The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) has carried out seven “Euromed Surveys” so far based on a broad sample of policy-makers and experts with the objective of covering the main issues on the political agenda of the region and monitoring the progress in Euro-Mediterranean perceptions and policies. After dedicating last year’s Survey to the management of human movements and migrations in the Euro-Mediterranean region, the IEMed decided to dedicate this year’s edition to violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

The 8th Euromed Survey was conducted among 6,500 experts and actors from the 43 countries that are members of the Union for the Mediterranean, 746 responses were received, which constitutes a representative sample of this expert community. In addition to the descriptive report of the results and the annexes that set out the results in a comprehensive and visual manner, this publication also gives some space to more in-depth analyses of a few strategic issues related to violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The objective of the “qualitative analysis” written by renowned experts is to offer keys to better understand some of the main issues at stake.

The topic of the survey was identified at the beginning of 2017 and the survey itself was conducted in spring 2017. This survey is part of a determined and consistent effort that the IEMed has made over the last few years to analyse and facilitate the understanding of this phenomenon through a number of activities and publications. While doing so, the IEMed has not only tried to decode the causes and impact of the phenomenon as well as the policy responses deployed to face it, but has also insisted again and again on its truly global and in particular Euro-Mediterranean dimension. Steadfastly, it has also tried to contribute to fighting prejudices and misperceptions that too often pollute the debate on violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Violent extremism is not affecting primarily and mostly European Union countries. Violent extremism is not imported from the southern Mediterranean. As much as it is important to understand that all countries of the region are affected and that violent extremism is also prospering in European Union countries, it is necessary to acknowledge that the root causes of extremism are numerous. The profiles of extremists are so varied that it is difficult to establish a general diagnosis and devise simple recipes or policies to address the issue. However, in addition to other factors such as values and identity crisis or low socioeconomic prospects, it is important to acknowledge that creeping Islamophobia, the surge of populist and nationalist groups in the EU and the continuation or the reproduction of authoritarianism in the southern Mediterranean region are factors that fuel violent extremism.

The Euromed Survey was designed to capture all these elements. The questionnaire is structured around three main groups of questions. First, it focuses on the environments, causes as well as mechanisms that favour the surge of violent extremism at the societal and individual level. The second group of questions looks into the impact of violent extremism while the last part is dedicated to the policy response to violent extremism.
On the Context, Drivers and Mechanisms that Favour the Surge of Violent Extremism

This batch of questions aims to assess the opinion of the respondents on the environments, drivers and mechanisms that favour the surge of violent extremism in a society and at the more individual level.

Asked to identify in which environments individuals are more likely to be turned into violent extremists, a majority of respondents answer “conflict zones” and think that Syria and Iraq are the two countries more likely to continue suffering from violent extremism in the upcoming years. While there is a tendency in the European public opinion to consider EU countries as primary victims and targets of violent extremism, this serves as a useful reminder that this is not the case. This result also relates to another finding of the survey which attributes the main responsibility for the surge of violent extremism to governments and state authorities, either because of their participation in military interventions, or because of the way they deal with domestic developments.

Within the European Union, France remains the most exposed country according to the respondents, who interestingly are generally more prone to consider that other countries are exposed to the threat of violent extremism than their own. After “conflict zones”, the internet and social media is seen as the main terrain that facilitates the surge of violent extremism. Interestingly, respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries are more prone than their European counterparts to identify “religious communities” as a fertile environment for the development of violent extremism.

As mentioned above, the issue of the drivers of “radicalisation” is extremely complex. The IEMed is therefore sceptical with simplifying discourses of those who put all their eggs into one basket and pretend to explain the phenomenon of violent extremism only through the lenses of one theory. Both the design and the results of this survey acknowledge this difficulty. Overall, respondents seem to be of the opinion that violent extremism is to be understood mainly as a social rather than as a religious phenomenon. “Weak state capacity, economic exclusion and limited opportunities” are seen as key drivers of violent extremism in Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries. In turn, “political exclusion and discrimination” is seen as key driver in EU countries, in particular according to respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries. At a more individual level, respondents agree to consider that the most significant individual driver to violent extremism is the perceived humiliation and discrimination from the society in the country of residence on ethnic, national, linguistic or religious grounds.

On the Impact of Violent Extremism

With the second block, we explore the mechanisms through which violent extremism is threatening the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean space as a whole, while at the same time putting this threat into perspective. Violent extremism is definitely a security threat for a number of countries and is indeed perceived as the main threat in the Euro-Mediterranean region. However, the dramatic and visual impact of terrorist attacks should not obliterate the fact that other phenomena affect the stability and security of the region and in particular right-wing extremism and Islamophobia as well as authoritarian trends. Further than this, it appears that these phenomena are connected with each other.
to some extent: violent extremism fuels islamophobic and nationalist discourses in some countries and is used to legitimate authoritarian trends in others. Survey results show very clearly that the main perverse effect of those attacks is that they risk undermining cohesion in culturally diverse societies according to the respondents.

Terrorist attacks, terrorist groups and foreign fighters: these are three dimensions that one associates with the threat of violent extremism and that the survey looks into. Looking back to terrorist attacks that hit Euro-Mediterranean countries over the last years, it is important to acknowledge that each and every attack has a specific and important impact and that it is the accumulation of those attacks that shakes the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region. Asked about the attacks that had the most harmful impact on the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole, respondents do not necessarily refer to attacks that hit their respective countries. Overall, attacks that hit Paris over the last years as well as attacks in Tunisia tend to be identified as those that were most harmful. Turning to specific groups that are behind those attacks, respondents acknowledge the role of Daesh but also argue that defeating it will be neither easy nor sufficient. In a possible “post Daesh” scenario indeed, some existing organisations (in particular Al-Qaeda) are likely to take the lead and/or new jihadist organisations are likely to come up.

Finally, the threat of violent extremism is associated to a large extent with foreign terrorist fighters, defined as “individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict” (UN Security Council resolution 2178). Tackling the foreign fighters threat requires as a matter of priority improving cooperation between countries (including information sharing) as dealing with foreign fighters returning to their home countries only through a repressive angle will not be enough. Echoing debates that were held in some countries of the region, a majority of respondents agreed that preventing them from returning to their country of origin could not be an option.

On Policy Responses

The third block of this Survey aimed to capture respondents’ assessments on various aspects related to the policy response to violent extremism. To start with, it appears that a majority of respondents have a rather positive opinion of the efforts undertaken in their respective countries, although the results also show some variations from one country to the other. For example, respondents from Algeria and Morocco assess that the efforts of their respective countries are highly or very highly effective in much bigger proportions that Tunisian and Egyptian respondents. Within the EU, respondents from Spain or Italy tend to rate the efforts of their countries slightly more positively than respondents from other European countries such as France, Germany or Belgium.

In general it is perceived that the priority strand of actions to counter violent extremism is to deal with its root causes, including socio-economic ones. Security-oriented measures are not seen as the main priorities. Multilateral frameworks in particular could contribute to addressing these root causes (focus on the development agenda rather than focus on the security/counter terrorism agenda) and supporting those actors that can make a difference, in particular communities, civil society and local actors.
Respondents unambiguously highlight the need for more regional Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on preventing and countering violent extremism, acknowledge that there is a deficit of cooperation between security agencies of Mediterranean northern and southern countries, think that cooperation in this field should not remain only bilateral and not focus only on the security angle. A majority of respondents thinks that Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation fora to address violent extremism and exchange best practices are missing and a majority thinks that the Union for the Mediterranean could play a role in this regard.

As far as the European Union itself is concerned, scaling-up security-oriented measures within the European Union is not seen as a matter of priority. On the external front, respondents also agree to consider that “supporting good governance in non-EU countries in order to address underlying factors of radicalisation” is more of a priority than “contributing to strengthening security capacities of non-EU countries”. There is a perception gap regarding the importance to counter discrimination in the European Union as a matter of priority. Respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries have ranked “countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin” as a number one priority in higher proportions than their European counterparts. In turn, “contributing to solving conflicts outside the EU that provide fertile ground for violent extremism” is ranked first by EU respondents. Respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries are consistently rating the effectiveness of EU frameworks in higher proportions than their European counterparts. Targeted mechanisms such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Office or the cooperation with IT and social media are seen as more effective than broad policy frameworks such as the European Neighbourhood Policy. The fight against terrorist financing is seen as an important strand while the reinforced checks introduced in the Schengen context are assessed as least relevant when it comes to counter-terrorism purposes.

Overall, results of this survey combined with open comments formulated by the respondents and the analytical articles offer very useful insights into the Euro-Mediterranean dimension of violent extremism. The responses do not systematically follow Northern vs. Southern Mediterranean patterns and show how countries in both rims of the Mediterranean face similar challenges. Results also call for enhanced Euro-Mediterranean cooperation confronting violent extremism, an objective that the IEMed will continue to pursue.
THE RELIGIOUS AND IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

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Analysing the ideological dimensions of Jihadism is a controversial exercise. While the EuroMed Survey was not primarily designed to tackle this dimension, some questions incidentally related to it and respondents were also offered the possibility of expanding on it in the framework of open questions. Many researchers, journalists and politicians find it difficult to accept that such violence can be politically or religiously based and prefer to explain it as the result of an economic and social situation of discrimination and to limit its political aspect to the relatively unfertile ground of indoctrination and crime. The religious factor is generally approached only to indicate its usurpation (“This has nothing to do with Islam”) or as an echo of cultural incompatibility (“Paris est une fête”) and civilizational incompatibility (“Why do they hate us?”) of “religious lunatics”.

It is however important to go beyond the idea that Jihadism is just a phenomenon external to our societies, derived from an irrational or constrained attraction of individuals to big ideological labels such as Daesh or Al-Qaeda. Despite the concept of rupture often put forward by the literature on radicalisation, studying how Jihadists build the religious and political dimension of their cause shows us that their particular uses of radicalism, with or without resorting to violence, are based on close interaction with their environment.

Although the configurations of the Arab world and Europe are different, we can actually see that when political and religious institutions are no longer capable of providing both citizens and believers with the means to resolve the contradictions inherent in the hyper-liberal context in which they evolve, Jihadism operates as a political and religious mythology that gives those who identify with it the feeling of reaching truths that would have been concealed to them, thereby enabling them to resume control of their lives.

At a political level, they see the idea of violent confrontation at the heart of Jihadist ideology as the opportunity to impose a new space of negotiation on policy-makers. Their group of reference thus moves from the status of “manipulated mass” to that of the ultimate enemy feared by the “powerful”, not only because of the terror it inspires but also because of its capacity to produce an autonomous criticism of the world and its conflicts. At a religious level, their adhesion to a reading of the Koran in which violence and death organise life enables them to turn their marginality into a religious virtue by becoming el farqa nadjia, a small group of people chosen by God to make “Islam triumph”. Having the “courage” not to conceal the religious truth represented by Jihadism consequently becomes a sign of divine choice, whereas in their reading of the holy texts most other Muslims would maintain an intentionally ambiguous relationship with the principle of armed struggle, or even regard it as a taboo.

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1. The original version of this article was written in French and is available at www.iemed.org
2. This article is based on different interviews conducted since 2004 with sympathisers with Jihadist ideology, having or not engaged in violence, in the Maghreb and Europe. The quotations in italics are directly taken from them in order to give the reader an insight into their worlds of thought.
A Takeover of the Political Space through the Enemy's Role

One of the most frequent ways of contesting any political project of the so-called radical Muslims consists of introducing them as individuals without a precise goal, fascinated by chaos. Although their reading of the local and global political challenges is sometimes confused, the Jihad is however for them more a means of returning order to the world rather than destroying it. It is even through their fear of the *fitna*, often mentioned through the dislocation of families or the economic and security instability surrounding them, that they justify their attraction to the promise of an Islamic state, the only structure capable of organising and harmonising their life.

While waiting for its emergence, their fascination with the possibility of a new political order is first expressed by the rejection of the modern state. This state would have failed to offer a “better future” to its citizens, and the main project of its political representatives would be to exclude the governed from real political decision and discussion spaces by giving them “the illusion that their vote can change things” in order to better “exploit” them to the benefit of hidden interests.

This crisis of identification with the state and this mistrust regarding the mechanisms of representative democracy is not specific to Jihadists. However, the impossibility of an Islamic political radicalism, even non-violent, finding a place in it (in contrast to other ultranationalist or ethical radicalisms that are more or less tolerated) exacerbates a feeling of iniquity in the access to political criticism, which groups such as Daesh do not hesitate to exploit. Moreover, the fact that the media and decision centres both in Europe and the Arab world do not permit Muslim public opinion to exist other than with the aim of supporting them in their fight against terrorism without being able to show their weak points contributes to a reductionist simplification of the participation of Muslims in good governance and to preventing a citizenship based on democratic disagreement from emerging. This configuration often leads the future Jihadists to reject the “manipulated” political space “imposed” on them, considering that their states just want “yes-men Muslims” and that “violence alone enables you to be respected”.

Their criticism of the state is also a moral criticism denouncing man for “forgetting” God’s laws. This criticism is certainly common to several fundamentalist groups but while quietist Salafis choose a form of passive resistance to the “trials and injustices” by withdrawing from world affairs, Jihadists consider violence, which can also only be expressed at a discursive level, as a means of control and rebalance of their role in the political space. For them, the aim is not to enter this space by placing themselves at the service of Muslims with specific strategies to meet their daily needs. What prevails is the possibility of intervening as an alter-ego of the state by establishing themselves as the enemy, thus subverting the political marginality to which the legitimate institutions confine them. It is also one of the reasons that Jihadists will prefer to burn their passport rather than an Israeli flag, while choosing names of war (*kounya*) that link them to their country of origin (such as Abu X el Belgiki, the Belgian, or el Firansi, the French) or will even accept the principle of the *hijrah* (the tradition of migrating to “the land of Islam” of persecuted Muslims) but will return to carry out attacks in their native country as soon as they have the opportunity.
The Legitimising Phantom of the Chosen Group

All Jihadists recognize a religious foundation in their action but this is difficult to interpret through the methodological approaches and the scales of observation currently chosen to analyse violent extremism. For instance the ideological religious dimension does not come through in question 5 of the Euromed Survey as mentioned in some open answers (see Graph 1 and open answers below).

Graph 1: Drivers providing fertile ground for the development of violent extremism.
% of the most significant driver in group of countries

- Weak state capacity and failing security: 29% in SSM countries, 6% in EU countries
- Role and impact of global geopolitics, including perception of political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression of certain groups in other countries: 29% in SSM countries, 28% in EU countries
- In the country of residence: political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression, Islamophobia: 11% in SSM countries, 50% in EU countries
- Economic exclusion and limited opportunities: 31% in SSM countries, 16% in EU countries

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

En principe, les facteurs nommés plus hauts, en soi, ne représentent aucunement une base de radicalisation. Ce sera seulement leurs manipulation et utilisation dans un discours revanchiste ou idéologique (salafism), qui leur donnera un potentiel de justification ou de ‘rationalisation’ pour commettre des actes terroristes au nom de l’Islam.

Finnish respondent

The options in this question are limited and are biased to the deep roots theory. It does not appreciate the power of extremism as an ideological and spiritual force. Of course, it is related to a multitude of socio economic and cultural factors, but it became an independent and self generating force in its own right.

Egyptian respondent

There is no mention of violent religious ideology (Jihadism) and abetting conservative clerics (e.g. Al Qaradawi) who do not get their hands dirty personally, but egg others on. Talking about the elephant in the room..., but for political correctness this point was probably dropped from the menu.

German respondent
Because of difficult access to the field, these approaches favour life experiences limited by situations of repentance or imprisonment and mainly focus on how religious radicalism weakens integration or favours resentment of non-Muslims. Nevertheless, the construction of this religious radicalism is not limited to the relations between believers and non-believers and mainly forms part of the history of their own religious group and its cleavages.

One of the most important issues in Jihadist religiosity is that of the farqa enadjia (the chosen group). Many groups have proclaimed themselves as the chosen group in the history of the Muslim world but what justifies divine choice here is the radical nature of the Jihad itself rather than the attachment to a just religious practice. For them radicalism in their discourse and/or action is enough while they await paradise without burdening themselves with the laborious accumulation of good actions. This religious superiority also feeds much more off the context than the norm, given that the outlines of contemporary Jihadism as a religious group are quite vague.

The concept of the chosen group works first as a ready means for over-valuing individuals (the Jihadist discourses are highly marked by the idea of ‘izza, pride in Arabic). Making the Jihad the condition sine qua non of access to the chosen group enables them to turn their mundane fascination for virility, the appropriation of goods or the culture of arms into religious assets. What interests them most are the passages of the Koran on the armed struggle, and their reflection on their relationship with God in daily life is extremely limited. The benefits of forming part of the chosen group are expected in the hereafter and without too much effort because the multiplication of aalamat esaa (the signs of the end of the world) and the martyr’s prospect shorten the long path it would have been necessary to take to be recognised by God in normal circumstances. But the privileges down here are also equally important, as shown by how Jihadists appropriate the concept of ghanima (the spoils of war) by taking wives, villas with swimming pool or large cars...

