutions; the rights of migrants, on behalf of whom the Forum asks national governments to ratify the United Nations Conventions for the Protection of the Rights of migrant workers and their families. The Forum did not however merely confine itself to analysing the Partnership’s record, but also proposed specific solutions and guidelines addressed to politicians in the field of employment and social rights. According to the Trade Unions, the most important actions to be undertaken in the near future are the following:

- To ensure economic and social rights, and guarantee good-quality employment on both the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean;
- To include the creation of employment and the improvement of economic and social rights in the Mediterranean countries as one of the explicit objectives of the Partnership;
- To convene a grand Euro-Mediterranean Conference on Employment during 2006;
- To organize regular periodic meetings of the Employment Ministers of the region;
- To envisage mechanisms to be applied throughout the region intended to monitor and survey the economic, social and employment situation, and at the same time to promote training programmes particularly for young people and women;
- To include studies of the impact that reforms and all other decision-making processes have on employment and the social situation;
- To progress towards the definition of a Euro-Mediterranean Strategy of Employment, fixing common objectives;
- To establish official safeguard and compensation mechanisms to protect against the consequences of political and economic reforms;
- With regard to the Neighbourhood Action Plan and the European Neighbourhood Policy, to take specific action to promote social dialogue, to reinforce trade union freedom or to respect the rights enshrined in the principal conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO);
- Finally, the Forum asked to be fully involved and consulted in any existing or future initiatives concerning employment, and renewed its invitation to the ILO and in particular to ACTRAV (the Workers’ Activities Office of the ILO) to attend the Forum.

ETUC: www.etuc.org/
ICFTU: www.icftu.org/default.asp?Language=FR
For the Forum and related documents: www.etuc.org/a/1649

Free Trade Areas, which in the following years will enter into the last phase of its transitional period in which customs duties will be dismantled on European products which compete directly with local industrial production (Tunisia in 2006, Morocco in 2008, Jordan 2010, Lebanon 2011), runs the risk of having more than a proportionate effect on women, causing massive job losses in those sectors where there is a larger female workforce representation. These are precisely the sectors where progress of participation of women in the labour force has concentrated over the last decade. Interestingly, the question of female employment is notoriously missing within the framework of the mise-en-niveau or industrial modernization programmes financed throughout the region by the MEDA funds. All of this runs the risk of increasing the already more than proportional high vulnerability of active women to falling into the informal economy, agricultural underemployment or the precariousness of unpaid family support.

In view of this situation, in the year 2005 the initiatives, forums and studies on women’s employment in the Arab world have proliferated, from the fourth and last Arab Human Development Report 2005, especially dedicated to the question of female Arab participation in social and economic life (UNDP, 2005), up to the conference organized by the Arab Women’s Forum on “Women as Engines of Economic Growth in the Arab World. Ten Years After the Barcelona Process: Empowering Women as a Catalyst for Economic Development” (in July 2001 a regional forum of governmental experts had already been held on this question) and the EuroMed Women’s Conference held in Barcelona on 24th
and 25th November 2005. Ten years after the Barcelona’s Declaration which recognized “the key role of women in development” and engaged the Partner countries to “promote their active participation in economic and social life and in the creation of employment”, the first report by FEMISE, the Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic Institutes, on “Women and Economic Development in the Mediterranean” has been published. The report concludes that, without the women’s contribution, mainly through their work, there can be no development in the Arab Mediterranean countries [Radwan, S., and Reiffers, J.-Louis (cords.), 2006].

According to World Bank estimates published in the first big study on this question carried out in the region, the lower participation rate of women in the labour force recorded in Arab Mediterranean countries taking into consideration their age structure, level of education and fertility rates (the main factors determining the rate of female labour force participation throughout the world) results in a loss of 25% of the average family revenues and, on a macroeconomic level, results in a smaller rate of economic growth of 0.7 percentage points a year. Thus, we are facing one of the main explanatory factors for relative Arab economic backwardness (World Bank, 2004).

All of this will culminate in the organization of a Euro-Mediterranean Women Ministerial Conference to be held in Ankara, Turkey, on 13th and 14th November 2006, which has been preceded by a preparatory conference held in Rabat on 14th and 16th June 2006, and which should lead to a Euro-Mediterranean Plan of Action on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society. The big questions dealt with in these forums and conferences are logically girls’ and women’s access to education, women’s political participation or the elimination of persisting legal discriminations contained in the legislation of too many States in the region. But there is no other policy that could have a bigger impact on women’s life’s prospects, and on their contribution to economic development in their countries, than simply offering them decent job opportunities which are compatible with their family life. And the MEDA Programmes, barely gendered so far, should be a spearhead in that direction.

References


The Arab region consists of 22 countries with a population of over 300 million. It is estimated that over 60 million Arabs live on less than US $2 per day. While most Arab countries are considered middle-income, there are large pockets of poverty that exist in most countries including those with large oil revenues.

Experience throughout the world has proven that microfinance helps the poor to increase income, build their businesses, and secure their future by reducing their vulnerability to external shocks. Furthermore, microfinance is often a powerful tool for empowering the poor, especially women, to take charge of their economic well-being and those of their families.

The Arab microfinance industry is young with high growth potential. Currently, it is estimated that there are over 75 microfinance institutions (MFIs) providing credit to poor microentrepreneurs. The majority of these programmes are south of the Mediterranean (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia and Syria). Programmes also exist in Yemen, Algeria, Iraq, Bahrain, Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The region’s top MFIs are openly committed to best practice microfinance. Furthermore, it is estimated that around 85% of the region’s active clients are served by sustainable microfinance institutions.

Despite the above-mentioned progress and the sector’s development there are challenges facing the industry in the region including the fact that the sector as a whole is reaching more of the marginalized in the society.

According to the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) benchmarks, Arab MFIs record the lowest average loan balance per borrower as a percentage of the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. The region’s top MFIs have proven to have excellent leadership abilities, impressive outreach and growth, as well as a commitment to best practice microfinance. Furthermore, it is estimated that around 85% of the region’s active clients are served by sustainable microfinance institutions.

Challenges and Opportunities for Arab Microfinance

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tor is serving only 15% to 20% of the estimated 8 million plus microentrepreneurs with no access to financial services. Expanding the coverage also means reaching countries where there is no or limited best-practice microfinance and increasing the coverage to rural areas where poverty is prevalent. This section of the article will outline the major challenges facing microfinance practitioners as they seek to meet the demonstrated demand for financial services as well as highlight some of the major events that took place during 2005 to reduce the effect of these challenges.

**Underdeveloped Microfinance Infrastructure**

Despite the efforts made by governments, donors, MFIs and Sanabel, there are still on-going challenges regarding the limited availability of Arabic microfinance literature and research, few regional qualified technical assistance providers and consultants, limited regional coordination as well as insufficient capacity building services.

2005 saw the launch of several important initiatives in an attempt to address the issue of building a strong microfinance infrastructure for the future. This year, Sanabel organized four new Training of Trainer courses in the region providing around 30 training opportunities for Arab trainers and consultants. The network also organized more than 15 training courses and workshops in Arabic and French for microfinance managers in seven Arab countries where around 250 managers participated. These courses deigned as an integral part of the region’s capacity building initiatives were organized in partnerships with various organizations like the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), the Microfinance Centre (MFC) in Eastern Europe and the International Labour Organization (ILO). 2005 also saw the launch of the first phase of preparation for the Training Academy for Arab Microfinance Leaders (TACAML), an intensive training programme expected to open its doors in early 2007.

In September 2005, Sanabel in partnership with CGAP and the Grameen-Abdul Latif Jameel Initiative launched the Arabic Microfinance Gateway (www.arabic.microfinancegateway.org). This unique website serves as a neutral public forum for microfinance stakeholders to facilitate the exchange of experiences, perspectives, viewpoints as well as microfinance information and research in Arabic.

**Product Diversification**

The Arab microfinance sector is still very much credit oriented, there are limited product and service diversifications where MFIs in some countries are exploring ways to include microinsurance, micro-leasing, money transfer services and voluntary savings. More and more of the Arab MFIs need to realize that the poor and the very poor that lack access to traditional formal financial institutions require a variety of financial products. While in most cases laws and legislations may hamper this, it must be also noted that MFIs need to think creatively in their attempt to address the needs of their clients by forging strategic alliances and links with mainstream financial institutions in their countries.
The year 2005 has been very important for the EUMEDIS Programme. A number of Pilot Projects came to their contractual end with satisfactory results, the first EUMEDIS International Conference was held in the Dead Sea in Jordan, the management of the programme was de-concentrated to the EC Cairo Delegation, and the project participated to the WSIS Conference in Tunis. Next year will be still more engaging as the overall programme ends and the final Conference will be held in June in Alexandria at a very significant venue for the region, the Bibliotheca Alexandrina.

EUMEDIS rides the wave of Mediterranean cooperation
Since 2001, 22 Pilot Projects have been operational, involving more than 400 partner institutions from 23 countries. EUMEDIS has successfully demonstrated the advantages that ICT can offer the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, both to improve the social and business environment and to contribute to the inter-cultural dialogue, as this must be built upon through mutual awareness and understanding amongst states, institutions and, most importantly, amongst societies and people. In this respect the contribution of EUMEDIS has been significant: around one thousand professionals, university researchers, doctors, experts, teachers and public officials have been working together for almost five years. More than ten years ago, the Barcelona Conference highlighted the importance of dialogue in the Mediterranean region. The event marked the start of a process with ambitious and long-term objectives: turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of exchange and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity. Recognizing how crucial the upgrading of local telecommunications infrastructure was to achieving these goals, the European Commission launched the EUMEDIS initiative in 2000. EUMEDIS was designed to contribute to the expansion and improvement of the Euro-Mediterranean information society, ultimately paving the way for economic development and an EU-Mediterranean regional partnership.

An overall approximate budget of 43 million € was allocated to projects supporting and improving healthcare, e-commerce, education, industry, business and innovation for SMEs, as well as tourism and cultural heritage. The primary targets are hospitals and other medical research institutes; chambers of commerce and industrial federations; universities, research and professional institutions; public and private research centres; museums (including NGOs promoting cultural heritage) and anyone involved in the promotion of tourism in the region. Local authorities have recognized the importance of developing information and communication facilities and have decided to invest in infrastructure.

The first EUMEDIS International Conference
The Dead Sea Resort, Jordan, played host to the inaugural EUMEDIS International Conference on 17th – 18th April. Almost 300 participants from across Europe and the southern Mediterranean took part in the Conference which had as its focus the subject of “Closing the Digital Gap in the Mediterranean Region”. The Conference provided the opportunity to disseminate projects’ results and to exchange experiences and best practices after four years of sustained activities. All Pilot Project’s were represented in Jordan, each with a stand facilitating an exposition of their projects and an opportunity to present to a larger public their results aimed to provide flexible, sustainable products open to all stakeholders and benefiting future generations.

The Conference reflected on the importance of the Barcelona Process in bringing interests closer together. There was sincere hope that education, sustainable growth, human rights and democracy would be at the forefront of the region’s initiatives over the coming years. The main speakers highlighted EUMEDIS achievements to date, the importance of inter-cultural dialogue in the region and the impact of the digital divide on women’s access to the internet. The importance of benchmarking from such forums was stressed, to take stock of the EUMEDIS initiative in order to go forward together with a common purpose, asserting that the establishment of the EUMEDIS community stimulates dialogue which is the first step towards development and, ultimately, peace in the region.

Projects for a digital era
Some of the EUMEDIS Projects are already delivering their benefits to the final beneficiaries:

EMISPHER is a telemedicine, e-health and medical e-learning project built on cutting edge technologies, which guarantees quick and easy access to key medical information. Patients, irrespective of their geographical location, benefit from the internet-satellite platform and the exchange of medical expertise it provides. The platform enables hospitals, medical institutions and universities to share their experience and it allows students to benefit from medical e-learning. The satellite network covers 10 sites (Casablanca, Tunis, Algiers, Cairo, Istanbul, Berlin, Clermont-Ferrand, Athens, Nicosia and Palermo), creating a truly cross-Mediterranean network.

During the ATVN-EU-GP Conference, 1st – 3rd December 2005 in Pullusk (Poland) the EMISPHER Project was awarded the first prize in the “e-health” category of the “Good Practice Projects” contest, funded by the European Commission and called “The Best 2005”. The award of the first prize for EMISPHER and its VEMH is seen as recognition of its global and integral approach to the implementation and integration of modern ICT for improved healthcare, crossing regional and programmatic boarders and contributing to global healthcare improvements.

In the area of education, MED NET’U has created a network for unified distance learning. The main aim was to bring together a group of Euro-Mediterranean partners from universities, institutions for vocational training and technological associations. Classes are broadcast on two TV satellite channels and modules exist in different language versions. The modules are taught in a digital platform for the web and on the Internet by satellite. Partners from Algeria, Italy, France, Greece, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey provide and co-produce courses using these distance learning technologies. More than 600 hours of university courses are available and hundreds of students in different Mediterranean Universities are following the courses.

MEDPRIDE supports SMEs in 11 countries, focusing on innovation as a crucial factor to increase their competitiveness. This is especially crucial for countries from the southern Mediterranean region where globalisation has accelerated the need for innovation even more. The reasons underlying this situation can be different: cultural, economic or a lack of infrastructure. Very often the main obstacle to innovation is a combination of all these aspects. This project set up a network of centres of excellence. These support SMEs at national level and provide services such as training, networking and support for knowledge transfer.
and local level by finding the right match between research and technology on the one hand and business initiatives on the other. The service is adapted to local conditions to generate the best results and to enable SMEs to benefit from the globalisation process.

EUMEDIS supports the textile industry in the region with the E-MED TEX NET project. This project uses new information technologies to promote competitiveness in the textile and clothing sector. Visitors will find information on the different markets, laws and regulations and innovations on a multilingual web-based service portal. They will also be able to establish business contacts and trade thanks to the platform. Finally, the platform also offers training courses on e-commerce and competitiveness.

EUMEDIS Participated in World Summit on Information Society, Tunis
The World Summit on Information Society seeks to address the challenge of creating a global village that includes underdeveloped areas. In order to set realistic goals and a workable timeframe, the World Summit takes place in two phases. The second phase of the conference took place in Tunis in November 2005.

EUMEDIS is contributing to the development of an all-inclusive development-oriented Information Society. Four projects were represented in Tunis and provided information about their activities at a stand in the ICT 4 all Exhibition.

STRABON held a round-table on 15th November entitled “Euro-Mediterranean scientific cooperation: networks and information systems”. The round-table gave the Tunisian, Moroccan and Egyptian partners the opportunity to report on their cooperation and other initiatives in Cultural Heritage and Sustainable Tourism. Dr. Georgi Graschew, coordinator of the EMISPHER project, presented the Virtual Euro-Mediterranean Hospital Initiative (VEMH) in a conference organised by the Tunisian “Centre Informatique de la Santé” on 16th November. In addition, Professor Maria Amata Garito, from MED NET’U and Uninettuno President, gave a speech entitled “From NET-TUNO to Med NetU – the Euro-Mediterranean Distance University”.

Building the grid to share research and education
EUMEDConnect is the EUMEDIS infrastructure-building project: its scope is to provide an Internet-based network in the Mediterranean region dedicated to research and education purpose. The network provides a backbone linking Mediterranean research centres and institutions with over 3,500 research and education establishments worldwide. EUMEDConnect transforms the scale and reach of the Mediterranean research network, fosters greater levels of research collaboration and helps to accelerate the rate of Internet development in the region.

In 2005 the EUMEDConnect network has been finally completed, and 11 of the 12 Mediterranean partners are now being connected. Jordan became connected to the network in August with a 45 Mbits circuit; Syria became connected in November with 4 Mbits; and Palestine also became connected in November with a 45 Mbits circuit. An upgrade of the Moroccan connection has been contracted and this will increase capacity of this link from 34 to 155 Mbits. For the Mediterranean partners without connectivity to GEANT (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia), EUMEDConnect has increased international IP connectivity by 800% since 2002, similar increases are expected for other partners being connected.

Traffic is growing rapidly on the network, and it particularly provides the network infrastructure over which collaborative projects needing high speed and reliable Internet-based data communications can run as the planned EUMEDGRID, the very large ‘Grid’ computing project that will use the network.

What lies beyond?
EUMEDIS has provided the incentive for the development of the information society in the Mediterranean region. It has raised awareness and achieved tangible results thanks to a range of successful projects. In 2006, EUMEDIS will organize its final conference in June in a very significant place for the region, the Bibliotheca Alexandrina, after which the projects will go their own way, continuing to bridge the digital divide between the Mediterranean region and its neighbours.

The recent de-concentration of the management of the EUMEDIS project from the European Commission in Brussels to the Delegation in Cairo has several advantages. Firstly, it makes sense in geographical terms, as it is much easier to determine what is at stake for each project and to take decisions accordingly. This also allows for a better understanding of the environment in which the projects are being set up (the MEDA region). Thanks to the Delegation, an interactive network between the region’s ten delegations has been created to strengthen the “ownership” of the activities that take place in their counterpart countries. More practical tools are now in place (databases, monitoring systems) that allow for an improved follow-up of the projects and to multiply the national (bilateral) programmes that are financed by sectors similar to those covered by EUMEDIS.

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Office, Brussels

In the attempt to address the above challenge, various meetings and conferences took place in the region, specifically in Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, however the largest gathering directly addressing this issue was Sanabel’s third Annual Conference that took place in Marrakech, Morocco between November 28th – 30th, 2005 under the Title of “From Microcredit to Microfinance in the Arab Region.” The event, which also celebrated the end of the UN Year of Microcredit, attracted more than 400 delegates from 30 countries discussing various topics related to the state of Arab microfinance with a focus on moving the sector forward to become more inclusive.

Grants and Soft Loans VS Commercial Funding
The Arab microfinance industry has to overcome its reliance on grants and soft loans and to begin building bridges and links with commercial sources. It is a widely known fact that local governments and donors will not be able to fulfill the financial needs of MFIs not only to reach the un-served 8 million microentrepreneurs but also to provide them with diverse and inclusive financial services. In order for this to happen greater involvement of the private sector and local sources of capital is crucial. There are limited examples of this in Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco, however certainly not to the degree required.
ABOUT SANABEL, THE MICROFINANCE NETWORK OF ARAB COUNTRIES

Sanabel is a membership-driven regional network for microfinance institutions in the Arab world. Its mission is to maximize the outreach to Arab microentrepreneurs by providing microfinance institutions with a forum for mutual learning and exchange, capacity building services, and advocacy for best practice microfinance. Sanabel presently has 47 members representing 11 Arab countries. These members serve more than 1,100,000 active clients in the Arab world (85% of the total clients served).

To read more about microfinance in the Arab region please visit www.sanabelnetwork.org.

There are also limited experiences of banks entering the sector in Egypt and most recently during 2005 in Yemen, Jordan and Palestine, but again not to the levels potentially possible in this sector. This requires creating awareness within the private sector about the importance of microfinance, as well as increasing the level of transparency and improving MFI reporting standards and increasing the number of MFIs subjected to rating and to neutral appraisals and evaluations.

Again, 2005 saw several activities attempting to address the issue of commercial funding and bank downsizing. Some donors active in the region like the Rockdale Foundation (USA) started developing training and awareness tools to train MFIs in dealing with banks and investors with the objective of creating strong partnerships for the long run. Other international networks and organizations like ACCION, IFC and IFAD have started investigating the possibility of expanding local bank activities in microfinance in the region. In November 2005 a “Financing Forum” was organized during Sanabel’s third annual conference where MFIs from the region networked with representatives from leading investment funds and banks. In addition to this, towards the end of 2004, Sanabel in partnership with the MIX established its Transparency Unit, promoting transparency and rating among Arab MFIs with the objective of attracting more investments.

Public Awareness and Regulatory Environments

For the Arab microfinance sector to flourish two further challenges have to be addressed. Firstly, creating public awareness about the benefits of microfinance, both at the client level as well as at the investor and government levels. Secondly, a lot has to be done in the area of regulatory reform within the sector to encourage governments to create an enabling environment for microfinance. Most MFIs in the region operate within unclear and often conflicting legislation that does not support the principles of best practices and hinders MFIs from prospering and growing or even to transforming into regulated financial institutions.

On the regulatory front, 2005 witnessed a variety of promising initiatives and activities across the region. On May 21st, the first meeting of the Executive Council of the CGAP MENA Initiative was held in the Dead Sea Resort in Jordan. The Executive Council chaired by Her Majesty Queen Rania Al Abdullah of Jordan, and membership of Ministers from Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Yemen has been formed to guide the initiative and to highlight the importance of appropriate government policies in greatly expanding the access of poor people to the financial services. During the meeting, the Council endorsed a set of best practice principles to scale up microfinance in the region. 30 high-level government officials, opinion leaders, bankers and representatives of the microfinance industry were present at the meeting. Furthermore, the first half of 2005 has seen the development of national strategies for microfinance in Egypt, Yemen and Jordan. All three strategies have a stated objective to provide access to financial services through a broad, inclusive and diverse financial sector. The strategies were developed to serve as guides for governments and donors in the respective countries.

On the public awareness front, 2005 saw the start of a number of exciting experiments in an attempt to educate and inform the public about microfinance. As part of its celebration and promotion of the UN Year of Microcredit, Sanabel participated during 2005 in the Global Microentrepreneurship Awards (GMA) programme along with the UNDP, Citigroup Foundation, and the GMA Student Alliance in four Mediterranean countries: Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. The GMA programme had three main objectives, to recognize and celebrate the contributions that microentrepreneurs bring to the world economy, to raise awareness and support of microentrepreneurs by highlighting their talents and accomplishments, and to create the next generation of microfinance networks and stakeholders. In the four Arab countries that took part, more than 80 microentrepreneurs and loan officers were awarded cash prizes (amounting to more than $70,000) in ceremonies that were held under the patronage of distinguished public figures, such as HM Queen Rania of Jordan, HE Mrs. Mubarak, Egypt’s First Lady and HE Mr. Driss Jettou the Prime Minister of Morocco. In addition to the UN GMA programme, Sanabel organized its 2005 Regional Microentrepreneur Awards, recognizing the work of 11 successful microentrepreneurs from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Yemen and for the first time Sudan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq participated in the awards. Illustrating yet another innovative initiative for 2005, the Grameen – Abdul-Latif Jameel Initiative sponsored four commercials for the promotion of regional microfinance. The commercials were based on the inspiring stories of four of Sanabel’s 2004 Regional Microentrepreneur Award winners. The ads portrayed four women microentrepreneurs describing their projects and how these projects have changed their lives and improved the living conditions of their families. The ads, targeting a Pan Arab audience, ran on Arab satellite channels and aimed to show the importance of microfinance as a poverty alleviation tool. The campaign targeted both potential microentrepreneurs on one-side and business and government decision makers on the other.
Libya Looks to a Bright Future Post-Sanctions

Libya’s Dramatic Transformation

On 19th December 2003, an announcement was made simultaneously in Washington, London, and Tripoli that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi had promised to terminate his country’s efforts to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction and to fully cooperate with the international community in destroying them. This announcement was preceded by equally significant steps to end Libya’s international isolation and pave the way for Tripoli to rejoin the global economic and political system. Most notably, Libya officially accepted responsibility for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, carried out by Libyan intelligence officers, and agreed to pay financial compensation to the families of the victims of this terrorist attack.

To reward Tripoli for denouncing international terrorism and agreeing to adhere to the norms and rules of the non-proliferation regime, the decade-long United Nations sanctions were lifted. London re-established diplomatic relations with Tripoli that had been severed in 1984, and Washington substantially eased the economic sanctions it had imposed in the late 1970s and 1990s. These concrete steps to normalize economic and diplomatic relations with Libya were followed by well-publicized direct contacts between Western leaders and Gaddafi. Energy partnership has been at the heart of these consultations.

Libya’s Energy Outlook

Unlike Gulf producers such as Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, where oil was discovered earlier in the 20th century, oil in Libya was discovered late in the 1950s. Yet, in a short period of time, the oil discoveries were brought on-stream. Thus, by the late 1960s, Libya had become the world’s fourth largest exporter of crude oil. The rush to raise production in Libya reflected not only the world’s growing appetite for oil, but also certain advantages the Libyan oil sector enjoys.

First, Tripoli holds huge proven oil reserves—estimated at 36 billion barrels, or 3.1 percent of world’s total. Second, production costs are among the lowest in the world. Third, Libya produces high-quality, low sulphur “sweet” crude oil. Fourth, the proximity of Libya to Europe is a big advantage in terms of ease and cost of transportation.

Given these advantages, it is little wonder that American and European oil companies were heavily involved in exploring and producing oil in Libya. The country’s oil production reached a peak of 3.32 million barrels per day (b/d) in 1970. This high level of production, however, proved unsustainable. Economic sanctions and political isolation took their toll. In 2003 Libya produced 1.488 million b/d—less than half of its production in 1970. This decline can be explained more by political factors than geological ones. From the outset, the post-1969 revolutionary regime had tense relations with the U.S. government and American oil companies operating in the country. Eventually, in the mid-1980s, these oil companies completely withdrew from Libya. For most of the 1990s, comprehensive international sanctions were imposed on Libya by the UN Security Council. Bilateral sanctions in the 1980s and multilateral ones in the 1990s deprived Libya’s oil industry of the spare parts, new equipment, modern technology, management techniques, and foreign investment badly needed to maintain and upgrade its production capacity. Despite this hostile political environment, a competent Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) and a handful of European oil companies kept oil production going over the years, although at a level greatly reduced from that of the booming late 1960s.

Diplomatic re-engagement with Libya and the easing of sanctions have been followed by serious efforts by international oil companies to resume their oil exploration and production operations...
in the country. Since mid-2004, the entire Libyan hydrocarbon sector has seemed poised for promising development, fuelled by foreign investment.

Oil Partnership with the United States

U.S. oil companies have been involved in Libya’s oil industry since the discoveries of Libyan oil in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Some of the largest oil fields were found in concessions held by independent U.S. companies. Marathon, Amerada Hess, and Conoco (now ConocoPhillips) formed the Oasis Group that, with the NOC, achieved world-class commercial oil discoveries in Libya’s Sirte Basin in 1962. The outcome of this partnership was a steady and substantial increase in Libya’s oil production. However, the ongoing political tension between Washington and Tripoli interrupted this mutually profitable partnership. In January 1986, then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order imposing unilateral sanctions against Libya. U.S. companies’ assets in the country were put in “suspended animation.” In order to protect their concessionary interests, five U.S. firms signed a Standstill Agreement with the NOC. Under this agreement, the U.S. companies retained the original rights and obligations in the fields they operated, while NOC became responsible for the development of these fields until the return of the U.S. firms.

In the following two decades, the Standstill Agreement has survived the extreme political tension between the two states. Since the mid-1980s, the NOC and its subsidiaries have maintained production at these fields, albeit at much lower levels. With the lifting of UN sanctions in 2003 and the easing of U.S. sanctions, American oil companies were allowed to resume their operations in Libya.

Exploration Licences

Libya is eager to increase its oil production. Indeed, the NOC announced that it wants to produce 2 million b/d by 2007. In order to achieve this goal, Tripoli acknowledges its need of foreign investment to modernize its energy infrastructure. In early 2005 Libya held an exploration licence round. International oil companies showed great interest in the country’s largely un-explored and under-utilized hydrocarbon resources. Four factors have heightened foreign investors’ interest in Libya’s oil: high oil prices; certainty of proven reserves; availability of new acreage that had been off the market for years; and scarcity of opportunities to explore for oil in other parts of the world.

More than 120 companies had applied for the auction acreage. Of the 15 blocks, 9 are onshore and 6 offshore. Three U.S. companies – Occidental Petroleum Corp., ChevronTexaco Corp., and Amerada Hess International Ltd. – won interests in 11 of the 15 permits. Other successful bidders hail from Australia, Algeria, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Canada.

These licences are based on an exploration and production-sharing agreement (EPSA). Prior to 1973, foreign oil companies worked in Libya under concession arrangements. Since then the EPSA has become more common. Under an EPSA, the government, through the NOC, retains exclusive ownership of oil fields while signatory oil companies are considered contractors. Three rounds of EPSA contracts were held – one in 1974, another in 1980 and a third in 1988, with some differences regarding recovery of development and production costs. EPSA contracts usually involve an initial exploration period, during which companies assume exploration costs and risks and are required to invest specific sums in exploration. If a discovery is made, the EPSA continues in force for a set period (usually 20 to 30 years); output is divided between the NOC and the contracting company. The 2005 licensing round was based on a more attractive model called EPSA-IV. Under this revised formula, contracts are awarded on the basis of competitive bidding, instead of closed-door negotiations. International companies carry all exploration and appraisal costs, as well as training costs for Libyan nationals, during a minimum exploration period of five years. Thereafter, capital expenses for development and exploitation, as well as operating expenses, are borne by the NOC and the investor according to their primary agreement. The hope is that the EPSA-IV will attract more international oil companies to Libya.

Relations with Europe

Libya enjoys a unique relationship with Europe. These special ties are based, at least in part, on historical experience and geographical proximity. Several European countries have extensive trade relations with Libya; nearly all Libyan oil is sold to European countries, including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Furthermore, European oil companies maintained their Libyan operations after their U.S. rivals left in the 1980s.

Prospects for continuing close cooperation between Europe and Libya remain strong, given the growing European dependence on imported oil and gas supplies and the European policy of diversifying its suppliers. For the past two decades, the North Sea’s oil and gas deposits satisfied a big proportion of European energy needs. The North Sea currently seems to have passed its peak; it can no longer fulfill the widening gap between Europe’s rising oil and gas consumption and its declining production. As such, Europe is growing more dependent on foreign supplies. Russia, Norway, and Algeria already are major energy providers to the EU, and the EU is now showing great interest in Libya. Libyan oil and gas can be shipped easily to Italy and Spain, and from there to the rest of Europe. Indeed, Italy and Spain are positioning themselves as potential gas conduits to northern Europe.

Since the early 2005 Libya’s natural gas exports to Italy have increased. The NOC is a partner with the Italian company Agip in a joint venture called the Western Libya Gas Project (WLGP). The goal is to produce 10 billion cubic meters a year over a 20-year period. Most of this gas will be exported to Italy via the Green Stream pipeline that was inaugurated in late 2004 to connect Libya and Italy through Sicily. This is the first such scheme to utilize Libya’s
THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN IN FEMISE ACTIVITIES

2005 was a pivotal year for the Mediterranean as a region. Ten years after the Barcelona Process, which created an innovative framework for north-south co-operation, Euro-Mediterranean co-operation is changing direction, or at least, is modifying its framework with the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy. It is without doubt a transition which is creating opportunities and challenges. This point of view is supported in the recent reports published by FEMISE (Euro-Mediterranean Forum of the Economic Institutes).

On the economic front, for which the network is most particularly responsible (with the support of the European Commission, renewed in 2005 for another 4 years) the great lesson of recent months has been the capacity of the Mediterranean partners to overcome up until now the increase in petrol prices, one of the major economic shifts in 2005. The considerable price rise has not so far had the negative impact that was feared, at least on current deficits. This year again, revenue from tourism and the remittances by workers abroad have helped avoid serious imbalances, which shows that the resilience capacity of Mediterranean countries has grown over the last decade. Nevertheless the fact remains that this shift will noticeably affect the budgetary situation in as much that the price of petrol or other primary materials are the most often subsidised or controlled in order to protect disadvantaged populations. This policy allows a certain social equilibrium to be maintained, but there is a price. In fact therefore, the financial needs of Mediterranean countries have increased, whereas the international situation is less favourable, marked by uncertainties in developed countries (fear of property market bubbles, increase in American and European interest rates, among others) and dynamic input in the region does not always reach the necessary levels, especially in terms of job availability. A completed transition through a consolidation phase bears witness to the relative stability of Mediterranean economies, into a phase where changes must be more noticeable and influential upon the daily lives of participants.

It is in this context, within which FEMISE considers that the EU has a key role, that the Commission has modified its Mediterranean policies by putting in place the Neighbourhood Policy. This policy is a unilateral offer by the EU which, to sum it up briefly, offers its neighbours in Mediterranean countries the chance to share in the acquis communautaire (the body of EU law accumulated so far), that is to say a sub-assembly of some 2000 directives which are the bedrock of the EU. This adapted sub-assembly is defined as “an approximation of the acquis”, that is to say a contextualised adaptation, which would offer the Mediterranean countries a stake in the internal market, which is at the heart of the European proposition. FEMISE will place this question at the centre of its research programme for 2006, asking some 70 members of the network to conduct an academic reflection on the main economic directions that both the established and new members must take in order to give the southern countries a better foothold in the Union. The primary objective will be to direct the development of Mediterranean partners towards stronger growth, and above all towards employment creation within the multilateral framework of the partnership, now made complete by the Neighbourhood Policy. The idea is that the diffusion of specific elements of the acquis communautaire and the opening up of Southern economies will boost the behavioural and institutional changes necessary for this heightened dynamism. This must however be carried out in a sustainable manner, that is to say without causing major macroeconomic imbalances or causing poverty to increase, an essential factor in maintaining social cohesion and confidence in the European offer. Such a transition is not without consequences and it will be essential to forecast requirements for support and technical assistance, so that these are available for Mediterranean partners to use. Assistance of this nature for neighbours is at the very heart of the European project and it must combine the Association Agreements with the most recent dispositions of the Neighbourhood policy. The question of the relationship between the Barcelona Process and the Neighbourhood policy have been at the core of recent investigations by FEMISE, in considering that Neighbourhood policy is complementary to the European offer and must consolidate the partnership and not take its place. Studies by FEMISE show first that the concept of profound integration is not an appropriate theoretical reference and that continuing to use such a reference may lead to new disappointments. Secondly, their studies show that interdependence between Europe and the Mediterranean is in fact undeniable. This was taken into account by the Barcelona process, but in an incomplete manner, and it must therefore fail to the Neighbourhood Policy to develop this concept. The essential here will be to work out a regional vision together, because it is so important to be aware of the socio-economic consequences arising from the adoption of a significant number of European directives in the Mediterranean basin. This regional vision includes also those regional institutions, for negotiation or arbitration, which would be necessary to perform.


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vast untapped gas reserves. It is also the biggest foreign investment in Libya’s energy sector since UN sanctions were suspended in 1999, and it further cements Agip’s strong relationship with the NOC.

To sum up, in the mid-2000s, Tripoli relations with both Washington and Brussels have substantially improved. Economic and diplomatic relations have been restored. The Council of the European Union lifted the arms embargo that had been in effect since 1986 and decided that a technical mission to Libya should be conducted to examine arrangements for combating illegal immigration. The Council also decided that an act of solidarity with those infected with HIV/AIDS at the Benghazi Hospital be implemented as soon as possible. The Council finally decided to closely follow the human rights situation in Libya and negotiate a fisheries agreement with Tripoli. These issues are likely to dominate relations between the two sides in the rest of the decade.
The Role of Gas in Mediterranean integration

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The Relative Importance of Gas

From an energy point of view, 2005 has been a very convulsive year. On an international level, fears that there may be an energy crisis equivalent to that of the seventies of the last century have increased. According to the media, contributing to these fears are the growing about end of oil and specific factors such as the situation in Iraq; the new crop of leaders in Latin American oil-producing countries, Chávez in particular; the growing demand from China and India; and, in recent months, the concern caused by the situation in Iran. In the case of Europe, this feeling of energy insecurity was intensified, right in the middle of the 2005 Christmas holiday period, due to an extremely brief cut in the supply of Russian gas, which reaches Central and Eastern Europe via Ukraine. A conflict, that in principle should have been read as neighbour motivated – between the two former USSR countries that share a network of gas pipelines –, was interpreted in Europe as a serious threat to our energy security.

Among other consequences, these ingredients have increasingly led the attention to questions relating to natural gas. An energy model based on gas has many features in common with one based on oil, but there are two significant differences that we would like to emphasize: a) the predominance of gas could mean a change in the most important players on the International Energy Scene (IES), especially where producing countries are concerned, and b) the gas market is not technically unified. In the case of gas, geographical proximity does matter and consequently increases the possibility of creating "regional markets", "controlled" by regional players. In fact, the European Union itself establishes in the technical report for the preparation of the Green Book that "there is no world market for natural gas: gas is sold in three separate consumer markets: in the United States, the European Union and Asia." From this affirmation we can deduce that the potential that regional alliances may have as an instrument of energy politics should be highlighted, since gas intrinsically leads to an “obligatory” policy of buying and selling on a regional basis.

European countries consume approximately 16% of the world’s natural gas. This figure currently represents 24.3% of the total gross primary energy consumption of the 25 member states of the E.U. In the future, it is estimated that this percentage will increase; just as it is also predicted that the dependence on imported gas will increase, from acquiring half the amount presently consumed from other countries, to importing three quarters of our requirements some time between 2015 and 2020. European consumption is principally fuelled with gas from three areas: Russia, Norway and Algeria. On average, according to Eurogas, 24% of the total gas consumed in the 25 EU countries comes from Russia, 59% from European countries, including Norway, 10% from Algeria, and the remaining 7% from other suppliers including Libya and Egypt. These data indicate that for the EU, the situation is quite different to that of oil. When we talk about gas, the focus is on three suppliers, two of which are continental and the other, Mediterranean.

As we move towards the south-west of the continent, by looking at the figures for the Europe of 15 member states rather than the Europe of 25, the influence of Algeria, the Mediterranean supplier, increases to 21% of total gas consumption; and if we only focus on the two southernmost countries of the EU, Italy and Spain, the Algerian supply is even greater. According to British Petroleum, out of the total gas that enters the continent by gas-pipeline, almost 40% of that consumed in Italy and 70% of that used in Spain originates from North Africa. These data are reinforced if we consider that of the gas imports arriving from Algeria to the EU by gas pipeline (86.6% of the total), 69% passes through Italy and 23% through Spain.

The Algerian Deposits in the European Area

If we consider energy relations as dichotomical – there are countries that sell crude and gas and others that buy it –, the isolated figures that we have presented, would lead one to think that, in the Mediterranean area, what exists is an asymmetric relationship of dependence. This idea moves us away from a possible scene of energy integration, but this possibility comes up when we consider energy relations as a game, with at least three groups, between the gas of the producing countries, the consumers and those who act as intermediaries in the process; the governments and companies of the sector.
The importance and urgency of employment as the main economic and social challenge for Arab Mediterranean countries is unquestionable (see Med. 2003, Mediterranean Yearbook, p. 151). And yet, over the ten years of the Barcelona process there has been no single region-wide study investigating the relation between employment and the main framework of economic relations between the European Union and its Southern and Eastern Mediterranean neighbours: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Neither FEMISE, nor EuroMeScO or even the European Commission in the framework of its ongoing Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Areas have undertaken such an analysis.

This is the main purpose of the “EuroMed Employment” project, a Comparative Study of the Impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Free Trade Areas and MEDA Programs) on Employment and the Right to Work in 8 Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. The project is a joint initiative by the Euro-Mediterranean Trade Union Forum and the Spanish trade union Comisiones Obreras and its Fundación Paz y Solidaridad Serafin Aliaga. It was prepared in cooperation with the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) and was financed by the Spanish International Cooperation Agency (AECI) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which also provided logistic support in the entire region.

The “EuroMed Employment” project, implemented throughout 2005 and 2006, consisted in elaborating eight national studies on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Employment in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria, as well as a study of the consideration of employment by European institutions within the Euro-Mediterranean process. Studies were carried out by 17 local independent experts, mostly economists, under the coordination of a scientific director, the Spanish economist Iván Martín, and of a follow-up committee consisting of the five participating organisations. Studies were carried out using a standardised questionnaire and a preliminary version of each of them was discussed and validated in two subregional seminars held in Rabat in October 2005 and in Amman in December of the same year. The resulting 100-pages comparative study has been drafted on the basis of these nine studies, and it was presented and discussed at the final conference of the project organised in Tunis in September 2006. The comparative study will be published in English, French, Spanish and Arabic.

Amongst the initial conclusions and recommendations of this comparative study, which up to now is the widest analysis carried out on this issue at a regional level, it is worth mentioning the following:

- The eight national studies offer a detailed analysis of the national labour markets, employment prospects, labour policies and regulation in each of the countries. The general conclusion is that the daunting challenge of employment in the Euro-Mediterranean region requires an active employment policy both at the national level and in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This is particularly important in respect to female and youth employment and the role of the informal economy, which undermines the economic and social situation of the population in Arab Mediterranean Countries and hampers their development.

- The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s impact on employment, particularly as a consequence of the implementation of the free trade areas, will generally be irrelevant, neither negative nor positive (although the impact will be greater in the Maghreb countries). However, its effects can be significantly negative in particular industries, especially with regards to the employment of women in specific manufacturing sectors present in the countries from that area. This requires specific gender and employment programs.

From this point of view, in 2005 there was a significant change in the Mediterranean gas game: the passing in Algeria of Law 05-07 of April 28th relating to hydrocarbons. This leads us to think that the Algerian hydrocarbons will be a constituent piece in the Euro-Mediterranean geoenergy area. In this piece there are two elements indicating that the tapping of Algerian hydrocarbons will be incorporated into the activity of private consortia of companies, which include those identified as European (Gas Natural, ENI, Total, Fina, Elf,…). The first element is that with this law, the Algerian State will no longer be a producing State, as it is a law that separates the State – as the owner of the country’s subsoil riches – from SONATRACH, the national Algerian hydrocarbons company. This means that for the State, the export of oil is no longer considered as the privileged means for obtaining national income. For this reason, “Algerian national political” criteria have less and less influence on the quantities of crude oil and gas that are exported. Evidence
of this is that, even in the case of oil, sources close to the Algerian authorities have already stated their intention to abandon the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota discipline.

The second is that this same law converts SONATRACH into an exclusively commercial company, while at the same time limiting its participation in international consortiums that exploit Algerian hydrocarbons. This can only reinforce the tendency which can be seen in the attached table. That is, that the importance of “foreign” gas production in Algeria has constantly increased.

Both factors indicate the loss of “Algerianity” of the country’s gas, which predictably will be considered as a marketable asset capable of yielding profits – not national income – for the companies that market it. From this point of view, it is relevant to remember who markets this gas to integrated consortiums of European and domestic companies: principally SONATRACH.

Gas, a Factor of Regional Energy Integration?

The answer to this question is ambivalent. It has already been said that the current structure of infrastructures and storage in Algeria is conceived principally for the export of gas to Spain, Italy and France, and it is mainly companies from these countries that acquire the gas. From this point of view, the hydrocarbons and the companies, currently from Algeria – but according to predictions of the Mediterranean Energy Observatory (OME) also from Libya and Egypt in the near future (2.31% and 2.52%, respectively, of the European supply in 2010) form the European upstream gas sector and remain integrated – micro-economically – in the same logic as the European energy industry.

However, the growing construction of pipelines gives greater prominence to the transit countries, with potential ability to influence the course of energy relations. From this perspective, especially in the case of the Maghreb, the construction of pipelines to Europe gives an importance to Morocco and Tunisia which they did not have in the previous oil market. It seems very unlikely that Morocco or Tunisia would carry out any action against Europe, but it is plausible that they could use this position of transit country to resolve their ancestral conflicts with their neighbour Algeria, in the case of Morocco, or Libya, in the case of Tunisia – and obviously, also vice versa.

If such a situation were to arise, we would find ourselves up against a Maghreb geo-energy area, that acted with a logic previously unknown, a logic that would not resemble that of the most national kind governed by the producing states of the past, but would still have in common with the past situation the fact that national interests would take precedence over regional energy integration.
For the last 25 years, the textile and clothing industry (T&C from here on) has been one of the most important industries for the Mediterranean region as a major source of income and employment. Recent developments on the international trade arena have raised questions whether the structure and dynamics of the T&C industry in the region is bound to experience some radical changes. This article will underline the importance of the T&C sector for the Mediterranean countries, discuss the context of the recent challenges, with an emphasis on trade liberalization and events it triggered in 2005, and explore their perceived and predicted consequences.

### Importance of Textile and Clothing Sectors for Mediterranean countries

The T&C sector plays a crucial role in the economies of the Mediterranean countries and in their trade with the EU. According to the Commission of the European Communities, “the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean countries outside the EU employ directly a total 4.3 million people, of which the countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean area employ over 3.7 million people [according to Euratex data] (approximately 2/3rds are accounted for by Turkey and Egypt). The weight of textile and clothing employment is very important in Tunisia (46%) and Morocco (41%). In Morocco, the sector has provided 60% of new manufacturing jobs since 1986. In Tunisia, the sector created a third of new industrial jobs between 1997 and 2003.

The largest T&C producer in the Mediterranean region is Turkey followed by Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Syria, and to a lesser extent and more recently Jordan. Turkey is a country with a complete textile and clothing manufacturing pipeline and a broad domestic raw material base which supports the downstream T&C industry. It is one of the leading cotton producers in the world.

In Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan, clothing is the first export commodity; in Egypt and Syria textile and clothing articles are the second export commodity after oil products. In all countries the textile and clothing sector accounts for 20-50% of exports.

In addition, due to a mixture of trade preferences, geographical and cultural proximity, low labour costs, relatively higher quality standards, and EU investments there is an important complementariness in the T&C sector between EU and the MEDA countries. A significant proportion of European textiles are processed and transformed in the Mediterranean region and re-ex-

### Table 4: Table of EU trade with Mediterranean countries (T&C in millions euros)

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<td>16,781</td>
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<td>6,777</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>9,433</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>1,607</td>
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<td>2,598</td>
<td>1,796</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>2,969</td>
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</table>

Source: European Commission, DG Trade.
Recent Challenges to the T&C Sector in the Mediterranean Region

The sector is currently going through a period of tough challenges:

- **Quota Phase-Out: The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)**: abolition of quantitative restrictions (quotas) which took place on 1st January 2005
  - China’s WTO Membership: increased competition in the global T&C supply chain mainly from Asia and especially China,
  - **EU Enlargement**: its challenges and opportunities
  - **Multilateral Trade Liberalization**: ongoing negotiations within the Doha Development Round which leads to further preference erosion and relocation of offshore production
  - Building up of the Pan – Euro-Mediterranean zone
  - A period of marked slowdown in economic activity and sluggish demand in the EU
  - The Euro’s significant upward trend against the US dollar

Almost every segment of the T&C sector in the Mediterranean region has been affected from the impact of these developments of the last few years. The economies of small developing countries are considered to be significantly vulnerable to changes in the international trading arena. Hence, the challenges listed above are of special importance to smaller countries, like those in the Mediterranean, that rely most heavily on textile and clothing exports for their economic welfare and growth and might therefore be adversely affected.

Moreover, Mediterranean T&C industry is mainly composed of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) which makes it more difficult to maintain production and compete with dynamic Asian competitors.

In fact, these recent challenges could disturb the balances in the regional division of labour and result in significant losses for both sides of the Mediterranean putting at risk the ongoing regional integration plans. They could also have serious economic development consequences, for countries who count on their T&C exports as their growth engine.

Consequences of Trade Liberalization and Other Developments of 2005

According to the European Commission document "Evolution of EU Textile Imports from China 2004-2005":

- The disruptive impact of liberalization of Chinese textile exports to the EU
in the first nine months of 2005 has been limited to a fairly narrow range of product categories.

- In these categories there have been absolute rises in textile imports and steep falls in unit prices. For products liberalized in 2005 there has been a very significant increase in China’s market share by 145% in volume and 95% in value. And a significant (20%) fall in unit prices.

- China’s share of exports to the EU in these textile categories liberalized on 1st January 2005 has increased dramatically at the expense of traditional EU suppliers, mainly in Asia but also in North Africa, the ACP and the Mediterranean region.

- Textiles exports in products liberalized in 2005 from Mediterranean countries to the EU fell for the first nine months of 2005 (with the exceptions of Turkey and Lebanon).

- It is noteworthy that the most significant displacement by China has been exports previously originating from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

- Although EU producers have suffered from market disruption in the categories affected as a result of the fall in unit prices and greater Chinese competition in export markets, there has been only a slight increase of textile imports into the EU in the first nine months of 2005, either in the 35 products liberalized on 1st January 2005 (4.8% in value and 10.4% in volume), or in total textile imports. (3.7% in value and 4.9% in volume).

- Serious market disruption has been limited to a small number of product sectors which have experienced both double digit absolute growth in exports, a rise in Chinese exports, and steep falls in unit prices sufficient to force restructuring.

- Although the immediate beneficiaries of quota elimination were predicted to be consumers, the retail prices for garments have been pretty stable throughout 2005.

### Table 5: Quotas and growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Minimum volume integrated (%)</th>
<th>Accumulated volume (%)</th>
<th>Remaining quota growth rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01.01.1995</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.01.1998</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.01.2002</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.01.2005</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Full integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6: Change in Exports (first nine months of 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Volume</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>-56%</td>
<td>-68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>-33%</td>
<td>-41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>-30%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

Although the state of the T&C sector in the Mediterranean region consists of a variety of strengths and weaknesses, there is a strong belief among some experts in the field that the T&C industry will continue to play a crucial role in Mediterranean economies, in terms of job creation and sustained growth. Major T&C suppliers in the Mediterranean region who have developed strong commercial ties with the EU can maintain their positions even in the light of the recent challenges to the industry and to the region.

The new trade environment has the potential to offer new opportunities and expand trade to industries in both developing and developed countries and allow the more efficient allocation of resources.

Moreover, with the 10th June agreement, the Mediterranean T&C sector seems to have caught a breathing period until 2008. The Mediterranean countries should use this limited time efficiently and focus on developing:

- a strong and diversified mix of T&C products
- full-package production
- high-quality, high value-added products
strategies to open up to diverse markets outside the USA and the EU
• flexibility in production
• reduction of delivery time, turnaround time, co-contracting, designs and collections
• backward linkages to indigenous textile industries
• forward linkages to markets
• technological upgrading
• enhancing skills in the industry
• research, development and innovation
• information and communication technologies (ICT): the development of business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
• infrastructure improvements to support efficient trade logistics
• bilateral governmental agreements with importing countries that would favour local industries

The Pan-Euro-Mediterranean area and its very rapid implementation would be very valuable. Euro-Mediterranean companies would be able to fully take advantage of the natural advantages of this area, well in advance of the end of the Barcelona Process by 2010. A more integrated Mediterranean area would have the means to address heightened competition by increasing its own competitiveness. T&C components could circulate freely along the comparative advantages of each producer at each stage of production. Moreover, the economies of scale that will emerge in the integrated area can add incentives for investors in the region and outside and increase the much needed FDI for many Mediterranean countries. Achieving the objective of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone will make it possible to bring the EU T&C sector together with that of the Mediterranean countries (including Turkey and, in the longer term, the Balkan countries). Using the logistics advantage of being close to the European market T&C producers in the Mediterranean region would be able to maintain high market shares in fast moving, high quality and high value-added items.

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The emergence of the “Multi Meda”

The most important economic piece of news of 2005 in the Mediterranean was about the great investments made by private multinational companies – but rather than the north investing in the south, it was the other way round. Companies that were founded and located in southern Mediterranean countries, invested in countries on the northern shore. These companies took years to internationalise their activity, normally with small investments from South to South. However, in 2005 they revealed to be capable of such ambitious investments that made them appear on the front pages of the world’s press.

In the summer of 2005, the Egyptian Naguib Sawiris, first shareholder of the Egyptian Telecom Company Orascom, became the main Euro-Mediterranean investor. He placed his money in Europe, by buying the Italian operating company GSM Wind for a little more than 12 billion Euros. This operation from Egypt to Italy, from the South to the North, is the biggest Euro-Mediterranean investment in history. Only the direction of the flow of capital is opposite to what we usually see, and its size also means that it is on a much bigger scale than usual. The total amount of the Wind operation far outweighs the total sum of foreign investments received by all the Meda countries from all over the world both in 2002 and in 2003.

Meda Multinationals, or MultiMeda, have not just appeared with this spectacular operation. They have been transferring their capital and “know-how” abroad for years. Normally they are venerable state-owned or public sector companies that acquired the necessary turnover for these operations thanks to state monopolies, and operated on a South-South axis.

A well known case is that of the Moroccan Office Cherifien des Phosphates (OCP), which has a presence in India as well as in Pakistan. South-North operations took place using the same strategy. For example the operations carried out by the Algerian company Sonatrach, which holds the gas export monopoly in Algeria and which has significantly invested in Spain in the past couple of years. The company started building a chemical plant in Tarragona together with BASF, it holds shares in the Reganosa regasification plant in Galicia, while at the same time it allied itself with CEPSA to form a joint venture within the electrical sector. These South-North operations were occasionally structured around holding-type companies which invested in Europe the profits earned by the State in the exploitation of natural resources under monopoly conditions. The best-known case is that of Libya, whose external holdings, such as Lafico, have a significant number of shares invested in all types of Italian organisations, from the Juvenus Football Club to the car manufacturer Fiat. Nevertheless, these operations were considered more as a symptom of the economic dysfunctions of the MEDA countries; in this region, State monopolies did not even generate local investment.

In 2005, however, some MEDA economies showed themselves to be capable of creating private entities which have both the necessary boldness and the capacity to invest in external markets. There have been many examples of internationalisation in southern Mediterranean private companies during 2005. An example of this is the largest Lebanese bank, Banque du Liban et d’Outre-Mer (Blom), which bought the Egyptian bank Misr Romanian Bank in 2005, for almost 100 million dollars. This organi-
sation has affiliated companies in France (Banque Banorabe, Switzerland (Banque Banoroint), Syria (Bank of Syria and Overseas) and representative offices in half a dozen countries. Its Lebanese competitor, Bank Audi, followed in its footsteps by starting up its business activity in Syria in 2005 while keeping banking subsidiaries in France and Switzerland. For a further example of Lebanese multinational financial dynamism, let’s consider the Fransabank bank, which invested 35 million dollars in creating a subsidiary in Algeria. In this country, in 2005, the Group Byblos, which is also Lebanese, bought 51% of the Algerian bank Al Rayan for $12 million. Regardless of the proliferation of Lebanese operations, these financial multinationals exist in almost every southern Mediterranean country. The final example to take into consideration for 2005 is the Israeli bank, Bank Hapoalim that bought the Turkish bank C-Bank for $113 million.

Without wishing to tire the reader with extensive lists, we have to report that multinationals also appear in different sectors and include unsuspected countries. They are present in Syria, for example, a country which does not lead Mediterranean countries’ rankings for business dynamism. However, the Tabourian Group, which in July 2005 bought the Lebanese company San nine Mineral Water for $11.5 million, is Syrian.

All these investments made in 2005 refer to private companies, which do not count on monopolies to increase their financial strength. Their emergence shows that at least some companies in some southern Mediterranean countries have gained an outstanding level of maturity. The key to achieving this is probably to be found in their “know-how” and in their market knowledge rather than in their economic power. Something which can always be obtained from a northern partner. This is the case of the Moroccan Bank Attijari Wafa, which won the tender for the privatisation of the Tunisian Banque du Sud. The Moroccan bank carried out this operation in alliance with its second shareholder, the Spanish Santander Group. Another case of a northern company seeking the support of a southern one to invest in a third country, is that of the French group Danone, which reached an agreement to create a biscuit factory in Algeria together with the Tunisian company Sotubi, with percentage holdings of 51% and 49% respectively.

Let’s conclude this overview with the Egyptian Group Orascom, which besides being a telecommunications multinational with investments from Algeria to Jordan, also has a dynamic construction materials division which has just inaugurated its first cement factory in Algeria while already building its second one. “MultiMeda” multinationals certainly have a long way to go before reaching the same level as their counterparts in other continents which have already attained the status of world leaders. For example, the Mexican company Cemex in the cement sector, or the Indian firm Mittal in the iron metallurgy field. However, this type of operation is starting to become a significant element which should be taken into consideration. Having said this, we also need to mention that southern Mediterranean countries have a long way ahead of them before becoming net exporters of capital.

Up to now they have received rather than made foreign investments, even though only in small volumes. For example, the investments contribute a level of foreign currency revenue to the area significantly lower than the remittances of their emigrants. Everything suggests that these constants remained throughout 2005, or were maybe on the rise once in a while, though to prove it is necessary to wait a few months for the publication of these countries’ balances of payments.

While this data is still missing, we should also note that among the investments received by the region, telecommunications have also featured. This is the sector which was restructured in Turkey when the negotiations for Turkey’s entry into the European Union started, giving rise to significant operations. On one part, the British Vodafone company won the tender for the Turkish company Telsint through offering $4.5 billion. On the other, the Russian company Alpha bought 13% of Turkcell for $1.89 billion. This certainly induced the Finnish company Telia Sonera to unleash a lawsuit, claiming that it had signed an outline agreement to carry out the same operation. Thirdly, the Saudi group Oger bought 55% of Turk Telekom for $6.5 billion in 2005. It has to be considered that these operations, in the balance of payments, will only count as foreign investment to the extent that they really involve the entry of fresh capital and prevent investors resorting to local banks to finance operations.

Except for telecommunications, the effect of opening negotiations with the European Union has been noticed in almost all sectors of the Turkish economy, where there has been a surge of foreign investment. For example, the Anglo-Dutch oil company Shell, together with the Turkish Group Koc, bought the Tupras refinery for $4.14 billion, while the United States General Electric bought 25.5% of the Turkish bank Garanti for $1.55 billion. Another country that experienced an outstanding 2005, more for the quality of foreign investments rather than their quantity, was Morocco. A country which marked the start of the year with the successful initial listing of Maroc Telecom, an organisation that is publicly quoted in Casablanca and Paris. This contributed to create the country’s profile as a destination for investment. Another important factor was the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, which attracted the interest of various textile groups, mainly fabric manufacturers. For example, the Italian denim manufacturer Legler allied itself with the Moroccan group Senoussi to build two plants, investing 90 million euros. At the same time, Fruit of The Loom, which also specialises in cotton fabrics, expanded its Moroccan plant by investing 70 million euros. Both are following in the footsteps of Tavex, the Spanish denim specialist, which extended its Settat factory by investing 60 million euros. Other operations of great strategic significance were carried out by Cesce, the Spanish export credit agency, which took a 19% share in its homologous Moroccan export insurance company, Société Marocaine d’Assurance à l’Exportation. While the Spanish Telefonica obtained the second fixed telephone licence in the country.

The third significant country in 2005 was Algeria, where the novelty lay in the quantity of projects carried out. Algeria probably reached an historic
Within the framework of initiatives aimed at economic cooperation and trade in the Euro-Mediterranean region, the activities of the ANIMA network are notable. ANIMA is a five year project (although initially conceived as being over three years) launched in 2002 and largely financed by the European Union. Its main objective is to help the MEDA partner countries, plus Cyprus and Malta to equip themselves with the tools and strategies that will attract and increase foreign investment. Its headquarters is based in Marseille and the institution which steers the project is the French Agency for International Investment (AFII), supported by ICE (Italian Institute of Foreign Commerce) and the Investment Department (Morocco). For the MEDA countries the majority of interlocutors are represented by the Investment Promotion Agencies (IPA).

Beyond the missions entrusted to it by the European Union, such as that of training, networking and promotion of investment, ANIMA’s strategy, as presented by its members on the official website, is very clear: “tell the truth, be pragmatic, exchange and share”. This involves primarily analysing the different situations in each country and targeting debate in political and economic terms. The systematic use of casestudies can also contribute to a significant acceleration in investment activity in the Mediterranean. The network was conceived from a cooperative viewpoint: all the partners must contribute with both their positive and negative experiences, so that everyone may benefit, in an environment of parity, without distinction between North and South.

Among the principal activities put in motion during 2005, the following are notable:

- Organisation of, or participation in, many EuroMed gatherings, such as the Mediterranean Economics Meeting (organised by IEned and The Cercle des Economistes) in September 2005 or the World Information Society Summit (Tunis November 2005);
- Organisation of activities which promote and lobby the network. The action of lobbying mainly consists of the drafting of documents and institutional propositions concerning possible future developments, in keeping with a vision of perpetuating the network (strategic dossier directed at European decision makers, at a national or regional level; offer of AIM – Investment Accelerator; a legally structured status to be created, preparation of an ANIMA CLUB similar to the AFII Club);
- Organisation of eleven training seminars at a regional level, European and local, in MEDA countries (Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey). On this subject note that until now more than 900 MEDA professionals have been trained;
- Two secondments of long duration since IPA-MEDA (Egypt et Morocco);
- Distribution and circulation of three bilingual bulletins (paper and electronic) and duplication of website;
- Pursuit of initiatives such as MEDA Entrepreneurs (for the promotion of investment in the region by businessmen from different diasporas), MedFranchise (for franchise development) or Medinnov (creation of a Mediterranean network for innovation, research and development);
- Carry out 7 technical assistance missions (Cyprus, Syria, Tunisia, Israel, Turkey, Egypt and Morocco);
- Duplication and development of several databases such as MIPO (MEDA Investment Project Observatory) for investment projects; Ani-contacts for the filing of contacts; database “Experts” for FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) experts or even a Top 1000 for the main foreign businesses who have already invested in the region;
- Carry out, publish and launch studies (assessment of FDI in the area, investors perceptions of the region, etc, etc).

Finally, ANIMA proposes to act as a base for the creation of the first IPA of the Euro-Mediterranean region, “a desire shared as much by the founders of the project as by IPA MEDA”.

For more information: www.animaweb.org
For the Mediterranean database: www.animaweb.org/investir_bdmediterraneenne.php

record from this point of view, which suggests that the country has left behind the conflict in which it was involved in the 90’s. Algeria strongly confirmed its re-entry into the group of countries receiving the largest investments. It did not have operations of great scope, but it had many of them, and in all sectors. For example, the Brazilian organisation Neobus created a bus assembly factory, while the French distribution company Champion agreed to open a hypermarket. Moreover, various Spanish companies managed to win tenders to build desalination plants, and various oil companies obtained contracts to explore and exploit oil fields. This point brings us to the last important sector of 2005, energy, which experienced great dynamism thanks to the high prices of crude oil. So, the Italian company ENI will put 330 million euros in order to increase the capacity of the Transmed pipeline which carries Algerian gas to Italy. Gas Natural did the same, while the year started with the launch of the new Medgas pipeline, between Spain and Algeria, a project directed by the Spanish company Cepsa. High crude oil prices explain the number of oil companies expanding their plans to increase production so as to take advantage of the market’s bullish tendency. Cases such as the Austrian OMV Aktiengesellschaft’s investment of 100 million Euros in the Tunisian Ashtart oil-field do not attract any particular attention. With the same aim, the United States Corporation Amerada Hess will invest $500 million in Algeria, the British company British Gas will invest $880 million in a second liquefaction plant in Egypt, and even the Malaysian company Petronas will invest $2 billion in Egypt.

These are only some of the milestones in the really large list of foreign investments in Euro-Mediterranean energy. In spite of everything, 2005 will be shown in investment records as the year in which the creation of Meda multinationals was revealed to be possible. In 2006 we will see whether this trend was short-lived or if it continues.
During the VI Interministerial Summit of the World Trade Organization (WTO), held in December 2005 in Hong Kong, a minimum agreement was reached amongst the 150 WTO Member Countries which allowed the Doha Round to be salvaged and avoided a similar failure to the one which took place during the 2003 Cancun Summit. In general terms, the agreements reached in Hong Kong are far from the objectives marked out in the Doha Development Agenda, which was launched after the September 11 attacks and which claimed to favour developing countries trade in order to fight against poverty and to achieve a more balanced globalization system. However, with these agreements there is still hope of closing the Round in time so that the final package can be handed into the American Congress in April 2007, before Bush’s Term of Office finishes, and which will probably not be renewed.

Regarding the same turn of events which took place in Cancun, the negotiations were generally focused on three aspects: agriculture trade, access to non-agricultural product markets and service trade treatment. Running the risk of simplifying it too much, the multilateral trade negotiation’s dynamic can be summarized by the exchange of agricultural concessions on behalf of developed countries and concessions for manufactures and services on behalf of developing countries. In Hong Kong an agreement was reached on behalf of the rich countries to reduce their agriculture support, especially concerning export subsidies, but they hardly advanced in the opening up of developing countries’ manufacture markets and services, as the developed countries had claimed.

This struggle between developed countries and developing countries conceals very different circumstances between the developing countries themselves, for which it is not possible to make generalizations on their impact on each other. The developing countries which have led negotiations, like Brazil or India, have little to do with the economies of the south Mediterranean shore, for which the concessions given to the former do not necessarily have to benefit the latter. This article claims to clearly expose some general considerations on the interaction between the multilateral trade negotiations and Euro-Mediterranean trade.

**Hong Kong and the Mediterranean**

The Hong Kong agreements fix the international trade tendencies and, therefore, place a framework of reference on Euro-Mediterranean trade relations. However, the interaction between both processes is complex, given the existing inequality between the EU negotiating positions and the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC) negotiating positions. In the first place, the EU negotiates on a group level after adjusting the negotiating mandate regarding Member States’ interests, while the MPC negotiates on an individual level. The MPC’s diverging interests are prominent, which on occasions leads them to be in negotiating groups with conflicting positions. Furthermore, although according to Cancun’s Summit, developing countries have shown a greater negotiating power than in the past, the concessions obtained in Hong Kong have created benefits on a greater scale for countries like Brazil or India than for the rest of the developing economies.

As far as MPC countries are concerned, the Multilateral Negotiations present two very different facets: access to EU markets, EU’s main trade partner (although the conditions for entry into the American market are also relevant for countries like Jordan, Israel, Egypt or Turkey), and the treatment granted by EU to the rest of the developing countries. In the first place, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership gives to the EU and to the MPC a larger margin for negotiation than the WTO framework, where the concessions are immediately distributed to all members according to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Clause. In the second place, the MPC has already experienced the impact of Preference Erosion which was stipulated in the Uruguay Round, for example in the textile industry. Upon eliminating the Multi-fibre Agreement, which fixed quotas for each country, the big Asian exporters have taken the place of the southern Mediterranean producers in the European market.

Furthermore, the reduced MPC impact on world trade supposes that negotiations are focused on products which have scarcely any interest for these countries, as has happened in the agriculture sector with sugar, bananas and cotton (with the significant exception of Egyptian cotton). However, as we have already pointed out, the multilateral negotiations set the tone for regional agree-
EURO MEDITERRANEAN SUMMIT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COUNCILS AND OTHER SIMILAR INSTITUTIONS, AMMAN, 20TH AND 21ST NOVEMBER 2005

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), a body which was created in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome, ensures the representation of the various socio-economic components of European organised society. As an advisory body, its members and the organisations represented can take part in the E.U’s decision-making process. Since the beginning of the Barcelona Process, the EESC has actively worked towards establishing relations and collaboration projects with the Mediterranean partners, both with economic and social Councils and with other similar institutions, in countries where this body is not yet established. This network has especially promoted the advisory function and created organisations for social dialogue. On the occasion of the anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, the EESC and its Mediterranean counterparts got together in Amman to assess ten years of partnership and re-launch their role in political decision-making, calling for a more active participation by means of consultations. A positive signal answering this request came directly from the Euro Mediterranean Leaders’ Summit on 28th November 2005; then the EESC President was invited for the first time to this official meeting to represent the voice of organised society, by outlining the conclusions of the Amman meeting.

A basis for reflection and evaluation, the final Declaration of the Amman Summit firstly emphasizes that, despite the progress made in establishing the Partnership, it has not fulfilled the expectations it created either on the security or development fronts. However, it remarks with especial regret that the political authorities have not given the necessary priority to the social dimension of the process. The Declaration also states that the representatives will commit themselves, for their part, to reinforcing participation in the process, with particular attention to the ENP; they will promote social dialogue in cooperation with the International Labour Organisation, and will strengthen their connections with the Anna Lindh Foundation, the UMCE and the Euromed Trade Union Forum. As for the Declaration’s section dedicated to conclusions and recommendations, some of the most interesting observations should be remembered:

- The request to pursue efforts to reinforce the development of the advisory bodies’ role in the region and their participation in defining and implementing partnership and neighbouring policies;
- The reinforcement of the social network on a Mediterranean level;
- The promotion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the intention of supporting peace and dialogue (a request put forward by the Palestinian and Israeli Social and Economic Councils and supported by the other members of the network);
- The need to confirm and expand the term of office given to the EESC, to Social and Economic Councils and to other institutions which form part of the same network, within the Partnership’s framework;
- The request to organise a Euro-Mediterranean conference on labour;
- The wish to continue promoting participative democracy;
- The promotion of equality between men and woman;
- The establishment of advisory authorities in those countries that still do not have them and the guarantee that all institutions can act independently from governments;
- The promotion of transparency and the fight against corruption so that investments can bring authentic and equitable developments, both at an economic and at a social level.

The next meeting is due to be held in 2006 in Slovenia.

Website:
For the full script of the Final Declaration: http://eesc.europa.eu/sections/res/med/eve events/docs/amman_2005_frr.doc

ments. A multilateral liberalization pressurizes in order to deepen the regional agreements, and determines the tendency of the agreements in a more or less liberalizing way. Therefore, it should be interesting to treat the implications of Hong Kong’s agreements for Euro-Mediterranean trade separately in the ranges of agriculture trade, and non-agriculture and service trade.

Agriculture Trade

The agriculture sector was included in the GATT/WTO during the last Uruguay Round, and is one of the most problematic vectors in the multilateral negotiations, given some of the developing countries insistence in improving its access to the rich countries agricultural markets, and the rich countries unwillingness to reduce their support to the agriculture sector. However, the simplistic vision that the developing countries are interested in agriculture liberalization without any distinction does not correspond to reality, especially in the case of the MPC. The diversity of its interest is expressed in its distribution amongst the different groups formed for the WTO negotiations. In this way, Egypt is the only MPC integrated into the powerful G-20, led by Brazil and India, formed by developing countries that have agricultural exporting capacity and consequently are interested in a far-reaching liberalization. On the contrary, Israel forms part of the G-10, the most defensive group in terms of agriculture protectionism, while Turkey is integrated into the G-33, the group of ‘special product friends’, for those developing countries who ask for a differential treatment and a special safeguard mechanism, although they also have a very offensive approach regarding rich countries subsidies. Finally, Morocco and Tunisia form part of G-90, a group of countries united due to the preference erosion problem, all of which enjoy preferential access to the rich countries market, and especially to EU market, on which they are very dependent. These countries demand these preferences to be maintained as long as the developed countries agricultural subsidies affecting their products will survive. In any case, for the MPC Conference a dilemma concerning the expansion into the agriculture market has arisen. On the one hand, they want better access conditions to enter into the European markets with Mediterranean products (fruit and vegetables) and its processed products, where they have comparative
advantage, but fear that the multilateral liberalization allows third countries to take control over their market prices on some of these products, to the extent that the preference margin would be reduced. On the other hand, they support special treatment and a safeguard mechanism for grain, meat and dairy products trade, in which they are not competitive. In general, they are importers of these products, and so therefore they also fear that by reducing the grants given in the EU, their prices will increase, and consequently the food bill, which is already of great importance. For example, if the world prices of grain increase, this will also imply a heavy pressure to maintain, or even to increase subsidies for MPC consumption, or to reduce the customs duties on these products, with the resulting budgetary impact.

Manufacturing and Services

A priority for developed countries, together with service trade liberalization, is to improve the entry into non-agricultural product markets of developing countries, given that they maintain very low manufacture tariffs, in comparison to developed countries. One of the main obstacles to the conclusion of the negotiations stems precisely from the fact that the rich countries believe that the concessions regarding this matter are not equal regarding those carried out in agriculture trade. In any case, the developed countries requests point above all to the protectionism of the new industrialized countries, like Brazil or India. For the MPC, which enjoy free access to the EU’s manufactures’ market and which are in the process of liberalizing their manufacturing sectors in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, this aspect only turns out to be relevant concerning these three points: to minimize preference erosion which is currently enjoyed by the European market, to improve its access to third markets, and to receive a differential treatment as developing countries in relation to third countries. In any case, putting questions of business politics to one side, the MPC can obtain important interests by modernizing its business institutions in line with what has been stipulated by the WTO concerning standards, origin rules, solution of differences or customs law. The liberalizing agenda has cut back in terms of services, investments and intellectual property protection. It covers topics of great interest for developed countries, which enjoy important comparative advantages in those areas, but the developing countries have refused to include in negotiations with the amplitude desired by the developed countries. The international financial institutions consider, not without reason, that by liberalizing the service trade in developing countries, this will increase their economy’s competitiveness, but the developing countries fear that their tertiary sectors would go under the rich countries big company control. Furthermore, the developing countries demand as a consideration the liberalization of the Service Trade’s Method 4, which involves moving the work force to the country where the service is needed, and which is perceived by the rich countries as a concealed way to liberalize the work force movements. The service trade is being contemplated in the same way as manufacturing and agriculture by the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, emphasized by the EU Neighbourhood Policy. In this area, the Euro-Mediterranean agreements are obviously weaker in comparison to the EU’s multilateral negotiations. For that reason, a major advance in multilateral trade service liberalization could have an important impact on the MPC, above all if some type of agreement referring to Method 4 is reached. Nevertheless, given that it seems highly unlikely that both extremes are implemented right now, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements continue to maintain its focus on WTO-plus in terms of services, that is to say, entail a greater liberalizing component in the regional framework than in the multilateral framework.

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The Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development: A Framework for Regional Partnership

Context and Process

Concerned by the increasing marine pollution, the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea and the European Union have been cooperating since 1975 to improve their common Mediterranean environment, through the UNEP/Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP). Over the past 30 years, UNEP/MAP has evolved in response to the improved understanding of the close relationships between the environment, conservation and development. It has expanded its remit and no longer focuses solely on Mediterranean Sea pollution. It also concerns itself with pollution generated on land due to the development process with integrated coastal zone planning and natural resource management as the key tools through which solutions are being sought.

In the early 1990s and 2000s, global developments in environmental approaches confirmed and supported MAP's widening scope, in particular, Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. MAP responded in 1994 with the preparation of an Agenda MED 21, adapting Agenda 21 to the Mediterranean context, and the establishment of the MCSD in 1996, demonstrating the commitment of the Contracting Parties to working toward integrating environment and development in the entire region. MAP activities and achievements in relation to Sustainable Development, mainly through the MCSD, have raised high expectations among most of the MCSD members and other partners, despite the shortcomings regarding the follow up and implementation of its recommendations and proposals for action.

The Mediterranean is an eco-region with a unique heritage and very specific features and its future depends on ensuring that development patterns are sustainable throughout the region. Through its legal system for the protection of the environment and its Regional Commission for Sustainable Development, the Mediterranean is already a pioneer in environmental matters and sustainable development approaches. The Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development offers another chance for the region to make history through genuine partnership and co-development for a common Regional Vision. To that end, the EU has a determinant role to play as a key driving force but this requires a true sense of partnership, not just a free trade area.

Considering that the MCSD is a think-tank composed of experts representing governments and major groups from civil society, the MSSD was prepared through a large participatory process, associating as much as possible relevant experts at regional and national levels. Through its impact on awareness raising, capacity development and decision making towards a strategy for sustainable development, the preparatory process was at least as important as the end products.

Common Vision and Framework Orientations for a Regional Strategy

Increasingly active, co-operation in the Mediterranean is however affected by a lack of common vision and inadequate co-ordination between the main partners involved and also by a mismatch between resources available for develop-
In 2005, the European Environment Agency (EEA) published a report on priority environmental topics in the Mediterranean in collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme/Mediterranean Action Plan (UNEP/MAP). Having the objective of identifying the main contaminated areas, the report seeks to provide a general view to complement that of previous reports. Beginning with the observation that a large number of activities linked to the presence of humans are concentrated on the Mediterranean coast and the impact that these activities have on the marine ecosystem, and taking into account that the knowledge of many environmental topics is limited, the report highlights the following aspects as the greatest pressures that are exerted on the Mediterranean:

**Sewage and urban run-off.** 31% of the 601 coastal towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants do not have any waste water treatment plants. The rapid growth of many villages and towns, in particular on the southern shore, and the increase in the tourist population, are exacerbating the problem.

**Solid waste.** Waste generated in the towns is often emptied into the sea without any kind of treatment, and covers the seabed.

**Industrial effluents including oil processing.** Chemical and mining industries that produce significant amounts of industrial wastes, such as heavy metals or hazardous substances that may reach the marine environment and adversely affect the ecosystem, are frequently encountered along the coast. Stockpiles of obsolete chemical products, such as certain pesticides and persistent organic pollutants (POPs), should also be included in these aspects.

**Urbanisation.** Urbanisation of the coastline is one of the major problems in the Mediterranean, since it very often leads to a loss of biodiversity as a consequence of the destruction and physical alteration of the area, this is usually due to uncontrolled development, especially tourist infrastructure. It should also be added that salt marshes and wetlands are destroyed to obtain sand and stone for building.

**Eutrophication.** Very common in sheltered areas such as harbours and semi-enclosed bays along the Mediterranean coast, mainly in the vicinity of coastal towns. Untreated (or partially treated) urban effluents contain nutrients that contribute to the accumulation of excessive deposits of organic material.

**Sand erosion.** Notwithstanding natural causes, human activities such as mining may increase its impact and produce a variety of adverse effects, in particular the destruction of the soil surface, a degradation of the dune system and a loss of biological diversity.

**Marine transport.** This is without doubt one of the major sources of contamination by hydrocarbons derived from petroleum. It is estimated that about 220,000 vessels of more than 100 tonnes each cross the Mediterranean annually, discharging approximately 250,000 tonnes of oil, in addition to the quantities spilled in accidents (80,000 between 1990-2005). Incidents at the terminals and during routine discharging account for another 120,000 annual tonnes.

**Biological Invasions.** Climatic changes in conjunction with deteriorated coastal ecosystems have resulted in changes to biodiversity due to the introduction and establishment of exotic species, 64 of them during the 21st century (23 in 2004).

**Harmful Algal Blooms.** This has lead to significant public health problems caused by the consumption of seafood contaminated by toxic algae.

**Exploitation of marine resources.** Impact on the ecosystem caused by uncontrolled fishing that leads to changes in the structure of fish populations. High discard rates of target species is also contributing to a loss of biodiversity.

**Expansion of aquaculture.** Intensive aquaculture has become a matter of concern for the Mediterranean economy given that production has increased 17-fold over the last 30 years. The most adverse effects include a reduction in abundance and diversity, although many of these effects are very localised and reversible.

**Natural hazards.** There are also unforeseen natural impacts such as earthquakes and seaquakes which result in coastal degradation.

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**ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN**

- The need and strong political request...
The report concludes by indicating that inadequate treatment of urban waste and management of chemical products are the main problems in the Mediterranean, although a distinction needs to be made between the countries on the northern shore and those on the southern and eastern shores. In the former case, despite the existence of legal framework, corrective technologies and preventive mechanisms, the political will to apply them is lacking. In the rest of the Mediterranean, economic growth is at the expense of the environment, since neither the economic conditions are adequate nor is the requisite technology available. The fundamental priority is thus the development and application of environmental legislation and ratification of the main multilateral environmental agreements.

References:

**TABLE 8 Major environmental problems in the coastal zone of the Mediterranean countries**

<table>
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+ Important problem  +/- Medium problem  - Small problem

with the support of the civil society for a MSSD,

- The existing extensive and cumulated knowledge on the region’s pressures, states and responses,
- The consolidated common grounds and the scope of the regional consensus, and
- The achievements throughout the preparatory process in terms of analysis, awareness, consultations and capacity building,

The MSSD report was finally elaborated during a period of 10 months between the two MCSD meetings of 2004 and 2005. Most Mediterranean stakeholders and partners are expected to be interested in and concerned with the results and proposals of the MSSD. These concern also UNEP/MAP as the objectives of the Strategy and its derived policy actions are expected to exert a major impact on UNEP/MAP’s programme of work, at least for the period of the next decade.

As for the Vision and Orientations, the Strategy was prepared in close cooperation and involvement of the governments, IGOs and NGOs experts, including some regional Business Associations and Local Authorities networks, as well as other partners such as the UN and European, Arab and Adriatic institutions and programmes. Giving due consideration to the Mediterranean context and stakes, seven priority fields of action were identified; these concern: water resources, energy and climate change, transport mobility, tourism, agriculture and rural development, urban development, management of the sea, marine resources and coastal areas. Throughout the MSSD preparatory process, it appeared that pursuing Sustainable Development in the Mediterranean Region is essentially a task of transforming governance, and preparing and implementing a Sustainable Development Strategy that could be considered as a test case for adequate
and efficient governance. Therefore, moving seriously towards and implementing efficiently Sustainable Development will require adequate structural changes in economic, social, environmental and political sectors. Consequently serious actions are urgently required in response to: reforming fiscal policies, inequity and inequality of access to assets and resources, integrating environment in development policies, decoupling environmental degradation and resource consumption from economic and social development, reorienting and increasing public and private investment towards Sustainable Development.

Motivation and active participation of various countries as well as representatives of civil society have largely contributed, through information and lobbying campaigns, to the recognition of the value of the MSSD. Not only within MAP but also vis-à-vis other major partners such as the EU, ending up by explicitly stressing its importance in the declaration of the Heads of States of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership at its ten-year anniversary in 2005.

The Mediterranean Region has now its Commission on Sustainable Development and its framework Strategy for Sustainable Development, two specific features that should be further promoted and strengthened, as they do constitute the necessary decision-making tools for a Region that badly needs stability, partnership, shared prosperity and sustainable development.

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Kyoto in the Mediterranean: Climatic Risks, International Agreements and Economic Opportunities

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On the 16th February 2005 the Kyoto Protocol came into effect, after seven years of finalizing negotiations and thirteen years after adopting the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Rio de Janeiro. Finally, an international treaty sets objectives so that developed countries reduce or limit their greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). The fulfilment of this objective, pursued for a long time by the European Union, will have some interesting implications on the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean's Exposure to Climate Change

Although the scientific consensus on the existence of climate change impelled by human activity is already very strong (IPCC, 2001), the regional studies on the climate change’s impact still contains a significant level of uncertainty. However, it seems well established that the Mediterranean climate could suffer important changes, even under intermediate or conservative scenarios of an increase in GHG emissions and of the average global temperature (Giannakopoulos et al., 2005). In this way, for the years 2031-2060 the average temperature may increase between 1 and 3 °C, the increase being more intense inland than on the coast. Similarly, there will be a substantial increase in the number of extremely hot days as well as an increase in heat waves, especially on the southern shore. Also, a general rainfall shortage is expected, which will be more noticeable during the summer and in the southern Mediterranean countries. On the other hand, on the northern shore, an increase in torrential rain is predicted.

