







Cumulative Cases per 100,000 Inhabitants as of 16 September 2020



Cumulative Deaths per 100,000 Inhabitants as of 16 September 2020




## MAP A.1b | COVID-19: Cases in Mediterranean Countries and States of Emergency Declared




\* **Albania** declared a state of natural disaster on 24 March. Prior to this, the epidemic state was declared on 11 March. **Bosnia and Herzegovina** declared a state of emergency for natural disaster. With respect to Republika Srpska, it declared a state of emergency from 3 April until 22 May. **Croatia** has not declared a state of emergency but the Croatian Parliament passed a law increasing the authority of the National Civil Protection Service. **Egypt** has been under a state of emergency since the terrorist attacks against two Coptic churches in Alexandria and Tanta in April 2017. On 22 April, Parliament approved 17 amendments to the 1958 Emergency Law expanding presidential and military powers. **France** reported -840 cases on 3 June and 169 cases on 25 June as a correction to the daily case count. **Italy** reported -148 cases on 20 June as a correction to the daily case count. **Jordan** reported -142 cases on 27 July as a correction to the daily case count. **Mauritania** reported -3 cases on 27 March as a correction to the daily case count. **Palestine** reported -3 cases on 20 March and -6 cases on 23 May as a correction to the daily case count. **Portugal** declared a state of alert on 13 March, going on to decree a state of emergency on 19 March. As of 3 May, the country lowered the measures adopting the state of calamity. Also on 3 May, the country reported -161 cases as a correction to the daily case count. **Spain** declared a state of alarm, the first stage of its state of emergency. In **Tunisia**, a general sanitary containment was adopted on 21 March, implied under article 80 of the Constitution of 2014, enforcing a state of emergency that, overlapped the one already in place since the terrorist attacks of November 2015.

# MAP A.1c | COVID-19: Deaths in Mediterranean Countries and Nationwide Lockdown/Curffew Measures



\* **Algeria** reported -2 deaths on 4 August as a correction to the daily death count. In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, containment measures were adopted by the entities that make up the country: The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina imposed the lockdown from 22 March to 15 May. The lockdown in the Republika Srpska was imposed between 21 March and 22 May. **Cyprus** activated the Quarantine Law of 1932 by virtue of Article 188 of the 1960 Constitution, which allows preconstitutional legislation to continue to apply unless modified or repealed. **Egypt** did not impose a national lockdown but a national night curfew. **France** reported -218 deaths on 20 May as a correction to the daily death count. **Italy** reported -31 deaths on 25 June as a correction to the daily death count. **Jordan** reported -11 deaths on 5 August as a correction to the daily death count. **Libya** reported -2 deaths on 13 August as a correction to the daily death count. **Malta** imposed a partial quarantine, mandatory for vulnerable people and those over 65. **Mauritania** did not impose a national lockdown but night curfews in the most affected areas. **Montenegro**, **Portugal** and **Slovenia** imposed partial lockdowns in the most affected areas within their territories. **Syria** reported -10 deaths on 5 August and -3 deaths on 14 August as a correction to the daily death count. **Turkey** imposed partial lockdowns in the most affected areas within its territory.