The concept of the chosen group is then built upon the criticism of other references to Islam for which the Jihad is not a priority, also contradicting here the idea that Jihadism would emerge outside time, without a link to its environment. The Muslims that abandon the violent struggle are seen as “useless to Islam”, as are the community manifestations such as the Friday prayer in the mosque. Islamist parties are for them particularly guilty of only discussing the project of an Islamic state without “having ever managed to impose the sharia”. The toughest accusations are paradoxically directed at the religious wise men, accused of “selling false interpretations of the religion just to please their masters the Americans” (the quotation here particularly concerns Saudi Arabia). In a context in which the religion is controlled, if not confiscated, by the state or made more complex by the Ulemas, Jihadism makes it possible to re-appropriate a religious legitimacy based on a simple logic: the marginality of the Muslim’s commitment to the Jihad confirms the chosen character of those for whom it is the heart of belief.

**Jihadism: the Mirror of the Political and Religious Taboos of Contemporary Islam**

The difficult consideration of the political and religious factors of violent extremism has an impact on the orientation of the current deradicalisation policies. The Arab countries, worried about a weak state authority, mainly call for hardening of security. Europe, made anxious by the potential for revolt of its Muslim citizens, asks them to show loyalty.

These approaches focused on fear of violence, which is certainly justified, do not allow us to see that the attraction of a minority towards Jihadism also acts as a way to reveal the taboos of contemporary Islam, notably that of the religious and political representation of the youths that it is urgent to better apprehend.
In alternative spaces such as the social networks, the Jihadist religious and political readings propose a simplifying way of remedying the disorder of the world but as a secret only revealed to those who are worthy. Indeed, very often we access it by trying to understand subjects that the western and Arab official political and religious actors silence, such as their involvement (or non-intervention) in several conflicts concerning Muslim populations, torture, civilian victims and the economic interests of the countries at war.

It is therefore important to favour a public culture of political debates, particularly among youths, enabling a certain radicalism to be expressed democratically and non-violently, even when the aim is to clarify questions related to the exclusive exercise of power. Religious actors also have a significant role to play in the dissemination and clarification of the religious interpretations of violence and war. However, this will only be possible by abandoning the idea that the questions posed by those who might be tempted by violent extremism are incoherent and totally detached from the political and religious logics of the rest of the world.

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**This will only be possible by abandoning the idea that the questions posed by those who might be tempted by violent extremism are incoherent and totally detached from the political and religious logics of the rest of the world.**
ISLAMOPHOBIA, EXCLUSION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

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Over the last few years, a number of countries have been hit by violent extremist attacks that induced a shock in public opinion, due to both the number of victims and the symbolic impact they had. Repeated attacks in a number of European cities have strengthened pre-existing radical and misconceived attitudes towards Islam. A growing part of the society has been seduced by discourses amalgamating Islam, Islamism, immigration and terrorism. Conversely, Islamophobia and right-wing extremism have also in some cases fuelled the radicalisation of young Muslims towards violent extremism. Islamophobia and right-wing extremism actually constitute a threat in themselves that should not be underestimated.

Right-Wing Populist Parties and Islamophobia,
Major Threats to Security and Stability

Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties (Alonso & Kaltwasser, 2014) are responsible for the surge of Islamophobia as an element of reactivation of the left-right cleavage.

Since the 1970s, right-wing parties have contributed to placing racism and Islamophobia into the political debate, thus obliging all parties, either left- or right-wing, to take a position on this topic. This politicisation has contributed to maintaining the objectivisation of the immigrant group and inside this group, the presentation of Muslim immigrants as the archetype of “the Other”.

PRR parties’ political thinking regarding Muslim immigrants and their descendants is profoundly determined by colonial relations, which could be defined as a fundamental inequality between white colonists and non-white colonised. Let us not forget that the French National Front was founded by French Algerian militants whose political thinking was determined by the colonial relations in French Algeria.

Building two opposed and essentialised categories of people is key to the creation of an “us” and a “them”, a crucial step towards the construction of identity. This construction of two opposed categories allows Islamophobic parties to promote the idea of the impossibility of immigrants integrating. The right-wing narrative stipulating that Muslims have a secret plan to occupy France via demography and replace “true French people” is another key pillar of their rhetoric.

The negative attitudes towards Muslims are situated in the field of identity and cultural belonging. There has been a displacement from differentiation based on racial/biological elements to differentiation based on supposed identity categories. Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (Taguieff, 1989) have evoked a new kind of racism since the 1980s, which is no longer based on a racial difference but on the supposed impossibility of different cultures and identities mixing or sharing the same territory. Racism is thus displaced from the biological to the symbolic and cultural field. According to this idea and transposing it to the French context,
“Muslims” are thought to be incompatible with the “Republic”, the latter representing the Western conception of the state.

Lately, PRR parties have gained voters and weight in a number of EU countries while the question of the modalities of the relations between EU Muslims and non-Muslims is at the centre of the public debate, and as the wave of terrorist attacks generated a reflection over the integration of Muslims in Western societies. This is a sign, therefore, that the category “Muslims” is objectivised as the debate on Jihadist-related violence often leads to questioning the place of Muslims in the EU.

Results to Question 7 of the Euromed Survey of Experts and Actors show that respondents identify Islamophobia and PRR parties as a threat in its own right to the stability and security of Euro-Mediterranean societies. Furthermore, according to the graph below, corresponding to Question 7, EU respondents even think that right-wing extremism and Islamophobia are a bigger threat to their respective countries than “Violent Islamist extremism”.

**Graph 1: To what extent do you consider that the following phenomena threaten the stability and security of your own country?**
(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

In other words, Islamophobia and right-wing extremism are not only a threat because they may fuel the rhetoric of extremist Jihadists and offer fertile ground for the development of Jihadist-related violent extremism, they are also a threat in their own right and have the potential to harm social cohesion in European societies.

Similarly, when asked what the EU’s priority to tackle violent extremism should be, a relative majority of respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries identify “Countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin” as a top priority.

**Economic and Social Exclusion, Fertile Ground for Radicalisation**

In addition to the perception of a growing Islamophobia, descendants of immigrants from MENA countries in Europe are confronted with economic exclusion, as they are not able to find job opportunities fitting their academic level, which is usually higher than their parents’. This lack of opportunities is the basis of the relative deprivation that the descendants of MENA migrants feel and what allows us to place them in the cadets sociaux category as they are not able to reproduce or top their parents’ way and level of life. The concept of cadets sociaux refers to a class of young people who lack economic opportunities and are unable to play a
political role (Bayart, 1989). Cadets sociaux, as they are prevented from finding a place in society, tend to express their perceived deprivation through radical political positions and even to seek an alternative to the feeling of belonging to the state they were born in. For instance, relative deprivation and the impossibility of perpetuating their parents’ way of life were the two starting points of the politicisation of many young Tuaregs in Mali and Niger in the 1970s and 1980s. They developed an alternative belonging to a constructed “Tuareg nation”, which was one of the core elements of the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s. This analogy with the political situation in post-colonial Mali is illustrative of how a group of excluded people can adhere to an alternative ideology with the purpose of protesting against their condition of exclusion, seen as an injustice. This idea is reflected in the graph below, corresponding to Question 6 of the Euromed Survey.

Graph 2: In addition to an enabling environment, to what extent can the following elements help to explain why an individual turns to violent extremism?
(results show the first choice out of three)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>SSM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception of humiliation and discrimination from the society in the country of residence on ethnic, national, linguistic or religious grounds</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiences of state repression or exclusion from rights</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of socioeconomic integration</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological vulnerability</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normalisation of violence</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal causes (divorce, breakup, loss of job…)</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrill of adventure</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

EU respondents gave crucial importance to perception of humiliation and discriminations (30.1%) for explaining how an individual turns into a violent extremist. Respondents therefore agree that the real or perceived relation between the individual and the rest of the society or the state is key to understanding what drives an individual to violent extremism.
As one can see with the responses to Question 6 of the Euromed Survey, the economic exclusion is often coupled with the impossibility of reaching recognition in society. Descendants of MENA immigrants feel that their parents' acculturation efforts did not lead to their full integration into the society, as many "non-Muslims" keep seeing them as not fully French and identify them as a homogeneous group that does not want to lose its identity and embrace the French one, as if there were a monolithic "Muslim" identity with characteristics totally opposed to the French or Western one.

This feeling of exclusion coupled with the refusal to consider them as fully French citizens partly contributed to making young people seen as Muslim adopt an alternative identity. Their perceived condition as Muslims and their supposed belonging to the Muslim cultural area induced their embracing of a transnational ideology that fits in with their feeling of belonging to the “Muslims” category.

Violent Extremism, Post-Colonialism and Justification of Violence

Radicalisation towards violent extremism is to some extent the consequence of the failure of EU countries to integrate a generation of young Europeans. These young Europeans whose parents or grandparents migrated from MENA countries refuse acculturation as the only option to be considered a full citizen.

Radicalisation is a process whose source is a feeling of deprivation. One chooses – or is seduced – by violent radical political options because the access to some key resources is forbidden or impossible. Radicalisation always happens in reaction to a situation or against a group that are no longer judged bearable. Therefore, this has to be taken into account when one wants to identify the causes of radicalisation.

Against the idea according to which radicalisation is only a product of the propagation of the Salafist ideology, one can affirm that this phenomenon is the product of the failure of the institutions responsible for promoting the social cohesion of different groups of people.

However, violent extremism is obviously only the most radical and violent option among a wide range of political options to contest the current conditions of integration that can be gathered under the generic expression of “speaking Muslim”, i.e. mobilising a Muslim-related cognitive system strongly influenced by post-colonialism to analyse the situation of excluded Muslim descendants and build an alternative toolbox for political action.

“Speaking Muslim” means adopting a language and a cognitive system opposed to the acculturation and assimilation discourse, still commonly used as a synonym of integration by a significant part of the EU countries’ population. Muslim-related rhetoric allows the people who use it to create an alternative international community characterised by the use of this cognitive system and the mobilisation of political causes in the so-called “Muslim world”.

The association of this discourse, perceived as being endogenous and the subsequent embracing of transnational causes perceived as a transposition of one’s own situation, is used as a tool of propaganda and recruitment by Daesh, an organisation that, via Internet and the social networks, builds a discourse about a clash of civilisations with a strong anti-colonial component.
It is widely known that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been internationalised and some “Muslim youths” in EU countries give their support to the Palestinians as they analyse the conflict as a colonial one. “Speaking Muslim” is therefore regarded as endogenous rather than religious.

The most important difference between the adoption of this Muslim-related cognitive systems and violent extremism is that violent extremists produce a discourse that legitimises violent action as another, and even the most efficient, one to fight against inequality, exclusion and the perceived permanence of colonial relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, as French sociologist Xavier Crettez (2016) analysed it. According to him, radicalisation can be thought of as a process towards the acceptance of violence as the only solution to ensure the triumph of one’s cause.

To conclude, Islamophobia can be analysed as an element of instability and a threat to EU societies. Islamophobia is a key element to understand why some young descendants of MENA countries’ immigrants are embracing a post-colonial ideology based on a perceived common belonging to the so-called “Muslim world”. But right-wing extremism is dangerous per se as it sometimes promotes itself as a radical violent discourse against a significant part of the population. In this sense, right-wing extremism and Jihadist violent extremism may be two sides of the same coin. It is only by promoting inclusive policies and open societies, i.e. by reforming non-Muslims’ attitude towards Muslims, that these tensions can be overcome.

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Bibliography


THE ROLE OF PROPAGANDA IN VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND HOW TO COUNTER IT

ALEXANDER RITZMANN

The 8th Euromed Survey conducted by the European Institute of the Mediterranean touches upon a number of important and complex issues related to violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region, including the question of the context and drivers through which violent extremism can prosper. Echoing some of the results, this article looks into propaganda as a tool of extremist ideologies and how to counter it.

What is Propaganda?

Propaganda, as a tool of extremist ideologies, aims to generate and promote a world view that reduces the complexity of life to a simple black and white picture. This structured attempt to reform the cognitive (and emotional) perceptions of a target audience to initiate an action in the interest of the propagandist has probably been a part of every political or religious conflict (Jowett, 2012).

In 1622, when the Catholic Church professionalised its missionary work to counter the progress of the Protestants, the body responsible for this important endeavour was called “Sacra Congregatio de propaganda fide”, which gave the name to what since then has been called propaganda. Over the conflict of what true Christianity is, Catholics regarded propaganda as something positive, while Protestants saw it as a tool of the enemy (Bussmer, 2013).

Propaganda, in the form of recruitment messaging, generally follows the pattern of diagnosis (what is wrong), prognosis (what needs to be done) and rationale (who should do it and why) (Wilson, 1973). The self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS/Daesh), for example, follows the same principle: diagnosis (Islam/Sunni Muslims are under attack), prognosis (fight/create the Caliphate) and rationale (help however you can).

The IS then uses sub-narratives for every target group they want to reach. Adventure-seeking young men were promised a future as heroes who are fighting for a just cause and who would be rewarded, amongst other things, with wives and sex slaves. Medical doctors and engineers were lured in by the call to helping fellow Sunni Muslims in need and to being part of the creation of the perfect Islamic utopian society, the Caliphate. Young women were promised an important role by becoming the wives of the “lions of the Caliphate” and securing its future by raising their “cubs” (Winter, 2015).

How Does Propaganda Work?

Extremist propaganda often has clear-cut messages that promise clarity, relevance and meaning in addition to emotional and social benefits, such as belonging to a new family or brotherhood/sisterhood. For propaganda to increase its chances of success, it needs to be close to
an already existing (perceived) truth of the targeted audience. 180-degree conversions happen but very rarely. Most of the time, a radicalisation process takes place gradually in accordance with political crises or conflicts, like the war in Iraq and Syria or the influx of refugees and migrants into Europe. These real-life events are then being manipulated to fit into the ideology of the extremists (Schmid, 2013).

The 8th Euromed Survey respondents support this finding. Most respondents selected “Conflict zones” as the most enabling environment for extremist recruitment. The Survey also shows that “Internet and social media” are being seen as the second most enabling factor for extremist recruitment (Euromed Survey, 2017a).

Graph 1: In which environments and contexts are recruiters more likely to successfully turn an individual into a violent extremist?
(results show the first choice out of three)

The online world allows for easy one-to-one interaction. If someone comments on, likes or shares content hosted by extremists, they will very likely receive a reaction by a recruiter. He or she will act as a sort of social worker who can give simple answers and solutions for complex situations and problems. In the case of Islamism, they will also promise a safe path away from the eternal pains of hell. Recruiters then target those who appear to have a cognitive opening, are in an emotional crisis, who seek help, a new beginning or who are simply curious (RAN, 2016).

It is very likely, however, that the role of the social media in radicalisation is overstated. The fact that today’s extremists use social media for propaganda and recruitment does not mean that there is a causal connection between this technology and the impact of extremist ideologies. Prior generations of propagandists and recruiters mostly used schools, universities, radio stations and TV shows, or simply gave semi-public speeches and were able to enlist hundreds of thousands into violent national-socialist or communist movements, for example. The following open comment from an Algerian respondent to the 8th Euromed Survey illustrates this reality.
The extremists also used mosques and fitness and sports clubs to spread their propaganda for joining a violent extremist group. Fitness and martial arts clubs were also used for propaganda, offering the young a boosted self-valorising image. Of course, school, marginalised urban areas, internet and social media are also fertile ground for recruitment.

Algerian respondent

The Muslim Brotherhood, at times a violent extremist organisation, was founded in 1928 and had tens of thousands of members before today’s technologies arrived. In the 1980s, an estimated 20,000 foreign fighters followed the offline call for “Jihad” to Afghanistan (Hegghammer, 2013). Al-Qaeda recruiters used to tour the world with VHS video cassettes as their technological tool to spread their propaganda. Simply put, recruiters go where their target audiences are.

Limiting the ability of extremists to abuse social media and the internet, on the other hand, is key (see section “How to Counter Propaganda and Promote Alternatives”). The ongoing struggle between security concerns, freedom of speech and business interests shows that this is easier said than done.

While much propaganda distribution happens online nowadays, very few people radicalise all by themselves. In most cases, a trusted person provides the necessary “credibility” that makes it easier for the individual to accept the manipulated information. This “trusted messenger” could be a family member, a friend or a charismatic recruiter (Vidino, 2017, & Sagemann, 2008).