The south Mediterranean, together with the Iberian Peninsula, Italy and the Balkans, will also be affected by an increase in the risk of fires. With regards to biodiversity, it is likely that the climate change will provoke a large increase in the risk of extinction of certain species. Likewise, a general reduction in agricultural yield is to be expected, which could be more acute due to the reduction in water availability. Finally, it has also been foreseen that the climate change may modify northern European tourist habits and that the increase in sea level, although moderate in the Mediterranean, may particularly affect the highly populated Nile Delta. To resume, the effects of climate change in the region can be serious and damage very significant economic sectors, such as tourism and agriculture, as well as important human settlements.

The Developed Countries Agreements

The Kyoto Protocol obliges industrialized countries to globally reduce their GHG emissions by 5% between the base year (1990 for the main gases) and the period 2008-2012. However, this is a differential agreement, in the way that the percentages vary from country to country (Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack, 1999). In order to concentrate on this yearbook’s topic of interest, the EU15 group has to reduce its emissions by 8%, which is the same as Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Romania; Hungary and Poland have to reduce them by 6%; and Croatia by 5%. During the so-called Agreement on Emissions Trading, adopted in June 1998, the Fifteen Member States Union distributed the emission units’ quota unevenly amongst its Member States. In this way, Luxemburg will have to reduce its emissions by 28%, Germany and Denmark by 21%, Austria by 13%, United Kingdom by 12.5%, Belgium by 7.5%, Italy by 6.5% and the Netherlands by 6%. Finland and France have agreed to not increase their emissions, Sweden will limit its growth by 4%, Ireland has to do the same by 13%, Spain by 15%, Greece by 25% and Portugal by 27%.

On the other hand, the rest of the Mediterranean countries emissions (mainly the southern and eastern coasts) are not subject to any international agreement to reduce or limit their emissions, and therefore, can develop freely. It is worth pointing out that neither Cyprus or Malta have any obligation to reduce emissions, as they do not form part of the OECD they are not considered developed, nor Turkey, which states that its membership to this organization should not be interpreted as an indicator of its level of development.

It is turning out to be complicated to fulfil Kyoto’s objectives, in particular for Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Greece, although not only for these countries. According to the European Environment Agency (EEA, 2005), in the year 2003 the EU15’s GHG emissions were 1.7% less than in 1990, still far from the reductions according to the Protocol. The future projections are not very optimistic either. The policies that are already be-
ing implemented will only be able to reduce the EU15’s emissions by 1.6% between 1990 y 2010. If we add the measures that are in the planning phase to the ones in place now, the reduction will reach 6.8%. Upon fulfilling the EU15’s agreements, the acquisition of rights of emission will be obtained. On the other hand, emissions have been reduced substantially in almost all of the new member states, which have experienced restructuring or the disappearance of very contaminating industries and with very high levels of energy consumption. According to the report mentioned before, in 2003 these emissions were 32% less than in the base year, although it is expected that there will be a substantial increase leading up to 2010.

In order to fulfill its objectives, the Kyoto Protocol has established three Flexible Mechanisms. In the first place, the Rights of Emissions Trading Scheme will allow those states which exceed their agreement to sell excess GHG emissions to those states which do not reach their targets. It is expected that this exchange is particularly intense between the EU15 countries and central and western European countries. Secondly, by means of “Joint Implementation”, the developed countries (or other agents that are authorized by the developed countries) will have the possibility to invest in other northern countries and in this way acquire the emissions which they have been allowed to save. This formula is called the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) when the investing country is from the north and the receiving country from the south. One would have to expect that this last option would give rise to a certain exchange of emission rights projects between both Mediterranean shores.

**Economic Opportunities: The Clean Development Mechanism and its Funding**

Unlike the other two mechanisms, which will not begin to function fully until 2008, the CDM projects are already being currently developed. In this way, the northern countries are conforming to the Memorandum of Understanding with the southern countries and as a result of this agreement the first experiences are beginning to unfold, normally after overcoming numerous controls and national and international administrative procedures. This is a sector in expansion and therefore it is very changeable: there are hundreds of projects being negotiated, but there are only a few that are being implemented already.

However, judging by the information supplied by the CDM Executive Committee, in the report elaborated during 2005’s second semester by the EU’s British Presidency, and by the specialized CDM Watch NGO, it appears that those European states which are committed to limiting their quota of emissions are not prioritizing the CDM implementation with the southern or eastern Mediterranean countries. The main bulk of this type of investment is assigned to the big southern countries in process of industrialization (Brazil, India, China and South Africa) and Latin American countries, although this tendency is not so marked in the cases of Italy (which develops projects in the Balkans), Spain (which has a memorandum with Morocco) and France (which has projects in Morocco and Tunisia). In general, then, the Mediterranean states which are disposed to receive CDM are focused on a small number of projects.

Finaly, we tackle the question of finance, which for the time being displays a similar pattern to the one which was pointed out above. The large industrialized southern countries and the Latin American countries absorb a significant part of the funds associated with the international regime for the struggle against climate change and southern and eastern Mediterranean countries do not receive funds on the same scale. The regime is financed by three funds, managed at this time by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which is at the same time administered by the World Bank. They are the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Adaptation Fund. At the time of writing this document, and according to the information given by the GEF, the Popular Republic of China has received around a fifth of the funds allocated to individual countries, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico together have received more than 15%, and India close to 7%. On the other hand, the amount for Mauritius, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya added together did not exceed 4%; neither did Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon together. Albania, Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia hardly exceeded 2%; and those countries which joined the EU in 2004, together with Romania and Bulgaria, did not reach 6%.

As a conclusion, the enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol imposes on those regions susceptible to climate change a set of obligations which are difficult to fulfill, and offers them opportunities which appear to not be fully taken advantage of.

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GAP: A Grand Design for Sustainable Development

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The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP, in Turkish acronym) is a regional development project aimed at full-fledged socio-economic development of the Upper Mesopotamia, or the “Fertile Crescent,” home to some of the earliest civilizations in the eastern Mediterranean. The Project area lies in southeastern Turkey, covering nine provinces corresponding to approximately 10% of Turkey’s population and an equivalent surface area. The recognition of the great water potential of the Euphrates-Tigris river system in Turkey led to drawing up plans for its sustainable development for irrigation and hydropower generation and to control floods and droughts.

The GAP, in its historical context, was formulated as a package of water and land resource development project in the 1970s, which was later on transformed in the early 1980s to a multi-sectoral, socioeconomic regional development programme, and then into a sustainable human development project in the 1990s. The basic objectives of the GAP are to remove interregional disparities in the country by alleviating conditions of abject poverty, and to raise the income levels and living standards in the region.

The water resources development programme of the GAP includes 13 groups of irrigation and energy projects, seven of which are on the Euphrates river and six on the Tigris river. Within the scope of these 13 projects, 27 billion kWh of hydroelectric energy is estimated to be generated annually with 7,500 MW installed capacity. In order to utilize the available water resources, the GAP envisages the construction of 22 storage dams and 19 hydropower plants, of which 9 dams are completed and 7 hydro-power plants are in operation. The Project includes irrigation networks on the Euphrates-Tigris river basin to irrigate 1.82 million hectares of land, of which 231,915 hectares are in operation. The level of realization of energy projects is 75% and that of irrigation projects is 13%. The total cost of the project is estimated to be $32 billion, 16 billion of which have already been invested. The cumulative energy produced by the dams in the region reached 234 million kWh as of the end of 2005. The monetary equivalent of this energy is $14 billion. The GAP scheme has already had a considerable impact on overall hydropower generation in Turkey with its 45% share.

Challenges & Potential in the GAP Region

Compared with the rest of Turkey, the GAP region has had a higher population growth, fertility and infant mortality rates, and lower life expectancy at birth than the national average. Tribal structure has been the dominant type of organization for centuries in the region. The region is well below country averages in terms of the number of schools and of student/teacher and student/class room ratios. Water for drinking and other purposes is not available in sufficient quantities. It is also not purified or chlorinated in many urban settlements. Around 28% of the village population lacks drinking water, and 12% have drinking water only in limited quantities.

In spite of these bottlenecks, the region has a potential in terms of water, land and human resources. The majority of the region lies in the Euphrates-Tigris river system, which represents over 28% of the nation’s water supply by rivers, and economically irrigable areas in the region make up 20% of those for the whole country. The distinguishing feature of human resources is the proportion of the young population. Approximately 77% of the population is under the age of 35 in the year 2005.

Major Components of the GAP

In accordance with the GAP’s sustainable development approach, special programmes and projects have been initiated to emphasize the human dimension of development through project implementations concerned with the basic social services (education, health, housing) gender equality, urban management, irrigation facilities and environmental sustainability, institutional and community capacity-building, and public participation. These projects have been initiated by the GAP Regional Development Administration, established under the Turkish Prime Ministry in 1989 to coordinate the development-related activities in the GAP region in close cooperation and partnership with the other concerned government institutions, local governments, municipalities, civil society organizations, private corpo-
tions, international institutions and funding agencies. A sample list of the projects which the GAP Administration has led since the early 1990s is displayed in Table 9.

The GAP Master Plan (1989) outlined the framework of the regional development, set a timetable for the development of water and soil resources in particular by taking into account the financial and technical capabilities, and determined the development and employment to be created by this transformation. Projections of the Master Plan could not be realized largely because of the public financing crisis, which deepened in the 1990s, and because of the terror incidents. Although the Master Plan envisaged a growth rate of 6.8% in the Gross Regional Product and a radical transformation of the economic structure, the growth rate could be realized only at 4.9% in 2005 as industry and services could not develop at the projected rates. In 2005 there had been concerted efforts to attract more investment into the region to take part solidly in the commercial activities of the eastern Mediterranean. Hence, in early January 2006, the GAP Administration proclaimed the year 2006 to be the ‘Investment Year in the GAP.’

The GAP in 2005: An Overview

The 1st GAP Business and Investment Forum

The GAP region offers dynamic population structure; vast capacity for agricultural production; tourism potential; rapidly expanding markets; proximity to other markets in the Middle East; and state incentives provided to investments in the region. In spite of this favorable environment, investments in the region are still insufficient mainly due to technical, financial and managerial constraints of potential investors. Hence, “The First GAP Business and Investment Forum” which took place on 14th May 2005 at Sanliurfa Harran University focused on these constraints to come up with solutions relevant to all entrepreneurs. Approximately 750 firms and businessmen have participated in the Forum from textile, food, tourism, machine manufacturing, construction and other sectors.

The 1st Middle East Economic Cooperation Forum

Within the framework of the “Strategy for Promoting Trade with Neighbouring and Other Countries in the Region” launched in 2000, the Turkish Undersecretary of Foreign Trade took steps to improve the trade with the countries of the region and significant progress has been achieved since then. In spite of this progress, however, it is not possible to say that the trade potential between Turkey and other countries of the region has been fully realised. As a matter of fact, the volume of Turkey’s foreign trade with the countries of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East remained at $6.7 billion for the first 5 months of 2005. In this context, both with its geographical location and its economic potential, southeastern Anatolia is well positioned to contribute to the further development of Turkey’s trade with the countries of the region. To be more specific, the GAP region stands as a potential supplier especially in the sectors of machinery-equipment, food and textiles and, furthermore, it may well serve as a bridge for those Middle Eastern companies seeking markets both in Turkey and in other European countries.

The 1st Middle East Economic Cooperation Forum took place on 2nd October 2005 under the joint organization of the GAP Regional Development Administration and the Diyarbakir Cham-

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<th>TABLE 9</th>
<th>Examples of GAP Sustainable Development Implementation Projects:</th>
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<td>• Management, operation &amp; maintenance of irrigation systems.</td>
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<td>• Reuse of irrigation return water.</td>
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<td>• Income Generating Activities in Areas out of the Coverage of Irrigation.</td>
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<td>• GAP Region Public Health Project.</td>
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<td>• Environmental Education Project.</td>
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<td>• Zeugma 2000 Archeological Project.</td>
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Participants in the Forum included businessmen from Turkey and other countries in the region, as well as guest speakers from Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Iran and Iraq. 106 out of 218 participants have attended the Forum from Middle Eastern Countries (Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Syria), 88 from the GAP region and 24 from outside the region.

Young Turkish Businessmen Living in Europe Meet Businessmen from the GAP Region

With the supportive contributions of the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, the GAP Administration and the Young Businessmen Association of Turkey (TUGIAD) jointly organized the meeting “GAP Reunion of Young Businessmen Living in Europe” in Gaziantep on 26th November 2005. The Forum brought together deputies from the provinces of the region, leading figures in the financial sector and representatives from governmental and non-governmental organisations. The meeting was organized in line with several objectives including the assessment of investment opportunities for the transfer of the experience and funds of the businessmen to the GAP region, informing businessmen abroad about the economic potential of the region and consolidating cooperation with businessmen abroad and others who are active in the country. The organization covered about 300 young businessmen active in various countries in the EU as well as 200 others from the region and other parts of the country.

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On November 25th, 2005, the city of Barcelona organised a “Conference of Euro-Mediterranean Cities” within the framework of the tenth anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. More than forty town-mayors from towns both North and South of the Mediterranean gathered at this conference with the aim of analysing the situation of cities in the partner countries, of measuring the challenges that these cities face and of determining priority areas for action which could be integrated in the new European Neighbourhood Policy.

It is within this framework that the city of Barcelona asked the Marseille Institut de la Méditerranée to carry out a study on the largest cities of the Mediterranean, which conclusions were debated during the Conference, as described below. These conclusions were collected within a common declaration that was signed by the mayors present at the conference and presented to the representatives of the European Commission that also attended the event. This declaration suggests that the urban dimension should be taken more into account in the new European Neighbourhood Policy, as well as proposing a firm development plan for basic public services. This recommendation is currently being debated within the Commission.

Cites are a permanent aspect of Mediterranean history. It is along the coasts, along the dense and ancient scattering of cities, that commerce has thrived following the maritime routes, eventually forming what we now know as the Mediterranean area. The most ancient cities in the world were founded here. Most of these cities were, in one age or another, large and active centres that shone their light along the length of the Mediterranean and into the Middle East. Eventually, the great commercial currents were abandoned, to the benefit, at first, of Venetian and Ottoman powers, and then of European colonial powers. These cities currently face multiple challenges. They are, from this point of view, a magnifying mirror of the difficulties encountered by Mediterranean countries within the present trend of globalisation, which is unfavourable to these countries and to which they are finding it hard to adapt.

The attraction of the great towns of the South is imposing a surplus of population that exceeds their capacities of spatial expansion. Moreover, nowhere is the magnitude of the problems arising from urban changes more evident: the increasing need for housing, infrastructure, provision of water and energy, schools, hospitals, as well as the lack of control of food and industrial markets, give rise to speculation, penury and price increases, and are closely tied to the movement of concentrations and spatial redistribution of activities.

It is evident that Mediterranean cities share the majority of management-dysfunctions that concern urban regions around the world; however, in the Mediterranean, these problems are characterised by their magnitude and by the lack of means to address them. Today, “town” is synonymous with “bad lifestyle”, “discomfort” and “insecurity” for its inhabitants. Within a situation of high unemployment, the rural exodus amplifies an informal sector that represents a means of survival for millions of citizens. The risks of social destabilisation that result from this situation are significant. Large sections of urban population, victims of social and economic insufficiencies, suffer extreme poverty, as manifested both in the monetary sense and in the lack of quality of life. Moreover, insecurity and violence also represent a menace for those in precarious situations, who may become easy prey for integrist networks.

At the same time, a different aspect of cities which exists together with those described above and which is becoming stronger, is the one of the modern city, open to the world, aspiring to become part of the great European and worldwide chorus and playing the role, within their own country, of cutting-edge of economic dynamism and transformer of society. It is the “competitive” city, which has included itself within a process of integration into the regional and global network, seeking a high specialisation based on the attraction of investment to an easy and pleasant urban environment with a highly qualified workforce.

The majority of great cities aspire to continue playing the role of the “regional capital”, standing out in the Euro-Mediterranean environment and beyond. All great cities of the South are therefore territories of transition for social, economic and environmental changes, where great stakes are played for the entry of their own countries into the “world-economy” from which they have hitherto been excluded.

Amongst all these challenges, the first and perhaps foremost challenge is that of demography. In this sense, the urban population of the countries of the South and East of the Mediterranean, estimated today as 165 million inhabitants, is predicted to grow by about 4 million
On 25th and 26th November 2005, Barcelona City Council, in collaboration with United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) and Eurocities, organised the Euro-Mediterranean Cities Conference, Barcelona+10, in the days leading up to the Heads of State and Government Summit. The objective of the Cities Conference was to provide a platform for local governments to present their positions on the Barcelona Process. The Cities Conference merged with that of the Regions on the Saturday afternoon, 26th November to present a Joint Cities and Regions Declaration before the European Union, which was represented by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council, Javier Solana.

The Cities Conference
The Euro-Mediterranean Cities Conference brought together more than 70 mayors and local representatives from both sides of the Mediterranean basin. It gave an opportunity to assess the intermunicipal cooperation over the last ten years, as well as to define the principal lines of a joint action plan. The mayors stated that many of the key subjects that affect the Mediterranean area, such as the growth in extreme poverty and the lack of resources in the cities to be able to offer adequate services, are related to the explosion in urban growth.

The current situation
A study undertaken at the request of the city of Barcelona, by the Institut de la Mediterrània in Marseille, was used as the basis for the debate. It analyses the situation of ten Mediterranean cities, 10 years after Barcelona. The Mediterranean cities studied are: Algiers, Alexandria, Amman, Beirut, Casablanca, Damascus, Gaza, Istanbul, Tel Aviv and Tunis. The document makes conclusions on the lack of resources destined to the region and on the need to move from isolated projects to coordinated action within a proper regional development strategy, which is tied to the Millennium Development Goals. After analysing the data collected and the investments undertaken over the last 10 years, the document states that a minimum of 10 thousand million euros is needed each year, which would mean 100 thousand million until 2015, to be able to respond adequately to the growing necessities of the large cities on the south shore of the Mediterranean. It calculates that this sum would permit it to cover around 50% of the deficit in urban infrastructures.

Despite the criticism of the general balance of the results obtained in the Barcelona Process, the mayors emphasised the important role that the decentralised cooperation has played as a motor for development in the region and as a means of confraternity between the communities and their representatives.

The Conclusions
The local representatives underlined the need to give support to the cooperation between cities to promote peace in the region, the important pending subject of the decennium, and they confirmed their compromise to promote citizen participation in local government. Consequently, the participants decided to form a Mediterranean Local Authorities Forum, which will meet regularly and provide a political arena that would permit the definition of a joint development strategy for the region and the debate of the recurring problems at a higher political level, to be able to find viable solutions.

At the same time, the mayors present welcomed the creation, within the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), of the Mediterranean Commission. The secretariat has been established in the city of Marseille and the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region. This worldwide commission can become a platform for coordinating the various regional and transregional local government networks that operate in the Mediterranean.

The continuous promotion of equality between genders and the specific support for the participation of women in all spheres of society was recognised by the Conference as a principal objective that should be included in the joint actions. It highlighted the need for women to especially participate in the local decision-making bodies.

Success for Local Governments in the States’ Summit Documents
The results of the States’ Summit are brought together in a Declaration of the Presidency and an Action Plan, where we can see the positive effects of the political action undertaken by the participating cities, regions and networks in the Process. The Declaration of the Presidency refers to the importance of reinforcing the ties between national governments and other actors, and particularly in the promotion of collaboration between local and regional administrations.

On the other hand, the Action Plan promotes the processes of political decentralisation and the decentralisation of the provision of services, as a specific point to take into consideration in future actions. The mentioned documents also contain other objectives identified in the Joint Declaration of Regions and Cities. These include the promotion of citizen participation in the taking of decisions and the work on gender equality, particularly in the promotion of the political participation of women in all areas of public administration.

This success, however modest, gives us the possibility to claim for specific support for the work of local governments in the region and to be able to redefine the cooperation programmes that are needed to promote the development of the Mediterranean basin.
Access to drinking water and to hygiene currently represents, as discussed above, a priority. Water resources are nearly insufficient everywhere, and in some places they reach dramatic proportions; physical infrastructure is seldom at the level required. The management of this sector is often faulty and financial resources are often lacking. A report of United Nations (UNSD Millennium Indicators OMS-Unicef – 2003) estimates that 30 million people do not have permanent access to drinking water in this region. The majority of these people are in suburban and rural areas of Turkey, Algeria, Morocco and Syria. The urban infrastructures for distribution of drinking water and for sanitation are very insufficient and do not follow the increase of population in the majority of cities.

Sanitation poses a problem everywhere and is at least as grave and urgent as access to drinking water. The level of collection and of domestic water-treatment especially is very low and, in some cases, even inexistent. As seen above, many large cities do not have a water-purification station. Nearly 90% of urban waste in the towns that were studied is discarded without treatment into the Mediterranean, which therefore receives 60,000 tonnes of detergents, 100 tonnes of mercury and 12,000 tonnes of phenols per year.

To this situation one must add the little control in the issue of industrial waste. Companies often found in urban or suburban environments are mostly insensitive to environmental constraints and little affected by legislation which, although abundant, is seldom implemented. These companies sometimes discard their polluting effluents into the sanitation network, but often also into subterranean outlets, into rainwater streams or directly into the environment, particularly into natural watercourses.

As urban waste is concerned, the enormous urbanisation combined with the strong industrialisation have placed most of the cities studied in a situation of urgency: insufficient collection, piling-up of waste from savage or uncontrolled urban discharges and lack of treatment, particularly of special waste. It is estimated that at present there are nearly 40 million tonnes of urban waste generated in towns of the Euro-Mediterranean, representing about 0.7 kg per person per day. This volume increases by about 3 to 4% per year due to the combined effect of urban demography and evolution of lifestyles.

In all the cities that were studied, it was also evident that public transports were...
insufficient due to the extent of agglomeration, that infrastructures were mediocre, that the inhabitants enjoyed only limited resources and that there were clear gaps in public funding. Recently, however, certain projects have seen the light in the aim for recovery of the public domain of public transport: the Cairo underground (a third line has been opened), the light metro of Tunis, the tramway of Istanbul and the project for the underground in Algiers. However, these projects risk not being completed due to their high cost. A project for an underground has been under debate in Casablanca for over twenty years. Finally, the third challenge is the fact that social housing does not spare any of the cities in the South and East of the Mediterranean. The urban environment has become totally de-structured in favour of the multiplication of the urban periphery consisting of shack-towns and precarious housing. The proportion of non-regulated housing is about 40 to 60% of new accommodation. These illegal constructions resemble the shack-towns that have arisen for many years around urban centres and where whole families, away from their native villages, are packed into improvised shelters. The reasons for this situation are nearly always the same, relating to the difficulties encountered by the states to manage the use of grounds, to control speculation in the housing market and to produce sufficient social housing. Challenges of the same magnitude can be seen in the transition of the “productive city”. The large cities of the Mediterranean represent a great proportion of the national wealth of their country. Immersed in the process of globalisation, the majority of towns frame their actions within strategic plans that aim to reconcile the attractiveness of the territory towards foreign investment, particularly in the services sector, with the constraints of an equilibrated spatial development. One of the most visible signs is the multiplication of the so-called “projects of urban regeneration” which tries to reconcile social and economic constraints within a single region. It is therefore necessary to note that these projects have hitherto tended to increase the spatial segregation between a centre that is rapidly modernising and a suburban space that accumulates environmental problems, sanitary risks and problems of access to transport and housing. There are answers to all of these problems. The solutions to these issues have in many cases been identified a long time ago. But the practical application of solutions gives rise to questions of political priorities in accordance with urban development in the Mediterranean. Behind this question lies the issue of governance at different levels of intervention and of their coordination within a particular territory. However, today, the cities of the Mediterranean are at a transition stage in which two streams of logic meet: the traditional logic rooted in the state-organisation inherited from the past and which expresses itself through a rising administration, and a more modern logic which foundations lay in the separation of powers, transparency and respect for the law. This duality characterises the current situation of political systems and of the functioning of states, to the extent that the system of governance, as well as political structures, always require a double-interpretation. In conclusion, the problem of governance is at the crossroads of the reforms that must be carried out to further develop the country; furthermore, beyond the mere technical aspects, overcoming the challenges discussed above depends very much on the evolution of the institutional and political framework.
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The key factors (2007-2013)

The challenges for territorial cooperation in the Mediterranean are easier to predict for the year 2006, due to a combination of several different factors:

a. The adoption of the financial perspectives. The agreement of December 16th, 2005 at last gives the territorial actors a durable framework, even if the European Commission’s (EC) original aspirations to work towards Objective 3 “territorial cooperation” have been significantly reduced in scope. Nevertheless, North/North cooperation on the Mediterranean should benefit from a budget similar to that allocated for the period 2000-2006 with the prospect of operating within a unified Mediterranean context. Transnational projects will continue to benefit from about 1.4 billion euros of Community co-financing at a rate of 75% for all participants across the board. Negotiations to designate the boundaries for the future Interreg areas for 2007-2013 are now more or less completed. The Mediterranean is one of the zones which will see most changes compared to the previous period. The new zone will in fact join up the existing “Western Mediterranean” and “Archimed” zones, and will also include nearly all the Italian regions, as well as Slovenia. In total, 8 of the existing 25 EU countries will be concerned: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Slovenia, Malta, Greece and Cyprus with the possibility that Turkey could be included under the terms of its Pre-Accession instrument. Furthermore, in relation to North/South cooperation, part of the cross-border package has already been earmarked for co-financing the European Neighbourhood Policy (about 25% of the total), equivalent to about 1.5 billion euros. To this sum it will no doubt be possible to add similar amounts under section 4 of the budget (“external relations”), in order to cover not only bilateral cooperation, but also cooperation for a whole maritime basin, with particular reference to the Euromediterranean context.

b. The Barcelona summit has given rise to a vigorous mobilization of regional and local actors, and this mobilization has in particular manifested itself in favour of decentralized cooperation in the Mediterranean basin. It reflects the sentiments evoked by the foreign affairs ministers of the Euromediterranean Partnership when they met in June 2005.

c. The EC is now better equipped to measure the requirements of the cross-border package within the framework of the neighbourhood policy instrument. The regulations of the European neighbourhood and partnership instrument have now established the rules of eligibility for bilateral cross-border cooperation and also for cooperation on the basis of a whole maritime basin, which will make it possible to involve all regional and local partners, and will thus provide a real tool for decentralized cooperation in the Mediterranean.

d. At the same time, the EC approved on January 25th, 2006 a number of programmes relating to the EU’s external cooperation with the ACP countries and with the EU’s neighbouring countries. The regional and local dimension is a constant feature, particularly in relation of the guidelines on the subject: “Non-state actors and Local Authorities in development.” Recognition of the role that regional and local collectivities have to play in the external partnerships of the EU is finally starting to become a reality after several years of uncertainty.

The Opportunities which Need to be Seized to Implement Decentralized Cooperation in the Mediterranean

A certain number of question nevertheless still need to be answered regarding the establishment of future programmes, not least of which is the relationship between the continuing Interreg on the North, and the component of north/south and south/south cooperation of the ENP. Administrative and financial architecture which is going to be set up will have a major influence on the future success of these programmes. Common sense would call for the rapid establishment of a system similar to the one set up in the Baltic over the period 2000-2006. It should be remembered that, in the case of the Baltic programme, the FEDER, PHARE and TACIS credits were administered by the same team in the offices of shared secretariats at Rostock (Germany) and at Karlskrona (Sweden), thus making the best use of the different skills available and avoiding possible elements of friction that could be caused by the
On 25th and 26th November 2005, two days before the Euro-Mediterranean Summit, representatives of the governments and administrations of 70 regions of 21 countries in the Euro-Mediterranean area met in Barcelona at the Euro-Med Regional Conference Barcelona+10. The Generalitat, Government of Catalonia organised the event together with the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions in Europe, in collaboration with the Committee of the Regions of the European Union. The objective of the regional presidents attending was to analyse the Barcelona Process and its future development from the point of view of the regions and, especially, to establish which role the local and regional governments will play in the future. The emergence of the regions in the European Union as an important player in international relations is a phenomenon dating from the 70s which became fully consolidated in the 80s. The principal objective of the regions as a collective, apart from defending their own competencies in the European remit, was to contribute to create a union in which the territories and people of Europe were coming closer and closer. In the 90s the regional governments played an important role in preparing the expansion of the European Union, through a tenacious work of decentralised cooperation – aimed to resolve the myriad of practical problems relating to the adhesion process. Those present at the meeting were in agreement that the next enlargements and, above all, the new European neighbourhood policy (including, of course, the policies towards the Mediterranean area) are the new international challenges that the regional authorities have to face. The local and regional authorities are responsible for a series of policies that directly affect the citizens. Furthermore they can count on a deep understanding and permanent contact with the people and social players of the regions, and this turns them into an essential bridge between the great national and international projects and people’s everyday life. For this reason, their representatives gathered in Barcelona, demanded a greater role in the strategies and programmes of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The participants’ demands were brought together in a declaration jointly signed by the mayors attending the Euro-Mediterranean Cities’ Conference Barcelona+10, which was organised by the Ajuntament de Barcelona (Barcelona City Council) at the same time as the Conference of the Regions. The declaration advocated for a change in the Euro-Mediterranean Process that would bring the people to the centre of the process: to move from a partnership of the States to a partnership of men and women. The participation of the local and regional authorities is essential to this task, as they are the levels closest to the citizens and responsible for the public policies which directly affect people’s everyday lives. In order to centre the process on the people, the declaration signed by the regional presidents and mayors proposed taking the Millennium Development Objectives approved by the United Nations as a reference point. To the sustainable human development advocated by the Millennium Objectives, one also needs to add the demand for democracy and good governance. Furthermore, respect for human rights and the guarantee of human dignity are elements that have to be included in the reference framework of any Euro-Mediterranean Partnership action. The signers did not just make these declarations, as they also included two other important elements in the text of the declaration. Firstly, they made a series of proposals, principally addressed to the State Governments and the European institutions so that they could discuss on these topics during the two-day later Heads of States and Governments Summit. Secondly, and very significantly, the mayors and regional presidents adopted concrete commitments for their administrations. These commitments set the course for the implication of the regions through decentralised cooperation. They take onboard crucial subjects, such as technological and commercial cooperation, education and professional training, dialogue between societies, immigrants’ living conditions and the fight against racism and all forms of xenophobia, including anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.

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THE REGIONS MAKE THEMSELVES HEARD

specific constraints inherent in the implementation of each financial instrument. In order to avoid any operational delays, it would be preferable to make a certain number of choices with regard to the location and structure of the future secretariat as soon as possible. Past experiences show that Mediterranean projects have regularly suffered delays in this respect. With the expectations created by the adoption of the new neighbourhood programme, it is not acceptable to envisage the type of delay that has occurred in the past, sometimes amounting to more than 18 months. The recurrence of a similar situation during the setting up of a programme could have dire consequences when it comes to considering the future budget provisions for the European Union in 2008/2009. The innovatory nature of the future project means that it is even more important to anticipate the complex problems that will be involved in setting it up.

The strategy and future priorities of the “Mediterranean” programme North-North

The DG Regio main priorities for the Mediterranean zone are already known; it is for the State Region partnership to outline the final details before entering the operational phase. In this way we know that the priorities for north/north cooperation will include risk management, control of water resources, safety at sea, and regional competition on a transnational scale. It should be remembered that the transition from a Community initiative (Interreg IIIb) to Mainstream regional policy (Objective 3) will reinforce the EC’s ability to fix the strategic priorities for the programme.

Which strategy for north/south programmes?

The definition of priorities for cooperation within the framework of the future neighbourhood instrument will inevitably be different from that applied in the north/north context. The problems of establishing a viable legal and financial framework will inevitably lead to a complete separation of the north/north and north/south programmes. Regrettably as this may be, it is nonetheless a certainty that the north/south programme will include more “people to people” projects, whilst north/north cooperation will deal more with EU structural projects. It remains to be seen whether it will be possible to manage, on a case-by-case basis and in a coordinated way, a number of north/south structural projects involving national and regional authori-
Decentralised public cooperation is no longer an emerging dossier within the framework of international cooperation but has become an assumed reality for local and regional governments. The relations between local governments demonstrate the added value of a partnership established between equals, based on sharing common values and objectives.

In the Mediterranean context, there has been a growing implication of the cities, provinces and regions in international cooperation actions. It is evident that it has become another element in the political strategy of the territorial community. Slowly, the cooperation actions coming from the different components of the local community (public services, associative sector, professional organisations, companies and representatives of different population groups) are gathering. As a consequence, we are advancing towards a new model of cooperation that is taking over from the classical, more vertical vision, centred on the simple transfer of resources. Furthermore, we are moving towards a complex cooperative system, based on multilevel relations that ought to be richer and more dynamic.

Within the framework of the commemorative acts of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, the Diputació de Barcelona (Barcelona regional authority) organised a seminar on September 2005 on “Appraisal of and prospects for Decentralised Cooperation among Euro-Mediterranean Local Governments” to examine its effectiveness in two regards. Firstly, to reflect on the decentralised cooperation implemented in the Mediterranean area. And, secondly, to debate the prospects that—in the medium and long-term—should direct this cooperative platform.

The meeting matched up with the definition of the strategic policies of the Arco Latino Association in order to achieve one of its principal objectives: to establish links with the south and east shores of the Mediterranean within the framework of the Barcelona agreements. The Arco Latino is an association of individual Spanish regional and town councils, Italian provinces and French departments in the western Mediterranean, which makes up a south European polycentric Euro-territory that stretches from the Algarve to Sicily.

The 40 experts attending the meeting agreed that there was a need to define a decentralised cooperation that was effective, efficient and, above all, coherent with the new challenges of the Euro-Mediterranean Association and the European Neighbourhood Policy.

In particular, the Barcelona Declaration, the end result of the seminar’s discussions, demonstrates the need to create specific instruments that permit the valuation of the cooperation of the territorial collectives (through a Euro-Mediterranean Decentralised Cooperation Observatory and a School of Governance), the recognition of the role of local and regional governments within the framework of the Euro-Med Partnership (participation in the elaboration process of the European Neighbourhood Instrument and the creation of a Euro-Med forum for the local and regional authorities) and to continue cementing the cooperation between the local actors in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

The local and regional governments are, without a doubt, going to have an increasingly important role within the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations and for this reason, they need to be incorporated in it and recognised by it.

More information
www.euromediterrania2005.org
www.arcolatino.org

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New Partnership Opportunities to be Seized

The meeting between cities and regions held during the Barcelona summit on November 26th, 2005 led for the first time to a common declaration made by all partners present. In view of the challenges to be faced and the complexity of the partnerships between regional and local authorities on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, several new factors have emerged:

• The need to make sure that the spirit of cooperation does not become dispersed, and that efforts are focused on precise objectives which involve the partners in a much closer collaboration than in the past;
• The need to overcome the institutional barriers existing between countries, by bringing together in the cooperation projects the decentralized levels of administration of the countries on the southern shore: the regions, the départements/provinces, and the cities. There is a real need to organize and benefit from projects by stressing the complimentary nature of partners and the existing synergies. In this way there emerges in different regions a common desire to organize cooperation between entities in a more structured fashion, particularly through existing channels. The following examples are noteworthy:
  - Cooperation between départements/provinces through the Arco Latino network
  - Cooperation between regions through the CPMR and its Inter-Mediterranean Commission.

There will certainly be every good reason to develop the appropriate opportunities and methods to collaborate between these different networks, with the overriding aim of creating a type of network skill-bank, the frame of reference of which remains to be defined. Its main role could be to focus on the methodology, and the matching up of supply and demand for services according to the skills and priorities of each partner. Various possible initiatives which could be undertaken can be mentioned. The most pressing need would be to mobilize all potential participants so as to establish cooperation in a structured and effective manner.
MDGs: A general overview

Adopted by 191 countries at the Millennium Summit in 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a set of eight time-bound, measurable goals aimed at improving living conditions world-wide. The MDGs aspire towards poverty eradication, universal primary education, gender equality, reduced child mortality, improved maternal health, the combat of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, environmental sustainability and global partnerships for development. The MDGs are designed to be achieved by 2015 and are measured for each country through 18 targets and 48 indicators. The MDGs were developed and heralded in the United Nations’ Millennium Declaration, which asserted that the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance are vital for MDG achievement. Marking the first five years following the Millennium Summit, the World Summit (14th-16th September 2005) witnessed the signatory countries’ re-affirmation to MDG achievement.

MDGs in the Mediterranean

MDGs in the Mediterranean – Who Does What

Reflecting the many levels of development found in the Mediterranean region, the MDGs – their status, achievement and promotion – vary drastically from country to country. France, Italy and Spain’s work on the MDGs is mainly through their role in the Millennium Campaign, and as donors to UN projects and programmes working on achieving the MDGs – either through the EU or directly to specific projects. Of the remaining European states in the Mediterranean region, three are MDG donors (Cyprus, Greece and Malta), and six have produced National MDG reports or MDG status reports (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia and Turkey). Information is not readily available on Monaco’s actions with regard to the MDGs.

Of the eight Arab states bordering the Mediterranean, all work with UN agencies on the MDGs, and seven have published NMDGRs. Not an Arab state, Israel also has not produced a National MDG report.
MDGs in the Mediterranean – Why They Matter

Designed to be universally applicable, the MDGs can be specified and localized for each region, sub-region, country or governorate. Although most of the Mediterranean countries predict being able to achieve the majority of the MDGs by 2015, as specified in their NMDGRs, the intra-regional disparities run deep. According to the Human Development Report 2005, for example, adult literacy (for anyone 15 years or older) ranges from 99.7% for Slovenia, to 88.3% for Turkey, to 50.7% for Morocco.

MDG Achievement in the Mediterranean

The vast disparities between the Mediterranean countries would make direct comparison between countries ineffective. The Arab region consists of the 22 members of the League of Arab States. The 2005 Arab Region MDG Report advocates dividing analysis by sub-region. In accordance with these sub-regional divisions, the following analysis will look at MDG achievement in the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya), and in four out of six Mashreq counties (Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria). The remaining Arab sub-regions are the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (six countries), and the LDCS (six countries).

All eight Arab Mediterranean countries are middle income/intermediate development level countries with discrepancies among them, with the exception of Palestine. Due to the ongoing occupation and conflict in Palestine, massive damage has caused the deterioration of all Palestinian development and MDGs indicators. Analysis will then follow for those European Mediterranean countries which have produced NMDGRs or MDG data. Additional analysis will include the remaining Mediterranean EU countries.

In both the Arab – and the European-Mediterranean countries’ NMDGRs, Goal 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger) is emphasized, with economic growth and job creation recommended. Additional challenges cited for all Mediterranean countries include intra-country regional disparities, gender inequality and youth unemployment. The needs for improved methods of data gathering, and for gender-disaggregated data, are also highlighted in all reports.

MDG-related events vary widely across the Mediterranean in 2005. In the Arab states and European Mediterranean countries with NMDGRs, the MDG events are primarily focused on MDG achievement, through projects, programmes and workshops. For the European Mediterranean donor countries, however, MDG involvement includes campaigns and awareness raising to urge further action by these governments in assisting MDG achievement.

Arab MDGs in the Mediterranean

The Arab NMDGRs include concerns of high fertility and illiteracy rates. Large and potentially widening poverty gaps are noted in most Arab NMDGRs, as is the lack of sufficient social and health services. Additionally, it is worth noting that most “Arab countries lack the adequate statistics and comparable data required to identify meaningful trends… (and) an adequate definition of poverty or the poor has not been reached or adopted in many Arab countries.” (Abdel Samad, 2005).

International reports state that the poverty incidence in the Arab region (measured at less than $1/day per capita PPP) varies between 2.5% and 3.5% of the total population. This is the lowest rate of all the regions of the world – and thus sends the misleading message that poverty eradication is not a priority for the region. National governments contribute to the situation when they opt for conservative poverty estimates in their own countries by using low poverty lines, assuming that it provides a better image of their countries and proves the efficiency of their social and economic policies. However, most experts, civil society organizations and concerned citizens are not convinced by these estimates. For these reasons the 2005 Arab Region MDG Report chose to disregard the 1$ per day poverty line, and used instead estimated national poverty lines – although it then faced some methodological constraints which made comparisons among countries risky.

Maghreb MDGs Statistics

According to the national poverty lines cited in the Arab Region MDG Report 2005, poverty in the Maghreb increased from 7.3% to 9.1% between 1990 and 2000. Total poverty in Tunisia, however, decreased from 6.7 in 1990 to 4.2 in 2000. Food deprivation is stable at 5% in the Maghreb, (although high in Morocco at 7%) and
the primary education enrolment rate was 93.5% in 2002, an increase of 13% in 12 years. Gender disparities are decreasing in terms of literacy and education, but remain high for the workforce and decision-making. Under-five child mortality rates have dramatically reduced in the Maghreb countries, but very little achievement has been made in improving maternal health. Energy use per unit of GDP is relatively stable, carbon dioxide emissions are decreasing, and the proportion of the population with access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation is increasing slightly.

**Mashreq MDG Statistics**

Egypt and Syria are witnessing a reduction in absolute poverty and Lebanon’s poverty rate is stable. Poverty in Palestine, however, a crisis-affected country, has spiralled since 2000, with no indication of declining. Food deprivation has increased for Palestine, up to 19%, and the prevalence of underweight children under five in Egypt increased to 8.6%. Primary education enrolment increased in the region to 93.2%, and the gender parity index for primary education is 0.92. Gender disparity in the workforce and in positions of decision-making is still high, although with 10% female representation in parliament, the Mashreq leads the Arab world. Child mortality has been reduced by two-thirds in the region, but only limited gains occurred for improving maternal health. Additionally, Female Genital Mutilation continues in Egypt, resulting from an absence of law enforcement. Energy use per unit of GDP is increasing, with cultivated land representing only 5% of total land area, making land degradation a major threat. The proportion of the population with access to safe drinking water is decreasing slightly in the region, but increasing for access to improved sanitation.

**Maghreb MDG Events**

In Morocco in 2005, UN projects focused on engendering the MDGs by advocating equality in education, and on enhancing parliamentarians’ capacity and substantive knowledge of MDGs. A third project, piloted by UNDP Morocco and the Algerian Muslim Scouts, targeted the promotion of the MDGs in rural areas through reinforcing the capacities of local NGOs, as well as assisting the formation of 40 NGOs. In June, the MDGs City-to-City Challenge Pilot Program—a mobilization of city-to-city relationships maximizing international municipal cooperation in addressing the MDGs—partnered Chicago with Casablanca.

At the second Pan-African Youth Leadership Summit in Morocco, 18th-23rd August, young leaders from more than 40 African countries identified sports as an entry point for MDG achievement, with UNDP Morocco’s sports initiative to help at-risk youth in Casablanca proposed as a replicable example.

In Tunisia the Millennium Caravan, now in its second year, continued to raise awareness about the MDGs and how they can be achieved in Tunisia. Orchestrated through a project by UN agencies, civil society and the private sector, the Millennium Caravan has now toured the majority of Tunisia’s governorates.

In November in Libya, MDG training sessions were held for local government officials to help capacity development for localizing the MDGs, orchestrated by UNDP.

**Mashreq MDG Statistics**

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**Europe MDG Statistics**

The European NMDGRs, in addition to their strong focus on poverty elimination, include discussions of social exclusion, the need to develop new technologies
for economic growth, policy reform to deepen decentralization and policies to increase trade liberalization. Poverty increased through the 1990s for all of the countries under consideration and is now unevenly decreasing, resulting from the war in the former Yugoslavia and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Turkey witnessed spiralling inflation in 2001. Absolute poverty is now on the decline in the region. However, in Albania, 26% of the population lives beneath the national poverty line (US$2 per day); 5% lives in extreme poverty, (less than US$1 per day) and cannot afford to buy basic food. In Turkey, 1.35% of the population suffers from food poverty. Croatia suffers from unemployment, with 6.2% of the workforce unemployed long term in 2001. Serbia, with high unemployment at 30%, targets lowering long-term youth unemployment. Slovenia, an EU member, does not suffer from absolute poverty. Slovenian households with the greatest risk of poverty are those where the main source of income are pensions, or which consist of single people over 65.

Europe MDG Events

Albania’s second NMDGR was published in September, and regional development strategies to achieve the MDGs were developed for five regions in Albania. UNDP published Advancing Development through Sub-national MDG Reports: a case study of Albania, as well as a report on The Role of Civil Society and Volunteerism in Promoting the Pro-Poor & Pro-Women Agenda, with case studies linking the MDGs and volunteerism. A cooperative project between UN agencies and a local NGO launched a project to tailor MDG target 9 (integrating the principles of sustainable development into country policies) to local government policies. Albania’s 50 MDG Youth Ambassadors travelled throughout the region of Vlora creating awareness about the MDGs with high school students. Throughout June and July, the Croatian Youth Network conducted MDG training for youth organizations, training participants in the MDG process and developing new ways to involve the youth in MDG achievement.

Serbia completed its first MDG review in June. Working towards MDG 7 (ensuring environmental sustainability), the Danube River Enterprise Pollution Reduction project was launched in May by UN agencies. Turkey’s second NMDGR was published in June.

Mediterranean EU Counties’ MDG Events

The Live 8 concert was held in Paris, in coordination with the first global White Band Day and in counterpart to the G8 meeting in Scotland in July. The Live 8 concert was organized with the support of the Millennium Campaign. The second White Band Day was held in August, with eight international club nights highlighting the MDGs and global poverty, one of which was in Paris. In September the Paris City Hall exterior was decorated with banners saying “Action Mondiale 2015 Plus D’Excuses – Global Action 2015: No excuse!” with the MDGs listed.

Italy’s Coalition Against Poverty was launched in March, joining NGOs, unions and student groups calling on their government to maintain its promises of helping to realize the MDGs. In June, Lenny Cravitz performed in Florence at a concert organized by the Italian Millennium Campaign, the city of Florence and MTV Italy as part of their No Excuse 2015 campaign. Launched in 2003, the No Excuses 2015 campaign was founded by the Millennium Campaign, and is active across European Mediterranean countries. The ‘No Excuse 2015’ TV advert was launched in Perugia in August. In September the Milan Film Festival, in collaboration with the Millennium Campaign, highlighted world poverty and the MDGs. Later that month 200,000 people marched from Perugia to Assisi in a demonstration organized by the No Excuses 2015 campaign, and the campaign was also highlighted in Bologna during MTV Day 2005.

In Spain, the Millennium Development Goal Gates (an exhibit of 16 totem poles in the form of eight arches to symbolize the dialogue between children from wealthy and poor countries) arrived in Albacete in May for the Solidarity Fair. The gates were then moved to Madrid, where they were exhibited during Madrid’s anti-poverty weekend, held a week before the G-8 meeting in Scotland in June. The weekend’s highlight was a demonstration with 8 huge white bands, representing the MDGs. In July, the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao was symbolically wrapped in a white band, as part of the Millennium Campaign’s White Band Day. In September supporters of the Zero Poverty Campaign in Madrid gathered with alarm clocks outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to wake up their government to poverty, carrying a giant alarm clock marked with MDG 8. In October, the Spanish Alliance against Poverty launched its “Hot Autumn” campaign, targeting MDG awareness through demonstrations, exhibits and concerts held through December.

Key Issues and Challenges for MDG Achievement

The following text was abridged from the 2005 Arab Region MDG Report. However, it was felt that most of the concerns raised are also applicable to those European Mediterranean countries which have published NMDGRs. The Arab region has demonstrated progress in many MDG-related fields. However, progress varies across the sub-regions, at the country level, and from goal to goal. The middle income countries of the Mashreq and Maghreb have made good progress on some goals, such as education, but have been less successful on others, such as eradicating poverty. In those countries, poverty, unemployment and migration are key issues of concern. However, in Palestine, which is an exception to the overall trends in the Mashreq, the achievement of the MDGs is tied to conflict and occupation. Efforts and resources should be focused on peacebuilding, building effective public institutions, strengthening civil society and economic development.
On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, the Generalitat, Government of Catalonia, and more specifically its Department of Health, encouraged the idea of holding an International Forum of the Euro Mediterranean region so as to establish a basis for political cooperation concerning issues related to the field of health. The Forum, which was held in Barcelona on November 14th and 15th 2005, brought together representatives of 26 countries from Europe and the southern shores of the Mediterranean, individuals working in the field of Health from 23 countries, and representatives of institutions of the European Union and of multilateral organisations. The aim of the meeting was to gain a deeper knowledge of the “Health” question in the Euro Mediterranean region. The intention was to achieve this by means of debates and presentations, so as to encourage international cooperation and the mutual interchange of experiences and techniques, while at the same time asking the public authorities to ensure that their health policies take into account the need for an approach involving greater cooperation and mutual aid. With this aim, various discussion seminars were organized, on the following subjects: the structure of the health system in each country, the use of information and communication technology to improve health treatment (e-health), and the free circulation of patients and of those working in the health field. These seminars proved to be a very useful vehicle for the exchange of ideas, for assessing the current health situation, and especially for drawing up proposals to be presented to the authorities. Here are some of the most interesting suggestions that emerged from the meetings and were presented in the Forum’s Conclusions.

**Health system structures:** analysis of processes for reforming health system structures.
- A combination of strategies and initiatives was outlined to help improving the administration of health services, such as, for example, an analysis of the services provided by the public sector in different countries, the creation and exchange of techniques for adjusting different systems, or the need to work together on important issues such as AIDS, bird flu or different aspects of the treatment of tobacco addiction;
- A new formula was proposed for collaboration between the public sector, private sector and international institutions for investment in the health field;
- The need to encourage decentralised management structures was underlined.

**E-Health:** analysis of the application of ICT technology.
- The need to use this technology was underlined, since it could potentially give greater flexibility both for patients and for health workers, as well as facilitating access to the health system structures;
- For this reason those participating backed a motion calling on the authorities to ensure that the application of ICT becomes a priority in the Health sector;
- They also underlined its fundamental importance for research, development and innovation.

**Free circulation of patients and health workers:** analysis of the quality and reliability of the attention given to patients, and the role of health workers in the context of free circulation of individuals.
- In this respect those participating commented on the importance of events like the Forum to exchange information and experiences;
- Those participating supported the establishment of common standards for the Health systems throughout the region;
- Another subject of discussion was the importance of assisting foreign patients according to their specific situation (as tourists, permanent residents, etc).

Finally, the Catalan and Spanish Governments announced their intention to promote the Mediterranean diet at UNESCO as a World Heritage feature.

For further information: www.euromedsalud.net

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**Establishing Peace and Security**

The cost of war and conflict, in terms of lost lives, displacement, and setbacks to development, continues to be high. This is particularly evident in Palestine, where there is ongoing occupation, and in countries marred by internal conflict and strife for over a decade, namely Algeria and Lebanon.

A comprehensive and just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is needed. The international community should continue all efforts to bring peace and security to the region, while spreading a culture of peace-building and nation-building based on respect for human rights, including the right to development, as well as democracy and good governance. Peace and stability in the region is the most urgent priority for both Arab and European Mediterranean countries.

**The Way Forward**

The achievement of MDGs is largely dependent on the adoption and implementation of integrated and comprehensive development policies and strategies concerning poverty reduction, unemployment, gender equality, the environment, rural and urban development, health systems, education, science, technology and innovation. That will require sustained action at the local, national and regional levels, and reform aimed at partnership, good governance, democracy and respect for human rights.

The way forward to keeping the promise entails action on four main fronts; the first being *regional integration* aimed at pooling and harnessing the region’s human, financial, and natural resources and capacities with a view to achieving regional partnership in development and solidarity in the international political arena and global economy.

Second, *reform and democratization* on the levels of the state, society and political culture as a basic pillar of development.

Third, *pro-poor social and economic policies* based on partnership between the public sector and civil society, while promoting a larger role for the private sector in terms of social responsibility and environmental sustainability.

Fourth, *strengthening the role of civil*
society in the development process and lastly, promoting the establishment of effective public institutions capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century.

Bibliography


Links of Interest

Millennium Campaign
www.coordinationsud.org/2005/

Millennium Project
www.unmillenniumproject.org/index.htm

MDGs in Europe and CIS Region
www.undp.org/mdg/undps_role_regional_cis.shtml

MDGs in the Arab region
www.undp.org/mdg/undps_role_regional_arab.shtml

National MDG reports – search by country name
www.undg.org/index.cfm
The year 2005 marked the five-year review of progress toward the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – a broad development agenda aimed at eradicating poverty in its various dimensions and improving the lives of women and men alike. Emanating from previous international conferences and summits, and based on the principles and values expressed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration that was adopted by 191 countries at the Millennium Summit (6th-8th September 2000), the MDG agenda encompasses 8 mutually re-enforcing goals, 18 time-bound targets to be achieved by the year 2015 and 48 measurable indicators to track progress.

On the occasion of the 2005 World Summit in which world leaders and heads of state met to review progress and follow-up measures in relation to achieving international development goals, including MDGs, a number of stock-taking reports were prepared by various UN regional and specialized agencies, in addition to country reports prepared by governments in cooperation with civil society. In the Arab Region, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN-ESCW) partnered with a dozen United Nations specialized agencies to prepare the Report on the Millennium Development Goals in the Arab Region 2005. The report, approximately 45 pages and available in both Arabic and English, is intended for a broad audience including government, international development organizations and financial institutions, the donor community, and civil society. The report aims to raise awareness on the MDGs and highlight areas in need of concerted efforts and resource allocations. The following is a synopsis of the report’s main findings and the full report is available in both Arabic and English on the ESCWA website at www.escwa.org.lb/divisions/scu.

### Progress Toward Achieving the MDGs in the Arab Region

The Arab countries have demonstrated progress in many of the MDGs. However, progress varies, across the sub-regions, at the country level, and from goal to goal. Moreover, significant gaps in progress and status exist between women and men, girls and boys, and urban and rural areas. Overall, the Arab Least Developed Countries (Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen) by far face the most challenges across all eight Goals, particularly in terms of funding and basic services and infrastructure. The middle-income countries of the Mashreq (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syrian) and Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) have made good progress with regard to some goals, for example, education, but have been less successful in others, for example, eradicating poverty. In those countries, poverty, unemployment and migration are key issues of concern. However, in Iraq and Palestine, which are exceptions to overall trends in the Mashreq, the achievement of MDGs is tied to conflict and occupation. In these areas, efforts and resources must be focused on peace-building, building effective public institutions, strengthening civil society and promoting development.

### Table 10: Millennium Development Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Achieve universal primary education</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Promote gender equality and empower women</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Reduce child mortality</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Improve maternal health</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ensure environmental sustainability</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Develop a global partnership for development</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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1 The author wishes to thank Ms. Gheda Temsah for contributing to this article.
2 The Report on the Millennium Development Goals in the Arab Region 2005 could not have been prepared without the dedication and generous contributions – both technical and financial – of participating UN agencies. The following agencies collaborated in this inter-agency effort: FAO, ILO, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNDP-SURF, UNESCO, UNEP, UNFPA, UNAIDS, WFP, and WFP.
and economic development. The rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) possess the resources to surpass the targets set by the MDG framework. However, the issue of sustainability, whether economic, environmental or social, is pivotal in the GCC region.

Poverty

It is unlikely that the Arab region as a whole will succeed in eradicating poverty and hunger (Goal 1) without concerted efforts and increased resources, particularly in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In 2000 it was estimated that almost one-half of the populations of those countries lived in poverty and more than one-third suffered from food deprivation.

Education and Gender equality

Despite modest progress since 1990, in 2002 almost 20% of children of primary school age were not enrolled (Goal 2) and some 44 million adult women aged over 15 years could not read or write. While gender equality in enrolment across all levels of education has generally improved, in many countries absolute levels are low for both boys and girls. Moreover, gains in education have not translated into commensurate progress in women’s economic and political participation, which remain among the lowest in the world (Goal 3). In 2000, the economic activity rate of Arab women was 29% and their share of seats in national parliament was a low 8% in 2005.

Child mortality, maternal health and the spread of HIV/AIDS

In underdeveloped and conflict-stricken countries – namely Djibouti, Iraq, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen, under-five child mortality rates are close to or higher than 100 per 1,000 live births, compared to the regional average which was 70 in 2003. Maternal mortality is a major health concern in the Arab LDCs, where slightly more than one-half of births were attended by skilled health personnel during the period 1995-2000. In those countries child and maternal health challenges are tied to access to quality primary and sexual and reproductive health care, in addition to access to basic services – namely, clean water and sanitation; and the spread of infectious diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS and other diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis (Goal 6). Although the overall prevalence of HIV/AIDS is relatively low in the Arab region, the general trend is towards an increase in infections and expansion of the epidemic. Between 1990 and 2003 the number of reported AIDS cases rose by some 42% to 13,865. Over half of those cases were in the Arab LDCs where more than 1% of the population aged between 15 and 45 years was HIV positive.

Environmental sustainability

Progress toward achieving environmental sustainability (Goal 7) requires more concerted efforts to protect and conserve natural resources – especially energy and water; to improve efficiency of non-renewable energy and water sources; and to correct market failures and distortions by accounting for the environment in national accounts. Despite the region’s vast energy resources, in 2003 some 64 million people, mostly in rural areas, had no electricity. Access to sanitation is lower than that of safe drinking water, particularly in rural areas and the Arab LDCs. If concerted actions are not taken, some 82 million people in the Arab region in 2015 will lack access to safe drinking water, 124 million will be without access to basic sanitation and 50% of those persons will be living in the Arab LDCs.

Partnership for development: aid and trade

The achievement of MDGs requires global and regional partnerships (Goal 8) based on mutual accountability and responsibility, in which wealthier nations, through funding, debt relief and fair trade agreements, support the efforts of developing countries to adopt relevant development strategies within a supporting global environment. One major problem facing the Arab region is that it is still perceived by many donors as being resource-rich. This misconception ignores that fact that almost one-quarter of the Arab population reside in the Arab LDCs, which are in most need of increased development assistance and funding.

Development aid

In recent years, total aid, measured in current United States dollars, to the Arab region increased from $5.33 billion in 1999 to $8.32 billion in 2003. However, three middle-income countries, namely, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan, received over half of all aid in 2003, reflecting, in part, new donor priorities, which are influenced by political considerations. Moreover, with the exception of 2002, LDCs consistently received less than the regional average in aid per capita: in 2003, they received only 16% of all official development assistance (ODA), which was $8.3 billion, despite constituting 22% of the total Arab population in that year. It must be noted that the richer Arab countries have made significant contributions to ODA at the regional and international levels in the past: between 2000 and 2003, the GCC countries provided a total of $13.7 billion in development aid.

Trade

Most Arab States have initiated trade liberalization programmes, albeit with varying degrees of success. In 2003, total exports from the region made up only 4.1% of total world exports, while imports represented 2.7% of total world imports. Moreover, notwithstanding attempts to diversify, most countries in the region continue to export a narrow range of low value-added goods, dominated by fuels, which accounted for 70% of total exports in 2002, agricultural products, textiles and chemicals, to a limited number of export markets, and, predominantly, the European Union.

Challenges for Achieving the Goals

Notwithstanding differences in progress toward achieving the goals, the Arab countries face a common set of issues
and challenges – namely, peace and security; the eradication of poverty and development; greater regional partnerships and integration; respect for human rights, democracy and good governance; and the protection of the environment.

The Way Forward

The achievement of MDGs is largely dependent on the adoption and implementation of integrated and comprehensive development policies and strategies related to poverty reduction, unemployment, gender equality, the environment, rural and urban development, health systems, education, science, technology and innovation. Pro-poor social and economic policies based on partnership between the public sector and civil societies are needed, while promoting a larger role for the private sector in terms of social responsibility and environmental sustainability and civil society, especially the media, in terms of advocacy and raising awareness. The way forward requires sustained action at the local, national and regional levels, and reforms aimed at regional partnership and integration – with a view to pooling and harnessing human, financial and natural resources and capacities; good governance, democracy and respect for human rights; and institutional capacity building, particularly strengthening national statistical capacities to produce quality statistics that are needed to support a culture of evidence-based and effective policy-making in the region.
Strengthen Women’s Role in Society

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One of the potentials and, at the same time, one of the most important challenges of the Euro-Mediterranean region, concerns the status of women and their citizen participation. A key aspect in measuring conditions in different countries, as shown by the Human Development ratings: illiteracy, the low rate of employment and the scarce political representation of women does not favour the Southern Coast. It is true that there has been an advance regarding some criteria and that legal reforms have also made progress.

If we have to evaluate the relative condition and status of women in the region we should point out that considerable progress has been made over the last decade. In fact, women nowadays marry later than in previous years, giving priority to their education and professional training to the extent that they represent more than half of the university graduates in many of these countries. They are also more active in the different economic sectors and they are increasingly reaching high level public and political positions. These advances have favoured the awareness for the need to reform their legal status in the region and have recently led to an incomparable reform dynamics, both in Maghreb and Mashreq, initiating a process that is breaking away from centuries of discrimination and violation of women’s fundamental rights.

This progress promotes considerable positive impacts, in societies on the Southern Mediterranean Coast, both in the medium and long term future. However, in spite of this progress and the new opportunities it provides, there is still inequality. Based on this information and within the framework of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration (and, on the other hand, coinciding with the 10th Anniversary of the Beijing Platform of Action) the Euro-Mediterranean Conference for Women was held on 24th and 25th November 2005. This forum has, beyond doubt, awakened great expectation and novelty during the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Summit. From this perspective, and in tune with the evaluations carried out by the various Euromed bodies and by those European institutions linked with the Barcelona Process, as well as by other forums (like the Sana’a Regional Conference 2005 and the Arab League in their Algiers meeting during the same year), the starting point for the work of the Women’s Conference 2005 is the conviction that equal opportunities for both men and women is a transversal topic which influences the economic and human development of all the countries and people living in the Euro-Mediterranean area. In this respect, achieving equality between women and men is one of the most important common topics which bind Euro-Mediterranean societies.

The Euro-Mediterranean Women’s Conference Barcelona+10 has been organized around three work sessions related to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership main topics: i) women’s rights as a guarantee of Human Rights and democratic development, and as a mean for a more united society; ii) women’s contribution from a microeconomic and macroeconomic point of view, to achieve sustainable development; and, iii) women’s access to professional training, education and culture, as a means to improve work opportunities, competitiveness and active citizenship.

Besides the numerous reflections in the conclusions presented to the Commissioner Benita Ferrero in the closing act, the participants state that:

• they consider that the women’s movement has been gaining strength in all of the Partnership countries. Nevertheless, more funds need to be assigned, there needs to be an improvement in the legal framework for the running of women’s NGO’s as well as giving more acknowledgment to their work. In this way, it should be remembered that civil society can give a great impetus to social advances which are, eventually, integrated into government policies.

• they consider necessary to promote better information related to women’s networks in the Euro-Mediterranean region with the aim of exchanging information on active groups, achieving cohesive communication and discussing medium and long-term objectives.

• they underline the importance of involving civil society in this reflection, both on the level of listening to them in decision-making processes, regarding the need to support and strengthen their institutional development, and their capacity to work in networks as a dynamic force in the Euro-Mediterranean area.

• they propose to establish a Euro-med regional mechanism of a qualitative nature, involving societies and governments, in order to observe women’s situation in the Euro-Mediterranean
area, to promote good practices and to report the deterioration or the lack of application of Human Rights in gender policies.

- they emphasize the need to integrate the cross section of women’s policies into the various European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans.
- they value very positively the European Commission’s initiative to organize a Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, with the participation of civil society, centred on women’s difficulties, and they appeal for it to be held in the second semester of the year 2006.

**The Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference to Reinforce Women’s Role in Society (Istanbul, 14/15 de November 2006)**

Its objective will be to adopt a Euro-Mediterranean Plan of Action with an aim to reinforce women’s role in society (2007-2011), intended to promote equality between men and women in the region. The Plan of Action will be elaborated in accordance with the objectives of the 5 year Work Plan’s, adopted by the Euro-Mediterranean members during the Summit held during the Tenth Anniversary event of the Barcelona Declaration.

The elaboration process of this Plan of Action has been developed over the course of various months throughout the year 2006 and will be approved during the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, which will be held exactly to this effect, on the 14th and 15th November 2006 in Istanbul. The preliminary reports at the debates of the preparatory conference are intended to offer dynamic, crosscut approaches regarding the Euro-Mediterranean and regional context, in terms of opportunities, adversities and experiences of the reforms in process concerning the promotion of the status and condition of women in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

With the prospect of extending the queries, the elaboration of three preliminary reports was entrusted to three Euro-Mediterranean networks favouring those constitutive elements which make for best practices:

- EuroMeSCo: to elaborate a report synthesizing the fundamental Human Rights for women and about legislation in the remit of family and public life in the region;
- FEMISE: to obtain a report on the Economic Integration of women in the region;
- Anna Lindh Foundation: to prepare a report on the sociocultural sphere and gender relationships in the region.

Considering the different contributions requested by the European Commission, the subject of stereotypes is, without a doubt, the most transversal between the North and South Mediterranean, since although the legal and participatory aspects still present serious differences, the changing mind is much slower process and it requires constant attention so that it can be carried out in different areas in the North as well as in the South.

One of the events necessary in order to carry out an evaluation of the work and proposals was the Preparatory Conference in Rabat, Morocco, 14/16 June 2006. A regional meeting programmed in the framework of the preparatory process for the Ministerial Conference, where the participants came from all over the region, including Libya and Mauritius. Some qualified participants have been invited to discuss and expand their analysis and put it to debate, recommendations from the heart of the three established boards regarding these three major topics. These boards will establish large time margins for the debates, with the objective of deepening and diversifying the exchanges, as well as compiling recommendations to be introduced in the Euromed Plan of Action 2007-2011.

The objectives assigned for the Rabat Preparatory Conference are the following:

- to establish a diagnosis/evaluation in terms of progress, opportunities and setbacks concerning women’s situation in relation to men’s situation, with reference to: (1) women’s fundamental rights, with regards to the essential democratic element, (2) the status and economic participation of women in the region and, finally, (3) social and cultural questions concerning social gender roles in the region;
- to highlight and share the teachings taken from the experience of the reforms in process in the three aforementioned fields, including the contribution and the role of the different people involved;
- to formulate the proposals for changes considered relevant, specific and precise, both on a regional and national level, with the aims of integrating them into the Euromed Action Plan to reinforce women’s role in society (2007-2011), which will be presented to the Ministerial Conference in November 2006 in order for it to be introduced.

The Euromed Action Plan to strengthen women’s role in society will contain measures which will have to be put into practice, both on a bilateral and regional level, within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership framework. It will help to capitalize the heritage of the Partnership within the framework of the Barcelona Process and will allow the reinforcement of the equality aspect in action plans elaborated within the EPN framework, with the objective of specifying the measures listed in the Plans of Action.

The Plan will capitalize knowledge, analysis, initiatives, current actions and strategic recommendations as well as all the existing contributions, both on national and regional level, from the group of national (Official Institutions, NGO’s, Investigation Institutes), regional and international representatives (the process of setting into motion the Beijing Platform for Action, Objectives for Development of the Millennium, etc.)

The conference will not be limited to ratify large financial funding on behalf of the Commission; it will also demand the commitment, which had already been demanded during the Barcelona Women’s Conference in November 2005, for the 35 countries to introduce the Action Plan measures into their bilateral cooperation policies, and for the Southern countries to introduce them into their national budgets.

The women living within the different Mediterranean cultures have been references for important cultural assets.
which have been transmitted throughout time like, for example, language, religious beliefs, oral literature, as well as ecologic and artistic knowledge. On the other hand, with regards to Education and Professional Training, women have been able to revitalize the business, political, scientific, academic and cultural world over the last decades. But women’s status on the Southern Shore is evolving very slowly, not only because of the mentalities but also due to a lack of funds and a true political resolution.

The question presents a higher pitch in the context of globalization, where the preservation of cultures faces a tendency to standardization, which makes necessary to protect the world’s cultural heritage, which has revealed to be the fourth pillar of sustainable development; it has also resulted in the inter-cultural dialogue process where women must voice their opinion. Women, absent from this dialogue, become victims of Cultural Relativism, which tends to marginalize their rights and their condition. (World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 2002). On the other hand, women’s place in culture is also recognized in artistic production. Even though women are not absent from the aforementioned production, in both schools and in the young artist’s exhibits, there is little of their work and names included, both in important collections and in academic studies. Even in Europe, as an educational priority, some governments do not have a non-sexist education established, however at times we find that several regional or municipal communities present interesting programmes in the field of education. In this field, the awareness campaigns carried out by governments can help to change mentalities, starting by their own leaders.

Without a doubt, it is necessary to identify, sustain and reinforce regional, national and local initiatives which favour the presence of women’s roles and their participation in government, as well as their participation in actions carried out to transform society, in order to be able to respond to the new roles and demands of women.

References

Conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Women’s Conference Barcelona+10
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The Mediterranean, which has been the centrepiece of civilisation for centuries, has become the natural forum for a vigorous renewal of dialogue in recent years with two of the world’s most powerful regions – an expanding European Union and a resurgent Arab world – wrestling with the challenges of modernity and political change.

As Turkey and Croatia bid for European Union membership, with, who knows, Albania and Serbia to follow, and as Israelis and Palestinians continue their painfully slow and wary progress towards some recognisable and peaceful solution to an injustice, which is the cause of a burning resentment within the Middle East and yet barely understood by people in the west, the role of media in the region has become more important than ever.

There has never been a more critical time, whether it is in the service of peace or modernity or development, for building an information bridge between the north and south of the Mediterranean. Yet if we look closely at the experience of events in 2005, it suggests there is still a long way to go.

Information Caravan Pulls Into Tunis

By far the most significant media opportunity of the year was that offered by the World Summit on the Information Society, held in Tunis, 16th–18th November. For the past decade the United Nations has been holding summit meetings on major issues of global concern, including poverty, racism, globalisation, and the rights of women. The caravan finally pitched up in Tunisia just as the information revolution seemed to be coming to a peak.

In the Internet era telephones and televisions have become boutiques of information and the traditional world of the media has been blown apart by the process of technological convergence. The uncertainties, and the optimism, of the information society meant that many invested great hopes in the summit as an opportunity to give the information society human form by ensuring that everyone, even the poor and isolated, has access to computers while guarantees could be put in place to end all forms of Internet censorship.

Regrettably, it is not so simple. While thousands of international delegates and activists from civil society argued for simple and inclusive policies inside the Summit tent, outside the atmosphere was very different. Tunisia is one the world’s worst offenders when it comes to violations of press freedom and the Summit, as many feared, was marred by the continuation of Internet censorship outside the conference zone. A hunger strike by human rights activists added to the bizarre atmosphere.

The meeting ended quietly. The United Nations caravan moved on, with summit fatigue settling in, and with no great breakthrough to speak of. For many in the world of the media it was a wasted opportunity made worse by the grotesque choice of venue and summed up by the local censorship of the representative of Switzerland when he spoke out against Tunisia’s denial of free speech to its citizens.

A Clash of Cultures

The summit highlighted divisions between the information culture north and south of the Mediterranean. In the north most journalists work in conditions where there is enough attachment to a notion of freedom of expression that gives the media the right to decide freely what to say and how to say it. In many countries of the south, however, press freedom exists in twilight conditions where laws and intrusive governments keep information sources, particularly the television, under a tight rein.

The problems of understanding between north and south are exacerbated by European media stereotypes of the Arab world which seem to be greater and more dangerous than they have been for decades. The media fails to distinguish between fundamentalism and mainstream Islam and appear to regard engagement with religious communities as compromising progressive values rather than an opportunity for dialogue in order to win people over.

The emphasis on terrorism and fanaticism in the Arab world has been made worse by the war on terrorism launched by the United States after the 11th September attack on New York and Washington.

It is an obsession, fed by sensationalist and superficial reporting of conflict in the Middle East and nurtured by unscrupulous and racist politicians. It contributes to an increasingly fearful climate within previously stable metropolitan communities in Europe.

Today in countries with a history of tolerance like Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands, a toxic
In the framework of the celebration of the Year of the Mediterranean, the European Commission started a series of conferences called “Euromed and the Media”. This initiative, which included the celebration of three international seminars during the second half of 2005, had as an objective to analyse the actual and potential role played by the communication media within Euro-Mediterranean relations. After ten years of partnership, “Euromed and the Media” offered to journalists, chroniclers and commentators the time and the opportunity to reflect upon general issues within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the role that communication media can play.

1. Dead Sea, “Euromed and the Media”, 26th and 28th September

The first meeting of the series took place on the Dead Sea (Jordan) between the 26th and the 28th September 2005. Even though topics on the situation of the Near East, Iraq and Cyprus were discussed in detail, the participants also had the opportunity to analyse and discuss the role of journalists in this type of context. Also, they called for action on a significant number of practical recommendations and agreed on the need to make proposals on essential issues for journalism as a profession, such as security, freedom of expression, action against racist and xenophobic news presentation, and regulating the power of those who control the media in the region. Moreover, they insisted that media professionals can act in favour of mutual understanding only if they are allowed to carry out their work in an appropriate way, which is not always easy in this region.


New issues were dealt with in Marseilles, such as the journalists’ need to find accessible information regarding Euro Mediterranean policies and the migration dossier. On this note, the participants stressed the importance of the migratory phenomenon and how it is dealt with in the news, because of its effects on society. One of the issues highlighted was the training of journalists, since it was concluded that establishing Euro Mediterranean faculties of journalism could be an essential vehicle for the propagation of the Barcelona Process.


Following both these seminars, the “Euromed and the Media” series was completed with the holding of a third seminar in Barcelona, the day before the Special High Level Meeting of Barcelona on the 27th and 28th November. Organised by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (ElMed), the European Commission and the Anna Lindh Euro Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures, the international seminar on “Mass Media and the Mediterranean” took place on the 25th and 26th November. The Barcelona meeting, which was attended by over two hundred participants from 35 countries, amongst whom were mass media editors, journalists and experts, had two main objectives: to analyse the production of news information and the creation of opinions and perceptions in the Mediterranean; and to present the conclusions reached by the “Euromed and the Media” series.

Amongst the main conclusions arising from the Barcelona meeting, stands out the complexity of the news in the Euro Mediterranean region, especially after September 11th. For this reason, representatives stressed the need to face the increasing simplification of the news through the use of reliable sources and authentic freedom of expression. Along with complexity, the challenge of reality was also highlighted as reflecting upon the fact that information agendas are mainly centred on terrorism, violence and religion. In front of this situation, participants emphasized the need to make less spectacular news and to concentrate more on social and economic transformations. The seminar’s conclusions also highlighted the challenge involved in today’s world in presenting information about other individuals or communities. In front of the distortion of the other person’s image and its consequent criminalisation, mutual understanding becomes necessary before any type of dialogue can take place.

They also pointed out the challenge that would represent for our sense of identity, the reorganisation of the news scene, due to the increasing number of Arab satellite television channels. Finally, the need to strengthen the public image of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership was presented as an obvious and basic condition in order to obtain a further involvement of the society in the Barcelona Process.

Amongst the conclusions underlined in Barcelona stands out the appeal for a more active and committed role of the media in order to build bridges between countries and cultures. This idea, brought up by the European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, was reinforced by the call of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, for responsibility in the communication media, insisting on the urgency of the need to create and consolidate a space devoted to Euro Mediterranean questions.

Another subject that should be especially highlighted is the European Union’s commitment to drive initiatives in order to foster freedom of expression and plurality of information in the southern Mediterranean countries. The European Commissioner for External Relations as well as Christian Leffler, European Commission Director for the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean, expressed the European Union’s wish to offer compensations and aids to countries who introduce law reforms which guarantee freedom of expression. The proposal to create a specific Euromed Centre which would provide concrete information on the projects encouraged in the Euro Mediterranean conferences should also be emphasized. Moreover, with the intention of facilitating mutual awareness and collaboration on both shores of the Mediterranean, it was suggested to create journalist networks and “lobbies” as well as exchange and mobility programmes. In order to continue with the series “Euromed and the Media” it was proposed to create a reflection Focus group, able to produce specific proposals.

Mariona Rico
ElMed

Journalists’ Summit Outlines an Agenda for Change

This difficult climate provided the backdrop to a crucial meeting of Mediterranean journalists held in Almeria, Spain, 14th-17th April. Organised by the Almeria Press Association, the Federation of Spanish Press Associations (FAPE), and the International Federation of Jou-
nalists (IFJ), 30 groups representing more than 65,000 journalists from 24 Mediterranean countries agreed a crucial manifesto that confirmed the role journalists from the Mediterranean have to play in building bridges of understanding.

The Almeria Declaration was stout in its defence of free journalism against all forms of pressure and censorship and denounced the conditions in some Mediterranean countries where journalists suffer attacks, censorship, tortures and other forms of intimidation.

The journalists called for action over the safety of journalists, fresh initiatives to promote the rights of women in journalism, and urged journalists and the media to exercise caution in the language and coverage of issues related to migration and ethnic minorities.

They also expressed concern over media concentration and its impact on free expression and pluralism and made a strong statement in favour of professional independence for journalists and protection of their social conditions.

Dialogue on the Road to Barcelona

Three meetings supported by the European Union Euro-Med programme during the second half of 2005 focused continually on the contradictions and challenges of working in a region where notions of independent journalism and versions of freedom of expression vary from culture to culture and country to country.

Arising out of the 10th year of the Barcelona Process, as the Year of the Mediterranean, the series of meetings in Jordan, Marseille and Barcelona gave journalists, media experts and policymakers an opportunity for reflection on achievements of the European Union’s efforts to create dialogue and working relations between the media and journalists in the countries of the Southern Mediterranean and the European Union. Selected international journalists took part in meetings which had the task of defining policy affecting the media in the next phase of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Not an easy task, given the increasing tension which overwhelmed the media in an intertemporal global debate in the early part of 2006 over a series of cartoons published in a Danish newspaper.

In fact, while the first meeting of journalists was getting underway at the Dead Sea, Jordan, 26th–28th September, the cartoons crisis was about to explode in Denmark where it was to become a matter of national controversy for almost three months before making international headlines and sparking a painful confrontation between western values and Muslim conventions.

This fracture highlights a division within journalism on both shores of the Mediterranean which figured throughout the discussion both in Jordan and the subsequent meetings in Marseille, on 17th–18th October, and Barcelona, on 25th–26th November.

Journalists at these meetings continually touched on the degree to which each society has the right to set limits to what is tolerable in what can be published and reported. Cultural sensitivity means that journalists, occasionally, must exercise restraint and leave unsaid things that might cause unnecessary trouble and tension.

This is freedom of expression moderated by commonsense. All of these meetings were framed around the notion of respect for the nature of different cultures and an understanding that without dialogue and the professional exchange between journalists the complex differences in approach to news selection and media content, which are strikingly different in the region, will not be properly understood.

What is important, however, is that the debate takes place between professionals without the interference of politicians and governments intent on manipulation and massage of the media to suit their own interests. The issues are important, but they must be debated, discussed and decided by journalists and media professionals themselves.

In this respect the outcomes of these meetings, which looked at media cooperation, training issues, relations with authorities, the need for professionalism and social conditions, were a success and continued with the adoption of a structure for continuing dialogue which will see a new set of media initiatives to be adopted in the context of the European neighbourhood policy which replaces the multilateral basis of the Barcelona process.

In Jordan key international journalists and analysts from around the Mediterranean discussed the complex role of the media in different societies and priorities for further action were forwarded into the further meetings in Marseille and Barcelona. The results, which as expected focused on training and assistance issues, gender rights and the critical issue of racism and xenophobia formed the basis of a package which was delivered to the November Barcelona summit meeting of governments as policy issues for further consideration.

Bridging the Gulf in Understanding

Besides providing a welcome opportunity for discussion between a comprehensive gathering of EU and Mediterranean journalists, the meetings did move along an agenda calling for better understanding and continued cooperation between international journalists in the north and south.

The meetings could not have come at a more critical time. Issues such as press freedom, the struggle for gender rights, tackling xenophobia and the importance of professionalism in the media are as important as building a political dialogue. Importantly, the meetings helped identify a core group of journalists and experts to help build a structured, sustainable system of information exchange and dialogue aiming to improve levels of understanding and to eliminate the hostility, suspicion and ignorance which characterises much of the media coverage of Mediterranean affairs.

If 2005 revealed anything it showed that the gulf in understanding between communities is as wide as ever and that the challenge to the media is to break the templates of prejudice that continue to distort relations. An early return to the simple values of informed reporting, in context, by people of goodwill is long overdue.
The Mediterranean Social Forum 2005: A First Step In The Process

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The year 2005 saw the first meeting of the Mediterranean Social Forum (FSMed), a process that forms a part of the World Social Forum and is in keeping with its Charter of Principles. Various events and concerns defined the postulations of the FSMed, but it is worth highlighting in particular the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process (or Euro Mediterranean Partnership), which generated various study groups and also a specific mention in the assembly of social movements celebrated just after the closure of FSMed. The FSMed was created in 2001, as a result of the concerns of a group of Catalan organizations, within the context of the spectrum of Regional Forums that emerged after Porto Alegre. As was also the case for the thematic forums, these regional forums were proposed by the International Council of the World Social Forum in order to propagate the principles that inspire its annual meeting in other regions of the world, so as to generate new alter globalization initiatives.

With this aim, it was decided to establish a structure in the Mediterranean region that could act as an interface to stimulate debate and hear the proposals of the organizations and individuals participating. In this sense, the FSMed has never claimed to be the only body representing the needs of civil society in the Mediterranean. Its main objective has been rather to create an open, pluralistic space, managed and organized autonomously by the organizations working against neo-liberal globalization in the region. The idea was to create a chance to reflect on the Mediterranean reality, its opportunities, conflicts and problems, with the conviction that solutions will be found by reducing the inequalities that exist between the individuals and peoples living there. The initiatives were intended to involve as much as possible the civil society that is trying to change the current dynamics, exercising influence on the policies of national governments and international organizations so as to achieve a level of economic, social and political development that is both sustainable and respectful of the environment and of human rights in other words, of a true dialogue between cultures. There was also the conviction that this will only be possible with the active participation of the sector of society which is not committed to the established world order and which in real terms has the will to work and cooperate together to subvert and transform the current world order.