## MAP A.2 | Maritime Borders and Main Gas Fields in the Levant Basin



### Main Gas Fields in Levant Basin

FIELD	LICENSE	Estimated / original gas reserves	Discovery	Start of production	Partners' exploration/exploitation rights
Aphrodite	12	129 bcm	December 2011	2024-2025 <sup>1</sup>	Noble (35%), Delek (30%), Shell (35%)
Calypso	6	170-230 bcm	February 2018	n.a.	Eni (50%), Total (50%)
Glaucus	10	142-227 bcm	May 2019	2025 - 2026	ExxonMobil (60%), Qatar Petroleum (40%)
Soupia (Cuttlefish)	3	n.a. <sup>2</sup>			Eni (50%), Total (50%)
Yishai	Pelagic	7-10 bcm	November 2015	n.a.	Israel Opportunity Energy Resources (21%), Nammox Oil & Gas, (63%), Eden (11%), Petroleum Services Holding (5%)
Leviathan	Rachel and Amit	605 bcm	December 2010	December 2019	Delek (45.34%), Ratio Oil Exploration (15%), Noble (39.66%)
Tamar	309 / Matan	318 bcm	January 2009	March 2013	Noble (25%), Isramco (28.75%), Delek (22%), Tamar Petroleum (16.75%), Dor (4%), Everest (3.5%)
Dalit	Michal	6.1-9.5 bcm	March 2009	On hold	Isramco (28.75%), Noble (25%), Delek (22%), Tamar Petroleum (16.75%), Dor (4%), Everest (3.5%)
Noa	Noa	1.3 bcm	June 1999	June 2012. Depleted in 2014	
Mari-B	Ashqelon	27.52 bcm	February 2000	December 2003. Depleted by 2012	Yam Tethys Joint Venture: Noble (47.059%), Delek (48.50%), Delek Group (4.441%) <sup>3</sup>
Pinnacles		1.3 bcm	March 2012	June 2012. Depleted in 2014	
Tanin	Alon A	45.2 bcm	February 2012	2021	Energean (100%)
Karish	Alon C	98.9 bcm	May 2013	2021	Energean (100%)
Dolphin	Hanna	2-3 bcm	January 2012	n/a. <sup>4</sup>	Noble (39.66%); Delek (22.67%); Avner (22.67%) Ratio Oil Exploration (15%)
Shimshon	Shimshon	65.19 bcm	July 2012	n.a.	Isramco (50%), Naphta (20%), Israel Oil (10%), Modiin (10%), ATP (5%), Petroleum Services Holding (5%)
Gaza Marine	Gaza Marine	28 - 32 bcm	2000	n.a.	Investment Fund of the Palestinian Authority (27.5%), Consolidated Contractors (27.5%) <sup>5</sup>
Zohr	Shorouk	849.51 bcm	August 2015	December 2017	Eni (50%), Rosneft (30%), BP (10%), Mubadala Petroleum (10%)

- After carrying out various drilling tests in 2012 and 2013, the partners in the Pelagic license concluded that part of the Aphrodite Cypriot gas field expands into the Israeli EEZ so part of it lies under the Yishai Lease. This led to Israel's opposition to the exploitation of Aphrodite until the dispute on its offshore border with the Yishai gas field is settled with Cyprus.
- SAIPEM 12000 drillship, commissioned by Italian energy company ENI, was halted by Turkish warships in February 2018 making it impossible to fulfil the drilling works due to Turkish claims on Cyprus' EEZ.
- Israel's heavy dependence on the gas produced at Yam Tethys due to the fall in Egyptian gas supply following the outbreak of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, has accelerated the depletion of gas reserves at Pinnacles (in August 2013), Mari-B (in May 2019) and Noa (near depletion). Currently, Mari-B serves as a storage facility for gas from Tamar field.
- In July 2016 the Petroleum Commissioner at the Ministry of Infrastructures, Energy and Water of Israel decided not to recognize the Dolphin natural gas reservoir as a commercially viable discovery, in opposition to the partners' opinion in accordance with the provisions of the Petroleum Law. Accordingly, in 2017 the partners filed an appeal on the Commissioner's decision, in order to extend the exploration license obtained in 2008, which was finally rejected.
- After acquiring British Gas in February 2016, Royal Dutch Shell reached an agreement in April 2018 with the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) to sell its entire stake (60%), leaving PIF as sole owner of the license and with PIF and Consolidated Contractors each holding 27.5% of the development rights and allocating the remaining 45% to be assigned to an international operator. Greece's Energean showed interest in acquiring a 45% stake in July 2018, but a final decision depends on prior agreement between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority.

Own production. Sources: Marine Regions, Flanders Maritime Institute (VLZ); Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), United Nations; European Journal of Political Law; BG Group; Delek Drilling; ENI; Noble Energy; Israel Opportunity Energy Resources; Globes; World Oil; Ministry of Energy of Israel.




① In 27 November 2019, Turkey and the Government of National Accord of Libya based in Tripoli signed in Istanbul two memorandums of understanding (MoU) on military cooperation and on the delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas (continental shelf and EEZ) in the Mediterranean. The latter sets in its Art.1 a 18.6 n.m. maritime border between the coordinates 34°16'13.720"N – 26°19'11.640"E and 34°09'07.9"N – 26°39'06.3"E (Letter to the UN A/74/634 – 27 December 2019). Both memorandums, which came into force for both parties as of 8 December 2019, have been denounced by Egypt (A/74/628 – 24 December 2019) and Greece (A/74/706 – 19 February 2020 and A/74/758 – 19 March 2020), which also expelled the Libyan ambassador in Athens on 6 December 2019. Egypt and Greece consider the accords void on the grounds that they are against international law and to the Skhirat agreement on 17 December 2015 between the parties in conflict in Libya. Cyprus, the European Union, the United States and Israel also condemned them. Turkey is not a party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) while Libya is a signatory but has not ratified it. In the case of the memorandum on military cooperation Egypt and Greece state that it also contravenes the arms embargo on Libya imposed by the Resolution 1970/2011 of the United Nations Security Council.