One has to take into account the specific context of the radicalisation process where internet and social media, religious communities and family and friendship networks can play a critical role, as what is being offered in the first place is a feeling of belonging that holds very strong appeal to individuals confronted with an identity crisis and systematic exclusion.

German respondent

For example, the vast majority of IS recruits in Europe have been drawn in through Salafi networks that operated online as well as offline (Heinke, 2017). Yet, their significance was underestimated by governments and civil society alike. “Sharia for Belgium”, the “Read” campaign in Germany and other similar Salafist groups in the UK, the Netherlands and France, etc., undertook their grooming of European youth in plain sight. Since these activities were often not illegal in the beginning, there was little governments could do directly. In many cases, extremist propaganda and recruiters remained unchallenged (European Foundation for Democracy, 2017).

The Role of Ideology in Propaganda

Ideology is a set of narratives and values that creates a coherent world view. As shown particularly clearly by the IS, ideology is also the very glue that binds the engineer to the petty criminal, the mentally ill to the small businessman, the female honours student to the bus driver. Extremist ideology is generally based on a simplistic binary perspective of victimhood (us, the in-group) and aggressors (them, the out-group). This categorisation plays a key role in legitimising the actions of extremists, which would otherwise simply be seen as ordinary criminal acts. Ideology has two functions in the radicalisation process: a) as described above, it can try to pull someone into extremism through manipulation and propaganda; and b), it is a tool of self-empowerment that gives someone the feeling of being in charge of their life by submitting to a higher cause and of having a clear purpose.
In conclusion, for propaganda to be successful, three factors need to be at play: 1) an ideology; 2) a cognitive opening of the propaganda recipient; and 3) a trusted messenger who serves as a bridge between message and receiver.

**The Limits of Propaganda**

Tens of millions of Europeans have heard of the deeds and demands of the IS through the media and millions have seen its online propaganda, which is regarded as state of the art by many experts in the field of communications. To date, 5,000 to 7,000 Europeans followed the call to migrate to the so-called Caliphate. Why so many? That is an important question many research projects are focusing on. But the equally important question is why so few?

Neuroscience and cognitive science show that adults live in “filter bubbles” and “echo chambers”, making them largely immune to external information that challenges their existing world views. This is not a reference to the ongoing debate about the role of social media, in particular Facebook, in this context, but about subconscious cognitive processes of the human brain (Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2016).

Our confirmation bias preselects information that confirms our beliefs over conflicting input. Cognitive dissonance makes sure contradictory information is framed in such a way that we can easily disqualify it (British Psychological Society, 2016). This not only means that it is hard for us to fundamentally change our opinions or beliefs but it is even harder for someone else to do this against our will.

So how can propaganda overcome this natural defence mechanism? It often needs, at least in the beginning, the cooperation of the targeted individual. For adults to adopt an extremist ideology, a cognitive opening, a desire to change oneself, is necessary. This desire to change is often caused by a personal crisis. Young people, who are in a developmental phase, curious and looking for answers and a place in society, can be more open to manipulation. Their “filter bubble” is not yet fully developed.

Since 99% of adults and youths do not become violent extremists, no matter their personal circumstances or grievances, the limitations of propaganda are obvious (Horgan, 2014). Unfortunately, the same mechanisms also limit the effectiveness of counter-measures.

**How to Counter Propaganda and Promote Alternatives**

There are four ways to reduce the effectiveness of extremist propaganda:

1. **Prepare**: Critical media literacy of the population should be increased, particularly by educating youths in schools on how to evaluate and qualify the sources of information. This should be seen as a part of “democracy training”, with the concept of critical thinking applied in daily life.

2. **Disrupt**: Extremist propaganda can be taken off online media by using technology like eGLYPH, which can automatically detect and delete content that has previously been red flagged. To protect free speech, the application of algorithms needs to be transparent and limited to the worst of the worst, focusing on clearly illegal content (Waddell, 2015).

3. **Empower**: Alternative narratives, which aim to promote positive messages, universal values, role models or other kinds of information relevant to a specific part of the population. These campaigns are supposed to strengthen the “immune system” of individuals or communities against extremist propaganda.
4. **Challenge**: Counter-narratives, which aim at exposing lies and flaws of extremist organisations, need to be directed at a well-researched and narrowly-targeted audience that is either already curious about extremist content or in doubt of the currently adopted extremist world view.

As with any kind of intervention, serious consideration needs to be put into how to “do no harm” while trying to help. Studies have shown that making people, and youths in particular, aware of something that authorities consider to be bad for them may arouse interest in the issue in the first place (Hornik, Jacobsohn, Orwin, Piesse & Kalton, 2008). While this is less of a concern when communicating alternative messages, highlighting how bad and dangerous specific extremist or terrorist groups are can prove to be counter-productive.

Many who sympathise with extremist ideologies feel the need to act. Narrative campaigns that are designed as monologues and tell people only what not to do will therefore likely miss the needs of an audience that is upset or outraged about a real or perceived injustice. Campaigns should offer a “call to action”, a set of alternative things one can do to help those who want to become involved and the possibility to have a sustained dialogue with those who like to engage (RAN, 2016).

**Selecting the Right Partners for Preventing and Countering Extremist Propaganda**

The respondents of the Euromed Survey rank the promotion of civil society and local actors as their top priority in addressing violent extremism (see Graph 2). The key question now is how to do this in an effective way. As shown, ideology is a key element in propaganda and recruitment of extremists. A transparent due diligence and vetting process on who to work with, who to support or to fund is therefore essential. Some suggest working with non-violent Salafists or Muslim Brotherhood organisations. They argue that Islamists might have credibility for at risk individuals or violent extremists and might be able to convince them not to use violence.

**Civil society is seen as a key factor in addressing violent extremism. The key question now is how to do this in an effective way.**

Graph 2: Do you agree with the following statements regarding Euro-Mediterranean cooperation?

- Cooperation between civil society organizations working on the Prevention of Violent Extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean area should be reinforced: 7.8
- There is a deficit of cooperation between security agencies of Mediterranean northern and southern countries: 7.0
- Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation fora to address violent extremism and exchange best practices are missing: 7.1
- The Union for the Mediterranean could play a role in this regard: 6.3
- Cooperation should remain mostly bilateral, focus on the security angle and therefore primarily involve security and intelligence agencies: 4.1

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
Interestingly, no one suggests working with, or funding, non-violent neo-Nazi groups to convince violent ones to stop the violence. This is not to say that right-wing extremists and Islamist groups are the same. But both seek to overcome liberal and pluralistic democracies and to replace them with totalitarian Fuehrer-states or Caliphates. The non-violent extremists and the violent ones do not disagree much on what their final utopia should look like but on how to build it. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, has an evolutionary strategy, aimed at the gradual manipulation of Muslims and society as a whole, while the IS, as a revolutionary force, wants its Caliphate now.

It is important to select partners that authentically promote values such as pluralism, tolerance and liberal democracy and live up to those values within their own organisations. This will determine the credibility and long-term success of any preventive or counter-extremism action.

To strengthen the local immune system against extremist ideologies, propaganda and recruiting, the already existing resilient actors and alternative narratives in communities and neighbourhoods should be empowered. To achieve this, credible local voices need to be identified and supported, in particular through capacity-building training, networking and media contacts.

These male and female “good guys” could be shopkeepers, sports coaches, teachers or religious leaders, basically anyone who is promoting an inclusive, equal and pluralistic community and wants to speak out against extremism. Civil society organisations should be put in the driver’s seat here. Governments can help create, support and maintain these activities but should avoid driving and steering. In particular, individuals who are curious about extremist content will not listen to government-labelled messages. And, even more importantly, the credibility of civil society is at risk if regarded as the state’s mouthpiece.

Empowering the “good guys” from within communities and neighbourhoods, giving them a voice to tell their alternative narratives and providing alternative courses of action for those who want to act against injustice will be key in the ongoing struggle of preventing and countering violent extremism.

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From September 2012 to December 2015, Alexander worked as Senior Advisor MENA Region and Project Manager for GIZ, the German Development Cooperation, based in Cairo, Egypt. He has also lived and worked in Berlin, Brussels, Beirut, Jerusalem, Ramallah and Washington DC. In 2007 he was a DAAD-Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS), Johns Hopkins University, in Washington DC.

From 2001 to 2006 Alexander was a member of the Berlin State Parliament, overseeing the state police and intelligence agency, focusing on homeland security and data protection issues. He received his Master’s Degree in Political Science from the Free University Berlin in 2000.
Bibliography


AUTHORITARIANISM AND RADICALISATION TOWARDS VIOLENT EXTREMISM

ASIEM EL DIFRAOUH
Co-founder of the Candid Foundation in Berlin and Paris, a “think- and do-tank” that fosters Euro-Mediterranean understanding

Before discussing the very likely link between authoritarianism and radicalisation towards violent extremism it seems necessary to provide a basic working definition of authoritarianism. For the purpose of this article, authoritarianism shall be defined as very weak pluralistic political representation or the complete absence thereof. Further, authoritarianism implies a political legitimacy of the governing system that is not based on the rule of law and a constitutional framework but on emotionally-charged “higher goals” promoted by state propaganda, which could be economic development, the fight against exterior and interior enemies and typically the fight against terrorism. Civil society in authoritarian regimes is generally weak and/or excluded from the political process. Generally, authoritarian regimes exclude large groups of society – be they socioeconomic, ethnic or religious – from political, economic and societal decision-making.

The question of a correlation between authoritarianism and radicalisation towards violent extremism is highly charged and has very significant policy implications for other states. To put it very simply, the dilemma could be formulated as follows: should one support an authoritarian system that nearly always combats violent extremism with violent repression, often widening the repression to other groups of society, or should one put pressure on authoritarian leaders to allow for popular participation and the rule of law in order to reduce violent extremism.

The results of the Euromed Survey show that, overall, respondents recognize that authoritarianism is a threat to the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region and that it may fuel radicalisation towards violent extremism. However, there are some nuances according to the geographical origin of respondents and the results are sometimes ambiguous.

Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries’ respondents are very aware of the potential of authoritarianism to affect the security and stability of their own countries (see Graph 1).

Graph 1: To what extent do you consider that the following phenomena threaten the stability and security of your own country?
(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
Similarly, the fact that “promoting good governance, democracy and human rights” is identified as the second most important priority to counter violent extremism, seems to illustrate the awareness among respondents on the importance to counter authoritarian trends (see Graph 2).

**Graph 2: What should be the main priorities in order to effectively counter violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region?**
(results show first choice out of four)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>SSM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
<th>All survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addressing economic and social root causes</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(unemployment, inequalities)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting good governance, democracy and human rights</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

The responses to Question 6 lead to a similar conclusion, as the perception of humiliation and discrimination as well as the experience of state repression and the lack of socioeconomic integration (which can be related to authoritarianism) are considered as the three most important factors for radicalisation towards violent extremism (see Graph 3).

**Graph 3: In addition to enabling environment, to what can the following elements help to explain why an individual turns to violent extremism?**
(results show the first choice out of three)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>SSM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
<th>All survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception of humiliation and discrimination from the society in the country of residence on ethnic, national, linguistic or religious grounds</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiences of state repression or exclusion from rights</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of socioeconomic integration</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological vulnerability</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normalisation of violence</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal causes (divorce, breakup, loss of job...)</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrill of adventure</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
However, respondents from the Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries are less prone to consider that authoritarian trends endanger the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole than their European counterparts (see Graph 4) and perceive right-wing extremism and Islamophobia as more acute threats to stability and security. Similarly, respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries are a bit less prone that European respondents to recognize that terrorist attacks can be used by authoritarian regimes as a way to legitimize themselves (see Graph 5).

Graph 4: To what extent do you consider that the following phenomena threaten the stability and security of the Euro-Mediterranean countries and societies as a whole?
(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>SSM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent Islamist extremism</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing extremism and Islamophobia on the rise</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian trends on the rise</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Graph 5: In addition to the harm caused by terrorist attacks as such, to what extent do you consider that the following indirect effects of violent extremism threaten the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean space?
(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>SSM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimates authoritarian regimes</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

In this article, I will argue that, even though authoritarianism is evidently not the only reason, four major sets of factors point to a correlation between the authoritarian nature of regimes and radicalisation towards violent extremism.

The four major sets of factors coming into play are:

Firstly: By definition, authoritarianism operates, excludes and marginalises entire segments of society on ethnical, political, social or religious grounds. Exclusion is one of the best known causes of radicalisation to violent extremism.

Secondly: Authoritarian regimes promote monolithic ideologies and mindsets that prevent free and independent thinking. Those in turn make people vulnerable to equally monolithic ideologies promoted by violent extremists (see Ritzmann "The Role of Propaganda in Violent Extremism and how to Counter It" [5, 28]). One absolute truth leads to another absolute truth.
Authoritarian regimes often resort to lies and especially conspiracy theories to legitimise their rule. Their subjects are thus prone to believe in equally gross lies and distortions, such as in the Jihadist grand narrative and Jihadist conspiracy theories.

Thirdly: Authoritarian regimes too often leave very few non-violent options to contest their policies – so opposition groups frequently resort to violent means.

Fourthly: Violent repression by authoritarian regimes in turn frequently leads to a vicious circle of violence in which the opposition also becomes increasingly violent and opens the door for the most extreme elements.

Subsequently, I will discuss these four sets of factors, one by one, in more depth.

Set of factors 1. Exclusion: The Survey results provide some insights into how different forms of exclusion are perceived in terms of their influence on radicalisation. Overall, respondents recognize that exclusion is a driver to violent extremism. However, respondents seem to be much more sensitized to the effects of economic exclusion than to the effects of political exclusion (that one could more directly associate with authoritarianism). In other words, it seems that the link between exclusion and authoritarian regimes is not fully recognised.

Graph 6: Most significant driver for the development of violent extremism in SSM countries. (EU/non-EU countries)

Generally, we learn from the still too few studies conducted in Europe that exclusion does seem an important factor for radicalisation. The French Iranian researcher Farhad Khosrokharvar, for example, stresses that roughly a third of radicalised young Europeans come from socio-economically disadvantaged milieus of immigrants. The renowned Jihadist expert Thomas Hegghammer from Norway argues that Jihadism in Europe might be still increasing, as a rising number of male immigrants of Muslim origin suffer from an insufficient level of education and are socio-economically disadvantaged. Preliminary research on exclusion has been carried out in Tunisia and partially confirms these findings (“The Future of Jihadism in Europe: A Pessimistic View”, Thomas Hegghammer, 2016).
Set of factors 2: Authoritarian regimes promote monolithic ideologies and mindsets that prevent free and independent thinking. Those in turn make people vulnerable to the equally monolithic ideologies promoted by violent extremists. One absolute truth leads to another absolute truth. Here again there is unfortunately a lack of research with the notable exception of Randy Borum’s article “Psychological Vulnerabilities and Propensities for Involvement in Violent Extremism”. As he writes: Authoritarianism has been linked to a range of traits and attitudes that are consistent with militant, extremist, and even hate-oriented ideologies, including ethnocentrism, prejudice, nationalism, anti-immigrant attitudes, opposition to civil and human rights, and, finally, opposition to democratic values, civil rights and liberties, and human rights (Seipel, Rippl, Kindervater & Lederer, 2012).

The author of these pages has himself conducted a large number of informal and formal interviews with Jihadist extremists as well as with deradicalisation specialists, which seem to confirm the hypothesis that an authoritarian-shaped mindset increases the propensity towards equally authoritarian believe systems. As a number of young Egyptians told the author, Jihadism cannot be questioned as it represents the correct interpretation of Islam and is in this sense a final and unquestionable truth. Very frequently, authoritarian regimes justify their rule with conspiracy theories, e.g. the involvement of foreign powers who want to destroy the state and national unity. Likewise, violent extremists resort to conspiracy theories, such as the global conspiracy against Islam. People who have been prey to one conspiracy theory might easily fall for another one as they are not used to processing information critically or to consulting independent objective sources.

Set of factors 3: Where authoritarian repression pushes opposition groups into the hands of violent extremists. The example of Egypt illustrates the rapid radicalisation towards violent extremism by an increasingly authoritarian regime. The government’s war on terror where any vaguely “Islamist” opposition is considered a terrorist group as well as the war against the uprising of economically and socially disenfranchised Bedouins have so far only driven more people into the arms of violent extremist organisations. The number of terrorist attacks has also increased considerably.

Set of factors 4: There are also examples of formerly secular pro-democracy activists who have been drawn to Jihadism as a consequence of regime repression. The vicious circle of violent repression and extremism has first become evident with the horrors in Iraq where the formerly ruling Sunni minority has now been disenfranchised by the Shiite government and even more in Syria, where the barbarian repression of the Assad regime led to the radicalisation of a considerable part of the initially mainly peaceful opposition.