The Importance of the Forum

The most important aspect singled out by many participants was the fact that it had been possible to hold the Forum at all. Despite all the difficulties its organization had involved, between 16th and 19th June, 2005 the first important step was taken to launch the FSMed process. Although various uncertainties had arisen throughout the period of preparation (which had lasted for over three years), the fact that the event was finally able to be held in Barcelona was a real success for the organizations and social movements which from the very beginning had committed themselves to the creation of this space for holding dialogue, undertaking campaigns and seeking alternatives. In this sense, and in the international political context of the period in which we live, we should highlight the significance of the commencement of this process as a point of interface between the civil society of the Northern, Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean, and with the real participation of the Arab world. Like at the beginning of any other process, there was of course a mixture of praise, criticism and reflection, but always bearing in mind the fundamental role that the Mediterranean has, and may have in the future, as a meeting-place between the North and the South, as a space where different cultures converge, as a place of continual migration and a place of interchange in the context of the economic relations that exist between the two shores. One of the conclusions to be noted is the importance of strengthening the relations between the organizations and social movements that are working to build another possible Mediterranean.

Participation in the Forum in Figures

The FSMed had over 5,000 participants, originating from more than 40 peoples or states all over the world. It should be noted that it was extremely difficult for persons from the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean to participate for reasons associated with obtaining the necessary visas (the figures show that they made up 13% of the total attendance). The technical service responsible for the event had to make an enormous effort to process visas for the persons who had requested them. Out
of a total of 728 visas requested, 472 were obtained (giving a ratio of 64.8%).
On the basis of these figures and the difficulties experienced, it was and continues to be necessary to state explicitly the precarious situation of persons who wish to apply for visas to travel to Europe, and the urgent need to set up new systems and mount campaigns to allow free circulation of individuals throughout the Mediterranean and respect the human rights of the persons travelling.
One of the problems in organizing the Forum was to advertise the holding of the event. It was not easy to contact all the main organizations in the region, and if we also bear in mind that there was practically a complete absence of participants from some states (such as, for example, Lebanon and Egypt), we can state that in the future it will be essential to take action on this question, most probably by encouraging the internal structures that already exist in these states, and which are vital for the continuation of the process. In this sense, it will be important to be able to count on the presence of participants who did not attend the first meeting, and to react to the real struggles taking place in the different peoples or states.

Themes and Activities


On the basis of these main themes, the organizations and social movements involved in the organization of the Forum proposed 194 activities (in the form of seminars and workshops) convened and managed autonomously by up to 347 organizations, thus following one of the norms of the type of organization that is used by the World Social Forum. Only one major conference on each of the main themes was the responsibility of the assembly, which was responsible for the political decisions connected with the workings of the process. It should be noted that the theme that registered the largest number of activities was “Economic, social and cultural rights and models of development,” followed by “Democracy and human rights” and “Conflicts, militarism and peace”. This list gives us an idea of what are the main concerns of the organizations and social movements which are actively working against neo-liberal globalization in the Mediterranean region.

On the other hand, despite the enormous concern that the theme gives rise to, as a result of the incidents occurring every day in the region, the subject of migration was the one that attracted least activities. The theme dealing with women also requires a special mention: it was not in fact one of the themes that attracted most applications for activities but, contrary to what this objective statistic may lead us to suppose, the role of women and their contribution and importance in the Mediterranean region was one of the points on the agenda in various different talks, seminars and workshops. In the same way, a women’s assembly was held which brought to the forefront at the Forum the campaigns undertaken by collectives from all areas of the Mediterranean region.

General Observations

In the current international political context, the Mediterranean is one of the “hottest” zones on the planet and in the coming years it could acquire an even more crucial importance than it already has at present. In this sense, the creation of a space by and for civil society in the Mediterranean region has led to, and can continue to lead to, the production of alternatives to the neo-liberal policies that have existed so far. If we also bear in mind that the World Social Forum is going to hold its next annual meeting in Kenya, we can continue to see the FSMed as a connecting-point between Europe and Africa which contributes to creating a new North-South relationship.

It will be necessary to reflect at length on how the process can be pursued. Cooperation and interaction between the organizations and social movements of the Northern, Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean has not been simple. The establishment of good relations between the various different groupings, the definition of common problems, the type of event to be organized and held, the finance required to do so, the participation that can be expected, etc. – all these will be essential issues for reflection on the future of the FSMed process. There is no doubt that the process will continue, but will need to undergo a certain number of modifications. With the conviction that civil society has the capacity to mobilize support, to launch campaigns, to propose alternatives, and to initiate dialogue in order to resolve conflicts, we may hope that the space that was inaugurated in 2005 between all the peoples and states that make up the Mediterranean region will contribute to the construction of another possible Mediterranean.
The External Dimension of the UE Immigration Policy. Relations with the Countries of Origin and Transit

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The dramatic events which took place in Ceuta and Melilla in the autumn of 2005 revealed the need to reflect on the external dimension of the European Union immigration policy. The images of the sub-Saharan immigrants trying to get over the railings of both cities added to the European institutions’ concern regarding other frontiers which also undergo a high migratory pressure of an irregular nature, such as Lampedusa, Malta or the Eastern Greek Islands. Given the attention this gave rise to, together with the numerous references in official documents made that year, it would appear that the year 2005 represented the discovery by the European Union of the sub-Saharan immigration and its impact on their Mediterranean member countries. On acknowledging the fact that a global approach is required for migration, the European Union confirms the need for a coherent external dimension for its immigration policy and recognizes that both the Mediterranean and Africa have become priority regions within it.

From Tampere to The Hague

In the conclusions of the Tampere European Council in 1999, the European Union acknowledged the importance of managing the waves of immigrants in a global manner by establishing relations with the countries of origin or transit and jointly carrying out cooperation projects and activities with them. The Tampere Agenda, which together with the Treaty of Amsterdam can be considered the basis of common immigration policy, was also the pioneer in acknowledging the importance of the external dimension of the aforesaid policy. From the time the period for the implementation of Tampere was finalized, however, there has been a noticeable difference between the objectives aimed at and the results obtained in the last five years. On the one hand, it is clear that there has been a manifest lack of harmony between the Commission’s proposal capacity and the decisions taken by the Council, which has left matters unsolved and has obliged the European Parliament, consultative in terms of justice and home affairs (JHA), to try to reduce the effects of many of these decisions. On the other hand, the requirement of unanimity has also been an element of distortion, as it has made it easier for the member states, especially those which are sensitive to home affairs, to obtain a consensus of minimums in the European framework. Further elements which have postponed the development of this common policy have been the process of expansion in 2004 and, on a greater scale, the obstacles which were encountered in a constitutional process which anticipates that the matters on the JHA Agenda will now be the object of a co-decision – a complex proceeding which grants the European Parliament a greater capacity of intervention in the Union’s regulation process, and prevents the European Council from confirming a common position which does not rely on the approval of the Parliament – and which extends the use of the qualified majority in this area. With regard to the external dimension of the immigration policy, this area was clearly disrupted by the unexpected, fateful events of September 11th, which changed the priorities on the European agenda for immigration, focusing in particular on the security aspects. From the five years of the application of Tampere, it is clear that a greater securitization has been laid on the immigration agenda – discussed basically in the Home Affairs Councils –, which has pushed other aspects of economic development and social integration into the background. Although The Hague Programme has continued on the lines initiated in Tampere with regard to the priority given to the dimension of security in migratory policies, what is certain is that it has incorporated new elements into its plan of action, like the employment policy – following the Lisbon Agenda – and integration or external policy. On this latter point, The Hague Programme points out that cooperation with the countries of origin or transit of the migratory waves must be intensified, co-development should be tiptoed over and the competence of the European Union should be set out in order to reach re-entry agreements. The events of the final quarter of the year have once again stressed the importance of the external dimension of immigration policy.

2005 or the Importance of the External Dimension

In the area of Justice and Home Affairs, relations with third countries are basically linked to technical programmes to seal off their borders, re-entry agreements or clauses which have become an essential requirement in relations.
with other countries and one last element, which has undergone and acquired a pre-eminence in recent years, which is the connection between migration and development. Although the determining of access to official financial aid funds for development arose in Seville in 2002, on the signing of the re-entry agreements, this was neither the Tampere nor The Hague option. On the contrary, both agendas consider this aid to be an instrument to prevent forced migratory waves due to their having reached the limits of human endurance like poverty, the collapse of social systems and political instability among other things. On the same lines, Communication 390 on Migration and Development from September, 2005 acknowledged the deterring nature that the promotion of economic, social and civil rights might have on immigration in the countries of origin and it stresses the potential of the link between migration and development.

In 2005, three documents acquire special relevance with regard to the external dimension of the European immigration policy. All three of them emphasize the importance of the Mediterranean area and they came out shortly after the shocking images of hundreds of people trying to get over the frontier railings in Ceuta and Melilla. Firstly, Communication 491 came out on the relative strategy of the external dimension of the freedom of space, security and justice in October, 2005, in which the Commission, following The Hague Programme, reiterates the importance of the external dimension of JHA matters and the relevance of immigration and asylum in this field. It is, therefore, necessary to improve the capacities of other countries in migratory management, especially with regard to frontiers, irregular immigration and the binomial migration-development.

Moreover, in the conclusions of the informal Council of Home Office Ministers in Hampton Court at the end of October, and the subsequent Communication 621 regarding the monitoring of the priorities therein, the positive aspects of immigration both for the European Union and the countries of origin were underlined, but the importance of fighting against irregular immigration to avoid human tragedy was pointed out. In a conceptual turn, the idea of greater development to reduce immigration was considered substituting for that of improved management of immigration for better development; signifying, among other things, a guaranteed contribution of migration to development while mitigating brain drain and making expeditions easier, and fighting illegal immigration by controlling frontiers and re-entry agreements. In the Presidency conclusions of the Brussels European Council from December, the growing importance of immigration in the European Union and its member states was emphasized and the need was underlined to find a global approach that would signify, at least, an increase in the dialogue and cooperation with African countries and with all those countries which span the Mediterranean area.

**Objective: Africa and the Mediterranean**

Annexed to the aforesaid conclusions, the Council expressed the need, in answer to the events which took place at the end of 2005, for its “Global approach to migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean”, in which it requests a greater collaboration among the member states with regard to JHA matters. Furthermore, the Council demands that migrations be a priority in the political dialogue between the European Union and the African Union, that information mechanisms be established with regional network links with priority countries and that work be done with the African states in order to promote the role of Diaspora in projects of co-development. The Euro-African ministerial conference on migrations, due to be held initially in June, 2006 in Rabat, should be the first step in this direction.

However, and with regard to the Mediterranean neighbours, they acknowledge the new challenges in the management of the waves of immigration and border controls which they are coming up against as transit countries, and the resulting need to bring existing instruments like the MEDA Programme or the association agreements up to date. Apart from planning a Euro-Mediterranean meeting on migrations, the Council wishes to apply the best practice of other models of cooperation like, for example, the Baltic Sea, and to study the participation of other countries in coast patrol networks or in the system of external surveillance. Finally, and along the lines of the regional MEDA JHA I programme, they wish to intensify research to know more about and improve the management of the waves of immigration and migratory routes and, at the same time, contribute to strengthening the regional links between the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan countries.

**A Euro-Mediterranean Opportunity**

It is clear that the European Union has to find a way, with regard to the countries of origin and transit, to coordinate the waves of immigration, and that requires an effective policy of common immigration. However, there are several unfinished elements on the work agenda in the aforesaid policy: on the one hand, the procedure of co-decision should be revitalized, and this signifies overcoming the inter-governmental cooperation which has operated until the present time. On the other hand, the external dimension of immigration policy will have to be defined more clearly, specifying the contents of relations with the countries of origin and transit, as well as bringing the instruments necessary to carry this out up to date and making them available. In order to make the immigration policy coherent, its external dimension should be complemented with elements from other areas of common action, such as cooperation, commercial or employment policies, among others.

In a figurative sense, the borders of the European Union are not situated in the Mediterranean anymore and have been moved to the Sahara. To ask the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean to cooperate in the co-management of the waves of immigration or, what would appear to be the same thing, to ask them to become the gendarmes of the European borders, cannot just be based on the obvious need for controlling the irregular waves of immigration, but should be accompanied by a package of measures which
The government’s immigration policy that emerged from the legislative elections on March 14th, 2004 has put emphasis on the employment issue, in contrast to the previous phase of the policy which focused on domestic issues. The change in policy orientation came about when the development of governmental policy on the issues of immigration, emigration and asylum was allocated to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and a State Department for Immigration and Emigration was created within its remit. The responsibilities of the Ministry with respect to immigration matters accordingly remain confined to the field of police intervention, in addition to responsibilities for asylum, refugee status, rules regarding stateless persons and services for refugees.

Royal Decree 2393/2004 of 30 December that developed the Constitutional Law 4/2000 of 11 January (amended on a number of occasions), is a clear example of this vocation to link immigration to the labour market, subject to the consideration of other non-employment situations that would be duly authorised for implementation and regulation on Spanish territory, primarily family reunification procedures. The text of the regulations highlights the eminently economic nature of migratory flows, binds the normal administrative situation of the immigrant to the requirement to possess a residence permit, as well as a work permit in the majority of cases governed by the aforementioned regulations. Completely in tune with the most recent Community legislation on the subject, it emphasises the employment situation of the foreigner as the key element in his integration, since a regular employment relationship provides access to an acceptable and stable level of social acceptance, and is ultimately the fact that determines his social participation. As set forth in the introduction to the Royal Decree, acceptance of new immigrants in Spain is primarily based on the necessity to fill job vacancies and therefore, as a general rule, “Immigrants who wish to take up employment will have to obtain a visa in their homeland which will permit them to work or to seek work.”

The Regulations paved the way for normalisation or regularisation of a large number of foreigners who found themselves engaged in casual labour in Spain. At the end of this procedure, the quantitative balance should merit a positive evaluation based on the data expounded below. A total of 691,655 applications were submitted, 688,419 of which had been dealt with by 30 December 2005. The number of positive authorisations totalled 573,270, i.e. 83.3%, and negative authorisations were 115,149, i.e. 16.6%.

The number of foreigners granted an authorisation and subsequently insured under the general Social Security scheme was 550,136. The Madrid Region has the highest number of members, 130,741, followed by Catalonia with 111,062, the Valencian Region with 81,904 and the Andalusian Region with 67,803. In terms of nationalities, the Ecuadorians have the highest rate of membership with 122,636, followed by the Romanians with 95,993, the Moroccans with 64,697 and the Colombians with 48,355.

The normalisation procedure has enabled the legitimisation of the employment of 242,586 female workers (44.10%) and that of 307,491 (55.89%) male workers. The majority of this working population is aged between 25 and 39 (60.51%), with older workers comprising 21.44%, and younger workers 18.05%.

Finally, it is very important to emphasise that the normalisation procedure has enabled the legitimisation of a large number of people who are engaged in casual work in the domestic, agricultural and construction sectors. The Social Security scheme for domestic workers has accordingly enrolled 33.42% new members, the scheme for agricultural workers 14.16%, and the construction sector (the general scheme) comprises 21.19% of the total. The new rules and the finalised normalisation procedure should provide a considerable number of foreign citizens with an entitlement to the assistance and benefits offered by the public employment services. The regulations for the general scheme should, moreover, apply in such a manner that they enable the recruitment of people who find themselves in and reside in Spain, as well as the flexible and smooth management of the annual contingent where necessary; it should also enable them to rely on significant participation by the autonomous regions that have been given the remit of managing active labour policies. It is very important to highlight the role that the new regulations confer on the autonomous regions in managing immigration policies; autonomous participation in establishing the contingent and the list of occupations for which it is difficult to recruit, as well as their participation in verifying a shortage of indigenous job applicants as a prerequisite for an employer to be able to recruit a foreign worker that is not resident in Spain.

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acknowledge the contribution of immigration to development both in the Mediterranean countries of origin and the destination countries. At the same time, one must work on this so that these instruments and actions are spread to the sub-Saharan countries, which have become a challenge for the foreign action of the European immigrant policy. In this sense, it may be particularly suggestive to strengthen the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and incorporate immigration matters into the new European Union’s neighbourhood policy.

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Migrations within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

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The signature of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995 marked the intention of the fifteen European member states to create a dialogue with the countries situated in the Southern Mediterranean. It started with the idea that Europe could not be built up in an isolated way, on the basis that it was expanding to the East and it had to take a stand regarding the South.

The initial idea was to restore a certain balance between the East – where the visa system would be progressively abolished and enlargement procedures would be discussed – and the South, whose previous relations had been close. The anchor point of this dialogue was the Mediterranean.

From the beginning, the fact that the Mediterranean is not a homogeneous entity hindered the terms of the dialogue. As the geographer Yves Lacoste summarised, the Mediterranean is an olive tree civilisation. There are not one but three Mediterranean seas: one in the West, which is essentially Western Europe and the Maghreb countries; a second one consisting of the Balkans and finally one in the Orient, the Near East, and the Mashreq countries on the Mediterranean coast. There are various problems as the Northern/Southern relationship is essentially concerned with the Western Mediterranean, the objectives were very quickly determined fundamentally by the European calendar and not by the Southern countries. These aims were ambitious as the Barcelona Process set itself the goal of “turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of communication, trade and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity”. Amongst these objectives was to begin a dialogue between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries about democracy and culture. This is because at the time some Northern countries had only recently become democratic (Spain and Portugal). Other aims included the issue of peace and security, mainly referring to the Near-East situation, and the question of economic development.

Security, Peace and Economic Development

These three areas, defined by the Northern countries, have not really been taken into consideration even by the Southern countries. The Barcelona Declaration was signed by the 15 member states of the European Union and 12 Southern Mediterranean partners, amongst which two, Cyprus and Malta, joined the Union in 2004. Today it is known that in order to carry on a process there has to be a feeling of “ownership”, in the sense of the appropriation of the objectives of a dialogue by both parts. This has been, beyond doubt, one of the reasons that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been slow to make an impact. Moreover, the Algerian crisis, the uncertain situation in the Middle East, and the economic stagnation in several countries on the Southern Mediterranean coast in 1995, which resulted in continuous emigration, made the dialogue difficult.

The idea of establishing a system based on the NAFTA was added to the three initial common objectives. The intention was to set up a free economic trade zone as an alternative solution to migrations (facilitating the movement of goods in order to avoid the movement of people). In the NAFTA, the emigration issue is not mentioned free trade is simply established with the prediction that it will eventually impact on migration, but this is not mentioned in the overall perspective of this process. It is worthy of note that through the NAFTA, the free trade process between the three countries has had an influence on Mexican development but has had no impact on Mexican emigration. According to United States estimates, approximately 12 to 13,000,000 illegal immigrants have been recorded the United States safeguard Canada by absorbing most of the Latin-American emigration, especially that coming from Mexico. Free trade has therefore not affected migration, the movement of people not being an alternative to the movement of goods.

In the Barcelona Process, Europe attempted to secure its borders by eliminating customs barriers with the countries on the southern Mediterranean coast, especially in the Western Mediterranean. At the beginning the expiration date should have been 2011, but then it was postponed indefinitely. Today, there is no compensation effect to be reported between one and the other: the movement of goods does not imply a drying-up of migration. Some studies show rather the opposite: the more movement of goods, trade and exchange there is, the more people circulate. Let’s take the example of Moroccan tomatoes saying, “if you don’t want Moroccans in your country, buy their tomatoes”. An industrial type of agriculture for the production of standard tomatoes, which could be exported on to the European market, was set up in Southern
Morocco in the Agadir region. The consequence of this industrial production was to offer a market for Moroccan production, while concentrating agricultural development in limited areas with greater prosperity. This caused the unemployment of a large series of small producers who turned out to be potential candidates for emigration. On the other hand, the mentioned rural exodus phenomenon induced by production could potentially speed up emigration. So you get “both the Moroccans and the tomatoes” at the same time; in reality, the movement of goods has never stopped people circulation. The Venetian Republic was a location with intense cultural mobility and trade of goods, but it also had intense mobility of population. Such is the case today in the Mediterranean, with both a geopolitical fracture and intense crossings and exchanges.

**Evaluation of the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue Ten Years After**

The Euro-Mediterranean dialogue was set up on two levels. First, bilateral cooperation through association agreements with Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria and the Palestinian Authority. An agreement signed with Lebanon is waiting to be ratified. The content of these agreements varies from one partner to the other. So, MEDA programmes financed structural adjustment policies in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. The second level is regional multilateral cooperation which intends to complete bilateral cooperation in the areas of education, human rights, development, environment and culture. Its pace is marked by Euro-Mediterranean conferences and supported by an adequate system, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

**Political and cultural dialogue**

In 2005, several events have led to the assessment of the results of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue: the assessment has been mitigated because of a deep disappointment in the South, which was due to the lack of willingness from the Union countries to make this partnership one of the priorities of their agenda. As for politics and culture, no regime on the Southern Mediterranean coast has evolved towards democracy. However, some countries such as Morocco have opened up in quite a significant way. On the contrary, faced with radical Islamism, European countries seemed to fear that the opening to democracy mainly favours regimes that claim to follow Islam. The implementation of universal suffrage in most of the southern Mediterranean countries, would lead to regimes in power that follow Islam. When choosing between an authoritarian secular regime or universal suffrage system and political Islam, European countries chose the authoritarian secular regime. They trusted more authoritarian non-democratic countries which guaranteed secularism, rather than more democratic states which admit universal suffrage but have religious people in power. This was the choice made by most European countries in this area.

**Security and peace**

In this domain, everything is put at risk by the Near and Middle East conflict. There has not been much satisfaction in this area if one takes into consideration the central role represented by the Palestinian issue in the political life of regimes on the Southern coast of the Mediterranean. Sometimes this even serves as an outlet for dissent to finally “sweeten the pill of the imposition of authoritarian regimes” by playing a game which consists of partly diverting the population’s main interest towards the Palestinian issue in order to avoid mobilisation against the various regimes’ most recent events. On their part, the European countries reinforced their borders through a series of agreements signed with southern countries making of them the border guards of Europe (readmission agreements), reasserting the dissuasion strategy against the illegal crossing of borders by criminalizing it, and by toughening visa and asylum regulations (Dublin II agreements, 2003).

**Prosperity and Development**

The Mediterranean is an area where the development gap is the largest in the world within a very small geographic area: the gap between the GDP of countries on the Southern coast and those on the Northern one is in a ratio of 1 to 20. This explains why this zone is an area of intense emigration, because of the widespread diffusion around the Mediterranean of the image of Europe promoted by the media, by the transnational networks’ intense activity creating a series of exchanges between the Northern and Southern coast, by weddings which form a significant part of emigration, by cash transfers (14 billion euros were transferred from Europe to immigrants’ countries of origin; not all of these being Mediterranean, but for the most part consisting of Morocco and Turkey). All this means many exchanges, but also many ruptures.

Yet Europe continues to block the way: visa regulations have been kept in place everywhere, while Southern countries’ main request was to turn them more flexible in order to improve the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. Moreover, Europe reinforces its security system in order to stop the transit from the South to the North (as is the case in the Canaries towards Spain). Many European summits have had this effect, Seville in 2002, Thessalonica in 2003, or The Hague in 2004. The European countries’ planned and united mobilisation against the circulation of people in the Mediterranean area as we can see.

No answer was given to the matter of visas, which is one of the most significant requests made by society when heads of State go to the Maghreb countries as individuals or as a group. Readmission agreements have involved southern countries in supervising their own borders, as has been seen in Morocco, especially when sub-Saharan emigrants passed through Ceuta last autumn, and more recently when the European Union helped Spain to confront the influx of sub-Saharan illegal emigrants who were arriving in the Canaries. With regard to those originating from the Mediterranean region, the right to asylum is very strictly limited and there is a continuous violation of human rights. This is denounced by several associations which observe the situation in detention centres – first in the waiting areas, then in the detention centres as individuals wait to be escorted back to the border, and also...
During the process itself of being escorted back to the border. Other elements can be highlighted. Difficulties of dialogue also arise from the fact that European countries’ interest in the matter is unsystematic. Northern and Eastern European countries do not devote their energies to the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, as those countries are not their neighbours. It is not their priority, and they are not concerned if the dialogue is not functional and if there are illegal migrations passing through the Mediterranean. Admittedly, there are many Moroccans in Denmark and Holland. However, Finland, Norway or other countries actively involved in the Schengen agreement, such as Poland, have a very limited interest in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. This is visible when taking part in meetings in Brussels. This is the first problem. Second problem: there are not many countries that were originally involved in sponsoring the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. France was very active in this respect, but it was mainly Spain that sponsored it through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was very active in this debate. It is not by chance that the final evaluation of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements was carried out in Barcelona in the autumn of 2005. Some European countries’ limited interest in the matter weakens certain aspects of the dialogue. Finally, the third factor is that Europe’s opening up to the East re-focused its attention on the consolidation of the acquis communautaire, on the conditions for the new countries to join, and the harmonisation of European policies. All this prevented a stronger interest in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue.

**Development**

Concerning the last subject, the development issue, it can be stated that European countries’ encouragement towards states on the Southern coast of the Mediterranean has less of an effect on growth than the transfers of funds carried out by the emigrants themselves. These transfers are the essential element in the financial contribution between the North and the South, as companies contribute very little because of uncertainty about the stability of a certain number of countries on the Southern coast of the Mediterranean, which they define as “risk countries”, in addition to the fact that the countries themselves offer them very limited incentives for development. Some European programmes deriving from this partnership, the MEDA programmes in particular, attempted to move from a developmental policy which was carried out from State to State to one that would more affect society. Co-development programmes have become decentralised co-development programmes which operate, for example, from city to city. These programmes consist in the common sharing of interests and resources of a northern metropolis with a southern metropolis, thus allowing population to become closer. Otherwise, they link development programmes with associations that act as mediators between the North and the South, these are mainly run by migrants’ associations to encourage the creation of micro-project policies in the Southern countries. If this has not created development, it has provided at least a start in building networks and involving society in the issue of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. This has been achieved thanks to a small elite consisting predominantly of members of different associations.

As for the rest, we are still in the phase of making declarations (the European Neighbourhood Policy, introduced in 2005) and there appears to have been a great delay with regard to the initial objectives laid out by the Barcelona Objectives.

**Evaluation**

Which perspectives remain today to relaunch this dialogue? Politically, a certain number of regimes are completely caught up in an authoritarian drifts and have become “quasi-monarchies”, in Rémy Leveau’s words. Authoritarian republican regimes have become hereditary monarchies. This type of evolution is found in certain countries and does not include actual monarchies such as Morocco and Jordan. A country which has opened up to democracy is Morocco, where there has been a significant evolution. However, at the moment it is difficult to predict any type of evolution taking place in Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Egypt or in Libya. There are still many uncertainties about the evolution of these countries. This is one of the main obstacles to open dialogue.

The situation in the Near East is changing. It could be that Hamas’s rise to power will unblock the situation, but for the moment this is highly confused and it is difficult to determine whether it will have an impact on the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue or not.

As for emigration policy, we are in a sort of status quo position in which there is hesitation between on the one hand opening the borders to immigrants from the southern coast of the Mediterranean with qualifications, or opening them in a bilateral way through short-term labour agreements (as a form of seasonal immigration), and on the other hand wishing to strengthen border supervision and fight against illegal immigration along the European borders. As both these objectives are proposed at the same time, the European position remains contradictory on this matter.

Moreover, demographic forecasts are a fundamental issue in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, as on the Southern coast of the Mediterranean 50% of the population is less than 25 years old, compared to an ageing Europe. However, at the same time, it is known that in the Maghreb countries the demographic transition has already started, and that this “golden age” situation will change (young population, available and numerous to look after its relations as it does not have many responsibilities itself, not having many children). It will continue until the 2030’s. This situation will concern one generation, then the Southern population will start going through the same ageing process experienced by Europe.

Another important issue is the shortage of labour force in European countries, combined with the presence of a population on the southern shores of the Mediterranean that is very much available, but for whom it is difficult to find work and earn a living because of the European public’s fears of inflows of immigrants and Europe’s reluctance to consider itself as a land of immigration. Moreover, migrants established in the South are significantly less prepared to
migrate as there is not much hope of improving their situation in a short period of time in Southern countries. Those who manage to enter do not have much hope of seeing an improvement in their situation and would rather settle. There is therefore no mobility amongst the populations of the different countries, as has been experienced in the East since the fall of the Berlin wall, despite the fact that this is an essential component of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue.

The Balkans, (the northern Mediterranean) and Turkey, which should be considered as another coastal zone, have not been mentioned at length. In the initial definition of the Barcelona Program, the main debate is between Europe and the South, especially the South West, as the Northern Southern border with Egypt, compared to that of its neighbours, is not considered to be at the centre of the dialogue between the North and the South. As per the Balkans, there has been a fundamental progress since the Yugoslavian crisis, Albania opening up, even though relatively since the fall of the Berlin wall, Turkey’s progressing level of candidacy to join the European Union and to meet the membership conditions introduced by European countries. Turkey’s entry in the European Union will represent a significant progress for the partnership, as it will eliminate a series of cultural obstacles such as the role of Islam in Europe, a partition which persists within the dialogue between the northern and southern coast. This country, which is neither Eastern nor Southern, would allow the widening of the representatives range. Countries in the Balkans are small, amongst which the main one is Greece with only 10 million habitants and not much influence in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue.
Ceuta and Melilla: Security, Human Rights and Frontier Control

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At the beginning of the 90’s, a new phenomenon started to appear at the frontiers of Ceuta and Melilla: sub-Saharan migratory flows, and Ceuta and Melilla were definitively included in the geopolitical panorama of South-North migrations. North and South started to assume once again a crucial importance in both cities and the management of these new migratory flows started to reveal political contradictions of great depth. The first of these being the uneven application of regulations concerning immigration as regards to the rest of the Spanish territory. In 1999 the Spanish Government and the European Union decided to protect the cities’ borders with a modern and sophisticated system which would prevent immigrants from entering, delimiting those imaginary boundaries between Europe and Africa which were never definitely marked in Ceuta and Melilla. Those borders which only appeared on military maps and tourist guides, that for various centuries had represented a place of interaction and exchange, those borders capable of colouring the social fabric of both cities, are today the defiant symbol of the divide between two worlds, and are evidence of police supervision of immigration, as well as being the most expressive demonstration of the concept of a Fortress Europe that only accepts capable, good and qualified immigrants into its territory.

There is absolutely no doubt that 2005 brought back the barrier running along Ceuta and Melilla’s border perimeter into the sad and paradoxical limelight of Spanish and international public opinion. Just five years ago there were very few studies warning of the terrible consequences of building a fence towards the sky, asserting that immigration was and is a world-scale phenomenon, and that it could not be resolved by blocking borders. The communication media fomented alarm in Spanish society by inducing fear of an invasion of immigrants, with an avalanche of immigrant groups attempting to jump over the fences in search of the promised land; and this could be seen as an indirect means of justifying police and security policies.

A more appropriate and reasonable analysis in the face of the sealing of the borders in Ceuta and Melilla inevitably leads us to question the impact on immigrants’ human rights, and the arbitrary nature of the treatment the respective border police would reserve for those desperate human beings fleeing from a precarious existence, and would have been willing to attempt to cross the wired wall. The death of a 17-year-old young Cameroonian in August 2005, while attempting to jump over the barrier in Melilla, represented the start of the tragic events which took place between September and October. For some years now, the areas surrounding the border perimeter of the two cities, their woods and hills, had become the last stage of these immigrants’ long journey. These are overcrowded and precarious places where they wait for an opportunity to jump over a threatening barrier, which between September and October claimed the lives of 14 human beings. I do not intend to spend time describing in detail what actually happened nor reporting the responsibilities of Spanish and Moroccan forces for the death of these victims, who died because of hunger and political persecution. It is of no use to note that hundreds of defenceless immigrants were shot, leaving them with either superficial wounds from rubber bullets or fatal wounds from real ones, after having travelled for thousands of kilome-
ters along badly-defined migratory routes in the African desert. It is essential to point out that everything that happened around the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as the extraordinary increase in the amount of people dying whilst attempting to emigrate, are inevitable implications of the way in which the European Union and, of course, the Spanish Government approach immigration on the southern frontier. This is a policy according to which the priority is to ensure a system of police control which can close the borders and does not hesitate to infringe people’s fundamental rights, including the one to live. From my point of view, this is not coherent with the political message of the High-Level Meeting between Spain and Morocco which took place in Seville, nor with that of the visit of the Spanish deputy prime minister María Teresa Fernández de la Vega, and more recently of the Prime Minister himself, to the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, in September and October 2005 and in January 2006. It would be restrictive to focus one’s attention on the exchange of accusations between Madrid and Rabat or to frame the events in the panorama of bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco. Actually we are confronting issues for which the European Union and the International Conventions for Human Rights have the leading roles, followed by Spain and Morocco, whose secondary roles are no less significant and who have committed themselves to follow those binding guidelines which have been assigned to them in a script entitled: “Protection of Human Rights1.” For those who have had the opportunity to closely observe the development of the Spanish Government and the European Union’s frontier control policy in the face of the phenomenon of sub-Saharan immigration in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, it is essential to take 1999 as a point of reference; this was the year when the wired fences were built. Since then, frontier control policy has taken on a threatening and defiant character, another wall of shame having been permanently established in a location which for centuries represented a focus for economic and cultural exchanges. The repeated attacks on the fences of Ceuta and Melilla throughout 2005; the shootings and deaths of immigrants in September and October; the immediate sending in of troops as an exceptional measure to control the borders; the Spanish Government’s returning of 73 immigrants to their countries of origin; raids by the Moroccan Gendarmerie on the zone adjoining the fence that separates Ceuta and Melilla from Morocco, and the subsequent transporting and abandonment of hundreds of sub-Saharan immigrants at the Algerian border in the depth of the desert – all this paints a horrific picture in which two sovereign countries adhering to the main instruments protecting Human Rights and the European Union itself declare their own war against the hunger and desperation of those deciding to voluntarily abandon their countries of origin. It was thought that by sealing the borders in Ceuta and Melilla, and with the initiation of the Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE), the creation of a new European Borders Agency, and the deployment of hundreds of well-armed soldiers, it would be possible to prevent or regulate the flow of sub-Saharan immigrants. Sub-Saharan immigrants currently represent 4% of the immigrant population legally resident in Spain, a truly ludicrous number if compared to the Moroccan, Colombian and Ecuadorian communities present in the country. However, the construction of the two wire fences, which the Executive has since raised to a height of six metres and to which it has added a system of three-dimensional railings, the constant supervision of these installations, and finally, the allocation of significant resources for their maintenance, seem to be key aspects in the border management of migratory flows towards Ceuta and Melilla. We are experiencing a controlling attitude which has proved to be incompatible with the respect for Human Rights and which goes beyond the concept of mere frontier control. Policies for the control and regulation of immigration have been and continue to be controversial ground, as they involve tensions between the principle of national sovereignty and the safeguarding of human rights. Understanding and interpreting the attacks on Ceuta’s and Melilla’s fences, the deaths of some immigrants, the returning of others, and the abandonment of the majority in the African desert or near the Algerian frontier, becomes similar to shooting a film. Here the main actor, represented by the European Union, attempts to manipulate the secondary ones, amongst whom is Morocco, by linking the provision of development aid and/or EU funds to the country’s acceptance of a new European role: controlling immigration. This involves the demand for results in the form of the expulsion and/or return of immigrants to their countries of origin, and implies that Europe is outsourcing the responsibilities it acquired through the communitarisation of the migration issue in the Amsterdam Treaty. Everything considered, the migration issue was only ever going to get a negative treatment, in other words, it would never be possible to shoot the film, nor would there be any rewards if the secondary actors start to move freely on the scene without observing such an important rule as the respect for Human Rights. The measures to be taken so that Spain can manage its southern border more coherently, and so that in the near future Ceuta and Melilla no longer need to coexist with a barrier overlook-

1 According to Luis Peral, the Ceuta and Melilla crisis did not fulfill some Principles of International Law. All the States belonging to the International Community shall not expel, extradite or refoul to the frontiers any person whose life or liberty may be threatened as a consequence of such actions. The no refoulement principle not only concerns people fleeing from persecution but also regular or not regular immigrants when they reach the frontiers. People refouled, whose access in the national territory is prevented by force, are under the jurisdiction of the refouling State, at least in the moment when the access on the territory is directly or indirectly prevented. At this moment the human rights principles are not fulfilled. Even though protecting the country’s borders is legitimate, the fact of preventing the access to those people who will thereby suffer, with a valid concern, from tortures, life and freedom limitations, is a clear violation of the no refoulement principle. Sealing off borders in cooperation with Moroccan authorities would constitute an indirect, though serious, violation, but nevertheless a minor violation, of the no refoulement principle. Therefore, under any circumstance, a situation of emergency or necessity may justify the suspension or non fulfillment of the principles defending human beings from tortures and maintaining a minimum standard of life and liberty.
As a result of the incidents reported at the borders of the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Africa, which had tragic consequences as 14 people died whilst attempting to cross the frontier, the European Commission sent a technical mission over to both cities accompanied by a representative of the European Borders Agency, in order to get a direct testimony of the events and analyse and study the measures the EU should take to resolve the situation in the EU border zone.

The report reflects upon three main issues. Firstly, it observes that both Morocco and the EU are experiencing an increasing migratory pressure from Africa. Secondly, it highlights the need for the EU to increase aid and assistance to strengthen current control measures which both Morocco and Spain are already implementing. Finally, the report suggests that the EU’s response should consider three lines of action: to increase aid to Morocco, involve Algerian participation and develop a comprehensive migration policy with countries of Sub-Saharan origin.

The increase of migratory pressure caused by flows of Sub-Saharan people going to the EU and passing through Morocco is not expected to diminish, at least in the near future, since the causes of these human movements are both of a structural (large scale environmental degradation) and situational nature (linked to war conflicts). The irregular character of these migratory flows has grown an exceptional way, and the large scale coordinated attempts to cross the bordering fence of Ceuta and Melilla is a reflection of this phenomenon. In fact, it is thought that these attempts represent a displacement of migratory flows caused by the intensified supervision taking place on Moroccan and Spanish coasts. During 2004, around 10,000 people were arrested by Spanish patrols as they were attempting to cross the Strait of Gibraltar and, according to Spanish sources, 20,000 people in Algeria and another 10,000 in Morocco could have been waiting to cross the Mediterranean. The great majority of them came from Sub-Saharan countries, Mali and Gambia standing out among others, but there were also people originating from Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Sudan, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau. Moreover, the presence of an increasing number of immigrants coming from South East Asia (India and Bangladesh) makes one think that the networks for trafficking and smuggling human beings are expanding across the area, whilst becoming more “professional” and intensifying the violent character of their actions.

The measures taken by the Spanish government to reinforce border control also have their correlate in the Moroccan authorities’ response, not only with regards to their border supervision but also to stopping and dismantling networks for trafficking and smuggling human beings. One consequence of this effort on its maritime frontier has been the increase in irregular immigrants entering its territory, especially of those coming in via Algeria. In this light, the EC report stresses the importance of promoting dialogue and cooperation between both countries.

Another notable consequence is that, because of the increase in the number of people in an irregular situation in Morocco, there is a process whereby the differentiation between an immigrant and an asylum seeker or refugee is seriously affected. The report picks up on the fact that there are reasonable doubts to think that an effective protection practice for those people asking for help and safety once in Morocco is not taking place. This extends beyond the crisis linked to irregular immigration, a problem to be recognised and dealt with by international agreements linked to the protection of refugees.

The report states that irregular immigration has to be seen as a problem for the EU. It has to be seen from the double perspective that these flows affect international commitments concerning the respect of human rights and are, therefore, of an essentially transnational nature. So, one of the main recommendations of the European Commission’s report urges the intensification of cooperation and training of transit countries situated on the southern border of the EU, so as to achieve an ordered management of migrations and to set up appropriate protection for refugees and asylum seekers.

With regards to specific measures towards Morocco, it affirms that the EU must consider a series of policies which complement the association agreement between the EU and Morocco, whilst it is becoming necessary to speed up the implementation of the action plan intended for this country within the framework of the recently approved European Neighbouring Policy. The main measure to be developed is the collaboration and exchange of information and know-how for border control and surveillance, which would also extend to the Southern and Eastern frontier of the country.

As per Algeria, the EC report points out that up to now there has not yet been any dialogue between the EU and Algeria on this matter. However, because of the recent signature of the association agreement and, hence, the resumption of political dialogue, the Commission should encourage the possibility of collaborating with Algeria within the migration management context as soon as possible.

On a multilateral level, careful consideration is given to the fact that migrations should start to become part of the EU and African Union cooperation agendas, by identifying practical measures to manage migrations, fight against illegal immigration, and the traffic and smuggling of human beings.

Within the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it states that during the summit for the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, measures are introduced to increase Euro-Mediterranean cooperation with regards to migrations, initiating the necessary steps to guarantee an agenda which would reflect the Pan African dimension of the current migratory flows. Access to the entire document:


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Immigration: Let’s Listen to What Our Southern Neighbours Have to Tell Us

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At the end of summer 2005, young people died outside Melilla as they were trying to get into Europe. One month later, other young people, this time born in Europe of immigrant parents, expressed their bitterness over the inequality of opportunity which still affects them a generation later, in riots which were to shake up the suburbs of Paris and other French towns for most of the autumn. On New Year’s Eve, 2006, in the centre of Cairo, scores of Sudanese migrants met their deaths, outside the premises of United Nations Refugee Agencies (UNHCR) where, with three thousand of their fellow countrymen they had been trying to get their refugee status recognised.

On the outskirts of Paris, at the entrance of the Spanish enclaves of Morocco, or at the heart of the Egyptian metropolis, North Africans and Sub-Saharan people find themselves side by side. The region which extends from Morocco to Turkey, south of the Mediterranean, is one of the most active migratory areas of the world today. As well as being a major centre of emigration it is a passage well-worn by new waves of immigration, originating from the south and the east.

These migrations were a central subject of the “5+5 Dialogue” ministerial meeting (the countries of the western Mediterranean, with five from the Maghreb: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania et Tunisia, and five from Europe: Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal) organised in Paris on 9 and 10 November by the French Minister Jean-Louis Borloo, and later also of the summit conference of the Euromed Process, brought together in Barcelona by the Spanish prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero on 27 and 28 November.

What are the levels and the trends of migrations, in origin, in destination, or in transit via the countries of the southern Mediterranean? What impact do they have on the development of the countries of origin? And on the country of destination? How do the states and societies respond? All these questions are the subject of a report published in October by the European University Institute, Florence within the framework of a project financed by the European Commission. Mediterranean Migrations - 2005 Report. The report covers the following countries, from West to East: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian Territory, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. This 400-page report is the fruit of the labours of a network of thirty experts from the countries of the southern Mediterranean, demographers, economists, corporate lawyers and political analysts who are offering the first systematic inquiry into this question of great political urgency, and emphasises, once is not habit, the vision of the south. Here are some of the results.

The first result will not be a surprise. Despite the restrictions on immigration which are multiplied across the four corners of the world, emigration remains a major characteristic of the southern Mediterranean. Between 10 and 15 million first generation emigrants originate from this area. It would be unrealistic to offer a more precise figure, as the statistician was confronted with two contradictory realities: that of the country of residence and that of the country of origin, which do not include the same people in their calculation of numbers. Those of double nationality, citizens of their adopted countries, effectively always remain expatriates of their country of origin, and the same goes for their children. On one hand they are no longer immigrants, but on the other they are still emigrants. People of double nationality are not numerous enough, however, to account for the difference from single to double between calculations by their countries of residence and by the consulates of their countries of origin. Temporary migrants and those in illegal situations are another component. Because they are likely to offer protection to their expatriates who are in vulnerable situations, the consulates do indeed have contact with a part of this population which the current statistics are incapable of reaching.

Whether or not people like to hear it, emigration from the southern Mediterranean, which did slow down during the last two decades, is on the increase again. Morocco can be seen as an example. According to consulate registrations, the number of Moroccans living abroad went from 1.5 million in 1993, to 3.1 million in 2004, a 100% increase in twelve years, which represents an annual growth of 6.3% in the emigrant Moroccan population, against only a 1.3% rise in the total population of Morocco itself. France has gone into the lead with both the total number of Moroccan registrations (1,115,000 in 2004) and the supplementary figures
over twelve years (+435,000), followed by Spain (+360,000 in twelve years, being a total of 425,000 in 2004) and then followed by Italy (+210,000 / 300,000). The figures for Spain, more recent than those of the Moroccan consulates, show that the movement of Moroccan emigrants continues: from 420,556 to 31 December 2004, the number of Moroccans registered in Spanish communities went up to 511,294 as at 31 December 2005, being an increase of 21.5% in one year (www.ine.es).

Each on its own scale and with its own specific destinations, countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Lebanon show trends similar to those of Morocco. The continuation for yet another decade, of a strong demographic increase in these countries’ numbers of young adults and their lack of prospects in local job markets, suggests that the pressure will go on for several more years. Only Turkey stands out in this group, thanks to spectacular economic success, which is beginning to create a country of return for some of its former emigrants.

The second result is less expected for Europe, which loves to see itself as the focal point of all migrants. It is not the only destination of emigrants from the southern Mediterranean, of whom it only in fact receives less than half. The Gulf Arab states and Libya also take as many, even though their politics, hitherto ultra protectionist, provide for a drastic reduction in employment accessible to immigrants, despite the spectacular revival of petrol income. Far behind, the United States and Canada appear to have become a new magnet. At the moment they receive less than 10% of the emigrants from the southern Mediterranean, but this is already more than 50% of the most qualified among them. While 66% of the first generation emigrants originating from the southern Mediterranean who are now in Europe have an inferior or rudimentary level of education, 58% of those who are in North America are university graduates. Such a difference between Europe and North America can be explained in part by the succession of generations: migration into Europe, an older concept, started in times when few young people from southern Mediterranean coun-
tries had access to secondary school or university, which has since become more commonplace. But it is also due to the contrast between the politics of economic immigration: North America is open, albeit selectively, whereas Europe is generally speaking, closed.

Today it is considered good form to explore the brain-trade. Let us be careful not to get mixed up. The countries of the southern Mediterranean are not those of the southern Sahara. In Egypt, Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia, it is a long hard road for the cohorts of young graduates: firstly there is unemployment, which affects this category more than all others, sometimes lasting many years; then often there is disappointment, when a job is finally found, but at a level and with wages well below initial aspirations. In these conditions, the circulation of skills is not a trade, but the free choice of responsible men and women. Rather than stigmatising it, we should organise it so that it is beneficial to all parties.

How do the governments of the southern Mediterranean view the emigration of their citizens? Employment is their main priority. Even if they recognise that emigration can alleviate the pressure on the work market no-one would recommend it as a solution to unemployment. On the other hand everyone notices their diasporas, that is to say the results of former emigrations, as a resource that it is proper to cultivate. An economic resource, as the money sent by emigrants (to the order of 20 billion dollars a year for the whole of the southern Mediterranean!) contributes towards the stability of balances of payments heavily in deficit, and allows the conditions of existence of the families of migrants to be improved in their regions of origin, and these are among the poorest people, and the money is primarily invested in housing, health and education. It then becomes a diplomatic resource, because the confidence displayed by the diasporas is a guarantee of the opening up of their country of origin, and thus an asset in attracting foreign investment.

One after the other, all the countries of the southern Mediterranean have thus established institutions, often ministerial departments, to handle the affairs of their expatriates. These institutions follow three lines of policy: the maximisation of economic benefits drawn from the diasporas, the protection of their rights in their countries of residence, and the preservation of their cultural identity. The first line is conveyed by a modernisation of banking and fiscal systems, the second by a development of the rule of law, and the third by the extension of activities, notably religious, organised from within the southern Mediterranean countries and directed towards second generation migrants. These three lines leave many questions unanswered. Primarily, what is the sustainability of development supported by the transfer of savings of emigrants? The savings which an emigrant is likely to send to his country of origin follow a cycle: they increase at first, as fast as the problems of settling in will allow, then they decrease, as the migrant progressively ceases to feel like an outsider, and builds a new life in the place where he lives. To maintain a regular flow of savings transfer, there needs to be a regular flow of new emigrants. Temporary migration is the scheme best suited to this objective. Secondly, are the countries of origin ready to grant to their emigrants the same rights as those they intend to defend for them in their country of destination? Apart from Algeria, no country of the southern Mediterranean has to date, for example, recognised the principle of political participation of diasporas. Thirdly, are the policies of defending identity followed by countries of origin entirely compatible with the effective integration of immigrants into their new society of residence? This is doubtful when the new society, as in France’s case, is reluctant to tolerate the development of communities and relies on powerful instruments of cultural homogenisation, the most obvious example being schools. The third result of this enquiry is that the southern Mediterranean is far from being just a region of emigration. There are in fact 3.6 million residents who were born abroad and 2.1 millions of non-nationals. Apart from the “traditional” migrations in the region of the Near East (Jewish immigrants and Palestinian refugees) all sorts of immigration flow is recorded of varying size and legality, such as Sub-Saharan in the Maghreb, but also Sudanese in Egypt, Syrians in
Lebanon, Iraqis in Jordan, Moldavians and Georgians in Turkey, or even Filipinos and Sri Lankans in all the countries of the Arab East. The transitory migrants, those en route for Europe (or for other continents) who find themselves stuck in the southern Mediterranean having failed to reach their initial destination, do not form the majority of the flow, far from it, even if current events in Europe only hold them back. All these countries possess legislation, or else policies, which allow them to give status to foreigners and to define their access to certain rights and responsibilities. But only Morocco (2003) and Tunisia (2004) are equipped with laws specifically to manage the entry and stay of foreigners with the view of fighting illegal immigration and penalising those who practise or facilitate it. In Morocco, the law of 2003 has even given rise to a lively debate lasting several months, truly democratic, on the appropriateness of alienating neighbours from the south Sahara by trying to please those of the northern Mediterranean, or of trampling on the human rights which state that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own” (art. 13) by preventing illegal migrants from leaving Morocco.

It would be wrong to always limit the prevention of illegal immigration to being a service to Europe. In the southern Mediterranean, plagued by an unemployment rate in the double figures, the response is also possibly primarily out of concern for protecting nationals in the job market. Even if they do not adhere to all the methods recommended by some European governments for controlling illegal migration, such as the establishment of camps for the separation and removal of immigrants from their territory, the countries of the southern Mediterranean share the primarily security-based approach to this problem. The question upon which points of view diverge from one Mediterranean shore to the other, and this is where the European governments ought to listen to their southern partners, is that of economic migration and the global approach which the south is calling for. We cannot concentrate effectively on the repression of illegal immigration if we do not tackle its prevention by development, and by recognising that development is achieved through the organisation of legal economic migration.

References

**The Alliance of Civilitations. The double meaning of the Palma de Mallorca meeting**

Máximo Cajal  
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In his speech at the UN General Assembly meeting, on September 21st 2004, the Spanish prime minister proposed an *Alliance of Civilizations between the Western world and the Arab and Muslim world* and suggested to the Secretary-General the possibility of setting up a High Level Group to carry out this proposal. This group, made up of twenty eminent figures, met formally, for the first time, in Palma de Mallorca (Spain) between 27th and 29th November 2005.

The meeting in Palma was the climax of the first stage of a process whose principal milestones were, during the course of 2005, the co-sponsorship of this initiative by the Turkish prime minister in June, with all the symbolic and political significance that this entailed; the announcement of the initiative by Kofi Annan in mid-July, which meant its formal acceptance by United Nations; and the designation of the Group members at the beginning of September, a decision that left the way clear for their work to begin. This sustained series of specific steps consolidated the visibility and credibility of a project that, from its launch until the present day, has aroused the active and explicit interest of some thirty countries and international organizations, thus simultaneously underlining its institutional strength. The proposal also provoked scepticism, and in some cases a distrustful distancing of positions, while here in Spain it was greeted by the relentless (and still continuing) harping on of an opposition that has so far been incapable of formulating a minimally coherent and rigorous position capable of giving expression to their small-mindedness.

The fact is that by the end of last year another group had formed, this time informal and spontaneous, which had been joined by countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand, as well as by Iran and Jordan; Italy and the United Kingdom; Argentina, Costa Rica and Mexico; Egypt, Tanzania, Tunisia and South Africa, along with the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the Ibero-American General Secretariat and the European Commission, whose support was later confirmed by the EU itself. The United States of America also joined, having announced in September its proposal of contributing to the projects being considered under the umbrella of the Alliance of Civilizations. In 2006, it has been European countries above all that have individually joined this support group: Austria, Belgium, Slovenia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland and Switzerland, along with Afghanistan, El Salvador, the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, Qatar and Senegal.

The members of the High Level Group, designated on the basis of their strict personal merits and according to a geographical and cultural distribution in harmony with the global character of the work entrusted to them, received from the Secretary-General their “terms of reference”. These constitute a mandate to assess, firstly, certain events – “new and emerging threats” – that endanger international peace and security, in particular those that come from the forces that fuel extremism; secondly, to identify collective action that would be capable of facing them; and finally, to recommend a series of specific measures and practices aimed at bridging the widening gap between the West and Islam, without forgetting the interdependent nature of different civilizations and cultures. In the light of these recommendations, it will be the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the United Nations – in consultation with the co-sponsors, that is, with the Spanish and Turkish Prime Ministers –, to determine, at the end of this year, how to present the Action Plan to the international community.

Palma de Mallorca was also the setting for the beginning of a process, of a collective exercise of reflection, whose aim has always been, from the very beginning, to make one more step forward – as the Prime Minister said in the opening session of the meeting –, in relation to other partial, sectorial or regional initiatives that were already under way, many of whose objectives are similar to those pursued by the Alliance of Civilizations and should therefore be taken into account within its ambit. The additional value he referred to in his speech, is precisely provided by the eminently political perspective and the global dimension implied by the fact that this proposal is incorporated in the United Nations Organization and that it has been supported by Kofi Annan.

If, as Rodríguez Zapatero also said, the aim pursued is to foster knowledge, understanding and mutual respect, moderation and appreciation of diversity, as well as an awareness of the growing and inevitable interdependence between peoples and nations, the instrument to achieve these objectives cannot but be a coalition between governments, international organizations and civil society. This requires concerted action on a world scale that will help close the widening gap that is opening up, both
On 14th April 2005, Narcis Serra, president of the Fundació CIDOB, presented in Rabat the study “L’image de l’Espagne au Maroc” which was carried out by Noureddine Affaya and Driss Guerrauoi.

Why is there a need for a study on the image of Spain in Morocco?

If we want to speak about dialogue and alliance, what we need most is to get to know one another. Understanding and recognition. This recognition normally expresses what we think of the others. More than once, while discussing certain issues, the question has come up as what the Spanish think of the Moroccans. However, the question on what they think about us is not so usual. This study wishes to discretely deepen the mutual understanding from the point of view of the others, in order to put Moroccan-Spanish relations on a new footing, jointly implicating themselves in a new dynamic of cooperation, exchange and communication.

At the same time, the study “The image of Spain in Morocco” is in itself a dialogue between the philosopher Noureddine Affaya and the economist Driss Guerrauoi. Each one, through their own points of view and fields of analysis, uses the study to record this Moroccan view of Spain and the Spanish. Their objective is the restoration of constructive communication between Morocco and Spain, and the identification of the most pertinent dimensions of their entangled cultural and human relations. They have both been surprised by the lack of reference material to be used as the basis to discover the image of the Spanish in the mind of the Moroccans and that would make the Spanish an object of reflection.

According to the philosopher it is a matter of rising the awareness amongst the institutional leaders, the media and the various actors on the importance of the images in improving the relations between these two neighbouring countries, since the prejudices are already globally and – let’s not close our mind to reality – within our own societies. A few months after the meeting in Palma, when the cartoons published some time earlier by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten came to the attention of the public, this incident – that was apparently banal to us Westeners but that set off a wave of emotions in Islamic societies together with unacceptable violent protests–, harshly shown the relevance of that diagnosis. The need was clearly shown to rise up against those who incite hate and intolerance, in any place and using any kind of arguments, distortions, ruses and pretexts, Similar considerations were expressed in Mallorca by the Turkish Prime Minis-
but they lack of a pragmatic and strategic approach concerning what should be done in concrete terms. This is the real difference, the originality that the Alliance of Civilizations provides. Annan, on his side, asked them to assess the alarming developments taking place; the growing levels of intolerance, extremism and violence, and the evident tensions between East and West that, if not stopped, could even threaten world stability. It is up to the Group to consider this alarming situation and propose a collective answer aimed at reducing these tensions. Its basic task, he said, is to manage that this common humanity triumphs over perceived differences, that the awareness of living in the same world becomes established, that there is no other choice but to understand and respect one another. For, in the end, your work is not only for an Alliance of Civilizations. It is equally for a global civilization for all members of all societies.

The meeting in Palma partly coincided with that one held in Barcelona by the European Union to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Euromediterranean Process. Here the EU commented, for the first time, on the Alliance of Civilizations. Its members committed themselves to acting jointly against racism, xenophobia and intolerance and to encourage intercultural dialogue through the Anna Lindh Foundation and in support of the Alliance of Civilizations. While taking place in Doha the meeting of the High Level Group on February 27th, the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs reiterated their explicit support in Brussels. They did it in the conclusions they assumed about the muslim world reactions to the publication of the cartoons.

Mallorca was the starting point of an ambitious and complex task. All that was needed was a few minutes dedicated to the challenge to be faced. Therefore it was inevitable that – under the direction of their two co-presidents, the Spaniard Federico Mayor Zaragoza and the Turk Mehmet Aydin –, the members of the Group should dedicate their first interventions to present their own personal points of view regarding the assignment they had received and their particular view of the world situation. Little by little the boundaries were marked out, which was imperative in order to avoid the risk of dispersion. Everybody there was very aware indeed that the Alliance of Civilizations cannot expect to solve the problems that afflict humanity. But what it can do, and this is its commitment, is identifying the problems – without shying away from the ungrateful task of pointing the finger at where it hurts most –, and provide the necessary prescriptions to remedy such problems. In this task the Alliance can count on the international scene actors, whose help is necessary not to waste all the efforts and shutter all hopes. In this way a certain number of general issues were identified in this first review which makes it possible to define what is at stake. Such matters as the interdependence and the complementary nature of civilizations, to the point of considering that only one civilization exists; the multipolar and complex character of the relation between current conflicts and challenges, which leads us not to concentrate on the terrorist threat alone; the incompatibility between religion and the practice of indiscriminate violence and terrorism; the urgent need to focus our attention on relations between the Muslim and the Western world, between Islam and secularized Christianity; the weight of political and economic grievances based on the inequality of power, and the resentment due to the way this power is exercised. All these topics and the need to establish and activate a widespread discourse radically opposed to that one dominating at present moment and used by extremists to justify their attitudes. Certain areas of priority action were also identified in Palma. These included education, both formal and informal; media, and communication in general; youth; migratory movements; and women.
Arab Media: What has this to do with Europe?

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In September 2005, Egypt witnessed its first presidential election (with the presidential poll open to more than one candidate) after 25 years of authoritarian rule. Despite the criticism that surrounded the voting process and which secured the 77-year-old President Mubarak a fifth term, it is vital to acknowledge the role assigned to the state media both prior and during the election. The Egyptian cabinet had announced that the state media should play a new role in that historical election by allocating equal time to all the ten presidential candidates, including the President. The state television channels welcomed the initiative in the name of professional integrity and media independence and thus allocated 30 minutes for each candidate per coverage, a step that had been praised by various NGOs inside and outside Egypt. Also in Lebanon, following the rising tension with Syria in the wake of the assassination of the former Prime Minister, Rafik El Hariri, (Syria was accused of plotting the assassination), the Lebanese parliament amended their television regulations in order to allow MTV, a private anti-Syrian channel, to go on air again. Syria, in turn allowed Syrian private investors, for the first time, to open private satellite channels to compete with existing state outlets.

These examples prove that the media had been acknowledged as a useful political tool, and furthermore, that changes within the media field itself can have an impact on re-formulating the relationship between the media and the state. This development should be seen in light of the recent changes on the Arab media scene and which made it inevitable for statesmen to accommodate their political communication to the needs of the new media. This article briefly points out some of these changes as a point of departure for discussing the impact of these changes on the democratisation of the region, i.e. promoting freedom of speech, engagement in civil society, confronting social problems, etc.

The New Trend

Chief among these changes is the emergence of TV journalism in Arabic television, which several scholars claim was an unknown professional concept amongst Arab journalists until MBC, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya entered the scene. Before then, news reporting depended upon reading material collected from international agencies and broadcasting the pre-recorded reading. The new satellite channels, however, adopted many of the professional practices known to European and American journalists, including live reporting, in-depth discussions with guests in the studio, etc. The number of satellite channels has been consistently growing since the mid-1990s, now reaching well over 100 channels, and a recent estimate by the Arab Advisors Group indicates that this figure may well double within the next decade.

In addition to Syria starting permitting the establishment of private media outlets, 2005 witnessed further changes on the Arab media scene, including proposals to establish specialized channels, such as: an Arabic Islamic channel in Morocco; an English-language Islamic channel and another tourism channel in Saudi Arabia; Yemen announced its plan to open a youth channel; Al Jazeera announced the inauguration of a channel dedicated to the needs of children, not to mention its plan to launch an English speaking news channel this year; the BBC announced its plan to open an Arabic speaking television channel in 2007, which will be followed by another in Persian.

Interestingly, the entertainment sector, which is much larger than the news sector, has also witnessed several important developments. The genre of talk show has been introduced as a new format with daring discussion topics such as youth sexuality, informal marriages, etc.; reality TV consolidates its position as a popular youth genre and as a popular discussion topic for journalists and scholars alike. Seen against this backdrop, the communication between the state and the people has had to adapt to the new reality, despite some commentators’ claim, such as Charles Levinson (Levinson, 2006), that the core message of the state television is still the same old story and that nothing fundamental has changed. The question then is whether the new development marks a real balance between changes of format as well as content.

Style Before Substance?

This change – and whether it has been genuine or just cosmetic – was the main issue in my book The Making of Arab News, released in 2005 in the USA. In this book (Mellor, 2005a), I pointed to
From the 22nd-23rd of November 2005, the international conference of *Culture in the Euro-Mediterranean Area*, took place in Barcelona, sponsored by the Department of Culture of the Government of Catalonia, and the Interarts Foundation (Barcelona). Approximately 190 people took part, coming from more than twenty states, representing associations from civil society engaged in the field of the arts and several other institutions, such as the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures, The Arab League for Education, Science, and Culture (ALECSO) and the Department of Culture of the Government of Catalonia. The aim of the conference was to promote a debate on cultural and artistic aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, by identifying the most significant aspects of cultural creation in the region. Furthermore, the conference was an opportunity for culture professionals to evaluate the development of the Partnership in this sector, and put together specific propositions which would promote further artistic and cultural cooperation. To facilitate this, four workshops were organised on the following topics: Creation and Mobility; Culture and Social change; Cultural Diversity; and finally, Cooperation, Cities and Culture in the Mediterranean. The results which came from the conference underlined primarily that until now there have been gaps in the definition of the Euro-Mediterranean area, both on a cultural and a political level. The professionals thought that it was necessary to understand the Mediterranean as a “source of energy and creativity for cultural cooperation, not as a problem” and above all that the definition of the area is still insufficient because the Balkans and countries such as Libya need to be included. Concerning the difficulties noted in the sector, the professionals highlighted:

- The fact that cultural cooperation is still conceived from an interstate and institutional viewpoint, while the other actors (public or private) are relegated to marginal roles and are little considered;
- This leads to a sort of marginalisation of cultural cooperation and difficulties in implementing new projects, mostly between local administrative groups;
- Cultural cooperation often suffers from asymmetry in institutions and types of management between South and North, mainly concerning the “unequal recognition of the role of civil society”, due to the fact that numerous state and intergovernmental organisations “keep local administration at the level of non-governmental agents”;
- The lack of a means of support for the mobility of artists and professionals and the dispersal of information;
- The lack of available training adapted to different local realities.

Following the workshops, the participants put together recommendations in order to face common problems. Some of the most remarkable propositions suggested were:

- The necessity for relaunching the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of the Ministers of Culture which has not met since 1998;
- To support the participation and engagement of civil society, to overcome interstate logic;
- To establish specific lines of funding for cultural cooperation and the opening up of small and medium-sized initiatives;
- To strengthen South-South cooperation;
- To stimulate the circulation of information and establish new mechanisms to facilitate the mobility of artists in the Mediterranean, such as the creation of a “mobility fund”;
- To grant a more central role to culture within the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Following the discussions, the institutions attending at the conference pointed out their intention to take immediate steps to support cultural cooperation. In particular, the Department of Culture of the Government of Catalonia announced the signature of an agreement of collaboration with the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation (AECI) “for the implementation of a qualification program for cultural professionals in the Mediterranean” and the Coalitions for Cultural Diversity gathered in Barcelona agreed to ask the states of the region to ratify the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression “so that they adopt policies favourable to cultural diversity”. The Interarts Foundation, on its part, expressed its interest in continuing to support the creation of areas for artistic encounters.

Website reference: www.barcelona10.org www.interarts.net/esp/1_1_index.php

The homogenisation impact of globalisation on the Arab journalistic practices, e.g. live reporting, presenting two sides of the story, etc., while pointing to the lack of addressing immediate social issues, e.g. schooling, child labour, corruption, etc. As I argue, the intertwining of western (Anglo-American) and Arab traditional format has sometimes been seen as a progressive step in the development of the regional image vis-à-vis the West. In other words, by being able to produce western genre, Arab professionals mark their professional identity on a global basis. For instance, Al Jazeera prides itself of being a beacon of objectivity, which is a long-held American journalistic norm, in order to mark its presence not only regionally but also internationally; Barbie dolls, seen as an emblem of western infatuation with promiscuous lifestyle, have been challenged by an Arab version (called Fullah); films and music videos have become a competition arena for Arab media professionals to show their incorporation of the latest techniques and looks; the Internet has become an integral part of the national identity for several gulf countries such as Kuwait not to mention that several Gulf cities, such as Jeddah, have come to resemble American states rather than the traditional nomadic land.

But the change, I warned, may end up being a merely cosmetic change with little genuine impact upon the development and everyday life of the Arab peoples. Why, for example, should we hail American style TV journalism if the news content does not address social issues and merely maintains the traditional political outlook? Or why should we hail the building of skyscrapers if issues such as the discrepancy between social classes are not subject to public debates? Or why should we hail the reality show *Big Brother* for teaching Arab audiences to...
vote for a winner, if the voting experience is not genuinely conducted and practised in real life?

**Substantial Knowledge**

The problem, in my view, is the lack of deep understanding of the Arab social identities, both of audiences and professionals, as presented in the media. Indeed, the increasing number of publications and reports published recently about Arab media has mostly been descriptive in nature, pointing at the change in format in Arab media and speculating about the new mixture of modern images alongside traditional lives. Thus the result is a largely speculative bundle of concerns about the role of the media in changing the political and social scene in the Middle East. But what we need now – perhaps more than ever – is to encourage and embrace an in-depth understanding about the mechanisms of this change and its contingency. We need to unravel the impact of these changes not only on the surface, i.e. journalistic forms and genre, but also upon journalism as a profession. Media, both news and entertainment, reflects the mediated representation of national as well as pan-Arab identities. We need to understand the rivalry and yet similarities, amongst the diverse social identities (re)presented in the new media. We need to conduct qualitative audience analyses to replace the traditional scheme of counting voices that favour Al Jazeera versus those who favour CNN. We need to understand the politics of the popular versus the political, and the mechanism of change as imposed by an elite class versus the consensus emerging from the classes below. In summary, we need qualitative data that goes deeper than the descriptive and speculative.

**Post-Euro-Med**

The changes on the Arab media scene were raised in one of the main sessions during the Euro-Med and the Media Seminar, held in November 2005 (see my article in Afkar/Idées No. 8). The session resulted in a heated debate between some speakers (including myself), and other Arab journalists and attendants who preferred to hold the discussion to the ‘Us versus Them’ level characterized by focussing on the different coverage of Arab affairs in western versus Arab media, or the censorship imposed by statesmen, etc. In my view, the ‘Us versus Them’-debate represents a sort of denial to see the picture from within, i.e. how media professionals themselves – actively or passively – help consolidate certain images and avoid tackling the social issues that should be the part and parcel of their task. At the end of the session, a west European participant asked me, ‘all what was said today was good, but what has this to do with Europe or the Euro-Med?’ This summarises the problem. We tend to look at the outer layers of the Arab problems in a search for a remedy rather than seeking a deeper understanding of these problems. For instance, western news about the Arab affairs revolves typically around security and politics, etc., rather than immediate social problems. Thus, the European audiences are likely to be familiar with the names of threatening fundamentalists, somewhat less familiar with the names of Arab leaders and rather ignorant about schooling, poverty, medical service, urbanization, etc. Thus the vast majority of journalistic accounts and even the majority of academic accounts, inflict a typified identity upon all Arabs, leading observers to eventually wonder why things have not changed much in the Arab societies, despite the media, political and economic attention that Europe is pouring into the region. It is time to update the focus of our analysis, targeting the issues that really matter, rather than asking ourselves, ‘what has this to do with Europe?’

**References**

The World Bank Institute has established aggregate governance indicators to try to make a quantitative comparative analysis of different countries. On the basis of the accumulation of hundreds of indicators a certain number of indices have been established (from -2.5 to +2.5) concerning six dimensions of governance:

- **Voice and Accountability**: A measure of political, civil and human rights. Includes indicators of citizens’ ability to elect governments and the independence of the media, among others.
- **Governmental Effectiveness**: A measure of the competence and independence of the administration and the quality of the public services, and also of the credibility of governmental commitments.
- **Rule of Law**: A measure of the confidence in the effectiveness of a society’s regulations. Includes the perception of the incidence of crime, the efficiency of the justice system and the confidence in the application of contracts.
- **Political Stability**: A measure of the likelihood of an unconstitutional or violent threat to a government, including terrorism, that could have an effect on political continuity, or could undermine citizens’ ability to elect and replace the government by peaceful means.
- **Regulatory Quality**: A measure of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price control, or inadequate bank supervision, as well as the imposition of charges by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade or businesses development.
- **Control of Corruption**: A measure of the perception of corruption, and especially of the effects of corruption on the business environment, where they imply a lack of respect for laws and a failure of governance.

Own production. Source: www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
Map A.2 | Legislative elections in Iraq (15-12-2005)

Dahuk
Ninawa
Arbil
Tamin
Sulaymaniyah
Salah ad Din
Diyala
Baghdad
Wasit
Babil
Karbala
Anbar
Najaf
Muthanna
Basra
Dhiqar
Maysan
Qadisiyah

Over 50% of votes for Unified Iraqi Coalition
Over 50% of votes for Kurdistani Gathering
Over 50% of votes for Iraqi Accord Front
National Iraqi List
Iraqi National Dialogue Front
Others

275 parliamentary seats

Own production. Source: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/iraq
OVERALL RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current for the Future</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qornet Sehwan</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli Bloc</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Renewal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total List of the Martyr Rafik Hariri</strong></td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skaff Bloc</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murr Bloc</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Aoun Alliance</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amal</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Social Party</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Resistance and Development Bloc</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/lebanon
Map A.4 | Balkans. Refugees in Europe since 1991

The spheres are in proportion to the number of asylum-seekers.

Source: Le Monde Diplomatique

Map A.5 | Secret detentions and unlawful Inter-state transfers (2001-2005) according to the Council of Europe

Source: Council of Europe. http://assembly.coe.int

1990

2003

GDP per capita ($ PPP)

Share of the GDP by sector (%)

Own production. Source: UNDP and WB
Transport: Extension of the trans-European transport networks

Source: European Commission: Networks for peace and development. Extension of the major trans-European transport axes to the neighbouring countries and regions. Report from the High Level Group chaired by Loyola de Palacio. November 2005

Multimodal axes
- Trans-national axis
- Axis towards other countries
- Inland waterway axis
- Motorways of the sea
- Motorways of the sea port

TEN-T priority axes
- Road priority axis
- Railway priority axis
- Inland waterway priority axis

Priority project
- Road project
- Railway project
- Logistic centre project
- Inland waterway project
- Airport project

Own production.
Main countries producing emissions of CO₂ (% of world total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Emissions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>24.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>12.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>6.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1.9 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Kyoto Protocol and emissions of CO₂ in the Mediterranean

Countries which have ratified* the agreement with a commitment to limit or reduce emissions of greenhouse effect gases (December 2005)

Degree of compliance with commitments 2003

- Compliance
- Moderate failure to comply: excess of emissions < 10 % in relation to commitment
- Serious failure to comply: excess of emissions between 10 and 30 % in relation to commitment

Countries which have ratified the agreement without obligation to limit or reduce greenhouse effect gases (December 2005)

Countries which have not signed the agreement (December 2005)

CO₂ emissions per capita (tm)

Population (millions)

* Croatia is still waiting to ratify the Protocol.

Own production. Source: WRI, UNFCC and UNDP
Women (education and presence in parliament) (1990-2005)

Difference between enrolment rates for women compared with men
No data
Own production. Source: UNDP, 2005

Parliamentary seats occupied in lower or single chamber (%)

Difference between enrolment rates for women compared with men
No data
Own production. Source: UNDP, 2005
**Map A.13** | Human Development Index (HDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) (2003)

- **Human Development Index**: No data
- **ODA donated** ($ per capita)
- **ODA* received** ($ per capita)
- **Debt service** ($ per capita)

*According to the Committee for Development Assistance of the OECD we cannot talk in terms of ODA in Israel, Libya, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta, but the term Official Aid may be used.

**Map A.14** | Press Freedom

- **Press Freedom Index of Reporters without Borders (2005)**
- **Daily circulation of newspapers per 1,000 inhabitants (2000)**


#### Urban Population (%)

- **1975**
  - Urban population: 24.8
  - Rural population: 10.8

- **2003**
  - Urban population: 36.3
  - Rural population: 14.3

#### Total Population (millions of inhabitants)

- **1990**
  - Urban population: 90
  - Rural population: 90

- **2000**
  - Urban population: 17.1
  - Rural population: 17.1

#### Source:
Own production. Source: UNDP, 2005
Evolution of Fertility

Fertility Rate (number of children per woman)

Evolution of energy consumption

Consumption of energy per capita (kg of oil equivalent)

Evolution of mortality rate for children under 5 years old

Mortality rate of children under 5 years old per 1,000 births

Own production. Source: WB
Map A.17: Tourism and pollution in Mediterranean coastal areas (2000)

Tourists in coastal areas (thousands)

0 100 500 1,000 2,000 5,000 10,000 15,000 30,000 50,000

Critical point of pollution

Retail production. Source: Plan Bleu

National tourism

International tourism

%
Map A.19 | Mediterranean Migration Routes

Routes:
- **Land routes**
- **Maritime routes**
- **Major air routes**

Main areas of entry in the EU:
- Amman
- Istambul
- Ankara
- Tunis
- Maghnia
- Oujda
- Rabat
- Ouarzazate
- Ouargla
- Tamanrasset
- Aswan
- Port Said
- Al Jawf
- Tessalet
- Arlit
- Dirkou
- Ghardaia
- Algiers
- China
- Bangladesh
- Pakistan
- India


---

Net enrolment ratio for primary (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net enrolment ratio</th>
<th>86</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>92</th>
<th>94</th>
<th>96</th>
<th>98</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of pupils in private education (primary) (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of pupils in private education (primary) (2003)</th>
<th>86</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>92</th>
<th>94</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
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<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
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<td>99</td>
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<td>Private</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Catches (thousands of tonnes)

Gulf of Lion

Levant

Sardinia

Tuna (GFCM area)

Marmara

Aegean

Balearics

Ionian

Total GFCM (including Black Sea)

Own production. Source: Fishstat, General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM)/FAO
January 2005

The creation of the EU makes a step forward with the European Parliament’s adoption of the Treaty establishing a European Constitution. In Algeria, the Minister of Home Affairs confirms that the GIA has been disbanded. In Croatia, the President Stipe Mesic wins a second term of office. From the first of January Turkey introduces a new currency. Spanish-Moroccan relations improve with the visit of the King of Spain, whilst Turkish-Greek relations deteriorate following accusations against Turkey for violating Greek territorial waters. At the same time Turkey reopens relations with Israel. The Republic of Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina decides to reinforce its cooperation with the ICTY and simultaneously Serbia and Montenegro attracts European and American criticism for not collaborating with the ICTY.

Spain

• On the 3rd of January, the Prime Minister José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero opposes the “Ibarretxe Plan” describing it as secessionist and anti-constitutional as it suggested a “free association” between Spain and the Basque country. On the 13th of January, Juan José Ibarretxe, the Basque autonomous President, contests Zapatero’s request to withdraw the plan. The Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) threatens to withdraw its support to Zapatero if he opposes the plan, since the minority government needs backing from regional and left-wing groups.

• On the 16th of January the Basque terrorist organisation (ETA) declares to be in favour of negotiating with the government without mentioning an eventual ceasefire. On the 18th of January ETA claims responsibility for a car bomb attack which injures a policeman and on the 30th of January, following a telephone warning, a bomb explodes in Denia, a holiday resort in Southern Spain.
  • On the 17th of January 8 people are sentenced for having given logistic assistance and false documents to some suspects in the attacks of September the 11th 2001 in the United States.

France

• On the 3rd of January the trial of 4 people starts, including the Franco-Algerians Djamel Beghal and Kamel Daoudi, accused of being members of the Al-Qaida cell in Paris responsible for organising attacks against American targets in France. Beghal has supposedly confessed these facts in the United Arab Emirates before being extradited to France, where, he affirms he was forced to confess under torture.

• On the 13th of January, the Minister of Justice Dominique Perben calls for a criminal investigation to be held against the arguments advanced by the leader of the National Front (extreme-right party), Jean-Marie Le Pen. According to these the German occupation in France during the Second World War was benevolent. Such declarations, according to the French press laws, could lead to a prison sentence of up to 5 years.

• Between the 25th and the 29th of January, 12 people are arrested on suspicion of recruiting Muslims to lead the “holy war” against the American forces in the United States.

• On the 27th of January, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) unanimously condemns France for violating the rights of the terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1997. The prisoner was kept in isolate confinement from 1994 to 2002 and again from March 2004 onwards. The accusations, according to which the prisoner was treated in an inhuman and degrading way are dismissed by a vote of 4 to 3.

• On the 31st of January the trial which will establish who was responsible for the fire in the tunnel of the Mont Blanc in 1999 starts. There are 4 companies and 12 people in the dock over involuntary homicide and negligence.

Italy

• On the 10th of January a ban on smoking in public places comes into force throughout the country, causing some protests as it involves fines for the establishments and the smokers who do not abide by the law.

• On the 25th of January the judge Clementina Forleo from the court of Milan dismisses the accusations of terrorism against 4 Tunisians and a Moroccan provoking criticisms from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Vice Prime Minister Gianfranco Fini and the European Commissioner responsible for Justice and Freedom, Franco Frattini. She declares that it is necessary to make a distinction between the defendant’s engagement in guerrilla activities for recruiting militants to fight against the American forces in Iraq and terrorism. On the 28th of January, the Court of Cassation (the Italian Supreme Court) decrees that travelling to Iraq to take part to the insurrections is an act of international terrorism.

• On the 27th of January the trial of 47 people starts, including policemen, doc-
tors, nurses and prison warders, accused of verbally and physically mistreating anti-globalisation protesters during the 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa which left hundreds injured and caused the death of a demonstrator.

- On the 28th of January, the Italian Court of Cassation blocks the extradition of the Moroccan imam Mohammed Rafik to his country, which suspects him of being involved in the Casablanca attacks of May 2003. The judge bases his decision on the risk of Rafik being tortured or killed if extradited to Morocco.

**Malta**

- On the 14th of January, Amnesty International requests to open an inquiry over information received according to which, members of the Maltese armed forces would have inflicted physical abuse on some asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. This happened at the immigration detention centre of the army barracks in Safi as they were peacefully protesting against the length of their detention, the lack of information concerning the development of their demands for refugee status and humanitarian protection. Those who were refused asylum already were complaining about the absence of information regarding their future.

**Slovenia**

- On the first of January Slovenia takes over the presidency of the OSCE for 2005.

**Croatia**

- On the 2nd and 16th of January two rounds of Presidential elections take place. The current President of the Social Democratic Party (SPH), Stipe Mesic, wins a second 5 year term of office.
- On the 4th of January, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mionir Zuzul, is accused of being involved in a corruption scandal and resigns.
- On the 31st of January, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), sentences Lieutenant General Pavle Strugar, former commander of the Yugoslavian navy, to 8 years of prison for not attempting to prevent the attacks on civilians during the bombing of the city of Dubrovnik in 1991.

**Bosnia-Herzegovina**

- On the 8th of January, the President of the Srpska Republic (the Serbian entity in Bosnia), Dragan Cavic, nominates Pero Bukejlovic as Prime Minister. The former Prime Minister resigned at the end of December to protest against the dismissal of Bosnian Serb officials accused of not cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). A few days following Bukejlovic’s nomination, the authorities announce a certain number of measures in order to reinforce cooperation with the ICTY. These include the creation of a team of 8 people on January the 13th with responsibility for verifying whether anyone involved in the murder of over 7,000 civilian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995, still has an official position or is connected with the institutions of Srpska or Bosnian Republic.
- On the 15th of January, for the first time, the authorities of the Srpska Republic hand a war crimes suspect over to the ICTY, the Serbo-Croatian Savo Todovic. The latter is accused of taking part in the management of the Kazneno-Popravni Dom camp, where 300 prisoners were killed during the 1992-1995 war.
- On the 17th of January, the ICTY condemns two Serbo-Croats to 18 and 9 years in prison for their involvement in the Srebrenica massacre.
- On the 17th of January, 300 agents of the Secret Service are dismissed in order to fulfil one of the conditions for joining the NATO and the EU.

**Serbia and Montenegro**

- On the 10th of January, following the assassination of a 16 year old Albanian by customs officers as he attempted to cross the Macedonian border, thousands of people of Albanian origins protest in the streets of Presova. They request that the Serbian military and police units are replaced by international troops in Albanian majority areas.
- On the 13th of January, a Nigerian police officer from the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), is killed in Kosovo as his car explodes. On the 23rd of January, the International Crisis Group declares that the situation in Kosovo is increasingly dangerous and could lead to severe riots or even to a new war.
- On the 14th of January the Kosovo administration, Michael Polt, announces that the United States decided to cut aid to the country and withdraw technical advisers in the Serbian Ministries. They threaten to take other punitive measures if the government continues to challenge the ICTY.
- On the 18th of January, the UN Security Council adopts resolution 1581 (2005) allowing judges from the ICTY to finalise some active cases.
- On the 21st of January, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, postpones his trip to Serbia and Montenegro to discuss the reforms necessary to join the EU, as this country does not cooperate with the ICTY.