② Starting in 2004, Greece and Libya held four rounds of negotiations to set their maritime borders that have so far failed to produce any result. Greece defends the application of the equidistance principle (median line) to define the maritime borders taking into account the islands under Greek sovereignty in the area while Libya advocates applying the principle of proportionality.

③ Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus nor its right to declare an EEZ (declared in 2004) taking into account its insular status devoid of its own continental shelf, according to the Turkish criteria that also affects Crete and the Greek islands involved in the Aegean dispute with Greece. In this sense, Turkey submitted to the United Nations the notes 2004/Turkuno DT/4739 (2 March 2004), 2005/Turkuno DT/16390 (4 October 2005) and 2013/14136816/22273 (12 March 2013) and the letters A/68/857 (25 April 2014) A/73/804 (18 March 2019) and 27 February 2020 (A/74/727) stating that Turkey has ipso facto and ab initio legal and sovereign rights in the maritime areas of the Eastern Mediterranean that are west of meridian 32°16'18"E. Additionally, in a letter dated 13 November 2019 (A/74/550), Turkey states that the outer limits of the Turkish continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean follow the median line between the Turkish and Egyptian coastlines to a point to be determined in the west of 28° 00' 00"E.


④ The Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) geopolitical doctrine was first exposed in 2006 by the Turkish Admiral Cem Gürdeniz. It claims extensive maritime jurisdiction in the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean and Black seas as a reversal of the status quo established by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. From 27 February until 8 March 2019 the Turkish Navy held a large naval exercise simultaneously in the Aegean, the Black sea and the Eastern Mediterranean under the name Mavi Vatan.

MAP A.4a | Military Expenditure (2019)



Own production. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

MAP A.4b | Evolution of Military Expenditure since 2000




Own production. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).




## MAP A.5 | GDP Evolution (1995-2020)

Evolution of Gross Domestic Product per capita, current prices (purchasing power parity; international dollars)




Evolution of Gross Domestic Product, current prices (purchasing power parity; international dollars)







### Value Added by Sector, 1995/2019 (% of GDP)




### Employment in Services, 1995/2019 (%)





MAP A.7a | Evolution of Trade with the UE and the other Mediterranean Countries (1995-2018). Exports




Exports to EU-28 over Total (%)



Exports to Mediterranean Countries over Total (%)  
(by destination)



MAP A.7b | Evolution of Trade with the UE and the other Mediterranean Countries (1995-2018). Imports





Imports to EU-28 over Total (%)

- More than 75%
- From 65% to 75%
- From 55% to 65%
- From 45% to 55%

- From 35% to 45%
- From 25% to 35%
- Less than 25%
- Data unavailable


Imports to Mediterranean Countries over Total (%)  
(by origin)

- Rest of Med Countries
- SEMC
- EU-28 Med Countries




MAP A.8a | Evolution of Demographic Indicators in the Mediterranean (1995-2020).  
Age, Fertility and Population Growth


Median Age of the Total Population (years)




Total Fertility (live births per woman)



Average Annual Rate of Population Change (percentage)



Total Population, 1995-2020





Source: UNPOP.

# MAP A.8b | Evolution of Demographic Indicators in the Mediterranean (1995-2020). Life Expectancy and Urbanization

## Life Expectancy at Birth for Both Sexes Combined (years)




## Percentage of Population Residing in Urban Areas




## Urban Agglomerations of the Mediterranean Countries with the Highest Number of Inhabitants (1995-2020)

Urban Agglomeration	1995	Urban Agglomeration	2020
Cairo	11,962	Cairo	20,901
Paris	9,510	Istanbul	15,190
Istanbul	7,665	Paris	11,017
Madrid	4,688	Madrid	6,618
Barcelona	4,227	Barcelona	5,586
Rome	3,739	Alexandria	5,281
Alexandria	3,244	Ankara	5,118
Athens	3,122	Rome	4,257
Milan	3,020	Tel Aviv-Jaffa	4,181
Casablanca	2,963	Casablanca	3,752
Ankara	2,842	Athens	3,153
Lisbon	2,600	Milan	3,140
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	2,396	Izmir	2,993
Naples	2,218	Lisbon	2,957
Algiers	1,973	Algiers	2,768
Izmir	1,966	Beirut	2,424
Aleppo	1,864	Damascus	2,392
Damascus	1,848	Tunis	2,365
Turin	1,733	Naples	2,187
Tunis	1,700	Amman	2,148


## Number of Urban Agglomerations with 300,000 Inhabitants or More in 1995 and 2020, by country




MAP A.9a | International Tourism in the Mediterranean and Firsts Effects of Covid-19. Share and Growth




International Tourism as Share of Total Tourism (%) 2018/2019



International Tourist Arrivals, by month (% of change 2019/2020)




Tourism as % of GDP



Source: UNWTO.