Even “successful” military campaigns by repressive regimes for the most part do not tackle the problems caused by violent extremists in the long run/sustainably. Algeria, which was the first Southern Mediterranean country confronted with a large-scale insurgency by Jihadists, did not only pay a tremendous human price for fighting the insurgency but was only able to reduce the phenomenon through a political process (amnesty and reconciliation) and, as of now, not entirely successful fight against economic exclusion with considerable resources from its oil and gas wealth. Yet the Jihadists were not completely defeated. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb relocated to the Sahel countries and in recent years was still able to commit large-scale attacks and even destabilise neighbouring countries.

Generally, one can state that repressive and authoritarian regimes create spillover effects. The Egyptian repression of the first historic Jihadist movement after the assassination of Anwar Al Sadat in 1979 led to a massive influx of Jihadists to Afghanistan and consequently to the formation of al-Qaeda.
These spillover effects to other countries amplify in an increasingly globalised world as shown by the Syrian civil war with its tens of thousands of foreign fighters from authoritarian regimes like Chechnya and Saudi Arabia or from countries where Muslim minorities are oppressed, like the Philippines. The influx of European fighters in Syria and Iraq can definitely not be explained by authoritarianism in Europe, but Jihadist attacks in Europe are also partly rooted in the not entirely mistaken belief by violent extremists in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean that European countries are de facto allies of repressive regimes in the Arab world. This is true for the first Jihadist attacks in Europe, for example in France in the 1990s related to Algeria, as well as for more recent attacks related to the conflict in Syria and Iraq.

As the previous discussion shows, a strong correlation can be made between authoritarianism, (perceived) social, economic and political marginalisation of individuals or groups and consequent radicalisation towards violent extremism. At present, governments in the North tend to cooperate with authoritarian and repressive regimes in the South, believing that they will successfully defeat extremists and minimise the direct effects of violent extremism on both the global economy and the societies of the North. Not only does this behaviour stabilise and legitimise authoritarian regimes that disrespect fundamental human rights, it also fuels hatred of marginalised groups within the authoritarian states of the Southern and Southeast Mediterranean against the nations of the North, not to mention the disenfranchised Muslim minority groups within the Global North.

This leads to a crucial dilemma, especially for practitioners and policy-makers: should democratic governments support authoritarian regimes in their confrontation with violent extremists without putting considerable reform pressure on them in regard to democratisation, the rule of law and the respect for human rights? The author of these pages believes that the economically and politically powerful states of the Global North must permanently exercise such pressure on authoritarian rulers and make extensive use of soft diplomacy to amplify this effort.

The path to democratisation might be cumbersome and extremely long. Pure repression might lead to quicker short-term gains but in the long run accountability and participatory political systems will be the only solution to combat violent extremism at its roots.

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BUILDING A BRIDGE: ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY IN PREVENTING ALL FORMS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

LUCA GERVASONI I VILA
Codirector of NOVACT, International Institute for Nonviolent Action

A few weeks after the terrorist attacks in Barcelona, clichés about how to fight terrorism are again doing the rounds. For some, the members of the cell behind the Barcelona attacks were “brainwashed” and should be fought using legal weapons such as those used to combat sect recruitment strategies. For others the blame lies in the lack of social cohesion and integration policies. For many, anti-terrorist policies should be reinforced through an intensive deployment of police.

To some extent, similar questions are being raised in Germany. The recent entry in the Bundestag of the populist radical-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has given even more ground to the debate around how to counter the emerging radicalisation of Neo-Nazi movements. Should local police be reinforced? Should intelligence agencies infiltrate social media? Should we convert school teachers into allies of police forces to denounce cases of violent radicalisation?

The reality is that over the past few decades, Euro-Mediterranean governments have chosen to answer these questions with the same linear responses: violent extremism and terrorism should be addressed through security counter-terrorism measures.

In several countries, constitutional amendments or legislation have been approved to trigger a state of emergency more easily or to grant special powers to security and intelligence services. In France, for example, a new state of emergency norm has been established standardising a range of intrusive measures, including powers to ban demonstrations and conduct searches without judicial warrants. Some states have misused counter-terror laws to target human rights defenders and political activists. Turkey, Israel or Egypt are a stark example. Almost all Euro-Mediterranean governments have passed new laws allowing indiscriminate mass surveillance and granting intrusive powers to security and intelligence services including wire-tapping, monitoring of electronic communications and surveillance of telecommunications networks without any judicial oversight. In general, the anxiety to respond to violence is driving the Euro-Mediterranean region into a deep and dangerous state of permanent securitisation where plural and democratic values have been limited and expanding human rights violations are committed in the name of security.¹

Has this been effective? The responses to the 8th Euromed Survey seem to be quite critical regarding the results obtained after decades of intensive investment in security. The results can be easily read as an agreement on the point that security-only counter-terrorism strategies cannot dry up the emotional and social wellsprings of violent radicalisation and, indeed, can make matters worse. There is a general agreement in the Survey on the point that maintaining a state of emergency in countries at risk, increasing the level of law enforcement, reinforcing the military response against terrorist groups or increasing border control should not be the way towards a more effective response (see Graph 1). We need to think differently.

Graph 1: What should be the main priorities in order to effectively counter violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region?
(results show the first choice out of four)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the number of law enforcement members to monitor the whereabouts of suspected individuals</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting good governance, democracy and human rights</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating the spread of hate speech, promotion of violence and dissemination of terrorist propaganda online</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solving unresolved conflicts</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better information sharing of intelligence between Euro-Mediterranean countries</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaging communities; local initiatives can generate a climate of trust and enhance cooperation on the ground</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk assessments and development of risk indicators</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposing alternative narratives to propaganda developed by violent extremist groups</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Islamophobia</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing border control</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military response against terrorist groups</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating information circulation between security/intelligence services and local authorities/religious communities</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the number of law enforcement members in order to monitor the whereabouts of suspected individuals</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining state of emergency in countries at risk</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

The Euromed Survey results are consistent with the idea that there is a general need to take a more comprehensive approach which encompasses not only ongoing security measures but also systematic preventive measures that directly address the drivers of violent extremism and its root causes. But how can we organise it?

How can civil society, particularly in the Euro-Mediterranean region, generate a new paradigm based on the prevention of violent extremism? Let’s explore some key ideas in this short analytical article.

State action against terrorism may prompt many to join violent extremist groups: civil society could be a more legitimate actor to work on prevention

There is a paradox that is not easy to explain: state actions (among which not only of authoritarian regimes against terrorism have the potential to push people into violent extremism. Why?
Perhaps the most rigorous answer to understand this paradox are the results of the study “Journey to Extremism in Africa”, published recently by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), where almost 500 former combatants were asked about their drivers, incentives and tipping point for recruitment. There is a growing alarm that, as a region, Africa’s vulnerability to violent extremism is deepening and it seems that expanding our knowledge regarding what is motivating this “new front” seems fundamental right now.

What were the conclusions of the report? Of more than 500 former members of militant organisations interviewed for the report, 71% pointed to government action, including the killing or arrest of a family member or friend as the incident that prompted them to join a group. The report says: “State security-actor conduct is revealed as a prominent accelerator of recruitment, rather than the reverse”. Also: “In a majority of cases, paradoxically, state action appears to be the primary factor finally pushing individuals into violent extremism”.

Of course, the report does not say that the heavy-handed tactics adopted by authorities is the only factor leading individuals into violent extremism: many factors can explain the spread of the attraction of extremist ideologies. But it seems that the responses that governments are adopting are making things worse.

There is a logic that can help us understand this. We are aware that governments’ counter-terrorism response in almost all countries aims to suppress terrorist activity by security adopting strategies that generate a decrease in civil liberties and rights. The problem is that the already existing individual and group grievances can be boosted by these strategies. And, even more, the fact that governments responsible for taking care of the whole population are responsible for violating rights of some stigmatised communities can help to spread a narrative that makes the message of violent extremist organisations more attractive.

Aware of this potential risk, are state institutions and security forces the most legitimate actors to implement preventive measures to render the violent extremist message unattractive? Probably not. This is why engaging independent civil society in preventing all forms of violent extremism, promoting good governance, democracy and human rights and addressing economic and social root causes is probably one of the most important tasks to be developed in the future. They are the best alternative.

Civil society represents an underused resource to confront violent extremism

During the last few decades various international statements at all levels have highlighted the role of civil society in a comprehensive and multidimensional response to the threat of violent extremism. The United Nations’ General Assembly, in its resolution adopting the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, confirmed the determination of member states to “further encourage non-governmental organisations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy”. In the framework of the OSCE, the African Union, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation or the European Union, among others, it has been recognised that it is critically important to engage civil society in finding common political settlements for conflicts and to promote human rights and tolerance as essential elements in the prevention of violent extremism.

However, the good-will positions expressed have not been followed by real on-the-ground measures to reinforce the civil society contribution to prevent violent extremism. The results of the Euromed Survey actually show that this should be a priority of multilateral initiatives.

Graph 2: The need to address the rise of violent extremism at the multilateral level has been acknowledged and has materialised in a number of initiatives. To what extent should the primary concern of multilateral initiatives be to:

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

- Promote and fund projects targeting communities and civil society and local actors: 7.6
- Focus on the development agenda: 7.4
- Exchange best practices among experts: 7.4
- Promote and fund capacity-building initiatives targeting national authorities: 7.2
- Focus on the security/counter-terrorism agenda: 6.9
- Set up parameters of action (offering a framework for national and regional action plans): 6.8

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Actually, there is a growing concern that states are interested in restraining the space of civil society. In the name of fighting terrorism, governments have curtailed political freedoms and imposed restrictive measures against human rights defenders and civil society activists in many countries. States systematically invoke national security and public safety to shrink the space of independent civil society activities. In many countries, special legislative and regulatory measures have been used to crack down on NGOs and activists who advocate social change and criticise government policies. These measures make it more difficult for civil society actors to promote human rights and tolerance as an essential element in the prevention of violent extremism. It is essential to maintain and protect civil society if we want to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.

Civil society can reinforce community resilience and raise alternative narratives faced with the violent extremist message

We should all agree that when security authorities need to respond, we have in fact already failed in our longing for peaceful existence. When a state imposes a response based on security measures, it is because there has been a failure to deal with the factors that lead to extremism and violence. Nowadays, there is something that we know: radicalisation is a local phenomenon that happens on soccer fields, in parks and cafes. There is no way to investigate every person but if someone is already suspected, only local communities, their families, friends, the people they meet in cafés, could know about it. Equipping them to solve local problems and avoiding the distraction of easy, unhelpful generalisations about immigrant or local communities is the best way to thwart the violent extremist international aims.
Most of the fact findings regarding radicalisation processes indicate that very few recruits were self-radicalised; for the vast majority, radicalisation was facilitated through social interaction.

Again we risk providing a reductive answer. The local context is crucial in every experience. In some context recruiters operate within the closed and trusted circles of neighbourhood, family and friendship networks; in others it is within the prisons, religious communities or refugee camps...

Moroccan respondent

Areas where recruiters can prey on people’s hopes in the face of alienating defeat are the best places to convert people to any kind of unusual ideology or faith, including ones that might lead to extreme violence.

UK respondent

The Internet can facilitate this but the existence of very specific geographical hotspots that produce the bulk of violent extremism indicates that, when it comes to recruitment, offline factors are more important than the Internet. When radical ideas get introduced into tight-knit networks of friends the feelings of individual or group grievances act as echo chambers that reinforce those beliefs.

That means that any specific activity aiming to prevent the success of violent messages should have the capillarity, the legitimacy and the capabilities to foster community resilience faced with the violent extremist messages. Evidence-based approaches would try to mitigate group radicalisation. Values and beliefs are socially embedded. Once the social setting changes, the beliefs may lose their grounding. For this reason, social organisation delivering a different message, an alternative narrative, are not only crucial for mitigating radicalisation processes but can be important in the prevention and deradicalisation process as well. Several programmes have proved that civil society members acting locally can be an effective tool to pull a person or group away from violent extremism.

There is an emerging agenda of the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Society for contributing to the prevention of violent extremism

One of the most repeated and dangerous clichés when debating the potential involvement of civil society organisations in prevention of violent extremism activities has been the “rumour” of their lack of a positive agenda to contribute constructively to policy proposal. Most of the governments, when interviewed regarding the need to engage CSOs, repeat quite similar ideas: CSOs are not prepared, they are there just to criticise, they have no constructive ideas... This is no longer true. Human rights and peace-building organisations have been organising over the last few years all across the Euro-Mediterranean region to set up an agenda for action. The Barcelona Declaration is an example of these efforts. Answers to Questions 14 and 15 of the 8th Euromed Survey edition gives credit to the shared proposal that there is a need to further reinforce CSOs’ engagement in prevention of violent extremism and target communities. It is especially relevant that it was the most supported quote both for Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries and for EU countries.

3. This matches with Ritzmann’s assertion “The role of the social media in radicalisation is overstated” see Ritzmann “The Role of Propaganda in Violent Extremism and how to Counter it” p. 26).
Graph 3: Do you agree with the following statements regarding Euro-Mediterranean cooperation?

- Cooperation between civil society organizations working on the Prevention of Violent Extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean area should be reinforced
  - Totally disagree: 64%
  - Disagree: 22%
  - Neither agree nor disagree: 6%
  - Agree: 10%
  - Totally agree: 1%

- Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation fora to address violent extremism and exchange best practices are missing
  - Totally disagree: 53%
  - Disagree: 23%
  - Neither agree nor disagree: 10%
  - Agree: 8%
  - Totally agree: 5%

- There is a deficit of cooperation between security agencies of Mediterranean northern and southern countries
  - Totally disagree: 50%
  - Disagree: 22%
  - Neither agree nor disagree: 13%
  - Agree: 9%
  - Totally agree: 6%

- The Union for the Mediterranean could play a role in this regard
  - Totally disagree: 40%
  - Disagree: 24%
  - Neither agree nor disagree: 12%
  - Agree: 9%
  - Totally agree: 15%

- Cooperation should remain mostly bilateral, focus on the security angle and therefore primarily involve security and intelligence agencies
  - Totally disagree: 14%
  - Disagree: 16%
  - Neither agree nor disagree: 12%
  - Agree: 21%
  - Totally agree: 36%

- There are some ideas shared by most independent CSOs that deserve to be shared

It is important to insist on the need to confront all violent extremisms. There has been a tendency in academia and policies to focus much of the efforts on studying radicalisation processes connected to Jihadism while other forms, equally dangerous, of violent extremism were almost forgotten, such as the extreme right or Islamophobia. Only by understanding the interconnection between the different forms of violent extremism will it be possible to set up effective responses. This is coherent with the results of the Euromed Survey including those related to question 16: countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin, should be the priority work of the EU and member states (see Graph 4).
Graph 4: What should the EU and its member states focus on as a matter of priority? (results show the first choice out of three)

- Countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin: 25%
- Contributing to solving conflicts outside the EU that provide fertile ground or violent extremism: 22%
- Supporting good governance in non-EU countries in order to address underlying factors of radicalisation: 13%
- Countering terrorist propaganda and hate speech online: 11%
- Focusing on targeted preventive measures: 7%
- Promoting inclusive education and EU common values: 7%
- Deradicalisation, disengagement and reintegration strategies: 6%
- Security-focused measures within the European Union: 6%
- Contributing to strengthening security capacities of non-EU countries: 3%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

The second idea is the need to focus on latent violence (cultural and structural violence) and not only on direct violence. According to CSOs there is a need to work not only on confronting terrorist attacks but also on preventing other forms of violence such as hate speech, hate crimes or structural violence.

The third idea is the need to work on ensuring the protection of human rights in counter-terrorism laws. An independent civil society is one of the most promising strategies to ensure a state action that will respect human rights standards. Only a society with professional watchdog systems will have enough social capital to promote democratic values and protect civil society space.

Last but not least is the defence of a community development approach. Faced with violent extremism, we will not be successful unless we can harness the idealism, creativity and energy of civil society groups all around the Euro-Mediterranean region. Social movements must be empowered to make a constructive contribution to the political and economic development of their societies and nations. Civil society can offer a positive vision of a future together that can generate an effective alternative to violent radicalisation. CSOs are convinced that engaging civil society in community development actions, based on the full respect for human rights and with economic opportunities for all, represents the most tangible and meaningful alternative to violent extremism and the most promising strategy to render this menace unattractive.