**Macedonia**

- On the 18th of January, the European enlargement commissioner, Olli Rehn, declares in front of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee that there could be a new candidate country to join the EU between now and the end of the year if the commission considers Macedonia’s arrangements sufficient. Macedonia is still just a “potential candidate country” at this stage. Rehn announces that starting negotiations with Macedonia is one of his objectives during his term of office ending in 2009. He stresses that progression to candidate country status will depend on the type of answers Macedonia gives to a questionnaire it is filling in, on the quality of its technical measures, on the country’s positive and constant political evolution and on political reforms especially in the judicial field.

**Albania**

- On the 10th of January, the Albanian Parliament adopts a new election law by 99 votes to 140, the first of a series of reforms scheduled to anticipate this summer’s elections. The new law, elaborated with the assistance of experts from the OSCE, intends to resolve problems encountered in the past concerning electoral rolls, constituencies and vote
count. Those in favour of the new law say that it will help to avoid a deadlock such as the one in Ukraine after the second set of Presidential elections which was characterised by frauds, on top of silencing Western Countries’ critics who denounced the irregularities of previous ballots.

Greece

• On the 10th and 14th of January, the Greek High Command denounce that Turkish coast guard patrol boats invaded Greek territorial waters by the islet of Imia (Kardak in Turkish), over which Turkey disputes Greek sovereignty. However, Ankara dismisses these accusations. Over the last months, Greek High command has regularly accused Ankara of violating its national air-space and territorial waters.
• On the 20th of January, the Greek Parliament introduces a law preventing media directors from entering into public contracts. This, according to the government is supposed to fight against the influence played over public life, behind the scenes, by business men who are also press executives. The socialist party (PASOK) votes against it, accusing the government of wishing to distance media directors in favour of the opposition so that conservative business circles can profit from it. Most Greek media, traditionally very partisan, is controlled by half a dozen successful business men otherwise engaged in contracts within the public sector.

Cyprus

• On the 24th of January, the Greek-Cypriot President, Tassos Papadopoulos, nominates Andreas Gavrielides as Minister for Health, after the forced resignation of Constantina Akkelidou, found guilty of interfering with justice by the Court of Nicosia.

Turkey

• On the first of January, Turkey introduces a new currency eliminating 6 zeros off the previous one.
• On the 2nd of January, Turkish security forces, repel an attack by people suspected of being militants from the People’s Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel), who entered the country via Iraq. In January, Turkey, the United States and Iraq meet in Ankara and agree on a mechanism for sharing information as well as discussing ways to cooperate in order to protect Turkey from potential terrorist threats coming from the north of Iraq.
• On the 2nd of January, the President of the Islamist party Virtue, Reaci Kutun, criticises the strict conditions imposed by the EU for Turkey’s entry and requests a Turkish referendum on joining the EU.
• On the 3rd of January, the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign affairs, Abdullah Gül, pays a visit to Israel to discuss the re-launch of Middle East peace negotiations and to restore Israeli-Turkish relations, damaged after Recep Tayyip Erdogan described an Israeli raid on the Palestinian occupied territories as a political blunder. Gül is the highest member of the government to have paid a visit to Israel since the Justice and Development party (AKP) came to power in 2002.
• On the 12th of January, The Guardian announces that Turkey has sent over 1,000 moderate imams to Europe to promote a peaceful interpretation of Islam.

Syria

• From the 24th to the 27th of January, the President Bashar al-Assad goes to Russia to meet President Putin and some senior officials. Both leaders sign a declaration about strengthening their future relations which will be based on friendship and cooperation. According to Israel, Russia sold some advanced missiles to Syria that could be employed to reinforce Hezbollah’s military capacity, a group that Syria supports in Lebanon. On the 25th of January, a spokesperson from the Russian Ministry of Defence declares to the news agency ITAR-TASS that Russia will not sell offensive weapons to Syria.

Lebanon

• On the 28th of January, the Security Council adopts resolution 1583 (2005), prolonging the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon up to the 31st of July 2006. It is the first time that this resolution refers to year 2000 UN report, which states that Shabaa lands are part of Syria and not of Lebanon, undermining Hezbollah’s activities, which the Lebanese government considers to be a resistance movement for national liberation.

Jordan

• On the 4th of January, the Jordan State Security Court, announces the accusation of four Islamists for their implication in a plot intended to attack Western tourists and Israelis as well as some secret services members.
• On the 12th of January, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, travels to Jordan to conduct the first visit in Jordan from a high-ranking official of the Atlantic Alliance. This trip is in line with the Alliance’s efforts to increase the levels of “Mediterranean dialogue”. This is a cooperation program that has been in place for ten years and that NATO was committed to revitalise during its Summit at the end of June in Istanbul. NATO’s intention is to meet this cooperation program to that of the Partnership for Peace (PFP, offered to European countries and to ex-soviet republics in central Asia).

Egypt

• On the 5th of January, diplomats close to the International Atomic Energy Agency declare that the UN Nuclear Watchdog has proof that secret nuclear experiments have been carried out in Egypt, mostly during the 80s and 90s but also last year. These could be used in armament programs. Inspectors do not deem these conclusions alarming enough to require a report from the IAEA Board of Governors.

Libya

• On the 23rd of January, a team of French lawyers from the NGO Lawyers without Borders, goes to Libya to support the defence of five Bulgarian nurses sentenced to death for having infected Libyan children with the AIDS virus.
• On the 29th of January, the French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin declares in an interview with the Tunisian
daily paper Ach-Chourouq that Libya is an “essential contact”, that it should find its place in “le concert des Nations” as well as on the regional map and adds that France encourages the country’s reinsertion programme.

Tunisia

• On the 18th of January, Manuel Marín, President of the Spanish Congress of deputies, pays a visit to Tunisia, in order to strengthen parliamentary relations between the two countries by activating the role of parliamentary friendship groups and organising periodical meetings. During a press conference, before leaving Tunisia, Marín confirms the creation of a friendship group with Tunisia within the Spanish Parliament.

• On the 30th and 31st of January, the French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin pays an official visit to Tunisia. During his talks with the Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his counterpart Mohamed Ghannouchi, he pleads for a collaborative immigration policy, with the aim of an immigration policy that will simultaneously take into account the needs of the host country and those of the country of origin. He declares to be against a unilateral policy based on quotas. In an interview published on the 30th of January in the Tunisian newspaper Le Temps, Raffarin states that France will remain opposed to “the establishment of transit centres outside the EU, notably in Maghreb, to filter candidates for immigration”. Tunisia is also against it. Both countries have approached the terrorism issue in a similar way and Raffarin declares to be “very satisfied” to re-establish the former cooperation between Tunisia and France on this matter. He was also pleased with the exchange of information and the quality of relations between various services related to both countries. Finally, Raffarin declares that France will continue to support Tunisia’s economic and social modernisation.

Morocco

• From the 17th to the 19th of January, the King Juan Carlos of Spain pays an official visit to Morocco, an indication of an improvement in relations between the two countries after years of tensions caused by territorial disputes and by the problem of illegal immigration.

European Union

• On the first of January, Luxembourg takes on the rotating presidency for the next six months. Re-launching the “Lisbon Strategy”, with the objective of making the EU the most competitive area in the world, coming to an agreement on the budget for 2007-2013 and reforming the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) are amongst its priorities.

• On the first of January, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, also becomes the President of Euro Group for two years, the group that brings together the 12 member countries that have adopted the Euro.

• On the 12th of January, the Parliament approves the Treaty instituting a Constitution for the European Union which is adopted by 500 votes in favour to 137 votes against with 40 abstentions. The majority of opponents are members of parliament from the United Kingdom, Poland and the Czech Republic and come from Euro-sceptical political parties. Amongst the arguments against the Constitution, there is the socialist criticism which describes the constitution as being anti-social and the catholic criticism which refers to the Christian origins of European civilisation.

• On the 14th of January, the European Commission announces that it will take Portugal, Greece and Spain to the European Court of Justice for breaching Community provisions on the environment. Portugal is put on the spot for not having created enough natural reserves for wild birds, for having reduced nature reserve surface areas for protected species and for not having implemented European rules on water resources protection. Moreover, the EC urges Lisbon to suspend the building of the Alqueva dam, as it considers it to be detrimental to the environment. If the European Court of Justice agrees with the European Commission, the EU will be entitled to fine its three Member Countries.

• On the 14th of January, Eurodeputies gathered in a plenary session in Strasbourg, re-elect Nikiforos Diamandouros as European Mediator. During his five-year term of office, the mediator particularly intends to set up a single telephone number covering all of the European Union territory to have access to the mediators’ network.

• On the 17th and 18th of January, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (EcoFin), fails once again to agree on SGP reforms. Germany’s proposal is to loosen the public deficit rule (3% of GDP) in order to allow for an excess of the deficit during stagnation of economic growth or during expensive structural reforms. The proposal causes contentions between France and Italy on one side, which are in favour, and on the other the remaining European countries which fulfil the SGP criteria. Moreover, Germany requests that its contribution transfer to the ex-communist Eastern region and the country’s participation to the European budget are taken into consideration when calculating its public deficit. The commissioner for Economic and Monetary affairs, Joaquin Almunia, describes the
German proposal as “constructive” while the EU President, Jean-Claude Juncker, opposes to the exclusion of certain categories of expenses from the SGP calculation and reminds Germany that it is not the only country responsible for European economy.

- On the 18th of January Airbus A380 is unveiled; the model was designed by France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom and will come into service in 2006. With its 800 people capacity, it will be the world’s largest passenger aircraft.
- On the 27th of January, Amnesty International (AI), sends an open letter to the Council and to the Commission to denounce “the alarming situation of asylum seekers within the EU’s own borders”, the police suppression of an asylum seekers’ peaceful demonstration in Malta and a case of torture of both adult and minor afghans in Greece. AI said to be “very concerned” that these violations “have not been addressed by the Council and the Commission”.

February 2005

On the 14th of February, the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri is assassinated and an unknown group claims responsibility for the attack. Suspicions are immediately drawn to Syria and the United Nations set up an investigation commission. The pro-Syrian Lebanese government is ousted under popular pressure. As for the rest of the Middle East, Jordan and Syria sign an agreement putting an end to their border disputes. For the first time since the end of the conflicts, a Serb President visits Kosovo. In Portugal and Cyprus legislative elections are anticipated. Croatia appoints a new Prime Minister and Karolos Papoulias becomes Greece’s new President. As regards to the EU, both the growth and Employment strategy and the European Commission’s President Social and Environmental Agenda receive sharp criticism. Finally, Spain and Slovenia approve the European constitution by referendum.

Portugal

- On the 10th of February, the 127 Portuguese policemen deployed in South Iraq as part of a stabilisation force since November 2003, leave the country.
- On the 20th of February, the Socialist Party (PS) wins the anticipated legislative elections against the Social Democrat Party coalition (PSD) and the People’s Party (PP), currently in power. The PS wins an absolute majority, the first one the party achieved since the restoration of democracy in 1974. These elections are all the more important as the electoral participation is the highest in the last ten years (62%).

Spain

- On the first of February, the Deputies Congress (Lower House) opposes the proposal of the autonomist Basque President, Juan José Ibarretxe, describing it as unconstitutional. This is to organise a referendum in the Basque Country on a statute of “free association” with Spain. Ibarretxe declares that if he wins the regional elections anticipated to be in April, he will go against the Congress’ decision and will organise the referendum. “The plan Ibarretxe intends to increase the region’s autonomy, to set up the Basque country’s own representation in the EU and to create a union with the Southern French Basque region.
- On the first of February, 4 members of a Moroccan family as well as a Spanish citizen are arrested for the attacks of the 11th of March 2004 in Madrid.
- At the beginning of February, the government announces that illegal immigrants who are able to present a work contract and can justify at least six months of residence in Spain, will be eligible for a residence and work permit of up to one year starting from the 7th of February. According to the Prime Minister, these measures will allow Spain to meet the demand for unqualified workers in the country. The opposition party, the Popular Party (PP), as well as France and Germany criticize this decision as it will encourage immigration in Spain and Europe.
- On the 9th of February, a bomb explodes near a conference centre in Madrid where King Juan Carlos is expected a few hours later; 40 people are slightly injured. The Basque terrorist group ETA claims responsibility for this attack. On the 11th and 17th of February, 20 alleged ETA members are arrested.
- On the 20th of February 77% of Spanish people taking part in the Referendum on the European Constitution say “yes” (44% of Spanish people). This is the first referendum on the European Constitution taking place. The Spanish Socialist party in power, the PSOE, as well as the main opposition party, the PP, were in favour of the “yes” campaign. The “no” campaign was conducted by the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and the United Left (IU).

France

- On the 11th of February, an alleged member of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) is arrested, suspected of being involved in the Casablanca attacks of May 2003 and the Madrid attacks of March 2004.
- On the 11th of February, two Corsican nationalists, Gérard Cianelli and Hervé Santelli, are sentenced to 10 and 8 years in prison for the bomb attack aimed at Emile Zuccarelli, the Mayor of Bastia in March 2002.
- On the 24th of February, the Paris Court of Appeal orders Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the National Front Party (FN), to pay a fine of 10,000 euros for encouraging racial hatred against Muslims in an interview given to Le Monde in 2003.
- On the 25th of February, three Islamist militants, amongst which one Pakistani, Ghulam Mustafa, and two French, Hakim Mokhti and Hassan al-Gheguer, are taken to court on suspicion of having helped Richard Reid, who attempted to explode shoe bombs on a Paris-Miami flight in December 2001. A fourth person, described as the Imam of the Mosque in Paris, is accused for breaching the Foreigners’ Law by taking in Reid.
- On the 25th of February, the Minister of the Economy, Finance and Industry, Hervé Gaymard, resigns after the newspaper Le Canard Enchaîné reveals the exorbitant price of his luxury apartment in Paris (14,000 euros per month) paid using public funds.
- On the 28th of February, the National Assembly and the Senate approve modifications to the French Constitution, making it compatible with the European Constitution and also allowing
the possibility of organising a referendum on the above mentioned European Constitution.

Italy

- On the first of February, the former leader of the Sicilian regional government and political ally of Silvio Berlusconi, goes to court accused of having passed on information to the Mafia regarding some official inquiries. On the 18th of February, Moro Mori, Leader of the Italian Republic Civil Secret Service and Segio di Caprio, a high ranking police detective, find themselves summoned to court accused of having helped and supported the Mafia during the arrest of Salvatore Riina, a Sicilian Mafia leader, in 1993.
- On the 14th of February, the European Commission asks Italy for some assurances concerning its intention to authorise foreign buyouts of Italian banks, as the country is suspected of protectionism in the banking sector. The President of the Italian central bank, the Bank of Italy, is accused of hindering foreign companies’ attempts of buying out Italian banks.

Slovenia

- On the first of February, the State House of Assembly (Lower House) ratifies the European Constitution.

Croatia

- On the 17th of February, the House of Representatives (Lower House), approves of a cabinet reorganisation following the resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in January. The current Minister for Integration, Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic, becomes the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the 27th of February, Kitarovic reproaches the EU for having led the opening of Croatia’s entry negotiations to a deadlock by requesting, as a precondition, the arrest of general Ante Gotovina, who is pursued for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). She insists on the fact that Gotovina is not in Croatia.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- On the 15th of February, the Spsrska Republic legislative power approves the new cabinet, presided by Pero Bukejlovic, member of the Serb Democratic Party.
- On the 24th of February, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) accuses two generals from the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), Milan Gvero and Radivoje Miletic, of being involved in the Srebrenica and Zepa war crimes in 1995. Both men submit themselves to the ICTY respectively on the 24th and 25th of February. On the 28th, Ramism Delic, also member of the VRS, submits himself to the ICTY as he is suspected of having breached laws and customs of war. During the war he was responsible for foreign voluntary Muslims found guilty of torturing, assassinating and raping Bosnian-Croat civil prisoners.

Serbia and Montenegro

- On the 2nd of February, Greece extradites Dejan Milenkovic to Serbia, a member of Serbia’s main criminal group, the Zemun Gang, and the key suspect in the assassination of the Serbian Prime Minister in March 2003.
- On the 3rd of February, general Vladimir Lazarevic, accused of war crimes for his actions during the war in Kosovo, submits himself to the Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). This is after meeting the Serbian Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, who is put under increased pressure by the International community to hand over fugitive war criminals.
- On the 13th and 14th of February, the Serbian President Boris Tadic, sets out on an historical visit to Kosovo, the first one by a Serbian President since the NATO bombings in 1999. Tadic affirms once again that Kosovo is Serbian and that its independence is unacceptable.
- On the 22nd of February, the Prime Minister of Montenegro, Miodrag Vlahovic, proposes a virtual independence between Serbia and Montenegro. The day after, the Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica rejects the proposal saying that it violates the Belgrade Agreement (March 2002) on the establishment of the union of Serbia and Montenegro. On the 28th of February, the Minister for Foreign Affairs for Montenegro declares that Montenegro wishes to join NATO and the EU as an independent member and not as part of the confederation.

Albania

- On the 15th of February, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whilst on tour in the Balkans, declares to Tirana that his country is firmly decided on supporting Albania’s entry in NATO’s structures.
- On the 23rd of February, the Albanian justice clears the Prime Minister Fatos Nano of accusations of arms dealing between Albania and Kosovo in 1998. These allegations were made in November 2003 by a deputy from the opposition who could now be charged with defamation.

Greece

- On the 8th of February, the socialist Karolos Papoulias, elected by the Vouli (unicameral legislative parliament), becomes the new President of Greece.
- On the 9th of February, the European Commission suggests giving Greece an extra year (until the end of 2006) to comply with the budget deficit criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact (3% of GDP), before imposing sanctions.

Cyprus

- On the 20th of February, during the anticipated legislative elections in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Turkish Republican Party led by the pro-European Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat returns to power, increasing its seats to 24 out of 50 in the Republican Assembly (unicameral).

Turkey

- On the 2nd of February, experts defuse an explosive packet found in a club in Incirlik, generally frequented by Americans.
- On the 5th of February demonstrations take place in the capital Ankara to protest against American foreign policy, as its presence in Iraq, while the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice starts a two-day visit to Turkey.
- On the 7th of February, the President of the Human Rights Consultancy Council, Ibrahim Kaboglu, and some of his colleagues resign accusing legislative, ju-
dicial and executive powers of hindering their work.

- On the 14th of February, Istanbul Tenth Criminal Court acquits 8 of the 71 people charged for the suicide attacks taken place in Istanbul in November 2003.
- On the 15th of February, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) within the European Council, publishes its report requesting the reduction of the role religion has in Turkey. Amongst other things it proposes to eliminate religion as a compulsory course in schools as well as removing the religious reference from ID cards. On the 16th of February, Sevket Kazan, vice-President of the Islamist Welfare Party, criticises the Justice and Development party currently in power for not seeing the “stratagem against our country”. Kazan declares that this report intends “to separate a nation from its moral values and to extend the crusades to Turkey”.
- On the 22nd of February, during a ministry reorganisation, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan appoints Atilla Koc as the new Minister for Culture and Tourism, as a replacement of Erkan Murcu, a secular liberal from AKP who criticised Erdogan’s attempt to criminalize adultery.
- On the 23rd of February, the Grand National Assembly (GNA-unicameral) grants an amnesty to 677,000 students who were expelled from universities after the 29th of June 2000, some for having refused to remove the Islamic headscarf at university. They will be able to enrol at university again but the ban on wearing the headscarf remains in full force.
- On the 23rd of February, two soldiers are injured during clashes between the Turkish Army and the People’s Defence Force (HPG) in the south-east of the country.

Lebanon

- On the 14th of February, the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri is assassinated in Beirut in a car explosion as his convoy passes by, also causing the death of 16 people and injuring 135. An unknown Islamist Group (Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria) claims responsibility for the attack against Hahiri, which was carried out because of his relations with Saudi Arabia. Even though Syria immediately condemns the attack, the Lebanese opposition parties indicate the Pro-Syrian administration and the Syrian government as responsible for Hahiri’s death. Since his resignation in October 2004, the Prime Minister became increasingly more critical against the Syrian military presence in Lebanon. On the 15th of February, the United States withdraw their ambassador from Syria. On the 16th of February, during Hahiri’s funeral, thousands of people gather together, holding up anti-Syrian slogans and insulting the Pro-Syrian President, Emile Lahoud. On the 18th of February, the opposition groups call for an “independence uprising” and requests for Lahoud Pro-Syrian regime to step down in order to set up a new government which will organise a Syrian military pullout. Following this declaration, thousands of people in favour of the opposition group together in the centre of Beirut, where they stay throughout the month of February. On the 21st of February, during a visit to Brussels, the American President G. W. Bush requests that Syria withdraws its troops from Lebanon. On the 24th of February, the Lebanese Minister of Defence, Abed Al-Rahim Murad, announces that he reached an agreement with Syria for the withdrawal of all of its troops to the valley of Bekaa, in line with the 1989 Taif Agreement which put an end to the Lebanese civil war. On the 25th of February, the assistant of Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Walid al-Mu’alim, declares that the Syrian government is ready to cooperate with the UN in order to apply resolution 1559 (2004) which requests the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. He adds, however, that it will be the Lebanese government and Security Services’ responsibility to ensure that internal security is maintained. On the same day, a UN team, presided by the Irish Peter Fitzgerald, starts an investigation commission on Hahiri’s assassination. On the 27th of February, the Lebanese government of Prime Minister Umar Karami steps down under popular pressure. On the same day, during a heated parliamentary session, some deputies from the opposition accuse the Karami government of having organised Hahiri’s assassination.

Syria

- On the 16th of February, the Syrian Prime Minister Mohammed Naji al-Itri, meets the First Vice-President of Iran Mohammed Reza Aref. The two decide to stand together against the threat of Americans who see them as the main obstacles to the establishment of peace and democracy in the Middle East. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Assistant, Walid al-Mu’alim, while explaining the nature of Syria’s relationship with Iran, declares to the London based newspaper Al-Hayat, that this is a strategic bond and not an alliance against a third state.

Jordan

- On the 22nd of February, the King of Jordan Abdallah II, begins a European tour in Spain centred on Near East developments.
- On the 28th of February, Jordan and Syria sign an agreement resolving a long frontier dispute by exchanging lands on their communal borders. Moreover, Syria and Jordan sign an agreement on fighting against drugs traffic and organised crime as well as another 19 treaties in the fields of culture, agriculture, commerce and transport.

Egypt

- On the first of February, Mohammed Abdel Rahman Badawi, a key suspect in the October 2004 attack on Sinai, is killed during a confrontation between the police and Islamists in the mountains near Ain Sudr. On the 22nd of February, a Human Rights Watch report declares that the estimated 2,400 people arrested without charge following the October 2004 attack, were victims of torture and inhumane treatment.
- On the 27th of February, President Hosni Mubarak announces important democratic reforms. While up to now the President was not elected directly but selected by legislative power and submitted to a referendum, the reform modifying article 76 of the constitution will
allow more candidates to come forward for the Presidential elections taking place at the end of 2005. Once approved, the amendment of article 76 will be subject to a referendum.

**Libya**

- On the 5th of February, the French Minister of Defence Michele Alliot-Marie, goes to Libya to re-launch a military cooperation which used to be productive but was spoilt by the years of embargo. Alliot-Marie and her Libyan equivalent, Abou Bakar Younes Jaber, sign a master agreement establishing their future relations with regards to strategic communication, military cooperation and weaponry issues.
- On the 6th of February, the Italian Minister of Internal Affairs Giuseppe Pisano, during a business trip to discuss immigration issues, reasserts the Italian government intention of assisting Tripoli to find solutions geared towards promoting legal immigration as well as stopping clandestine immigration from its origins. This includes a firm suppression against clandestine organisations responsible for it.
- On the 10th of February, the American Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, William Burns, at the end of his visit to Tripoli, reaffirms the United States objective to totally restore normal diplomatic relations with Libya. On the 11th of February, the United States and Libya lift restrictions preventing each other’s diplomats from visiting their soil.

**Tunisia**

- On the 8th of February, Tunisia and Algeria inaugurate a “collective memory” museum in the bordering city of Gharr-dimaou (North Eastern Tunisia).
- On the 13th of February, the first private Tunisian television channel starts broadcasting.
- On the 14th and 15th of February, a seminar takes place in Tunis regarding the “dismantlement of the Multifiber Agreement and its repercussions on the economies of the countries in the Arab Maghreb Union”; this was organised by the Arab Maghreb Union and the African Economic Commission. Tunis seminar participants are unanimous: Maghreb countries have to work together to guarantee the survival of their textile-clothing sector and to preserve their market shares.
- On the 22nd of February, the “International Freedom of Expression Exchange” (IFEX), a large network of associations campaigning for the freedom of the press, accuses Tunisia of banning newspapers, closing internet sites, imprisoning people because of their opinions or press activities and of resorting to torture.

**Algeria**

- At the beginning of February, the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was appointed honorary President of the main pro-governmental party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), putting an end to almost two years of internal disputes within the party between those in favour of Bouteflika and those supporting the former President Ali Benflis.
- At the beginning of February, the President appoints former President Ahmed Ben Bella as leader of the National Commission for a General Amnesty (CNAG), which is responsible for the amnesty of Islamist rebels.

**Morocco**

- On the 14th of February, for the first time King Mohammed VI appoints a civilian, Yassine Mansouri, as head of the General Directorate of Studies and Documentation (DGED), the Moroccan counter-espionage service.
- On the 17th of February, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) get together in Rabat. This meeting, which coincides with the 16th anniversary of UMA’s creation in 1989, is dedicated to analysing the regional group’s renewal prospects.

**European Union**

- On the 2nd of February, the President of the European Commission (EC) José Manuel Durao Barroso, reveals the European Union Growth and Employment Strategy up to 2010. This strategy is described as being neoliberal and excessively “pro-market”. One of the strategy’s most controversial proposals, which Germany and France oppose, concerns the liberalisation of services providing that anyone or any company can offer its services in another European country as long as they respect the rules of their country of origin (with the exception of public services). On the 9th of February, Durao Barroso presents a Social and Environmental Agenda to complement the Strategy. This envisages the promotion of collective negotiation, a greater role given to trade unions in companies’ decisions and greater environmental responsibilities for big enterprises. This agenda is criticised for having an “anti-business” orientation.
- On the 16th of February, the EC decides to allocate 8 million euros to finance information campaigns on the Constitution in those member countries that are least informed. Eurosceptic parliamentarians condemn this decision describing it as propaganda.
- On the 16th of February, the Party of European Socialists (PSE) accuses the EC President Barroso of compromising the EC’s independence by turning up in the Portuguese elections supporting his former Party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD).
- On the 17th of February, disagreements continue within the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (EcoFin) on the Stability and Growth Pact and particularly on the criteria fixing the public deficit threshold to 3% of the GDP. Luxembourg presidency will have to draw up one last reform proposal between now and March.

**March 2005**

Anti-Syrian demonstrations continue in Lebanon while the United Nations fact-finding inquiry report makes Syria indirectly responsible for the death of the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. In France, the National Liberation Front of Corsica – The Fighter’s Union (FNLC-UC) suspends its ceasefire. In Italy, the Senate approves a controversial constitutional reform that reinforces the Prime Minister’s powers and increases regions’ autonomy. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian-born President is dismissed from presidency and the Prime Minister in Kosovo resigns to submit him-
self to the ICTY. The EU postpones opening entry negotiations with Croatia and accuses Turkey of human rights violation. In Algeria, the fact-finding inquiry on disappearance cases during the civil war excludes any State responsibility.

Portugal

- On the 4th of March, the Prime Minister José Socrates (Socialist Party PS) announces the composition of his cabinet which will be approved on the 12th of March. Two independents are appointed to two vital roles: Diego Freitas do Amaral, who was Minister of Defence and President of the UN General Assembly and who is very critical of the American foreign policy, is appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Luís Campose Cunha, former vice governor of the Portuguese Central Bank and renowned for his fiscal conservatism, becomes Minister of Finance.
- On the 22nd of March, the Assembly of the Republic introduce reforms which intend to modernise the economy, bring back the 150,000 jobs lost under the previous government, achieve a 3% increase in the annual GDP, raise internal investments and improve infrastructure.

Spain

- On the 8th of March, the Moroccan Jaouad el Bourouiti, suspected of having collaborated with the perpetrators of the Madrid attacks on the 11th of March 2004, is arrested. On the 18th and 19th of March, two brothers of Spanish nationality, suspected of having hidden kamikazes in safe locations, are arrested.
- On the 11th of March, following the inquiry on the Madrid attacks which brought to light the faults within the co-ordination of security forces, the government introduces a series of measures in order to reinforce the security of the country against terrorist threats. The Civil Guard, the Police and the National Intelligence Centre will be linked together by a single command and will have to share their information. 1,000 supplementary officers and 130 translators from Arab countries will be employed.

France

- On the first of March, President Jacques Chirac promulgates an environmental charter which gives constitutional force to rights and obligations arising from the need of protecting the environment.
- On the 10th of March, the National Liberation Front in Corsica — The Fighter’s Union (FNLC-UC), the main secessionist movement on the island, suspends the ceasefire observed since November 2003 after the opening of the trial of 22 nationalists from Corsica. Amongst these was the suspected commander of FNLC-UC, Charles Pieri accused of extortion, embezzlement, of financing terrorism and associating with criminals in a terrorist plot. On the 11th of March, a bomb explodes outside a government building in Ajaccio, injuring 5 people.
- On the 10th of March, the son of former President François Mitterrand, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, is the object of a judicial investigation for having profited from embezzlement in Angola’s arms trade case.
- On the 15th of March, a court of Paris sentences two French men of Algerian origin, Djamel Baghal et Kamel Daoudi, to 10 and 9 years of prison respectively for being members of an Al-Qaida cell that was planning an attack against American targets in France. Another 4 people have been condemned to prison sentences going from 1 to 6 years. During the trial, the court finds out that the person in charge of carrying out the suicide attack against the American embassy was the Tunisian professional footballer, Nizar Trabelsi, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison for similar offences in Belgium.
- On the 21st of March in Paris the trial of 47 businessmen and politicians starts, amongst which are the former ministers Michel Giraudeau, Miehe Roussin and Guy Drut, accused of fraudulent party financing under the mandate of Jacques Chirac (1977–1995), who at the time was the mayor of the city of Paris.
- On the 29th of March in Paris, the trial of three French of Maghreb origin and an Algerian starts, accused of having helped the assassins of Ahmed Shah Masud, the Northern Afghan Alliance commander.
- On the 29th of March, the senate introduces a law that raises the minimum legal age for marriage from 15 to 18 years in an attempt to fight against forced marriages within the muslim community and other immigrant communities.

Italy

- On the first of March, official statistics show that the public deficit has reached 3% of the GDP, the maximum threshold authorised by the EU Stability and Growth Pact.
- On the 3rd of March, the government majority within the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House) stops a proportion of legislative reforms on financial regulation which intends to prevent any enterprise fraud, following the Parmalat scandal in 2004. The government rejects the amendments to the law on false accounts, introduced not long after Berlusconi came to power. The opposition parties believe that the amendment suppression supports Berlusconi’s economic interests.
- On the 4th of March a diplomatic crisis erupts between the United States and Italy after American troops shoot Nicola Calipari, an Italian Secret Services agent, just after he rescued the hostage Giuliana Sgrena in Iraq. On the same day, the American President G. W. Bush expresses his regrets in a telephone call to the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi promising to conduct an inquiry to establish the exact circumstances of Calipari’s death. The incident relaunches requests to withdraw the Italian troops from Iraq. On the 15th of March Berlusconi announces that Italian soldiers will leave in September 2005, then retracts his statement two days later.
- On the 13th of March, a bomb placed by the “Unabomber”, a serial bomb planter, explodes in a church in Treviso injuring a young child.
- On the 15th of March, Cinzia Banelli, a member of the Red Brigades is sentenced to 16 years in prison for being involved in the murder of a government councillor in 2002.
- On the 17th of March, an Advocate General from the Court of Justice for the European Communities declares that the enterprise tax known under the
name of Irap is illegal because of its similarity to VAT. The Finance Minister announces the tax abolition.

- On the 23rd of March, the Senate (Higher House) approves a controversial constitutional reform which reinforces the Prime Minister’s executive power, leading to the senate’s federalisation and increases the autonomy of the 20 Italian regions. On the same day, the Minister of Administration Reform and of Decentralisation, Roberto Calderoli, a member of the Northern League, retracts his threat of withdrawing from the governmental coalition, which he made because of the time taken to introduce the above mentioned reform. The opposition parties criticise this reform which allows the Prime Minister to disband the legislative authority and to dismiss Ministers.

Croatia

- On the 16th of March, the European Union Ministers of Foreign Affairs decide to postpone entry negotiations with Croatia which were due to start on the following day. This is because of the country’s lack of cooperation with the Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) General Ante Gotovina’s arrest. No new date is proposed for the beginning of negotiations. While Croatia reaffirms that Gotovina is not in the country, the ICTY declares that it cannot rely on Croatia’s full cooperation for as long as Gotovina is not submitted to the ICTY. Austria, Hungary and Slovenia favour the opening of negotiations to congratulate Zagreb on reforms made. However the majority of states are opposed to it, amongst these are France, The Netherlands, The United Kingdom and Germany.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- On the 9th of March, there is the official inauguration of a special court in Sarajevo, to which the Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) will transfer a certain number of trials. Croatia is the first country in the region to be entrusted independent judgement in these affairs. Little by little this court’s international judges and attorneys will be replaced by Bosnian professionals.

- On the 11th of March, the former Minister of Internal Affairs of the Sprska Republic (Bosnian Serb entity), Mico Stanisic, submits himself to the ICTY, as suspected of being involved in the permanent relocation and ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs between April and December in 1992 on what was to become the “Serbian State” territory.

- On the 14th of March, Gojko Janjic, the leader of a paramilitary group responsible for invading the city of Foca in Bosnia in 1992, who contributed to the realisation of “rape camps”, gives himself in to the ICTY after taking refuge in Moscow for 4 years. He was accused of crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war.

- On the 23rd of March, former Bosnian Serb general, Vinko Pandurevic, is transferred to the ICTY, accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the laws and customs of war and of being involved in the Srebrenica massacre of 1995.

- On the 29th of March, the High Representative of the International Community, Lord Paddy Ashdown, dismisses the Croatian-born President Dragan Coic, from the tripartite presidency established in October 2002. The day after, Covic is sentenced for corruption activities committed before being appointed as President.

Serbia and Montenegro

- On the 7th of March, general Momcilo Perisic, the Yugoslav Army former High Command Leader from August 1993 to November 1998, submits himself to the Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as he is accused of crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war because of crimes committed by his troops in Bosnia and Croatia, amongst which the Srebrenica attacks on civilians.

- On the 8th of March, Ramush Haradinaj, the Prime Minister of the disputed Serbian province of Kosovo, resigns to submit himself to the ICTY that accuse him of crimes against humanity, violations of the laws and customs of war for actions committed against Serbian, Albanians and Roma between March and September 1999 in Kosovo. He pleads not guilty. On the 23rd of March, the Assembly elects Bajram Kosume to replace him.

- On the 15th of March, Kosovo’s President, Ibrahim Rukova survives an assassination attempt.

Macedonia

- On the 15th of March, the Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in its first conviction in Macedonia, takes to court Ljube Boskovski, the former Minister of Internal Affairs and Johan Tarculovski, a former Macedonian policeman and the bodyguard of the past President Boris Trajkovski. The two men are accused of violating the laws and customs of war during confrontations between Macedonian security forces and Albanian rebels in Jubotno near Skopje at the beginning of August which cost 10 Albanian lives. Ljube Boskovski and Johan Tarculovski are transferred to the detention unit of the ICTY respectively on the 24th and 16th of March.

- On the 13th and 28th of March the local elections take place for mayors and district council members. This is the first test for the reforms established in the Ohrid Agreement, which put an end to the Albanian insurrection requesting more autonomy for the Slavs in the country. The OSCE elections observation mission denounced numerous irregularities during both rounds of voting.

Greece

- On the 18th of March, the budget deficit official figures indicate a shortfall of 6.1% of the GDP, well over the government predictions (5.3%) and the maximum threshold provided in the EU Stability and Growth Pact (3%). The difference from the predictions is due to excessive expenses incurred during the organisation of the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. This is the highest deficit in the Euro-zone since the introduction of the Euro in 1999. On the 29th of March, in order to reduce its external deficit, Greece increases its indirect taxes on cigarettes and alcohol and raises VAT from 18 to 19%.
Cyprus

- On the 4th of March, following the February legislative elections, the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Rauf Denktash, brings Mehmet Ali Talat (Republican Turkish Party CTP-pro-European) back to his Prime Minister role. On the 8th of March, the President accepts Talat’s decision on maintaining the coalition with the Democrat Party (DP-anti-European). On the 16th of March the new government receives the vote of confidence of the Republican Assembly by 29 votes to 19.

Turkey

- On the 4th of March, security forces kill 2 members of the People’s Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel) and arrest 3 others in the cities of Sirnak and Mardin. On the same day, Kurdish People’s Defence Forces (HPG) kills four soldiers in the Gabor mountains. On the 5th of March, the HPG kills a policeman in the Mardin district.
- On the 7th of March, the EU officially condemns Turkey for the disproportionate use of force by the anti-riot police, who employed truncheons and tear gas to disperse a group of women and young people during a non-authorised demonstration in Istanbul on International Women’s Day. The Enlargement commissioner, Olli Rhen, visiting Turkey during these events, raises doubts on Turkey’s intention to implement the reform process before going into the negotiation phase for joining the EU.
- On the 13th of March, 3,000 people, amongst which representatives of European Youth Organisations, get together for the Turkish Communist Party initiative to protest against the EU and the United States.
- On the 26th of March, according to The Guardian, Erdogan takes the satirical magazine Penguen to court for the caricatures depicting him.
- On the 29th of March, Rhen announces that Turkey consents to sign a protocol which extends the customs agreement with the EU to the ten new members including the Greek part of Cyprus. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, however, specifies that he will not recognise the Greek Cypriot government until the division of Cyprus Island is settled.

Syria

- On the 9th of March, thousands of Syrians demonstrate in the streets of Damascus in support of their President Bashar al-Assad, who is increasingly pressured by the international community to withdraw his troops from Lebanon, since the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, on the 14th of February.
- On the 10th of March, violent confrontations erupt while hundreds of students and members of pro-governmental youth groups attack demonstrators asking for a reduction of the state of emergency which has been in place for the last 42 years.

Lebanon

- Throughout the month of March, the international community pressure demanding the withdrawal of all Syrian troops and security agents intensifies. On the first of March, the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the French Minister of Foreign affairs, Michel Barnier, during a meeting in London supporting Palestinian Authority, demand an immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. The following day, the American President makes a similar declaration and adds that all countries in the world speak unanimously and demand the Syrian troops pullout. He then says that Syria has to withdraw before the Lebanese elections in May. On the 3rd of May, the heir prince of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz, warns Syria that generally benefits from Saudi support, that if the country does not withdraw from Lebanon it will suffer the consequences in its relationship with Saudi Arabia. On the 5th of March, whilst talking to the Syrian People’s Assembly (unicameral legislative), al-Assad announces that Syrian troops will pull back in the Bekaa Valley, in the East of Lebanon, before moving to the border. This is in compliance with the Taif Accord, the 1989 agreement on national reconciliation which is in line with the 2004 UN Security Council 1559 Resolution. On the 7th of March, with the Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, the Syrian leader agrees that the pullout in the Valley will be carried out at the end of March and that a military committee will be put in place to administer operations. While for many in the Lebanese opposition the pullout of Syrian secret services (mekhabarat) is more important than the pullout of troops.
- Al-Assad does not mention Syrian military secret agents in his withdrawal plan. Throughout the month of March, anti-Syrian demonstrators maintain their presence in Martyrs square in the centre of Beirut. The Lebanese opposition political class multiplies its requests to Hezbollah to join the “Intifada for Independence” ranks (also called Cedar Revolution), which unites Christians, Druzes and Sunnite Muslims. The Hezbollah refuse, organising a pro-Syrian demonstration on the 8th of March, which will make history as one of the greatest gatherings the country has ever had. On the 14th of March, the opposition organises a rally to mark the first month gone by since Hariri’s assassination. On the 16th of March, the International Herald Tribune reports that Syrian secret agents are starting to evacuate their headquarters located in the Ramlet al-Baida district in the centre of Beirut. On the 24th of March, the UN report regarding Hariri’s assassination makes Syria responsible for the politically tense situation preceding Hariri’s murder, without saying, however, that the country is responsible for the attack itself. The report mentions the threats made by President al-Assad against Hariri if he opposed to prolonging the Lebanese President mandate. It also criticises the Lebanese government for its lack of effort in establishing the truth on Hariri’s assassination and requests that an independent board of enquiry is put in place. The report later adds that the board will not be able to function efficiently if the current Lebanese Security Service leadership remains in force. The Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs criticises the report, while President Lahoud asks the UN to do what is necessary to establish the truth. Outside the Arab League Summit, the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi, defends the role played by Syria in Lebanon and accu-
On the 10th of March, President Lahoud reappoints Prime Minister Umar Karami to his position, as the opposition was not capable of agreeing on a common candidate to replace him. Karami suggests to the opposition to form a unity government, which the opposition refuses until all Syrian troops leave the country and an international enquiry is put in place to investigate Hariri’s assassination and the Lebanese high ranking security service officials are replaced. On the 30th of March Karami announces to the President that he has failed to create a new cabinet.

On the 18th, 23rd and 26th of March three bombs explode in some Christian districts of Beirut killing three people and injuring another 17. On the 20th of March, the Druze opposition leader accuses Pro-Syrian groups of bringing disorder.

On the 8th of March, some Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli officials decide to renew their joint efforts to fight against the ecological disaster present in the river Jordan. No agreement is reached on key elements of restoration of the water supply, which in the past 50 years decreased from 1.3 billion cubic metres to less than 100 million, of which over 20 million is untreated sewage.

On the 20th of March, the State Security Court condemns in absence the Jordanian Abu Misab Zarqawi, the Al-Qaeda leader responsible for the holy war in Iraq, to 15 years of prison for terrorist conspiracy.

On the 22nd of March, Jordan withdraws its ambassador from Iraq, after Iraqi Shiite Muslims accused the country of letting Sunni militants enter Iraq. These criticisms follow an attack committed by a Jordanian on the 28th of February in the Shiite city of Hilla, which caused 125 deaths. Shiite Iraqi politicians demand the Jordanian Monarchy, which in the 80’s was close to Saddam Hussein’s regime dominated by Sunnis, apologise for the attack, compensate the victims’ families, arrest and extradite the Iraqi officials from Saddam’s former regime who are taking refuge in Jordan.

Egypt

On the 12th of March, the leader of the opposition party Al Ghad, Ayman Nur, who was accused of counterfeiting signatures necessary for the official recognition of his party in January, is released on bail. On his way out of prison he declares that he will stand in the Presidential elections. However, on the 22nd of March, the prosecutor announces that Ayman Nur will be taken to court accused of counterfeiting.

On the 27th of March, the Muslim Brotherhood organises a demonstration in front of the legislative buildings in Cairo, to request political reforms. The police arrests 230 members and supporters.

Libya

On the 22nd and 23rd of March, during the Arab League meeting, the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Al Gaddafi, declares that he will not succumb to Western pressure and that he will not forgive the Bulgarian nurses who are accused, together with a Palestinian doctor, of having deliberately infected 426 children with the AIDS virus. On the 29th of March the 5 Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor appeal against their death sentence in front of a Libyan court.

Tunisia

At the beginning of March, in the framework of the organisation of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) by the United Nations in Tunis, the violations of human rights increase. On the first of March, Mohammed Abbou, lawyer and member of the National Council for Liberties in Tunisia (CNLT), is arrested. In an Internet article Mohammed Abbou criticised the invitation to attend the WSIS made by the government to the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon at the end of February as well as the persistent torture of Tunisian political prisoners. On the 2nd of March, plain-clothes policemen physically assault several lawyers gathered outside the Tunis Palace of Justice, for protesting against the arrest of Mohammed Abbou. On the 4th of March police forces assault numerous people, amongst which are human rights defenders, during a demonstration called by political parties and independent non-governmental organisations who wished to protest against the authorities’ refusal to grant them authorisation to hold their meeting. On the 7th of March, the police forcefully break into Tunis Tribunal, where around fifty lawyers defend Abbou. On the 9th of March, at request of the National Bar, the majority of 1,400 Tunisian lawyers go on strike in order to denounce the police’s forceful entry in their offices. At the beginning of March, during various demonstrations protesting against the invitation made to Sharon, the police injure six people amongst which is Radhia Nasraoui, lawyer and human rights campaigner, who openly criticised Abbou’s arrest. On the 10th of March, students go on general strike, which leads to clashes with the forces of law and order especially in some university institutions in the capital. In a communication brief, the Democratic progressist Party (PDP/ opposition) denounces the repression caused by the student insurrection and demand the release of students arrested. Authorities point out that the invitation addressed to the Israeli Prime Minister is not of a bilateral nature, specifying that he was invited just as all the United Nations member countries’ leaders were.

On the 4th of March, the General Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Rodrigo Rato, says goodbye to the “success story” of Tunisian economy which has to prepare itself, according to him, to confront new challenges, especially in the textile sector.

On the 19th of March, the representatives of eight parties (4 Tunisian parties of which two are legal and two are unrecognised, three Moroccan parties and one Algerian) get together in Tunis to discuss the theme “For an Arab Maghreb Union freed of political prisoners”. They demand that Arab prisons are emptied of detainees in this category, that the latter’s individual and public freedom is respected and that their governments respond to the Arab masses’ hopes for democracy, whose absence, according to them, represents the main obstacle to the region’s development and to the realisation of complementarity and union. Nevertheless, they record the progresses made by...
Morocco with regards to establishing truth and equity.

- On the 29th of March, on the occasion of the official visit to Tunis of the Turkish Prime Minister M. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, both countries express their determination to develop their commercial relations. Tunisian Prime Minister, M. Ghannouchi, asks Tunis and Ankara to join their efforts to promote the textile industry so to protect their market share from external markets, especially the European one.

Algeria

- On the 21st of March, President Bouteflika meets the King of Morocco Mohamed VI outside the Arab summit in Alger, in order to prepare the AMU summit. The presence of King Mohamed VI in Alger is a major diplomatic event for Maghreb as no Moroccan sovereign has visited Algeria in the past 14 years.
- On the 26th of March, Islamist rebels from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), kill two soldiers in an ambush set up in the East of Alger.
- On the 31st of March, an inquiry commission appointed by the government regarding cases of disappearance, concludes that members of the Algerian secret forces are responsible for the disappearance of 6,146 civilians during the civil war in the 90s. It also specifies that the agents in question acted on their own initiative and not under the state orders. The inquiry, conducted over 12 months, draws on the State’s leader national reconciliation policy.

Morocco

- On the 6th of March, Watanouna (Our Nation), a network of non-governmental organisations, organises a demonstration in Morocco bringing together 30,000 people (artists, NGO, opposition members...). This is to claim for international support for the efforts shown to obtain the liberation of Moroccan prisoners of war from the independentist movement sahraoui, in Tindouf, Western Algeria, at the border with Western Sahara. Demonstrators urge Algeria to release militaries and denounced the human rights violations and acts of torture committed in the Sahrawis refugee camps. Encouraged by Moroccan authorities, Watanouna addresses a petition to the UN signed by over 500,000 Moroccans requesting the prisoners’ liberation.

European Union

- On the first of March, a regulation providing a common judicial area in terms of family law, comes into force. All the EU members except for Denmark take part to it.
- On the 8th of March, International Women’s Day, Vladimir Spidila, Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, announces the creation of the European Institute for Gender Equality.
- On the 22nd and 23rd of March, the Brussels European Council makes two decisions marking the victory of the Franco-German axis. Firstly, the European Council sanctions the Finance Minister’s decision of softening rules of the European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), just as France and Germany wished. Consequently, no sanction can be taken towards a state that violates the 3% deficit criteria, whether it is confronting economic recession or a period of persistent slow growth. Moreover, as per certain expenses financing education, research, defence, external aid, and every expense contributing to “Europe’s unification” (a German request for its unification), they will be excluded from the calculation of public deficit. Finally, the period admitted to remedy excessive deficit, changes from 1 to 2 years and can be extended to 2 supplementary years if the economic situation during excessive deficit proceedings has negative effects on the budget. These reforms are criticised by countries respecting the SGP rules and the European Central Bank which fears that these reforms would not lead to an inflation and would make necessary to raise the euro zone interest rates. The European Council’s second decision regards the refusal of the European Community (EC) directive project for the liberalisation of the services sector (Balkenstein directive). France and Germany oppose it as it would weaken the European Social Model. According to the States opposed to the directive, the “country of origin criteria” will favour the poorer new member states and result in “social dumping in richer European States”. Finally, the European Council introduces the Growth and Employment Strategy by the EC President, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, to re-launch the Lisbon Strategy which intends to make Europe the most competitive economic area in the world by 2010.
- On the 23rd of March, President Chirac declares that the budget reduction (4.6 billion euros per year), which the United Kingdom benefits from since 1984, is no longer necessary. The Minister of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Jack Straw, replies that he will exercise his veto against any attempt to erase the British rebate. The EC President, Durao Barroso, proposed that the British rebate is replaced by a “generalised corrective mechanism”, through which other net contributor countries are equally eligible to reimbursements, this would lead to a decrease of the British rebate. According to Durao Barroso, these measures are justified by the fact that the United Kingdom, which in 1989 had the third lowest GDP, today has a higher GDP in comparison to other net contributors to the European budget (Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden) and that the extended European Union includes much poorer countries than the United Kingdom.

Arab League

- On the 22nd and 23rd of March, the Arab League holds a summit in Alger, in Algeria. Only 13 out of 22 leaders are present and few resolutions are introduced. Even though the crisis in Lebanon is not mentioned in the final text, Syria finds itself supported in its policy against “foreign intervention”. Sovereigns and State leaders insist on the need to pursue the development and modernisation procedure in order to concentrate on democratic practice, the enlargement of political participation, the promotion of human rights and the role of women in society. They also call for the revitalization of common mechanisms of action as well as the re-launch of economic partnership projects. As per the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, General Secretary Amr Mohamed Musa declares that “commitments have to be made in return for disengagement.
April 2005

While the Egyptian government faces increasing pressures for political reforms, Egypt is shaken up by a terrorist attack in Cairo, which causes 21 deaths. In the Near-East, Syria leaves Lebanon definitely; where a new government is set up under Najib Mikati’s leadership and in a Christian district of the capital four bombs explode in two weeks. In Italy, the Prime Minister Berlusconi forms a new government after resigning, following his governmental coalition defeat in the regional elections. In Maghreb, for the first time in 14 years, Tunisia accepts to authorise Human Right Watch to visit its prisons, suspected of keeping prisoners in prolonged isolation. In Turkey, 40 soldiers die in the most violent confrontations with Kurdish rebels since the PKK announced its ceasefire in 2003. Again in Turkey, the government accepts to put in place a Turkish-Armenian commission of historians which will discuss the issue of Armenian genocide. Finally, in the TRNC, Mehmet Ali Talat becomes the new President.

Spain

- On the first of April, Belgium extradites Youssef Belhadj, an Al-Qaeda spokesman who claimed responsibility for the Madrid attacks of 11th of March 2004, to Spain. On the same day 12 people are arrested in the country, suspected of being connected with Islamic activism and of being involved in the Madrid attacks. Four of the suspects are linked to Belhadj, while the others are suspected of being associated with Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, the Madrid attacks’ leader who exploded himself in an apartment in the suburbs of Madrid in April 2004.
- On the 21st of April, the Cortes (Lower House) introduces a bill allowing marriage between partners of the same sex. This makes Spain the fourth country in the world to introduce such law. This law was a PSOE electoral promise. On the 22nd of April, the Vatican condemns this decision, which was also strongly criticised by the conservative opposition.
- On the 22nd of April, the trial of 24 men accused of being members of the Al-Qaeda network starts. Three of the accused are suspected of being directly involved with the September 11th attacks in the United States, amongst these Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, Al-Qaeda’s leader in Spain. This trial represents the culmination of an 8 year investigation conducted by the judge Baltasar Garzon.

France

- On the 6th of April, Amnesty International (AI) presents its report entitled “France: The Search for Justice” in which AI accuses French police of using excessive force, acts of bad treatment and torture, of carrying out illegal homicides especially against Arabs and blacks and of being guilty of racial abuses. AI highlights the impunity resulting from these acts in the French system.
- On the 7th of April, Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), announces the French Council for the Muslim Religion President’s nominations: Abderrahmane Dahmane, as national secretary responsible for relations with immigration communities and Ahmed Guenad, Muslim businessman, at the UMP Executive Council. These nominations intend to modernise the UMP and to open it to all communities.
- On the 8th of April, an alleged member of the terrorist “Chechen cell” based in France, is put under judicial investigation. On the 24th of April, the Moroccan Said al-Maghrebi is arrested, suspected of recruiting French Muslims to join the insurrection against American forces in Iraq. On the 29th of April, Nouari Khiai confirms the judicial questioning of Zoubir Harabouai and Farez Massaoudi, suspected of financing Islamic terrorism by borrowing funds with the pretence of creating an IT firm and then declaring it bankrupt.
- On the 14th of April, President Jacques Chirac affirms that he will not resign in the eventuality of a negative vote in the European Constitution referendum. On the other hand, the Minister of Internal Affairs Dominique de Villepin, declares that whatever the result of the referendum, some political changes are required. On the 26th of April, the German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder visits Paris in order to give his support to the “yes” campaign of his French counterpart.

Italy

- On the 3rd and 4th of April, regional legislative elections take place in 20 regions, marking the defeat of the governmental coalition of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, against the centre-left coalition which wins in 11 regions against 2 for Berlusconi. On the 14th of April, negotiations within the governmental coalition to confront the defeat conclude with the withdrawal of the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats, because of Berlusconi’s refusal to revise the coalition programme or call for anticipated elections. On the 19th of April, the leader of National Alliance threatens to withdraw its party from the coalition. On the 20th of April, Berlusconi resigns. The following day, however, the President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi asks him to form a new government which goes into power on the 23rd of April. The new government, which retains 19 of the 23 ministers in their posts, sets as its priority to support the expansion of businesses, encourages economic growth and improves Southern
Italians’ living standards. It also creates a Development and Cohesion Ministry, responsible for encouraging relations between the North and the South of the country.

- On the 26th of April, Fininvest, Berlusconi’s company, announces a 51% to 34% reduction of its holdings in the multimedia company Mediaset, which owns 3 television channels and considering that Berlusconi is the head of government, and can control the public channels (RAI), this allows Berlusconi to have an influence on 90% of the Italian television market. Romano Prodi, the opposition leader, states that even though he has sold part of his shares, Berlusconi retains his control over Mediaset as Fininvest remains its main investor and his son, Pier Silvio, is Mediaset vice-President and is responsible for the company’s broadcasting.

- On the 26th of April, an American investigation on the death in Iraq of the Italian Secret Services Agent, Nicola Cappelli, drops all charges against American soldiers who shot him just as he freed a Development and Cohesion Ministry, responsible for encouraging relations between the North and the South of the country.

- On the 4th of April, the former Vice-President and is responsible for the company’s broadcasting.

- On the 25th of April, General Nebojša Pavković, member of the Drina corps from the Serbian Army in Bosnia, submit themselves to the ICTY.

- On the 14th of April, the International Commission on the Balkans presents its report entitled “The Balkans in Europe’s Future” in Belgrade. The report recommends a radical revision of international politics within the Balkans and the transferral of the High Representative’s responsibilities in Bosnia to a European official in charge of enlargement. The High Representative, Lord Ashdown declares to the Financial Times that according to him his role is still useful in some respects even though he admits that his mandate will have to come to an end in the near future. The report also criticises the UN administration of the Kosovo Province affirming that the region should benefit from some form of independence. Finally, the report declares that the European Policy has not been able to convey a convincing political perspective to the people in the Balkans and that a radical change in European thought is necessary, all taking into consideration “the enlargement fatigue” present in certain European capitals.

Serbia and Montenegro

- On the 4th of April, the former Vice-President of Internal Affairs, general Sreten Lukić, accused since 2003 of crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war during the 1998-1999 Kosovo conflict, is transferred to the Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) detention centre in The Hague. According to the government’s version of events, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. On the 25th of April, General Nebojša Pavković, former leader of the High Command Rank of the Yugoslavian Army, who lead the Serb campaign in Kosovo, surrenders to the ICTY that accuse him of crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war.

- On the 9th of April, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vuk Draskovic, declares to the Financial Times that general Ratko Mladic, former commander of the Serb forces in Bosnia is hiding thanks to the help of Serbian secret services. Miroslav D. Petrovic, a former Serb officer who deserted, on the 11th of April declares to the Serb independent newspaper Danas, that Mladic is hidden by the Serbia-Montenegro army.

Macedonia

- On the 9th of April, in an attempt to put an end to the dispute with Greece regarding Macedonia’s name, which persists since the independence of this former Yugoslavian Republic, the UN special correspondent Matthew Nimitz suggests “Republika Makedonija-Skopje” as a new name, which the translation would not be recognised. While Greece declares to be satisfied with the proposal, the Macedonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ilinka Mitreva declares that she will not accept any other name at international level, but the one registered in the constitution (Republic of Macedonia) and that Macedonia will continue to negotiate to find a suitable compromised name which will be employed only in bilateral relations with Greece.

- On the 10th of April, elections are recalled to the polls to vote for district councils and for the second ballot of mayoral elections in 19 out of 84 administrative districts present in the country, as well as in the capital Skopje. According to the press agency Makfax, local elections took place without major irregularities or severe violations of the electoral system, as opposed to the elections last March.

- On the 22nd of April, a court in Skopje acquits 4 people, amongst which 3 former policemen who were accused of having killed 7 immigrants coming from South Western Asia in March 2002.
Appendices

**Albania**

- On the 24th of April, former Albanian President Sali Berisha is re-elected as leader of the democratic party (the opposition), which held its congress in Tirana before the legislative elections next July.

**Greece**

- On the 6th of April, the European Commission congratulates Greece on the efforts undertaken to reduce its public deficit to 3% of its GNP as the EU Stability and Growth Pact requires.
- On the 19th of April, the Greek government recognises the Armenian massacre as genocide. On the 24th of April, Armenia commemorates the 90th anniversary of the beginning of the Turkish Ottoman massacre.

**Turkey**

- During the month of April, 40 Turkish soldiers and 41 Kurdish are killed in the most clashes between the army and violent Kurdish rebels since the end of the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK – illegal) ceasefire in September 2003. Towards the end of the month, military operations against the PKK and the Kurdish People’s Defence Forces (HPG) intensify, and the Turkish Army assembles at the Iraqi border. Several bombs explode in Istanbul during the course of the month (on the 6th, the 17th and the 30th of April) causing the death of a policeman. On the 17th and 18th of April, the police defuses two other bombs in Istanbul.
- On the first of April, a bomb explodes in a shopping centre in a predominantly Catholic district of Beirut, causing 6 injuries. It is the fourth bomb in the last two weeks that explodes in Christian districts.

**Syria**

- During the course of April, the International Community continues to pressurise Syria to withdraw from Lebanon.
- On the 15th of April, the Human Rights Association in Syria which is based in Damascus, announces that it will sue the Syrian government for the first time on the grounds of torture.

**Lebanon**

- On the first of April, a bomb explodes in a shopping centre in a predominantly Catholic district of Beirut, causing 6 injuries. It is the fourth bomb in the last two weeks that explodes in Christian districts.
- On the 7th of April, the United Nations Security Council introduces resolution 1595 (2005) where it declares being concerned about the UN fact-finding enquiry’s results on the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. The Council sets up an independent investigation commission in Lebanon, conducted by Mark Quaterman from the UN Department of Political Affairs, which will be responsible for helping Lebanese authorities to find the culprits, organisers, sponsors and accomplices of his assassination.
- On the 13th of April, after 5 weeks of negotiations, the Lebanese Prime Minister Umar Karami (Pro-Syrian) announces that he abandons all efforts to form a new government. On the 15th of April, President Emile Lahoud appoints Najib Mikati as Prime Minister. Mikati, who has some relations with Syria and is a friend of President Assad, received unexpected support from the members of the opposition. On the 27th of April, the new government is approved by the National Assembly.
- On the 26th of April, the remaining Syrian troops and the last members of the Syrian intelligence service leave Lebanon, following pressures exerted by the International Community after the death of the Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri on the 14th of February in Beirut. The leader of the Syrian High Command, Ali Habib declares that Syria withdraws from Lebanon as the country is now capable to assume its own responsibilities.

- On the 17th of April Poland joins the 9 Euro-
Jordan

- On the 5th of April, King Abdullah II accepts the resignation of Prime Minister Faysal Akif al-Fayiz and appoints Adnan Badra, who held the portfolio of Agriculture and Education in the 80s and was UNESCO’s Assistant General Director. According to the Middle East International, Fayiz’s government was unpopular and attracted the king’s dissatisfaction because of its campaign against professional associations and their political activities. On the 7th of April Badra forms a new government.
- On the 17th of April, the Israeli government announces that it intends to free 9 Jordanian prisoners in an effort to strengthen and improve bilateral relations.

Egypt

- During the course of April, judges, journalists and students demonstrate to protest against the lack of political reforms and attempt to increase the pressure on the government. On the 6th of April, the Judges Club organises a sit-in during their meeting in Alexandria to protest against the interference of the executive in judicial affairs. They threaten to not supervise the next Presidential and legislative elections if a law guaranteeing the independence of judicial power is not introduced. On the 12th of April thousands of students demonstrate in the country’s different campuses (of which 2,000 in Assiut), to express their support to the Kifaya movement, request Mubarak’s resignation and oppose the succession of his son Gamal Mubarak.
- On the 7th of April, a bomb explodes in the touristic souks of Khan al-Khalili in Cairo, causing 21 deaths amongst which 10 are foreign. On the 8th of April, a group named “Islamic Brigades of Pride in Egypt” claims responsibility for the attack. This was carried out to show President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak that there are some active Mujaheen and that the movement is not only made of lethargic cells as Mubarak previously declared. On the 11th of April, the Minister of Internal Affairs declares that the person responsible for the suicide attack is a minor from the suburbs of Cairo, Rifaat Ahmed Bashandi, who became an extremist after his father’s death and who, according to many specialists, would have acted alone.

Libya

- On the 14th of April, the EU Ministers of Internal Affairs get together to discuss the establishment of cooperation with Libya as well as technical assistance to supervise its borders and coasts. The European Commission presents a report to the Ministers where it declares that Libyan authorities are incapable of managing the migration flux into the country’s territory.

Tunisia

- On the first of April, during the fifth meeting of the Mixed Committee for Industrial Cooperation in Tunis, Tunisia and Morocco agree to intensify their cooperation on the prospects of development of the textile sector. This is a vital sector for both economies which, amongst others on the European markets where the greatest part of Tunisian and Moroccan exportation is sold, finds itself threatened by Chinese exportations since the dismantling of the Multi-Fiber agreements. They agree to adopt a “common and united attitude” to stand against the challenges of international competition.
- On the 20th of April, during a press conference in Tunis with 3 Tunisian NGO’s, Human Rights Watch (HRW) present a report denouncing tortures, rape and the isolation, sometimes of 10 years, of over 500 political prisoners, enforced to suppress the islamiat opposition. On the same day, the Tunisian government agrees to no longer place prisoners in prolonged isolation cells for over ten days and authorises HRW, for the first time since 1991, to visit the prisons suspected of practicing prolonged isolation.
- On the 25th of April, the Tunisian ecological party, “Green Tunisia”, which has been waiting for a year to be legalised by the authorities, denounces the political freeze of which it has been the object and affirms its right to “organise itself freely”. The party’s coordinator, Abdelkader Zitouni, asserts to have accomplished, in vain, all the administrative and judicial formalities to obtain the legal receipt, as required by the law. On the 29th of April, the founders of a new left-wing party, the Patriotic and Democratic Working Party (PTPD), deplore the authority’s refusal to legalise their formation.
- On the 27th of April, several opposition parties grouped within a “Democratic Alliance for Citizenship” denounce the invalidation of their lists for the local elections planned for the 8th of May in Tunisia, describing it as “irregular”. The authorities explain that the lists’ invalidation is due to “breaches of electoral law”.
- On the 29th of April, Mohamed Aboubou, Tunisian lawyer and human rights defender, is sentenced to three and a half years in prison for “inducement to infringe the law”, “spreading false information” likely to disturb the peace and “assault and battery” against a lawyer colleague, a charge added the day before.

Algeria

- Throughout the month of April, Algeria is shaken by a series of attacks which cause the death of civilians. Even though these attacks are unclaimed, the authorities suspect the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPO), whose aim would be to cause the failure of the government’s amnesty project. On the 17th of April, Boulencouar Oukil, leader of a GIA unit, thought responsible for the death of 14 civilians on the 7th of April at a fake roadblock near Larbaa and also responsible for the death of another 16 civilians in Medea last October, is captured. Mohamed Chama, also a GIA member and suspected of the 82 civilians’ massacre in Larbaa in 1997, is also arrested.
- On the 2nd of April, Algerian authorities announce the removal of the need for visas for Moroccan nationals wishing to visit Algeria, an initiative welcomed as a step further towards the “warming” between the two countries.
- On the 3rd of April, Algerian groups defenders of Human Rights, call for an independent investigation on the arrest (carried out by security forces) and consequent disappearance of over 6,000 civilians during the 90’s. These groups refuse the report of the 31st of March 2005, established by the Enquiry Com-
mission. On the 14th of April, 5 international human rights defence organisations, amongst which the International Federation of Human Rights (IFHR), Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), denounced the general amnesty project in a joint statement, stating that it “could permanently deprive the victims or their families of their right to truth, justice and compensations”. The amnesty project was planned by the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to put an end to 13 years of violence.

- On the 7th of April, the day before his first re-election anniversary, the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika speaks to the nation and announces a five year programme (2005-2009) for the support of economic growth with a budget of over 4,200 billion dinars (55 billion dollars). The President specifies that above all this intends to “improve the population’s living conditions”.
- On the 10th and 11th of April, the second conference of the (AU) African Union’s Ministers of Education, takes place in Alger in the presence of the UNESCO general director, Koichiro Matsuura. This conference has the aim to sum up the objectives concerning African education established for the decade 1997-2006.

Morocco

- On the 12th of April, a Rabat tribunal bans the Moroccan journalist Ali Lmrabet, well-known for being critical towards the monarchy, from practising journalism for ten years as well as fining him. The Association of families of Sahrawis, victims of repression in the Tindouf camps, filed a libel suit against Ali Lmrabet at the beginning of the month because of an article he wrote where he challenged the official argument on Tindouf camps. Lmrabet believes that this sentence intends to stop him from publishing his new magazine “Demain Libéré”.
- On the 21st of April, the Moroccan government presents a new plan which intends to fight against corruption within the kingdom, in which cost would go up to 2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Azzedine Akesbi, the Moroccan representative of the NGO Transparency welcomes this decision.

European Union

- On the 13th of April, two thirds of EP votes oppose a series of proposals to regulate European parliamentary expenses. The EP majority group, the European People’s Party, justifies its opposition by stating its wish for a global reform of the system which would entail a uniform salary for all parliamentarians (currently salaries vary for each nationality reflecting those paid to parliamentarians in their nation of origin).
- On the 14th of April, EU Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs, because of insurmountable legal and technical obstacles, decide to postpone their plans to create a register containing information about EU citizens’ sentences, which is in line with The Hague’s Programme for Freedom, Security and Justice introduced in November 2004.
- On the 14th of April, the EC declares that it will take several European countries to the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC). Amongst these are Italy, Malta and Portugal which are accused of not having implemented European Directives compelling telecommunications monopolies to open up to competition.
- On the 18th of April, Die Welt reports that the President of the European Commission (EC), José Manuel Durao Barroso spent his holidays on Spiros Latsis’s yacht, a Greek billionaire banker. Following this, the EC agreed to support one of Latsis’s companies with a grant that goes up to 10 million Euros. According to the same newspaper, as for the commerce commissioner Peter Mandelson, he spent his holidays in the Caribbean during which he went to a party on Paul Allen’s yacht. Paul Allen is the co-founder of Microsoft, who is currently in a legal dispute with the European Commission because of antitrust laws. Both commissioners deny any conflict of interests. While the European Parliament (EP) requests an explanation, on the 25th of April Durao Barroso revives the 1999 proposal suggesting the creation of an independent authority responsible for supervising eventual conflicts of interest deriving from the behaviour of EU officials and politicians.

May 2005

The French referendum rejection of the European Constitution causes a serious political crisis in the EU. The Egyptian multi-party system in the Presidential elections, is definitely recorded in the constitution. In the Near East, general Michel Aoun returns to Lebanon after being in exile for over 25 years, while a fifth attack targets the Christian community. In Turkey, Kurdish Freedom Falcons set off a bomb in Kusadasi, while in Algeria, 12 soldiers die in an attack organised by Islamist rebels. Relations between Syria and the United States deteriorate because of the issue concerning the access of rebels in Iraq. In Spain, the Batasuna leader is arrested following the explosion of several bombs and the government accepts willingness to negotiate with ETA if it declares a ceasefire. Finally, both the governmental coalition of the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and the Croatian conservative party in power, face a political defeat in regional elections.

Portugal

- On the 23rd of May, an independence commission lead by the Bank of Portugal concludes that the public deficit risks reaching 6.83% of the GDP in 2005, which corresponds to twice the 3% of GDP limit imposed by the Growth and Stability Pact in the Euro zone. On the 25th of May, the Portuguese government announces a plan to fight against the public deficit soar, amongst other things this includes an increase on VAT and taxes, as well as freezing the wages of officials, whose retiring age will be in line with that of the private sector.
- On the 24th of May, the Portuguese former Prime Minister Antonio Guterres, is appointed as head of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

Spain

- On the 6th of May, two members of the Basque terrorist group, ETA, are sentenced to 2,775 years imprisonment each for having planned a bomb attack on a train directed to Madrid on Christ-
mas Eve in 2003. The bomb was defused in time. On the 17th of May, the Cortes (Lower House) approve a motion consenting to open peace negotiations with the terrorist group ETA, as long as it declares a ceasefire. On the 16th, the 22nd and the 25th of May three bombs explode in Madrid, the last one slightly injuring 52 people. A few hours after the explosion of the last bomb, Arnaldo Otegi, the leader of Batasuna, the political party linked to the terrorist organisation ETA, is arrested.

- On the 7th of May, the government announces that 700,000 immigrant workers benefited from the amnesty law for illegal workers. The number of registered workers rises by 4% and almost 90% of jobs on the black market have therefore been legalised. The opposition party, the People’s Party (PP), criticises this initiative. According to the Minister for Labour, Jesus Callestra, this initiative contributed to reducing criminality and to promoting economical growth.

**France**

- On the 11th of May, in Paris, the trial of three people starts, amongst which two French, accused of having assisted Richard Reid in his attempt to make his shoes explode in a Paris-Miami flight in December 2001.
- On the 13th of May, the Algerian Nacer Eddin Mettau is taken to court suspected of having provided false identity documents to Muslims wishing to join the insurrection in Iraq.
- On the 16th of May, the Pentecost national day of holiday becomes a “solidarity day” for the elderly and disabled people with the aim of avoiding a heat wave tragedy similar to that which occurred in August 2003. The government’s objective is to raise a special tax on the assets gained from the additional work carried out on that day in order to finance extra care for these particularly vulnerable people. While this initiative is supported by the majority of trade unions, almost half of the employees do not go to work.
- On the 17th of May, A Parisian Court condemns the Algerian Abderahmane Ameroud and two French, Adel T seabouri and Youssef el-Aouni, to prison sentences of up to 7 years because of their involvement in the assassination in 2001 of Ahmed Shah, commander of the Northern Afghan Alliance. On the same day, two French of Algerian origins are sentenced to 2 and 5 years of prison for employing Islamic fighters in order to send them to Afghanistan.
- On the 20th of May, Charles Pieri, alleged leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica — Fighters Union (FNLC-UC), is condemned to ten years of prison as he is found guilty of financing terrorism. Nineteen other people, amongst which Pieri’s “lieutenants”, Charles-Philippe Paoli and Jacques Mosconi are also sentenced.
- On the 29th of May, the French reject the European Constitution project by 54.68% of the votes in the national referendum. 69.3% of the population participates in it. This result marks the defeat of President Jacques Chirac who actively conducted the “yes” campaign. On the 30th of May, the Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin hands in his resignation. On the 31st of May he is replaced by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Domestic Security and Local Liberty, Dominique de Villepin.

**Italy**

- On the 2nd of May, the government makes public the report on the death of the secret services agent Nicola Calipari, killed by American troops in Iraq just after freeing the Italian journalist taken hostage by Iraqi rebels. According to the report there is no proof that the death of Calipari was deliberate, but the American troops’ “inexperience and stress” are to blame for their disproportionate reaction. As per the American report, it states that the American soldiers are not responsible and accuses Italy for not coordinating the rescue operation with the Americans. Moreover, it highlights that the car in which Calipari was, travelled at an excessive speed and would not have responded to the American soldiers alerts.
- On the 8th of May, Berlusconi’s centre-right coalition experiences another defeat with the elections in Sardinia and in the Northern Regions of Valle d’Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige. The centre-left opposition parties ask the Prime Minister to resign.
- On the 19th of May, 26 arrest warrants are issued in the North of Italy, following several informants’ detailed plan reports to the government on the Milan and Cremona bomb attacks. On the 20th of May, three Algerians are arrested in Naples accused of supporting the Algerian organisation, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), suspected of having connections with Al-Qaeda.

**Malta**

- On the 30th of May, 60 illegal immigrants originating from Eritrea and Sudan, divided on two drifting ships are brought back to Malta.

**Croatia**

- On the 15th of May, the conservative party in power in Croatia since 2003 (HDZ), is weakened by the local and regional elections after the left-wing opposition wins over the main cities, Zagreb included, and leading nine of 21 regional assemblies. These results can be explained by mixed economic results and the government’s failure to open negotiations regarding the country’s entry into the European Union.
- On the 18th of May, Carla del Ponte, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), declares to journalists present at the headquarters of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), that Croatia’s current efforts will allow the rapid arrest of General Ante Gotovina, who has escaped since he was charged with war crimes in 2001. The Croatian prime Minister, Ivo Sanader, commits to research for the fugitive more actively hoping to open negotiations for Croatia’s entry into the European Union, suspended because of the Gotovina affair, next June.

**Bosnia-Herzegovina**

- On the 4th of May, Ivo Miro Jovic, elected by the Chamber of Representatives (Lower House), becomes the new Croatian member of the tripartite presidency, following Dragan Crovic, relieved from his duties by the High Representative Lord Paddy Ashdown. On the 9th of May, the Higher House approves his election and on the 18th of May he takes up his post.
• On the 12th of May the trial against the Serbs-Bosnian Radovan Stankovic affair, accused of violating the laws and customs of war and of crimes against humanity in the “rape camps” near Foca between 1992-1993. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), transmits a case to the country’s judicial authorities for the first time. This is the Serb-Bosnian Radovan Karadzic, has been seen twice during the course of April, apparently as he was organising his mother’s burial. During her burial, on the 5th of May, hundreds of people wear T-shirts featuring Karadzic picture, as he is also absent. On the 25th and 26th of May, troops from the European Stabilisation Forces, EUPFOR, search the house of Karadzic’s partner, as well as those of his two children. In Mid-May, UN expert forensic surgeons find a communal grave in Kosovo, probably containing corpses of Serbs killed by Albanian guerrillas.

On the 5th of May, Greece denounces new violations of Greek air-space by Turkish military planes and describes them as “provocative”. On the 12th of May, the Greek Parliament rejects a motion by the opposition of 151 votes to 300. This requested the organisation of a referendum on the European Constitution which had already been ratified in parliament on the 19th of April. The opposition requested a referendum as it believed that this procedure would increase Greek interest in the treaty.

Cyprus
• On the 6th of May, the Greek-Cypriot President, Tassos Papadopoulos, appoints Petros Clerides as Minister of Justice following Solon Nikitas, who resigned in April following the acquittal of the former Health Minister Constantina Akkelidou, accused of interfering in judicial affairs.

• On the 16th of May, the envoy of the Greek-Cypriot President Tassos Tzio- nis, meets the UN Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Sir Kieran Prendergast, at the UN headquarters in New York to discuss the new efforts invested in unifying the island.

Turkey
• On the first of May, a bomb explodes in the seaside city of Kusadasi, killing a policeman. Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) connected to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), claim responsibility for the attack. During the course of the month of May, several clashes between the Turkish Army and the PKK rebels cause the death of 69 soldiers and 8 Kurdish rebels.

On the 11th of May, the IMF approves a confirmation agreement (stand-by agreement) which goes up to 6.66 SDR (Special Drawing Rights), to support the Turkish financial and economic programme up to year 2008. The IMF congratulates Turkey for its economic performances, highlighting that inflation was the lowest in the past 30 years and that the last three years’ average growth was of 8%.

On the 12th of May, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) stipulates that Abdullah Ocalan, PKK leader banned from Turkey and sentenced to...
life in 2002, was not judged by an independent and impartial tribunal and that he only had limited access to his lawyers. This decision is unappealable. Turkey announces that the country will conform to this decision and that Ocalan will be judged again.

- On the 24th of May, the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan appoints Ali Babacan as head negotiator in discussions regarding Turkey’s entry into the EU, due to start in October. Ali Babacan was the Minister of Economy who helped Turkey recover from its economical crisis.

- On the 27th of May, the Grand National Assembly votes a modified version of the reformed criminal code by 346 votes to 3, which will come into force on the first of June. Groups defending human rights and multimedia organisations, already critical towards the reform, declare that the new version does not make any significant step forward towards freedom of press.

Syria

- On the 4th of May, President Bashar al-Assad issues a decree in order to include the Syrian Social Nationalist Party in the National Progressive Front, which brings together the 6 main political parties of the country.

- In Mid-May, the leader of the Arab Organisation for Human Rights in Syria, Mohammed Ra’dun, is arrested. From the 24th to the 31st of May, several journalists and intellectuals, members of the Al-Atasi Forum for Democratic Dialogue, are arrested and interviewed.

- On the 20th of May, The Times reports that Americans and Iraqis accuse Syria of denying the activities of rebels who enter Iraq through Syria. On the 24th of May, the Syrian ambassador in the US, Imad Moustapha, announces that Syria suspends all military and intelligence cooperation with the United States in protest against their unfair and unfounded accusations. Moreover, he accuses the United States of trying to deteriorate its relations with Syria despite its withdrawal from Lebanon and the measures taken against the insurrection in Iraq. On the 30th of May, Syria announces having deported 30 Saudi Arabianis who could have joined the conflict in Iraq and that over 1,200 people have been arrested during the past weeks as they were attempting to surpass the Iraq border.

Lebanon

- On the 4th of May, for the first time since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, the Prime Minister Mikati goes to Syria where he meets the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

- On the 4th of May, a court in Beirut cancels all charges against the former Maronite army commander, General Michel Aoun, exiled in France since the defeat of the Liberation War which he organised against the Syrian occupation army in Lebanon at the end of the 80s. On his return to Lebanon, where thousands of supporters are expecting him, he announces his new party, the Free Patriotic Movement, which will take part in the next legislative elections.

- On the 6th of May, an attack in the city of Jounieh, a seaside centre mainly frequented by Christians, causes one death and 22 injuries. This is the fifth bomb targeting Christians since the death of Hariri in February.

- On the 13th of May, after several rockets were set off from Southern Lebanon to Israel, the Israeli army attacks four Hezbollah outposts in the disputed Shaba’a farms area near the Golan Heights.

- On the 29th of May, 28% of electors vote in the first round of legislative elections taking place in Beirut. The candidates’ block conducted by the son of the former Prime Minister assassinated in February, Saad al-Hariri, wins 19 seats. The remaining three rounds will take place in the rest of the country in June.

Jordan

- On the 9th of May, the Ministers of Jordan, Israel and Palestine, gathered together in Amman, decide to carry out a feasibility study for the construction of a canal linking the Red Sea to the Dead Sea. The World Bank will finance the study, which will amount to 20 million dollars. The canal, which will cover 175 Km from Aqaba to the Dead Sea, will allow the production of electricity, the provision of drinking water and will help to stop the Dead Sea from drying out.

Egypt

- On the 10th of May, the People’s Assembly (unicameral) approves by 405 votes to 34, the amendment of article 76 of the constitution in order to introduce a multiparty system in the Presidential elections. This initiative came from President Hosni Mubarak, who was put under increasing pressure, both internally and internationally, to make political reforms. After voting against, 26 members of the Assembly, amongst which the leader of the opposition party Al Ghad, Ayman Nur, go out to protest against the reforms which according to them are limited and are targeted to keeping Mubarak’s National Democratic Party in power. In fact, in order to present a candidate to Presidential elections, the party has to have at least 5% of the seats in the Assembly, a threshold that no opposition party reaches which implies that opposition parties are therefore excluded from the next elections. Moreover, any independent candidate has to assemble 300 signatures in support of his candidacy, amongst which 65 from the Assembly, 25 from the Consultancy Council (Shura – Higher House) and 10 by local councillors in each of the country’s 14 provinces. On the 25th of May, 83% of Egyptian electors approve this constitutional amendment via referendum. According to the authorities, there was a 54% participation whilst independent reports describe polling stations as being deserted, following the opposition parties’ request to boycott the referendum. Throughout the referendum campaign, the opposition parties and especially the Muslim Brothers were picked on by the government. The Muslim Brothers protest against the detention of 2,000 of their supporters during the course of the campaign, amongst which is their Secretary General Mahmoud Izzat.

Libya

- At the beginning of May, Libya suspends the payment of the third and last instalment of financial compensations
directed to the families of the victims of the Lockerbie attack in 1988. This is because the American State Depart-ment did not observe the precondition of removing Libya from the list of coun-tries supporting terrorism which was established in the August 2003 agree-ment between the USA, Libya and the United Kingdom and backed by the Uni-ted Nations.

- On the 3rd of May, the group Royal Dutch/Shell announces to have reached a long term agreement worth 637 million dollars for a large scale exploration for natural gas and a development agreement with the National Oil Corp in Libya.