### International Tourist Arrivals, by month (thousands) 2019-2020




\* Absolute difference in international tourist arrivals between the months of 2020 and 2019.




MAP A.10a <sup>1</sup> Water Resources in Mediterranean Countries




**Total Renewable Water Resources (km<sup>3</sup>/year)**




**Long-term Average Annual Precipitation in Volume (Km<sup>3</sup>/year)**




**Total Renewable Water Resources per capita (m<sup>3</sup>/inhab/year)**






**Water Stress (%) 2015-17\***  
(% of total renewable water resources originating outside the country)




Sustainable Development Goals. Target 6.4: By 2030, substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity.  
Indicator 6.4.2 Water Stress: Total freshwater withdrawal/[(Total renewable water resources)- (Environmental Flow Requirements)]


**Water Stress Evolution (1968-2017)**




**Water Withdrawal**



**Desalinated Water Produced (km³/year)**




MAP A.11 | Gender Gap




Own production. Source: World Economic Forum, *Global Gender Gap Report 2020*.

MAP A.12 | Press Freedom Index (2020)




Own production. Source: REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, *World Press Freedom Index*, [www.rsf.org](http://www.rsf.org).

MAP A.13 | Internet Users





Own production. Source: ITU.

MAP A.14 | Education, Repeaters and Enrolment in Private Institutions





Repetition Rate in Lower Secondary General Education, 2017-2018 (%)

Repeaters in Lower Secondary Education (number)





Percentage of Enrolment in Private Institutions by Level of Education (%)




Liner Shipping Connectivity Index\* (quarterly Q4<sup>th</sup>, 2019)

Container Port Throughput\*\* (2018), in TEU


Evolution of Port Liner Shipping Connectivity Index\*\*\* (quarterly Q4<sup>th</sup>, 2011-2019) in Top Mediterranean Ports

	Q4 2011	Q4 2012	Q4 2013	Q4 2014	Q4 2015	Q4 2016	Q4 2017	Q4 2018	Q4 2019
Spain, Algeciras	49.8	45.5	46.0	55.5	58.5	60.6	63.8	61.2	67.8
Greece, Piraeus	38.7	41.1	43.3	47.5	42.6	46.8	51.2	61.2	62.5
Spain, Valencia	53.7	50.9	51.1	51.2	51.9	53.7	57.6	55.7	60.5
Morocco, Tanger Med	39.8	46.0	51.8	52.5	54.0	58.0	62.5	58.4	59.2
Spain, Barcelona	50.1	47.1	47.5	48.0	49.4	50.4	55.7	52.6	58.0
Italy, Genoa	39.2	45.4	40.1	39.8	49.3	52.4	54.0	54.2	56.1
Egypt, Port Said	45.8	45.4	47.3	48.5	46.7	47.7	49.0	47.1	53.8
Malta, Marsaxlokk	36.5	41.9	42.9	44.8	50.3	49.7	48.5	49.4	51.3
Italy, Gioia Tauro	35.6	36.6	38.4	39.2	38.3	38.8	43.4	43.5	48.8
France, Fos	34.4	38.7	40.8	41.0	41.4	43.0	45.7	46.9	48.8
Turkey, Ambarli	27.5	42.4	42.5	48.1	42.5	44.5	45.8	45.6	47.4
Italy, La Spezia	35.7	38.0	37.5	37.0	37.5	41.0	44.5	44.5	45.8
Lebanon, Beirut	36.5	35.7	35.9	39.7	37.5	37.5	40.9	42.9	43.9
Turkey, Mersin	19.4	21.9	23.4	28.5	29.1	38.7	44.1	42.1	42.1
Israel, Haifa	16.9	28.5	28.0	29.6	33.3	36.5	36.6	36.3	39.9
Turkey, Izmit Korfzei	17.1	19.3	20.4	22.4	33.4	36.8	35.6	35.5	38.8

\* The liner shipping connectivity index (LSCI) is an indicator of a country's position within the global liner shipping networks. It is calculated from the number of ships, their container carrying capacity, the number of services and companies, and the size of the largest ship.

\*\* Container port throughput indicates the total number of containers handled by a port, per country, expressed in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). A TEU represents the volume of a standard 20 feet long intermodal container used for loading, unloading, repositioning and transshipment.

\*\*\* The port liner shipping connectivity index reflects a ports' position in the global liner shipping network. A higher value is associated with better connectivity.