Civil society can offer a positive vision of a future together that can generate an effective alternative to violent radicalisation.
The opportunity of the UN Plan of Action

Faced with the current efforts to develop a new, more comprehensive and effective paradigm based on the prevention of violent extremism, there has been a relevant initiative that deserves attention: the UN Secretary-General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism that was presented to the General Assembly on January 2016. In this Plan, the Secretary-General calls for a comprehensive approach encompassing ongoing measures with systematic preventive steps to address the underlying conditions that drive individuals to radicalise and join violent extremist groups. The Plan is a concrete response from the international community coordinated among civil society groups from all over the world that appeals for concerted action to support national, regional and global efforts to prevent violent extremism and assist member states, municipalities and governorates in developing National Plans of Action.

The UN Plan of Action constitutes the inaugural basis for a comprehensive approach to this fast, evolving and multidimensional challenge. At a time of growing polarisation on several national, regional and global issues, the new paradigm based on prevention offers a real opportunity for all the actors of the Euro-Mediterranean community to offer a more agile and far-reaching response. The definition of local plans could be an excellent opportunity to build bridges with civil society groups and call upon the commitment of civil society organisations to concerted action.

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VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN LIBYA AND ITS EURO-MEDITERRANEAN IMPLICATIONS

MUSTAFA EL SAGEZLI
General Manager, Libyan Program for Reintegration and Development

Introduction

Since the early 1980s, Libya has been a fertile environment for the spread of radicalisation, extremism and violent resistance to Gaddafi’s authoritarian repressive regime. The current situation must be understood in the light of this recent history, as suggested by a Libyan respondent to the Euromed Survey in the following quote:

In my country, Libya, it is the failure of all state institutions as well as decades of dictatorship and oppression that lead to grief and radicalisation of youth.

Libyan respondent

In 1976, Gaddafi imposed on the Libyan people his Green Book that all Libyans had to follow and adopt in their personal, social, political and economic life. Libyans had no choice but to implement the Green Book and its tenets in their life or else they would be persecuted or imprisoned, and in many cases opposing the “Great Leader” would lead to physical liquidation. This zero tolerance policy towards any opposition to the regime gave no choice to peaceful opposition inside the country. A simple verbal comment on or criticism of the regime could easily lead to the death penalty in front of masses in the holy month of Ramadan. Exclusion and crushing of any second opinion except the Guide’s made opponents of the regime gather, communicate and group secretly underground.

In the 1980s many opposition members were executed and thousands were imprisoned and tortured. Underground networks, prisons and secret groups were fertile environments for radical and extremist seeds to grow and flourish. Extremist ideologies, such as Al-Qaeda, were imported from Salafist Jihadist group rhetoric against dictators and tyrants. The government’s closure of Islamic universities teaching the moderate traditional Maliki Islamic school of thought and the neglecting of Islamic scholars gave way to many young Jihadist activists and zealots becoming the new religious leaders. Calls for Jihad, revolt, violent resistance and rebellion against a tyrant found listening ears from many young people. A leader that silenced any free voice, impoverished a rich nation and imposed his personal philosophy on the people gave no choice to youths but to revolt.

Young people in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s found all venues blocked for expressing their opinions, aiming for a peaceful change and living a decent life. The situation is best described by the Libyan Arabic proverb “Oppression leads to explosion”, and explosion it was on 17 February 2011. The post-revolution Libyan governments and society face the challenge of violent extremism that was inherited from the previous regime in an environment of conflict, the spread of arms and proliferation of militias. Understanding the root causes of violent extremism and analysing the current context is the right way to find sustainable solutions to the phenomena. Libya, with its proximity to Europe and being a Euro-Mediterranean country, affects and is affected by its region and surroundings. As illustrated by the results of the Euromed Survey, Libya is likely to
continue to suffer from violent extremism in the coming years, which is a threat to its stability as well as the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole.

**Graph 1: Which of these countries* are likely to become targets or continue being targeted by violent extremism in the upcoming years?**
(results show first choice out of three)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SSM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents had a drop-down menu with the 43 Euro-Mediterranean countries (members of the Union for the Mediterranean) as well as Russia, the US and the Gulf countries, Iran and Iraq.

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Therefore, Libya’s challenges and solutions to its violent extremism problem should be well understood and supported by its Euro-Mediterranean neighbours. In this article I shall explore the causes of and solution to the violent extremism challenge Libya faces and how Libya and its Euro-Mediterranean neighbours can overcome this challenge and its implications for the region. The results of the Euromed Survey will allow me to illustrate some parts of this analysis, particularly those related to drivers of violent extremism and ways to confront it.

### Causes

**Injustice**

Exclusion in its political, social and economic forms is a cause of radicalisation and extremism (see El Difraoui “Authoritarianism and Radicalisation towards Violent Extremism” p. 34). Political and socioeconomic grievances are strong drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism. For more than four decades only pro-Gaddafi revolutionary committees enjoyed the status of true patriotic citizens, giving them socioeconomic and political privileges. All non-members of the Gaddafist revolutionary committees were marginalised and excluded from any sort of political participation or socioeconomic privileges. Normal citizens who were non-members of the revolutionary committees lived their daily life suffering injustice, hoping that change would come and in many ways their hearts secretly supported any form of opposition to their oppressor including radical violent means. Oppression and injustice were the most effective tools of recruiting youths to radical and extremist groups. Leaders of such groups found it easy to convince oppressed youths to defend their rights with all possible means, including violence.

**Political and socioeconomic grievances are strong drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism in Libya.**
The Euromed Survey 2018 Qualitative Analysis

Cultural and Ideological
Ideology played a crucial role in radicalising many young Libyans. Radical religious interpretations and narratives of Islam were adopted by angry youths. Themes like Jihad, violent resistance and martyrdom were adopted by youths facing the totalitarian regime either secretly underground or in prisons. Many Islamic jurisprudential rulings (Fatwas) calling for Jihad were taken out of context to recruit, mobilise and arm youths by Jihadist Salafist extremist groups. With the lack of Islamic educational institutions and the long marginalisation of Islamic scholars, such groups were the only source of Fatwas for youths. The Malaki moderate traditional Islamic schools, universities and scholars were all silenced or marginalised by the Gaddafi regime, opening the door for importing violent extremist Fatwas from the Salafist Jihadist extremist school.

Socioeconomic Grievances
As illustrated by the results of the Euromed Survey, poverty, unemployment and socioeconomic exclusion are all drivers of radicalism, especially when they are interconnected with a belief that you are a citizen of a rich country. A young man who believes that his country is rich and that the regime is depriving him of his country’s riches is bound to have many grievances.

Graph 2: Drivers providing fertile ground for the development of violent extremism.
(% of the most significant driver by group of countries)

- Weak state capacity and failing security: 21%
- Role and impact of global geopolitics, including perception of political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression of certain groups in other countries: 22%
- In the country of residence: political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression, Islamophobia: 31%
- Economic exclusion and limited opportunities: 45%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Knowing that a small privileged group of society is enjoying the country’s resources (oil and gas) and not being able to benefit from the country’s wealth to live a decent life can only lead to radicalisation. Young Libyans had a famous saying during Gaddafi’s regime that “we are a rich country with a poor population”. Libya with all its riches scored relatively low on the human and economic development indicators.

The post-revolution governments since the break of the armed conflict in 2014 have not been able to accomplish any reforms to the economy. In the last three years the economy has collapsed with the Libyan Dinar losing 80% of its value. These economic failures are a strong driver towards more chaos, conflict and rise of violent extremism.

Themes like Jihad, violent resistance and martyrdom were adopted by youths facing the totalitarian regime.

Not being able to benefit from the country’s wealth to live a decent life can only lead to radicalisation.
International Interventions
In Libya and the Arab countries, Western policies were always in favour of Western interests no matter who ruled our countries or how bad they were governed. Authoritarian, repressive regimes, including Gaddafi’s, were tolerated for decades with little concern for the livelihood of the people, democracy or human rights. The only intervention on the side of the people, their freedom, human rights and prosperity were in 2011 in support of the Arab Spring. Many Libyans thought that it was a new Western policy shift from supporting tyrants to supporting peoples’ rights and democracy. Unfortunately, after the success of the Libyan revolution the Western intervention stopped short of supporting Libya in nation building. This policy of refraining from intervening in state building, socioeconomic development and security sector reform was seen as betraying the revolutions.

Worse than that is the claim by some Western politicians that intervening to support the revolutions against authoritarian regimes was a mistake, as if the people do not deserve to be free and live in a democratic country. Such opinions and claims can only send the wrong message to youths that Western policies support tyrants and oppressive regimes as they can make better bargains with them. Policies of some Western governments supporting Hefter, a military dictator seen by many Libyans as the incarnation of Gaddafi, are a clear setback to the 2011 policies of supporting the people’s uprising for a free democratic prosperous Libya. Hefter, after failing to come to power through a military coup in February 2014 in the capital Tripoli, returned to Benghazi with his Karama (Dignity) campaign against “Terrorism”. Since then the country has entered into civil war, chaos and a power vacuum, as illustrated by the comment of a Swiss respondent to the Euromed Survey.

The process of state-rebuilding in these countries will undoubtedly be accompanied by violent extremism, especially if there is a power vacuum as in Libya or if power is contested by multiple actors.

Swiss respondent

The policies of some Western countries to support military dictators claiming to fight terrorism can only fuel radicalisation, violent extremism and spread chaos in Libya and the region.

Solutions

Inclusion
Political and socioeconomic inclusion of all components of society including youths is essential for deradicalisation, stability and peace building. World states that were able to include their political opponents and religious political parties such as Morocco, Indonesia, Malaysia and Israel are a good example of including politically moderate and extremist religious parties in their democratic political system.
Political inclusion gives ideological radicals an opportunity to express themselves peacefully rather than violently. Such political inclusion gives ideological radicals an opportunity to express themselves peacefully rather than violently. Many of the radical groups and parties deradicalise by joining the democratic process. Entering into the democratic game of alliances, elections, campaigning and joining political coalitions softens many of the extreme views of these parties. Socioeconomic inclusion is also an effective tool of deradicalisation, demobilisation and disarming of armed radical groups. SMEs and economic opportunities attract many of the youths who otherwise would be attracted by extremist militant groups. Interviews that were conducted after the Libyan revolution in 2012 showed that more than 42% of armed revolutionaries including Islamic extremists were willing to demobilise and disarm in exchange for an opportunity to establish a small business (LPRD, 2015).
Dialogue, Awareness and Education
Talking, debating and negotiating with extremists might not be a policy favoured by Western governments but in the Libyan context it can save many lives and deradicalise many youths. Many of the young radicals and extremists have not been well educated or exposed to any free thinking environment. In the era of Gaddafi a person had one of two choices: either to believe in and follow the Green Book or adopt a rebellious philosophy. The trend amongst youths in the 1990s and 2000s was to adopt Jihadist Salafist ideologies where they found mental comfort in standing up to “Tyrants and Pharaohs”.

Most Arab countries (dictatorship regimes) have helped directly or indirectly in the surge of violent extremism by banning political and religious freedom. The imprisonment of Islamist leaders and their followers led to more radicalisation and gave them the illusion that they are being fought because they are on the right path, because their cause is the holiest.

Talking and debating with these young extremists is an important method for deradicalisation. Violent extremist Islamic groups depend on misinterpretations of Islamic jurisdictions (Fatwa). By talking and debating with them it is possible to convince many of them of the weak basis of their hypothesis and that their Jihadist path is a deviation from Islamic jurisdictions. Spreading awareness in schools, universities and society about the misconceptions of Jihad and advocating a moderate Islamic narrative is also an important method of protecting youths from violent extremist ideologies. Empowering the traditional moderate Maliki Islamic school of thought by reopening its schools and universities and connecting them to the Maghreb Maliki educational institutions can stop the high wave of Salafism coming from the east.

Socioeconomic Reintegration
The greatest challenge that Libya’s stabilisation faces is the lack of security caused by the proliferation of arms and armed groups. Millions of arms have been spread amongst Libyans during the revolution and continue to be in the hands of the population all over the country. Hundreds of armed groups in the country vary from ex-revolutionaries, ex-regime supporters, and tribal, extremist and criminal groups. Some efforts were started after the revolution in 2012-2013 by the Libyan Program for Reintegration and Development (LPRD) to reintegrate ex-revolutionaries into the new state, including socioeconomic reintegration and SMEs. Socioeconomic reintegration depends mainly on SMEs as it is the only way to provide ex-combatants with sustainable business and job opportunities with the current situation of the bloated public sector. Entrepreneurship and SMEs can create jobs and economic development in local communities where it is most needed. Municipalities can play an important role in reintegrating armed group members, including extremists, by providing them with rehabilitation, business incubation, training and financing new small businesses. Engaging ex-combatants in new businesses has proved to be a very effective method of reintegration and disarmament.

Positive International Policies
The West and our European neighbours have been intervening in our internal affairs since the colonial era. These interventions have been driven by mere economic and political interests. The West must admit that during the last century most of the policies on our region and Libya did not prioritise freedom, democracy and the prosperity of our people. Now is the time to change these policies and engage in a balanced sincere partnership with the people based on mutual benefits. The Arab Spring has opened the way for a new partnership between Europe and Libya based on the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and open markets that the 17 February uprising called for. Unlike coordinating with authoritarian repressive regimes, partnering with democratic governments that represent the people could be the right framework for combating terrorism and violent extremism. Intervening to help the Libyan people to rebuild their new state by reconciliation, security sector reform, institution building, good governance and socioeconomic reforms would bring stability and prosperity to both sides of the Mediterranean.
Conclusion and Implications for the Euro-Mediterranean

Libya is a country of great importance for the Euro-Mediterranean region. With its unique location in the centre of North Africa, its abundant natural resources and its young human capital, Libya can contribute to the prosperity of the Euro-Mediterranean region. However, the fragile security context and the proliferation of armed groups have devastating consequences for its social stability and economic development. Libya is at a crossroads: either it moves ahead into state building, stabilisation and socioeconomic development or it falls into more conflict. Violent extremism, terrorism and chaos are a contagious disease that is affecting neighbouring countries and the Euro-Mediterranean. If the world is a small village then the Euro-Mediterranean is a farm in this village. Members of this farm must ensure all inhabitants security and well-being, otherwise the whole farm will suffer. The Euro-Mediterranean countries have no choice but to help Libya overcome its fragility, conflict and state building challenges to save Libya and the region from chaos.

Mustafa El Sagezli, General Manager of the Libyan Program for Reintegration and Development. Graduate of Utah State University and the London School of Economics. He was Deputy Minister of the Interior in Libya’s Transitional Government and the Founding Director of the Warriors Affairs Commission from October 2011.
EU-TUNISIA COOPERATION ON SECURITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM¹

GILLES DE KERCHOVE
EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator²

The European Union’s resolute commitment to support the Tunisian democratic transition since the January 2011 revolution remains intact and is a long-term concern. The EU stands firm on Tunisia’s current challenges, such as the Libyan crisis and the threat of the return of terrorist fighters following the disappearance of the “Caliphate” in Iraq and Syria.

The EU and Tunisia have defined a new cooperation approach with the aim of providing the responses that best adapt to its rapid evolution and ambitious reform process, also in the security field.

The Tunisian revolution revealed the structural difficulties to be addressed by the security institutions and the judiciary. Reforms are underway to enable these key sovereign sectors to fulfil their missions while developing a culture of accountability and transparency based on respect for human rights and the rule of law.

The conclusions of the Council of Foreign Affairs held on 9 February 2015 (after the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015) and later those of 19 June 2017 called for stronger cooperation in the fight against terrorism, particularly in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. It is in this context that since 2015 experts in security and counter-terrorism have been appointed in the region, including within the EU delegation in Tunis. These experts provide real added value to our cooperation, help to structure it more efficiently and meet the expectations of the Tunisian authorities.

The EU has developed a privileged working relationship with Tunisia. It has started a series of visits (I went to Tunis five times in 2015, and also accompanied Donald Tusk, President of the Council of Europe, after the Sousse attack) that led to a high-level dialogue on “security and counter-terrorism”³ since September 2015 while promoting full respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. On 19 January 2017 the second high-level dialogue was held.⁴ The EU and Tunisia also agreed on a third meeting of this political dialogue in 2018.

Tunisia is currently the only Mediterranean Partner Country with which the EU has deployed so comprehensively the range of instruments at its disposal to fight against terrorism.

¹ The original version of this article was written in French and is available at www.iemed.org
² The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of its author and can in no way be considered as reflecting the views of the Council of the European Union or the European Council.
³ This dialogue was the first of this kind for the EU with a third country of the MENA region.
⁴ The priorities defined for 2017 are: implementation of the Tunisian strategy to fight against terrorism; fight against radicalisation; mobilisation of the EU justice and home affairs agencies (Europol, Eurojust, CEPOL); improvised explosive devices (IEDs); arms trafficking; protection of soft targets and aviation security; and the fight against money laundering, which finances organised crime and terrorism.
For its part, the Maltese Presidency of the Council of the European Union organised an official visit to Tunis with the delegates of the EU member states of the Council’s Working Party on Terrorism International Aspects (COTER) last April, which helped to make member states more aware of the Tunisian reality and bore witness to the improvement of the security situation thanks to a better Tunisian response to terrorism and increasingly more coordinated aid from the international community. Finally, I went to Tunis on 16-18 October 2017 after the visits of Commissioners Hahn and Avramopoulos last summer.