**Tunisia**

- On the 3rd of May, the Tunisian lawyer Faouzi Ben Merad is sentenced to four months of prison for contempt of court. The authorities justified this verdict by recalling that lawyers have primarily a duty to show an example of respect towards the judicial institution. However, according to Merad’s colleagues this sentence is aimed at Mer-ad’s repeated criticisms of the gov-ernment. Merard blames the government for controlling the judicial system and for exploiting it at the expense of its oppo-nents.
- On the 8th of May, the Council Lo-cal Elections take place marking the overwhelming victory (93.86% of the seats) of the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) of President Ben Ali. A part of the opposition, excluded from the bal-loot, denounces a climate of political lockdown. Four parliamentary opposi-tion parties close to power (People’s Unity Party, Democratic Socialist Mo-vement, Unionist Democratic Union, Social Liberal and Democratic Party) and an independent list took part in 65 constituencies winning 268 seats or a 6.1% rate. The general rate of participation is of 82.76%.

**Algeria**

- On the first of May, President Abde-laziz Bouteflika reorganises the ministerial cabinet, keeping Ahme Ouyahia as Pri-me Minister. According to the Algerian newspaper al Watan this reorganisa-tion reinforces Ouyahia’s position.
- On the 15th of May, 12 soldiers are killed in an attack organised by the is-lamist rebels in the Khencela region, in the East of the country. Algerian media accuse the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).

**Morocco**

- At the beginning of May, over 1,000 suspects in the Casablanca attack affair of May 2003, detained in various prisons of the country, start a hunger strike. On the 10th of May, one of the prisoners, Khalid Boukri, dies. According to The Middle East International, prisoners request to be released unconditionally, an investigation of the attacks and the trial of those who have tortured them during their detention.

**European Union**

- On the 23rd of May, the EU Minis-ters of Defence in Brussels agree on a schedule starting from 2007 for the cre-ation of 13 “battle groups” of 1,500 people each, for the EU Rapid Reaction Force. The first three groups will be made by 1) France, Germany and Spain 2) Germany, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia 3) Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Norway.
- On the 24th of May, in an attempt to come closer to the United Nations ob-jective to provide assistance to deve-lopment by reaching 0.7% of the GDP, Development Ministers adopt the de-velopment assistance agenda propo-sed by the EC last April.
- At the end of May, the EU goes through a serious crisis following the French rejection of the treaty instituting a European Constitution on the 29th of May. On the 29th of May, the President in power Jean-Claude Juncker from Luxem-bourg and the EC President, José Manuel Durao Barroso, refuse to drop the treaty and declare that the ratifica-tion process has to continue as 9 coun-tries out of 25, representing almost 50% of Europeans, have already ratified the treaty. They also specify that the treaty stipulates that if up to 5 countries do not ratify the treaty, this will be reconsidered rather than abandoned. The various countries that still have not ratified the treaty agree with more or less enthusi-asim with this position. On the 30th of May, the British Prime Minister requests a period of reflection on the conse-quences of the French vote.

**June 2005**

In the Near East, the anti-Syrian oppo-sition wins the legislative elections in Lebanon. President Mubarak announces that he will put himself forward for a fifth mandate of Presidency in Egypt. In the Balkans, a video of the Srebre-nica massacre is made public, which makes direct reference to the respon-sibility played by the former Yugosla-vian President Slobodan Milosevic in the massacre and leads to the arrest of for-mer members of the “Scorpions”. While Turkey makes a step forward towards joining the EU by enforcing its new cri-minal code, the EU, with regards to the negotiations procedure, imposes the strictest conditions that have ever been imposed to any candidate state. The European Council is marked by the di-sagreement between the 25 member states on the budget for 2007 and on the future of the European Constitu-tion, as Cyprus has just ratified it. A new government is set up in France under the Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin and in Spain, an important net-work of radical islamiasts who recruited combatants to fight in Iraq, is disman-tled.

**Portugal**

- On the 15th of June, the Portuguese former Prime Minister Antonio Gute-rres, appointed by the United Nations General Assembly, takes on his duties as the 10th United Nations High Com-missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), re-placing Ruud Lubbers from The Ne-therlands, who was involved in a sexual harassment scandal.

**Spain**

- On the 1st and the 2nd of June, Eng-land extradites the Moroccan Farid Hi-lai to Spain, wanted for the attacks of March the 11th 2004 in Madrid and September the 11th 2001 in the United States. England also extradites Hedi Ben Youssef Boudhiba to Spain, who is suspected of being part of a Spanish network which gave logistic support to
those who carried out the September 11th attacks.
• On the 4th of June, 300,000 people demonstrate in the streets of Madrid on the initiative of the Association of Victims of Terrorism (AVT) and the main opposition party, People’s Party (PP), to protest against the Prime Minister’s José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero plan to open negotiations with the Basque terrorist organisation ETA. On the 10th of June, two grenades explode in Zaragoza airport, after an ETA warning. There are no victims. On the 26th of June, a car explodes by a sport stadium in Madrid, probably as an attempt to undermine Spain’s candidature to organise the Olympic Games in 2012. There are only material damages to report.
• On the 15th of June, the Minister of Internal Affairs, José Antonio Alonso, announces that a network of radical Islamists, that recruits combatants to carry out suicide attacks in Iraq in name of the Al-Qaeda organisation of Abu Misab Zarqawi, is dismantled. The network is controlled from Syria and is connected to several countries in Northern Africa, the Middle East and also to the United Kingdom. Amongst the 16 people arrested, 11 were preparing suicide attacks in Iraq and 5 are suspected of being linked to the terrorist attacks in Madrid on the 11th of March in 2004.
• On the 23rd of June, the regional Basque President, Juan José Ibarretxe from the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) is re-elected for a third term in office, thanks to the support given by two of the new representatives for the Basque Communist Party (ETAK). Ibarretxe’s party wins 34 votes out of 75 in the Parliament, followed by the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) which wins 33 votes.
• On the 25th of June, the International Herald Tribune announces that the United States oppose the Spanish authority’s interviewing of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a high ranking member of Al-Qaeda captured in Pakistan and kept in detention in the United States where he is suspected of having helped in the organisation of the September 11th attacks. This interrogation is crucial for the trials of Driss Chebli and Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, the alleged leader of Al-Qaeda in Spain, who was arrested in November 2001 and who, in July 2001, would have organised a meeting between al-Shibh and Mohammed Atta, one of the suicide pilots of September the 11th attacks to the United States. If, between now and December, prosecutors still do not have a firm accusation against Yarkas, according to the Spanish law which allows 4 years of detention without sentence, he will have to be released.
• On the 30th of June, the Senate and then the Cortes, approve by 187 votes to 147 the law allowing homosexuals to get married, adopt children and to inherit one from the other.

France
• On the 2nd of June, President Jacques Chirac appoints a new government with Dominique de Villepin as Prime Minister. This new cabinet marks the return of the President of the Reform Movement Union (UMR), Nicolas Sarkozy, as Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs and Regional Development. On the 8th of June, Villepin announces that his main objective will be a reduction of unemployment (10.2%) and that in 2006, a programme amounting to 4.5 billion euros, will be put in place to create new jobs. On the 6th of June, the government, which claims to intend to preserve the French social model, sells 152 million shares from France Telecom which amount to 3.4 billions, reducing the State participation to the company by 35%.
• On the 3rd of June, a court in Paris condemns Le Monde’s editor, Jean-Marie Colombani and three of its writers because of an article published in June 2002 which linked Israeli politics towards Palestine to the Jews persecution in Europe. Le Monde declares that it will appeal against.
• On the 4th of June, the opposition Socialist Party (PS), decides to withdraw six members from its ranks, amongst which the former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius, for having campaigned “no” to the European Constitution, going against the party’s official policy, which requested a “yes” vote.
• On the 4th and 27th of June respectively, the Franco-Moroccan Hamid Bach and the Franco-Tunisian Boubaker el-Hakim, who are connected to Fadrid Banyettou, the spiritual leader of the

“Iraqi networks” in France, are placed in provisional detention, suspected of being members of a recruitment network for the Iraq insurgency. On the 21st of June, six other men are arrested in the cities of Limoges and Montpellier for similar reasons. On the 16th of June Ghulam Mustafa Rama is condemned to 5 years in prison for having assisted Islamic militants in Kashmir and for having morally supported Richard Reid, who attempted to detonate explosives in his shoes on a Paris-Miami flight in December 2001. Two members of Rama’s group “Che-min Droit” (Straight Path) are condemned to sentences of 4 years in prison.
• On the 6th of June, the National Liberation Front of Corsica – Fighters Union (FLNC-UC) admits responsibility for 21 recent attacks, therefore confirming the end of the ceasefire. It accusesthe government of not having policies addressing Corsica’s needs and of treating Corsica’s patriots as mafia criminals.
• On the 19th of June, the elections in the French Council for the Muslim Cult (FCMC), which is supported by the government, are marked by the moderates’ progress, contrary to the previous elections in April 2003. Dalil Boubakeur is re-elected to the Council’s presidency.
• On the 21st of June, a court in Lyon acquits the radical imam Chirane Abdelkader Bouziane, who was sentenced for having encouraged violence against unfaithful women in his book. According to the judge, the imam was simply explaining what is written in the Qur’an. On the 23rd of June, two prosecutors appeal.

Italy
• On the first of June, 5 members of the Red Brigades, a left wing group of violent activists, are condemned to life sentence for the murder of Marco Biagi, a government councillor, in 2002.
• On the first of June, a parliamentary committee opposes the nomination of Andrea Monochio to the presidency of RAI, the public television channels, spoiling the government’s plan to privatise it.
• On the 3rd of June, the Northern League (LN), a member of the centre right coalition, declares to favour the withdrawal of Italy from the Euro zone. The Minister for Labour and Social Policy, Ro-
berto Maroni (LN) requests the organisation of a referendum on the matter. Even though the Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi criticised the Euro’s high rates compared to the dollar and reproached that the European monetary policy is the cause of the Italian economic recession, on the 5th of June, after a telephone conversation with the President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, he confirms his support of the Italian participation to the Euro zone. According to the economists, the re-introduction of the Lira would increase the Italian external debt because Italy would no longer benefit from the weak interest rate of the Euro zone.

- On the 6th of June, the EU warns Italy against sanctions if its public deficit surpasses the 3% of GDP established in the EU Pact of Stability and Growth (PSG). According to the EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Joaquin Almunia, the excessive Italian deficit, which has lasted for 3 years, cannot be considered as exceptional. This situation would allow Italy to avoid the sanctions, according to the modifications made to the PSG in March. The European Commission decides to give to Italy some extra time (2007) to rectify its deficit, because of certain government commitments.

- On the 24th of June, a judge in Milan issues an arrest warrant against 13 CIA agents, accused of having committed a “criminal abduction” by taking the Egyptian Imam Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, who received political asylum, on the 17th of February 2003 to Milan. This abduction is part of the CIA’s “extraordinary rendition” programme, according to which suspects can be transferred to third countries, some of which are known to employ torture, in order to interrogate them and all of this without the approval of a court of justice. According to Nasr, the CIA has taken him to Cairo where he was the victim of acts of torture during his detention. CIA and the American Embassy in Rome deny these allegations.

Croatia

- On the 8th of June, the enlargement European Commissioner, Olli Rhein, declared that Croatia made progress in its cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) but that there is still a lot of work to be done for this cooperation to become “total”. On the 13th of June, the Head Prosecutor of the ICTY Carla del Ponte, states that Croatian authorities have not fulfilled their obligations to locate, arrest and transfer General Ante Gotovina, accused of war crimes. She also affirms the necessity of a few extra months to establish whether Croatia is doing all that is in its power to arrest Gotovina. She accuses Croatia of lacking a proactive attitude, manipulating important information in the enquiry and authorising media campaigns that discredit the ICTY and its partners in Croatia.

- On the 10th of June, on the island of Brijuni, Croatia and Slovenia sign a declaration where they commit to avoid all border incidents. They also commit to an economic and cultural cooperation.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- On the 7th of June, the Prime Minister Adnan Terzic announces his acceptance of the resignation of the Minister of Foreign affairs, Mladen Ivanic, which Ivanic submitted in December 2004, after the High Representative Lord Paddy Ashdown accused him of deliberately failing to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Serbia and Montenegro

- On the first of June, a video broadcasted during the trial of the former Yugoslavian President, Slobodan Milosevic, shows the execution of 6 Muslims on Treskavica’s mountain by “the Scorpions”, a group of Serb paramilitary policemen under the orders of the Serb Interior Minister’s secret services and therefore under Milosevic’s orders. This is the first public evidence of Milosevic’s implication in the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995, which cost the life of 7,000 Muslims. On the 2nd and 3rd of June, the Serb government arrests 10 former members of the “Scorpions” who are suspected of having taken part in the massacre shown on the video.

- On the 9th of June, the American undersecretary of state for political affairs, Nicholas Burns, announces that the United States are going to unfreeze an aid of 10 million dollars to compensate the improvement of Serbia-Montenegro’s cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and adds that the government is working hard to arrest the Serb-Bosnian military commander, General Ratko Mladic. On the other hand, on the 13th of June, Carla Del Ponte declares in front of the UN Security Council that the authorities continue to fail in arresting and transferring 10 fugitives to the ICTY, amongst which Mladic, the Serb-Bosnian leader Radovan Karadzic and the Croatian General Ante Gotovina. On the 22nd of June, the government announces its attempt at contacting the network supporting Mladic, so that he gives himself up.

- On the 29th of June a Serb Court condemns 10 officials from the Milosevic’s regime (amongst them the Special Police Commander, Milorad Lukovic, and the state security chief, Radomir Markovic) to prison sentences for their implication in the failed murder attempt of the opposition leader and current Serb Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vuk Draskovic, which cost the life of four people.

Macedonia

- On the 29th of June, Greece accuses Macedonia of having on the official Ministry of Foreign Affairs website a link to a map of Macedonia that includes part of Greece and Bulgaria. Macedonia denies these facts.

Albania

- On the 8th of June, the Macedonian radio reports that the Albanians from Macedonia have registered their first political party, the Macedonian Alliance for European Integration, led by Aftim Mitrevski.

Greece

- On the 13th of June, the Vouli (uni-
East of Turkey during violent clashes

soldiers and 41 rebels die in the South

During the course of the month, 87

Turkey votes to 19.

meral legislative) ratifies the Treaty in-

priot House of Representatives (unica-

• On the 30th of June, the Greek Cy-

cesscases.

the UNFICYP freedom of movement

Forces decision to lift the restrictions on

solution 1604 (2005), which prolongs

• On the 15th of June, the United Na-

Cyprus

According to the unions some jobs will be

employees go on general strike for 24

hours to protest against the reforms.

problems in Turkey between 1915 and 1923 and

massacre. This is after the Minister of

Justice described the organisers as trai-

ors.

• On the 9th of June, the Bosphore

University is forced to postpone a three
day conference which would gather to-
gether those intellectuals and acade-
mics that contradict the government’s of-

ficial position concerning the Armenians’

massacre. This is after the Minister of

Justice described the organisers as trai-

ors.

• On the 16th of June, relations be-

tween Turkey and Germany become tense

after the Bundestag (Lower House)

unanimously adopts a resolution that

condemns the Ottoman Empire for the

massacre of over 1.5 million Armenians in

Turkey between 1915 and 1923 and

criticises the Turkish government for

refusing to tackle the case.

• On the 22nd of June, the European

Commission President, José Manuel

Durao Barroso, asks for the organisa-

tion of a serious debate concerning

Turkey’s entry into the EU, as objec-
tions to Turkey’s membership have pla-

yed a part in the French and Dutch vote

for the European Constitution. He asks

the member states to respect their com-

mitment to open negotiations with Tur-

key on the 3rd of October, bearing in

mind that this will not automatically lead to

the country joining the union. On the

29th of June, while certain states and

commissioners request to replace the

Turkish entry prospect with “a privileged

relation” one, the EU publishes the con-

ditions which would frame Turkey’s entry

negotiations. These are the strictest

conditions ever imposed to a candida-
te state. Amongst these conditions, the-

ere is the respect of human rights and of

a legally constituted state, which if bre-

ached, would result in the negotiations’

being suspended. Turkey is also requi-

red to resolve the issue of Cyprus divi-
sion. Finally “permanent safeguard clau-
ses” are put in place to prevent a large

immigration of Turks in case the country

becomes a member. No entry date is put

forward, negotiations will last at least ten

years.

Syria

• On the 4th of June, according to Is-

raeli secret services, Syria tested three

Scud missiles, one of which flew over the

Turkish province of Hatay. According to

Israel, the Syrian move intends to pro-

voke the United States as their relations

are tense since the assassination of Ra-

fiq al-Hariri in February.

• From the 6th to the 9th of June, the

Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party in power

holds its 10th congress in Damascus.

In his opening talk, President Bashar al-

Assad asks the party’s leaders to reви-

to the economy and to fight against

corruption. On the first day of the con-

gress, Abdel Halim Khaddam, the Sun-

nite Muslim who is the highest ranking

official in a regime dominated by the

Alawites minority, announces his resi-

gnation from the position of Vice Pre-

sident which he held since 1984 and

from the duties he has within the party.

He also invites his colleagues to fo-

llow his example in order to give way to

the new generation. During the con-

gress, the Party’s National Command

(i.e. Pan-Arab) is abolished and the

Regional Command (i.e. National) is

reduced from 21 to 14 members. The

party’s veterans supporting the former

President Hafez al-Assad are replaced

by young supporters of the same Pre-

sident.

• On the 23rd of June, the American

Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice,

during a G8 meeting in London, warns

Syria to stop islamic militants from cross-

ing the Iraq border, as this contributes to

Iraq’s instability.

• On the 30th of June, tensions be-

tween the United States and Syria in-

crease as the American Treasury De-

partment freezes the assets of the Home

Affairs Minister Maj.-Gen. Ghazi Kan’an

and of Col. Rustum Ghazali, who lead

the military presence and the intelli-

gence services from Syria to Lebanon.

This is a purely symbolic act, as neither

of them have any assets in the United

States.
Lebanon

• On the 2nd of June, the Lebanese journalist from An-Nahar, Samir Kassir, who is against the Syrian presence in Lebanon, is assassinated as his car explodes near his house in the Beirut Christian district of Ashrafiyeh. The opposition accuses Syria and its Lebanese allies, in particular the Lebanese President Emile Lahoud.
• On the 5th, 12th and 19th of June the National Assembly’s (unicameral) last round of elections take place. “The anti-Syrian opposition” consisting of the Future Current, the party of the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri assassinated in February, the Democratic Gathering, the Lebanese Forces, Qornet Shahwan and other small party blocks, wins 72 seats of the 128 in the Assembly. The two other main party blocks in the Assembly consist in the alliance between Amal (Liberation and Development) – Hezbollah (35 seats), supported by Syria and the Patriotic Movement bloc of general Michel Aoun, who returned to Lebanon in May after a long period of exile in France. On the 21st of June the government of Najib Mikati, formed in April, resigns. On the 28th of June, the new Assembly holds its first session and Nabbi Berri, Amal’s leader, is re-elected as the Assembly’s President for his fourth term in office. On the 30th of June, the Assembly elects the Future Current candidate, Fuad Siniora as Prime Minister, with 126 votes. Siniora was the former Minister of Finance and Rafiq al-Hariri’s councillor.
• On the 21st of June, the former Secretary General of the anti-Syrian Lebanese Communist Party, Georges Hawi, is assassinated as his car explodes near his house in the Beirut district of Wata Muteitbeh. Condoleezza Rice, the American Secretary of State declares that Syria contributes to creating a situation of instability in Lebanon, without accusing the country directly of the assassinations.
• On the 29th of June, the Hezbollah guerrilla attacks an Israeli’s army outpost in the disputed region of the Shabaa Farms, causing the death of an Israeli soldier and of a Hezbollah combatant and injuring three Israeli soldiers. As a reaction, the Israeli army bomb villages under the Hezbollah control, in Southern Lebanon.

Jordan

• On the 16th of June, the Minister of Finance Basim Awadallah resigns from his post in order to put an end to a crisis between Adnan Badran’s government and the House of Representatives (Lower House), in which some of the opposition members are very critical towards Awadallah and other members from the government’s economic department because of their economic policies. The real reason of the crisis seems to be the lack of representation within the government for the country’s Southern tribes and the significant presence of Palestinians who occupy 12 of the 26 ministerial portfolios.

Egypt

• On the 1st of June, hundreds of people, amongst which numerous women dressed in black, demonstrate on the streets of Cairo requesting the resignation of the Home Affairs Minister, Abib al-Adli. They believe him responsible for the police passivity during the assault carried out by the members of the National Democratic Party (PND) against the women who were demonstrating on the day a constitutional amendment was voted, which allows a multi-party system during the September Presidential elections. Some women had their clothes ripped off on the roads.
• On the 9th of June, in its report entitled “Reading between the red lines” Human Rights Watch accuses the Egyptian government of stifling academic freedom by censoring certain course books, preventing research into controversial issues, intimidating student activists and forbidding certain extra-curricular student activities.
• On the 13th of June, Muhammad al-Baradei is re-elected for his third 4 year mandate of Presidency in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), after the United States withdrew their objection to his re-election. The United States opposition was linked to the fact that al-Baradei did not support the Americans as they asserted the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Moreover, certain members of the Bush administration describe his policies towards Iran as being too “soft”.
• On the 14th of June, President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak’s spokesman announces that the President will stand for his fifth and last term in office in the September Presidential elections. The President announces that if he is re-elected, he will appoint for the first time in 24 years, a Vice-President, inducing some people to think that he is preparing his son Gamal Mubarak to succeed him as President of the country. In Mid-June, Gamal Mubarak, leader of the political Committee of the PND in power, declares that he is not looking to fill a higher position.
• On the 20th of June, during a two-day official visit to Egypt, the American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, calls for reforms in the Middle East in a talk to the American University in Cairo. She adds that “the United States have pursued stability in the Near East at the expense of democracy and have found neither one nor the other. Now we take another path. We support the democratic aspirations of the people.”

Libya

• On the 7th of June, 9 Libyan policemen and a Libyan doctor, accused of having tortured 5 Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor to induce them to confess the infection of 426 Libyan children with the AIDS virus, are acquitted. The spokesman of the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gergana Grancharova, question the Libyan judicial system. On the 30th of June, the Supreme Court of Libya decides to postpone its decision to the 15th of November on the appeal of the 5 Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor against their death sentence. This decision is welcomed by the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Solomon Passi.

Tunisia

• On the 2nd of June, the 6th session of the Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) starts, under the presidency of M. Mohamed Afif Chiboub, President of the Tunisian parliament. Approximately 140 deputies representing the parliaments of 5 Maghreb countries take part in it. The ac-
tive participation of the Maghreb people representatives to these meetings shows their determination in pursuing the edification of the Maghreb Union.

- From the 12th to the 14th of June, M. Ekmeliddin Ihsanoglu, secretary general of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), visits Tunisia, where he meets the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Higher Education, Culture and the Safeguard of Heritage, the Secretary of State responsible for IT, the Internet and free software use to examine different aspects of the Tunisian cooperation with the OIC.

- On the 30th of June in Tunis, the 9th ordinary session of the Council of Arab Ministers of Communication starts. The meeting is dedicated to analysing the Arab cooperation in the new information and communication technologies sector (ICT) and to establish ways to benefit from them.

**Algeria**

- On the 7th of June, 13 local council guards are killed and 6 injured during the explosion of their lorry near the village of Ain Rich, which is over 400 km to the South of Alger.

- On the 29th of June, a court condemns Mohammed Meguerba to ten years in prison for having set up and being part of a foreign terrorist network. According to the United Kingdom, he would have taken part in an attack on London, employing castor-oil instead of other poisons.

**Morocco**

- On the 14th of June, the Moroccan monarchy recognizes a second islamic party, Al Badil Al Hadari, which was an active organisation since 1995.

- On the 17th of June, the Minister of Communication declares that Rabat intends to introduce a law liberalizing the media which would put an end to journalists’ imprisonment for defamation of the monarchy and would alleviate restrictions imposed to foreign televisions and radio stations.

**European Union**

- On the 16th and 17th of June, negotiations on the 2007-2013 budget during the Brussels European Council, reach a deadlock following the refusal of the English Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to accept a reduction on the budget rebate (which the United Kingdom has been benefiting from since 1984) without a firm commitment on the part of other member states to modify Europe’s expenses and, in particular, the expenses for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The French President, Jacques Chirac, accuses Blair of disclaiming an agreement made in 2002, which stipulates that the agricultural expenses will not decrease between 2007 and 2013. All the EU members, except for the United Kingdom, support the European Commission proposal which consists in replacing the English rebate with a “generalised corrective mechanism”. This would allow other member states, which are also net contributors to the European budget, to be eligible to receive reimbursements, which will consequently reduce the English rebate. The United Kingdom, supported by some other member states, requests to transfer some expenses dedicated to agriculture to “modern” priorities such as research and increase of competition. The last proposal for a final compromise, which the President in power, Jean-Claude Juncker from Luxembourg presented to the Member States and which includes a freeze of the English rebate and a revision of the CAP, is rejected by the United Kingdom, Finland, The Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Another point of friction within the Council is the French and Dutch opposition to the European Constitution. There are those who wish to continue national ratifications and those who believe that the document is dead, as it needs to be adopted unanimously to come into force. Finally, the 25 members accept to continue with the ratifications, with the possibility of a change of date if necessary. The 25 members agree on the need for some time of reflection and that Europe has to start listening to its citizens.

- On the 24th of June, the 25 Ministers for the Environment oppose the EC proposal of lifting the bans on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) in Austria, France, Greece, Germany and Luxembourg, in accordance with the end of the EU moratorium on the GMO, established in July 2003.

**July 2005**

Four months after the attack in Cairo, Egypt is again the target of a terrorist attack, which causes 88 deaths in Sharm el-Sheikh. In Turkey, a bomb explodes in Kusadasi, causing 5 deaths, while confrontations between the Turkish army and the Kurdish rebels cause 91 deaths. In Lebanon, attacks against Pro-Syrian dignitaries continue as a new government is formed under the Anti – Syrian Prime Minister Fuad Siniora, which includes members of the Anti-Syrian coalition. For the first time in history, Hezbollah takes part in a Lebanese government and a woman was handed a ministerial portfolio. In Maghreb, Algeria proceeds on the way to national reconciliation with Kabylie, while Morocco reforms its nationality code and Tunisia provides its Parliament with a High House. In the Balkans, three bombs explode in Pristina on the day the UN launched an enquiry on the possibility of opening negotiations on Kosovo’s status. In Albania, the legislative elections, criticised by Europe, mark the victory of the centre-right group of the Albanese former President Sali Berisha. In Europe, several European States face the worse drought in decades and the fires in Spanish forests kill 14 voluntary firemen. As for the EU, Malta ratifies the European Constitution and Turkey signs the Ankara Protocol specifying that it does not entail official Turkish recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. The London terrorist attack of the 7th of July leads certain European States, such as France and Italy, to take preventive measures and to reinforce their anti-terrorist laws and pushes the EU to accelerate the implementation of exceptional anti-terrorist precautions established in 2004.

**Portugal**

- The month of July is marked by a drought over 97% of the territory, causing a 70% decrease in the production of cereals and numerous fires in the forests which, on the 21st of July, cause one death.

- On the 15th of July, 500,000 workers protest against the tax increase and the reduction of public expenses. On the 20th of July, the Minister of Finance,
Luis Campos e Cunha, responsible for implementing these unpopular measures, resigns mentioning family reasons and tiredness as the main factors. On the same day, the Prime Minister Jose Socrates appoints Fernando Teixeira dos Santos as Minister of Finance and they both declare that they will continue following Campos e Cunha’s policy.

- On the 20th of July, the EMU communicates to Portugal a deadline of 2008 to adjust its public deficit to the criteria (3% of the GDP) established by the EU Growth and Stability Pact.

Spain

- During the month of July, Spain experiences the most severe drought in the last 60 years, which makes necessary to ration water. The country is affected by numerous fires in the forests; one fire in particular, in a national park at 160 Km south of Madrid, on the 16th of July costs the life of 14 voluntary firemen.
- On the 3rd of July, the Basque regional President declares that the Spanish government has started negotiations with the Basque terrorist group ETA. Representatives from the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) deny the start of negotiations. ETA claims responsibility for four bomb attacks in the north of Spain on the 12th of July and two in the south of Madrid on the 29th of July.
- On the 15th of July, the Moroccan Abdeneri Essebar is arrested, suspected of being member of a terrorist organisation and of having helped a terrorist involved in the 11th of March attacks in Madrid to escape the country. Essebar, who lost his daughter in law in the attack, denies the accusations.

France

- During the month of July, the two main branches of the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FNLC), the FNLC-Fighters Union and the FNLC-October 22, claim responsibility for numerous recent attacks in Corsica. The FNLC-Fighters Union accuses the French government of being reactionary and the Corsica administration of being subjugated. On the 29th of July, two Corsicans, suspected of being involved in the FNLC-October 22 attacks in 2003, are brought to justice.
- On the 10th of July, the government imposes water rationing in half of its regions because of the drought, the worst France has experienced in the last 30 years.
- On the 12th of July, a court in Lyon confirms the expulsion of two Muslim girls because they were wearing an Islamic headscarf.
- On the 13th of July, judicial sources confirm that Athman Deramchi (Abbou Yousef), alleged member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), has been arrested in France on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by Italy.
- On the 26th of July, in response to the 7th of July terrorist attacks in London, the Internal Security Council, led by the President of the Republic, Jacques Chirac, introduces new anti-terrorist measures (more earlier surveillance of suspected individuals, the compulsory withholding of emails and telephone calls for one year, the installation of cameras in train and bus stations in Paris) which will have to be introduced by the legislative power in Autumn. As for prevention, the government expels radical imams, withdraws from the Schengen zone in order to re-establish control over the borders and raises the level of security alert to the second highest level.
- On the 27th of July, the Mont Blanc tunnel trial ends in Belleville with the condemnation of 120 people and three companies, found guilty of murder and/or criminal negligence.

Italy

- On the first of July, the American ambassador is summoned in front of the Prime Minister Berlusconi, to clarify the American position in the kidnapping of the imam Mustafa Osama Nasr in Italy by the CIA in February 2003 and to ensure that the self-defence domestic law will be observed in the future. On the 25th of July, Italy issues six arrest warrants against CIA members. According to intelligence service experts, the CIA could not have operated without the complicity of the Italian government, which the government denies.
- On the 1st of July, the authorities declare of having dismantled the "Strategic Anti-Terrorism Department" an extreme-right illegal organisation which fights against extreme left and militant Islamism. The group, which includes several police officers, tried to obtain funds from the EU and the Vatican. A deputy of Berlusconi’s party, Forza Italia, has previously declared that the group had the approval of the police and the intelligence services.
- On the 7th of July, following the London attacks, Italy reinforces its police and military surveillance of potential targets and increases the attributions of the police force and the army in order to pursue and arrest suspects. On the 9th and 10th of July, 142 people, mainly illegal immigrants, are arrested in Milan. On the 29th of July, the Senate (Higher House) approves the proposals of the Minister of Home Affairs, Giuseppe Picardi, to authorise that terrorist suspects are detained for 24 hours without charges and that the communication surveillance is reinforced. On the 13th of July, a Moroccan and a Tunisian, members of a terrorist group, are found guilty of having planned an attack against Italian interests.
- On the 8th of July, three alleged members of the Red Brigades are given a life sentence for the assassination of Massimo d’Antona, a government councillor, in May 1999.
- On the 14th of July, a great majority of prosecutors and judges in the country demonstrate against the controversial reform of a judicial law, which implicates their independence. Following the President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi’s refusal to sign for this law in December 2004, on the 20th of July the Prime Minister presents a new version of the legislation.

Malta

- On the 9th of July, the La Vallette’s forces of law and order declare that over 200 illegal immigrants, amongst which a majority of Eritreans and Ethiopians, have arrived on the Maltese island of Gozo, which represents the most significant arrival of illegal immigrants since 1991.
Slovenia

- On the 2nd of July, 7 Slovenian residents originating from other ex-Yugoslav republics start a hunger strike in the name of approximately 18,000 people removed from the national registers by the Ljubljana authorities in 1992, one year after its independence. The group demands the granting of a right of residence to former Croats, Bosnians and Serbs present in Slovenia, right which would allow them to find work and be covered by health insurance. In April, electors opposed a law proposal which would return the right of residence to the 18,000 people concerned via referendum.

Croatia

- On the 12th of July, the House of Representatives (Lower House) approves the nomination of Ivica Kirin as Minister of Home Affairs.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- On the 11th of July, the 10th anniversary of the massacre of 7,500 Muslims in Srebrenica is commemorated in presence of the Serb President, Boris Tadic, who hasn’t gone as far as to apologise for the role of the Serb forces in the massacre. On the 28th of July, the wife of Radovan Karadzic’s, Serb leader responsible of the massacre, publicly asks him to give himself in.
- On the 20th and 22nd of July, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), decides to transfer the cases of five Serb Bosnians to the Yugoslav (ICTY), decides to transfer the cases of five Serb Bosnians to Bosnian Courts.

Serbia and Montenegro

- On the 3rd of July, three bombs explode in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, targeting the offices of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), OSCE’s headquarters and Kosovo’s legislative power. These attacks coincide with the launch of an evaluation by the special UN envoy, Kai Eide, to determine if Kosovo has reached a sufficient level of democracy to start negotiating on its status.
- On the 18th of July, a special Serb Court condemns seven former members of the Serb security system, amongst which Milorad Lukovic, leader of the Special Operations Unit “Red Berets” and Radomir Markovic, former State Security Chief, to long prison sentences for the abduction and assassination of the former Serb President Ivan Stambolic in 2000. During the verdict, the judge declares that President Slobodan Milosevic, his successor, was behind this assassination, even though Milosevic denies these accusations.

Macedonia

- On the 6th of July, Greece announces that it will check the existence of “irredentist” maps in Macedonia’s school books, the country which Greece calls “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM), insisting on the fact that this is a “very serious” and recurrent problem. On the same day, the Greek newspaper Kathimerini states that FYROM students are taught that a part of their country is occupied by Bulgarians and Greeks.

Albania

- On the 3rd of July, the centre-right formation of the conservative former Albanese President Sali Berisha, wins the legislative elections against the Socialist Party of the outgoing Prime Minister, Fatos Nano and left-wing formations. Several formations and political parties lodge complaints denouncing the invalidity of the ballots in several constituencies. The OSCE, the European Parliament, the EU Council and the European Council criticise the elections’ process, claiming that they have only partially responded to democratic criteria. On the 8th of July, socialists accuse Berisha’s democratic party of having rigged the legislative elections’ results in several constituencies.

Greece

- On the 3rd of July, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, Costas Caramanlis and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, place the first stone of a 300 km pipeline which will connect both countries in 2006. This work will transport natural gas from the Caspian Sea to Western Europe.
- On the 27th of July the “Popular Revolutionary Action”, an extreme-left unknown group, which made its first appearance two years ago, claims responsibility for three explosions which occurred during the last eight months in front of the premises of some construction companies in Athens, and announces new attacks. In a letter addressed to the Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia, it declares that these bomb attacks intend to denounce those enterprises that have profited from the works for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games. The explosions which caused no victims and minor damages occurred in December in front of the Technical Olympic facilities, in May in front of AVAX facilities and this month in front of the firm BTP Aktor respectively.

Cyprus

- On the 27th of July, an Imair plane, a private airplane company from Azerbaijan, which landed in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), only recognised by Ankara, represents the first non-Turkish commercial flight to the north of Cyprus in over 30 years. The plane transports a group of around 90 businessmen, bureaucrats, artists and journalists who are going there to meet the Cypriot Turkish leader Mehmet Ali Talat and other TRNC officials, as well as businessmen.
- On the 28th of July, the EU Cypriot Commissioner, Markos Kyprianou, accuses the TRNC authorities of having stopped him from entering the Northern occupied area of the island despite the diplomatic privileges in use for European diplomats. He declares that “with such decision, M. Talat is imposing confinement to the Turkish Cypriots and cannot complain as Europeans wish to see them but he refuses to let them in.”

Turkey

- During the month of July, 55 soldiers and 36 rebels die in the south-east of the country following clashes between the army and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Kurdish People Defence Forces. On the 1st of July, the police kill a member of the People’s Liberation Front of Kurdistan, who was about to enter the Ministry of Justice in Ankara and explode himself. On the 10th
of July, 22 people are injured in an attack near Cesme, for which a branch of the PKK, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) claims responsibility. The PKK denies being involved. On the 16th of July, five people are killed in a bomb attack in the seaside resort of Kusadasi. In front of this situation of violence, on the 19th of July, General Ilker Basbug, the second highest officer of the High Command, declares that the level of violence has not reached that of the 90's and that the armed forces have the situation under control.

- On the 29th of July, Turkey signs the Ankara protocol extending the Customs Union with the EU, to 10 new European State members, amongst which is Cyprus. By signing, Turkey fulfils the last key condition for its accession negotiations to start. Turkey specifies that this signature does not entail the country's recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. This statement concerns the European Parliament as well as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, which threatens to vote against the opening of negotiations if Turkey does not recognise the Republic before the 3rd of October. A European survey published on the 18th of July, reveals that 65% of Europeans are against Turkey joining. On the 27th the EU President, Tony Blair, reasserts his support for Turkey’s entry, underlining its importance for European security.

**Syria**

- On the 3rd of July, under external pressure to fight against the insurrection in Iraq and to arrest militants who use the Syrian territory to organise the Iraq insurrection, the government proceeds to arrest 34 suspect militants near the Lebanese border. On the 4th of July, confrontations erupt on the mountain of Qaissou, 4 km from Damascus, between Syrian security forces and Iraqi rebels causing the death of a policeman and the arrest of a Lebanese suspect. Amongst the Iraqi rebels are the former body guards of the ex-Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein.

- On the 14th of July, the Financial Times reports that Syria has drastically reinforced its controls at the Lebanese border, as political tensions between the two countries increase.

**Lebanon**

- On the 12th of July, the pro-Syrian Minister of Defence, Elias Murr, is seriously injured by the explosion of his car. Two civilians die in this attack, which is another attack to add to the series of attacks against pro-Syrian dignitaries.

- On the 18th of July, the National Assembly (unicameral) approves a law abolishing the former Maronite leader of the Lebanese Forces militia, Samir Geagea, sentenced to life in 1994 for the murder of some of his rivals and of Prime Minister Rachid Karami. Geagea, detained for 11 years in isolation, is released on the 26th of July. The Assembly also releases approximately 40 Islamic militants, some of which are suspected of having connections with Al-Qaeda; they were accused of plotting to attempt against embassies in Beirut.

- On the 19th of July, the new Prime Minister Fuad Siniora presents his new government, which consists of the members of the anti-Syrian coalition, amongst which Siniora’s Future Current, led by Saad al-Hariri son of the former Prime Minister assassinated in February, the Democratic Rally, lead by the Druze Walid Jumblatt, as well as the Shiite groups Hezbollah and Amal. Hezbollah, that for the first time takes part in a government, is given the ministerial portfolio for energy and water. For the first time in Lebanese history, the government includes a woman, Na'ilah Mouawad, widow of the former President Rene Mouawad, assassinated in 1989; she becomes the Minister of Social affairs. Even though the Anti-Syrian coalition holds two thirds of the National Assembly’s seats, some key positions are still in the hands of people considered to be Pro-Syrian (Ministries of Defence, Justice and Foreign Affairs). On the 22nd of July, in support of the new government, the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pays a surprise visit to Lebanon. She requests that the Hezbollah guerrillas are disarmed in respect of the United Nations resolution 1559 (2004).

**Jordan**

- On the 3rd of July, King Abdullah II embarks on a ministerial reorganisation, which is perceived as an attempt to appease conservatives and members of tribal origins in the House of Representatives, who threatened to withdraw their confidence in the government of Adnan Badran. This is because the cabinet he formed in April did not include a member originating from the South of the country and because the economic department of the government includes Jordanians of Palestinian origins.

**Egypt**

- On the 2nd of July, the Cairo Judges Club publishes a report accusing the government of having falsified the numbers of those participating in the national referendum which approved the constitutional amendments in favour of a multi-party system. The report declares that officials were threatened if they did not falsify the results. The Club campaigns for a complete supervision of future Presidential elections. On the 6th of July, a court in Cairo postpones the trial of Ayman Nur, leader of the opposition party al Ghad, accused of forging signatures in order to put himself forward for Presidential elections to the 25th of September. On the 20th of July, the reformist opposition movement Kifaya calls for a boycott of Presidential elections describing them as illegal. The movement’s announcement follows the withdrawal of two reformers from the electoral campaign, the feminist writer Nawal Saadawi and the human rights and sociology activist Saadeddin Ibrahim, who have been arrested on several occasions.

- On the 23rd of July, three bombs explode in Sharm-el-Sheikh, causing the death of 88 people, amongst which tourists and Egyptian workers. The Al-Qaeda group in Egypt and in Syria, Abdullah Azzam’s Brigades and the Saint Fighters for Egypt, immediately claim responsibility for the attack. Some time later, a third group, the Tawhid and the Egyptian Jihad claim responsibility for the attack and declare to target “crusaders” in the name of Al-Qaeda. On the 24th of July, the government declares that approximately twelve Bedouins have been arrested in relation with the investigation.

**Libya**

- On the 1st of July, a spokesman from the prosecutor in Mannheim (Germany)
declares that a German suspected of having helped Libya between 2001 and 2003 to obtain centrifuges allowing uranium enrichment with the prospect of making nuclear weapons, is detained in Germany. The man is suspected of having been part of an international network for the traffic of high technology products, mainly operational since the 90’s in the emirate of Dubai.

* On the 4th and 5th of July, during the 5th Summit of the African Union in Sirte, the African leaders attempt to show that Africa can preserve its unity on crucial issues such as the G8 or its place in the UN and that Africa prioritises the interests of the continent to national ambitions. The African leaders postpone the designation of the countries entitled to the two permanent seats in the UN Security Council, which the continent claims and for which Egypt and Libya are candidates. The leaders reiterate their commitment to an increase in political integration, a key objective for the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, whose ultimate goal is to have “the United States of Africa”.

* On the 15th of July, the European Commission unfreezes one million euros, towards the long term action plan launched in Benghazi for the fight against AIDS in 2004. Here, over four hundred children and their mothers are infected with the virus.

* On the 21st of July, Omar Shaluf, father of the Libyan opponent Hadi Shaluf, resident in Paris, is assassinated in Zliten (to the East of Tripoli). The murder occurs three weeks after the first opposition congress in London. The case is followed by several NGOs and by the UN commission in Geneva.

**Tunisia**

* On the first of July, the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH – legal), the National Council for Liberties in Tunisia (CNLT – not recognised), the International Association for Support for Political Prisoners in Tunisia (AIAPPT – not recognised) and the Association for the Fight against Torture (ALTT-not recognised), launch a campaign to promote a general amnesty in favour of prisoners of conscience and detainees sentenced for political offences. On the 15th of July, as launching a new website on freedom of expression in Tunisia, the Tunisian Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of 13 organisations members of the International Federation of Expression Exchange (IFEX), asks the Tunisian government to put an end to the blocking of internet before the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Tunis, in November 2005. According to the TMG website, the government systematically censors the access to no fewer than 20 websites offering independent information and providing an analysis of political issues and human rights in Tunisia. On the 18th of July, a second private radio station, “Radio Jawhara”, is formed in Tunisia. On the 25th of July, Mohammed Abbou, “the lawyer for freedom” detained since the 1st of March 2005, starts a new hunger strike in order to inform the Tunisian and international public opinions on the violations of human rights in Tunisia.

* On the 3rd of July, Tunisia makes a step forward towards democracy by setting up a Higher House, two thirds of which is voted for by the Chamber of Deputies (National Assembly) and by local councillors. Following this election, President Ben Ali’s party, which already controls 80% of the National Assembly’s seats, reinforces its position in the Parliament by obtaining an overwhelming majority of seats in the new Higher House of the Parliament.

* On the 25th of July, in a talk during the occasion of the Republic’s 48th anniversary, President Ben Ali announces a bill in favour of legal opposition. In accordance with this bill, the opposition parties who have seats in the local constituencies will occupy 20% of seats in regional councils. The future law is intended to benefit four opposition parties. During his talk, the President rules out any possibility of dialogue with the Islamist opposition, putting an end to speculations on an eventual dialogue with the Islamist party Ennahdha (Renaissance), dismantled and forbidden in 1990.

**Algeria**

* From the 5th to the 10th of July, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), led by President Sidiki Kaba, pays a visit to Algeria. In a joint statement, the FIDH and its affiliate Algerian Human Rights League, request the removal of the state of urgency which has been in force for 13 years and express their concerns on the consequent judicial proceedings involved against journalists and press companies. They ask the government to “respect and enforce respect of press freedom” and the judicial body “to not submit to pressures from the Executive Power”. As for the amnesty law, the FIDH alerts against impunity.

* On the 17th of July, the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika orders the dissolution of local councils in Kabylie, in line with the peace plan signed in January with the Berber minority of the country. Kabylians have largely boycotted local elections in 2002 because of a disagreement with the government and since then have asked President Bouteflika to dissolve the assemblies elected in order to organise a new ballot. The Socialist Forces Front (FFS), a party essentially based in Kabylie and which are threatened to lose many of its seats during the next ballot, denounces Bouteflika’s decision and threatens to organise demonstrations.

* On the 17th of July, President Bouteflika takes advantage of parliamentary holidays to let a decree pass abolishing a law that was passed the previous year on the initiative of Islamist parties, which prohibited the country to import beer and wine. This decision should facilitate negotiations to enter the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

**Morocco**

* On the 5th of July, a Moroccan Tribunal sentence Mohcine Bouarfa and Taoufik Hanouichi, two extremist Islamists leading members of a cell affiliated to the Jihad Salafist Group to death. They are accused for the murders of five of their compatriots, amongst which a Jew trader killed in Casablanca, a former official in the Ministry of Home Affairs and a policeman. Thirty one other members of this Salafist cell receive sentences of up to 20 years of criminal reclusion.

* On the 30th of July, during the occasion of the anniversary of his enthronement, Mohammed VI announces that from now on Moroccan nationality can be passed on from the mother, putting...
an end to the unequal treatment of men and women present in the nationality code.

**European Union**

- On the first of July, the United Kingdom takes on the EU rotating presidency again. The British presidency’s main concerns are an agreement on the European budget reform and its priorities, an agreement on services liberalisation, the opening of entry negotiations with Turkey on the 3rd of October and progress on Doha negotiations in the framework of the WTO in Hong Kong next December. Progress should be based on a higher economic growth and an improved access to the markets for developing countries.
- On the 5th of July, the 5 main member states (G5: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) together in Evian, agree to deport repelled asylum seekers and illegal immigrants on common charter flights. On the 26th of July, the first flight, organised by France and the United Kingdom, leaves for Afghanistan.
- On the 12th of July, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC) condemns France to pay a “combined” fine without precedents of 20 million euros plus 57.8 millions every six months for future non compliance of the Common Fishing regulation.
- On the 13th of July, 6 days following the London bombings, the Council of Justice and Home Affairs urgently get together in Brussels to anticipate the implementation of anti-terror exceptional measures established in the November 2004 Hague’s programme for freedom, security and justice. These measures include compulsory withholding of telephonic data and emails and a more systematic exchange of information between the 25 members Security Agencies.

**August 2005**

The ‘Al-Qaeda attack in Aqaba, which was intended to hit American and Israeli targets, kills a Jordanian soldier. The new Lebanese Prime Minister goes to Syria in order to improve bilateral relations, which deteriorated because of the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and because of the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon. Arrests and interrogations concerning Hariri’s assassination enquiry continue in Lebanon, whilst the UN criticise the lack of Syrian cooperation in the enquiry. Another bomb explodes in a Christian district of Beirut. In Algeria, President Bouteflika publishes his project “Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation”. The assassination of two Serbs in Kosovo threatens the re-commencement of ethnic conflicts. In Turkey, while the Kurdistan’s Worker’s Party (PKK) is accused for having killed two civilians in an attack in Ankara at the beginning of the month, in mid August it announces a month long unilateral ceasefire. The debate surrounding the Turkish declaration on the country not recognising the Republic of Cyprus, together with signing the Ankara agreement, threaten the opening of negotiations for Turkey’s entry into the EU. Finally, one of the key suspects in the terrorist attack of March the 11th 2004 in Madrid, is arrested in Algeria.

**Portugal**

- During the month of August, fires in the woods continue.
- On the 29th of August, the director of the Alien and Border Service, Manuel Jarmela Palos, criticises the immigration law, which according to him is “too restrictive” and “totally inappropriate for the Portuguese reality”. He recommends the suppression of the obligation made to foreigners wishing to legally establish themselves in Portugal; this entailing them to get a working contract beforehand.
- On the 31st of April, the socialist Mario Soares, twice President of Portugal between 1986 and 1996, announces that he will put himself forward in the Presidential elections in January 2006. He declares the situation of crisis the country is going through and Portugal’s pessimist attitude induced him to present himself as a candidate; he believes it is necessary “to fight against this mindset”. The Portuguese socialist Manuel Alegre renounces to put himself forward in the presidential elections to avoid dividing the left-wing representation.

**Spain**

- On the 5th of August, 19 Africans wishing to emigrate illegally to Europe through the Spanish Canary Islands archipelago, die as their boat sinks off the Atlantic coast. There are two survivors.
- On the 9th of August, the Minister of economy and finances, Pedro Solbes, reveals the 2006 budget, according to which public expenses will increase of 7.6% on average and the main priorities will be social housing and research.
- On the 17th of August, the Spanish Ministry of Home Affairs tries to obtain his extradition as soon as possible.
- On the 26th of August and during the night of the 28th, hundreds of immigration candidates try to forcefully access the Spanish enclave of Melilla (in the North of Morocco). There are several injured.

**France**

- Between the first and the 11th of August, opponents of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) devastate 5 experimental fields in the centre and in the South of the country.
- On the 2nd of August, the Council of Ministers introduce a decree with new measures intending to create a more flexible work market and to promote the establishment of new positions for young people amongst others. The opposition parties accuse the government of not having put the measures to the vote of the legislative power before introducing them. On the 9th of August, the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) declares that two decrees violate French obligations contracted under the International Labour Organisation and the European Social Charter. During the course of August, another dispute erupts as the government announces its plan to privatise motorway operating companies, hoping to get 12 billion euros. The Minister of the Economy, Finance and Industry, Thierry Breton declares that one billion will be allocated to infrastructure projects and that
the rest will be employed to decrease national debt.

• On the 5th and 26th of August, two alleged radical islamists are deported to Algeria. One of them is Amar Heraz, who returned to France after being expelled once before, the other is Khelaf Hamam, sentenced at the beginning of the year for having helped in recruiting and training Muslims for the “holy war”.

• On the 26th and 29th of August, there are two fires in social housing estates occupied by immigrants in Paris which cause the death of 24 people, amongst which 14 are children. These intensify the polemics surrounding the immigrants’ accommodation conditions in the country.

Italy

• On the 25th of August, the Red Cross recognises that in September 2004 it let four Iraqi rebels pass through the American roadblocks in Iraq in exchange for the release of two Italian hostages. The Red Cross adds that the Italian government is not involved but that a member was warned of the operation. The Intelligence Services Agent, Nicola Calipari, took part to the exchange.

• On the 26th of August, Antonio Fazio, the governor of the Italian Bank (central bank) presents himself in front of the Ministers to face accusations according to which he helped the recovery of the 9th Italian Bank, Banca Antonveneta, through the Italian Popular Bank (BPI) against the Netherlands bank ABN Amro. Fazio is already the object of a European Commission’s investigation for the same reasons.

Malta

• On the 9th of August, an Algerian and two Maltese, who attempted to let 25 illegal immigrants pass from Malta to Sicily, are given custodial sentences ranging from 3 to 5 years.

• On the 23rd of August, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the European Council anti-corruption mechanism, publishes the Second Round Evaluation Report on Malta with the agreement of Maltese authorities. The report indicates that Malta has introduced several ethical codes, especially within those sectors most vulnerable to corruption but that the country still does not have a global anti-corruption strategy.

Croatia

• On the 4th of August, Croatia denounced as “inappropriate” the Serb Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica’s comments describing the Croatian military operation Tempest conducted ten years ago which put an end to the Serb-Croatian war of 1991-1995 as “ethnic cleansing”. A Croatian government statement specifies that the Tempest’s operation essential goal was to free the territories occupied by Serb secessionists.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

• On the 8th of August, the Serb-Bosnian Milan Lukic, accused of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for the actions committed as a member of the paramilitary group “White Eagles”, which was active in the city of Vojsegrad between 1992 and 1994, is arrested in Argentina. In September 2003, he was condemned in absence to 20 years of prison by a court in Belgrade.

• On the 26th of August, the arrest of the Serb-Bosnian paramilitary, Dragan Zelenovic in Russia becomes known.

Serbia and Montenegro

• On the 27th of August, 2 Serbs die and another one is seriously injured as their car is targeted by shooting in the province of Kosovo. The leader of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Soren Jessen-Petersen, shocked by the attack, urges the police to quickly arrest the culprits.

Greece

• On the 14th of August, Greece experiences its worse flight accident in Greece’s history, with the crash of a plane from a Greek-Cypriot company Helios, in the mountains to the North East of Athens, killing 114 passengers and 6 flight crew members.

Cyprus

• On the 30th of August, the Minister of finance, Makis Keravnos, resigns to accept the position of executive director of the Hellenic Bank. On the 31st of August, the Greek-Cypriot President, Tassos Papadopulos, appoints the former director of the World Bank, Mihalakis Sarris, to fill the vacancy.

Turkey

• During the month of August, 17 soldiers and 18 rebels are killed in the east of the country during clashes between the army and the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Kurdish People Defence Forces (HPG). On the 4th of August, Kurds are accused of having caused a bomb explosion in Ankara, which caused the death of a woman and her daughter. On the 6th of August, a bomb explodes in Istanbul airport, injuring three people. On the same day, 5 people are arrested, amongst which an alleged member of the PKK, as they are suspected of intending to organise an attack in the seaside city of Mersin. On the 7th of August, two people die in Ankara as a bomb that they are trying to set explodes.

• On the 2nd of August, following Turkey’s declaration on the 29th of July, stating that signing the Ankara agreement does not entail an official recognition of the Greek Republic of Cyprus, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dominique de Villepin, warns Turkey that not recognising the country could block the opening of entry negotiations, due to start on the 3rd of October. On the 4th of August, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declares that he will not accept new conditions for the negotiations to open and adds that the 25 members have already agreed on the opening of Turkey’s entry negotiations during the European Summit in December 2004. He specifies that in December 2004, the French President Jacques Chirac declared that signing the Ankara agreement would not imply the Republic’s recognition. On the 26th of August, the German opposition leader, Angela Merkel (CDU), in a letter addressed to EU State’s conservative leaders, declares that negotiations should not automatically lead to Turkey joining
but could rather lead towards a “privileged partnership”.

- On the 10th of August, the Syrian Hamed Oysi is arrested in Antalya and accused of being part of a terrorist organisation. On the 11th of August, the Syrian Luai Sakra, suspected of being linked to Oysi and of having planned an attack against an Israeli cruise ship as well as of being involved in attacks against Jewish and English targets in Istanbul in November 2003, is wanted by a court in Istanbul.

- On the 12th of August during a visit to the Kurdish village in the South East of the country, the Prime Minister Erdogan recognises that the government has made mistakes concerning the treatment of Kurds and promises to be more democratic in the future. On the 17th of August, the pro-Kurdish People Democratic Party (DEHAP), dissolves to join the ranks of the Democratic Society Movement (DTH), led by Leyla Zana, a Kurdish activist who was a member of the Turkish Democratic Party, which also dissolved. On the 19th of August, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) announces a month long unilateral ceasefire after the DTH requested to put an end to the violence.

Syria

- On the 31st of July, the new Lebanese Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora, pays an official visit to Syria with the objective of improving bilateral relations which have seriously deteriorated since the forced withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon at the beginning of the year. Siniora discusses problems that have arisen between the two countries with his Syrian equivalent, Mohammad Naji Otri and mostly about the blockade imposed since over a month ago, preventing the transit of Lebanese goods through Damascus towards Arab countries. On the first of August, Syria gives instructions to facilitate the transit of lorries at the Lebanese border.

- On the 15th of August, Ammar Koumban, member of the Arab Organisation for Human Rights in Syria, declares that Syrian police has arrested approximately 35 Kurds near Alep, in the North of the country, following confrontations during a Kurdish demonstration, which intended to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). This rally was forbidden by the authorities.

- On the 23rd of August, the Iraqi Minister of Transport, Salam al-Maliki, asks Iraq’s neighbouring countries to monitor the borders in order to prevent armed men from infiltrating the country. On the 25th of August, Ibrahim Gambari, the UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, declares in New York that Syria fails to cooperate with the UN Enquiry Commission on Hariri’s assassination. The Commission has been asking the country for documents and for the possibility to interrogate 5 Syrian witnesses for the past six weeks. Following Gambari’s statement, the Security Council publishes a declaration where, without mentioning Syria, it invites all parties and “those in particular who have not yet responded in an adequate manner” to fully cooperate with the UN enquiry. The American UN Ambassador, John Bolton, expresses his disappointment in front of “the Syrian lack of cooperation”. On the 28th of August, the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, agrees that his country will fully cooperate in the UN enquiry on the assassination of the Lebanese former Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri.

Lebanon

- On the 22nd of August, a bomb explodes in the predominantly Christian district of Zaïka in the North of Beirut, injuring 5 people.


- On the 30th of August, the Major General Jamil Sayyed, Brigadier General Ali al-Hajj and Brigadier General Raymon Azar, three former members of the Security who have tight links with Syria and who resigned in April, are arrested in order to be interrogated by the UN Enquiry Commission on the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. The Brigadier General Mustafa Hamdan, the actual Head of the Lebanese Republican Guard Brigade and President Emile Lahoud’s closest councillor, hands himself over to the Commission after being summoned by the police.

Nasser Qandil, former Pro-Syrian member of the National Assembly, is also detained.

Jordan

- On the 19th of August, a series of rockets aimed at the American warfare ship USS Ashland stationed in the port of Aqaba and aimed at the Israeli port of Eilat, miss their target killing a Jordanian soldier and injuring another. The Al-Qaeda Abdullah al-Azzam Brigades in the Levant and in Egypt, claim responsibility for the attack and threatens the Americans against carrying out other attacks against them. They also ask the King of Jordan, Abdullah II, to release their brother prisoners and to abdicate before being forced to. On the 22nd of August, the government declares that the Syrian Mohammed Hassan Abdullah al-Sihly organised an attack with his two sons and an Iraqi and that he has been arrested. On the 23rd of August, the Al-Qaeda organisation for the “Holy War” in Iraq claims responsibility for this attack.

Egypt

- On the first of August, one of the main suspects for the Sharm-el-Sheikh attacks of the 23rd of July, Mohammed Fumayfel, is killed during clashes with the security forces in Attauq, near Suez. On the 22nd of August, following searches carried out in the main city at the North East of Sinai, El Arish, security forces detain 500 people to interrogate them about the attacks.

- On the 11th of August, the electoral commission publishes the list of ten candidates authorised to put themselves forward in the presidential elections of the 7th of September. Amongst the adversaries of President Hosni Mubarak, there is the leader of the opposition party al Ghad, Ayman Nur and the President of the opposition party Neo-Wafid, Numan Gomaa. On the 21st of August, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, the leader of the Muslim Brothers calls Egyptians to vote in droves but advises not to vote for the current President.

Libya

- On the 21st of August, the son of the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Al
Gaddafi, Seif al-Islam, announces that the government intends to free 131 political prisoners, amongst which some members of the Muslim Brothers, an organisation which is forbidden in Libya. He also announces that the government will compensate those who have had their houses or properties confiscated during the “Green Revolution” in the 70's.

- On the 21st and 22nd of August, the President of the American Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Richard Lugar, goes to Libya.

**Tunisia**

- On the 17th of August, President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali starts a ministerial reorganisation. The current Prime Minister Abdelkabi Hermassi is replaced by Abdelwahab Abdullah, a long-standing councillor of Ben Ali.

- On the 9th of August, the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika publishes his proposal for the Defence of Human Rights (LADDH) demands truth and justice on the atrocities carried out during violence in Algeria, before any national reconciliation which would absolve the culprits.

**Morocco**

- On the first of August, a Moroccan, attempting to reach Europe illegally on board of a ship filled with dozens of immigration candidates, is killed by gunshots during clashes with the Moroccan Security forces. This death is the first one of its kind since the Moroccan authorities reinforced their suppression of illegal immigration this year following promises made to the European Union regarding this matter.

- On the 16th of August, Moroccan police arrests 13 Islamist activists accused of having attempted to carry out attacks in the country with the support of Algerian rebels from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).

**September 2005**

Mohammed Hosni Mubarak is elected for his sixth consecutive term in office as President of Egypt during the first disputed presidential elections the country has experienced. While the United States removes some sanctions against Syria, international pressures against Syria in Lebanese and Iraqi records intensify. The UN Commission’s enquiry investigation on the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri continues with the arrest of four high-ranking officials of Lebanese security, the interrogation of the Syrian Interior Minister and of the leader of Syrian Security Services in Lebanon. In Maghreb, an overwhelming majority of Algerians approve President Bouteflika’s “Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation”. The death of 5 Subsaharians who attempted to enter the Spanish enclave of Ceuta during a collective assault, initiates the polemic on illegal immigration in the region. Relations between Europe and Turkey are tense concerning the latter’s entry into the Union because of the proposal made by some European countries to only offer a “privileged partnership” to Turkey and because of the EU's official declaration stating Turkey’s obligation to recognise the Republic of Cyprus before joining. Kurdistan’s Worker’s Party (PKK) extends its ceasefire to the third of October, the day established for the opening of Turkey’s entry negotiations. The most important islamists’ trial in Europe ends in Madrid with the conviction of 18 Members of Al-Qaeda. For the first time in two years, Ministers of the Serb auto governance in Kosovo, meet to discuss decentralisation.

**Portugal**

- On the 19th of September, the government forbids Portuguese soldiers to demonstrate in front of the Parliament on the 21st of September. Against austerity measures introduced by the government; offenders will be given disciplinary sanctions. On the 21st of September, the soldiers’ wives demonstrate in the soldier’s place. The government and those responsible for the Army believe that the participation of functional soldiers will call into question “the discipline and cohesion” of the armed forces. Portuguese soldiers request the mediation of the President of the Republic, Jorge Sampaio, in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the country’s Armed Forces.

- On the 19th of September, European Finance Ministers formally accept, as the Commission has proposed, to give Portugal more time up to 2008 to reduce its public deficit – which should
come to 6.2% of the GDP in 2005 – under the 3% of GDP mark authorised by the Stability and Growth Pact.

Spain

• On the 15th of September, the Congress of Deputies (Lower House) introduces new legislation, which gives the government the approval of the legislative power over all deployment of Spanish troops abroad.
• On the 26th of September, the most important extremist islamists’ trial in Europe ends in Madrid with the conviction of 18 Members of Al-Qaeda. The Syrian Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, leader of Al-Qaeda in Spain, is sentenced to 27 years in prison for having organised a meeting in Spain in July 2001 during which the last preparations for the terrorist attack of September the 11th 2001 in the United States were organised. Mohammed Atta, one of the September the 11th kamikazes and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a high-ranking member of Al-Qaeda, took part in this meeting. The other 17 people accused, mainly of Moroccan or Algerian origins, are convicted to prison with sentences going from 6 to 11 years for being part of or having helped a terrorist network.
• On the 30th of September, the Parliament of the autonomous Community of Catalonia approves the constitutional statute which allows for a legal independent system in the Catalan community, the right to raise taxes and to be considered as a “nation” by 120 votes to 15. The statute will have to be accepted by the National Congress of Deputies (Lower House), but the Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero already intimated that he will not reject the statute in its entirety.

France

• On the 9th of September, two Sikh boys are expelled from their schools in the suburbs of Paris for having refused to remove their headscarves, violating the 2004 law which forbids wearing ostentatious religious symbols at state schools. Despite some rare exceptions, from the start of the school year there has been almost full respect of the law mentioned above.

Italy

• On the 11th of September, the President of the Movement for France (MPF), Philippe de Villiers, announces that he will put himself forward in the 2007 presidential elections. He will campaign against the “islamisation of France”.
• On the 16th of September, the Minister of Justice Pascal Clément, in order to fight against extremist proselytism in prisons, announces the nomination of the French Moulay el-Hassan el-Alaoui Talibi as the first Muslim chaplain in French prisons.
• On the 19th of September, people hear that the former Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry, Hervé Gaymard, will reimburse 58,894 euros to the State for having rented a luxury apartment in Paris, which led to his resignation.
• On the 26th of September, 9 alleged members of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), implied in the organisation of terrorist attacks in Paris, are arrested during police raids in the West and North West of the country. Amongst these is Safe Bourada, released in 2003, after having served half of his sentence for his involvement in the 1995 Paris attacks.
• On the 27th of September, a ferry from the National Maritime Company Corsica-Mediterranean (SNCM) is kidnapped in Marseille by 30 members of the Corsican Worker’s Union in protest against the government plan of privatising the SNCM which is in deficit. On the following day, paramilitary policemen resume control of the ferry without encountering any resistance. In protest, Trade Union Members and nationalists protest violently on the streets of Corse blocking the ports of Ajaccio and Bastia as well as the airport. The port of Marseille also experiences a block following the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) call for a strike. On the 29th of September, while the Prime Minister concedes that the State will keep 25% holdings in SNCM, trade unions are not satisfied and fear a loss of jobs.

Malta

• On the 28th of September, the authorities of Valletta organise together with the EU British presidency, a meeting gathering the representatives of the European Commission, Cyprus, Italy, Greece and Spain “to reinforce the capacity of research and rescue in the Mediterranean region in order to reduce human life losses”. Participants also encourage Malta to sign a bilateral agreement on this matter with the Libyan authorities.

Croatia

• On the 14th of September, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) accepts to transfer the trial of General Rahim Ademi and
of General Mirko Norac to a Croatian Court. This is the first time that the trial of people already indicted by the ICTY is transferred to Croatia.

- On the 20th of September, the General Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla Del Ponte, declares in an interview to The Daily Telegraph that general Ante Gotovina would be hidden in a Franciscan monastery in Croatia and that therefore the Catholic Church is protecting him. She adds that the Vatican refuses to cooperate with the Tribunal. On the 30th of September, during a visit to Croatia, she describes herself as being deceived of the country’s cooperation, despite certain positive developments.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- On the 16th of September, the Serb-Bosnian Sredoje Lukic, who handed himself over to the authorities of the Srpska, is transferred to the ICTY, accused of crimes against humanity and of violating the rules and customs of war. This is in relation to his activities within the paramilitary group “the White Eagles”, which operated together with the military units and the Serb Bosnian police in the city of Visegrad between 1992 and 1994.
- On the 29th of September, the Serb Bosnian Radovan Stankovic is transferred from the ICTY to Sarajevo to be judged by the Chamber for War Crimes in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the first transfer of a defendant the ICTY carries out towards this country.

Serbia and Montenegro

- On the 8th of September, Prvoslav Davinic resigns from the post of Minister of Defence following accusations of corruption.
- On the 15th of September, a Court in Belgrade issues an international arrest warrant against the wife of the former President of ex-Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, following her absence at her trial for corruption.
- On the 16th of September, the Serb Minister of State Administration and Local Self-Government, Zoran Loncar, and the Minister of Local Self-Government in Kosovo, Lutfi Haziri, meet in the Austrian capital to discuss decentralisation. This is the first high-level meeting between the two parties since October 2003. Not many concrete outcomes result from this meeting, but the two parties commit to continue negotiations.

Albania

- On the first of September, the Central Electoral Commission (KQZ), after having verified several complaints and reorganised the elections in three constituencies, announces the final result of the 3rd of July legislative elections, marking the victory of the centre-right opposition party, the Democratic Party of Albania (PDS) and its allies (80 seats out of 140). The Prime Minister Fatos Nano resigns describing the elections as “politically unacceptable”, the winners as “illegal” and declares that electoral violence is the basis of his defeat. Jozefina Tapolis becomes the first woman to occupy the Assembly President’s post. The government of Sali Berisha is approved by the Assembly on the 10th of September. On the 12th of September, the EU presidency welcomes the closing of the electoral process in Albania, which marks the first pacific transfer of power since the fall of communism.

Greece

- On the 8th of September, the Greek border guards arrest 118 illegal immigrants, crammed on board a semi-trailer, along with their three alleged Greek smugglers following a car chase near the Greek-Turkish border.

Cyprus

- On the first of September, the chief of the Cypriot diplomacy, George Laco-vou, requests a European response to the Turkish “provocative” declaration together with the protocol of the 29th of July expanding the Turkish customs union with the EU to the ten new state members. With respect to this document Ankara affirms that its signature does not entail recognition of the Cyprus Republic. On the 21st of September, after several weeks of discussions, the EU officially adopts a common declaration asking Turkey to recognise Cyprus before its entry into the European block and highlights that otherwise its entry negotiations might be affected.

- On the 14th of September, the spokesman of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, announces the nomination of the Danish Michael Möller to be his special representative for Cyprus. Möller will also be the head of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). He will take up his post on the 30th of November.
- On the 18th of September, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, states in front of the United Nations General Assembly, that any progress towards the settlement of the Cypriot affair will be difficult while the Turkish military occupation of the Northern part of the island continues and that he wishes the involvement of the European Union. On the 21st of September, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, during his talk to the Assembly, blames the failure of the Secretary General’s efforts to re-launch discussions on the basis of his peace plan, on the intransigence of the Greek Cypriot authorities which he accuses of intending to overlook the UN in their efforts to settle the Cypriot issues. Turkey adds that there will be no recognition of the Republic of Cyprus until a complete resolution is reached with regards to the United Nations.

Turkey

- On the 2nd of September, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, threatens to abandon negotiations for his country’s entry to the EU, if the EU has a different proposal other than the country fully joining the Union. On the 18th of September, the Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan asks Turkish electors in Germany to vote in the federal elections against Angela Merkel, candidate for the opposition Party CDU, which favours a “privileged partnership” between the EU and Turkey, rather than its entry. On the 23rd of September, the English Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Jack Straw, declares his support for Turkey’s entry which will help avoid a “clash of civilisations” and states that denying it would encourage extremist islams. On the 29th of September, the EU ambassadors in Brussels cannot reach an agreement regarding Turkey’s entry negotiations, as Austria demands that an alternative to the country’s entry be in-
introduced from the beginning. Austria, which prefers to establish a privileged partnership with Turkey, accuses the 25 members of “double standards” because they suspend negotiations with Croatia while they open them with Turkey.

- On the 4th of September, the police arrests 88 people following the clashes which erupted when Kurdish separatists were prevented from joining a protest rally against the isolation of the former Leader of Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan in a prison on the island of Imrali. 144 sympathizers of the PKK who went to this demonstration are assaulted by nationalists and confrontations with the nationalists throughout the day cause hundreds of injured. On the 21st of September, the PKK extends his unilateral ceasefire of a month up to the 3rd of October, the date when Turkey’s joining negotiations with the European Union are due to start. Despite the ceasefire, 45 soldiers are killed during the month during a confrontation with the PKK and the Turkish Army and the People’s Defence Force (HPG).

- On the 23rd of September, the European Commission condemns the decision of a court in Istanbul preventing a conference from taking place in two universities on the Armenians massacres under the Ottoman Empire between 1919 and 1923. The ban is finally lifted and the conference takes place in a third university.

Lebanon

- On the first of September, Detlev Mehlis, head of the UN Enquiry Commission on the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in February, announces he suspects Major-General Jamil Sayyed, Brigadier-General Ali al-Hajj, Brigadier-General Raymond Azar and Brigadier-General Mustafa Hamdan, four high-ranking Lebanese officials currently detained in Beirut, of having played a role in planning the attack. On the 3rd of September, the magistrate Elias Id issue arrest warrants against 4 people, known to have links with Syria. On the 12th of September, Mehlis and his team go to Syria, where they interrogate amongst others, the major-general Ghazi Ka’an and the head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, Col Rustum. When Mehlis visits, the head of military intelligence and the Syrian President’s brother in law, General Assaf Chaukat, is absent.

- During the month of September, continuing attacks in predominantly Christian districts of the capital increase since the assassination of Hariri. On the 25th of September, the Lebanese journalist and TV presenter, Mai Shidyak is the victim of an attack in the North of Beirut, which she will survive. A few hours earlier, she led a television debate on Syria’s involvement in Hariri’s assassination.

- On the 18th of September, the General Commander Michel Aoun, who returned to Lebanon in May after a long exile in France, announces the transformation of the Free Patriotic Movement, in a political party for “change and reform”.

Syria

- On the first of September, on the initiative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the heights of Golan (UNDOF), some 486 Sheiks from the Druze community, living in the occupied Golan, go to Damascus and stay four days in Syria.

- During the month of September, pressures against Syria increase with regards to the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and concerning American and Iraqi accusations that Syria does not cooperate enough to put an end to the Iraqi insurrection. On the 10th of September, the Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari demands the closure of the northern part of his border with Syria and imposes a curfew in the region next to the Rabiya frontier post. On the 15th of September, in a statement at Syria’s embassy in Washington, Syria says it is ready to cooperate with the American and Iraqi authorities to bring back security and stability. On the 19th of September, Americans organise a multilateral meeting within the United Nations, with the intention of isolating Damascus more on the international scene. On the 23rd of September, Syria imputes the infiltrations of rebels in Iraq to the United States. On the 25th of September, the Syrian President Bachar al-Assad meets his Egyptian equivalent Hosni Mubarak in Cairo to discuss diplomatic efforts intending to reduce tensions between Damascus and Washington regarding Lebanese and Iraqi dossiers and to prevent the isolation of Syria.

- On the 28th of September, exiled Syrians initiate a 2 day meeting in Paris for the political opposition to the Damascus regime, which gathers 30 participants and especially Kurd Syrians. The meeting intends to reunite Syrian opposition and to rally the International Community for its cause. The exiled demand the removal of President Bachar al-Assad from the regime without “foreign intervention”, the unity of the opposition, the creation of an independent judicial system, the freedom of press and political pluralism in Syria.

Jordan

- On the 3rd of September, the Jordanian security forces arrest three members of the islamist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir, whose leaders have encouraged hatred against Arab governments and have praised Iraqi rebels.

- On the 7th of September, a survey on the way Jordanians perceive the application of democracy in their country carried out by the Centre for Strategic Studies of the University of Jordan (CSS) between the 26th of August and the 1st of September, shows a general optimistic atmosphere on the progress of the level of liberties during this past year.

- On the 22nd of September, two Jordanians Moussa Khedr Ramadan and Mondher Mahmoud Saada, amongst which one was extradited by Syria, are brought before the court for having organised anti-American attacks in Jordan and for having attempted to join the Iraqi insurrection.

Egypt

- On the 7th of September, the President in power Mohammed Hosni Mubarak is elected with approximately 87% of votes to his sixth consecutive 5 year term in office; these elections will go down in history as the first multi-party system Presidential elections. The electoral participation is only of 23% (the re-
forming movement Kifaya called for a boycott) and the Presidential Electoral Commission refused to authorise NGOs to monitor the election, violating a court decision. On the 27th of September, President Mubarak takes an oath and declares in front of the Assembly that he will engage upon the path of reforms and national unity.

- On the 14th of September, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority meet in Urgada and commit to cooperate in promoting tourism projects together. This meeting is particularly dedicated to encouraging regional tourism, consulting tourism operators, coordinating security and facilitating conditions for granting visas.

**Libya**

- On the first of September, on occasion of the 36th anniversary of the revolution which brought Colonel Gaddafi to power in 1969, Libyan authorities grant an amnesty to 1,675 prisoners, of which 500 are foreign, who are serving sentences for minor offences.

- On the 28th of September, President George Bush lifts some of the weapon restrictions in Libya.

**Tunisia**

- On the 5th of September, Tunisian Justice suspends the opening of the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH) sixth conference, due on the 9th and 11th of September, also banning any preparatory activity. A “political decision under a judiciary guise” according to Me Mokhtar Trifi, the President of the League.

- On the 13th of September, the Tunisian Minister of Development and International Cooperation, Mohamed Nouiri Jouini, and the Director of the French Development Agency (AFD), Joëll Dali-gault sign a financing convention relating to projects safeguarding the Mediterranean. This is in line with the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) implemented by the UN.

- On the 28th and 29th of September in Tunis, the African Development Bank organises the first regional meeting for technical preparation to the 4th World Water Forum, whose objective is to coordinate the contribution and participation of Africa to this forum on a technical level.

**Algeria**

- On the 29th of September, 97.37% of Algerian electors approve via referendum the “Charter for peace and National Reconciliation” elaborated by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and made public in August. According to Algerian television, electoral participation goes up to 81.77%, figures put in doubt by human rights NGOs and some Algerian journalists. According to the Western press, participation in the region of Kabylia is very poor and reflects a rejection of the Charter by the Berber minority.

**Morocco**

- On the 29th of September, 5 Saharians Africans die and another 100 are injured as attempting to get over the fence marking the border between Morocco and the Spanish enclave of Ceuta. On the same day the Spanish government announces the deployment of 500 soldiers in both the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. On the 30th of September, the Spanish television announces that 5 Africans died following injuries caused by Moroccan shootings.

**European Union**

- On the first of September, the Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, Franco Frattini, reveals a package of proposals regarding political asylum and immigration, which are intended to implement the priorities of the Hague programme (November 2004) at European and National levels. Amongst these proposals there are common regulations for the return of illegal immigrants and of those who have not received the status of political refugees and a vigorous integration of legal immigrants, including an allegiance to the EU and its laws.

- On the 8th of September, Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs tear each other apart when deciding the length of the compulsory period for withholding telephonic and other types of data by telecommunication services for anti-terrorist and anti-criminal purposes. On the 21st of September, the Commissioner Frattini presents a compromise proposal, rising the compulsory period for withholding telephonic data to 12 months and emails to 6 months.

- On the 13th of September, the European Community Court of Justice (ECCJ) decides that the European Community (EC), with the support of the European Parliament (EP), has the right to ask member states to apply European directives through National criminal law. Even though the ECCJ decision concerns environmental Directives, it is intended to establish an EC general competency, which will enable the enforcement of all European legislation through criminal law and establish penalties for non conformity. The United Kingdom declares that this only applies to domains in which the EC already has many competencies, such as the environment and the internal market, and that many member states oppose to an harmonisation of criminal law.

- On the 27th of September, President Durao Barroso and the Industry and Enterprise Commissioner, Günter Verheugen, decide that a third of legal proposals currently discussed in European Institutions will be withdrawn because of their possible negative effects on competitiveness, growth and employment. The proposals are withdrawn with the intention of launching the “Lisbon Strategy” as a response to the French and Dutch rejection of the European Constitution.

- On the 25th September, the French Minister of Home Affairs and Regional Development, Nicolas Sarkozy, proposes to unify France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom in a “group of six” most populated countries which would act as a “new engine of Europe” in order to escape from the current inertia.

**October 2005**

The EU opens entry negotiations with Croatia and Turkey, where the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) announces the end of its ceasefire. The European Commission, confronted with the French and The Netherlands’ rejection of the European Constitution, launches its
“plan D”. Still in Europe, the French suburbs explode following the death of two young immigrants, which reflects a profound social unrest within the French society. During the month of October, the avian flu H5N1 reaches Europe. In Kosovo, the UN Security Council initiates negotiations establishing the future status of Kosovo. In the Near-East, international pressures on Syria continue, as the UN Enquiry Commission on the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, presents its preliminary report. In Egypt, the opposition organises itself within a “National Front for Political and Constitutional Change” in view of the legislative elections due at the end of the year. In Maghreb, the Tunisian government faces increasing internal and external pressures demanding respect of freedom of association and expression. Six sub-Saharan immigrants die while attempting to infiltrate the Spanish enclave of Melilla while the EU condemns Morocco for expelling the illegal immigrants in the desert without resources.

Portugal
- On the 17th of October, the Minister of Finance Fernando Teixeira unveils a strict budget for 2006, reducing public expenses by 1.7 billion euros, in order to decrease the public deficit to 4.8% of the GDP. Portugal, which for 2005 has an estimated public deficit of 6.2%, violates the EU Pact of Stability and Growth which it has to be in line with by the end of 2008 as it is subject to sanctions.

Spain
- On the 3rd of October, in the South West of the country, the French police arrests 3 suspected members of the Basque terrorist group ETA, amongst which are Harriet Aguirre Garcia, the alleged number two in the military system of ETA and Idioa Mendizabal Mugica, suspected of being responsible for a car bomb attack in 2002, in Spain.
- On the 19th of October, after Spain twice asked the American government in vain for an explanation of the death circumstances of the Spanish cameraman José Manuel Couso Permuy, killed during the bombing of his hotel near the American tanks in Iraq, a magistrate of the National Court of Madrid issues arrest warrants against three American soldiers. The judge Santiago Pedraz Gomez describes the attack on the hotel which provided accommodation for 130 journalists, as a crime against the international community.

France
- On the 4th of October, during the police raids in Montargis, 4 people suspected of being members of the group Ansar al-Fath, a branch of the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), are arrested and two of them are placed under judicial enquiry on the 7th of October. On the 9th and 10th of October, two convicted Islamist militants, Djamel Louanouci and Abderrahmane Sellem, are deported to Algeria.
- On the 4th of October, 1 million public and private workers go on strike to protest against the government’s economic policies which intend to make the small businesses working contracts more flexible and against the government privatisation plans. On the 28th of October, the government launches the partial privatisation (15%) of the company France Electricity. The Socialist Party (PS) promises to renationalise EDF when it returns to power. On the 27th of October, the government announces that the plan of privatising 30-35% of the nuclear energy company Areva is postponed.
- On the 13th of October, the strike against the privatisation of the National Maritime Company Corsica-Mediterranean (SNCM) ends following a negotiated agreement which sees the government keeping 25% of shares and the employers receiving 9%; the two together have the possibility to form a blocking minority.
- On the 14th of October, a court in Lyon sentences the radical imam Chirane Abdelkader Bouziane to 6 months of prison and fines him 2,000 euros for encouraging violence against women in his book. A court acquitted him in June. Bouziane declares he will appeal.
- On the 26th of October, the trial for the secret financing of the Rally for the Republic (RPR), when Jacques Chirac was mayor of Paris, ends with the conviction of 38 of the 47 politicians and businessmen on the dock, amongst which the former ministers Michel Giraud, Michel Roussin and Guy Drut.
- On the 28th of October, following the death by electrocution of two young Muslims wanted by the police, a riot breaks out within the young Arab population in the Parisian suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois. During the following nights the riots extend to other suburbs and become more and more violent, setting cars and public buildings on fire. The riots intensify after a tear gas grenade was set off by the police in the hall of a mosque on the 30th of October. At the end of the month of October, there have been 50 arrests and 30 injured policemen in total. On the 31st of October, the Minister of Home Affairs, Nicolas Sarkozy, reinforces the presence of the police in the sensitive suburbs and declares he will apply a “zero tolerance” policy against the rioters who he describes as “scum”. These proposals attract the criticisms of left-wing parties and of the leaders of Muslim communities, who call for confronting the underlying causes of this revolt, amongst which are unemployment, social exclusion and police brutality.