As revealed by the Euromed Survey conducted by the IEMed, the terrorist attacks suffered by Tunisia in recent years have had an impact on the country but also on the European Union and the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole.

Graph 1: In your opinion, which terrorist attack(s) do you consider the most harmful to the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole over the last few years?
(categories developed from the open-ended answers)

Europe shares the same security challenges as Tunisia, with the emergence of new forms of crime and terrorism, the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, as well as the same aspirations for human dignity and exemplary police forces.

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5. The creation of the donor’s platform “G7+6” is a remarkable example of good coordination on the ground.
Thus, in the framework of a comprehensive “anti-terrorism package”, the EU has backed the reforms thanks to a “Security Sector Reform Support Programme” endowed with €23 million. The resources mobilised are suited to the objective pursued. The aim is to support the security sector in the implementation of the institutional reforms to strengthen its capacity to efficiently fulfil its missions with due regard to democratic values, fundamental rights and human rights as guaranteed in the new Tunisian constitution.

The results of the Survey seem to indicate that Tunisians are less positive about the policies implemented to fight the phenomenon of violent extremism than some of their neighbours, while still recognising the scope of the challenges.

Graph 2: To what extent do you consider that the overall efforts deployed so far in confronting violent extremism in your own country are effective?

(answers in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All survey</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
<th>SSM respondents</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
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<td>High extent</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>Very high extent</td>
<td>39</td>
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Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

L’approche sécuritaire seule ne peut pas donner beaucoup de résultats efficaces, il faut déployer plus d’efforts par une approche globale.

Tunisian respondent

En Tunisie jusque-là la réponse a été sécuritaire. La population civile s’est montrée très vigilante et empêché le pays de basculer dans l’horreur.

Tunisian respondent

Les forces de l’ordre ont réalisé des progrès notables dans leur lutte contre le terrorisme. Mais le vrai combat sera socioculturel.

Tunisian respondent

The EU action seeks in fact to support the Tunisian authorities to meet these challenges. Three working lines were identified. A first section deals with the support for the reform of the internal security forces through the reform of the system of internal control and implementation of an independent external control system. Moreover, the project will enhance the technical and operational capacities of the state services to increase the efficacy of the security apparatus in terms of investigation and management of borders and crises.

Finally, the EU will contribute to the modernisation of the information services of the Ministry of the Interior and other institutions concerned with the main aim of better border control and efficiently fighting against terrorism.

Tunisians are less positive about the policies implemented to fight the phenomenon of violent extremism than some of their neighbours. The EU action seeks in fact to support the Tunisian authorities to meet these challenges.
As for strengthening the culture of the rule of law in the actions of the security forces, the project seeks, through the implementation of an internal and external control system, to monitor the behaviour of police officers to restore citizen confidence in the security institutions, fight against abuses and continue the fight against corruption. This effort seems in line with the views of those who, in response to one of the questions in the Euromed Survey on the priorities to be followed by the EU, considered that the EU should continue supporting the reforms concerning good governance.

Graph 3: What should the EU and its member states focus on as a matter of priority? (results show the first choice out of three)

- Countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin: 41%
- Contributing to solving conflicts outside the EU that provide fertile ground for violent extremism: 21%
- Supporting good governance in non-EU countries in order to address underlying factors of radicalisation: 14%
- Countering terrorist propaganda and hate speech online: 12%
- Focusing on targeted preventive measures: 6%
- Promoting inclusive education and EU common values: 7%
- Deradicalisation, disengagement and reintegration strategies: 4.4%
- Contributing to strengthening security capacities of non-EU countries: 4%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

L’UE est notre partenaire privilégié, notre passage obligé. Il convient de restaurer la confiance. Celle-ci dépend de son aide accrue au développement et de sa volonté réelle d’œuvrer pour une paix durable au Proche-Orient.

Tunisian respondent

This EU support for the Tunisian security sector should be placed in parallel to the financial and technical support consequently aimed at the justice sector, another pillar of the rule of law. The Justice Reform Support Programme in these two early phases represents an envelope of €40 million and contributes to the modernisation of the judiciary towards more independence, quality and efficacy.
In practice, the EU also puts at the disposal of Tunisia the experience of the member states and the technical means to help it guarantee the security of its land borders and to fight against transnational crime.

This element, implemented by UNOPS, notably foresees the modernisation of three command centres (Médenine, Tataoutine, Kasserine) as well as enhancing the capacities of the structures responsible for controls.

The border area with Libya (where the whole Tunisian population resisted terrorism, together with the police, by defending sovereignty, territorial integrity, the rule of law and Tunisian democracy) is facing specific challenges, linked to the existence of an old transborder trade between the two countries and its informal nature. This traditional ecosystem was heavily disrupted by the civil war in Libya. In this very specific context, the Danish Demining Group has implemented in Ben Guerdane a project aimed at strengthening the coordination between the local communities and local security officers.

The EU has rapidly implemented other initiatives to the benefit of Tunisia to assist it in the fight against terrorism. In particular:

- The adoption by Tunisia of the National Counterterrorism Strategy on 7 November 2016.
- The development of a global policy for the prevention of radicalisation. The EU has committed to mobilise the expertise of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) for the benefit of Tunisia and to encourage direct cooperation between the experts of this network and the Tunisian platform against radicalisation.

Also the support from different European agencies:

- CEPOL (European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training). CEPOL organises efficient operational training to fight against terrorism.
- Europol, whose new regulation that came into force in May enables direct cooperation at a strategic level with Tunisia, without the need to negotiate a formal agreement.
- Eurojust
- The new European Board and Coast Guard Agency (replacing Frontex).

The support of the European Gendarmerie Force (FGE) for the Tunisian National Guard is also being put into place and support for the fight against money laundering, which finances organised crime and terrorism, may be considered. Some activities are also underway to strengthen the legislative framework and the Tunisian services on firearms trafficking.
Apart from these initiatives bilaterally developed by Tunisia, the EU has implemented regional projects to fight against terrorism that benefit this country as well as all countries of the European southern neighbourhood (such as the project Euromed Police IV).

Tunisia is also a priority for the ‘Strengthening Resilience II’ programme, which is implemented by the British Council, working with partners in the region and elsewhere. This project, which will run until 2021, builds on a successful pilot, implemented between 2015 and 2017, and is working to strengthen the resilience of young people and communities against violent extremist narratives in order to reduce the appeal of violent extremist groups.

As well as providing clarity around approaches that deliver resilience, the programme is expected to increase the resilience of young people in susceptible communities and increase the number of positive social, political and economic pathways. It will also provide:

- A better understanding of susceptibility to violent extremism.
- Effective communication strategies that provide an alternative to violent extremism.
- Transformative impact through dissemination and influencing of governments, think tanks and multilateral institutions.

We will continue to share our experiences to bring foreign terrorist fighters to justice, fight against their radicalisation in prisons and favour their integration into society.

Finally, a special mention should be made of the important initiative by President Essebsi and the High Representative Federica Mogherini in December 2016 for a Youth Partnership. This partnership is devoted to strengthening the prospects of Tunisian youths, who played a decisive role in the Tunisian revolution. Enriching the prospects of youths is also a way of enriching the country as a whole. And I am very hopeful about this joint initiative. It is by better mutual understanding that our societies will be able to face common challenges.

Gilles de Kerchove, Belgian senior European Union official. He was Director in the General Directorate of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union from 1995 to 2007, when he was appointed EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator.
CONTEXT AND DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

This block aims to assess the opinion of respondents on the environments that favour the surge of violent extremism. It also looks into the causes and mechanisms that create favourable conditions for an individual to turn into a violent extremist.

Main findings

• Asked to identify in which environments individuals are more likely to be turned into violent extremists, a majority of respondents answered “Conflict zones”. The virtual domain, i.e. the Internet and social media, is ranked second by respondents (respondents from the Maghreb ranked it first).

• Only one EU country (France) among the five most exposed Euromed countries.

• Overall, Syria and Iraq are seen as the countries more likely to suffer from violent extremism in the upcoming years. France is the most exposed European country according to respondents.

• Respondents are more prone to consider that other countries are exposed to the threat of violent extremism rather than their own country.

• State authorities have a particular responsibility in the surge of violent extremism (foreign military interventions, authoritarian trends or the failure to come up with inclusive policies).

• While respondents from the European Union mentioned “Marginalised urban areas” as offering fertile ground for violent extremism in bigger proportions than respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries, the latter were more prone to identify religious communities and educational institutions as environments in which an individual can turn into a violent extremist.

• Prisons are not considered as the most sensitive environment in this regard. On deradicalisation in prisons, respondents are sceptical about the possible influence of moderate religious actors on already radicalised individuals and insist on the ineffectiveness of isolating specific prisoners. In turn, they stress the importance of preparing prisoners for their reintegration into society and of training prison workers adequately.

• Respondents acknowledged that the question of the drivers was complex and plural. Violent extremism is to be understood as a social rather than religious phenomenon.

• “Weak state capacity, economic exclusion and limited opportunities” are seen as key drivers of violent extremism in Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries. “Political exclusion and discrimination” is seen as a key driver in EU countries, in particular according to respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries.

• At a more individual level, respondents agree that the most significant individual driver was the perceived humiliation and discrimination from the society in the country of residence on ethnic, national, linguistic or religious grounds.

• Almost twice as many EU respondents as their counterparts from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries considered that “Psychological vulnerability” is the most important factor.
“TERRITORIALISING” VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Question 1 was aimed at identifying which countries presented the highest risk of undergoing violent extremist attacks in the upcoming years. Respondents were asked to rank the three countries most exposed to violent extremism. Among the countries ranked first by respondents, Syria and Iraq obtained the highest percentages, followed by France.

Differences of patterns in the responses from EU respondents on the one hand and Southern and Southeast Mediterranean respondents on the other are rather limited regarding the three countries cited above, although EU respondents selected these three countries as first choice in bigger proportions than their counterparts from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries. In turn, the latter were more inclined to rank Egypt or Libya first (see Graph 1).

Turkey was not identified as a major target for violent extremist groups by a high proportion of respondents. However, the country featured higher among Turkish respondents than among the rest of participants. Turkey appears in third position among Turks, with only France and Iraq above.

However, in general, respondents tended to regard other countries as potential targets rather than their own country. French and Moroccan respondents, for instance, have not massively indicated France and Morocco respectively as countries at high risk.

Graph 1: Which of these countries* are likely to become targets or continue being targeted by violent extremism in the upcoming years? (results show the first choice out of three)

* Respondents had a drop-down menu with the 43 Euro-Mediterranean countries (members of the Union for the Mediterranean) as well as Russia, the US and the Gulf countries, Iran and Iraq.
** Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
Below is a selection of accompanying comments formulated by respondents:

Syria’s Assad regime will have a Jihadist problem for many years to come because of its sectarian affiliation and its brutality. Ruling by force alone will not work. Turkey, as a neighbour of Syria and party to the conflict, will likely also have to cope with growing problems of radicalisation (as seen in recent attacks, including the assassination of the Ambassador of Russia in Ankara). Finally, Tunisia has the greatest number of citizens fighting for ISIS, and this problem will likely come to haunt it at home after the fall of Raqqa and Mosul.

Israeli respondent

The UK and France both have a history of colonialism and imperialism and are most of the time seen as the reasons for poverty, secularism and dictatorships in the Arab region (through years of colonisation). Both countries have also been involved in military campaigns in the region, therefore they are seen by Jihadists as the enemies of Islam and will be the target for their terrorist attacks. For Turkey, the situation is more or less related to the politics of Erdogan in the region and some foreign interests in destabilising the country by successive and repeated terror attacks.

German respondent

Mon choix s’explique par:
1. L’occupation de zones entières par des mouvements terroristes.
2. Par la fragilité des gouvernements et l’instabilité politique.
3. L’incapacité d’éradiquer les menaces terroristes dans les conditions sécuritaires faibles et non garanties.

Cependant, des attaques peuvent cibler aussi des pays tels que le Royaume Uni, les États Unis ou la France, même si le pouvoir politique est fort. Le double objectif des terroristes islamistes est :
1. De s’imposer dans les pays musulmans en vue d’arracher le pouvoir et installer la chariaa.
2. De s’attaquer à l’occident considéré comme ennemi d’un point de vue idéologique.

Tunisian respondent

**Question 2** was an open one that aimed at assessing respondents’ opinions on the main actors or type of actors responsible for the surge of violent extremism. Respondents were invited to identify up to two actors that have a “Particular responsibility for the surge of violent extremism”. The results indicated that a vast majority of respondents underlined the responsibility of state authorities, especially EU member states and the US (see Graph 2).

Governments in Europe that are not dealing with migrants’ marginalisation and increasing unemployment may push some youths to engage in violent extremism. Southern governments that polarise societies or are lax in fishing corruption and inequality or do not bother about youth unemployment may also spur radicalisation.

Belgian respondent

The governments have the first responsibility because of their failure to sustain or to increase the same levels of confidence they had at the time of elections. The sole focus on security and the lower focus on communication with youths and solving their acute problems especially in the impoverished areas deepen the situation and make it even worse.

Egyptian respondent
In this context, respondents often referred to military interventions that have destabilised regions where violent extremist groups are now based. Respondents specifically alluded to the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, jointly with several EU countries, as well as the French interventions in Libya and Mali and the foreign military presence in Syria.

Governments from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries are also held responsible for the increase of violent extremism, although in a slightly less significant proportion than Western governments. However, one can assume that most respondents who mentioned “Authoritarian and repressive regimes” also had Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries or Gulf countries in mind.

Les acteurs gouvernementaux tels que les pays comme l’Arabie Saoudite qui exporte son idéologie fondamentaliste (salafi-wahhabi) et radicalise ainsi une partie des musulmans dans le monde entier, y compris en Europe.

Finnish respondent

Graph 2: Which actor(s) (governmental or non-governmental) has (have) a particular responsibility for the surge of violent extremism? (categories developed from the open-ended answers)

In Question 3 the aim was to find out which environments were perceived by respondents to offer the most fertile ground for turning an individual into a violent extremist. Respondents were asked to choose three options and rank them. Among the options ranked first, respondents chose “Conflict zones” way ahead of the second most-chosen option, “Internet and social media” and the third one, “Marginalised urban areas”. “Prisons” and “Religious communities” are ranked, respectively, fourth and fifth (see Graph 3).
Graph 3: In which environments and contexts are recruiters more likely to successfully turn an individual into a violent extremist?
(results show the first choice out of three)

- Conflict zones: 32.8%
- Internet and social media: 19.6%
- Marginalised urban areas: 13.3%
- Prisons: 12.2%
- Religious communities: 10.1%
- Refugee camps/shelters: 4.3%
- Neighbourhood, family and friendship networks: 4.2%
- Educational institutions (school, university...): 3.6%
- Professional environment: 0.3%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Respondents from Mashreq countries and EU countries chose “Conflict zones” as first option in bigger proportions than respondents from the Maghreb. In turn, Maghreb respondents were most prone to consider “Internet and social media”, as well as “Marginalised urban areas” as environments that could contribute to turning somebody into a violent extremist. Maghreb respondents chose these two options in bigger proportions than EU respondents and even determined that the most favourable environment to radicalise towards violent extremism was “Internet and the social media”. “Prisons” were also chosen by more respondents from the Maghreb than from the Mashreq (see Graph 4).

Le discours d’incitation à la haine et de discrimination se développe principalement au sein des groupes religieux informels particulièrement dans les zones urbaines marginalisées, dans certains contenus scolaires et parfois dans les médias. Ce discours trouve écho dans les mosquées ou l’internet et les réseaux sociaux.

Moroccan respondent
Graph 4: In which environments and contexts are recruiters more likely to successfully turn an individual into a violent extremist?
(results show the first choice out of three)

- Conflict zones: 42.6%
- Internet and social media: 25.4%
- Marginalised urban areas: 12.4%
- Prisons: 14.2%
- Religious communities: 19.5%
- Educational institutions (school, university…): 5.3%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

It is also relevant to have a look at the distribution of the responses along the division between those from the EU and Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries (see Graph 5). While respondents from the EU chose “Conflict zones” and “Marginalised urban areas” as fertile ground for violent extremism in bigger proportions than respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries, the latter gave bigger importance to “Religious communities” and “Educational institutions” as environments in which an individual can turn into a violent extremist.

In Tunisia, the first recruiters are preachers, the second are close social relationships (family, neighbours and friends) according to the study carried out by the Tunisian centre of studies on terrorism (2016).

Tunisian respondent

The extremists also use mosques and fitness/martial arts clubs to spread their propaganda, offering to young people a self-valorising image.

Algerian respondent
Graph 5: In which environments and contexts are recruiters more likely to successfully turn an individual into a violent extremist?

(results show the first choice out of three)

- Conflict zones: 29.3% (SSM), 37% (EU)
- Internet and social media: 16.4% (SSM), 20% (EU)
- Religious communities: 14% (SSM), 11.3% (EU)
- Prisons: 14% (SSM), 11% (EU)
- Marginalised urban areas: 5.4% (SSM), 15.6% (EU)
- Educational institutions (school, university...): 5.4% (SSM), 2.3% (EU)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

In their open comments, respondents were encouraged to elaborate on outstanding features regarding specific countries:

Any environments leaving room for abuse and arbitrary punishments and any environments where human rights are practically under suspension are likely to lead to abuse and secondarily to being more susceptible to be willing to join any group, any cause that is offering “shelter”, belonging and a sense of purpose because, in that context, it will be like getting your humanity back, together with a form of safety, though that is most probably an illusion.

Swedish respondent

Though violent extremism is not really a problem in Greece, the inability to resolve or moderate the influx of refugees has allowed the Greek far right to become mainstream in many circles. Also, the inability of the state to overcome the reticence of a large part of society, especially the church, to build at least one mosque in Athens and to integrate Muslims has led to the presence of many illegal mosques with more radical teachings.

Greek respondent

A lot of those comments highlight the lack of inclusiveness and integration as an important parameter:

Neglecting and excluding youths and extremists from political life leads them to violence. Integration deradicalises them. Excluding moderate religious elements from political presentation radicalises them.

Libyan respondent

Le sentiment de marginalisation de communautés musulmanes concentrées dans des zones péri-urbaines est un phénomène à ne pas négliger en France.

French respondent
What is being offered in the first place is a feeling of belonging, which holds a very strong appeal for individuals confronted with an identity crisis and systematic exclusion.

German respondent

**Question 4** was only made available for those respondents that indicated the “Prisons” option among their three choices in Question 3. It is worth noting that the vast majority of respondents that did include “Prisons” among their three choices in Question 3 are from EU and Maghreb countries, whereas few Mashreq nationals did so.

This question was aimed at determining which measures could be taken to effectively address radicalisation in prisons. Several generic categories of measures were submitted to respondents: isolating already radicalised detainees to avoid the spread of radical positions, providing training for reintegrating society, specific training and skills learning for the detainees, psychological support, religious counselling and training for the prison personnel (see Graph 6).

La question principale est d’arriver à faire recouvrir au détenu son identité première de simple citoyen qui ne voit pas dans les autres des ennemis et des individus qui lui sont différents mais aussi qui sont dans l’erreur. Travailler sur son identité première (et non seconde, celle qui lui donne le qualificatif d’extrémiste) pour une auto-réconciliation avec son environnement.

Moroccan respondent

Prison staff training is essential. It takes lot of time but is rewarding. Solid knowledge of religion, history of conflict-prone regions, and psychology are necessary. The same thing applies to teachers.

Algerian respondent

**Graph 6: To what extent could the following measures contribute to curbing radicalisation processes in prisons?**

- **Awareness-raising and training of prison personnel**: 66% Very high extent, 19% High extent, 9% Neither low nor high extent, 5% Low extent, 3% Very low extent, 4% Don’t know
- **Preparation for reintegrating into society**: 64% Very high extent, 18% High extent, 9% Neither low nor high extent, 5% Low extent, 2% Very low extent, 2% Don’t know
- **Professional training and skills learning during prison (for detainees)**: 60% Very high extent, 22% High extent, 9% Neither low nor high extent, 9% Low extent, 2% Very low extent, 2% Don’t know
- **Psychological support**: 59% Very high extent, 22% High extent, 8% Neither low nor high extent, 6% Low extent, 3% Very low extent, 2% Don’t know
- **Religious counselling inside the prison**: 44% Very high extent, 21% High extent, 10% Neither low nor high extent, 11% Low extent, 6% Very low extent, 6% Don’t know
- **Isolation of radicalised detainees to avoid contact with the others**: 33% Very high extent, 18% High extent, 15% Neither low nor high extent, 12% Low extent, 6% Very low extent, 6% Don’t know

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
It appears that, in relative terms, the least popular measure is “Isolation of radicalised detainees to avoid contact with the others”, despite some slight differences of patterns per categories of respondents (for instance, policy-makers are more prone than civil society respondents to consider that isolation of radicalised detainees can contribute to curbing radicalisation in prisons).

Isolating people makes them feel deprived. Not allowing radicalised detainees to be exclusively with one another might be a better but not cutting them off from each other altogether. A combination of psychological support and skills training in combination with controlled access to other radicalised people is likely to work better.

UK respondent

The second least popular measure is “Religious counselling inside the prison”, in particular among EU respondents (slightly less so for respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries, including from the Maghreb). In the open comments, respondents stressed the fact that moderate religious actors cannot have an influence on already radicalised individuals. They also insisted on the ineffectiveness of isolating specific prisoners, on the importance of preparing prisoners for their reintegration into the society, and of adequate training for prison personnel.

Il serait difficile que l’accompagnement religieux puisse dédogmatiser un élément radical, pour la simple raison que le facteur de radicalité se puise dans la foi de la personne radicale, et qu’il considère le prêcheur « modéré » comme apostat qui tente de le convertir à une autre foi.

Tunisian respondent

**DRIVERS**

Closely linked with the issue of the territories in which and the networks through which violent extremism can prosper is the issue of drivers, i.e. what elements provide a fertile ground for violent extremism, both at the macro level (Question 5) and at the individual level (Question 6).

**Question 5** was aimed at assessing respondents’ perception of what the most significant drivers for the development of violent extremism are. Respondents had to choose between four drivers and were invited to establish a distinction between the most important drivers for EU countries on the one hand and for Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries on the other. They were also asked to identify such drivers in the case of their own country.

With the exception of “The role and impact of global geopolitics”, which respondents consider as a significant driver of violent extremism in equal proportions in both EU countries and Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries, respondents have a differentiated analysis when it comes to the relevance of other drivers in the European Union, on the one hand, and Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries, on the other (see Graph 7).

Economic exclusion and limited opportunities surely provide a fertile ground for the development of violent extremism in the Arab world, but also the lack of democracy and repression. On the other hand, marginalisation, discrimination, Islamophobia and political exclusion create terrorists in the West. Migrants or sons of migrants are never considered equal to the inhabitants of Western countries.

Syrian respondent
The drivers for which the most important difference appeared are “The weak state capacity” and “Political exclusion and discriminations”. Respondents determined that the former was a more significant driver for the development of violent extremism in Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries than in EU countries (difference of 23 points) whereas the latter was perceived as a key driver in EU countries (39 points more than for Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries). Respondents also consider that “Economic exclusion and limited opportunities” is a more relevant driver in Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries than in the EU.

Graph 7: Drivers providing fertile ground for the development of violent extremism. (% of the most significant driver in group of countries)

Furthermore, the trends are slightly different if one looks into the answers per category of respondents. When it comes to the situation in Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries, EU respondents and policy-makers are slightly more inclined to think that “Weak state capacity and failing security” is providing fertile ground for the development of violent extremism than respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries or respondents from the civil society (see Graphs 8 and 9).
Graph 8: Most significant driver for the development of violent extremism in SSM countries.
(civil society/experts/policy-makers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Civil society</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Policy-makers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak state capacity and failing security</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role and impact of global geopolitics, including perception of political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression of certain groups in other countries</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the country of residence: political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression, Islamophobia</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic exclusion and limited opportunities</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Graph 9: Most significant driver for the development of violent extremism in SSM countries.
(EU/non-EU countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Non-EU</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak state capacity and failing security</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role and impact of global geopolitics, including perception of political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression of certain groups in other countries</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the country of residence: political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression, Islamophobia</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic exclusion and limited opportunities</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Respondents from the Mashreq are also more inclined to think that political exclusion and discrimination is a driver than Maghreb respondents.
When it comes to the situation in the EU, there are even bigger differences in the analysis. EU respondents are more inclined to think that “Economic exclusion and limited opportunities” matters in the EU than Southern and Southeast Mediterranean respondents. In turn, Southern and Southeast Mediterranean respondents consider to a larger degree than their EU counterparts that “Political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression and Islamophobia” matters in the EU.
Respondents were also asked to choose what they perceived as the most important driver in their own country. A graph has been compiled with representative cases in both EU and South and Southeast Mediterranean countries (see Graph 12).

**Graph 12: Drivers providing fertile ground for the development of violent extremism.**
(% of the most significant driver in respondent’s own country)

- **Weak state capacity and failing security**: 25% (Tunisia), 13% (Morocco), 6% (Spain), 3% (France)
- **Role and impact of global geopolitics, including perception of political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression of certain groups in other countries**: 32% (Tunisia), 22% (Morocco), 26% (Spain), 10% (France)
- **Economic exclusion and limited opportunities**: 57% (Tunisia), 33% (Morocco), 35% (Spain), 32% (France)
- **In the country of residence: political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression, Islamophobia**: 32% (Tunisia), 35% (Morocco), 32% (Spain), 35% (France)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

With some small variations French and Spanish respondents identified “Political exclusion and discrimination”, “Economic exclusion” and “Role and impact of global geopolitics” as important drivers in their respective countries, which broadly matched with the perception of all respondents regarding the EU as a whole.

When it comes to respondents from Southern and Southeast regarding all SSM countries, “Economic exclusion and limited opportunities” prevails. This is in line with SSM countries commenting on their own countries. Maghreb and Mashreq respondents identify “economic exclusion” as the main driver for their own country (approximately 55 points). For example, 57.4% of Tunisian and Moroccan respondents chose this option as the most important one (see Graph 12).

Respondents from Turkey attribute more weight to the “Role and impact of global politics” for their own country than Maghreb respondents do for their own countries. In turn, they are less inclined to think that “Weak state capacity” is a problem in their own country than Maghreb respondents think it is in their country (see Graph 10). As for Israel, respondents attached less importance to “Economic exclusion and limited opportunities” in their own countries than in the Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries.

In the open comments, respondents highlighted the fact that one driver cannot be strictly isolated from the others:

> Usually there is not only one significant element but many in a certain context. For example, in Southern Mediterranean countries we cannot exclude the economic exclusion and limited opportunities option. In addition, there are other factors such as some youths lost the feeling of belonging to their homeland, and what can be called value crisis.

*Egyptian respondent*
The rise of violent extremism is due to a complex mix of drivers: from social economic conditions, school teaching delivered by highly motivated professors and/or preachers, religious narrative on TV or in local mosques; activities of charity NGOs during a natural disaster to intervene instead of weak absent state; feeding the hungry, maintaining family when the family head is absent or in jail, assistance always has strings attached, distribution of “religious” attire and books and money.

Algerian respondent

It is also worth noting that a number of respondents felt that the role of religion and ideologies was under-represented in this question and throughout the Survey (see Boubekeur “The Religious and Ideological Factors of Violent Extremism” p. 14):

Je suis surpris de ne pas trouver l’influence de certaines religions parmi les facteurs proposés.

French respondent

La dimension idéologique (lavage des cerveaux) essentielle manque complètement dans le schéma proposé.

Finnish respondent

The options in this question are limited and are biased to the deep roots theory. It does not appreciate the power of extremism as an ideological and spiritual force. Of course, it is related to a multitude of socio-economic and cultural factors, but it became an independent and self-generating force in its own right.

Egyptian respondent

There is no mention of violent religious ideology (Jihadism) and abetting conservative clerics (e.g. Al Qaradawi) who do not get their hands dirty personally, but egg others on.

German respondent

To close Block 1 on context and drivers of violent extremism, Question 6 was aimed at assessing respondents’ opinions on the prevailing individual drivers and motivations that push someone to turn to violent extremism (while Question 5 was about contextual and macro-level drivers). Respondents were asked to rank three options, the first one being the driver regarded as most important.

Graph 13: In addition to an enabling environment, to what extent can the following elements help to explain why an individual turns to violent extremism? (results show the first choice out of three)

| Perception of humiliation and discrimination from the society in the country of residence on ethnic, national, linguistic or religious grounds | 25.3% |
| Experiences of state repression or exclusion from rights | 23.9% |
| Lack of socioeconomic integration | 17% |
| Psychological vulnerability | 14.5% |
| Normalisation of violence | 12.3% |
| Personal causes (divorce, breakup, loss of job...) | 3.9% |
| Thrill of adventure | 3.1% |

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
Overall, respondents considered that the most significant individual driver was the “Perceived humiliation and discrimination from the society in the country of residence on ethnic, national, linguistic or religious grounds”. Indeed 25.3% of them ranked this as first option (see Graph 13). Close behind, 23.9% selected “Experiences of state repression or exclusion from rights” as the first option. In other words, respondents agree that the real or perceived relation between the individual and the rest of the society or the state is key to understanding what drives an individual to violent extremism.

La majorité des personnes amenées vers l’extrémisme violent souffrent de chômage et d’exclusion. Très rares sont les cas de personnes intégrées dans un cadre économique légal qui sacrifient leur statut pour entamer une aventure extrémiste violente. Dans le cas de la Tunisie, la normalisation de la violence, la répétition d’attentats terroristes, avec une vulnérabilité psychologique ont permis à certains de s’octroyer un pouvoir social et politique dont ils ont été privés. C’est pour cette raison que le renforcement des capacités et la confiance en soi sont des éléments primordiaux. Les rares personnes ayant un statut économique et social qui s’orientent vers l’extrémisme violent, le font pour des raisons idéologiques.

Tunisian respondent

Graph 14: In addition to an enabling environment, to what extent can the following elements help to explain why an individual turns to violent extremism? (results show the first choice out of three)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
Graph 14 contrasts the percentages of each option with the geographical origin of respondents. The EU/non-EU division is significant in the top two options. EU country nationals regard “Perception of humiliation and discrimination” as the first individual driver towards violent extremism whereas Southern and Southeast country respondents (in particular from the Mashreq) selected the “Experience of state repression” as the most important driver. Respondents who identified themselves as belonging to civil society were more prone to identify “Experiences of state repression” as the first driver than respondents belonging to the “Policy-makers” group.

The graph also shows a differentiated weight attributed to the importance of “Psychological vulnerability” as a factor leading to the radicalisation of an individual. Almost twice as many EU respondents as their counterparts from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries considered that this is the most important factor. In fact, EU respondents chose as first option “Psychological vulnerability” in bigger numbers than “lack of socioeconomic integration”.

C’est l’absence de perspectives (emplois, épanouissement, bien être) qui pousse une personne vers la radicalisation.

Moroccan respondent

What seems to me to be the most important factors in relation to Q6 are: 1) the fact that people have a (false) sense of fighting against global injustice, in other words, fighting for a bigger purpose, and 2) the person becomes part of a new community that is seen as welcoming and powerful, therefore making him/her powerful as well. Socioeconomic exclusion of the person or his/her community in the country of residence (and its perception) is important, but I am not sure it is a sine-qua-non condition.

Greek respondent
IMPACT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The second block of the Survey aimed to capture respondents’ perception about the impact of violent extremism. Questions 7 and 8 look into the mechanisms through which violent extremism can affect security and stability and put the threat of violent extremism into perspective, looking into other existing threats. Questions 9 and 10 relate to specific terrorist attacks and specific terrorist groups and Question 11 focuses on the phenomenon of foreign fighters.

Main findings

• Violent extremism is perceived as the main threat in the Euro-Mediterranean region. However, other phenomena also affect the stability and security of the region and in particular right-wing extremism and Islamophobia as well as authoritarian trends.

• European respondents fully acknowledge how right-wing extremism and Islamophobia affect the security and stability of their respective countries but when it comes to the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole, they are more concerned with the authoritarian trends. In turn, respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries, while acknowledging the effects of authoritarian trends in some of their countries, think that right-wing extremism and Islamophobia constitute the main threat to the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole.

• These threats are linked with each other. Violent extremism fuels Islamophobic and nationalist discourses in some countries and is used to legitimate authoritarian trends in others.

• Looking back to specific attacks that have hit Euro-Mediterranean countries over the last few years, the attacks in Paris are seen as having had the most harmful impact on the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole, followed by the attacks in Tunisia.

• The main perverse effect of those attacks is that they risk undermining cohesion in culturally diverse societies.

• Defeating Daesh will neither be easy nor sufficient. In a possible “post-Daesh” scenario, some existing organisations such as Al-Qaeda are likely to take the lead or new organisations are likely to emerge.