Italy
- On the 6th of October, the Senate accepts the reforms limiting the Bank of Italy Governor’s term in office to 7 non-renewable years, these reforms, however, will only apply to Fazio’s successors. On the 10th of October, the Governor of the bank of Italy, Antonio Fazio, suspected of favouritism in the recovery of the Italian bank Antoveneta, declares that it was his “institutional duty” to favour the recovery of Italian banks through a national bank rather than a foreign one. On the 18th of October, in protest to Fazio’s refusal to resign, the parliamentary opposition leaves the parliament as Fazio was speaking to them regarding the 2006 budget.
- On the 13th of October, the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House) approves a controversial electoral reform bill reintroducing the complete proportional representation before the legislative elections of April 2006. The parties of centre-left, who have boycotted the vote, declare that this reform would discrimi-
nate against the small centre-left parties that would not obtain enough votes to win a seat. They also state that this is an attempt of the Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, to maintain his coalition in power.

- On the 15th of October, the former Vice-Prime Minister, Marco Follini, resigns as leader of the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats (UCD), in protest to the nomination of the Prime Minister Berlusconi as candidate of the current coalition in power for the elections of April 2006. On the 27th of October, Lorenza Cesa replaces Follini as head of the UCD.
- On the 30th of October, Berlusconi declares in an interview that he attempted several times to dissuade the American President G. W. Bush from invading Iraq.

**Malta**

- On the 4th of October, the National Republican Alliance (ANR), an extreme right party, organises an anti-immigration demonstration gathering hundreds of people together against what they describe as a “silent invasion”. On the 9th of October, the Maltese authorities call on partners to provide urgent assistance to manage the problem of illegal immigrants on the island, which the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs, Tonio Borg, describes as humanitarian crisis.

**Slovenia**

- On the 15th of October, during a Congress of the Liberal Democratic Party of Slovenia (LDS), opposition party of the centre-left, Jelko Kacin, former Minister of Defence and current member of the European Parliament, is elected as President of the party.

**Albania**

- On the 3rd of October, the Ministry of Defence and currently member of the centre-left, Jelko Kacin, former Prime Minister of Slovenia (LDS), opposition party Congress of the Liberal Democratic Party of Slovenia, is appointed by the government as leader of the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats (UCD), in protest to the nomination of the Prime Minister Berlusconi as candidate of the current coalition in power for the elections of April 2006. On the 27th of October, Lorenza Cesa replaces Follini as head of the UCD.
- On the 30th of October, Berlusconi declares in an interview that he attempted several times to dissuade the American President G. W. Bush from invading Iraq.

**Croatia**

- On the 3rd of October, the EU Council accepts to open entry negotiations with Croatia, following the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) recognition of Zagreb’s cooperation with them. The opening negotiations were put back 7 months.
- On the 11th of October, in the ICTY starts the trial of three Serb generals from the Yugoslavian People Army, accused of crimes against humanity and violations of rights and the customs of war for the execution of 300 people in the city of Vukovar, on the 18th of November in 1991.

**Bosnia-Herzegovina**

- On the 5th of October, the Bosnian tribunal for war crimes announces its expectation of an increase in the number of trials concerning the Srebrenica massacre. This is after the result of a two year long investigation: a list containing the names of over 19,000 Serb Bosnian soldiers, policemen and officials suspected of being involved in the massacre is sent over by the Commission from the Srpska Republic (Serb entity in Bosnia).
- On the 18th of October, the Bosnian legislative power introduces a reorganisation plan for the police force, which is divided according to ethnicity. In this way, the government fulfils one of the key requirements for the opening of negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. On the following day, the European Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, advises to open negotiations.
- On the 26th of October, the procurators of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) announce the conclusion of an agreement with the Bosnian Croatian Ivica Rajic, suspected of having directed the Croatian Defence Council’s militia responsible for the death of 16 Muslims in 1993, in the village of Stupni Do. In exchange for a combined sentence going from 12 to 15 years, Rajic pleads guilty to premeditated assassination, inhuman treatment, appropriation of property and mass destruction, all crimes not linked to any military need.

**Serbia and Montenegro**

- On the 4th of October, the United Nations special envoy, Kai Eide, presents his global report on the status of the Province of Kosovo to the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. In his report he criticises Kosovo’s provisional government of Albanian origins, for not having worked enough to reinforce interethnic tolerance in the legal system. The report congratulates the establishment of economic and governmental structures. On the 24th of October, the Security Council follows the report’s recommendation to open negotiations on the future status of Kosovo. Annan announces the nomination of the former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari as its special envoy to conduct negotiations.
- On the 7th of October, Serb authorities convict 5 former members of the paramilitary police, known under the name of the “Scorpions”, for the murder of 6 Muslims from Srebrenica in July 2005. This is the first trial held in Serbia concerning the Srebrenica massacre. On the 27th of October, 9 Serb policemen are arrested for the assassination of 48 civilians of Albanian origins in the city of Suva Reka in Kosovo, whose bodies were found in 2001.
- On the 7th of October, President Svetovar Marovic appoints Zoran Stanisic as Minister of Defence. On the 21st of October, the legislative power approves this nomination.
- On the 10th of October, the EU and Serbia and Montenegro formally open negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, first step towards joining the Union. The Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, warns the country that negotiations could be suspended at any time if it does not fully cooperate with the ICTY.

**Macedonia**

- On the 26th of October, during a meeting in the White House marking the 10th anniversary of bilateral relations, George W. Bush congratulates the Macedonian Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski for the country’s efforts committed to join NATO and the European Union and thanks him for Skopje strong support in the war against terrorism.
Greece

- On the 17th of October, Greece becomes the first country in the EU to be affected by the avian flu H5N1, after some tests were carried out on the island of Oinouses, near the Turkish coast.

Cyprus

- On the 16th of October, the Greek Cypriot centre right Party United Democrats, elects Mihalis Papapetrou as President. Papapetrou criticises the government’s policy concerning the reunification of the island and declares that the objective of his party will be to create a common front including all those wishing for the reunification of the island.

Turkey

- On the 4th of October, following a two day long emergency meeting, the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs open entry negotiations with Turkey. These negotiations which have to last between 10 and 15 years do not give any guarantee of membership and will be suspended if Turkey violates the European criteria concerning human rights. Austria and France promise to their citizens to organise a referendum regarding Turkey’s entry and the Greek part of Cyprus threatens to use its veto at different stages of negotiations. On the 6th of October, Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), which is banned in Turkey, announces the end of its unilateral ceasefire, which it extended up to the 3rd of October. The PKK accuses the EU of ignoring Kurdish requests and declares that the opening of entry negotiations with Turkey turns the Kurdish problem into a European issue. During the month of October, 57 soldiers and 24 rebels die in clashes between the Turkish Army, the PKK and the People’s Defence Force (HPG) in Eastern Turkey.
- On the 7th of October, a court in Istanbul condemns the Turkish journalist of Armenian origins, director of Agos newspaper, Hanit Dink, to six months suspended sentence for “having insulted and weakened Turkish identity in the media” in relation with articles published in 2004 on Armenian identity.
- On the 9th of October, Richard Howitt, member of the European Parliament delegation which went to visit to Turkey to check its progress in terms of human rights, declares to have become acquainted with shocking reports concerning murders, extrajudicial executions and mutilations carried out by the army against people suspected of sympathising with Kurdish separatists.
- On the 10th of October, the EU blocks all imports of live birds and feathers originating from Turkey. On the 13th of October, the Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, Markos Kyprianou, confirms that the Avian flu Symptoms detected on the first of October in the city of Kiziksa on the North West coast of the Aegean sea, definitely are of the H5N1 variation which has already killed 60 people in Asia. As a precaution, from the first of October the government killed thousands of birds and placed the region under quarantine.
- On the 14th of October, 90 years after the Armenian genocide, the French Insurance Company AXA, indemnifies some of the descendants of the 1.5 million victims of the Armenian genocide who had taken out a life insurance with AXA.
- On the 24th of October, in Eskisehir, the trial starts of four policemen accused of having killed a Kurdish child with his father who, according to some relatives were disarmed and not connected to the Kurdish rebel groups the police were chasing at the time. This trial, which represents a test for Turkey’s recent human rights reforms, is finally adjourned after the litigant party leaves the tribunal in protest against the police’s refusal to allow NGOs in to observe the trial.

Syria

- Throughout the month of October, the United States increasingly presses the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad regarding the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and the Syrian lack of cooperation to fight against the insurrection in Iraq. On the 12th of October, the Minister of Home Affairs and former leader of the Syrian Intelligence Services in Lebanon, Major General Ghazi Kan’an, is found dead at his house. According to the official Syrian Press Agency, he committed suicide. A few hours before his death, he contacted a Lebanese radio station and admitted he has been interrogated by the United Nations Enquiry Commission on the death of the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and that he has not provided them with any information against the Syrian state. On the 16th of October, confronted with international pressures, the Syrian opposition, traditionally divided, issues the “Declaration on Damascus” requesting the end of the state of emergency and to hold a national conference for democratic reforms. A great number of opposition activists support this declaration, amongst which human right defenders, communists, Kurdish nationalists, exiled Syrians and the Muslim Brothers.

Lebanon

On the 18th of October, Lebanese authorities seek the former Secret Services Syrian agent, Zuhair Mohammed al-Siddiq, regarding the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. On the 20th of October, the leader of the United Nations Commission Enquiry on the death of Hariri, Detlev Mehlis, presents his preliminary report to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, in which he criticises Syria for its lack of cooperation and for the probable implication of high ranking Syrians in the murder of Hariri. He adds that the decision to kill Hariri could not have taken place without the agreement of high ranking Syrians from the Intelligence Services and without the complicity of their equivalents in the Lebanese Secret Services. Syria denounces the report and the Syrian Minister of Information, Mahdi Dakhilah, describes the report as not being very professional. A polemic breaks out as it becomes clear that several names of high ranking Syrians have been erased from the public version of the report. Amongst these is that of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s brother in law, who is also the current leader of Syrian Secret Services and that of General Asef Shawkat who would have forced Ahmed Abu Addas to claim responsibility for the attack as well as that of the Syrian President’s brother, also leader of the Presidential
Guard, Lieutenant Colonel Maher al-Assad. The report also accuses the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Farouk al-Shara, of providing the investigators with false information. On the 23rd of October, the Lebanese police accuse Mahmoud Abdel-Al, a member of the Pro-Syrian Sunni group, arrested the day before in France and who, according to the report, had phoned the Lebanese President Émile Lahoud a few minutes before the attack. On the 31st of October, the United Nations Security Council introduces resolution 1636 (2005) which drops the threat of economic sanctions against Syria (a Russian requirement amongst others), but requests Syria to arrest everyone involved in the assassination. The Council threatens to take further unspecified measures if Syria fails to cooperate with Mehlis, who finds himself given the significant authority of accessing the evidence amongst other responsibilities.

Jordan
- On the first of October, at the end of a meeting in Amman between the Iraqi Minister of Home Affairs Bayane Baqer Solagh and his Jordanian equivalent Aouni Yervas, the two countries sign an agreement protocol establishing cooperation to ensure security at their common border and to fight against terrorism and organised crime.
- On the 19th and 20th of October, the European Union External Relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, goes to Jordan where she meets King Abdullah II and the Vice-Prime Minister Marwan Muasher in order to discuss setting up a Jordanian National reform plan as well as a EU-Jordan action plan with regards to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
- On the 23rd of October, 5 Islamists are condemned to sentences going from 3 to 5 years in prison each for a plot intending to attack Israeli tourists in the Hashemite Kingdom. An activist party member of a group named Islamic Jihad has been trained in Syria and Lebanon.

Egypt
- On the 8th of October, the opposition leaders announce that they have re-grouped as a new coalition, the "National Front for Political and Constitutional Change" in view of the legislative elections in November and December. The front is coordinated by the former Prime Minister Atef Sidqi, President of the National Rally for Democratic Change. This coalition consists of 10 parties, of which three are currently represented in the Assembly (unicameral): the New Wafd Party, the Arab Democratic Nasserian Party and the National Progressive Unionist Party (Ta-jammu). The Centre Party (al Wasat), considered by many to be a branch of the Muslim Brothers as well as the Workers Party and the Dignity Party that have not received an official status as political parties, are also part of the Front. The Muslim Brothers and the Kifaya movement are also members but will not present a candidate. The Al-Ghad Party, whose candidate came second in the presidential elections in September, has not joined the Front because of the internal conflict within the party which broke out between the supporters of the Party leader Ayman Nur and the followers of Mustafa Musa, the second of the Party. Nur accuses Musa of being supported by President Hosni Mubarak’s Party, the National Democratic Party.
- On the 19th of October, the government announces the construction of a wall around the seaside resort of Sharm-el-Sheikh, targeted by a terrorist attack in July, in order to control the entrances and exits well.

Libya
- On the 18th of October, Libya signs a memorandum with the United Kingdom in order to facilitate the deportation of terrorist suspects towards Libya, which promises to not torture or execute Libyans deported by the United Kingdom.

Tunisia
- On the first and 2nd of October, the 12th ministerial session of the countries members of the Mediterranean Forum (1994) is held in Hammamet and presided by Tunisia during 2005, mainly intending to prepare the summit of the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, planned for the 27th and the 29th of November. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 11 member countries (Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey) informally approach the issues of security and stability in the Mediterranean region and their consequencies, such as the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration. On top of political issues, they discuss the Euro-Mediterranean economic partnership and the ways to consolidate the importance of investments. They decide to put the immigration issue, which demands a global approach, at the centre of the Euro-Mediterranean summit in Barcelona in November.
- On the 14th of October, the special reporter on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression of the UN Human Rights Commission, Ambeyi Ligabo, asks Tunis in a statement to free all opinion and press prisoners and to allow full exercise of freedom of opinion and expression in the country. On the 18th of October, eight association and opposition party leaders start an unlimited hunger strike to protest against the violations of human rights in Tunisia. Strikers demand freedom of association, freedom of the press, the release of political prisoners, Islamists, net sur-fer, young people unjustly accused of terrorism as well as the release of the dissenting lawyer Mohamed Abbou and the introduction of a general amnesty law. Approximately one hundred political personalities and opponents declare their support to the hunger strikers, who were visited by American and European diplomats. On the 19th of October, Tunisian authorities accuse the strikers of attempting to manipulate the international public opinion and to falsify Tunisian realities. On the 29th and 30th of October, approximately 200 people in Tunisia, take part to the hunger strike and to solidarity sit-ins with the eight strikers.
- On the 28th of October, in a declaration made during a preparatory meeting of the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society, the European Union, the United States and a dozen Western countries asked Tunisia to grant freedom of expression and to allow the access of independent media to this conference.
Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq claimed responsibility. In Algeria, the partial elections in Kabylie put an end to over three years of crisis. In the context of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) taking place in Tunis, human rights organisations mobilise to denounce violations of freedom of association and expression in Tunisia. The Syrian President accuses Lebanon of conspiring against Syria, while the UN Enquiry Commission on the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri receives Syria’s approval to interrogate 6 Syrian officials in Geneva. In Europe, as riots have spread on such a large scale in the French suburbs, the French government declares a state of urgency and sends back convicted rioters of foreign nationality. The EU opens negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the European Commission, in its follow-up report of future enlargements, criticised the slowness of political reforms as well as the human rights situation in Turkey.

Portugal

- On the 11th of November, the Socialist Party (PS) in power is the only party to approve the strict budget for the financial year 2006. The opposition parties vote against describing the economic growth forecasts as doubtful (1.1%) while the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) predicts a growth of 1.4% and deflation from now to 2006.
- On the 17th of November, the Constitutional Court approves the request of two left-wing parties, the Democratic People’s Union (UDP) and the Revolutionary Left Front (FER), to be disbanded in order to convert into political associations.

Spain

- On the 4th of November, the Spanish Supreme Court condemns Arnaldo Otegi, leader of Batasuna (Basque separatist party of ETA) to a year in prison for having called King Juan Carlos as “leader of tortures” during a press conference in 2003.
- On the 21st of November, the trial of

November 2005

Fifty seven people die in four suicide attacks in Beirut, for which Zarqawi, the
France

Throughout the month of November, riots in the French suburbs intensify and on the 4th of November they spread to over 300 French cities that have significant minority communities. On the 4th of November a man dies after being assaulted by some rioters. On the 8th of November, the Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin declares a state of emergency, which confers to local prefects the power to impose curfews, issue warrants for home arrests and block access to places which become gathering points for rioters. The state of emergency also allows the police to arrest and detain people who have not observed the curfew and to carry out searches during the day and at night. The state of emergency comes with measures to fight unemployment and improve education conditions in 750 “sensitive” suburbs and with the creation of a National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity. On the 9th of November, the Minister of Home Affairs and Regional Development, Nicolas Sarkozy announces that the convicted rioters who are not of French nationality will be expelled from the country even if they have a French residence permit. In response to the riots, on the 11th and 20th of November the mosques of Carpentras and Montbéliade are set on fire. In Mid-November, 200 public buildings have been vandalised, 9,000 cars have been burnt and over 3,500 people have been arrested so far. On the 14th of November, President Jacques Chirac breaks the silence and declares that the government’s first priority will be to re-establish order and peace, while underlining all along that the riots have revealed a “profound malaise” in the French civil society. While Chirac excludes positive discrimination in favour of minorities, on the 16th of November Sarkozy states that the riots have shown the need for positive measures to encourage the employment of minorities. On the 18th of November, the state of emergency, which was initially intended to last for 12 days, is prolonged to three months by a parliamentary decision, starting from the 21st of November. On the 18th of November, the Minister responsible for equal opportunities, Azouz Begag, requests to set up the statistics on France’s racial and religious composition. On the 29th of November, in response to pressures for more control over immigration, de Villepin announces a reinforcement of the legislation concerning immigration: a reinforced supervision of procedures allowing access to territory thanks to marriage or family entry and settlement and a more rigorous selection of students wishing to come to France to follow their programme. Following the criticism of centre-right politicians that the existence of polygamous families in France is a determining factor in riots, de Villepin announces a stronger implementation of the anti-polygamy law.

On the 4th of November, a court in Nanterre convicts the editor Abdelilah Cherifi Alaoui from the publishing house al Qalam to a 3-month suspended sentence and is ordered to pay a fine of 10,000 euros for having edited the anti-Semitic work “The Other Face of Israel” which was also forbidden from sale by the justice. On the 29th of November, anti-racist groups launch judicial proceedings against the National Front leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, who repeated several times on the radio that Nazi gas chambers were a small detail of history.

On the 9th and 10th of November, the 4th conference of the member countries of the 5+5 group is held in Paris and is centred on the theme of “Migration in the Western Mediterranean. This conference, which takes place a few days after the events in Ceuta and Melilla and while riots are still at their peak in France, is dedicated to the management of migratory fluxes, reception, integration and co-development.

On the 30th of November, the Minister for Culture and for Communication, Renaud Donnedieu, announces the launch of the French International Information Channel (CFII), which will be financed by the government and is intended to compete with English language international channels, namely the CNN (United States) and the BBC (United Kingdom).

Italy

On the 11th of November, it is heard that Italian prosecutors requested the extradition of 22 CIA agents who were involved in the abduction of the Egyptian imam Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr in 2003.

On the 11th of November, in order to save the national airline Alitalia, the Minister of Finance announces the privatisation of the company which allows the Italian State to sell all or part of its holdings in Alitalia and to go under the 50% mark.

On the 15th of November, the police in Naples and Brescia arrest three Algerians suspected of being members of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and of planning an attack in Italy.

On the 16th of November, the Senate (Higher House) approves the project of constitutional reform by 170 votes to 132, supported by the Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and the Northern League (LN), member of the coalition in power; this gives more autonomy to the 20 Italian regions. Moreover, the new reform transfers competencies to dissolve legislative power, nominate and dismiss Ministers from the President of the Republic to the Prime Minister. Whilst supporters of the new law are convinced that it will lead to greater stability of political life, the leader of the centre-left opposition deplores this reform. In order for it to be enforced, the law has to be approved by a referendum which will take place after
the legislative elections on the 9th of April 2006.

- On the 24th of November, the European Commission announces that it will sue the Bank of Italy with regards to its management of recent bank mergers which have affected some Italian banks.
- On the 25th of November, a general strike organised by the three main trade unions in the country, in protest against the reduction on public services expenses proposed for the 2006 budget, paralyses the country.

**Malta**

- From the 25th to the 27th of November, the 53 Commonwealth member states’ Heads of Government get together in Valletta. The main issues discussed concern global trade, at the dawn of the WTO negotiations in Hong Kong, and the fight against terrorism. The Valletta Declaration criticises the EU for its agricultural subsidies.

**Slovenia**

- From the 8th to the 11th of November, the Ministers of the 22 parties contracting to the “Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution” (21 coastal countries and the European Union), get together in Portorož on the initiative of the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) a United Nations Programme for the environment. Here they discuss a joint report of the European Environment Agency EEA and the MAP, “Priority Issues in the Mediterranean Environment”. This report reviews the existing and emergent pollution problems in the region painting a very sombre picture.

**Croatia**

- On the first of November, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) officially transfers the trial of General Rahim Ademi and of General Mirko Norac to a Croatian Court. This is the first time that trials of people already convicted by the ICTY.
- On the 22nd of November, the Greek Supreme Court approves the extradition of the Croatian Hrvoje Petrac, considered to be a close ally of the fugitive General Ante Gotovina, still wanted by the ICTY.

**Bosnia-Herzegovina**

- On the 2nd of November, during a meeting in Washington marking the 10th anniversary of the Dayton Agreement signature, which put an end to the 1992-1995 civil war, the three members of the collective Presidency, under American and European pressures, agree to modify the constitution in order to reinforce the federal government from now up to March 2006. Whilst with the current constitution, the power is mainly concentrated in two federated entities (the Sprska Republic and the Croatian-Muslim Federation) and the central government is weak, the American programme intends to maintain the two entities but to transfer a great part of their powers to the central government. During this meeting, for the first time, the three members of the collective Presidency ask that the accused war criminals hand themselves over to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at once.
- On the 16th of November, the ICTY acquits General Sefer Halilovic, high command leader of the Muslim Bosnian Army wanted for the murder of 32 Croatian civilians in Grabovica, in September 1993. On the 18th of November, a court in the Republic of Sprska convicts three Serb Bosnian policemen for war crimes for the first time, in relation to the death of 6 Muslims in Prijedor, in March 1994.
- On the 21st of November, the United Nations Security Council introduces Resolution 1639 (2005), which confirms the United Nations support to the Dayton agreement and gives a 12-month mandate to the Stabilisation Force lead by the EU (EUFOR), formed in November 2004 in succession of the NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR).
- On the 25th of November, the negotiations with the EU on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement formally begin.

**Serbia and Montenegro**

- On the 4th of November, the legislative power approves an agreement signed in July between NATO’s Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vuk Draskovic. The agreement allows NATO’s troops to freely circulate in Serbia and Montenegro so that they are able to access their bases in Kosovo and in Bosnia, where NATO has peacekeeping missions.
- On the 15th of November, the Serbian government introduces a resolution which opposes Kosovo’s independence and describes any other solution which might be imposed as illegal and unacceptable. On the 17th of November, Kosovo’s legislative power introduces a resolution in which it declares that it will not accept anything less than independence in the negotiations on Kosovo’s status. In this context, on the 21st of November, the United Nations special envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, arrives in the disputed Province to establish his first diplomatic contacts in sight of a final agreement on Kosovo’s status. On the 21st and 22nd of November he meets the Albanian and Serb leaders separately before going to Serbia, Macedonia and Albania.
- On the 16th of November, the trial of the former Yugoslavian President, Slobodan Milosevic is adjourned for health reasons. On the 29th of November, Milosevic and his lawyers oppose the attempt of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to speed up the trial by separating accusations linked to the Kosovo conflict from those concerning the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia.
- On the 30th of November, the ICTY recognises Fatmir Limaj and Isak Musliu, commanders of the Kosovar Liberation Army (UCK), as not guilty of the accusations they were charged with, which related to the crimes in Kosovo in 1998, and orders their release. On the other hand, Haradin Bala, another UCK commander, guard in the prison of Lapushnik is recognised guilty of tortures, cruel treatments and murder and is sentenced to 13 years in prison.

**Macedonia**

- On the 9th of November, the Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, declares that the European Commission has recommended granting Macedonia the candidate country status for
EU membership, without giving a date for the opening of negotiations all at once. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomes the inclusion in the political criteria of the need to resolve the issue of the name “Macedonia”.

**Greece**

- On the 2nd of November, 12 illegal immigrants die in the shipwreck of their boat, as they were crossing a narrow bottleneck between the port of Cesme (Turkey) and the Greek island of Chios. On the 18th of November, the Greek coast guards arrest 122 illegal immigrants on the island of Cythère (South West), where they had recently disembarked.
- From the 18th to the 20th of November, the representatives of 77 communist and labour parties from 65 countries get together in Athens to debate on “modern tendencies of capitalism and the alternative communist solution”.

**Cyprus**

- On the 21st of November, Dervis Eroglu, leader of the main centre right opposition party, the National Unity Party (UBP), resigns to leave his place to younger people.
- On the 24th of November, authorities of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) start to dismantle the roadblock which divided the capital Nicosia for 40 years. On the 28th of November, while the Greek authorities on the island gave the authorisation for reopening, they change opinion on the pretext that the TRNC forces were advancing beyond the ceasefire line.

**Turkey**

- On the 9th of November, the European Commission (EC), in its annual follow-up report on future enlargements, alerts Turkey of the unacceptable slowness of its political reforms during the year 2005 and the deplorable human rights situation, including the discrimination towards women, Kurds and religious minorities. The EC requests immediate action to put an end to torture and other abuses within two years. As per the economic criteria for entry, the EC decides to grant Turkey the status of “viable market economy”, an important prerequisite for joining the EU. On the 23rd of November, the Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, asks Turkey to ratify and implement the Ankara protocol, which would allow the expansion of its current customs union with the EU to the ten new EU member states, including the Republic of Cyprus and to abolish the restrictions imposed to Greek Cypriot boats disembarking in Turkish ports.
- On the 9th of November, a bomb explodes in the bookshop of a convicted member of PKK, in the Kurdish city of Semdinli, causing one death and 12 injured. Protests break out after the three people responsible for the attack are arrested and identified as police intelligence agents, inducing fear of the return of extrajudicial assassinations by the security forces, carried out at the beginning of the 90’s. At least 28 soldiers and 7 Kurd rebels are killed during clashes between the army and the People’s Defence Force (HPG) together with the PKK during the course of the month.
- On the 10th of November, the Human Rights European Court, which does not consider the Turkish ban on wearing the islamic headscarf in universities in order to preserve the secular character of academic institutions as a human rights violation, rejects the appeal of the student Leyla Sahin, expelled from the university of Istanbul in 1998 for wearing the headscarf.
- On the 12th of November, the Pro-European Democratic Society Movement (DTH) lead by Leyla Zana, registers with the Minister of Home Affairs as a political party under the name of Democratic Society Party (DTP). On the 19th of November, the Democratic People’s Party (Dehap) dissolves in order to join the DTP.
- On the 15th of November, the press agency *Anatolia* reports that two tutors of law at the University of Marmara in Istanbul are wanted for “encouraging hate and hostility” for having stated in November 2004, in a report for the Consultative Council which works for the government, that Turkish authorities should give more rights to minorities. On the 16th of November, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirms the journalist Burak Bekdil’s conviction to 20 months in prison, found guilty of insulting state institutions by declaring that ordinary people do not have much chance of receiving a fair trial in Turkey. On the 18th of November, the Turkish editor Fatih Tas declares that the government searched his publishing house Aram Publisher for having marketed a book that criticised Turkish identity, the State, the army as well as the founder of the republic, Kemal Atatürk.
- On the 16th of November, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan boycotts a press conference with the Danish Prime Minister, after he rejected, in name of freedom of expression, the Turkish request to ban the pro-Kurdish television channel Roj-TV in Denmark, which according to Turkey supports the PKK.
- On the 19th November, the police arrests a father and his son in the city of Konya, suspected of being members of Al-Qaeda.

**Syria**

- On the 2nd of November, in order to mark the Muslim celebration of the Aid al-Fitr day (the end of Ramadan), President Bashar al-Assad grants amnesty to 190 political prisoners, amongst which are opinion prisoners, including the human rights lawyer Mohammed Ra’dun, leader of the Arab Human Rights Organisations in Syria, imprisoned since May.
- On the 7th of November, Syria confirms that the Enquiry Commission on the assassination of the Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri summoned 6 Syrian officials, without specifying their names. According to the Arab newspaper based in London, *Al-Hayat*, these people are General Asef Shawkat, chief of Syrian military intelligence services and brother in law of the Syrian President; Major General Rustom Ghazaleh, chief of military intelligence services in Jordan at the time of Hariri’s assassination and his assistant, General Jameh; Major General Bahjat Suleiman, former chief of internal intelligence; General Abdul Karim Abbas, a member of the Palestinian branch of the Syrian general intelligence service and general Zafer Youssef, an intelligence services official. On the 9th of November, the chief of the Syrian enquiry Commission on the assassination, Ghada Murad declares that he started to interrogate the six people and has
forbidden them to leave the country. On the 10th of November, the Syrian President al-Assad declares that his country is ready to cooperate with the commission, as long as it is not detrimental to Syria. However, he adds that no matter how many efforts Syria makes to cooperate, she will always be accused of not making enough. Finally, Assad accuses Lebanon of conspiring against Syria and describes the Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora as "a slave of slaves" referring to his close connection with Hariri’s son, Saad al-Hariri and to the connections of the Hariri family with the French President Jacques Chirac and the Saudi Royal Family. On the 25th of November, Syria accepts that the 6 Syrian officials be interrogated in Vienna by the Mehlis Commission, after having received guarantees for their rights and for the respect of Syrian sovereignty. On the 27th of November, the Syrian television transmits an interview with Husam Taher Hussam, a former Syrian intelligence agent in Lebanon, who accuses Lebanese authorities of torturing him and paying him to make a false testimony to the Mehlis commission against General Shawkat and Colonel Maher al-Assad, chief of the civil guard and brother of the President.

Lebanon

- On the 21st of November, Hezbollah and the Israeli army confront each other at their common border in the South of Lebanon. Four fighters die and 11 Israeli soldiers are injured. On the 23rd of November, clashes break out after an Israeli plane dropped thousands of sheets of paper below Amman and in the South of Lebanon which said that Hezbollah is instrumentalised by Syria and Iran and causes considerable damages in Lebanon.

Jordan

- On the 9th of November, 57 people, mainly Jordanians and Palestinians, including major-general Bashir Nafeh, chief of West Bank's military intelligence services, loose their lives in four suicide attacks organised by Iraqis in three hotels of the Jordanian capital. On the 10th of November, in a statement on the internet, the Al-Qaeda Organisation for the holy war in Iraq and its leader, the Jordanian Abu Misab Zarqawi, claim responsibility for the attacks. Abu Misab Zarqawi accuses Jordan of being a "backyard for the enemies of faith, the Jews and crusaders" and warns the United States that its "backyards" are within attacking distance. On the 10th and 11th of November, thousands of Jordanians demonstrate in Amman to protest against the attacks of Zarqawi. On the 11th of November, Jordanian police announce they have arrested 120 people, predominantly Iraqis and Jordanians.

- On the 16th of November, King Abdullah dissolves the Senate (Higher House) and appoints a new one on the following day.
- On the 16th of November, the Chief of the Royal Hashemite Court, Faysal Akif al-Fayiz, resigns and is replaced by Salim al-Turk. In a series of governmental changes, nine royal councillors resign, including the Director of National Security Sa’d Khayr, who is replaced by Mraouf Bakhet. On the 24th of November, King Abdullah appoints Bakhet as the new Prime Minister. On the 27th of November the new government comes into power.

Egypt

- On the 9th, the 15th, the 20th and the 26th of November, the first two rounds of legislative elections take place in 17 electoral constituencies; the last round is planned for the 1st of December. The 26th of November is marked by violence and a great number of arrests. Two people die and over 800 members of the Muslim Brothers are arrested, as the police intervene to put an end to confrontations amongst supporters of rival candidates.

Libya

- On the 15th of November, the Supreme Court of Libya postpones the ruling on the appeal of five Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor to the 31st of January, in order to leave extra time for the defence. They were sentenced to death for having deliberately infected children with HIV, according to the accusation. On the 29th of November, the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abderrahmane Chalgham, declares to the Bulgarian press that the death sentences could be "lifted" in exchange for a humanitarian aid to the families affected.

Algeria

- On the first of November, the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika decides, on the day of the 51st anniversary of the start of the independence war, to pardon 6,778 convicted detainees and to grant partial sentence discounts.
- On the 24th of November, the partial elections in Kabylia take place, which put an end to a 3-year crisis. Partial elections consolidate the local pre-eminence of two main opposition parties, the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), despite the breakthrough of the National Liberation Front (only ex-party in power).

Tunisia

- From the 16th to the 18th of November, the second phase of the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) is held in Tunis. Amongst other things, this Summit intends to evaluate progress with regards to the reduction of the "digital gap" between industrialised and developing countries from now to 2015. Human rights international and Tunisian organisations criticise human rights violations at the dawn of the WSIS, the participation of the government to the WSIS and deplore that the Summit was organised in Tunisia, where the liberties defended by the UN are scorned.

Morocco

- On the 18th of November, King Mohammed VI grants pardon to 10,000 detainees, including 336 foreigners, on the day of the 50th anniversary of Morocco’s independence.
- On the 25th of November, Moroccan authorities keep 17 radical Islamists suspected of being members of an Al-Qaeda cell and accused of organising attacks in Morocco in detention.

European Union

- On the 9th of November, the President of the European Commission re-
organises some high ranking administrative positions in the European Commission (EC), reinforcing the presence of liberal Anglophones and reducing the Franco-German influence further.

- On the 8th of November, the 25 Member states’ Ministers of Finance reject the EC proposal asking the States to make an annual declaration showing that the EU funds administered by the states (over 80%) have been spent correctly. However, they commit to fight against fraud and squandering of EU expenditures in their countries. On the 15th of November, for the eleventh consecutive year, the European Court of Accounts refuses to certify the EU budgetary accounts because of irregularities. The Court’s report especially highlights the weaknesses in accounts related to expenses in the agricultural, regional development, overseas aid and research areas. However, the Court indicates for the first time, that the efforts agreed by the EC and the member States to implement the Integrated System of Management and Control (SIGC), which covers 59% of agricultural expenses, has effectively reduced the risk of irregular expenditure. The report criticises the EU for its slowness in implementing a new accounting system.

- On the 21st of November, the Ministers of Defence voluntarily introduce a code of conduct for the liberalisation of defence markets through which they accept to open their defence industry to competition with other EU countries’ markets. The EC had proposed a more restrictive agreement to accelerate the development of a Pan European Defence Industry.

- On the 22nd of November, the Court of Justice of European Communities (CJEC) General Lawyer decides to look into the European Parliament request of legalising the EU – United States agreement to anticipate the forwarding of transatlantic flights passengers’ personal data to American authorities.

- From the 22nd to the 24th of November, during a meeting between Ministers of Agriculture in Brussels, it is decided to reform the EU sugar system which has remained unchanged for 40 years. Amongst other things, they establish a 36% reduction in the guaranteed price of sugar over 4 years, a partial compensation to farmers affected and financial assistance to ACP countries influenced by the reform.

- On the 23rd of November, the EC puts forward a statement clarifying its interpretation of the 13th of September ECJ decision, which, with regards to the environment protection by criminal law, points out the Communities competences and not the Union’s. The EC, for which the scope of this ruling largely surpasses the environmental domain, consequently lists 8 “EU crimes” in its statement. These will have to be prosecuted by the criminal law of the member States, on the basis that penalties are established by the EU and not on a national level.

**December 2005**

Ante Gotovina, the war criminal most wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), is arrested by the Spanish police in the Canary Islands. The legislative elections in Egypt mark the victory of President Mubarak’s party, but also mark the significant progress of the Muslim Brothers on the political scene. ETA, the Basque terrorist group, explodes 5 bombs on motorways surrounding Madrid. In Italy, proportional representation is reintroduced by the total number of seats that will be in power during the legislative elections in April 2006. During the European Summit, the EU decides to grant Macedonia the status of “candidate country for membership” and introduces, after months of negotiations, the budget for 2007-20013. During the WTO conference in Hong Kong, the EU, pressured by the G-20, agrees to make concessions with regards to agricultural products export subsidies. During the course of the month of December, 38 soldiers are killed in a confrontation with Kurdish rebel groups in Eastern Turkey. The UN Enquiry Commission on the Assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri presents its last report to the Security Council which states that new evidence supports the implication of high ranking Syrian leaders and the complicity of their Lebanese colleagues in the assassination of Hariri.

**Portugal**

- On the 7th of December, the newspaper Diario de Noticias affirms that some 59 flights, chartered by the American secret services (CIA) illegally carrying alleged terrorists, sometimes to third countries that practice torture, have had to stop over in Portuguese airports since June 2002. On the 13th of December, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Diogo Freitas do Amaral, makes the conclusions of a Portuguese government enquiry public, declaring that there is no evidence to support this.

**Spain**

- On the 6th of December, ETA, the Basque terrorist group, explodes 5 bombs on two motorways surrounding Madrid, causing significant traffic jams. A sixth bomb explodes in a post office in Alasua in the Navarra region, without causing any injuries. The Santander airport is closed because of a bomb alert, but there are no explosions. On the 7th of December, the French police arrest Jon Koldobika Garmendia Martinez in the North of France, as he is suspected of being a member of the Donosti union, one of ETA’s best organised commando groups. On the 28th of December, two other ETA suspects, Mikel Larrañaga Altuna and Arnalitz Gisasola Olaeta, are arrested in France. On the 30th of December, the High Court convicts Diego Ugarte Lopez de Arkaute to 100 years and three months of prison for the murder of the Basque provincial Secretary General from the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party, Fernando Buesa and that of his body guard in 2000.

- On the 9th of December, 7 Algerians are arrested in the province of Malaga, suspected of giving logistics and financial support to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which is thought to be connected to Al-Qaeda. On the 19th of December, the Home Affairs Minister José Antonio Alonso, announces the arrest of 15 people members of a group led by the Iraqi Abu Sufian and suspected of employing radical Islamists for the insurrection in Iraq. Several former imams of Spanish mosques are members of this group.
France

- On the first of December, following riots in the French suburbs from October to November, the Prime Minister launches a "great national campaign" against discrimination and declares that 2006 will be the "year of equal opportunities". Amongst measures announced by Villepin, there are fines of 25,000 euros for companies that are found guilty of discrimination, new encouragements for businesses establishing themselves in poor areas and which employ young people and finally "parental responsibility contracts" which will deprive parents who authorise their children to be absent from school of family allowance.

- On the first of December, 10 years after his arrest in the United kingdom, the Algerian Rachid Ramda, suspected of being involved in the Paris terrorist attacks in 1995, is extradited to France. On the 7th of December his trial for "criminal association with a terrorist organisation" starts.

- On the 9th of December, President Jacques Chirac orders the revision of a controversial law made in February, which requests that history school books recognise the positive role of French colonisation, especially in Northern Africa. The left-wing opposition and the country's Muslim leaders criticise this law and fear that it might contribute to the alienation of minorities from former French colonies.

- From the 12th to the 15th of December, in a preventive action to stop all potential terrorist acts during the Christmas period, the police arrest 28 men of Northern African origins in the Parisian region. Amongst these is the Franco-Algerian Ouasini Cherifi, sentenced to 5 years of prison in 2002 for using a false passport and released in 2004. During raids in the Parisian suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois, policemen lay their hands on weapons and materials used to make bombs. On the 16th of December, judicial investigations start against 11 people arrested.

- On the 15th of December, the trial of 24 alleged members of the islamist Chechen cell in France starts, accused of terrorism, forgery of official documents or illegal residence.

- On the 22nd of December, the anti-terrorist law, introduced following the London attacks in July, is approved by the French Assembly. The opposition Socialist Party declares that it will dispute the law within the Constitutional Council. The law establishes that telephone and Internet data will be withheld for one year, the police supervision of people who have resided in countries that have terrorist training camps, stricter sentences for those guilty of terrorism or who support it, the installation of cameras in sensitive locations and an increase from 4 to 6 days of preventive detention of terrorist suspects prior to any charge that is made against them.

Italy

- On the 11th of December, two North Africans are expelled from the country under the new anti-terrorist measures.

- On the 13th of December, the European Commission launches a legal proceeding against Italy, accused of protectionism for having prevented the recovery of Italian banks through foreign banks. On the 19th of December, the Governor of the Bank of Italy, Antonio Fazio, resigns under increasing pressures from the Italian government. On the 28th of December, President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi signs new legislations which intend to limit the powers of the Bank of Italy’s Governor by establishing a six year limited term in office, which is only renewable once. On the 29th of December, Mario Draghi, Vice-President of the investment bank Goldman Sachs and former General Director of the Italian Treasury (1991-2001), is appointed as governor by the government.

- On the 14th of December, the Senate (Higher House) approves the controversial electoral law which reintroduces proportional representation for the totality of seats which will be in power in the legislative elections in March 2006. Romano Prodi, leader of the centre-left opposition condemns this law as it is intended for maintaining Silvio Berlusconi’s current coalition in power.

- On the 23rd of December, a court of Milan issues European arrest warrants against 22 CIA agents, suspected of having kidnapped the Egyptian imam Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr in Milan in 2003, before taking him to Egypt where he complains of having been tortured.

- On the 29th of December, the newspaper Corriere della Sera announces that Berlusconi is the object of a judicial enquiry concerning allegations according to which he has bribed his English lawyer, David Mills, to present false evidence in two trials in which Berlusconi or one of his companies were involved.

Malta

- On the 2nd of December, the Minister of Justice announces that the United States and The Netherlands suggested that Malta could welcome thirty refugees that arrive on the island every year. The Maltese government recently launched an appeal to other countries in the world, especially to those in the European Union, to help Malta resolve immigration problems which it struggles to confront.

Croatia

- On the 7th of December, Ante Gotovina, the most wanted war criminal by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), is arrested by the Spanish police in the Canary Islands. On the 10th of December, he is transferred to the ICTY, who was searching for him since July 2001 and on the 12th he pleads not guilty of murder, persecution and deportation in relation to the Croatian military offensive against the Serbs of Krajina in 1995. On the 11th of December, thousands of Croats, who see Gotovina as a war hero, get together in the city of Split and request that he is provisionally released from the ICTY and that he is judged in Croatia.

- On the 7th of December, a Bosnian-Croatian, member of the armed forces’ Jockers Unit (Dzorkeri) from the Croatian Community in Herceg-Bosna, known as the Croatian Defence Council, Miroslav Bralo, is sentenced by the ICTY to 20 years in prison for murder, rape, torture, illegal confinements and inhuman treatments against Bosnian Muslim civilians, including children, in the centre of Bosnia in 1993.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- On the 8th of December, Gojko Jankovic, a Serb-Bosnian leader of a para-
military unit which invaded the city of Foca half way through 1992 and contributed to the establishment of “rape camps”, is transferred to the Internatio- nal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu- goslavia (ICTY), in the war crimes divi- sion of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Tribunal.

• On the 15th of December, the direc- tion committee of the Peace Imple- mentation Council for Bosnia-Herzego- vina approves the nomination of Christian Schwarz-Schilling, who worked as an in- ternational mediator for the Croatian-Muslim Federation and for the Srska Republic, as High Representative of the International Community, in succession to Lord Paddy Ashdown. On the 31st of January 2006 he will take up his post.

• On the 28th of December, the Srska Republic introduces a law that abolishes its Ministry of Defence and of the Army. This law, which will come into force on the first of January 2006, is part of a series of reforms transmitting the au- thority of military affairs to the central go- vernment.

Serbia and Montenegro

• On the 9th of December, judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in charge of the trial of the former Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic, decide to not order the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the former German Chancel- lor Gerhard Schroeder to testify or to hold an interview before testifying, as requested by the lawyer responsible for Milosevic’s defence.

• On the 13th of December, a Serb court gives sentences going from 5 to 20 years in prison for 14 former mem- bers of the Serb militia for having as- sassinated 200 Croatian prisoners of war near the Croatian city of Vukovar in November 1991.

• On the 20th of December, the trial of 5 former members of the paramilitary police “Scorpions” starts, accused of having killed 6 Muslims in the city of Srebrenica in July 2005. They were arrested in October, following the bro- adcast of a video showing the murders on Serb television in June. On the 20th of December, the United Nations Inte- rim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) formally establishes the Mi- nistries of Home Affairs and Justice in the province of Kosovo conferring powers to them for which the UN was responsible for up to this moment. On the following day, the Serb government describes the creation of these two ministries as non- political, dangerous and reckless.

Macedonia

• During the European Summit in Brus- sels on the 15th and 16th of December, the 25 EU members decide to grant Macedonia the status of candidate country.

• On the 20th of December, the newly created party, the Party for Democratic Future (PAD), holds its first Assembly in Tetova and elects the former Tetova ma- yor, Alaidin Demiri, as president and Xhemel Abdiu as secretary general.

Greece

• On the 12th of December, a bomb explodes outside the Ministry of Eco- nomy in Athens, slightly injuring three people. The Revolutionary Combat, a ra- dical left-wing group, claims responsi- bility for this attack. On the 22nd of December, a bomb explodes outside the Ministry of Development.

• On the 25th of December, the Mi- nister of Justice decides to open an en- quiry on allegations regarding the chief of the English Secret Intelligence Ser- vice (M16) in Athens as well as 15 Gre- ek officials. According to these claims they have declared themselves guilty of abduction and torture against 28 Pa- kistani terrorist suspects in the London attacks of July 7th.

Cyprus

• On the 14th of December, the Uni- ted Nations Security Council introdu- ces resolution 1642 (2005), which extends the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UN- FICYP) to the 15th of June 2006.

• On the 19th of December, the Tur-kish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) ratifies a controversial law on prop- erty, which allows Greek Cypriots to request the restitution of their goods lost during the Turkish invasion in 1974. On the 22nd of December, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decla- res that Turkey is guilty of violating hu- man rights for having prevented Greek Cypriots from accessing their properties in the TRNC. The ECHR sentences Tur- key to pay compensations.

• On the 27th of December, the Fi- nancial Times reports that the EU has definitely abandoned its attempt to grant an allowance to the TRNC, because of the systematic opposition of the Greek-Cypriot government. Consequently, 120 million euros of the 259 million euros fo- recast for 2005, will no longer be paid to the TRNC.

Turkey

• During the month of December, 38 soldiers are killed in the east of the country during clashes with the Kurdis- tan Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Kur- dish People Defence Forces (HPG).

• On the 2nd of December, the BBC reports that 5 journalists are accused of having insulted the judicial power for applying law 301, a controversial law from the new criminal code, which convicts those who insult the Turkish iden- tity and the organs of the State. On the 15th of December, the European En- largement Commissioner, Olli Rehn de- clares that the trial of the Turkish writer Orhan Pamuk, is a trial testing Turkey’s commitment in favour of the freedom of expression. The writer was accused of having insulted Turkish identity in an ar- ticle published in the Swiss newspaper Das Magazin, in which he criticises Tur-kish silence on the death of thousands of Armenians and Kurds. On the 16th of December, the trial is adjourned to February 2006 in order to allow the Mi- nistry of Justice to decide whether the trial will be carried out under the former criminal code or under the recently re- vised one. On the 17th of December, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tay- yip Erdogan accuses the EU of interfer- ing with justice in order to influence the result of Pamuk’s trial. On the 28th of December, the Minister of Foreign Af- fairs, Abdullah Gül, admits that the ac- cusations against Pamuk have damaged Turkey’s image and adds that the laws limiting freedom of expression could be modified. On the 26th of December, because of the same law 301, the Ar- menian journalist Hrant Dink, editor of Agos newspaper, is wanted for having criticised her 6 month long sentence, re-
Syria

- On the 4th of December, Syrian Security forces and Islamist militants, members of the Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of the Levant), confront one another in the city of Alep, causing the death of two people on the Islamist front. The Jund al-Sham group was established in Afghanistan by Syrian, Palestinian and Jordanian fighters and was connected to Abu Misab Zarqawi, leader of the Al-Qaeda organisation for the Holy War in Iraq. This group, which claimed responsibility for the attacks of October 2004 in Sinai and for the attack in the theatre of Qatar in March, is suspected of planning further attacks in Damascus. On the 8th of December, 8 militants are killed in clashes with security forces in a city at the North East of Maarrat al-Numan.
- On the 7th of December, during the Organisation of the Islamic Conference Summit in Saudi Arabia, the issue of reopening bilateral peace negotiations between Syria and Israel is approached. This is thanks to the unexpected initiative advanced by the Saudi Arabian Prince Abu Misab Zarqawi in 2002, to relaunch the proposal for global peace in the Middle East.
- On the 21st of December, the United Nations Security Council approves resolution 1648 (2005) which extends the Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF) mandate by six months. The force is stationed on the border between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights.
- On the 30th of December, former Vice-President Abdel Halim Khaddam, who resigned in June and moved to France, declares in an interview broadcast by the Pan Arab Satellite Al-Arabiya, that the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad personally threatened the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, a few months before his assassination. On the 31st of December, the People’s Assembly (unicameral), votes in favour of judicial proceedings against Khaddam for high treason.

Lebanon

- On the 5th of December, a dozen bodies are exhumed from two mass graves in the Bekaa Valley, near the city of Anjar, predominantly of Armenian ethnicity. Syrian intelligence services were based here until their withdrawal last April, but the Syrian government denies its awareness of the existence of the mass graves and declares that the bodies date back to the Lebanese Civil War.
- On the 12th of December, the politician Jibril Tueni, both writer and editor of the liberal newspaper An Nahar, known for its criticisms of Syria, is assassinated in a bomb attack in an Eastern suburb of Beirut (Mkalles), less than 24 hours from his return from France, where he took shelter after receiving some death threats. Even though an unknown group named Strugglers for the Unity and Freedom in al-Sham, claims responsibility for the attack perpetrated against Mkalles for having spread “poison and lies”, the majority of Lebanese politicians accuse Syria.
- On the 12th of December, Detlev Mehlis, President of the United Nations Enquiry Commission on the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, presents his last report to the Security Council where he states that new evidence confirms the implication of Syrian High Officials and the complicity of their Lebanese colleagues in the assassination of Hariri. Mehlis also accuses Syria of attempting to block his investigation. Mehlis presents a list of 19 suspects, amongst which are 6 Syrians, of which 5 were interrogated in Vienna on the 5th of December. On the 15th of December, the Security Council introduces Resolution 1644 (2005), extending the Enquiry Commission mandate to the 15th of June 2006 and declares the Council’s concerns on the Syrian lack of cooperation with the Commission. On the request of the Lebanese government, the Commission accepts the extension of its mandate to other terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since the failed attempt to assassinate the former Economy Minister Marwan Hamadeh, on the first of October 2004. On the 29th of December, the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan announces the nomination of the Belgian Prosecutor Serge Brammertz, expected to succeed Mehlis who does not wish to preside the Commission for the next 6 months.

Jordan

- On the 18th of December, the National Security Court sentences the Jordanian Abu Misab Zarqawi, leader of the Al-Qaeda Organisation for the Holy War in Iraq and two of his associates, Isma’il Abu-Udh and Fahd Nouman al-Fahaiqi, to death by hanging for the missed bomb attack on the Jordanian border passage of Al-Karamah, at the border with Iraq in December 2004. The first two are sentenced in absence.
- On the 20th of December, a royal decree appoints Major General Mohammed al-Dhahabi as General Director of the Department of General Intelligence.

Egypt

- On the 7th of December, the legislative elections to allocate 444 seats out of 454 present in the People’s Assembly (unicameral), which spread over a month, finish. The last round of elections is marked by violence between the electors and the police in Kafr el-Shaik amongst other places, which cause 60 injured and one death. According to the Muslim Brothers, confrontations have broken out in the entire country after the police prevented electors from accessing the polling stations. On the 7th of December, 5 people die in the Nile delta after being shot by the police. According to the Egyptian Human Rights Organisation, on that day 355 polling stations are closed by the security forces. President Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (PDN) remains the main party in the country with 311 seats, 77 less compared with the elections in 2000. On the other hand, the Muslim Brothers, an illegal but tolerated organisation, which put themselves forward as independents, increase their representation sixfold winning 88 seats, forming the greatest opposition group in the Assembly. The Muslim Brothers announce that they will use their presence to put pressure for the abolition of laws restricting the activities of the opposition groups, which oblige the Muslim Brothers to work illegally. However, despite the progress of the opposition in the elections, the PDN managed to gather 3/4 of the votes necessary to amend the constitution. On the 31st of December, the Prime Minister Ahmad Mah-
mud Mohammed Nazif’s new government takes the oath.

- On the 24th of December, Ayman Nur, the leader of a branch of the opposition party Al Ghad, is sentenced to 5 years in prison for having falsified signatures in order to obtain recognition of his party for the presidential election of September 2005. On the same day, the White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, declares that this conviction calls into question the Egyptian commitment to democracy, freedom and the state of law and asks the Egyptian government to release Nur.
- On the 30th of December, at least 20 Sudanese die as the Egyptian anti-riot police expel 2,000 refugees from their camp, which they built in front of the United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees (UNHCR) in Cairo in protest against their treatment by the UNHCR.

**Libya**

- On the 22nd of December, Libyan negotiators, Americans and Europeans agreed on the establishment of a fund to help the families of 400 Libyan children infected with the AIDS virus. On the 25th of December, the Supreme Court decides that the 5 Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor, sentenced to death in May 2004 for having infected these children, have to be judged once again by the criminal court of Bengha zi, because of irregularities in their trial.

**Tunisia**

- On the 15th of December, the European Parliament (EP) calls on Tunisia to respect its “commitments relating to fundamental freedoms, especially to the freedom of expression and association” in a resolution. The EP requests that the Council and the European Community reacts with regards to the Association Agreement linking the EU to Tunisia.

**Algeria**

- On the 5th of December, Algerian authorities start a large operation escorting several hundreds of illegal African immigrants, stationed in the frontier zone of Morocco back to the border. On the 19th and 20th of December, the authorities repatriate 556 illegal Africans by plane.
- On the 5th of December, the new law on hydrocarbons, which puts an end to the nationalisation of this market sector, comes into force with the official creation of the Agency for Hydrocarbons Resources Valorisation (Alnaft) and the Regulatory Agency for Hydrocarbons (ARH), both under the authority of the Minister of Energy and Mines.
- On the 12th of December, the Ministers of Defence of the 5+5 Group, meet in Alger. The United States help organising this meeting. Thanks to a first balance considered to be very satisfactory, the Defence Ministers of the 5+5 group (10 countries from Southern Europe and Maghreb), in view of 2006, decide to reinforce their cooperation programmes for aerial and maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean against the terrorism phenomenon and illegal immigration.

**Morocco**

- On the 30th of December, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs summons the Moroccan Minister of Energy and Mines.

**European Union**

- On the first of December, the European Central Bank decides to increase the interest rate by a quarter, going up to 2.25% because of inflationary pressure.
- On the 2nd of December, the Ministers of Home Affairs introduce a directive obliging telecommunication services to safeguard telephonic and email data for six months, so that they can be employed in terrorist investigations and serious crimes. On the 14th of December, the European Parliament approves the directive by 378 votes to 197.
- On the 13th of December, the Ministers of Industry introduce a regulation on the registration, the evaluation and the authorisation of chemical products (RE-ACH), which intends to protect health and the environment more efficiently. From 2007, this directive will oblige companies to test chemical products imported into the EU in quantities over a ton per year. The results of these tests will have to be recorded in the new European Agency for Chemical Products, which has the power to prevent any importation. The chemical industries welcome the directive while environmentalists find it too flexible.
- From the 13th to the 18th of December, during the World Trade Organisation Conference (WTO), the 25 Union countries have to confront the increasing pressure of the G20. The G20 represents developing countries that export agricultural products, including Brazil, India and Southern Africa and is tacitly supported by the United States, which requests that the EU abolishes subsidies for the export of agricultural products. Finally, the Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson accepts measures to drastically reduce subsidies for export from now to 2010 and to abolish them in 2013.
- From the 15th to the 17th of December, during the European Summit, State and Government Leaders introduce the budget for 2007-2013. The agreement reached after several months of negotiations are made after which the English government accepts a cumulative reduction of 10.5 billion euros of its rebate and after that the French government approves a complete revision of the budget from 2008, including the budget of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The total budget amounts to 862.4 billion euros, which represents 1.045% of the EU global GNP. The new German Chancellor played a significant role in helping to obtain the agreement, by convincing France to accept a complete revision of all aspects of the budget, including the CAP.
- From the 19th to the 22nd of December, the Ministers for Fishing introduce a fishing agreement for 2006, which reduces the catching of certain species up to 15% and reduces the number of fishing days by 5%. The environmentalists, who requested a total ban on cod fishing so that the stocks could regenerate, regret that the Ministers decided to reduce it by only 15%.
- On the 28th of December, the European Space Agency launches the satellite GIOVE-A from Baykonur to Kazakhstan, a test satellite for the Galileo...
civil network, which will include 30 satellites and will compete with the American GPS (Global Positioning System).

**Arab League**

- On the 27th of December, the Arab League regional Parliament on an interim basis holds its inauguring session in Cairo. Mohammad Jassim al-Saqr, a liberal Kuwaiti, is elected as president of the Parliament, which will be based in Syria and will meet up twice a year in order to write up the agreements necessary for the creation of a permanent legislation from now until 2011.

**Gibraltar and Western Sahara**

**Gibraltar**

- On the 8th of January, the Commander of English forces in Gibraltar, David White, is found dead in his residence’s swimming pool. White was under police investigation for “personal affairs” and was recalled to the United Kingdom while he waited for the results of the investigation.

**Western Sahara**

- On the 28th of April, the UN Security Council, introduces Resolution 1598 (2005), extending the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until the 31st of October. The resolution requests the Polisario Front to immediately release all Moroccan war prisoners in line with international humanitarian rights and asks Polisario and Morocco to continue their cooperation with the International Red Cross Committee, in order to resolve the fate of people of whom there is no news since the beginning of the conflict.

- On the 24th of June, *The Middle East International* reports that some Saharians living under Moroccan law in Western Sahara and Southern Morocco, at the end of May and the beginning of June, have demonstrated against the transfer of a Sahraoui prisoner to Laayoun, the commercial capital of Western Sahara. The newspaper describes this demonstration against Moroccan domination as being political.

- On the 18th of August, the Polisario Front releases 404 Moroccan war prisoners, captured between 1975 and 1991, declaring that it was a political and humanitarian measure which intended to put an end to the conflict with Morocco.

- On the 29th of August, the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, appoints Peter Van Walsum from The Netherlands as personal envoy for Western Sahara, in replacement of Alvaro De Soto. According to the *Middle East Journal*, this nomination was welcome by the Moroccan part but it had a cold reception from the Polisario Front.

- On the 28th of April, the UN Security Council, introduces Resolution 1634 (2005), extending the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until the 30th of April 2006. The Resolution asks the Polisario Front and Morocco to continue their cooperation with the Red Cross International Committee.

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The following is a chronological record of events which have had an impact in Israel and Palestine in 2005.

The year 2005 will be remembered in the history of the Middle-East for the unilateral withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip in August, after 38 years of occupation. The election of Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian President in January allows the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to emerge from its isolation. During the historic February meeting between Abbas and Sharon at Sharm-el-Sheik, the two sides announce the cessation of hostilities and the resumption of peace negotiations between Israel and the PNA, which among other effects will lead to the freeing of nearly 900 Palestinian prisoners in February and June, and the transfer of security responsibilities for certain localities in the West Bank. There is also a warming of relations between the PNA and the United States, and Abbas is received several times by President Bush. Despite Abbas’s efforts to reconstruction the Palestinian security apparatus and the conditional “truce” announced by Palestinian Islamic factions in March, Palestinian terrorist attacks and Israeli attacks against selected targets intensify during the course of the year, endangering and sometimes bringing to a standstill the fragile progress of the peace process. Other important events take place during the year, including the marked increase in the influence of Hamas on the Palestinian political scene following on from the various municipal elections which are held throughout the year, the announcement of the bringing forward of the Israeli elections, the creation by Sharon of a new political party, Kadima, in November, and the reopening of the border-post at Rafah under the control of Palestinians and Egyptians, supervised by a mission-party representing the European Union.

January 2005

Israel

- On January 3rd settlers are involved in a violent confrontation with Police and Army reinforcements sent to dismantle two outposts of the Yizhar settlement at Shalhevet on the West Bank. On January 5th Sharon warns settlers not to attempt to mount armed resistance against his plan for unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from a small number of settlements on the West Bank.

- On January 10th the Knesset (the single-chamber legislative assembly) approves by 58 votes to 56, with six abstentions, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s formation of a new coalition government, which will enable him to carry out his plan for unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The new coalition is made up of Sharon’s Likud party, Shimon Peres’ Labour party, and the ultra-orthodox Unified Torah Judaism party. Thirteen members of the Likud voted against the coalition. Peres becomes deputy Prime Minister with his own ministry. On the day the vote takes place, thousands of Jewish settlers demonstrate outside the Knesset against the dismantling of the settlements.

Palestine

- On January 9th Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and candidate representing Fatah, is elected President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). He replaces the President of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Ruhi Fattuh, who had occupied the post on an interim basis since the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004. Mustafa Barghuthi, a human rights campaigner highly critical of the PNA, wins 20% of the vote. According to the Central Election Commission, 73% of voters take part in the elections. Abbas, who has always been opposed to the use of violence against the Israeli occupation and is in favour of reforming Palestinian institutions, is much appreciated on the international scene, and on January 10th the United States, which had ruled out all contact with Yasser Arafat, announces that it agrees to meet Abbas. On the same day, the High Representative for Foreign Policy and Common Security (FPCS), Javier Solana, is the first foreign representative to visit Abbas. On January 11th, the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, telephones Abbas both to congratulate him and to resume top-level bilateral relations, which had been suspended for nearly four years. On January 15th Abbas assumes his functions and asks the current Prime Minister Ahmed Qurie to form a new government.

- On January 27th, after their success in the municipal elections in the West Bank in December, the candidates supported by Hamas win the municipal by-elections in the Gaza Strip.

Peace negotiations

- On January 19th President Abbas, after an initial meeting with leaders of
the Islamic group Hamas from whom he is unable to obtain a commitment to a ceasefire, begins to deploy the Palestinian security forces in border areas of the Gaza Strip to prevent rockets and mortar-shells being fired into Israel. In response, Sharon decides to resume the coordination of security questions with the Palestinians. On January 21st the Palestinian security forces set up checkpoints at strategic intersections in the north of the Gaza Strip on the frontier with Israel. The Israeli chief of staff, General Moshe Yaalon, welcomes this move. On January 23rd Abbas announces that he is about to agree a ceasefire with the leaders of Hamas. On January 26th high-ranking Palestinian and Israeli representatives publicly meet again. On January 28th the Palestinian security forces complete their deployment in the Gaza Strip. In response, General Moshe Yaalon orders his troops to end all offensive operations in the Gaza Strip, to reduce the number of attacks in the West Bank, to bring to an end targeted killings and arrests of wanted Palestinian militants – unless they constitute a direct threat to the security of the Israeli population –, to suspend a certain number of roadblocks in the Gaza Strip and to reopen the three border-crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip.

Violence between the two sides

• On January 2nd Israel carries out a raid into the Gaza Strip in retaliation for the repeated firing of rockets and mortar-shells onto Jewish settlements. On January 4th an Israeli tank, while firing at Palestinian militants in the town of Beit Lahiya in retaliation for the launching of rockets against the borderpost of Bayt Hanun, kills at least seven Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, including an 11-year-old child. In retaliation, a Palestinian militant opens fire on Israeli soldiers at a checkpoint at Erez, and later in the day a rocket is launched against the same checkpoint. Responsibility for the first attack is claimed jointly by Hamas and by the Brigade of Martyrs of al-Aqsa. On January 12th an Israeli civilian is killed and three Israeli soldiers are wounded after being ambushed by the Islamic Jihad in the south of the Gaza Strip. Shortly afterwards three militants are shot dead. On January 14th six Israelis die in an attack jointly orchestrated by Hamas, the Brigades of the Martyrs of al-Aqsa, and the People’s Resistance Committees at the Karni terminal, the main point of commercial interchange between Israel and the Gaza Strip. In retaliation, the Israeli army kills three militants, and Israel closes off the Gaza Strip and cuts off all contacts with the PNA. Abbas condemns the attack, while at the same time also condemning the Israeli military actions taken against the Palestinians. On January 18th Sharon announces to his cabinet that the army has been given the order to take “all necessary action” against militants in the Gaza Strip. On January 18th a Palestinian kamikaze kills one Israeli soldier and leaves six others wounded at Abu Houli in the south of the Gaza Strip.

February 2005

Israel

• On February 1st Attorney General Menachem Mazuz announces that, contrary to the decision of a government committee in mid-2004, the Israeli law concerning the Possessions of Absent Owners (1950) cannot be applied to the agricultural land in East Jerusalem from which its owners (resident in the West Bank) have been separated by the Security Wall.

• On February 16th the Knesset approves the allocation of $900 million for compensation payments to Jewish settlers affected by the plan for unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from some of the settlements in the West Bank. On the same day the Minister of Defence, Lieutenant-General Shaul Mofaz, with the support of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, decides not to extend the term of office of the Israeli chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Moshe Yaalon, who had planned the military aspects of the Israeli withdrawal. On February 20th the cabinet vote, by a majority of 17 for to five against (including the Minister of Finance Benjamin Netanyahu, who wants the question to be subjected to a referendum), in favour of the evacuation of all settlements in the Gaza Strip and of four settlements in the West Bank. It is declared illegal for settlers to stay in these settlements after July 20th.

• On February 17th Attorney General Mazuz announces that proceedings will not be brought against Ariel Sharon in relation to the financing of the electoral campaign which made him leader of the Likud in 1999. Proceedings are brought however against his son, Omri Sharon, for fraud, perjury and breach of trust in connection with the same affair.

• On February 20th the cabinet approves, by a majority of 20 for to one against, the definitive course of the southern section of the security wall. The course adopted is closer to the Green Line (the 1967 frontier between Israel and the West Bank) than previous proposals, and goes some limited way towards meeting the objections raised by the International Penal Court and the Israeli Supreme Court.

Palestine

• On February 10th Abbas dismisses the head of national security in the south of the Gaza Strip, Omar Ashour, the chief of police in Gaza, Saeb al-Ajez, and the head of national security in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Abdel Razek al-Majaida. He also orders the security forces to maintain the ceasefire with Israel by arresting the Palestinian militant who launched 50 mortar-shells and rockets against the Jewish settlement at Neve Dekalim, in south-west Gaza.

• On February 12th Abbas meets the leaders of Hamas and of Islamic Jihad, who both agree to implement an informal truce period.

• On February 21st, in his State of the Union speech, the U.S. President, G.W. Bush, announces an additional package of direct aid to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) worth $350 million.

• On February 27th the Palestinian Legislative Council (or legislative body) approves the new cabinet of ministers, which, under pressure from reformist elements in Fatah, has been purged of loyalists of the late President Yasser Arafat, except in the case of the Prime Minister Ahmed Qurie and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nabil Shaath.
Violence between the two sides

- On February 25th a Palestinian kamikaze blows himself up in a Tel-Aviv discotheque, causing five deaths and over 20 wounded. Responsibility for the attack is claimed by the Islamic Jihad, but according to Sharon, the attack was organized by the group’s office in Damascus. The Syrian government denies any involvement in the attacks. On February 27th Sharon warns the Palestinians that he will resume military operations if they do not take strong measures against terrorism.

March 2005

Israel

- On March 3rd the central committee of the Likud supports by a majority vote a non-binding resolution asking the Likud members of the Knesset (legislative assembly) to seek a national referendum on Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s plan for a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and certain settlements in the West Bank. Sharon, leader of the Likud, rejects this request and declares that he will not let an extremist wing dictate party policy. On March 11th the Minister of Defence, Lieutenant-General Shaul Mofaz, approves a new timetable for implementing plans for the withdrawal, which would start in July and last for three to four weeks. A shorter duration of operations is envisaged compared to the previous timetable so as to reduce the possibility of confrontations between soldiers and settlers putting up resistance. On March 18th the government prohibits Israeli citizens from going to the settlements in the Gaza Strip so as to avoid an influx of activists during the period of the withdrawal. On March 28th the Knesset rejects the call for a referendum by a majority of 72 to 39. The reaction of the Council of Jewish Localities (Yesha) is to warn the government that the rejection of a referendum could lead to violent confrontations and civil war.

- On March 10th the Prime Minister’s office publishes a report made by the former attorney general Talia Sasson on the government’s role in the setting up of settlement outposts. It concludes that at least 105 outposts, and probably more, had been constructed illegally since the mid-1990’s. The report adds that the illegal outposts had been constructed with the connivance of different departments of state, in contradiction with the Sharon government’s requests to dismantle them. Sasson calls for an end to the undercover financing of these outposts by certain ministries, and recommends that Attorney General Menachem Mazuz bring proceedings against those involved in the illegal constructions, among them the adviser for settlement questions at the ministry of defence, Ron Shechner. The Israeli government subsequently decides on March 13th to dismantle 24 illegal outposts in the West Bank, and to appoint a committee to make recommendations concerning the supervision of budgets, and the planning and construction of settlements.

Peace negotiations

- On March 1st the British Prime Minister Tony Blair organizes an international conference to support the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) with a view to constructing a viable Palestinian state. More than 30 countries and organizations take part. A large part of the conference is taken up by security questions. The Palestinian delegation agrees to reinforce the security sector, but declares that its success will depend on the establishment of a worthwhile political dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis. The participants at the conference agree to give the PNA advice and assistance in this domain. The security coordination group set up in February by the U.S. under the leadership of General William E. Ward is to help the PNA to meet all the security commitments envisaged in the first phase of the Road Map. With regard to questions of government practice, the PNA undertakes to adopt a new electoral law, and to reinforce...
the legitimacy of its institutions of state by holding legislative elections during the summer, and local elections before the end of the year. The members of the Quartet meet on the sidelines of the conference and, in a joint declaration, ask the PNA to arrest and put on trial those responsible for the murderous attack in Tel Aviv on February 25th. The Quartet also criticizes Israel, and reminds the Israelis that the Palestinian State can only be a viable state if its territory is continuous, and not fragmented by the presence of Jewish settlements. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in a separate meeting with Abbas, also criticizes Israeli settlement policy, and warns that a state fragmented into different territories will not work.

• On March 16th, Israeli troops pass control of the security of Jenicho to the Palestinians, in accordance with the Israeli promise made at Sharm-el-Sheikh in February. It is the first area to be returned to the PNA since the reoccupation of the West Bank in 2002. On March 22nd it is the turn of Tulkarm to be transferred to the PNA, and negotiations are undertaken for the return of Qalqilia. The Israeli army is also said to have proposed transferring control of the security of the towns of Nablus and Jenin, fiefs of the Palestinian militants since the second Intifada, but the PNA is reported to have refused to assume this responsibility.

• On March 17th, after three days of discussions in Cairo between Abbas and 13 Palestinian factions including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the latter announce a conditional period of "calm", which will terminate at the end of the year if their demands for military withdrawal and release of prisoners are not met. The Israeli Prime Minister describes this decision as positive, but adds that progress in the peace process will depend upon the disarming of the terrorist organizations. On March 22nd, in an attempt to disarm militants, the ministry of the interior establishes a policy of arms-control in the Gaza Strip.

Conflicts between the two sides

• On March 20th, near Tulkram, Israeli troops kill Mohamed Abi-Hazneh, a militant of Islamic Jihad who is a key suspect in the case of the Tel Aviv attack on February 25th.

• On March 27th the Israeli Minister of Defence, Lieutenant-General Shaul Mofaz, declares in an interview with the New York Times, that Palestinian militants had introduced into the Gaza Strip Strela anti-aircraft missiles with the help of high-placed officers in the Palestinian military intelligence service.

April 2005

Israel

• On April 4th Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announces to the foreign affairs and defence committee of the Knesset (legislative assembly) that it is necessary to extend the settlement of Maale Adumin up to the frontier of East Jerusalem (Corridor E-1). Sharon gives no date for this work to start. The main Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat, calls on the U.S. to prevent completion of this project, which will destroy the peace process by separating the Palestinian territory from East Jerusalem.

• On April 5th divisions appear for the first time between Jewish settlers over Sharon’s plan for unilateral withdrawal, during a meeting with him to discuss how to dismantle the settlements in the Gaza Strip. While representatives from Gush Katif, the largest block of settlements in the Gaza Strip, agree to leave the settlements provided that their families are allowed to reconstruct their homes near Askelon, a place which resembles Gush Katif, other leaders of the settlers denounce such talks as treason.

• April 12th sees the opening of the trial of Mordechai Vanunu, arrested in November 2004 for violating the conditions of his release by speaking to foreign journalists and by trying to travel to the Gaza Strip. Vanunu had been released in April 2004 after an 18-year prison sentence for divulging Israeli nuclear secrets. On April 19th Minister of the Interior Ophir Pines-Paz prolongs Vanunu’s prohibition to travel by one year.

• On April 14th, a military court acquits the officer who had killed English journalist James Miller in May 2003.

Palestine

On April 5th The Independent reports that President Mahmoud Abbas’s attempts to take strong measures against Islamic militants have been made impossible due to a conflict with the young war-lords of the Brigades of Martyrs of al-Aqsa, linked to his faction of Fatah. On March 31st 15 members of al-Aqsa had fired on the Mukata (the President’s residence) and ransacked four restaurants frequented by high-ranking Palestinians and their families. As a consequence Abbas dismisses Ismael Jaber, the head of the armed forces in the Gaza Strip, and Yunis al-Has, the commandant in the district of Ramallah, since the security apparatus had failed to prevent these attacks. On April 24th, Abbas appoints Suleiman Helles as head of the national security forces, Ahmad Abdelkarim as head of military intelligence, Tarek Abu Rajab as head of the general intelligence service, and Alaa Hosni as chief of police. Abbas also orders the retirement of ten officers, including Major-General Moussa Arafat, cousin of the late Yasser Arafat and head of military intelligence. In order to placate the old guard of the “Arafat era”, Abbas appoints both Major-General Arafat and Major-General Amin al-Hindi, the former head of the general intelligence service, as presidential advisers with ministerial rank.

Peace negotiations

• On April 11th Sharon has talks with U.S. President G.W. Bush in Texas. At the end of the meeting, Bush makes a
speech that is amazingly harsh towards the Israelis, asking them to respect their obligations assumed in the Road Map, to dismantle all illegal outposts in the West Bank, and warning Israel that it should drop its plans to extend Jewish settlements in the West Bank. In private, Bush indicates his opposition to the Israeli plan to extend the Maale Adumim settlement in the West Bank, which would consolidate the illegal annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel, and would make the emergence of a Palestinian state even more difficult. On the other hand, the U.S. re-affirms its April 2004 commitment that Israel will not be forced to abandon all its settlements in the West Bank and return to the frontiers of 1967. On April 22nd, in an interview in The Jerusalem Post, Sharon declares that he will continue the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, despite American opposition.

- On April 14th U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, acting in the name of the Quartet, appoints James Wolfensohn to the post of special envoy with responsibility for coordinating the Israeli withdrawal and for improving the Palestinian economy.

Conflicts between the two sides

- On April 9th, the Israeli army kills three 15-year-old boys in the Rafah refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. According to the army, they were trying to cross the frontier with Egypt to smuggle arms, while according to their friend, who survived the attack, they were playing football. In retaliation, Palestinian militants fire mortar-shells at the Gush Katif block of settlements, without causing any wounded. In addition, Hamas and Islamic Jihad announce that they are reconsidering their commitment to a ceasefire. Abbas describes the killings as violations of the truce.

May 2005

Israel

- On May 1st Stanley Fisher, former first deputy-director general of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), becomes eighth governor of the Bank of Israel.

Palestine

- On May 2nd, the leader of the Yisrael Ba’aliya party, Natan Sharansky, resigns as Minister without portfolio responsible for Jerusalem, social affairs and the diaspora, in protest at the plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and from some of the West Bank settlements, which he describes as “a strategic error which will exacerbate the conflict with the Palestinians and will increase terrorism”. He also criticizes the fact that Sharon plans to withdraw from Gaza without insisting in return that security reforms should be carried out by the Palestinians.

- On May 2nd the family of British journalist James Miller, killed by an Israeli soldier who was acquitted in April of all charges brought against him, launch a civil action against the Israeli government to ask that the killer of their son be prosecuted.

- On May 4th, a State Department analyst, Lawrence Franklin, is arrested in the U.S. after being suspected of transmitting information about Iran to the “American Israel Public Affairs Committee” (AIPAC), the most important pro-Israeli pressure group in the U.S. In August 2004, Sharon had denied any Israeli involvement in this spy scandal.

- On May 9th, Sharon postpones until mid-August the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, initially planned for early July, so as to respect the traditional Jewish period of mourning from July 20th to 14th August, commemorating the destruction of two ancient temples in Jerusalem. On May 11th, the Minister of Defence, Lieutenant-General Shaul Mofaz, declares on the Israeli radio station that, unlike Sharon, he is not in favour of demolishing Jewish settlers’ homes after the withdrawal because of the time required to do so and the additional risks for Israeli soldiers. On May 20th, the EU trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson, asks Israel not to dismantle free trade agreements with the Gaza Strip, as originally foreseen in the withdrawal plan, since this would weaken even further the Palestinian economy.

- On May 15th, the Israeli cabinet re-affirms a law which prohibits the granting of citizenship to Palestinians who marry Israeli Arabs, leaving thousands of spouses with no legal status.

Peace negotiations

- From May 26th to 28th, the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visits the U.S. to meet the American President, G.W. Bush. Bush promises direct aid to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) totalling $50 million in order to develop the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal. The U.S. Congress would have preferred to provide aid through third parties. During the press conference at the end of the meeting, Bush reaffirms his support for an independent Palestinian state and declares his confidence in Abbas. He reiterates the comments he had made in April when Sharon was visiting the White House, calling on Israel to withdraw from all its illegal settlements in the Gaza Strip, to put an end to any further expansion of the settlements and to ensure that the Security Wall does not become a “political Wall”. Bush calls on the Israelis to withdraw to the positions held in September 2000 and adds that any changes to the 1949 ceasefire settlement must be made by mutual agreement and must guarantee territorial continuity for the future Palestinian state.

Conflicts between the two sides

- Despite the ceasefire agreement announced between the two sides, several violent incidents occur in May. On May 2nd, Israeli forces carry out a...
raid on a village near Tulkarm, in the West Bank, leading to the death of one Israeli soldier and of Shafiq Abdel Ghani, a member of Islamic Jihad accused of helping to plan the suicide attack of February 25th in Tel-Aviv. Later the same day, two rockets are launched from the Gaza Strip against the Israeli town of Sderot. On May 18th, Israeli forces launch an aerial attack in the Gaza Strip against Hamas forces who had made bomb attacks against the Jewish settlement of Gush Katif. In a statement addressed to Sharon, Hamas warns that the ceasefire will not last long if the attacks against the Palestinian people continue, to which Sharon replies that he will use “all means necessary” to put an end to the mortar-shell and rocket attacks on Israeli towns and settlements. On May 20th, Hamas, the Brigade of the Martyrs of al-Aqsa, and the People’s Resistance Committees launch a joint attack on the Kfar Darom settlement. In its retaliatory action Israel kills one of the three authors of the attack.

June 2005

Israel

- On June 9th the Israeli Supreme Court declares that the planned withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from a tiny part of the West Bank settlements is constitutional. The Court acknowledges that it has repercussions for the “human dignity” of the settlers, but adds that it has been approved by the Knesset and that “appropriate compensation” has been proposed.
- On June 11th Lieutenant-General Dan Halutz is named chief of staff of the Israeli armed forces.
- On June 13th The Guardian reports that the U.S. has suspended bilateral cooperation on different development projects and has interrupted delivery of equipment to Israel, following a dispute concerning a contract between Israel and China to modernize “Happy Killer”-type military drones previously sold to China.
- On June 17th the Israeli army announces that the navy is planning to construct a maritime barrier to the north of Gaza, so as to prevent the infiltration of activists and to prepare for the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The system will be equipped with electronic sensors and radar to compensate for the loss of surveillance posts in Gaza.
- On June 17th the Security Council adopts Resolution 1605 (2005), which prolongs for another six months the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) located on the Golan heights.
- On June 26th, the Israeli government approves the construction of a new community for settlers from Gaza at Nitzanim on the Mediterranean coast. On June 30th the Israeli army designates the Gaza Strip as a “closed military zone”, prohibiting access to any Israelis who do not live in Gaza. Shortly afterwards, the Israeli army evacuates 150 anti-withdrawal activists from the Palm Beach hotel, which had become their headquarters.
- On June 27th a military court convicts the Israeli soldier Idier Wahid Taysir for the killing in April 2003 of a British activist, Tom Hurndall, while he was trying to protect children in the south of the Gaza Strip.

Palestine

- On June 12th the Minister of the Interior announces that four Palestinians found guilty of murder have been executed at Saraya prison in the Gaza Strip. Under international pressure, Yasser Arafat had suspended all executions from February 2002 onwards.

Peace negotiations

- On June 2nd, Israel releases 398 of the 900 Palestinian prisoners it had agreed to release during the Sharon-Abbas meeting at Sharm-el-Sheikh in February. Two prisoners refuse to be released.
- On June 7th and 8th, the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, visits Israel and the Palestinian occupied territories. After a meeting with his Israeli opposite number, Silvan Shalom, he announces that the British government, which had had diplomatic contacts with the leaders of Hamas due to the increasing political power of Hamas in the Palestinian territories after the municipal elections in December 2004 and May 2005, will – as Israel requests – have no further contact with the leaders of Hamas until they renounce violence and the destruction of Israel.
- On June 9th the Palestinian Minister for Civilian Affairs and chief negotiator for the disengagement from Gaza, Saeb Erekat, accuses Israel of not divulging information that is crucial for the successful transfer of control of the Gaza Strip, so as to be able to blame later the Palestinians for the failure of the operation. He calls on the Israelis not to create the conditions for a “third Intifada”.
- On June 15th the Financial Times reports that Egypt has stationed 40 police and intelligence service officers in the Palestinian territories in order to give its support to the disengagement plan, and proposes the deployment of 750 border guards on its frontier with the Gaza Strip so as to prevent arms smuggling after the Israeli withdrawal. On June 19th the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announces, during a visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories, that Israel will destroy the settlers’ homes so as to allow the Palestinians to construct high-rise buildings and thus alleviate Palestinian overpopulation in Gaza (1.3 million inhabitants).
- On June 21st Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas hold their second meeting in Jerusalem, at Sharon’s official residence. The meeting does not lead to any advances on subjects crucial for a smooth Israeli withdrawal or for the continuation of the peace process.

Conflicts between the two sides

- On June 8th confrontations break out at Haram-al-Sharif (the Temple Mount) in Jerusalem, leaving several Palestinians wounded. On June 7th the Israeli army kills Mrawah Kalim, the military commander of Islamic Jihad in Jenin, as well as two other Palestinians. In retaliation, also on June 7th, Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants launch a series of rockets against Jewish settlements and against the Israeli town of Sderot. Rockets launched against the Israeli settlement of Gamei Tal, in the Gaza Strip, kill two Palestinian workers and one Chinese, and wound seven Palestinians. In a counter-attack on June 8th, Israel launches missiles
against Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip. On June 19th Islamic Jihad militants kill an Israeli sergeant-major on the frontier between Gaza and Egypt, and the following day they kill a civilian in Gaza. In retaliation, on June 21st, a few hours before the Sharon-Abbas meeting, the Israeli army arrests 52 Jihad Islamic militants in several towns in the Gaza Strip, and declares that the Palestinian Authority is inefficient. On June 24th, a Palestinian opens fire on a group of Israeli settlers, killing a ten-year-old child and wounding four people.

**July 2005**

**Palestine**

- On July 14th confrontations break out between Hamas militants and Palestinian security forces in the suburbs of Zeitun, leaving two dead and 30 wounded. This violence follows the Palestinian Minister of the Interior Nasser Yousef’s decision – taken in the middle of an Israeli attack – to establish a state of emergency in Gaza and to authorize the security forces to prevent militants from launching mortar-shells and rockets against Israeli targets.

**Conflicts between the two sides**

- On July 12th a young Palestinian from a village near Tulkram blows himself up in the town of Natanyaha, killing two women and two adolescent girls, and wounding about thirty other people. The Kamikaze declares on video that the Islamic Jihad still abides by the ceasefire announced in March, but that he is avenging Israeli violations of it. Mahmoud Abbas condemns the attack as going against the interests of the Palestinian cause. In reply, Sharon orders on August 13th “a severe retaliation” against the leadership of the Islamic Jihad, and Israeli troops retake control of Tulkram, which Israel had transferred to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in March. On July 14th, in retaliation for a rocket launched by Hamas from the Gaza Strip against the settlement of Nativ Haasara, killing a woman, Israel launches four aerial attacks against a charity organization linked to Hamas, a refugee camp and a cemetery used to launch rockets against Israel. On July 15th Israel continues its attacks and kills seven Hamas militants. On July 17th hundreds of Israeli troops are concentrated near the frontier with the Gaza Strip, and threaten to invade if the PNA does not prevent missiles being fired against Israel. Abbas declares that he is doing everything in his power and calls on the U.S. and other countries to prevent an Israeli invasion. On July 22nd and 23rd the U.S. Secretary of State makes an emergency visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories in order to restore calm. On July 24th Israeli security forces disarm and arrest a Palestinian who was about to commit a suicide attack in Tel-Aviv. Shortly afterwards two Palestinians kill two Israelis and wound four others while they were passing through a narrow corridor controlled by the Israeli army linking the settlement of Gush Katif to Jerusalem. The two Palestinians are shot dead.

**August 2005**

**Israel**

- On August 7th the Minister of Finance, Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s main opponent, resigns, a few minutes after the government approves the evacuation of the first settlements in the Gaza Strip. He declares that Sharon’s withdrawal plan will weaken Israel’s security, and criticizes the fact that the Palestinians have not been asked to take any security measures in return. Sharon appoints his ally Ehud Olmert, the deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Industry, Commerce and Labour, to the post. On August 30th Netanyahu announces that he will stand against Sharon as candidate to become president of the Likud, accusing Sharon of leaning too far to the Left.

- On August 28th Omri Sharon, son of Ariel Sharon, is convicted for illegally financing his father’s campaigns for the leadership of the Likud in 1999, and to be elected as Prime Minister in 2001.

**Palestine**

- On August 10th the Financial Times reports that, following the kidnapping of three workers from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) is to close its office in the south of the Gaza Strip and suspend its field operations throughout the Strip because of the deterioration of the internal security situation. Palestinian security forces rapidly release the three hostages.

**Peace negotiations**

- On August 2nd and 3rd 25,000 Israeli ultra-nationalists gather in the Israeli town of Sderot, near the frontier with the Gaza Strip, to protest against the withdrawal plan. Although the Gaza Strip had been designated as a “closed military zone”, in the previous few weeks several activists have succeeded in reaching the settlements in Gaza. In Israel the tension mounts when Eden Natan-Zada, a religious activist who had deserted the Israeli army in protest because of the withdrawal plan, and who lived in one of the settlements in Gaza, is battered to death by a crowd of Israeli Arabs, after killing four people in a bus in the Israeli Arab town of Shfaram. On August 15th Israel begins the evacuation of the 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip (with 8,518 settlers) and four settlements (with 674 settlers) out of the total of 120 settlements in the West Bank. On August 15th the settlers are offered a period of grace of 48 hours to evacuate Gaza, after which (from August 17th) Israeli soldiers will start to evacuate them by force. On August 16th and 17th, at Neve Dekalim, the largest of the Gaza settlements, hundreds of young religious nationalists interpose themselves as the army arrives to transport the belongings of those settlers who are prepared to leave Gaza. Four people are wounded, and 98 protesters are arrested. While there are few violent scenes in the Gaza Strip, in the West Bank a settler opens fire on a group of Palestinians, killing four of them. On August 18th the security forces expel thousands of settlers occupying two...
synagogues, one at Kfar Darom and the other at Neve Dekalim, the two most militant Jewish settlements in Gaza. On August 21st bulldozers start to destroy the 2,000 settlers’ homes in the Gaza Strip, and on August 22nd Netzarim, the last remaining settlement in Gaza, is evacuated. On August 23rd the two remaining settlements in the West Bank are evacuated. The Israeli army needed just nine days to complete the withdrawal, while up to three weeks had been envisaged in the original plans. The Palestinian National Authority welcomes the withdrawal, but declares that Gaza will continue to be occupied as long as the Israelis control both the frontiers and the circulation of people and goods. On August 31st the Knesset approves the Egyptian proposal to deploy 750 border guards along its frontier with the Gaza Strip, so as to prevent arms smuggling after the Israeli withdrawal.

Conflicts between the two sides

- On August 25th Israeli troops kill five Palestinians suspected of being involved in a suicide attack, during a raid on a refugee camp near Tulka. In the absence of witnesses, there are three adolescents among the dead. In retaliation, the People’s Resistance Committees launch a rocket attack near Sderot. On August 28th the Islamic Jihad claims responsibility for a suicide attack at a bus-stop in Beersheba, which wounds two security agents who were trying to get the kamikaze as far away as possible.

September 2005

Israel

- On September 1st the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, Silvan Shalom, meets his Pakistani opposite number, Mian Kursheid Mahmood Kasuri, in Turkey, one of the few Muslim countries to have recognized Israel. On September 17th the Pakistani President Pervaiz Musharaf addresses the Congress of American Jews, and states that he will not recognize Israel until a Palestinian state has been established.

- On September 2nd the deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Industry, Commerce and Labour, Ehud Olmert, announces that, under U.S. pressure, Israel has suspended a plan to build 3,500 new homes in the zone designated as “E1”, which had been intended to join up the settlement of Maale Adumim in the West Bank with the Arab section of Jerusalem.

- On September 6th Israeli military prosecutors open 17 criminal inquiries dealing with allegations made by Israeli soldiers that they received orders to fire on unarmed Palestinians. These inquiries come after interviews given by soldiers to “Breaking the Silence”, an organization of former Israeli soldiers which aims to bring to light abuses perpetrated by the Israeli army.

- On September 10th a British court issues a warrant to arrest Doron Almong, a former major in the Israeli army accused of ordering the destruction of hundreds of Palestinian homes in the Gaza Strip in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention, which designates as a crime any act of excessive destruction and any appropriation of property not justified by military considerations. On September 11th, when Almong is travelling to the U.K., Israeli diplomats warn him not to leave his plane so as not to be arrested. In mid-September, the former chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Moshe Yallon, cancels a visit to London, for fear of also being prosecuted for war crimes, and the Israeli government warns his successor, Lieutenant-General Dan Halutz, to avoid travelling to the U.K.

- On September 15th the Israeli Supreme Court, while at the same time declaring as legal the construction of the Security Wall inside Palestinian territory so as to protect Jewish settlements in the West Bank, takes into account the economic and social consequences of the construction of the Wall for five Palestinian villages, and orders the government to consider alternative trajectories so as not to separate these five villages from the main towns of Qalqilya and Habala.

- On September 23rd Bahrain announces that it is ending its economic boycott against Israel, so as to conform to the conditions of the free-trade agreement signed with the U.S. in September 2004. Bahrain thus becomes the first member of the Gulf Cooperation Council to suspend the boycott.

Palestine

- On September 7th the People’s Resistance Committees (PRC) assassinate Mussa Arafat, the former head of military intelligence, warning the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) that all those guilty of corruption shall be punished, and that what has been stolen from the Palestinian people must be returned. On September 9th the son of Mussa Arafat is released by the PRC thanks to Egyptian mediation.

- On September 29th municipal elections are held in 82 towns, constituting the final round of the elections which have been held since December 2004. Fatah wins 54% of the votes, as opposed to 26% for Hamas.

Peace negotiations

- On September 7th 750 Egyptian soldiers take up their positions along the frontier between Egypt and Gaza. On the same day Israeli announces, after months of negotiations, the closure for six months of Rafah, the border-crossing between Egypt and Palestinian territory, adding that from September 25th onwards both goods and Palestinian citizens will have to pass through Kerem Shalom, where Israeli, Egyptian and Palestinian territory converge. Israel accepts in principle that controls may be carried out by third parties at Rafah after the end of the six-month period. On September 12th the Israeli army completes the withdrawal of all remaining Jewish settlers and Israeli soldiers from the Gaza Strip, and returns control of the territory to the PNA, so ending 38 years of occupation. As soon as the Israelis have left, thousands of Palestinians take possession of the former Jewish settlements and destroy the synagogues.

Conflicts between the two sides

- On September 23rd a truck transporting rockets explodes during a Hamas parade held at the Jabaliya refugee-camp in the Gaza Strip to celebrate the Israeli withdrawal, killing 21 people and wounding 80, principally civilians. Hamas
accuses Israel of firing a missile against the truck, an accusation which is denied by both the Israeli authorities and by the PNA. In retaliation, Hamas launches several mortar-shells from the Gaza Strip against the Israeli town of Sderot, wounding five Israelis. The same day the Israeli army kills three militants of the Islamic Jihad, which launches a mortar-shell attack against Israel in retaliation. On September 24th the Israeli government gives a free hand to the army to act against the Palestinian factions. As a result the army positions tanks and artillery equipment on the northern and eastern frontier of Gaza, undertakes wide scale arrests of Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants in the West Bank, and resumes its policy of targeted killings. The same day four helicopters kill four Hamas militants in Gaza and destroy arms caches. The following day an aerial attack on the city of Gaza leads to the death of Mohammed Khalil, a leader of Islamic Jihad, and of another militant. On September 25th Abbas condemns the Israeli aggression, which he describes as unjustified. On September 27th the Israeli aerial attacks continue, targeting roads, bridges and empty buildings. On September 29th Israeli troops kill two Islamic Jihad militants at Burqin, in addition to a militant from the Brigades of the Martyrs of al-Aqsa in Jenin.

October 2005

Israel

- On October 6th the Supreme Court declares illegal under international law the use of Palestinian civilians as “human shields” during conflicts. The affair had been brought before the Court by human rights organizations in October 2002.
- On October 10th Bahrein, which has lifted its boycott against Israel, makes it clear that this does not imply any normalization of its relations with Israel.
- On October 11th, for the first time in the history of Israel, an Arab state, Qatar, makes a donation: $6 million to help the Israeli town of Sakhim, where Jews and Arabs cohabit, to construct a football stadium for its mixed team, Bnei Sakhnin.

Palestine

- On October 1st Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, under pressure from Israel and the U.S. to contain the militants, prohibits armed demonstrations in public. On October 2nd Hamas militants attack a Palestinian police-station in the city of Gaza, and fighting spreads rapidly to the nearby refugee-camp of Shati. A policeman and two civilians die. Hamas declares that fighting broke out after the police tried to arrest the son of Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, a leader of Hamas killed by Israel in April 2004. On October 3rd dozens of Palestinian policemen invade the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) building to protest against the lack of military equipment with which they have been faced in the recent confrontation with Hamas. An hour later the PLC approves a motion asking Abbas to form a new government within two weeks.
- On October 13th the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) publishes statistics which reveal that the number of Palestinians who have died as a result of internal violence is equivalent to the number who have been killed by the Israelis.

Peace negotiations

- On October 20th Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visits the U.S. to meet President G.W. Bush. Bush congratulates the Israelis and the Palestinians for their cooperation over the Israeli withdrawal. He calls on the Israelis not to expand their settlements, and asks the Palestinians to bring to an end the threat posed by armed groups. Abbas pleads for a resumption of negotiations with Israel. Bush announces that he will ask the Quartet’s special envoy for disengagement from Gaza, James Wolfensohn, to prolong his mission until 2006, so that he can continue with his task of improving the Palestinian economy.

Conflicts between the two sides

- On October 12th Israel announces the arrest of six Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, including Ibrahim Ghneimat, a high-ranking member of Hamas, who had been on the “wanted” list for eight years in relation to, amongst other offences, a suicide attack in Tel-Aviv in March 1997 which had cost three Israelis their lives. On October 16th a militant from the Brigade of the Martyrs of al-Aqsa kills three Israelis near the Israeli settlements of Gush Etzion and Eli in the West Bank. In retaliation Israel imposes new restrictions on Palestinians’ movements in the West Bank and suspends all contacts with the PNA. The same day the Israelis kills Nihad Abu Ghanim, a commandant of the Islamic Jihad in Jenin. On October 24th, in Tulkarm, Israeli soldiers kill Louay Sa’ad, one of the most wanted military commanders of the Islamic Jihad, together with his lieutenant Majed Ashkar, and arrest five members of the Tulkarm cell, suspected of organizing a new attack in Israel. Israel accuses this cell of being responsible for the attacks on February 25th in Tel-Aviv and on July 12th in Netanya. Later in the day of October 24th rockets are fired against Israel from the Gaza Strip. On October 26th the Islamic Jihad avenges the death of Sa’ad by committing a suicide attack in a market in the Israeli town of Hadera, causing the death of five Israelis and wounding 28. The spokesman for the Islamic Jihad, Khader Habib, describes the attack as an act of vengeance, and declares that the group still abides by the ceasefire proclaimed in March, but adds that they will not tolerate a unilateral truce. On October 27th Sharon warns the Palestinians that they will not gain their independence without putting a stop to the actions of the armed Islamic factions, and announces an uninterrupted Israeli offensive against these factions. The same day the Israeli army kills nine Palestinians, principally civilians, in an aerial attack on the Jabaliya refugee-camp targeting a truck transporting important activists of the Islamic Jihad. On October 28th Israel launches an aerial attack against the north of Gaza, and kills a member of the Brigade of the Martyrs of al-Aqsa.

November 2005

Israel

- On November 2nd "Physicians for Human Rights-Israel and the"Gaza

Physicians for Human Rights-Israel
Vanunu, released in April after completing an 18-year prison sentence for revealing Israeli nuclear secrets, is arrested for violating the conditions of his release by travelling to the Gaza Strip.

On November 15th The Independent publishes a report drawn up by European diplomats in Jerusalem, which calls on the European Union to intervene against the illegal Israeli policy aiming to annex East-Jerusalem (occupied since 1967). This would be achieved by expanding Jewish settlements in and around East-Jerusalem, and by the construction of the Security Wall, the consequences of which would be to cut off East-Jerusalem from the Palestinian territory in the West Bank. European Foreign Ministers refuse to make this report public because it could “radicalize the Palestinian population of Jerusalem, which has up to the present remained relatively calm.”

Peace negotiations

On November 1st Israel agrees to re-open the border-crossing at Rafah, between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, which is to be controlled by the Palestinians and the Egyptians under EU supervision. The Palestinians accept the European mission, but oppose the conditions imposed by Israel, which demands that no goods should leave via Rafah, and that the frontier should be controlled via a system of cameras. On November 7th the EU Foreign Ministers, meeting in Brussels, approve a mission to control the border-crossing at Rafah, in addition to the launching on January 1st, 2006 of a three-year mission to train the Palestinian police. On November 13th the Quartet’s special envoy for disengagement from Gaza, James Wolfensohn, is not able to reach an agreement with all parties over new border regulations for Gaza. On November 15th the U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, finally manages to achieve an agreement between the two parties, under which it is envisaged that individuals will be able to cross the frontier at Rafah from November 25th onwards. On November 25th Abbas formally opens the frontier between Gaza and Egypt, in the presence of European and Arab delegations.

December 2005

Israel

On December 11th Minister of Defence Shaul Mofaz resigns from the Likud, to join the new party of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Kadima.

On December 19th the Likud elects Benyamin Netanyahu as new president with 47 votes against 32 for Israel Katz, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development.

Palestine

On December 14th the young militants of Fatah announce their own list, al-Mustaqbal, for the legislative elections of January 25th, 2006, including among other figures Marwan Barghuthi, currently serving a prison sentence, Mohammed Dahlan, former head of preventive security in the Gaza Strip and currently Minister of Civilian Affairs, and Jibril Rajoub, former head of preventive security in the West Bank. The same day Hamas proposes a list of 62 candidates, headed by Ismael Haniyeh, considered as a moderate. When on December 15th Prime Minister Ahmed Qurie resigns in order to present himself as a candidate for the January elections, on December 24th he reverses his decision and resumes his functions as Prime Minister. On December 25th Israel announces that Palestinians will not be authorized to vote in East-Jerusalem if Hamas presents candidates there.

On December 21st a Dutch professor and his Australian assistant are kidnapped in the north of Gaza by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which demands the release of its secretary-general Ahmed Saadat, imprisoned in Jericho since 2002. They are released a few hours later. On December 28th a British human rights activist is kidnapped with her parents at Rafah, and is released two days later.
Conflicts between the two sides

- On December 5th a suicide attack perpetrated by the Islamic Jihad at the Hasharan commercial centre in Netanyha kills four Israelis and injures 40 others. In retaliation, on December 5th and 6th the Israeli army arrests 15 Palestinians in the West Bank, including the father and the brother of the kamikaze, who came from a village to the north of Tulkarm. On December 7th, in a targeted attack, the Israelis kill Mahmoud al-Arquan, the head of the sniper unit of the People’s Resistance Committees in Gaza. On December 8th the Israelis launch missiles against a home in Jabaliya, in the north of Gaza, killing two members of the Brigade of Martyrs of al-Aqsa, including Iyad Qaddas, accused of responsibility for the firing of numerous rockets against Israel from Gaza. On December 9th Israel suspends negotiations concerning the transport of Palestinian passengers between Gaza and the West Bank, which were due to start on December 15th. On December 14th an Israeli aerial attack to the east of Gaza kills four Palestinian militants, who the Israelis say were about to carry out an attack. On December 22nd the Israeli army kills three Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. In retaliation, four Israeli soldiers are wounded when a Qassam rocket touches their base near the Gaza Strip.

On December 27th the Israelis destroy two offices of the Brigades of Martyrs of al-Aqsa and a bridge which they say was used by militants. On December 29th Israel announces the creation of a “buffer zone” in the north of Gaza for an unspecified time period, and declares that anybody venturing into this area will be killed. On December 29th a kamikaze blows himself up while being pursued by Israeli troops, killing an Israeli soldier and two Palestinians. According to the Israeli deputy Minister of Defence, he was acting under the orders of the headquarters of the Islamic Jihad in Damascus.
The chronology that follows includes the most notable events that took place during 2005 as regards the Barcelona Process.

January 2005

1st January 2005

Trade

Brussels: The 22 December EU Council of Ministers decision enters into force. This decision extends the deregulation of agricultural trade between the EU and Palestine. The Palestinian products that benefit from the new regulation include tomatoes, grapes, strawberries, flowers and olive oil.

11th January 2005

MEDA

Brussels: The statistics concerning the implementation of the EuropeAid budget for the Mediterranean area are presented. Commitments amount to more than 1 billion euros, while payments exceed 1.1 billion. As regards the MEDA programme, commitments represent 700 million while payments total 800 million. Payments during 2004 represent the same total as the investments under the entire MEDA I programme between 1995 and 1999.

13th/14th January 2005

Investments

Marseilles: Euro-Mediterranean Investment Summit organised by The Economist and the Euro-Mediterranean Network of Investment Promotion Agencies (ANIMA) programme financed under MEDA. During this meeting, various aspects of investments in the Mediterranean region are discussed and a study undertaken by ANIMA is presented, stressing the increase in investment projects over the past year.

24th January 2005

Luxembourg Presidency

Brussels: The Council of the European Union meeting makes a note of the priorities of the Luxembourg presidency. The priorities for the Mediterranean region include consolidating the achievements of the Barcelona Process, as well as entrenching the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

25th January 2005

Parliamentary Assembly

Brussels: Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly’s Political Committee, which deals with, inter alia, the proposal to create an earthquake and tsunami alert system in the Mediterranean region, the Palestinian elections and the drafting of a report on the Barcelona Process.

26th January 2005

Politics and security

Brussels: Meeting of the Senior Officials of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, at which they discuss, inter alia, the priorities of the Luxembourg Presidency or the relations between the Barcelona Process and the strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and Middle East. The opportunities for the Peace Process following the Palestinian elections are also highlighted. Regarding the preparations for the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, the Commission announces a communication that will be sent out in the Spring.

31st January 2005

Scientific-technical cooperation

Brussels: The Council of Ministers of the EU adopts a decision to authorise the signing of a scientific and technical agreement with Egypt. This agreement will allow the Egyptian scientific community to join the European Research Area and increase Egypt’s participation in the activities of 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Development.

31st January 2005

Association Agreement: EU-Israel

Brussels: The EU Council of Ministers adopts a decision to authorise the signing of an Association Agreement protocol with Israel which adapts the agreement in order to take into consideration the joining of ten new Member States in the EU from 1st May 2004 onwards. This is the third in a series of protocols that must be signed with all the Mediterranean member countries with which the EU has entered into Association Agreements.

February 2005

4th February 2005

FEMIP

Athens: The Greek government pledges
28th February and 1st March 2005
Politics and security
Brussels: Meeting between the Senior Officials on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, at which the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Policy Institutes Network (EuroMeSCo) report on the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process is presented, which was written at the request of the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs ministers. The report considers the need to revise the Partnership in order to create a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States and integrate the (ENP) in the Partnership. The Senior Officials also discuss the Partnership’s construction measures, the prevention of tsunamis in the Mediterranean, programmes in the field of justice, freedom and security, among others.

13th-15th February 2005
EU-Jordan
Amman: Meeting of three of the EU-Jordan subcommittees. The Research and Innovation subcommittee deals with matters such as Jordan’s participation in the 6th framework EU research programme and Marie Curie grants, which are the first steps in the negotiations towards the EU-Jordan agreement on science and technology. The Industry, Trade, Services and Investment subcommittee deals with the deregulation of trading goods and the suppression of non-tariff customs barriers, among others.

21st February 2005
Neighbourhood
Brussels: The Council of the EU decides on the position that the EU will maintain in the Association Councils with Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as in the joint EU-Palestinian Authority Committee in view of the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Plans of Action with these Mediterranean partners. During this meeting, the Council condemns the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.

23rd February 2005
European Parliament
Brussels: The European Parliament adopts a resolution on the EU’s relations with the Mediterranean region. The Parliament calls on the Council and Commission to renew efforts to emphasise democracy and contribute to promoting the necessary political, economic and social reforms in Mediterranean countries. The Parliament also calls on Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon. In addition, it expresses its satisfaction for the increase and improvement in the return on the funds of the MEDA programme.

28th February and 1st March 2005
Euro-Mediterranean Committee
Brussels: At the meeting, the report written by the Euro-Mediterranean Network of Economic Institutes (FEMISE) on the economic aspects of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process is presented, which was drafted at the request of the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Offices. The report stresses the insufficient convergence between the economies of the region and the demographic problems. It proposes four lines of action: entrenched of reforms, reinforcement of the role played by the private sector and civil society, promotion of investment and R&D. Some of the key points of the report are approved by the Mediterranean representatives, while the EU highlights the progress made on matters such as the signing of the Association Agreements, the gradual establishment of the Free Trade Area and the improvement in financial cooperation. Later, the Committee meets as the Board of Directors of the Anna Lindh Foundation, in order to discuss the preparations for the Foundation’s opening ceremony planned for the 20 April in Alexandria.

March 2005
2nd March 2005
Neighbourhood
Brussels: The European Commission publishes the country reports on Egypt and Lebanon, which lay the foundations for the development of the national plans of action under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The country reports submit an analysis of the political, economic and institutional reforms in these countries. The decision to negotiate Plans of Action with Egypt and Lebanon was taken by the Council of the EU, although in the case of Lebanon the schedule of negotiations will depend on the development of the internal political situation.

7th and 8th March 2005
FEMIP
Luxembourg: Meeting of the FEMIP Committee of Experts which presents a series of recommendations to modernise financial markets in view of the FEMIP ministerial conference. The experts also stress the need for greater cooperation between the main political and economic actors in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The recommendations include aspects such as the development and implementation of regulations and supervision systems, improved competitiveness of the banking system and product diversification.

12th-15th March 2005
Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA)
Cairo: First EMPA plenary session at which delegations of the Mediterranean member countries, of the parliaments of EU member countries and of the European Parliament emphasise the centrality of the Barcelona Process as the main instrument for association and talks between the Euro-Mediterranean partners. In the final declaration, the progress of the ENP’s development as a mechanism to enhance the Barcelona Process is received positively. Among other issues, the parliaments outline the Process’ principle of joint responsibility and they ask the EU to play a more noticeable political role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, to promote investment in the Mediterranean region and the EMPA committees are asked to propose the creation of a civil protection instrument in the region.

16th March 2005
Association Agreement: EU-Morocco
Brussels: The EU Council of Ministers
adopts a decision regarding the signing and provisional application of an Association Agreement protocol with Morocco which adapts the agreement in order to take into consideration the joining of ten new Member States in the EU from 1 May 2004 onwards. This is the fourth in a series of protocols that must be signed with all the Mediterranean member countries with which the EU has entered into Association Agreements.

16th March 2005
Lebanon
Brussels: The Council of the EU calls for the Syrian troops to be withdrawn in accordance with resolution 1559 of the United Nations Security Council. The European Parliament had approved a resolution in this same regard on 10 March. Both declarations stress the importance of free, democratic and transparent elections in Lebanon.

17th March 2005
Palestine
Brussels: The MED Committee approves the National Financial Plan 2005 (Part I) which involves a contribution of 70 million euros in the Trust Fund to reform the public financial management of the World Bank for the Palestinian National Authority. This contribution is in addition to other types of European aid provided to Palestine.

22nd-23rd March 2005
Lebanon
Brussels: The European Council takes a decision regarding Lebanon which approves the conclusions adopted by the Council of Ministers on 16 March. The Heads of State and Government confirm their commitment to a sovereign, independent and democratic Lebanon. They appeal to Syria to withdraw its troops and intelligence services.

31st March 2005
Association Agreement: EU-Algeria
Algiers: Algeria completes the ratification procedure for the Association Agreement with the EU. The agreement is ratified by the National Council (upper house). This had been approved previously by the National Assembly (lower chamber) on 14 March. The parliaments of the EU member countries have not yet completely ratified the agreement.

April 2005

1st-3rd April 2005
Civil society
Luxembourg: The Euromed Civil Forum is held, which is the first prepared and organised by the Euromed Non-governmental Platform. The Forum’s final declaration calls for the setting up of permanent consultation mechanisms with civil society under the Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The Forum’s recommendations focus on the need to reduce the gap between declarations of intentions and the implementation of policies concerning human rights, equal rights, immigrant rights, respect for international law when solving conflicts, employment policies, fight against poverty, sustainable development or cultural diversity.

www.euromedforum.org

4th-5th April 2005
Agriculture
Rabat: Senior Officials of the Mediterranean and EC Member Countries participate in a seminar on the deregulation of agricultural trade in order to prepare the ministerial conference planned to be held in May. The participants propose a draft agriculture waybill in which measures are put forward to stimulate cooperation and agricultural trade, some of which could be included in the ENP Plans of Action.

6th April 2005
Textile
Brussels: The European Commission agrees to publish the directives related to the possible use of a safeguard clause envisaged by the WTO against textile imports from China. The potential increase in these European imports from China particularly concerns producers in Mediterranean member countries. The textile industries in Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey sell around 95% of their products in the European market.

11th April 2005
Politics and security
Brussels: Meeting between the Senior Officials on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to discuss two seminars planned for May and June, i.e. one on security in the Mediterranean and another on crisis management. A Euro-Mediterranean seminar on antipersonnel mines is also discussed. Before the meeting, a special meeting on Eurosecurity and Defence Policy (ESDP) is held, which discusses the draft action programme to reinforce Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in this field.

11th-12th April 2005
Economy
Brussels: Ninth seminar of Experts on economic transition which focuses on the economic achievements of the Partnership and Association Agreements in view of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process. During the seminar, the Commission’s Directorate General for economic and financial affairs submits an assessment document of the tenth anniversary of the Partnership.

http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/occasionalpapers17_en.htm

12th April 2005
Work programme
Brussels: The European Commission
adopts a work programme for the next five years to reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in view of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process. In the communication, the Commission summarises a series of specific proposals to make progress in the three priority areas: Education, Sustainable Economic Growth and Democracy and Human Rights. The programme also covers subjects such as Justice, Migration, Foreign Policy and Security, especially the fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the Middle East peace process and civil society’s role in the Partnership.

12th April 2005
Euro-Mediterranean Committee
Brussels: At the Committee meeting, the Commission’s Communication, submitted that same day, is considered to be positive. The Luxembourg presidency submits the draft directives for the next Euro-Mediterranean summit. The Commission reports on the Euromed Civil Forum held in Luxembourg. The meeting also deals with subjects such as cooperation in education or Mediterranean rules of origin. Later, the Committee meets as the Board of Directors of the Anna Lindh Foundation, to which two reports are submitted, one by the presidency of the Foundation and another by the Executive Director.

13th April 2005
Med Committee
Brussels: At the Committee meeting, the MEDA II Regional Financial Plan 2005 (part I) is considered to be positive. This plan, worth 155 million euros, includes contributions for the FEMIP, as well as support for three transactions, inter alia, that aim to boost talks between both shores of the Mediterranean: “Partnership for peace” that supports civil activities in Israel and Palestine; the Anna Lindh Foundation and the MED-PACT association programme between cities of the North and of the South.

15th-16th April 2005
Ministerial Conference
Senningen: At the informal meeting of EU Foreign Ministers on relations between the Mediterranean and Middle East, the ministers state their conviction that the reforms can only be successful if they are developed by the societies themselves and under no circumstances are they imposed from outside.

14th April 2005
Association Agreement: EU-Israel
Jerusalem: The fourth EU-Israel association Committee meeting is the first since the conclusion of the ENP Plan of Action. Those present discuss the implementation of the Plan of Action, the deregulation of agricultural trade and how trade with the Palestinians can be facilitated. In the field of political talks, the themes are the Middle East situation, anti-Semitism, the fight against terrorism and the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process.

19th April 2005
Cities
Brussels: The Eurocities network, which unites 121 European cities and includes a Euro-Mediterranean working group, explains its stance regarding the future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the role that the cities in the region must play. The network urges Euro-Mediterranean governments and European institutions to acknowledge cities in Euro-Mediterranean relations and in the ENP. The network calls for a Euro-Mediterranean forum of local governments to set up a specific program for cities. The network members are already part of the MED’ACT pilot programme for cooperation between cities financed by the MEDA programme. www.eurocities.org

25th April 2005
Association Agreement: EU-Tunisia
Brussels: The EU Council of Ministers adopts a decision approving the signing and provisional application of an Agreement Protocol with Tunisia which adapts the agreement in order to take into consideration the joining of ten new Member States in the EU from 1 May 2004 onwards. This is the fourth in a series of protocols that must be signed with all the Mediterranean member countries with which the EU has entered into Association Agreements.

27th April 2005
Association Agreement: EU-Algeria
Brussels: First informal meeting on the EU-Algeria economic talks among Senior Officials since the ratification of the Association Agreement. Themes include plans to reform the Algerian government, the creation of a favourable atmosphere for investment and preparations for the implementation of the Association Agreement. One of the demands made by the Algerian representatives is the need to clarify the relationship between the Barcelona Process and the ENP.

May 2005
9th May 2005
Road Map
Moscow: Quartet meeting at which a declaration is adopted that emphasises that times are promising for both Palestinians and for Israelis, who deserve full support from the international community. In addition, the Quartet states its commitment to support the efforts of both to ensure a successful withdrawal of Israelis from Gaza and from some regions of the West Bank.

10th May 2005
Human aid
Brussels: The European Commission announces the allocation of 28.3 million euros of human aid for one million Palestinians in Palestine and Lebanon. The aid will go to food and water supplies, health services, job opportunities, health and protection of the underprivileged. The aid will be channelled through ECHO, the EU human aid agency.

13th May 2005
Development
Edinburgh: The European Investment Bank and twelve development financial
institutions (members of the European Association of Development Finance Institutions, EDFI), sign an agreement to boost cooperation in the Mediterranean region. The members of the EDFI have consolidated an investment portfolio of 750 million euros invested in private sector companies in the region until the end of 2004. For its part, the European Investment Bank (EIB) has loaned 4,500 million euros through the FEMIP since it was set up in 2002.

18th May 2005
Politics and security
Brussels: Meeting between Senior Officials on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership focussed on the preparation of the seventh Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference planned for the 30-31 May in Luxembourg, and especially on the draft conclusions document. They discuss the proposals from member countries, which will continue to be dealt with by the Luxembourg presidency through consultations with the former. The Senior Officials also look at the future seminar on antipersonnel mines. The meeting is preceded by an ad hoc meeting about terrorism.

19th May 2005
Euro-Mediterranean Committee
Brussels: The themes of the Committee meeting are the preparations for the ministerial conference at the end of the month relating to chapters 2 and 3 of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In addition, representatives of the Euromed Non-governmental Platform submit the results of the Euromed Civil Forum in Luxembourg and request to be allowed into the Committee on a regular basis in order to put forward their points of view and remain informed about the Partnership’s development. Later, the Committee meets as the Board of Directors of the Anna Lindh Foundation, to which two reports are submitted, one by the Luxembourg presidency and another by the Executive Director of the Foundation.

23rd May 2005
Association Agreement: EU-Lebanon
Brussels: The EU Council of Ministers adopts a decision approving the signing and provisional application of an interim EU-Lebanon trade agreement protocol which adapts the agreement in order to take into consideration the joining of ten new Member States in the EU from 1 May 2004 onwards. Protocols of this type must be signed with all the Mediterranean member countries with which the EU has entered into Association Agreements or interim agreements.

23rd May 2005
Anna Lindh Foundation
Alexandria: The Anna Lindh Foundation is given legal status in Egypt, after which the legal conditions are set up to be able to receive funds, five million euros, under the MEDA programme.

30th–31st May 2005
Ministerial meeting
Luxembourg: The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers ends with an agreement on conclusions. There has not been an agreement between all members on conclusions since 1995. The ministers assess the achievements over the ten years of the Partnership’s existence and discuss the Special Conference that will take place in Barcelona on 27-28 November. The ministers state that in spite of the progress made, there is still a long way to go to develop the potential of the Barcelona Declaration. The ministers stress that the Association Agreements lay down solid foundations to develop the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In addition, the ministers consider the setting up of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Non-governmental Platform to be positive, as well as the FEMIP and MEDA programme activities. Looking to the future, the ministers consider the need to improve the Partnership’s activities in order to adapt them to the population. The ministers recommend preparing a waybill for the creation of the Free Trade Area in 2010 and for the deregulation of agricultural trade and services.

June 2005

2nd June 2005
Association Agreement: EU-Jordan
The EU-Jordan Association Council takes a decision regarding the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Plan of Action. The plan’s priorities focus on reinforcing the rule of law, promoting freedom of the press and equal rights, improving the business climate and increasing the country’s export potential, implementing sustainable development and poverty reduction strategies, as well as the development of sectors such as energy, transport and information society.

3rd June 2005
Migration
Luxembourg: The Council of the EU adopts conclusions about cooperation with Libya regarding migration, in which specific talks between the EU and Libya are considered to be appropriate in order to be able to implement cooperation mechanisms with the Libyan authorities. The Council points out that since Libya is not part of the Barcelona Process, cooperation is limited to certain areas and to a certain technical level.

9th June 2005
Freedom of press
Brussels: The European Parliament adopts a resolution regarding the freedom of press in Algeria. In this resolution, the Parliament appeals to the Algerian authorities to release the journalists imprisoned for libel.

16th June 2005
MEDA II
Brussels: The European Commission adopts a package of 155 million euros under the Regional Financial Plan 2005 of the MEDA II programme (1st part). The funds will be divided into three main areas: investment, talks and study networks. As far as investment is concerned, 100 million euros will be allocated to the FEMIP venture capital fund while another 25 million will go to the FEMIP technical assistance fund. As concerns talks, ten million euros will be allocated to promoting talks between civil society organisations in Israel and Palestine under the Middle East Peace Process, another five million will be used to finance the Anna Lindh Foundation for a period of five years, and, finally, five million will go to the MED-PACT pro-
programme for cooperation between local authorities. Lastly, the MEDA programme backing for Euro-Mediterranean study networks, about politics and security on the one hand and economic affairs on the other, is renewed with funds of five million euros allocated to each of the networks.

16th-17th June
European Council
Brussels: The European Council Meeting deals with several important subjects for Mediterranean member countries. It considers the ministerial conference in Luxembourg to be favourable and it takes note of the situation regarding the ENP as well as the Strategic Partnership in the Mediterranean Region and the Middle East, reaching an agreement on the need to pay more attention to the countries to the east of Jordan. The Council also adopts a declaration regarding the Peace Process in the EU and states its willingness to continue with its actions to find a solution to the conflict. It also adopts a declaration regarding the Lebanon, reaffirming the importance that the EU attaches to the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/ecofin/index.htm

20th June
FEMIP
Skhirat: Fourth FEMIP ministerial meeting at which the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Finance reassert their commitment to creating a closer economic and financial partnership. The ministers approve expert recommendations in the fields of water, health and transport. In the banking and financial sector, the participants request more direct support, as well as the publication of a Debt Management manual.

20th June
FEMIP
Skhirat: Signing of an 80-million euro loan for five science-technology parks. Each of the parks will be targeted at a specific sector: food and agriculture (Bizerte), textiles (Monastir), information technologies (Slax), biotechnology (Sidi Thabet) and mechanical and electronic engineering (Sousse).

22nd June 2005
Sustainable development
Athens: The Mediterranean Sustainable Development Commission, an advisory body for the Mediterranean Action Plan (UNEP/MAP), a United Nations programme within the Barcelona Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, adopts a “Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development”. Twenty-one countries and the EU participate in the Convention, which was signed in 1975. The new Mediterranean strategy is structured around political, economic, social and environmental objectives, as well as around specific priorities. The Foreign Ministers supported the strategy adopted at the Conference held during May.

23rd June 2005
Road Map
London: Quartet Meeting, at which backing for the plan to withdraw Israelis from Gaza and some areas of the West Bank is reaffirmed. The Quartet reasserts its belief that this is a chance to give fresh impetus to the Road Map.
152 km and which will form part of the national gas supply system.

11th July 2005
Med Committee
Brussels: Med Committee Meeting, which considers the National Financial Plans under the MEDA programme to be positive for seven Mediterranean member countries: Algeria (80 million euros); Egypt (110); Jordan (60); Lebanon (27); Morocco (148); Syria (22) and Tunisia (118), as well as the Regional Financial Plan 2005 (2nd part) (59.9 million). The latter is targeted at measures to improve the living conditions of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, at providing the TEMPUS and Euromed-Youth programmes with funds in 2005-06 and at ENP operations.

16th July 2005
Transport
Brussels: Euromed Transport Forum meeting to discuss the Blue Paper about transport in the Mediterranean region which will be submitted to the Euro-Mediterranean Transport Ministries at the meeting planned for the 15 December in Marrakech. The document is part of the Euromed Regional Transport Programme financed by the MEDA programme. In spite of the reforms introduced in the Mediterranean member countries, the document identifies six problem areas: institutional structures; infrastructure networks; the goods transport chain; international passenger transport; sustainability and financing.

18th July 2005
Association Agreement: EU-Algeria
Brussels: The Council of the EU takes a decision to complete the Association Agreement with Algeria which will enter into force on 1 September. The agreement, signed in 2002, has been ratified by both parties and will replace the 1976 cooperation agreement.

18th July 2005
Council of the EU
Brussels: The Council of the EU takes note of the British presidency’s priorities to implement the EU strategy in the Mediterranean region. These include the joint organisation with Spain of a Euro-Mediterranean summit in Barcelona to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, implementing the ENP and talks with Libya and Mauritania about their possible joining in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Council also draws conclusions about the Middle East peace process, expressing its concern about the recent escalation of violence and approving the Palestinian policy development programme that receives the EU’s backing through a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission.

26th July 2005
Politics and security
Brussels: Meeting of Senior Officials on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership at which the British presidency’s priorities are presented. It is agreed to hold a working group meeting on terrorism on 21 September. Morocco presents a non-paper prepared with France and Spain on joint migratory flow management and reinforced cooperation in judicial and political affairs. In addition, Greece informs about the Euro-Mediterranean seminar on crisis management which was held in June and Italy reports back on the first follow-up committee meeting of the Euro-Bridge programme regarding civil protection.

26th July 2005
Euro-Mediterranean Committee
Brussels: At the meeting, the British presidency presents its priorities. The Commission presents the main achievements of the Euromed Heritage regional programme. Some European countries and Mediterranean members demand that EU financing for broadcasts of the Euronews channel in Arabic be renewed. The Commission also informs about the preparations for the ministerial transport meeting planned for December. Another theme is the possible joining of Libya and Mauritania in the Partnership.

September 2005
1st September 2005
Association Agreement: EU-Algeria
The Association Agreement with Algeria enters into force. The agreement,
14th-16th September 2005
Cooperation
Barcelona: Symposium organised by Barcelona Council and the Arco Latino Association with the backing of the European Commission and the Committee of Regions entitled “Results and perspectives of the decentralised cooperation among local Euro-Mediterranean governments” in order to promote a slot for talks and thoughts on decentralised international cooperation between local entities in the Mediterranean region. The symposium adopts a final declaration to be presented at the Regions and Cities summit in November at which there is a call for the setting up of an observatory that compiles, systematises and gives visibility to experiences, results and the impact of decentralised international cooperation between Euro-Mediterranean regions and provinces.
www.euromediterrania2005.org

20th September 2005
Road Map
New York: Quartet meeting that assesses the successful conclusion of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza and some regions of the West Bank as positive, describing this as an important step towards achieving the vision of two democratic States at peace.

21st September 2005
Terrorism
Brussels: The European Commission adopts a Communication entitled “Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation”, which is the Commission’s contribution to the strategy that the Council will develop at the end of the year. The Commission considers that the EU is the instrument to fulfil and extend the level of skill that is being reached by the Member States. The Commission presents the Communication at the ad hoc Euro-Mediterranean meeting on terrorism on the same day. The meeting is attended by experts and Senior Officials from the 35 countries involved in the Barcelona Process.

21st September 2005
Transport
Jerusalem: The Israeli Minister of Transport and his Palestinian counterpart sign an agreement to establish a Joint Transport Bureau through the European Commission. The aim of this bureau is to coordinate cooperation in relation to the planning and development of infrastructures. The bureau’s location is yet to be decided and the list of joint projects yet to be finalised, which will be approved by both ministers at the next Euro-Mediterranean transport meeting planned for the 15th December. The bureau will receive financial support under the MEDA programme.

26th-27th September 2005
Politics and security
Barcelona: Meeting of Senior Officials on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership at which the Presidency expresses its satisfaction regarding the progress of the meeting on terrorism and announces the preparation of a terrorism code of conduct to be submitted at the summit held in November in Barcelona. The Presidency announces a seminar to be held in December on racism and xenophobia in the media and proposes the 9th November as a possible date for a meeting on disarmament and the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean.

26th-27th September 2005
Euro-Mediterranean Committee
Barcelona: The themes of the meeting include Euronews broadcasts in Arab and the Commission warns of the need to apply financial regulations in this regard. The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) presents the results of its survey on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The general assessment is positive, although progress needs to be made on visibility and on politics and security matters. The Generalitat de Catalunya presents the various events planned around the summit which include the Euromed Health Forum, the meeting of entrepreneurs, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, the Conference on Women, the Cities and Regions Conference, the meeting of Euro-Mediterranean parliament presidents and the seminar on the Media. The Euromed Non-governmental Platform announces that it will propose a conference on Governance at the summit.

26th-28th September 2005
Media
Dead Sea: In view of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process and the Year of the Mediterranean, the European Commission is organising a comprehensive international conference of Euro-Mediterranean journalists to assess the role of the media in the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The conference will include three meetings (Dead Sea, Marseilles and Barcelona). The meeting in Jordan focuses on intercultural communication challenges, political division and independent press, the role of the media in the Partnership and the role of administrations to facilitate the media’s work.

29th September 2005
FEMIP
Casablanca: Under the FEMIP, the European Investment Bank (EIB) announces the first loan awarded to a Mediterranean member country without guaranteeing sovereignty. The 30-million euro loan is signed at the Banque Marocaine de Commerce Extérieur (BMCE) to finance Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME).

October 2005

3rd October 2005
Peace process
Luxembourg: The Council of the European Union draws conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process. These include a positive assessment of the withdrawal of Israeli troops as a significant step towards implementing the Road Map. It fully approves the Quartet’s last declaration, and calls for the parties to take renewed action to fulfil the obligations of the Road Map. The Council also expresses its concern over the new acts of violence, the spreading of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the building of a wall to divide the Palestinian territory.

5th October 2005
Peace process
Brussels: Commission’s Communication to the Parliament and Council on EU-Palestine cooperation following the withdrawal. The communication aims to
define the elements for the EU's strategy in support of the Palestinian National Authority and the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank. The strategy focuses on the necessary actions to set up a Palestinian State that is feasible both politically and economically. This communication responds to the new circumstances following the Israeli withdrawal.

7th-11th October 2005
Migration
Ceuta and Melilla: A Commission technical mission goes to Ceuta and Melilla and North Morocco following the tragic incidents on the border between Morocco and these two cities, in order to analyse the characteristics of illegal African immigration through Morocco. The mission also aims to assess the situation on the northern Moroccan border, especially illegal immigration channels, and to listen the Moroccan and Spanish authorities opinions on the measures that could increase cooperation between the EU and Morocco to prevent and fight against illegal immigration. The mission’s report makes suggestions to boost cooperation with Morocco under the Association Agreement and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Plan of Action.

11th October 2005
Rules of origin
Brussels: The Council of Ministers approves the Commission’s proposal to create a Pan Euro-Mediterranean cumulation of origin area between the EU, the candidate countries, the Mediterranean member countries and Switzerland, Iceland, Norway and the Faroe Islands. This system will allow the area’s producers and traders to benefit from preferential customs tariffs. The cumulation of origin allows a product to be manufactured in several countries without the end product losing the benefits of preferential tariffs. The system has been in use since 1997 between the EU and the EFTA with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey since 1999. This decision extends the system to the Mediterranean member countries.

11th October 2005
Transport
Brussels: Seventh meeting of the Euromed Transport Forum at which the representatives of the member countries and the EU member states adopt the final version of the Blue Plan on transport in the Mediterranean. The draft agenda for the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial transport conference is also revised, which will be held on 15 December, and the draft conclusions that will be drawn at this conference are discussed.

12th October 2005
Migration
Florence: Under the Euromed Migration project, a regional initiative of the MEDA programme, the Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM), which is in charge of the implementation of the project, publishes its first annual report entitled “Mediterranean Migration 2005”. This report is the result of an extensive study on demographic, economic, legislative and political issues related to migration in the south and east regions of the Mediterranean.

17th-18th October 2005
Media
Marseilles: Second (of three) conference on the role of the media in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, organised by the European Commission. The three conferences are part of the Euromed regional “Information and communication” programme, one of the objectives of which is to increase the visibility of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Marseilles conference is focused on the reality of the Partnership and the ENP in the media, the freedom of expression, the role of journalism schools in specific training on the Partnership and social problems through the Euro-Mediterranean media.

17th-18th October 2005
Neighbourhood
Beirut: The European Commission and Libya start negotiations on the (ENP) Plan of Action. The EU working group for the ENP holds a series of meetings with government and civil society representatives which mark the start of the five-year Plan of Action negotiations under the ENP. Apart from the meetings, a seminar is organised with the interministerial working group coordinated by the Ministry of Economy.

28th-29th October 2005
Heritage
Barcelona: Seminar on “Cultural heritage in the Barcelona Process” organised by the Euromed Heritage programme with collaboration from the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), at which a series of recommendations and future guidelines are established. The main recommendation is to include cultural heritage and cultural activities in the ENP and ask Governments to view culture as an important tool for economic and local development and as a basic instrument to build a national identity.
www.euromedheritage.net/en/rmsu/rmsu_workshops/barcelona.htm

November 2005

6th-7th November 2005
Trade unions
Barcelona: In view of the Tenth Anniversary of the Barcelona Process, the 3rd general assembly of the Euromed Trade Union Forum is held, entitled “For Peace, Democracy, Economic Progress and Social Justice”. The Forum, which was set up in 1999, aims to increase the Partnership’s social dimension.

7th November 2005
Peace process
Brussels: The Council of the EU expresses concern over the ongoing violence in Palestine and stresses the need for the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to take complete control over order in Occupied Territories. The Council condemns the recent attacks against Israel, acknowledging Israel’s right to protect its citizens, although requesting that it abstain from extrajudicial murder. The Council expresses its support for the work of the Quartet’s special correspondent for the Israeli withdrawal. The Council urges Israel to cease activities in Palestine, including creating settlements, building a di-
ceeding wall and demolishing Palestinian houses.

8th November 2005
Politics and security
Brussels: Meeting of Senior Officials on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership at which presentations are given by the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Policy Institutes Network (EuRoMeSCo). The preparations for the Barcelona summit are discussed at the meeting, including the draft summit documents: the Declaration, Work Program and Code of Conduct on the fight against terrorism. The differences on these topics cause a new meeting to be called prior to the Conference.

14th November 2005
Agriculture
Brussels: First follow-up Committee meeting on the waybill for Euro-Mediterranean agriculture at which the agriculture Senior Officials assess the preparations by the EU and member countries in view of the start of negotiations to deregulate agriculture and fishing product trade. The meeting also identified actions regarding non-commercial aspects such as rural development or health issues.

15th November 2005
Trade
Brussels: Meeting of civil servants on Euro-Mediterranean trade to discuss the situation of trading relations between Euro-Mediterranean countries. The meeting focuses on topics such as commercial integration under the Barcelona Process, improvements in access to markets and increasing regional integration, negotiations to deregulate services, agriculture or investments and reinforcement of the political and institutional framework.

15th November 2005
Agriculture
Brussels: The Council of the EU takes a decision which authorises the Commission to start negotiations with Mediterranean member countries to develop the trade of agricultural and fishing products. The purpose of the negotiations is to achieve a broader trade deregulation in 2010. The negotiations will cover all non-commercial products and aspects but which are related to agricultural products. The talks will consider the special sensitivity of certain products for the EU and for member countries. The bilateral negotiations are expected to start during the first months of 2006.

20th-21st November 2005
Parliamentary Assembly
Rabat: Special meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) in view of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process. The debates focus on topics related to the future of the Process, such as the implementation of the EU’s strategic Partnership with Mediterranean countries, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Alliance of Civilizations and subregional integration prospects. The EMPA also adopts the recommendations made by its sectorial Committees (political, economic and cultural) for the Barcelona summit.

www.europarl.eu.int/intcoop/empa/default.htm

21st-22nd November 2005
Services
Brussels: The Council of the EU takes the decision to authorise the Commission to start negotiations with the Mediterranean Partner Countries regarding the deregulation of services and investments from 2006 onwards, in order to set up a free trade area in 2010.

21st-22nd November 2005
Peace process
Brussels: The Council of the EU draws a series of conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process. The Council considers the agreement between Israel and the PNA concerning border crossings between Gaza and Egypt to be positive. The Council announces a mission under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to supervise operations at the Rafah crossing. The Council also judging the announcement of Palestinian Legislative Council elections planned for January 2006 to be positive, and urges the PNA to provide everything necessary for the elections to be held. The Council also repeats that the EU is willing to provide economic, technical and political aid to the PNA during the elections and will send an electoral observance mission which will work in conjunction with the members of the Quartet and other international organisations. Finally, the Council stresses its concern over Israeli activities in East Jerusalem, including the construction of the dividing wall, the building of settlements and the demolition of buildings.

21st-22nd November 2005
Business
Brussels: First Euro-Mediterranean meeting of business leaders, organised by the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce in conjunction with the Association of Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce (ASCAME), with Eurochambers and other business organisations, which aims to explore opportunities for greater cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean in terms of economic and financial affairs. The meeting conclusions will be presented at the summit of Heads of State and Government in Barcelona.

22nd November 2005
Politics and security
Brussels: Meeting of Senior Officials on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership at which they discuss the preparations for the summit of Heads of State and Government and aim to reach an agreement on the documents to be used at the summit.

21st November 2005
Association Agreement: EU-Jordan
Brussels: Fourth meeting of the EU-Jordan Association Council, which defines the action priorities for 2006 and reviews the progress made over the past year. The Council also discusses the Middle East Peace Process and the Iraq situation.
22nd November 2005
Association Agreement: EU-Morocco
Brussels: Fourth meeting of the EU-Morocco Association Council which reviews the development of activities over the past year and the work carried out by the different subcommittees. The action priorities for 2006 are also defined, and topics of interest for both parties such as migration, fishing, deregulation of services and political talks are discussed.

22nd-23rd November 2005
Culture
Barcelona: In view of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, an international conference on culture in the Euro-Mediterranean area is held in order to set up a working agenda that establishes continuity in this field.

24th-25th November 2005
Women
Barcelona: As part of the events to mark the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, the Euromed Women’s Conference Barcelona+10 is held, in order to promote an active role for women in the Partnership, and highlight the need for a gender perspective when defining politics. The conference, structured around the three chapters of the Partnership, presents conclusions that the participants hope will be taken into account at the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference on women, which will be held during the second half of 2006.

25th November 2005
FEMIP
Paris: The FEMIP grants a 200-million euro loan to build a combined cycle power plant in Deir Azzour (Syria). This is the second electricity generation transaction signed with Syria and the fourth in the electricity sector over the past six years. The project will be undertaken by the Electricity Generation and Transmission Company (PEEGT).

25th-26th November 2005
Media
Barcelona: Third and final conference on the role of the media in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, organised by the European Commission. At the conference in Barcelona, organised in conjunction with the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) the journalists reassert their commitment to the freedom of expression and independence. The sessions deal with issues such as complexity, economic information, information on migration or the role of satellite channels in the Arab world, always from the point of view of the importance of media in the visibility of the Barcelona Process. The seminar conclusions will be presented at the summit of Heads of State and Government.

25th-26th November 2005
Regions
Barcelona: Regional Euromed Barcelona+10 conference organised by the Generalitat de Catalunya and the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe CRPM on the role of regions in the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, at which representatives of many regions in Euro-Mediterranean countries participate. This conference completes a joint session with the conference of Euro-Mediterranean cities which takes place simultaneously and at which a joint declaration is presented, which will be submitted to the summit of Heads of State and Government.

25th-26th November 2005
Cities
Barcelona: Conference of Euro-Mediterranean cities Barcelona+10, in order to boost decentralised cooperation in the Mediterranean and to reinforce the role of cities in the Partnership. In the joint final declaration of Mediterranean cities and regions, there is a request for a permanent Euro-Mediterranean forum of local and regional authorities to be set up, with backing and acknowledgement from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

27th-28th November 2005
Water
Brussels: The EU and Egypt sign an 80-million euro financial agreement to back the Egyptian programme to reform the water sector, launched in May 2005. The aim of the programme is to improve the management of water resources to ensure the population’s supply of drinking water, combined with industry and agriculture needs. The de-
centralisation and support for collaboration of the public and private sectors are the central themes of this programme.

30th November 2005
Assocation Agreement: EU-Morocco
Rabat: The EU and Morocco sign the first institutional twinning arrangements between EU member countries and Morocco. The arrangements include customs administration (with Italy), maritime safety (with France) and environmental protection (with Italy). A fourth institutional twinning arrangement is expected to be signed shortly regarding border police training (with France). These arrangements are signed as part of the Association Agreement support programme financed with a fund of 5 million euros, which was later increased by another 15 million. This type of instrument, used successfully in the EU enlargement process, which is used for the first time in Morocco and in Mediterranean member countries, opens up a new chapter in EU-Morocco cooperation and starts the effective implementation of the ENP. From now on, it will be possible to “twin” sectors of the Moroccan administration with their counterparts in a EU member country, allowing the Moroccan administration to benefit in the reform programme from the experience and knowledge of civil servants in EU countries.

December 2005
1st-3rd December 2005
Investment
Rabat: Fourth annual conference of the Euro-Mediterranean Network of Investment Promotion Agencies (ANIMA) project, at which the development perspectives of investment promotion in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are highlighted. During the conference, representatives of the Euro-Mediterranean business community present the new opportunities for investment in the region and the investors share their experiences and expectations. On 3 December, the meeting of ANIMA members is held, at which an assessment is made of the year’s activities and the 2006 activities are debated, i.e. the year when the project ends.
www.animaweb.org

6th December 2005
Energy
Algiers: The European Commission, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia sign a project to integrate Maghreb electricity markets. The project is one of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s objectives in the energy sector. The three-year project, financed by the MEDA programme, aims to support the Maghreb’s industrial structure and bring standards into line in view of a future integration of Maghreb countries in the EU internal electricity market. The project costs 6.2 million euros, of which the EU’s contribution totals 5.6 million.

12th December 2005
Trade
Brussels: Fourth meeting of the Pan EuroMed working group on rules of origin, at which representatives of customs administrations and related administrations of all the MMCs participate, as well as of EFTA countries, candidate countries and the Faroe Islands. The working group discusses the various topics related to the implementation of the Pan Euro-Mediterranean cumulation of origin system.

12th December 2005
Terrorism
Brussels: The Council of General Affairs and External Relations views the political talks with international organisations on the fight against terrorism as positive, as well as the progress made on the broadening of these talks through the Code of Conduct to Combat Terrorism reached at the Barcelona Summit. At the same meeting, the Council takes a common stance to establish a framework to impose restrictive measures against people suspected of being involved in the assassination of the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri.

13th December 2005
Palestinian development
Brussels: The European Commission signs a 14-million euro contribution for the recent Euro-Palestinian Credit Guarantee Fund. This fund, managed by the German Development Bank (KfW), will support the financing of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME) by local banks through soft credits and subsidies. The capital in this fund totals 29 million euros, of which 14 come from the Commission, five from the KfW and ten from the FEMIP. In addition, the financial partners also provide technical assistance to boost the financial sector in Palestine.

13th December 2005
Association Agreement: EU-Egypt
Brussels: The EU and Egypt sign a 26-million euro financial agreement to support the implementation of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement. The support programme will allow Egyptian public administrations to benefit from the institutional twinning arrangement, an instrument that was applied successfully in the EU enlargement process. The Egyptian public administrations can work with their counterparts in member countries to transfer know-how in areas such as tourism, investment promotion, postal services or maritime safety, as well as Association Agreement priorities and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Plans of Action.

13th December 2005
FEMIP
Brussels: The European Investment Bank (EIB), through the FEMIP, loans 45 million euros to the Palestinian National Authority for essential investments to improve electricity supply. This transaction represents the resumption of the EIB’s financial aid to Palestine after being absent for five years. The project is part of a 99-million euro programme to improve the electricity distribution and transmission network.

15th December 2005
Transport
Marrakech: First Euro-Mediterranean conference of Transport Ministers. The ministers discuss the Blue Book about Euro-Mediterranean transport policy, written as part of the Euromed Trans-
port Forum at the request of the European Commission, and about the final report by the Top Level Group regarding extending the trans-European transport network to neighbouring countries. In the conference conclusions, the ministers establish the priorities of future cooperation: institutional reform, regional transport infrastructures, maritime transport, multimodal transport, air transport and Galileo. Before the conference, the EU and Morocco sign a global air transport agreement. This is the first agreement of its kind to be signed with a third-world country, and lays the foundations for the future development of a common Euro-Mediterranean air space.


16th December 2005
FEMIP
Paris: The FEMIP grants a 100-million euro loan to extend the landline telephone network in areas of Syria that receive a poor service. This is the first telecommunications sector transaction in the Mediterranean region signed under the FEMIP.

21st December 2005
FEMIP
Paris: The FEMIP agrees on a 25-million euro venture capital facility with Egypt. The facility aims to develop the private sector in Egypt.
Other Co-operation Initiatives in the Mediterranean

1. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), created in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council, brings together seven countries in the Mediterranean region that are not members of NATO: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. This initiative is an integral part of the adaptation of the Alliance to the security situation following the Cold War, as well as an important component of the policy of alliances and co-operation of the organisation.

The Mediterranean Dialogue reflects the view adopted by the Alliance which is that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean region. The aim of this initiative is to contribute to regional security and stability, to arrive at improved mutual understanding and to eliminate the misconceived ideas the member countries have about NATO. Throughout its more than ten years of history, the Mediterranean Dialogue and its ensuing development have been based on five principles. Firstly, the notion of what is progressive in terms of participation and content, which has enabled a continual increase in the number of member countries over the years (Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Mauritania in 1994; Tunisia and Jordan in 1995; and Algeria in 2000) and for the content of the initiative to develop over time. However, the fundamentally bilateral nature of the structure of MD (NATO+1) should be emphasised despite the fact that multilateral meetings are held on a regular basis (NATO+7). The principle of non-discrimination is also a key element in the creation and development of the Dialogue; all the Mediterranean members are thus offered the same basis for co-operation and negotiation activities with NATO and the countries are free to choose the level and intensity of their participation in the Dialogue, which also includes the possibility of establishing Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP). The fact that the Mediterranean Dialogue is seeking to strengthen and complement other international efforts such as the Euromediterranean Partnership and the Mediterranean Initiative of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is also highlighted. Finally, it should be mentioned that in principle, the activities undertaken within the framework of the Dialogue are developed on a self-financing basis; however, the allies have agreed to consider requests for financial assistance to support participation by the Mediterranean members in the Dialogue.

The Mediterranean Co-operation Group (MCG) established at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 under the supervision of the North Atlantic Council, a decision-making body of NATO, is responsible for the Mediterranean Dialogue. The political advisors hold regular meetings to address all the topics related to this initiative, including its future development. Political consultations in the NATO+1 format are conducted regularly at ambassadorial level as well as by task forces. These meetings provide an opportunity to exchange points of view on a variety of topics that are relevant to the security situation in the Mediterranean, as well as on the development of the dimension of practical and political co-operation of the Dialogue. Meetings in the NATO+7 format are held regularly, including the meetings of the North Atlantic Council+7, in particular after the NATO ministerial meetings, summits of Heads of State and Government, and other NATO events. These meetings present an opportunity for NATO’s Secretary General to inform the Ambassadors of the Mediterranean Dialogue about the agenda of the Alliance.

The political dimension of the Mediterranean Dialogue also includes visits by senior officials from NATO, including the Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary General, to the Mediterranean Dialogue Countries, with the objective of meeting the authorities of the respective countries and exchanging points of view on the initiative, as well as becoming more familiar with the objectives and specific priorities of the individual members.

The co-operation measures between NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue Countries are based on an Annual Programme of Work, established in 1997, which includes seminars, workshops and other practical activities at public diplomacy level (information and press activities, scientific environmental co-operation), planning for civil emergencies, crisis management, border security, as well as consultations on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among other things.

The programme of work also has a military dimension that includes invitations to Dialogue Countries to observe – and in some cases to participate in – NATO’s military exercises, to attend courses and participate in other military activities of the Alliance. In addition, the consultation meetings NATO+7 that bring together NATO military personnel from the Mediterranean Dialogue Countries are held twice a
year. Meetings of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs have, however, been a regular feature of the Mediterranean Dialogue since November 2004 and the first meeting of the Ministers for Defence will take place in February 2006. Finally, it should be emphasised that three member states — Egypt, Jordan and Morocco — have co-operated militarily with NATO in operations led by NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR).

A new and different initiative, but complementary to the Mediterranean Dialogue, was simultaneously launched at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 with the aim of reaching interested countries in the Middle East region, commencing with the countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). The Istanbul Co-operation Initiative (ICI), accordingly, seeks to reinforce security and stability by encouraging mutually beneficial bilateral relations, in particular in the context of the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Four of the six countries of the GCC — Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait (first three months of 2005) and the United Arab Emirates (June 2005) — have joined this initiative. Just after the creation of the ICI, the NATO countries established the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative Group, composed of political advisors from the 26 delegations of the member states of the Alliance, responsible for determining the lines of action for the development of a series of practical activities with the countries interested in the initiative and ensuring implementation of these activities. In this sense, the group will also encourage member countries to participate in the ICI on the basis of 26+1 for the purpose of developing individual work plans.

**Chronology January 2005 – December 2005**

- 13th January, Jordan: Visit to the country by NATO’s Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. It is the first visit by a Secretary General of the Alliance to the country, with the objective of examining the implementation of a more ambitious and extensive framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue, in accordance with the resolution passed at the Istanbul Summit in June 2002.
- 17th February, Morocco: Visit to the country by NATO’s Secretary General, the first of its kind. The measures for reinforcing the political and practical dimensions of the Mediterranean Dialogue are examined, primarily focusing on the fight against terrorism and illegal trafficking.
- 24th February, Israel: First visit by NATO’s Secretary General to Israel to examine ways of strengthening political and practical co-operation with the country.
- 18th March, Rome (Italy): NATO and the broader Middle East region. Conference that brings together a hundred senior officials, parliamentarians, academics and experts in the field of security of NATO and the Gulf countries to exchange points of view on the implementation of the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative.
- 28th April, Tunisia: Visit by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to Tunisia to discuss the implementation of a more ambitious and wider framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue.
- 5th-7th May, Amman (Jordan): Recent Developments and New Political Perspectives in the Broader Middle East Region. NATO Conference and the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO.
- 15th-16th June, Israel: Meeting of the Secretary General with the Knesset Commissions for Foreign Affairs and Defence. During this visit, organised by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, the situation of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative are examined.
- 14th July, Mauritania: First visit by the Secretary General to the North African country. The meetings basically focus on two topics: how to continue and intensify co-operation between NATO and Mauritania, including areas such as general education and reform of defence; and how the international community could act more effectively against terrorism. This is the sixth visit by NATO’s Secretary General to the countries participating in the Dialogue, with the objective of continuing to strengthen the political and practical dimension of this initiative and building closer ties of trust, dialogue and co-operation in the Mediterranean.
- 26th September, Dubai (UAE): Promoting Co-operation and Fostering Relations: NATO-Gulf relations in the Framework of the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative. Conference organised by the Gulf Research Center (GRC) in collaboration with NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division. The principal topics discussed are the strategic balance of security in the Gulf from the differing perspectives of the Gulf and NATO, the definition of relations between NATO and the Gulf or the role of NATO in the promotion of co-operation in the areas of reform of defence and the fight against terrorism.
- 12th-13th October, Egypt: historic visit by NATO’s Secretary General to Egypt, testifying to the importance that the Alliance attached to the contribution by Egypt to the Mediterranean Dialogue and the strategic role of the country in the Middle East.
- 8th-9th November, Algiers (Algeria): La coopération entre l’Algérie et l’OTAN: évaluation et perspectives Seminar Algeria-NATO organised by the Institut National de Stratégie Globale (INESG) and NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division.
- 1st December, Doha (Qatar): Conference on NATO security and the Gulf. Sponsored by the government of Qatar, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and the RAND Corporation, this conference brings together NATO officials, company representatives and officials from the six countries that are likely to constitute the ICI. The debates focus on the development of security in the Gulf region and the promotion of ICI among the countries of the Middle East region.

More information:
Mediterranean Dialogue: www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm
2. Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation in the OSCE

At the beginning of the nineties the necessity for international organisations to show solidarity became apparent when challenges to the security of post-Cold War Europe were faced effectively. In this context, and taking into consideration the fact that many of the OSCE member states border on the Mediterranean, the importance of the Mediterranean dimension of European security becomes apparent.

OSCE currently maintains special relations with six Mediterranean countries, the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation (MPCs): Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan (since 1998), Morocco and Tunisia (since 1994). These relations involve organising seminars dealing with issues that are of particular concern to the Mediterranean, regular meetings of the Mediterranean Contact Group with member countries of the OSCE and holding Parliamentary Forums on the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation are also invited to participate in important meetings, including those which address the three OSCE dimensions: politico-military, economic and environmental, and humanitarian.

The OSCE Mediterranean seminars are attended by high ranking representatives from the member states of the organisation, the Mediterranean partners, and international organisations. Members of Parliament, academics and representatives from non-international organisations also attend. The objective of these meetings is to encourage the exchange of ideas and recommendations.

Mediterranean Seminar 2005

8th-9th September, Rabat (Morocco): The Role of the OSCE and the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation in Migration and Integration Policies.

Thirty-three member states of the OSCE participate in the seminar, together with the six Mediterranean partners for co-operation and another three partners for co-operation (Japan, Korea and Thailand). In its inaugural debate, the Slovene Minister for Foreign Affairs Dimitrij Rupel emphasised that if migration is managed in an appropriate manner, it could be of benefit to everyone, otherwise it could cause tension, inequality, prejudice, racism, populism and even violence. Of the main proposals that emerged from the seminar, the creation of a task force of experts on migration under the auspices of the Permanent Council of OSCE and the creation of a financial instrument to encourage greater involvement by the OSCE in the activities with its partners for co-operation are highlighted.


The OSCE Contact Group was established within the framework of the Permanent Council of the OSCE to facilitate the exchange of information of mutual interest and the generation of ideas (Bucharest Summit in 1994). Despite the informal character of these meetings, the participating states in the OSCE and the Mediterranean partners are usually represented by their ambassadors. The meetings between the Contact Group and the Mediterranean partners are preceded by a series of gatherings to prepare the agenda of the meeting and to explore other types of co-operation in the OSCE’s Mediterranean dimension. It should also be emphasised that the Contact Group invites representatives from other international organisations as well, such as the Director of the Venice Commission or representatives from the presidency of the EU in the Barcelona Process. In 2005, under the Belgian presidency, the Contact Group held regular meetings and one special meeting, to debate a wide range of topics in the three security dimensions of the OSCE, including anti-terrorism, tolerance and non-discrimination, the Barcelona Process and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, the reform of the OSCE, border control and security and human rights.

Finally, the activities of the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly deserves a special mention; with its 317 members it constitutes the parliamentary dimension of the organisation. Founded in 1990 after the Paris Summit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), its main task is to facilitate interparliamentary dialogue. The Mediterranean partners for co-operation are invited to attend the Parliamentary Assembly sessions. In addition, the existence of a Special Representative for the Mediterranean clearly demonstrates the interest in the Mediterranean. Appointments to this post are the responsibility of the President of the Assembly and until July 2004 it was held by the Scot Bruce George, who replaced the Frenchman Michel Voisin. The following functions of the special representative are relevant: reinforcement of the Mediterranean dimension of the organisation, maintaining relations with the Mediterranean partners for co-operation, and consideration of the instruments required to promote the organisation of the Mediterranean Forum under the auspices of the Parliamentary Assembly. The Forum is the response to the desire to strengthen the ties between the Parliamentary Assembly and the Mediterranean partners for co-operation in order to be able to show solidarity in addressing the issues related to security and stability in the Mediterranean. Following the meetings in Rome (11th October 2003) and on Rhodes (1st October 2004), between 7th and 9th October 2005, the third Euromediterranean Parliamentary Forum was accordingly held in Sveti-Stefan (Serbia and Montenegro). Among the topics discussed, those that are highlighted are primarily related to economic security, trade and co-operation in the Mediterranean, security risks in the Mediterranean, in addition to the threats and challenges in the region.


Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation: www.osce.org/ec


OSCE Parliamentary Assembly: www.oscepa.org

Istanbul Co-operation Initiative: www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html
3. Mediterranean Forum (Foromed)

Created in 1994 on the basis of a verbal declaration in Alexandria as a result of an Franco-Egyptian initiative, the Mediterranean Forum brings together eleven Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Egypt, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Turkey. This Forum constitutes an informal type of reflection, agreement and dialogue between the member states, with the objective of encouraging an exchange of perspectives with a view to bringing the positions of its participants closer together prior to the meetings that are held within the framework of the Euromediterranean Partnership.

With its flexible character into consideration, its restricted number of members, and the absence of protagonists directly involved in the conflict in the Middle East, the Mediterranean Forum is regarded as a “laboratory of ideas” from the Barcelona Process. Thus, by affirming the specificity of the Formed and each of the different discussion forums that exist in the basins of the Mediterranean, the member countries strive to give more visibility and substance to the work of the Formed with a view to making it the driving force of the Euromediterranean Partnership. This initiative is interested in the many challenges that face the Mediterranean region in the political, economic, cultural and social spheres, which has resulted in the creation of three task forces.

Throughout the year, various preparatory meetings of senior officials from the member countries were held, and focused on examining the measures to rationalise the work of the forum and address in greater depth the specific topics that are discussed at the annual ministerial meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

During its presidency of the Mediterranean Forum in 2005, Tunisia hosted the twelfth session on 1st and 2nd October 2005 of the Conference of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs from the member countries of the Mediterranean Forum. The Conference, held in Hammamet and opened by the Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdelwaheb Abdallah, anticipated the presence of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs from Algeria, Morocco, France, Malta, Greece, Turkey and Spain, in addition to the Egyptian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs from Italy and Portugal. This ministerial meeting, with its informal character, focused on three issues: the Mediterranean dimension of European Community Policy; movement of financial resources and promotion of direct investments in the Mediterranean area; and the establishment of a balanced dialogue between the cultures and civilisations in the Mediterranean basin. This edition of Foromed has a certain symbolic significance due to the fact that it is the last opportunity to focus on the media to drive the dialogue forward within the framework of the forum before the Barcelona Summit (27th-29th November) and the Global Summit on the Information Society in Tunisia (16th-18th November).

Taking into consideration the spirit of the Mediterranean Forum which is one of collective reflection, during the meeting various documents were drafted on emigration and migration of people, reinforcement of political dialogue and co-operation in the matters of security and defence, the fight against terrorism, Euromediterranean co-operation in the health sector, tourism, and investments in the region. These documents were produced in collaboration with two or three different delegations representing the countries of the forum to be presented for scrutiny at the Barcelona Summit in November. Tunisia also has the task, however, of presenting the participants with a global document entitled “Une vision commune de progrès et de solidarité dans le cadre du partenariat euroméditerranéen”. This document has been produced in collaboration with the member countries of the forum and was scrutinised during the meeting of senior officials on 30th September in Hammamet and has since been adopted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Secretaries of State representing the eleven countries of the forum.

The meeting also enabled stock to be taken of the existing interest in working towards strengthening the partnership, in particular in the spheres of economic, social and cultural co-operation. Proposals for the establishment of a Euromediterranean bank, implementation of financial instruments more suited to the urgent requirements of the entire region, social aspects, tourism, and the fight against terrorism were presented. With regard to the subject of terrorism, approval by the Participating States of a Code of Conduct on terrorism is noteworthy since it testifies to the existence of a common desire to confront this phenomenon so that it may be adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the Barcelona Summit. Migration issues also deserve a special mention since they highlight an important phenomenon that must be taken into consideration; namely that the Maghreb countries are not only countries of origin in terms of migration, but must also face the challenge of a significant presence of a sub-Saharan population.

After the meeting, Spain took over the presidency of the Mediterranean Forum for 2006 with the announcement that it would hold the thirteenth ministerial meeting during the last three months of the year in Alicante.

4. Dialogue 5+5

The Forum for the Dialogue in the Western Mediterranean, also known as Dialogue 5+5, is an informal political dialogue that brings together ten riparian countries in the Western basin of the Mediterranean: five countries from the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia) and five members of the European Union (Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal). This initiative was created in Rome on 10 December 1990 with the aim of reinforcing and enriching the political, economic and cultural dialogue between the two banks of the Mediterranean. However, the consequences of the Gulf War, events in Algeria or the embargo imposed on Libya, among other things, weakened the development of this initiative during the nineties. It was not until January 2001 that the 5+5 found itself being relaunched at the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Af-
fairs in Lisbon which has met regularly once a year in the Maghreb and in Europe alternatively since then. The 5+5 also holds regular meetings at other levels, such as that of the Ministers for Employment and Social Affairs, Defence, Home Affairs or national Parliaments.

Main meeting during 2005

- 29th-30th June, Valetta (Malta): Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. It discussed regional topical issues such as the situation in Iraq or the resumption of the Barcelona Process, against the background of the tenth anniversary in November. The participating ministers demonstrated their agreement on the importance of strengthening the social welfare systems in the Southern Mediterranean countries. The issue of illegal immigration was also subject to intensive debate and agreement was reached on the preparation of a high-level conference on this subject, which will bring together Euromediterranean transit and destination countries as well as sub-Saharan countries of origin. Other topics discussed apart from regional issues were the Libyan proposal of the Road Map for Peace and Security in the Western Mediterranean, the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, a Tunisian-Maltese report on Culture and Development and a Tunisian report on the Year of the Mediterranean. Morocco will take over from the Maltese presidency in 2006, which means that the next meeting will take place in the Maghreb country.
- 9th-10th November, Paris (France): Fourth Ministerial Conference on Migration in the Western Mediterranean. The Conference brings together the Ministers for Employment and Social Affairs from the basins of the Western Mediterranean at the invitation of France, the first country in the Northern basin to assume the annual presidency of this organisation. The conference was basically set up with the objective of consolidating the dialogue initiated in Tunisia in 2002 which has assumed dramatic significance recently due to the growth of the phenomenon of clandestine immigration. The aim is to be able to provide a global response to the phenomenon of migration (control of migratory movements, integration and co-development policies), also taking observance of the interests of the origin and host countries into consideration in a dynamic of solidarity, cooperation and development.

More information:
www.cohesion sociale.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/DP_4_conference_migration_mediterranee.pdf

- 11th-12th December, Algiers (Algeria): Meeting of the Ministers for Defence with the aim of taking stock of the actions implemented during the year and to determine the objectives for 2006. Hence, and in accordance with the French initiative of 2004, the 5+5 determined a plan of agreed action on maritime security, civil protection and aviation security in the Mediterranean, to combat terrorism, clandestine immigration and even illegal trafficking.

5. Euro-Arab Relations

The Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Euromediterranean Partnership are topics that occupy a large part of the agenda of the League of the Arab States, in particular that of its Ministers for Foreign Affairs, under the heading Euro-Arab relations. Among the activities undertaken within this framework during 2005, first and foremost, the participation of the Secretary General in the League of Arab States in the Euromediterranean Summit of November 2005 in Barcelona. Participation by the delegation of the League of Arab States, headed by its Secretary General Amr Moussa, is an important opportunity to take stock of the ten years of Euromediterranean Partnership, highlighting the significance of its consolidation as an effective process which, however, needs to be relaunched in order to achieve the many objectives indicated since its launch.

In this sense, the League of Arab States continues to support the Barcelona Process as the sole strategic option that offers a diplomatic channel through which to address issues of common interest, assisting the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean to boost their economies with the objective of abolishing the differences between the north and south. Participation of the organisation along the same lines in the next ministerial meeting which will be held under the European presidency in the second quarter of 2006 is also planned. This meeting will be a valuable opportunity to take stock of Barcelona II and to drive forward the activities contained in the plan of work adopted at the Euromediterranean Summit held in Barcelona in November 2005. The General Secretariat of the League of Arab States also participated in the fourth conference on the Euro-Arab Partnership, organised by the centre of the League of Arab States in Tunisia, in September 2005 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process. However, among the activities highlighted, mention should also be made of participation by the members of the Secretariat General of the League of Arab States, such as the head of the Paris and Geneva Missions, in the Conference organised by the Frederich Ebert Foundation in the city of Berlin in November with the objective of taking stock of the Barcelona Process.

More information:
www.arableagueonline.org

6. Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (All)

The Adriatic-Ionian Initiative is one of the most recent in the south-eastern region of Europe and the Adriatic. It has been functioning as a forum of co-operation for general issues since its creation at the Conference on Development and Security of the Adriatic and Ionian (Ancona, Italy) seas held on 19th and 20th May 2000. This initiative brings together Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Serbia and Montenegro and Slovenia. In accordance with the Declaration of Ancona, reinforcement of regional co-operation assists in promoting political and economic stability by creating a solid basis for the process of European integration. The activities of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative are spread over six full months: fight against organised crime, economic and touristic co-operation between small and medium-sized enterprises, environmental protection and sustainable development, co-operation in the sphere of maritime transport and cultural and inter-university co-operation.
The initiative lacks permanent bodies and the decision-making body is the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (Adriatic-Ionian Council) whose agenda is prepared at the periodic meetings held by the national co-ordinators or senior officials. The committee of senior officials meets two or three times throughout the year, depending on requirements and the periodicity determined by the presidency, whereas the round tables meet at least twice a year. In addition, the presidency of the round tables also varies each year during the period from May-June, depending on the country that assumes the presidency. The representatives from the European Union are invited to participate in the meetings of the Adriatic-Ionian Council in accordance with the rules of the Council, adopted on 24 November 2000 in Zagreb. However, the initiative has a rotating annual presidency that commences in May of each year and follows the alphabetic order of the member states. Hence, after the Croatian, Greek, Italian and Slovene presidencies, Serbia and Montenegro took over in May 2004, and Albania took over the presidency of the Initiative in May 2005. The main function of the presidency is to chair and organise the sessions during the six full months that represent the framework of the activities. Of the principal activities undertaken in 2005, the Adriatic-Ionic Council is highlighted; it was held on 7 June 2005 in the town of Cetinje (Montenegro) to debate the topics discussed during the six months of work of the initiatives held between 14 and 15 April 2005 in Miločer and Pržno (Montenegro): environmental protection and sustainable development; transport and maritime co-operation culture; economy, tourism and co-operation between small and medium-sized enterprises.

More information:
- Republic of Montenegro, Adriatic-Ionian Initiative: www.vlada.cg.yu/eng/ji
This chapter describes, in circum-Mediterranean order, the results of the Presidential and Legislative elections that took place in 2005 in independent states. The list also includes calls for referenda and those elections held in autonomous entities or in other relevant territories on an international level that are of particular political significance.

**Portugal**

**Legislative Elections**

20th February 2005

Previous elections: 17th March 2002

Parliamentary Republic with Single-Chamber Legislature, Republic Assembly (Assembleia da República). After the Chamber’s premature dissolution, elections were held to choose 230 members through an electoral system that gave a proportionate representation. The terms of office last for four years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (SP, Social Democratic)</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP, Conservative)</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitary Democratic Coalition (UDC)</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Spain**

**Referendum EU**

20th February 2005

Parliamentary Monarchy. Spain headed the list of those EU Member States that put to referendum the approval of the Treaty to establish a European Constitution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**France**

**EU Referendum**

29th May 2005

Semi-presidential Republic. After the “Yes” obtained in the referendum held in Spain and the parliamentary consent reached in eight Member States, France was the second EU country to call for a referendum concerning the sanction of the Treaty to establish a Constitution for Europe. The proposal’s defeat, added to that a little later in The Netherlands, contributed to the European Constitutional process reaching a crisis point, leading to the indefinite postponement of the processes for approval of this Treaty in other countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
<th>% 2nd round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stjepan Mesic (Croatian Popular Party – Liberal Democrats, HNS; liberal)</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jadranka Kosor (Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ; Conservative)</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boris Mikaic</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durda Adlesic (Croatian Social Liberal Party, HSL; Liberal)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slaven Letic (Right-wing Croatian Party, HSP; Right)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ljubo Cesic</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<td>Durda Adlesic (Croatian Social Liberal Party, HSL; Liberal)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ljubo Cesic</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Albania**

**Legislative Elections**

3rd July 2005

Previous: 24th June and 8th July 2001

Parliamentary Republic with Single-Chamber legislature. Elections were held to choose 140 members for the Assembly (Kuvendi); 100 of which were voted in single-nominal districts by means of a majority system in the second round and the remaining 40 by means of a proportionate system. The terms of office last for four years. Ac-
According to Freedom House, the Albanian Civil and Political Rights’ System is only partially free.

### Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Albania (PSD, left-center)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party of Albania (SP, Socialist)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Freedom, Justice and Well-being (ALDM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republican Party (RPS, Conservative)</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>New Democratic Party (PDR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Albania (PDK)</td>
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<td>Democratic Liberal Union (BLD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic National Front Party (PBKD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Union Party of Albania (PBDSh)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom and Human Rights’ Movements (LDLNj)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social-Democratic Party (PSDSh, Social-Democratic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Environmental Party of Albania (PAASh, Reformist)</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance Party of Albania (PADSh, Liberal)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Albania (PDDSh, Liberal)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for Human Rights’ Party (PBDN)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### North Cyprus (Republic of Turkey)

#### Legislative Elections

20th January 2005

Previous: 14th December 2003

The Parliamentary Republic is not internationally recognized as an independent state. Single-Chamber Legislature: After the anticipated call for elections, by means of a proportionate representation and for a Term of Office of five years, 50 members for the Chamber of Representatives (Temsilciler Meclisi) were elected.

### Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Republican Party (CTP, Social-Democratic)</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United National Party (UBP, Conservative)</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP, Centre)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Democratic Movement (BDH, Liberal)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Presidental Elections

17th April 2005

Previous: 15th April 2000

Citizens went to the ballot boxes to elect a President, who receives a 5 year term of office.

#### Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Ali Talat (CTP)</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dervis Eroglu (UBP)</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Arabcioigli (DP)</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuri Ceviket (YP)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeki Besiktepe</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huseyin Angoleml(TKP)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation: 69.6%

### Lebanon

#### Legislative Elections

30th May to 20th June 2005

Previous: 27th August to 3rd September 2000

Parliamentary Republic with Single-Chamber legislature. Elections were held to determine the composition of the Assembly of Representatives (Majlis Al-Nuwwab), with 128 seats and four-year terms of office. The voting system is proportionate and is obliged to keep a certain number of seats for each religious community (Maronites, 34; Sunnis, 27; Shiites, 27; Greek Orthodoxes, 14; Greek Catholics, 8; Druzes, 8; Armenian Orthodoxes, 5; Alawites, 2; Armenian Catholics, 1; Protestants, 1; Christian Minorities, 1). They are the first elections to be held following the end of the 29 year military presence of Syria in this country. The System of Civil and Political Rights of the country is not free, according to Freedom House.

### Palestine

#### Legislative Elections

9th January 2005

Previous: 20th January 1996

Territory not internationally recognized as a State. The National Palestinian Authority administers the government nominally in Cisjordania and Gaza. After Yasser Arafat’s death, elections were held to choose a new President, with a term of office of five years. Hamas and the Islamic Jihad boycotted demonstrations. The System of Civil and Political Rights of the country is not free, according to Freedom House.

#### Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mahmoud Abbas (National Liberation Palestinian Movement – Palestine Liberation Organization, FATAH – PLO)</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Barghouti</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tayyir Khalid (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, DFLP; Left)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Halim al Ashqar</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bassam al Salhi (Popular Palestinian Party, PPP; Socialist)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayyid Barakah</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation: 73.4%

### Egypt

#### Legislative Elections

9th and 20th November and 1st December 2005

Previous: 18th and 29th October and 13th November 2000

Presidential Republic with Second-Chamber Legislature. The Advisory Council (Majlis Ash – Shura) is partially
renewed every three years and consists of 264 members; 88 designated by the Presidency and 176 elected directly. Elections were held to determine the composition of the People's Assembly (Majlis al-Sha'ab), which holds terms of office for five years and consists of 454 members; 10 designated by the Presidency and 444 elected in bi-nominal districts by means of a Majority voting system. The demonstrations contained episodes of violence which forced the postponement of elections in six districts (12 seats remain to be allocated); despite hundreds of people related to the Muslim Brothers being detained, their presence in the Assembly increased. The System of Civil and Political Rights in Egypt is not free, according to Freedom House.

### Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Party (HDW, Authoritarian)</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Candidates supported by Muslim Brothers (Islamic)</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Delegation Party (HJW, Liberal)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National Unionist Progressive Association (Tagammu)** 2

**Other parties of the opposition** 2

**Other movements** 3

**Independents** 20

Participation: 28.5% (average participation during the three electoral rounds)

### Presidential Elections

**7th September 2005**

In 2005 the direct vote for presidency was introduced, with an approved constitutional reform by referendum held on 25th May. The initiative obtained a support of 82.9%, with 53.6% participation. The President receives a term of office of six years.

#### Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Hosni Mubarak (HDW)</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayman Abdel Aziz Nour (Party of the Future, HG)</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noman Khalil Gomaa (HJW)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation: 22.9%

### Sources

- Adam Carr’s Electoral Archive: [http://psephos.adam-carr.net](http://psephos.adam-carr.net)
- Elections Around the World: [www.electionworld.org](http://www.electionworld.org)
- Freedom House: [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)
- IFES Election guide: [www.electionguide.org](http://www.electionguide.org)

### Links

- [www2.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics](http://www2.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics)
- [www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2097_E.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2097_E.htm)
### TABLE A1

Official aid to the Mediterranean countries financed by the European Commission budget and by the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(in millions of euros)</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### GRAPHIC A1

EU Cooperation 2004

[Graph showing commitments and payments for different countries]

### TABLE A2  MEDA Programme 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Bilateral Meda</strong></td>
<td><strong>562</strong></td>
<td><strong>627</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Meda</strong></td>
<td><strong>135</strong></td>
<td><strong>174</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>698</strong></td>
<td><strong>801</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### GRAPHIC A2  MEDA programme evolution (1995-2004)

![Graph](#)


### TABLE A3  CARDS Programme 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitments*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bilateral Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>584</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Cooperation</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>679</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The European Commission has not published the data referring to payments by country for 2004.

### TABLE A4
**Mediterranean countries candidates for accession**

#### PHARE programme and pre-accession financial assistance 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLOVENIA*</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALTA*</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYPRUS*</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>236.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table Legend

- SLOVENIA
  - Agriculture: 2.0
  - Statistics and financial controls: 1.0
  - Internal market and Environment: 1.8
  - Justice and home Affairs: 2.5
  - Other programmes: 1.5

- MALTA
  - Environment: 1.2
  - Agriculture: 1.0
  - Transport: 1.0
  - Internal market: 2.6
  - Justice and Home Affairs: 1.0
  - Social policies and employment: 0.6
  - Administrative capacities: 4.5

- CYPRUS
  - Environment: 2.6
  - Internal market: 2.0
  - Administrative capacities: 2.9
  - Agriculture: 1.2
  - Justice and home Affairs: 0.4

- TURKEY
  - Pre-accession financial assistance
    - Obj.1: Copenhagen criteria: 19.0
    - Obj.2: Economic and reform criteria: 31.8
    - Obj.3: Reinforcement of public administration: 56.5
    - Obj.4: Justice and home Affairs: 11.5
    - Obj.5: Social and economic cohesion: 77.6
    - Obj.6: E.U. programmes: 39.2
    - Obj.7: Implementation of programmes and communication: 1.1

*Up to May 2004


### TABLE A5
**European Agency for Reconstruction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Contracts</th>
<th>Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>294.9</td>
<td>197.1</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>205.4</td>
<td>130.1</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Own production. Source: [www.eur.eu.int/agency/agency.htm](http://www.eur.eu.int/agency/agency.htm)*

### TABLE A6
**European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)**

**Financial decisions in Mediterranean areas in 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahrawi refugees</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East (Palestine)</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans by sector</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slovenia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorway construction</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Fund projects</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of SMEs</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croatia</strong></td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorway construction</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing the rehabilitation of municipal infrastructures</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cyprus</strong></td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a combined-cycle plant</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewer system and sewage treatment plant (Nicosia)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements to communications infrastructures</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia and Montenegro</strong></td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of road network</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and modernization of airports of Podgorica and Tivat</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement and rehabilitation of supply and treatment of water in Novi Sad and Nis</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of SMEs</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a combined-cycle plant</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a tunnel and improvement of the railway network</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial phase of construction of a lightweight train system in Bursa</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of SMEs</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Algeria</strong></td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of the capacity of the cement works at M'Sila</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco</strong></td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization of thermal power station at Mohamedia</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of wind farm between Tangiers and Tetouan</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of the supply and treatment of water in Safi</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of the supply and treatment of water in Beni Mellal</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of sewer system and construction of sewage treatment plant in Fez</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of social housing areas</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-credit operations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tunisia</strong></td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements to the urban road network</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a rail link to transport phospho-gypsum waste from Gabès</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of the road network in Tunis, Monastir and Medenin</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decontamination of the Taparura coastal zone</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing local authority investment</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a liquefied natural gas plant in Damietta</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of two combined-cycle modules at plants in Talkha and El Kuriemat</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition of Airbus planes to renew the fleet of Egypt Air</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of SMEs</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syria</strong></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a combined-cycle plant</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement and enlargement of sewer system in Saida and Sour</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of SMEs</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordan</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a gas pipeline</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: EIB www.eib.org/report/
### TABLE A8
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in the Mediterranean countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects Committed</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Algeria</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved access to justice for the more vulnerable sectors of the population</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic education and social dialogue</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights and increased autonomy for women</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights and equality of opportunities</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights of the gipsy minority</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to the Israeli legal system for the Arab citizens of Israel</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign to reinforce the rights of minority groups in relation to questions of territorial planning</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fight against racism</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel, the West Bank and Gaza</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project to combat the legitimisation of torture in Israel</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel and the Occupied Territories</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fight against torture</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia and Montenegro</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of the rights of minorities</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting racism and xenophobia amongst young people.</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of the victims of torture</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia and Montenegro and Albania</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of children and young people from minority groups</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of women victims of torture</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gaza and the West Bank</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to justice and democratic development</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcement of the social fabric</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of good governance in the organisations of civil society.</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raising of awareness against the death penalty in the Palestinian Territories.</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcement of the services available to victims of torture</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEDA countries (regional)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean network of human rights</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab (regional)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforce the capacity of civil society to move towards democratization</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights in South-East Anatolia</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting discrimination and promoting the rights of the minorities.</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of the rights of the gipsy minority</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centres of treatment and rehabilitation for the victims of torture</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of torture</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic map of torture in Turkey</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean

### TABLE B1

**Budget implementation by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maghreb and Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>17,605,996</td>
<td>14,193,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>12,235,209</td>
<td>14,679,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>4,939,540</td>
<td>6,265,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3,851,970</td>
<td>2,971,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2,729,173</td>
<td>1,924,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahrawi Refugees</td>
<td>3,226,887</td>
<td>5,888,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,362,164</td>
<td>2,129,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,082,034</td>
<td>1,267,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1,500,902</td>
<td>965,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>234,647</td>
<td>294,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>201,428</td>
<td>3,334,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>165,478</td>
<td>434,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Programmes</td>
<td>415,373</td>
<td>2,050,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Total</strong></td>
<td>49,550,799</td>
<td>56,399,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central and Eastern Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>4,507,803</td>
<td>3,599,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>2,152,283</td>
<td>1,511,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>844,822</td>
<td>1,228,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries (CIS-CEE)</td>
<td>2,944,448</td>
<td>31.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Programmes</td>
<td>3,493,150</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Total</strong></td>
<td>10,998,058</td>
<td>9,284,886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AECI, General Subdirectorate for Cooperation with Countries in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe.

### GRAPHIC B1

**Distribution of Spanish cooperation in Maghreb & Middle East by sector (2005)**

Source: AECL, General Subdirectorate for Cooperation with Countries in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe.
**TABLE B2** Distribution of Spanish cooperation in the Mediterranean by instrument (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maghreb and Middle East</th>
<th>Projects / Programmes</th>
<th>NGO Development</th>
<th>Food and Emergency Aid</th>
<th>Budget allocation /SWAP/ Global Funds</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Scholarships</th>
<th>Language Assistants</th>
<th>Cultural Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6,792,755</td>
<td>5,485,482</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>599,700</td>
<td>87,968</td>
<td>977,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>4,933,081</td>
<td>3,416,793</td>
<td>3,790,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>373,617</td>
<td>51,484</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2,116,124</td>
<td>2,219,918</td>
<td>18,349</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,685,000</td>
<td>164,469</td>
<td>42,072</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>1,008,340</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>401,832</td>
<td>56,808</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,034,472</td>
<td>430,961</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>438,618</td>
<td>20,136</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saharawi Refugees</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>1,257,757</td>
<td>4,216,514</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>114,453</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,227,603</td>
<td>278,270</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>441,072</td>
<td>107,616</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>632,466</td>
<td>365,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>154,831</td>
<td>65,120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>512,050</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>138,853</td>
<td>14,224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>132,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>123,431</td>
<td>38,472</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>133,539</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>880,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>320,591</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td>434,783</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Maghreb/Middle East</td>
<td>20,830,157</td>
<td>14,712,521</td>
<td>8,024,863</td>
<td>4,434,783</td>
<td>3,035,000</td>
<td>4,999,638</td>
<td>1,372,579</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>36.93%</td>
<td>26.09%</td>
<td>14.23%</td>
<td>7.86%</td>
<td>5.38%</td>
<td>6.19%</td>
<td>0.89%</td>
<td>2.43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Central and Eastern Europe**

| Bosnia-Herzegovina     | 1,750,000             | 1,616,402       |                        |                                       | 113,000      | 58,846       | 31,272            | 30,000          |
| Serbia and Montenegro  | 500,000               | 813,026         |                        |                                       | 167,552      |              | 31,372            |                |
| Albania                | 470,000               | 676,151         |                        |                                       | 55,000       | 27,817       |                   |                |
| Regional Programmes    | 103,300               | 459,330         | 591,304                | 925,926                               | 864,588      |              |                   |                |
| Total                  | 2,823,300             | 3,564,909       | 0                      | 591,304                               | 1,180,141    | 927,232      | 30,000            |                |
| Percentages            | 30.41%                | 38.39%          | 0.00%                  | 6.37%                                 | 1.81%        | 12.71%       | 9.99%             | 0.32%           |

Source: AECI, General Subdirectorate for Cooperation with Countries in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe.
## Migrations in the Mediterranean

**TABLE C1**  
Amount of foreigners from MPC according to their nationality in the European Union*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>17,308</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>7,221</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>23,785</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>685,558</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>4,013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>14,477</td>
<td>4,721</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>15,974</td>
<td>7,448</td>
<td>10,982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>79,838</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>83,631</td>
<td>3,226</td>
<td>333,770</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>725,782</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>168,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>24,243</td>
<td>1,194</td>
<td>3,263</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>260,622</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>4,117</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>10,219</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>1,609</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>5,565</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>4,933</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>10,435</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>833</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>47,827</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>5,361</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>33,278</td>
<td>1,277</td>
<td>2,861</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>118</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>468</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>28,679</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>10,826</td>
<td>5,552</td>
<td>6,663</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,912,169</td>
<td>127,226</td>
<td>42,562</td>
<td>30,450</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>2,287</td>
<td>258,817</td>
<td>7,881</td>
<td>195,878</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total EuroMed**  
2,145,195  
136,561  
140,939  
43,076  
259  
364,377  
26  
4,195  
1,997,823  
24,202  
398,480


---

**TABLE C1 (cont.)**  
Amount of foreigners from MPC according to their nationality in the European Union*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Luxembourg</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Cyprus</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>15,750</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>10,672</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>766,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>40,879</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>24,705</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>126,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>223,661</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>12,351</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,634,986</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>58,628</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>3,070</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>358,269</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>2,268</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>11,899</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>41,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>3,105</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>20,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3,333</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>10,454</td>
<td>1368</td>
<td>111,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>389</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>3,741</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>2,505</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>4,801</td>
<td>4,167</td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td>69,703</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>8,786</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>12,404</td>
<td>54,088</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>2,654,721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total EuroMed**  
2,114  
358,210  
181  
268  
810  
1,691  
2,101  
24,213  
137,001  
6,609  
5,788,331

### Table C2: MPC emigrants according to country of residence, in accordance with statistics from the countries of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>European countries</th>
<th>Arab countries</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria (1995)</td>
<td>991,796</td>
<td>66,398</td>
<td>14,052</td>
<td>1,072,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (2000)</td>
<td>436,000</td>
<td>1,912,729</td>
<td>388,000</td>
<td>2,736,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (2001)</td>
<td>157,030</td>
<td>123,966</td>
<td>325,604</td>
<td>606,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia (2003)</td>
<td>695,765</td>
<td>116,926</td>
<td>30,513</td>
<td>843,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (2002)</td>
<td>3,078,000</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>396,000</td>
<td>3,581,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Europe refers to everywhere except Arab Countries and the USA. Other refers to USA.


### Table C3: MPC emigrants in given countries according to level of education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>Pre-primary education, or first level of basic education</th>
<th>Second level of basic education, or non-higher education</th>
<th>Higher education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

TABLE D1  Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Negotiations started</th>
<th>Agreement concluded</th>
<th>Agreement signed</th>
<th>Comes into force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td>February 1997</td>
<td>July 1997*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>April 2002</td>
<td>September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>November 1995</td>
<td>January 2002</td>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>**-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>March 1998</td>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Interim agreement signed by the EU and the PLO (representing the Palestinian National Authority).
** In March 2003, an intermediate trade agreement came into force, making it possible to apply the commercial provisions of the Association Agreement before full ratification.

• So that Association Agreements may come into force, they must be ratified by the European Parliament, the parliament of the partner state, and by the parliaments of the twenty-five member states of the European Union.
• Turkey is governed by the customs union that took effect in January 1996, based on the 1963 first generation agreement, until its adhesion to the EU.
• Since its participation at the 1999 Stuttgart Conference, as the special guest of the EU presidency, Libya has taken part as an observer in some of the meetings of the Barcelona Process.

TABLE D2  Stabilization and Association Agreements with the Western Balkans Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Negotiations started</th>
<th>Agreement signed</th>
<th>Comes into force (interim agreement)</th>
<th>Comes into force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• The EU’s relations with the countries of the western Balkans are channelled through the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). The SAP is the framework within which various instruments are applied, including the CARDS programme. The SAP helps countries to implement the political and economic transition which can prepare them for a new contractual relationship with the EU: the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) through which they will be able to progress towards a closer association with the EU. The SAA focus on respect for democratic principles and reinforcing ties with the European single market. The purpose of these agreements is to establish a free trade area with the EU. At the present time Croatia and Macedonia have already signed SAAs with the EU.
• The European Council meeting at Thessalonica in June 2003 reconfirmed the EU’s perception of the countries of the Western Balkans as potential candidates to join the Union. In March 2003 Croatia presented its application to join the EU. In April 2004 the European Commission recommended opening negotiations for Croatia’s entry into the Union. The European Council meeting at Brussels in June 2004 recognized Croatia as a candidate for membership. In December the European Council decided that negotiations would begin in March 2005, although this was conditional upon the full collaboration of Croatia with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The lack of collaboration on the part of the Croatian authorities resulted in the beginning of negotiations being delayed until October 2005.
• On March 22nd 2004 the Republic of Macedonia presented its application to become a member of the EU. In May the same year the European Commission was asked by the European Council to prepare a reply concerning this application. The Commission presented its opinion in November 2005, recommending that Macedonia should be considered as a candidate to join the EU. This decision was reaffirmed by the European Council in December 2005.
TABLE E1
Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights and Penal Matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
<th>Elimination of discrimination against women</th>
<th>Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment</th>
<th>Rights of the child</th>
<th>Crime of genocide</th>
<th>International Criminal Court</th>
<th>Financing of terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>ILO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE E2
Multilateral Treaties on Labour Rights (Year of ratification)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Freedom of association and collective bargaining</th>
<th>Elimination of forced or obligatory labour in respect of employment and occupation</th>
<th>Elimination of discrimination</th>
<th>Abolition of child labour</th>
<th>Rights of immigrant workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE E3
Multilateral Treaties in the field of the Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
<th>Climate Change</th>
<th>Kyoto Protocol</th>
<th>Biological Diversity</th>
<th>Biosecurity Protocol</th>
<th>CITES</th>
<th>Persistent Organic Pollutants</th>
<th>Agenda 21 process</th>
<th>National Strategy for Sustainable Development</th>
<th>Number of municipalities involved in Agenda 21</th>
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### TABLE E4
Multilateral Disarmament Treaties

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## The Mediterranean in Brief

### TABLE F1: Human Development Index

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years)</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate ≥15 years (%)</th>
<th>Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (%)</th>
<th>GDP per capita ($ PPP)</th>
<th>Human Development Index value</th>
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<sup>a</sup> Some of these figures are estimates.  <sup>b</sup> Data from UNDP. 2005.  (..) Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F1: Population and development (2003)

Own production. Source: UNDP and UNPOP.
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Own production. Source: UNPOP.


### GRAPHIC F2 Population growth estimated between 2005-2050 (millions of people)

Main countries with an increase or a decrease in population

- India: 489.3
- Pakistan: 146.8
- Nigeria: 126.6
- Democratic Republic of Congo: 119.7
- Bangladesh: 101.1
- Poland: 6.6
- Italy: 7.2
- Japan: -18.9
- Ukraine: -20.1
- Russian Federation: -31.5

Own production. Source: UNPOP.
## TABLE F3  
**Population: structure and distribution**

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<th>Population in urban agglomerations of over 1 million inhabitants</th>
<th>Population within 100 km from the coast</th>
<th>Urban population living in slum conditions</th>
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Own production. Source: WB, WB, WB, UNPOP, UNPOP, WRI, WRI, WB.

a. Data for Cyprus and Malta are from the UNDP of 2005.

b. Data from 2000.

( .. ) Data unavailable.

## GRAPHIC F3  
**Evolution of the urban population (1950-2030)**

 Own production. Source: UNPOP.

Data between 2005 and 2030 are projections.
### TABLE F4: Education and training of human capital

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<th>%</th>
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<th>1998-2002</th>
<th>% GDP 1998-2002</th>
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* Own production. Source: WB, UNPOP, UNDP and UNESCO.

** Latest data available from this period.

#### GRAPHIC F4: Illiteracy (2000-2004)*

![Graphic showing illiteracy rates by region and gender](image-url)
### TABLE F5  Health and survival

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Own production. Source: UNICEF and WB.

<sup>a</sup> Data from 2000.  <sup>b</sup> Latest data available from this period.  <sup>c</sup> WB.  <sup>(..)</sup> Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F5  Infant mortality rate (2003)

*Deaths of infants under five years of age per 1,000 live births*
*Deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births*
### TABLE F6
#### Nutrition and food security

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Average daily calories supply per capita (kcal)</th>
<th>Cereal imports (tonnes)</th>
<th>Cereal imports (thousands $)</th>
<th>Cereal exports (tonnes)</th>
<th>Cereal exports (thousands $)</th>
<th>Children under weight for their age (%) under age 5</th>
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Own production. Source: FAO. Latest data available from this period. Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F6
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Own production. Source: FAO.
### TABLE F7: Access to health resources

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<th>Population with access to improved sanitation facilities</th>
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<sup>a</sup> Latest data available for this period.  
<sup>b</sup> Basically women between 15-49 years.  
<sup>c</sup> UNDP, 2005.  
<sup>d</sup> All of the methods are included.  
<sup>..</sup> Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F7: Number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants (2004)

Countries with the highest ratio of physicians:

- Italy: 6.19
- Cuba: 6.04
- Georgia: 4.56
- Belarus: 4.48
- Belarus: 4.56
- Pakistan: 4.25
- Ukraine: 3.96
- Unfpa: 3.90
- Israel: 3.87

Own production. Source: WHO.
### Table F8: Gender: Social Development

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<th>Adult literacy rate</th>
<th>Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools</th>
<th>Year when women obtained the right to vote</th>
<th>Year when women obtained the right to be elected</th>
<th>Year when the first woman was elected to Parliament</th>
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Own production. Source: UNDP and UNESCO.

- a. Refers to the first year when elected to the current parliamentary system.
- b. Some of this data are estimated and subject to revision.
- c. The date indicates the first year in which a woman was appointed to Parliament.
- d. First partial recognition of the right to vote and that to be elected.
- e. Situation up to the 31st of January 2006.
- f. Latest data available from this period.
- g. Data from 2000/01.
- (..) Data unavailable.

### Graph F8: Education (2002/03)

- Gender parity
- Number of women enrolled in comparison to men (%)
- Three girls for every four boys

Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools

Own production. Source: UNDP and UNESCO.
## TABLE F9 Technology and communication

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<td>644</td>
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Own production. Source: WB, ITU and UNCTAD.

a. Latest data available from this period.

b. UNCTAD, 2005. (..) Data unavailable.

## GRAPHIC F9 Information technology

**Internet users (% of population)**

Internet users (2003) World average: 15.0%

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<th>Region</th>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western and Pacific Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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Internet hosts (2002) (per 100,000 inhabitants)

- FR
- IT
- CY
- IL
- MT
- TR
- JO
- TN
- MA

Internet users (2003) (per 1,000 inhabitants)

- EG
- LY
- TN
- MA

Personal computers (2003) (per 1,000 inhabitants)

- EG
- LY
- TN
- MA

Own production. Source: WB, ITU and UNCTAD.
### TABLE F10  Security and military expenditure

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<th>Conventional weapons transfer</th>
<th>Military expenditure</th>
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<td>By country of origen</td>
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<td>thousands</td>
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<td>...</td>
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Own production. Source: UNDP, UNPOP and SIPRI.

a. Paramilitary forces are excluded. b. Military pensions are excluded. c. Military aid from the USA is included. d. Sum of exports or imports in the whole period. e. Amounts only relate to recurring expenditure.

GRAPHIC F10  Security, military expenses and armed forces (2003)

![Graph showing security, military expenses, and armed forces](image-url)
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Own production. Source: WB and UNDP.

*a. UNDP, 2005 (data from the two first columns are not comparable).
(..) Data unavailable.

**GRAPHIC F11** Economic growth (1990-2003)

Own production. Source: WB and UNDP.
## TABLE F12  Agriculture

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Own production. Source: FAO.

a. The agricultural surface is divided in “arable lands and permanent crops” and “fields and permanent pastures”. (..) Data unavailable.

## GRAPHIC F12  Evolution of the active population in agriculture (1965-2003)

![Graph showing the evolution of the active population in agriculture from 1965 to 2003 for various countries.](image-url)
### TABLE F13

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<td>Horses and</td>
<td>Exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and ovine$^a$</td>
<td>camels$^c$</td>
<td>Imports</td>
</tr>
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<td>thousands</td>
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Own production. Source: FAO.

*a. Includes bovine, caprine, ovine and buffalos livestock.  
b. Includes chicken and hens, ducks, turkeys and geese.  
c. Includes horses, donkeys, mules and camels.  
d. Includes the above categories and other unspecified animals.  
(…) Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F13

**Poultry (millions) (2004)**

Main countries with poultry:

- China: 5,186
- USA: 2,064
- Indonesia: 1,182
- Brazil: 1,150
- Russian Federation: 334

Own production. Source: FAO.
## TABLE F14  Fisheries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total fisheries</th>
<th>Fishing in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea</th>
<th>Aquaculture production</th>
<th>Trade in fish and derivative products</th>
<th>Average annual supply of fish and fish derivates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>marina</td>
<td>continental</td>
<td>tonnes</td>
<td>tonnes</td>
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<td>195</td>
<td>1,087</td>
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<td>19,938</td>
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<td>489</td>
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Own production. Source: FAO. \(\ldots\) Data unavailable.

## GRAPHIC F14  Main Mediterranean countries in fishing and aquaculture production (2003)

![Main Mediterranean countries in fishing and aquaculture production (2003)](image-url)
### TABLE F15  Employment and unemployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of active population</th>
<th>% of active female population</th>
<th>% of active male population</th>
<th>% of active population aged 15-24 years</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Services</th>
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<td>15.0</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
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<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
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<td>17.5</td>
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<td>13.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
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</table>

Own production. Source: ILO ILO ILO WB UNCTAD UNCTAD UNCTAD

*a. Latest data available for this period.  b. Data from WB.  c. Data from 1999.  (..) Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F15  Unemployment (2002-2004)*

*Latest data available for this period.
### TABLE F16  
**Income distribution**

| Portugal 1997 | 5.8 | 11.0 | 15.5 | 21.8 | 45.9 | 14.9 | 38.5 |
| Spain 1990 | 7.5 | 12.6 | 17.0 | 22.6 | 40.3 | 9.0 | 32.5 |
| France 1995 | 7.2 | 12.8 | 17.2 | 22.8 | 40.2 | 9.0 | 32.7 |
| Italy Malta 2000 | 6.5 | 12.0 | 16.8 | 22.8 | 42.0 | 11.7 | 36.0 |
| Slovenia 1998-99 | 9.1 | 14.2 | 18.1 | 22.9 | 35.7 | 5.9 | 28.4 |
| Croatia 2001 | 8.3 | 12.8 | 16.8 | 22.5 | 39.6 | 7.2 | 29.0 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina 2001 | 9.5 | 14.2 | 17.9 | 22.6 | 35.8 | 5.5 | 26.2 |
| Serbia and Montenegro 1998 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Portugal 1997 | 5.8 | 11.0 | 15.5 | 21.8 | 45.9 | 14.9 | 38.5 |
| Spain 1990 | 7.5 | 12.6 | 17.0 | 22.6 | 40.3 | 9.0 | 32.5 |
| France 1995 | 7.2 | 12.8 | 17.2 | 22.8 | 40.2 | 9.0 | 32.7 |
| Italy Malta 2000 | 6.5 | 12.0 | 16.8 | 22.8 | 42.0 | 11.7 | 36.0 |
| Slovenia 1998-99 | 9.1 | 14.2 | 18.1 | 22.9 | 35.7 | 5.9 | 28.4 |
| Croatia 2001 | 8.3 | 12.8 | 16.8 | 22.5 | 39.6 | 7.2 | 29.0 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina 2001 | 9.5 | 14.2 | 17.9 | 22.6 | 35.8 | 5.5 | 26.2 |
| Serbia and Montenegro 1998 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Cyprus 2000 | 6.1 | 10.6 | 14.9 | 21.7 | 46.7 | 13.3 | 40.0 |
| Turkey 2000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Syria 2000 | 6.1 | 10.6 | 14.9 | 21.7 | 46.7 | 13.3 | 40.0 |
| Lebanon 1997 | 7.6 | 11.4 | 15.5 | 21.1 | 44.4 | 9.0 | 36.4 |
| Jordan 1997 | 7.6 | 11.4 | 15.5 | 21.1 | 44.4 | 9.0 | 36.4 |
| Israel 1997 | 6.9 | 11.4 | 15.6 | 21.1 | 44.3 | 11.8 | 35.5 |
| Palestine 1997-2000 | 8.6 | 12.1 | 15.4 | 20.3 | 43.6 | 8.0 | 34.4 |
| Egypt 1999-2000 | 6.0 | 10.3 | 14.8 | 21.6 | 47.3 | 13.7 | 39.8 |
| Libya 1999-2000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Tunisia 2000 | 6.0 | 10.3 | 14.8 | 21.6 | 47.3 | 13.7 | 39.8 |
| Algeria 1995 | 7.0 | 11.6 | 16.1 | 22.7 | 42.6 | 9.6 | 35.3 |
| Morocco 1998-1999 | 6.5 | 10.6 | 14.8 | 21.5 | 46.6 | 11.9 | 39.5 |

*Own production. Source: WB.*  
*Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Slovenia, Greece and Israel categories are organized according to income per capita. The categories referring to other countries are organized according to consumption per capita.*  
*Data unavailable.*

### GRAPHIC F16  
**Relationship between the richest 10% and the poorest 10% (1990-2002*)**

![Graph showing the relationship between the richest 10% and the poorest 10% for various countries from 1990 to 2002.](image-url)

**Most egalitarian countries**

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Gini Coefficient</th>
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<td>5.55</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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*Own production. Source: WB.*  
*Latest data available for this period.*
### Gender: economic activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>% of female employment</th>
<th>% of male employment</th>
<th>Labour force occupational rate</th>
<th>Earned income</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
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<td>12%</td>
<td>Agriculture: women 23%</td>
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<td>2000/02</td>
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<td>8%</td>
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<td>2%</td>
<td>Services: women 6%</td>
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<td>20%</td>
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<td>21%</td>
<td>Industry: women 7%</td>
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<td>10%</td>
<td>Services: women 6%</td>
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<td>16%</td>
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<td>23%</td>
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<td>22%</td>
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<td>15%</td>
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<td>4%</td>
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<td>24%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1992/97</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Services: women 8%</td>
<td>$1,584</td>
<td>5,534</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1992/97</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Agriculture: women 10%</td>
<td>$2,430</td>
<td>7,789</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2000/02</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Industry: women 12%</td>
<td>$2,004</td>
<td>6,491</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>2000/02</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Services: women 11%</td>
<td>$14,159</td>
<td>25,969</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1990/97</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Agriculture: women 22%</td>
<td>$2,430</td>
<td>7,789</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1990/97</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Industry: women 7%</td>
<td>$1,614</td>
<td>6,203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1992/97</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>Services: women 40%</td>
<td>$3,840</td>
<td>10,420</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1990/97</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Agriculture: women 18%</td>
<td>$2,896</td>
<td>9,244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1998/2001</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Industry: women 40%</td>
<td>$2,299</td>
<td>5,699</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Own production. Source: UNDP. WB.
- a. Latest data available from this period.
- b. Estimates worked out according to the most recent available data from the 1991-2000 period.
- (..) Data unavailable.

### Income differences between genders ($ PPP and as a factor*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>7,789</td>
<td>25,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5,534</td>
<td>9,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6,491</td>
<td>6,203</td>
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<tr>
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<td>25,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>9,244</td>
<td>2,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5,699</td>
<td>2,299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The factor represents the number of times that male incomes surpass average female incomes within the same country.*
### TABLE F18 Production and energy consumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Energy production</th>
<th>Energy consumption</th>
<th>Energy consumption per capita</th>
<th>GDP per unit of energy use</th>
<th>Net energy import</th>
<th>Energy consumption by source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>thousands tonnes oil eq$^b$</td>
<td>thousands tonnes oil eq$^b$</td>
<td>kg oil eq$^b$</td>
<td>$PPP$ per kg eq</td>
<td>% of used energy</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3,643</td>
<td>26,392</td>
<td>2,546</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86.9</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>31,737</td>
<td>131,558</td>
<td>3,215</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<td>265,881</td>
<td>4,470</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53.2</td>
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<td>26,590</td>
<td>172,720</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>738$^c$</td>
<td>1,888$^c$</td>
<td>5.0$^c$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>3,379</td>
<td>6,951</td>
<td>3,486</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8,222</td>
<td>1,852</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>89.1</td>
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<td>4,324</td>
<td>1,052</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>1,981</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>88.5</td>
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<td>1,572$^{a,d}$</td>
<td>2,608$^{a,d}$</td>
<td>1,282$^{a,d}$</td>
<td>4.1$^{a,d}$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>91.2</td>
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<td>95.5</td>
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<td>2,453$^c$</td>
<td>3,109$^c$</td>
<td>8.3$^c$</td>
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<td>98.2</td>
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<td>1,063</td>
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<td>93.8</td>
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<td>98.6</td>
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<td>97.0</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>789</td>
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<td>-14</td>
<td>94.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,433</td>
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<td>-272</td>
<td>99.1</td>
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<td>10,753</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95.1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: WB.

$^a$ WRI.
$^b$ Oil equivalent: energy unit used which is equal to the energy contained in a ton of crude oil.
$^c$ Data from 2001.
$^d$ Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F18 Energy consumption (kg oil equivalent per capita) (2002)

![Energy consumption graph]

**Energy use average annual growth (1990-2002) (%)**

- **World average**: 1.2
- **MENA**: -2.7
- **EU/EEA**: 3.4
- **Latin America and the Caribbean**: 2.7
- **Middle East and North Africa**: 2.2
- **Southern Asia**: 2.2
- **Sub-Saharan Africa**: -0.3

Own production. Source: WB.
## Table F19
Production, consumption and access to electricity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population with access to electricity</th>
<th>Electricity production</th>
<th>Electricity consumption per capita</th>
<th>Electricity sources*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>billion kWh</td>
<td>kWh</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>45.7</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>17.1</td>
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<td>242.7</td>
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<td>4,271b</td>
<td>..</td>
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<td>14.7</td>
<td>5,907</td>
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<td>10.8</td>
<td>1,633</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>1,390</td>
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<td>4,231</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>85.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<td>1,951</td>
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<td>Palestine</td>
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<td>86.1</td>
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<td>71.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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</table>

Own production. Source: WB

* Percentages do not always add up to 100% as renewable electricity sources are not included.  b. WRI, data from 2001.  (..) Data unavailable.

## Graphic F19
Electricity consumption (1990-2001)

[Graph showing electricity consumption for various countries from 1990 to 2001]

Own production. Source: WRI

The information for 1990 on the ex-Yugoslavian countries corresponds to the average of the old federation.

(*) Information for 1990 not available.
### CO₂ Emissions

**CO₂ emissions by sectors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Industry and construction</th>
<th>Electricity</th>
<th>Total capita participation intensity</th>
<th>Emission intensity</th>
<th>2000 %</th>
<th>2001 %</th>
<th>2002 %</th>
<th>2003 %</th>
</tr>
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<td>1,000</td>
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<td>35.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Own production. Source: WRI, UNDP, Plan Bleu.
- a. Latest data available for the period 1999-2002, WB.
- b. Data from 1999.
- c. Includes Monaco.
- d. Includes San Marino.
- (.) Less than half of the displayed unit.
- (..) Data unavailable.

**GRAPHIC F20**

**CO₂ emissions coming from transport**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>CO₂ emissions coming from transport (t CO₂ per capita)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (without Middle East)</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**World average:** 24.1

**CO₂ emissions coming from transport (millions t CO₂)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Own production. Source:** WRI and Plan Bleu.

---

*a. Does not include motorcycles.*
### TABLE F21  Water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationals</th>
<th>Coming from other countries</th>
<th>Water dependency</th>
<th>Total per capita</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>As a percent of total water resources</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Industrial</th>
<th>Desalinated water production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>km³</td>
<td>km³</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>m³</td>
<td>km³</td>
<td>m³</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>6,859</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10                      12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>111.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2,794</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13                      19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>178.5</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>3,439</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16                    74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>182.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3,325</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18                    37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>120.0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>74                    1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>16,031</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>16                    3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>22,669</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>16                    3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9,429</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>27                    11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>164.5</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>19,815</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>16                    3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>3,147</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>16                    3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>13,306</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>16                    3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>6,998</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>16                    3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>27                    1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>227.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3,439</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>15                    11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>1,622</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3                    2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33                    1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>115.9</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>21                    4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>122.2</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31                    7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..                    ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>117.8</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8                    14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>801.7</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>8                    3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>16                    2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>22                    13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>8                    2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: FAO and UNPOP.

(*) Bangladesh has an important water dependency but this has not been shown to facilitate the graphic understanding.

### GRAPHIC F21  Water resources and dependency (2000-2002)

#### Countries with highest water dependency* (% of dependency) (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Water dependency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>97.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: FAO and UNPOP.

(*) Latest data available for this period. (-) Data unavailable.
### Environment

**TABLE F22**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National protected areas</th>
<th>Total Area</th>
<th>Forest Area</th>
<th>Deserts and dry lands</th>
<th>Firewood production</th>
<th>Land surfaces&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Marine and coastal areas&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Known species&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Threatened Species&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Ecological footprint</th>
<th>Own production. Source: WWF, UNDP and UNPOP.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|                          | thousands of km² | thousands of km² | % of the total | % of the total | thousands of m³ | % of the total | number | number | number | number |%
| Portugal                 | 92  | 38   | 41.1 | 2.2 | 600  | 4.4 | 26 | 606  | 30 | 4.2 |
| Spain                    | 505 | 179  | 35.5 | 2.6 | 2,055| 8.0 | 38 | 647  | 40 | 4.9 |
| France                   | 552 | 156  | 28.2 | 2.0 | 2,500| 3.0 | 83 | 665  | 31 | 5.6 |
| Italy                    | 301 | 100  | 33.1 | 3.3 | 5,814| 7.2 | 55 | 610  | 27 | 4.0 |
| Malta                    | 0.3 | ...  | ...  | ... | 0    | 13.5 | 5  | 391  | 11 | 3.8 |
| Slovenia                 | 20  | 13   | 62.3 | 10.0| 725  | 14.4 | 2  | 437  | 14 | 3.5 |
| Croatia                  | 57  | 21   | 37.8 | 0.0 | 954  | 6.0 | 18 | 461  | 16 | 3.0 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina       | 51  | 22   | 42.7 | 0.0 | 1,316| 0.5 | .. | 390   | 16 | 2.2 |
| Serbia and Montenegro    | 102 | 27   | 26.4 | 16.4| 2,097| 3.2 | 2  | 477  | 20 | 2.5 |
| Portugal                 | 26  | 9    | 35.3 | 100 | 699  | 7.1 | 380 | 18    | 22 | 2.2 |
| Albania                  | 29  | 8    | 27.1 | 37.9| 221  | 2.0 | 7  | 376  | 10 | 1.4 |
| Greece                   | 132 | 38   | 28.4 | 25.0| 1,057| 1.8 | 14 | 530  | 25 | 4.7 |
| Cyprus                   | 9   | 2    | 18.7 | 100 | 3    | 8.3 | 5  | 370   | 14 | 5.7 |
| Turkey                   | 784 | 102  | 13.0 | 85.9| 5,278| 0.7 | 14 | 581  | 29 | 2.0 |
| Syria                    | 185 | 5    | 2.5  | 100 | 18   | 2    | .. | 432   | 14 | 1.7 |
| Lebanon                  | 10  | 1    | 13.1 | 53.8| 82   | 0.3 | 1  | 447   | 15 | 2.8 |
| Jordan                   | 89  | 1    | 0.9  | 100 | 253  | 10.2 | 1  | 490   | 21 | 1.6 |
| Israel                   | 22  | 2    | 7.7  | 100 | 2    | 18.4 | 19 | 649   | 31 | 4.8 |
| Palestine                | 6   | ..   | ..   | ..  | ..   | ..   | .. | ..    | 4   | .. |
| Egypt                    | 1,001| 1    | 0.1  | 100 | 16,792| 4.6 | 17 | 599  | 23 | 1.4 |
| Libya                    | 1,760| 2    | 0.1  | 100 | 536  | 0.1 | 3  | 413   | 12 | 3.2 |
| Tunisia                  | 164 | 11   | 6.5  | 90.2| 2,138| 0.2 | 2  | 438   | 19 | 1.5 |
| Algeria                  | 2,392| 23   | 1.0  | 97.6| 7,545| 5.1 | 4  | 472   | 23 | 1.5 |
| Morocco                  | 447 | 44   | 9.8  | 89.0| 298  | 0.8 | 4  | 559   | 25 | 0.9 |

Own production. Source: FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO WRI WRI WRI IUCN WWF

<sup>a</sup> Includes the continental platform up to 200 meters depth.
<sup>b</sup> Only mammals (except marine ones) and nesting birds.
<sup>c</sup> According to categories I-V of the IUCN.
<sup>d</sup> Own production from FAO’s data.

(..) Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F22

**Ecological footprint and sustainable development (2003)**

**Ecological footprint by regions (global ha/capita) (2002)**
### TABLE F23  
**International trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Exports 2004</th>
<th>Exports 2004</th>
<th>Coverage ratio</th>
<th>Trade balance</th>
<th>Current account balance</th>
<th>Immigrant remittances</th>
<th>Foreign direct investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>millions $</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>millions $</td>
<td>millions $</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>33,014</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-14,472</td>
<td>-8,437</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>182,100</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>-54,718</td>
<td>-23,676</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>18,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>425,312*</td>
<td>96*</td>
<td>-6,448</td>
<td>4,394</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>24,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>344,786</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,451</td>
<td>-20,556</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>16,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>2,712</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-899</td>
<td>-271</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>15,570</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>-1,035</td>
<td>-99</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>8,022</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-7,466</td>
<td>-2,085</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>1,901</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-3,615</td>
<td>-2,038</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-5,398</td>
<td>-2,121</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-1,010</td>
<td>-279</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-1,419</td>
<td>-407</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>14,996</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-29,533</td>
<td>-11,225</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1,155</td>
<td>20*</td>
<td>-3,815</td>
<td>-282</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>61,683</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-22,949</td>
<td>-7,905</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>1,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1,788</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-6,055</td>
<td>-3,382</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3,950</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-3,049</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>2,287</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>38,520</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>-4,912</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1,619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Palestine      | ...          | ...          | ...            | ...           | ...                     | ...                    | ...                       | ...
| Egypt          | 7,530        | 60           | -5,916         | 3,743         | 3,341                   | 12.6                   | 1,253                     | 159|
| Libya          | 20,200       | 269          | 8,963          | ...           | ...                     | ...                    | 131                       | 62|
| Tunisia        | 9,660        | 55           | -5,816         | 1,582         | 4,218                   | 25.4                   | 583                       | 31|
| Algeria        | 32,930       | 177          | 10,895         | ...           | ...                     | ...                    | 882                       | 258|
| Morocco        | 9,660        | 55           | 17,127         | ...           | ...                     | ...                    | ...                       | ...|

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.  
a. Military expenditure excluded.  
b. Include workers remittances, salaries paid and transfers of capital.  
c. Data from Cyprus and Malta are from UNCTAD.  
d. From goods and services.  
e. French Guiana, Martinica and Reunion are included in French data.  
f. Own production from UNCTAD data.  
(….) Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F23  
**Exports of textile products to the EU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rest of the world</th>
<th>Non EU Mediterranean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>50,003</td>
<td>14,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>50,354</td>
<td>16,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>52,578</td>
<td>17,127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: European Commission, General Trade Directorate.  
(* The five first world exporters and the five first Mediterranean exporters are included.)
## TABLE F24 Exports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Food products</th>
<th>Agricultural raw materials</th>
<th>Fuels</th>
<th>Minerals and metals</th>
<th>Manufactured products</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Export concentration index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
<td>% of the total</td>
<td>% of the total</td>
<td>% of the total</td>
<td>% of the total</td>
<td>% of the total</td>
<td>% of the total</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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</table>

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.  

a. Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinica and Reunion are included in the data for France. (..) Data unavailable.

## GRAPHIC F24 Exports (2003)

### Spain

- **Food products**: 77.1%
- **Fuels**: 15.0%
- **Manufactured products**: 1.5%
- **Minerals and metals**: 1.2%
- **Agricultural raw materials**: 0.2%
- **Others**: 0.2%

### Slovenia

- **Food products**: 89.9%
- **Fuels**: 3.5%
- **Manufactured products**: 1.2%
- **Minerals and metals**: 3.1%
- **Agricultural raw materials**: 0.2%
- **Others**: 0.2%

### Syria

- **Food products**: 71.3%
- **Fuels**: 10.7%
- **Manufactured products**: 14.0%
- **Minerals and metals**: 0.1%
- **Agricultural raw materials**: 0.0%
- **Others**: 0.0%

### Lebanon

- **Food products**: 92.2%
- **Fuels**: 23.9%
- **Manufactured products**: 14.9%
- **Minerals and metals**: 1.4%
- **Agricultural raw materials**: 7.4%
- **Others**: 0.2%

### Israel

- **Food products**: 92.6%
- **Fuels**: 0.2%
- **Manufactured products**: 0.0%
- **Minerals and metals**: 0.0%
- **Agricultural raw materials**: 0.0%
- **Others**: 0.0%

### Morocco

- **Food products**: 66.9%
- **Fuels**: 21.4%
- **Manufactured products**: 18.0%
- **Minerals and metals**: 2.6%
- **Agricultural raw materials**: 7.1%
- **Others**: 0.0%

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.
### TABLE F25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Food products % of the total</th>
<th>Agricultural raw materials % of the total</th>
<th>Fuels % of the total</th>
<th>Minerals and metals % of the total</th>
<th>Manufactured products % of the total</th>
<th>Others % of the total</th>
<th>Import concentration index</th>
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<td>10.8</td>
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<td>17.0</td>
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<td>0.076</td>
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<td>2.7</td>
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<td>73.5</td>
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Own production. Source: UNCTAD

*a.* Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinica and Reunion are included in the data for France. (...) Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F25

Imports (2003)

- **Spain**: 74.3%
  - Food products: 10.0%
  - Fuels: 0.2%
  - Manufactured products: 0.0%
  - Agricultural raw materials: 0.0%
  - Minerals and metals: 0.0%
  - Others: 18.9%

- **Slovenia**: 78.4%
  - Food products: 10.0%
  - Fuels: 0.2%
  - Manufactured products: 0.0%
  - Agricultural raw materials: 0.0%
  - Minerals and metals: 0.0%
  - Others: 18.9%

- **Syria**: 70.5%
  - Food products: 10.0%
  - Fuels: 0.2%
  - Manufactured products: 0.0%
  - Agricultural raw materials: 0.0%
  - Minerals and metals: 0.0%
  - Others: 18.9%

- **Lebanon**: 60.1%
  - Food products: 18.1%
  - Fuels: 0.2%
  - Manufactured products: 0.0%
  - Agricultural raw materials: 0.0%
  - Minerals and metals: 0.0%
  - Others: 11.0%

- **Israel**: 79.4%
  - Food products: 10.0%
  - Fuels: 0.2%
  - Manufactured products: 0.0%
  - Agricultural raw materials: 0.0%
  - Minerals and metals: 0.0%
  - Others: 11.0%

- **Morocco**: 67.1%
  - Food products: 10.0%
  - Fuels: 0.2%
  - Manufactured products: 0.0%
  - Agricultural raw materials: 0.0%
  - Minerals and metals: 0.0%
  - Others: 11.0%
### TABLE F26  Tourism in the Mediterranean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tourist arrivals by country of origin</th>
<th>International outbound tourist</th>
<th>Nights in the destination</th>
<th>International tourism receipts</th>
<th>International tourism expenditure</th>
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<td>rate of exchange %</td>
<td>% in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>thousands 2004</td>
<td>thousands 2004</td>
<td>millions $ 2003</td>
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Own production. Source: WTO.  
* Data from 2003.  
( .. ) Data unavailable.

### GRAPHIC F26  Mediterranean tourism (% of the total) (2004)

Tourist arrivals (millions) (2004)

- France 30.1%
- Spain 21.5%
- Italy 14.9%
- Portugal 4.7%
- Turkey 8.7%
- Greece 5.8%
- Croatia 2.4%
- Tunisia 2.3%
- Egypt 23.3%

Remaining Mediterranean countries 8.6%

Tourist arrivals (millions) (2004)

- Mediterranean: 249.4
- Europe (non Mediterranean): 194.3
- North and South East Asia: 134.8
- North America: 85.8
- South and Central America: 21.7
- Africa (non Mediterranean): 20.4
- Caribbean: 18.2
- Oceania and Southern Asia: 17.7
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<td>22</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: OECD.

According to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) there is not an ODA in Israel, Libya, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta, but there is Official Aid, for countries which are part of the second section of the list of states receiving assistance from the CAD.

### GRAPHIC F27 Distribution of ODA by regions (%) (2003/2004)

ODA for the Middle East and North Africa (2003-2004) (% of the total)

- European Commission: 18.9%
- DAC: 15.1%
- International Financial Institutions: 1.5%
- United Nations Agencies: 24.9%
- Global: 13.5%

Sub-Saharan Africa: 58.3%
Central and Southern Asia: 15.0%
Rest of Asia and Oceania: 0.3%
Middle East and North Africa: 4.3%
Europe: 47.5%
Latin America and the Caribbean: 0.3%

Own production. Source: OECD.
### TABLE F28  
**External debt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>External debt</th>
<th>Debt service</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>millions $</td>
<td>$ of the GNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of the</td>
<td>% of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>..</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>2,920</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>18,795</td>
<td>47</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: WB.  
(*) There is no data for developed countries.

### GRAPHIC F28  
**Debt service and public expenditure on health**

**Countries with largest external debt* (millions $) (2003)**

- Brazil: 235,431
- China: 193,567
- Russia: 175,257
- Argentina: 166,307
- Turkey: 145,662
- Mexico: 140,004
- Indonesia: 134,389
- India: 113,467

Own production. Source: WB.
Definitions

**Adolescent fertility rate**
Number of births per thousand women aged between fifteen and nineteen.

**Adult literacy rate**
Percentage of people over fifteen years of age who can read, write and understand a short, simple text about their daily life.

**Agricultural land area**
Land surface area made up of arable and permanently cultivated lands and by permanent meadows and pastures.

**Annual population growth rate**
Exponential change in the growth of the population during the period indicated.

**Aquaculture production**
Includes marine, freshwater and diadromous fish, molluscs and crustaceans cultivated in marine, inland or brackish environments.

**Arable lands and permanent crops**
Agricultural surface area that groups the data on arable or farm land and land used for permanent crops. Arable and farm land is land given over to temporary crops (those giving two yields are only counted once), temporal meadows for cutting or grazing, land dedicated to commercial vegetable gardens or orchards and land temporarily fallow for a period of less than five years. The term does not include land that has been abandoned as a result of migratory cultivation. Land destined for permanent crops refers to land dedicated to crops that occupy the terrain during long periods and that do not need to be replanted after each harvest, such as cacao, coffee and rubber. It includes land occupied by bushes destined to flower production, fruit trees, walnut trees and vineyards, but excludes land planted with trees destined to the production of firewood or wood.

**Armed forces**
Strategic, land, naval, aerial, command and support forces. It also includes paramilitary forces, such as the gendarmerie, the customs services and the border guard if they are trained in military strategy.

**Average annual supply of fish and fish derivatives**
Calculated from the disposability of fish and its derivatives for human consumption, divided by the total population within the geographical borders of any given country. Nationals living in other countries are excluded, although foreigners living in the country are included.

**Average daily calories supply per capita**
Disposability of food for human consumption, expressed in kilo calories per person and per day. A national level of foods for human consumption is calculated, after deducting all the non food consumption (exports, fodder, industrial use, seeds and waste).

**Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions**
The emissions of carbon dioxide produced in the burning of all fossil fuels used by a country.

**Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions by sector**
Shows the proportion of carbon dioxide emissions produced by the burning of fossil fuels in the sectors of transport, industry and electricity production. The transport sector includes emissions produced by all forms of transport by road, rail and air, including agricultural vehicles travelling by road. International journeys by boat or aeroplane are excluded. The industrial and construction sector includes emissions produced by all types of industry and construction. The electricity sector includes emissions produced by the generation of electricity for public use, including thermal power stations.

**Cereal cultivated land**
The figures related to cultivated crop surface areas generally refer to the area harvested, although those corresponding to permanent crops can refer to the total planted area. The figures for the cultivated cereal area only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or are used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

**Cereal production**
The figures for cereal production only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or are used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

**Cereal production yield**
The outputs per hectare have been cal-
calculated using the data on surface area and production.

Cereal trade
The figures obtained by the FAO, have been supplied by the respective governments in the questionnaires sent out by the FAO.

Children under weight for their age
Percentage of children under five whose weight and height, for their age, is less than twice the standard deviation in comparison with the average for the relevant age group. The population of reference is the child population of the USA, which is assumed to be well nourished.

Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools
Number of students registered in the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education, regardless of age, as a percentage of the population having the official age to receive education at the three levels.

Consumer price index
Reflects changes in the cost, for an average consumer, in the acquisition of a basket of goods and services that can be fixed or can change at specific intervals; for example annually. The Laspeyres formula is normally used.

Contraceptive use rate
Percentage of married women (including couples living together) between fifteen and forty-nine years of age, who use, or whose partners use, contraception of any type, modern or traditional.

Conventional weapons transfer
Refers to the voluntary transfer of weapons, on the part of the supplier (excluding, therefore, captured weapons and weapons obtained from deserters), with military purposes destined for the armed forces, paramilitary forces or intelligence services of another country. They include conventional weapons or large scale systems, classified in six categories: ships, aircraft, missiles, artillery, armoured vehicles and guidance and radar systems (excluding lorries, services, munitions, small arms, support items, components and component technology and towed or naval artillery under 100 millimetre calibre).

Coverage ratio
Relation between the exports and imports of an economy, expressed as a percentage.

Crude birth rate
Number of births per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

Crude death rate
Number of deaths per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

Current account balance
The sum of the net exports – imports – of goods and services, incomes and net transfers.

Daily newspaper circulation
Refers to those newspapers published at least four times a week.

Debt service
The sum of the main payments and interest payments made in foreign currencies, goods or services for long term debts, interest paid on short term debts and repayments (redemption and charges) to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Desalinated water production
Amount of water produced by elimination of salt from salt water using a variety of techniques, including inverse osmosis. Most of this water is used for domestic purposes.

Deserts and dry land
Total area of semi-arid land (dry lands), barren and hyperborean (desert) that make up a country.

Duration of compulsory education
Number of years, within a determined age group, that children and young people are legally obliged to attend school.

Earned income
Approximate calculation based on the relation between female non-agricultural salaries in respect to male non-agricultural salaries, the proportion of women and men in the economically active population, the total of the female and male population and the GDP per capita (PPP in USD).

Ecological footprint
Measurement of the use of renewable natural resources by humanity. For a given population it is defined as the total area of biologically productive land and water required to produce the resources consumed, to maintain energy consumption, to make way for infrastructures and to absorb the waste generated by the population. The unit used to measure the ecological footprint is the global hectare and is defined as a hectare of biologically productive space, equal to the world average.

Economic activity rate
The proportion of the population over fifteen years of age that contributes, or is able to contribute, labour in the production of goods and services.

Electricity consumption per capita
Refers to the gross production per inhabitant and includes the consumption of auxiliary stations and the losses in the transformers considered an integral part of the central station. It also includes the total electricity produced by pumping stations, without deducting the electricity absorbed by the pumps.
**Electricity production**
Measured in the alternating equipment terminals of electric power stations. Also includes hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear energy sources and generation by geothermal, solar, wind, tidal and marine energy, as well as renewable residues and fuels.

**Electricity sources**
Refers to the energy sources used to generate electricity: hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear.

**Emission intensity**
Average quantity of CO$_2$ emitted per unit of incomes generated by a particular economy.

**Energy consumption**
Consumption equals the local production plus imports and changes in stock levels, less exports and fuel destined to boats and aeroplanes used for international transport. Shown is the consumption per inhabitant, as well as the origin of the source. By origin, the fossil fuels include the power consumption of petroleum, natural gas, coal and its derivatives. In the case of nuclear energy, an efficiency of 33% is assumed (European average). Hydroelectricity excludes consumption from pumping. The modern renewable sources include (wind, tidal, waves, photovoltaic and thermal solar, biogas and geothermal and fuels coming from the biomass, such as ethanol) and traditional ones (solid biomass, including wood, vegetable and animal waste, among others).

**Energy production**
Primary energy forms – oil, natural gas, coal and its derivatives and renewable fuels and residues – and primary electricity, all converted into equivalents of oil. The renewable fuels and residues refer to solid and liquid biomass, biogas and industrial and municipal residues.

**Export concentration index**
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is used, in a normalised version, to obtain values between zero and one (maximum concentration). It measures the degree of market concentration and the calculation takes into account the different product groups exported, according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).

**Exports**
The value of all goods supplied by an economy to the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.

**External debt**
The sum of the national debt, with public guarantee, private unsecured long term debt, credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and short term debt.

**Farming population**
Persons who depend on agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry for their subsistence. This category includes all those who carry out an agricultural activity and all this entails without official employment.

**Fertility rate**
Number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates.

**Firewood production**
Includes wood from trunks and branches, used as fuel for cooking, heating or producing energy.

**Fishermen**
Includes the number of people employed in commercial and subsistence fishing (both personnel on land and at sea), who work in fresh water, brackish water, marine area or in aquaculture activities.

**Fishing in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea**
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in the Mediterranean and/or in the Black Sea.

**Foreign direct investment**
Net direct investment that is made in order to acquire a lasting management interest in an enterprise operating in a country other than that of the investor. It is equal to the sum of the equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings and other long term and short term capital.

**Forest area**
Understood as all land with natural or artificial plots of trees, whether productive or not.

**GDP (see Gross Domestic Product)**

**GDP per unit of energy use**
Indicator of energy efficiency. The temporary differences and entire countries partly reflect, structural economic changes, changes in the efficiency of particular sectors and differences in the use of fuels.

**Gini coefficient**
Measurement of inequality in the distribution of income and consumption. A value of zero represents perfect equality and a value of one hundred total inequality.

**GNI (see Gross National Income)**

**Gross Domestic Product (GDP)**
The sum of the added value by all the resident producers in an economy, plus any tax on the product (without taking into account the subsidies). The added value is the net profit of an industry after adding together all the profits and subtracting the intermediate contributions.

**Gross Domestic Product by sector**
The contribution of the distinct econo-
mic sectors in the GDP is determined according to the added value determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).

**Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita)**
Using the official exchange rates to convert the figures in national currency into USA dollars does not measure the relative internal acquisition powers of each currency in each country. The International Comparison Project (ICP) of the United Nations and the World Bank develop measures of the GDP on an internationally comparable scale using as conversion factors, the Purchase Power Parities (PPP) in respect to each country.

**Gross National Income (GNI)**
The sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. The added value if the net profit of an industry after having summed up all profits and deducted international contributions.

**Growth in GDP**
Measurement of growth of an economy, obtained through the change in GDP over a period of time, calculated at constant prices.

**HDI (see Human Development Index)**

**Human Development Index (HDI)**
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) prepares the Human Development Index (HDI) by relating three indicators: level of incomes (GDP per capita), health (life expectancy at birth) and level of education (literacy rate and a combination of registration in primary, secondary and higher education).

**Immigrant remittances**
According to the definition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments Manual, workers’ remittances are goods and financial assets transferred by immigrants living and working in an economy (where they are considered residents) in favour of the residents of their former country of residence. An immigrant must live and work in the new economy for more than one year to be considered a resident there. The transfers made to the immigrants own accounts abroad are not considered transfers. Moreover, all those derived from the possession of a business by an immigrant are only considered to be normal transfers to the country of origin.

**Immigrants**
Refers to the people born outside of a given country at the mid point of the year. The data is given in absolute figures and as a percentage in respect to the population of the receiving country.

**Import concentration index**
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used, in a normalised version, to obtain values between zero and one (maximum concentration). It measures the degree of market concentration and the calculation takes into account the different product groups imported, according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).

**Imports**
Value of all goods received by an economy from the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.

**Infant mortality rate**
Shows the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per thousand live births.

**Information and communications technology expenditures**
Includes internal and external spending on information technology, as well as telecommunications and other office infrastructures.

**International outbound tourists**
Number of trips that travellers make to a given country from their normal country of residence, for a period of less than one year, for any other reason than to undertake a paid activity in the country visited.

**International tourism expenditure**
The expenditure in other countries of travellers from a given country, including the payments to national freight companies for international freight. It can include the expenses of single day travellers. The percentage it represents in respect of the exports, is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

**International tourism receipts**
Income received in a given country from visitors, including payments made to national freight companies for international freight. It also includes the prepayment of goods and services received in the destination country. It can include the income from single day visitors. The percentage it represents in respect to exports is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

**Internet users**
Defined as the computers within an economy that are directly linked to the worldwide internet. These statistics are based on the country codes of the addresses of the users and do not always correspond to the physical location of the computer.

**Investment in telecommunications**
Includes expenses associated with the acquisition of telecommunications equipment and infrastructures (including land, buildings, intellectual property and others). These expenses refer both to the initial installations and to all the reforms undertaken in the existing installations.

**Irrigated lands**
Irrigation data refers to the areas equip-
ped with hydraulic infrastructure to supply water to crops. Areas with partial or total control of the distribution, surface areas irrigated by diversion of rises in level and low and flooded areas where available water is controlled are included.

**Known species**
Referred to the total number of species in a given country. Only mammals (excluding marine life) and birds (only nesting, excluding hibernating or migrating) have been taken into account.

**Labour force occupational rate**
According to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), the Agriculture category also includes hunting, fishing and forest exploitation; the Industry category includes mining, extraction activities (including oil production), manufacturing, construction and public services (electricity, water and gas); the Services category includes the wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage services, communications, financial services, insurance, real estate, business services, as well as community, social and personal services.

**Land area**
Refers to the total surface area minus the surface covered by inland waters. Inland waters are defined in general as rivers and principle lakes.

**Life expectancy at birth**
The number of years that a new-born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.

**Live animal stock**
The data on stock covers all domestic animals regardless of age, location or final purpose. Estimates have been made for countries that have not supplied data, as well as for countries supplying partial statistics.

**Live animal trade**
Enormous quantities of unregistered animals cross the borders of some countries. In order to obtain more representative international trade figures of live animals, the FAO has incorporated estimates of the unregistered trade.

**Main telephone lines**
Telephone lines that connect the client’s telephone equipment with the public telephone network exchange.

**Maternal mortality ratio**
Annual number of deaths of women owing to causes related to pregnancy, for every 100,000 live births.

**Military expenditure**
Total of expenses effected by the Ministry of Defence and other ministries on the recruitment and training of military personnel, as well as the manufacture and acquisition of military supplies and equipment. Military assistance is included in the expenses of the donor country.

**Mobile telephone subscribers**
Mobile telephone users subscribed to a public, mobile and automatic service providing access to the public telephone network using cellular technology.

**Motor vehicles**
Includes cars, buses and loading vehicles, but not mopeds or motorcycles.

**National protected areas**
Areas of land or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of the biodiversity, the natural and associated cultural resources and managed through legal and other instruments. According to The World Conservation Union (IUCN) it includes the total area of all natural reserves, virgin areas, national parks, natural monuments, management areas of habitats and species, as well as protected land and sea areas in each country.

**Net energy import**
Shows the degree of energy use by an economy and to what extent it exceeds its domestic production. High-income countries are often the net importers while the majority of energy-supplying countries are middle-income.

**Net enrolment ratio**
Number of students enrolled in a level of education who are of the official school age for that level, as a percentage of the total of the population of official school age for that level. The figures are shown for primary and secondary education.

**Net migration rate**
The data is based on estimates that represent the average value per year for the period 2000-2005.

**Net number of migrants**
The entry of immigrants into a given country minus the outgoing emigrants of the same country. The data is estimated and represents the total net number for the period 2000-2005.

**Nights in the destination**
Number of nights that non-resident tourists spend within the country visited, regardless of the type of tourist establishment.

**Official Aid**
Official payments from donor countries to countries and territories on part II of the list of receivers of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This assistance is provided according to terms and conditions similar to those of the ODA.

**Official Development Assistance (ODA)**
The net payment of donations and loans granted under advantageous financial terms by official boards of partner countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or others, as well as internatio-
nal organisations, with a view to promoting economic development and well-being, including co-operation and technical assistance.

**Oil equivalent**

All the values of energy production and consumption presented in this classification are calculated and published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) which uses the equivalent metric tonne of oil based on the calorific content of the energy products as the unit of measurement. An equivalent metric tonne of oil is defined as $10^7$ kilo calories or 11,628 gigawatts per hour (GWh). This amount of energy is practically equal to the amount of energy contained in a tonne of crude oil.

**Permanent meadows and pastures**

Refers to land used permanently (five years or more) for herbaceous fodder, whether cultivated or uncultivated (meadows or uncultivated land for grazing).

**Population density**

The result of dividing the average annual population of a country by its land surface area expressed in square kilometres.

**Population in urban agglomerations of more than one million inhabitants**

Percentage of the population of a country living in metropolitan areas, that in 2003 had a population of more than one million people.

**Population infected with HIV**

Estimated number of people of any age infected with HIV or AIDS. Includes the whole living infected population at the end of 2003, regardless of whether or not they have developed the disease. It shows the actual figure and the percentage in respect of the population of the country.

**Population per physician**

The figure is obtained by dividing the number of inhabitants of a country by the number of physicians in its health system.

**Population with access to drinking water**

The percentage of the population that has reasonable access to any of the following sources of drinking water: household water connections, public stand-pipes, bore holes, protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater deposits. Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least twenty litres per person per day, from a source located within a radius of one kilometre from the home of the user.

**Population with access to electricity**

Refers to the number of people with access to electricity as a percentage of the total population.

**Population with access to essential medecines**

The percentage of the population with access to at least twenty of the most essential drugs (those that satisfy the health care needs of the majority of the population) that are continuously and affordably available from the public and private health services or from chemists, less than one hour away from their residence.

**Population with access to improved sanitation facilities**

Percentage of the population with access to adequate installations for the elimination of excrement, such as connection to drains or systems of septic tanks, flush latrines, pour flush latrines or ventilated improved pit latrines. A system of elimination of excrement is considered adequate if it is private or shared (but not public) and if it allows the efficient avoidance of people or animals entering into contact with the excrement.

**Population within 100 km of the coast**

Refers to the estimations of the percentage of the population that lives in the coastal area, based on the 1995 population data.

**Primary pupil-teacher ratio**

Number of pupils registered in primary schools divided by the number of teachers in primary schools.

**Public education expenditure**

Composed of capital expenses (construction, renovation, major repairs and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) and running costs (goods and services consumed during the current year and need to be renewed the following year). It covers expenses such as salaries and rendering of services, contracted or acquired services, books and didactic material, social welfare services, furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, insurance, rent, telecommunications and travel.

**Public health expenditure**

Refers to the recurring and capital expenses in government budgets (central and local), loans and external concessions (including donations by international agencies and non-governmental organisations) and social or compulsory medical insurance funds.

**R & D expenditure**

The current and capital expenses of creative and systematic activities that increase the stock of knowledge. Includes basic and applied research and experimental development work that leads to new devices, products or processes.

**Refugees**

People who have been forced to flee their country for fear of persecution owing to reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinions or membership of determined social groups and who are unable or unwilling to return. The asylum country is the country in which the refugee has requested asylum, but has not yet received a res-
Appendices

Med.

2006

The World Conservation Union (IUCN), includes all the species classified by the organization as "vulnerable, in danger, or in critical danger", but excludes all introduced species, species whose status is not sufficiently known, extinct species and those still without an assigned status. Only mammals (excluding marine life) and birds (only nesting, excluding hibernating or migrating) have been taken into account.

Rural population
The estimated population at the mid point of the year in areas defined as rural, as a percentage of the total population of the country.

Scientists and engineers in R & D
Professionals that have received further training to work in any scientific field.

Sectorial distribution of the active population
Shown by the percentages of the workforce employed in the different economic sectors: agriculture, industry and services.

Share of income
In the questionnaires carried out in homes in diverse countries to determine the distribution of income, they make five divisions (or quintiles) from the lowest to the greatest incomes. The two lower quintiles (40%) are considered the poorest. A relation is also made between the richest 10% and the poorest 10%, in order to establish the degree of inequality in incomes.

Smokers
The percentage of men and women who smoke cigarettes. The age range varies between countries, but in general it is fifteen years of age or above.

Television sets
Data on the number of televisions in use is obtained by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) using questionnaires sent to the national broadcasting authorities and industry associations.

Threatened species
Includes all the species classified by The World Conservation Union (IUCN), as “vulnerable, in danger, or in critical danger”, but excludes all introduced species, species whose status is not sufficiently known, extinguished species and those still without an assigned status. Only mammals (excluding marine life) and birds (only nesting, excluding hibernating or migrating) have been taken into account.

Total area
Refers to the extension of the country in its totality, including the surface area occupied by inland waters.

Total fisheries
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in any part of the world. Marine fishing is practised in seas or oceans, while freshwater fishing takes place in rivers, wetlands and inland lakes.

Total population
Includes all of the residents of a country or territory with the legal status of citizen, except refugees settled in a country of asylum, who are generally considered as part of the population of their country of origin. Values for 2005 and projections for 2050 are shown.

Tourist arrivals
Number of tourist who travel to a country other than that in which they have their usual residence, for a period no exceeding 12 months and whose main purpose in visiting is other than an activity remunerated from within the country visited.

Trade balance
Account that holds the imports and exports of an economy during a certain period of time with the purpose of reflecting the corresponding balance. The negative values indicate a deficit in the trade balance.

Use of fertilizers
Amount of vegetable nutrients used per unit of cultivatable land. The fertilizers considered are nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium. Consumption is calculated as production plus imports minus exports, and traditional nutrients (animal and vegetable fertilisers) are not included. The data obtained is the result of dividing the consumption of fertiliser of each country by the surface area of arable and permanently cultivated land.

Under fives mortality rate
Probability of death between birth and becoming five years old, expressed per thousand live births.

Unemployment rate
Percentage of the active population without work, but available for and seeking employment.

Urban population living in slum conditions
A place of precarious settlement is a group of individuals who live under the same roof and lack one or more of the following conditions: secure tenure (State protection against illegal eviction), access to drinking water, access to basic healthcare, structural dwelling quality, sufficient vital space. In accordance with the situation of the city in which the precarious settlement is found, this concept can be locally adapted.

Use of fertilizers
Amount of vegetable nutrients used per unit of cultivatable land. The fertilisers considered are nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium. Consumption is calculated as production plus imports minus exports, and traditional nutrients (animal and vegetable fertilisers) are not included. The data obtained is the result of dividing the consumption of fertiliser of each country by the surface area of arable and permanently cultivated land.

Water consumption
Total water used by humans in a year, without taking into account the losses due to evaporation in reservoirs. Includes water from non renewable underground sources, from rivers coming from other countries and from desalinated plants.
**Water dependency**
Percentage of water available in one country, coming from another.

**Water resources**
Refers to the total renewable resources, covering the watercourses of the country (rivers and underground rain water reserves) and the watercourses originating in other countries.

**Women in parliamentary seats**
Refers to the percentage of seats occupied by women in a lower or single chamber, or in a higher or senate, according to each case. In the case where there are two chambers, the data refers to the weighted average of the participation of women in both chambers.

**Year when women obtained the right to be elected**
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to stand for election was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to stand for election.

**Year when women obtained the right to vote**
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to vote was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to vote.
List of the Organisms Consulted for the Realisation of the Tables, Graphics and Maps

CARIM, Euro-mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migrations (CARIM)
www.carim.org

EUROSTAT, Statistical Office of the European Commission
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat

FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
www.fao.org

ILO, International Labour Organization
www.ilo.org

IMF, International Monetary Fund
www.imf.org

IPU, Inter-Parliamentary Union
www.ipu.org

IRFFI, International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
www.irfffi.org

ITU, International Telecommunication Union
www.itu.int

IUCN, World Conservation Union
www.iucn.org

OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
www.oecd.org

OHCHR, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
www.ohchr.org

Plan Bleu
www.planbleu.org

SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
www.sipri.org

UNAIDS, Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
www.unaids.org

UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
www.unctad.org
References of the reports and yearbooks consulted for the realization of the tables, graphics and maps

Handbook of Statistics 2005 (UNCTAD)
Human Development Report 2005 (UNDP)
SIPRI Yearbook 2005 (SIPRI)
State of World Population 2005 (UNFPA)
World Development Indicators 2005 (WB)
World Health Statistics 2005 (WHO)
World Resources 2005 (UNDP, UNEP, WB, WRI)
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<tr>
<th>Country Abbreviations</th>
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<td>LY</td>
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<td>Macedonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of</td>
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<td>Palestinian Territory, Occupied</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<td>ILO Bureau for Workers' Activities</td>
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<td>Invest in France Agency</td>
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<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>ALLI</td>
<td>Adriatic-Ionic Initiative</td>
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<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (TR)</td>
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<td>ANIMA</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Network of Investments Promotion Agencies</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>ASCAME</td>
<td>Association of the Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce and Industry</td>
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<td>Agreement on Textiles and Clothing</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>BMENA</td>
<td>Broader Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
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<td>CARDS</td>
<td>Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization</td>
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<td>CARIM</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration</td>
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<td>Advisory Council on Human Rights (MA)</td>
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<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.</td>
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<td>CEOE</td>
<td>Confederation of Employers and Industries of Spain</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
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<td>CGAP</td>
<td>Consultative Group to Assist the Poor</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (US)</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CISMOC</td>
<td>Center for Interdisciplinary Research on Islam in the Contemporary World.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPRM</td>
<td>Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe</td>
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<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People's Party (TR)</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<td>DAD</td>
<td>Democracy Assistance Dialogue (US)</td>
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<td>EAMS</td>
<td>EuroArab Management School</td>
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<td>EAU</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>EC</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community Of West African States</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>Electricité de France</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Environment Agency</td>
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<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>exploration and production-sharing agreement</td>
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<td>Euskadi and Freedom</td>
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<td>EUMEDIS</td>
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<td>FAPE</td>
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<td>Royal Armed Forces (MA)</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FEMIP</td>
<td>Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership</td>
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<td>FEMISE</td>
<td>Forum of Euro-Mediterranean Economic Institutes</td>
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<td>FIFA</td>
<td>International Federation of Football Associations</td>
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<td>FIS</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Front</td>
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<td>FLNC</td>
<td>National Liberation Front of Corsica</td>
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<td>Southeastern Anatolia Project</td>
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<td>General Agreement on Tariffs of Trade</td>
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<td>Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
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<td>GHG</td>
<td>Greenhouse Gas</td>
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<td>Armed Islamic Group</td>
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<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>Global Navigation Satellite Systems</td>
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<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
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<td>HBD</td>
<td>Association of the Union of Jurists (TR)</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human development index</td>
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HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HLM High-Level Meeting
HRW Human Rights Watch
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICATU International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ICT Information and Communication Technologies
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDF Israel Defensive Forces
IEA International Energy Agency
IECI Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq
IER Justice and Reconciliation Commission (MA)
IES International Energy Scene
IFAD International Fund for agricultural Development
IFC International Finance Corporation (WB)
IFJ International Federation of Journalists
IGO Intergovernmental organization
ILo International labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOM International Organization for Migration
IP Internet Protocol
IPA Investment Promotion Agency
IPA Instrument for Pre accession Assistance
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISPA Instrument for structural policies for pre-accession
ITU International Telecommunication Organization
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
KCL Kurdistan Coalition List
LDP Least Developed Countries
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas
MAP Mediterranean Action Plan
MBC Middle East Broadcasting Corporation
MCCSD Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MFC Microfinance Centre for Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States
MFIs Microfinance Institutions
MFN Most-favoured-nation
MHP Nationalist Action Party
MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MIPPO Mediterranean Investment Project Observatory
MIX Microfinance Information Exchange
MPC Mediterranean Partner Countries
MPDC Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (MA)
MSSD Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development
MTV Music Television
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>NIL</td>
<td>National Iraqi List</td>
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<td>NMDGR</td>
<td>National Millennium Development Goals reports</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OME</td>
<td>Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Énergie</td>
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<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>National Democratic Party (EG)</td>
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<td>Pre-accession Economic Programme (UE)</td>
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<td>Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy (EU)</td>
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<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
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<td>PLC</td>
<td>Palestinian Legislative Council</td>
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<td>PLC</td>
<td>Palestine Legislative Council</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>POGAR</td>
<td>Programme on Governance in the Arab Region</td>
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<td>POP</td>
<td>Persistent Organic Pollutants</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing power parity</td>
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<td>R &amp; D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>RBAS</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for Arab States</td>
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<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
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<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
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<td>SAPARD</td>
<td>Pre-accession agricultural instrument</td>
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<td>Stability and Growth Pact</td>
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