• Respondents, especially those from the Maghreb, associate the threat of violent extremism with the threat from foreign terrorist fighters.

• Tackling the foreign fighters threat requires as a matter of priority improving cooperation between countries (including information sharing). Dealing with foreign fighters returning to their home countries only through a repressive angle will not be enough. Preventing them from returning to their country of origin is not an option for a majority of respondents.

ON SECURITY AND STABILITY

The objective of Question 7 was to put “Violent Islamist extremism” into perspective, comparing its impact with two other phenomena. Respondents were invited to evaluate these threats first in their own country and second in the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole.

Overall, “Violent extremism” is seen as the most significant threat to stability and security, followed by “Right-wing extremism and Islamophobia” and by “Authoritarian trends”.

Graph 15: To what extent do you consider that the following phenomena threaten the stability and security? (mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>In the Euromed Region</th>
<th>In your own country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent Islamist extremism</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing extremism and Islamophobia on the rise</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian trends on the rise</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

However, it can be observed that the perception of these threats is consistently more acute when looking at responses from EU countries and SSM countries.

Graph 16: To what extent do you consider that the following phenomena threaten the stability and security of the Euro-Mediterranean countries and societies as a whole? (mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>SSM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent Islamist extremism</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing extremism and Islamophobia on the rise</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian trends on the rise</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

European respondents are prone to acknowledge that Islamophobia and right-wing extremism constitute a bigger threat to their respective countries (see Graph 17), they are less prone to do so for the whole Euro-Mediterranean region (while respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries do consider this threat as more significant for the whole region, see Graph 16).
The results of the Survey show an acute awareness among EU (and also Israeli) respondents about the threat of right-wing extremism and Islamophobia in their own countries, in particular in France and Belgium.

In turn, respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries are more prone to consider that authoritarian trends threaten the stability of the security of their respective countries (see Graph 17) than they are to consider this threat as significant for the Euro-Mediterranean region (while EU respondents do consider this threat as more significant for the whole region, see Graph 16).

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
Turkish respondents identify the rise of authoritarian trends both in Turkey and in the whole region as the most significant threat.

**Graph 20: To what extent do you consider that Authoritarian trends on the rise threatens the stability and security?**

(\text{mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent})

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Survey mean respondents on the whole region</th>
<th>Turkish respondents on the whole region</th>
<th>Survey mean respondents on their own country</th>
<th>Turkish respondents on Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Below is a selection of comments formulated in relation to the main threats.

À mon sens, ce qui menace la stabilité du pays c’est l’échec chaque année de toute réforme des secteurs sociaux, notamment l’éducation et la santé ainsi que l’absence de mesures rigoureuses pour améliorer la gouvernance de ces secteurs ainsi que d’autres secteurs.

Moroccan respondent

In most of the Arab world, external intervention (in all forms) is a more likely reason than the ones above. This of course is particularly true for Palestine.

Palestinian respondent

I would also like to mention the rise of right-wing extremism as a strong threat to Turkey’s stability and security. But in Turkey right-wing extremism is not related to Islamophobia; on the contrary with ultra-nationalist and Islamist extremism.

Turkish respondent

Instead of authoritarian trends, I would prefer to name the factor of controversial counter-terrorism and national security measures which can be subjectively perceived or furthermore framed as experiences of humiliation and repression by the state inviting “us” versus “them” discourses.

German respondent

In the open comments, respondents also establish links between the three different phenomena, thereby anticipating Question 8:

The Western world insists on its basic values, but sees itself forced to limit the implementation of those values to some of that in order to be able to fight extremism and avoid losing the values altogether. The main risks are that the right-wing populists gain support and take over if nothing is done against Islamic extremism, and that on the other hand measures against extremism end up stirring up more extremism.

Danish respondent

L’extrémisme violent génère et entretient les deux autres substrats proposés ici.

Mauritanian respondent
The difficulty here lies in the fact that authoritarianism feeds violent extremism, and in Europe, for strictly internal political reasons, Islamophobia is on the rise as the new scapegoat.

French respondent

The authoritarian trend, albeit unfortunate from a civil rights perspective, has side aspects that might help curb violence. Some within European countries seem to be willing to make that trade.

Lebanese respondent


Moroccan respondent

I believe right-wing extremism and Islamophobia and violent extremism feed each other.

Egyptian respondent

**Question 8** goes beyond the immediate, direct and most visible effects of violent extremism for countries’ stability, namely the harm caused by terrorist attacks, and focuses on four non-exclusive mid- and long-term indirect consequences of violent extremism. Respondents were asked to evaluate through which mechanisms these attacks were threatening long-term stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Results show that terrorist attacks are harmful mainly because they undermine cohesion in culturally diverse societies and because they fuel Islamophobic and nationalist discourses. The third element put forward is that they are used to legitimate authoritarian trends.

Answers from respondents regarding their own countries show the same patterns, but these indirect consequences are considered to affect their country to a lesser extent that the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole (see Graph 21).

**Graph 21:** In addition to the harm caused by terrorist attacks as such, to what extent do you consider that the following indirect effects of violent extremism threaten the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean space and your own country?

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Euromed Region</th>
<th>Own Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuels Islamophobic and nationalist discourses</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undermines cohesion in culturally diverse societies</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimates authoritarian regimes</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuels sectarian tensions, in particular Sunni-Shia</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
Answers of respondents from EU countries as well as from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries are rather homogeneous overall with a slight variation when it comes to the legitimation of authoritarian regimes and the sectarian tensions, whereby EU respondents show a higher concern (see Graph 22).

**Graph 22:** In addition to the harm caused by terrorist attacks as such, to what extent do you consider that the following indirect effects of violent extremism threaten the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean space? (mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>SSM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undermines cohesion in culturally diverse societies</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuels Islamophobic and nationalist discourses</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimates authoritarian regimes</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuels sectarian tensions, in particular Sunni-Shia</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

In the open comments, a number of respondents added that violent extremism also leads to securitisation of policies, which can be at the expense of civil rights and freedoms:

- […] terrorist attacks may not legitimate authoritarian regimes, but [they] have legitimated security policies and approaches with consequences for human rights and freedom guarantees.
  
  Spanish respondent

- L’approche sécuritaire revient en force au détriment des libertés [...].
  
  Moroccan respondent

**TERRORIST ATTACKS AND TERRORIST GROUPS**

**Question 9** was open-ended and aimed to sound out respondents on the terrorist attacks they perceived as most harmful to the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region.

The ad hoc categories shown in Graph 23 were developed based on the results obtained (some respondents referred to a specific attack, while others gave a more general answer indicating a country that has been targeted rather than a specific attack). Results show that 56% of the answers referred to attacks that happened in EU countries while 44% referred to attacks in the Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries. Overall, the most mentioned country is France: 38% of respondents refer to one of the main attacks that hit the country over the last few years. The most-frequently chosen specific attack is the November 2015 attacks in Paris (24% of all responses). Tunisia is the second most mentioned country (13%).

When looking at the most recurrent answers, it can be seen that there are no major differences between the answers from the North or the Southern rim of the Mediterranean (see Graph 23).
Graph 23: In your opinion, which terrorist attack(s) do you consider the most harmful to the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole over the last few years?
(categories developed from the open-ended answers)

As illustrated in the open comments, respondents fear that attacks in EU countries may jeopardise social cohesion, polarise attitudes towards Muslim populations and trigger a securitisation of policy responses at the expense of civil liberties. In Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries, respondents stressed the political, social but also economic impacts of such attacks. Open responses also show that beyond national effects, respondents are fully sensitised with the truly regional Euro-Mediterranean impact of such attacks.

The Paris attacks in November 2015 were indiscriminate (everybody could have been a target, including Muslims), the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo office targeted specifically the concept of freedom of expression. These attacks were more dangerous because they specifically tried to amplify a divide within Europe (Muslims and non-Muslims) and between Europe and the Middle East.

German respondent
While the attacks (in European cities) garnered the most attention as they hit at the heart of the EU, other attacks on the southern banks of the Mediterranean had a major socioeconomic impact in the countries affected, such as the Bardo and Sousse attacks in Tunisia as well as the Russian flight downing in the Sinai. The economic impact of these attacks continues to exert tremendous pressures on those countries causing further instability and disintegrating social cohesion.

Moroccan respondent

Terrorist attacks across the MENA region are constantly undermining the state capacity and the economic performance from most of their countries. This brings more instability into the region as a whole as it affects negatively not only the country which suffered the attack but also its neighbours. Moreover, it fosters the expansion of terrorism to other countries.

Spanish respondent

Some of the answers point out how specific countries are affected:

Attacks in Europe can have an impact on public opinion and change election results, fostering extremist propaganda. Attacks in Southern Mediterranean countries raise the tension level, leading to radicalisation and other attacks.

Italian respondent

Le Bataclan a été une horreur car l’attaque a touché tout le monde sans distinction de race, de religion, de classe sociale, l’objectif était la terreur, la division, la remise en question du modèle français et européen d’ouverture et de partage. Le Bardo car il vise le seul État du Printemps arabe qui a en partie réussi sa Révolution, et les attaques ont touché le tourisme, sa principale ressource économique, créant le chaos, la récession, le chômage, la fuite des investisseurs…

Tunisian respondent

Je pense que ces attaques reflètent assez bien le jeu de miroir qui est en train de s’installer et qui risque de fausser au passage l’analyse des experts sur la question. En effet, les attaques en Europe ont engendré les fantasmes sur le « Musulman barbare » (cf. PEGIDA en Allemagne), alors que l’attaque du musée Bardo se veut une forte symbolique d’un rejet de l’Occident, des touristes occidentaux et de leurs valeurs.

French respondent

Other answers underline the regional and sub-regional impact of terrorist attacks:

L’attaque du Mali par les groupes terroristes et le fait qu’ils ont mis en place pendant quelques mois un « état islamiste » a boosté le terrorisme dans la région et l’intervention française pour rétablir l’ordre a constitué un justificatif « légitime » pour les terroristes d’intensifier leurs attaques et opérations (Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, Burkina…). Concernant la Libye, la chute de Ghaddafi a été à l’origine d’une grave déstabilisation de la sous-région (dissémination des armes, soulèvement de groupes terroristes…).

Mauritanian respondent

The continuation of the war in Syria would create new extremist and terrorist entities along the lines of ISIS and other organisations such as Gabht al-Nosra, Ahrar al-Sham, and thus the effects of this extremist and violent environment will expand to the outside world. The terrorist attacks in Turkey reflected the extent of Turkey’s involvement in the conflicts in the Middle East and its embrace of a number of extremist Islamic movements and extremist groups in Syria, which has prolonged the conflict and threatens to turn Turkey into a transit route for extremists and terrorists to Europe.

Polish respondent
Targeting civilians, especially if there are women and children, creates waves of anger and hate that lead to a circle of violence.

Palestinian respondent

Some answers point to the need to make a distinction between the terror attacks and the violence in conflict zones:

I would rather believe that the instability of the region is not necessarily linked to a specific attack, but rather to instability in some of the countries like Libya, Syria and Iraq. On the public opinion effects, probably the Paris attack and the Bardo and Sousse attacks seriously affected the perception of security of Europe on one side and inflicted a serious economic loss in a country like Tunisia.

Italian respondent

I think it is very difficult to pinpoint just two attacks; the attacks in Europe (such as the ones in Paris and Brussels) definitely had an immense impact but if one considers numerous attacks in Libya and Syria as terrorist attacks then these are decisively more harmful in the long term.

Polish respondent

Some respondents also express some doubts regarding the need to single out specific attacks:

I don’t think ranking terrorist attacks is a desirable approach, in a way. The back side is that thinking in those terms might just function like a confirmation of “message received” and could encourage a continuation as “the bigger, the better”, a race in a way of who can scare more. Purposely ignoring or leaving out the details, such as anonymising those who want to become famous no matter for what – terror just as well, if it works. If the response or the result is not the expected one, it may become much less interesting to continue.

Swedish respondent

All terrorist attacks are harmful to the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region, as they amplify the existing tensions between the Arab and the Western countries, cultures and individuals. On the one hand, they fuel the worldwide Islamophobia and, on the other, the anti-Western tendencies in the Arab Muslim world.

Israeli respondent

It is not the individual attack but the constant “flow” of attacks in many different countries that changes matters by giving a sense of insecurity and fear and a sense of a need to take drastic measures to counter that. This is very harmful to the general perception of the balance to be found between security and liberty. There is clearly a tendency that people are ready to renounce on certain issues so far regarded as essential (private life, data protection, extended police powers...).

Danish respondent

Questions 10a to 10c were designed to focus on Daesh and more precisely to capture the opinion of respondents on whether Daesh is likely to be completely defeated soon (10a), to what extent defeating or weakening Daesh would be a major contribution to the eradication of violent extremism in the region (10b) and which groups could become a major threat in a possible post-Daesh scenario (10c).

Regarding the likelihood of Daesh being defeated soon, the Survey shows a rather balanced percentage of answers ranging from totally disagree to totally agree (see Graph 24), with EU respondents being less optimistic (34% agree or completely agree that Daesh will be defeated...).
soon) while Southern and Southeast Mediterranean respondents are rather optimistic (52% agree or totally agree). However, it also appears that respondents from the Mashreq (49% agree or completely agree) and Turkey (39%) seem to be less optimistic than respondents from the Maghreb (59%).

**Graph 24: Regarding specific terrorist groups: Do you agree that Daesh is likely to be completely defeated soon?**

![Graph showing the distribution of responses](image)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Some open-ended answers illustrate the complexity of the fight against Daesh:

**Moroccan respondent**

Daesh might be dislodged from Mosul and Raqqa. However, that won’t spell the end of the group. The decentralised model it has created means that affiliates will continue to exist and operate with loose links to the central leadership in places like the Sahel, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Afghanistan. The group will continue to exist within Syria in the absence of a solution to the conflict. In all likelihood, if and when the Syrian conflict is brought to an end subscribers to Daesh ideology will carry their extremism with them back to their countries of origin. The idea of Daesh will also continue to exist and serve as an avenue to express resentment and frustration within Europe among immigrants of second and third generation.

**German respondent**

It might be defeated militarily but the mentality will prevail as long as there are organisations that abuse the sense of alienation and discrimination. It might be defeated in Syria and Iraq but they build up their next power base in Libya. Failed countries are easy prey, and I am afraid we will have to live much longer with this phenomenon.

**Others hint at what it would take to defeat Daesh and the need to simultaneously act in different areas in order to do so:**

**Moroccan respondent**

Not that soon, as there are governments and social groups that benefit from their existence. If the supporting sources are drained, then the defeat of Daesh would be easier.

**Jordanian respondent**

You cannot defeat Daesh or any other non-state actor with a bombing campaign. This short-sighted Counter Terrorism strategy is likely to undermine long-term goals of removing “terrorists”. In fact, and in particular, the drone campaign in countries like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia may be fuelling more adherents to the Daesh or other extremist ideologies.

**Dutch respondent**

Others hint at what it would take to defeat Daesh and the need to simultaneously act in different areas in order to do so:
What would the complete defeat look like? We are talking about an ideology that is adaptive and is claiming a Caliphate that has deep roots in a perversion of a very well established religion.

UK respondent

Looking at history, terrorist groups survive decades (Spain, Ireland, Kashmir, Chechnya). Daesh has the support and logistics of some quarters in neighbouring countries. Daesh mantra will go on as long as there is a perception of double standards vis-a-vis Muslim communities, injustice, unfair treatment of Muslim groups in an indiscriminate manner.

Algerian respondent

Their territorial power will shrink; nevertheless, ideological and conflict ideas will be furthermore spread by communication channels and personal networks, and will decentralise the risk of Daesh-linked terror attacks.

German respondent

Question 10b goes one step further and asks whether the hypothetical defeating or weakening of Daesh would represent a major contribution to the eradication of the violent extremism threat in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Overall, 51% of respondents agree or totally agree with this statement. Mirroring the results of Question 10a, results here show that the percentage of those who totally agree with this statement is higher among respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries (28%) than among respondents from EU countries (21%).

Graph 25: Do you agree that defeating or weakening Daesh will be a major contribution to the eradication of the violent extremism threat in the Euro-Mediterranean region?

While acknowledging the importance of defeating Daesh, some respondents elaborate in their open comments on why this would not be enough:

Daesh is an expression of deeper political and sectarian problems and in the region. When these are addressed will we see a decline in violent extremism.

Danish respondent

I am not sure that defeating Daesh will contribute completely to end the violence in the Middle East or the world. I agree that Daesh is a terrorist organisation and it should be defeated but the question here concerns whether the reasons that led to the emergence of Daesh disappeared or still exist.

Palestinian respondent
ISIL may be defeated militarily in Syria and Iraq but the root of the threat, radical-Islamist violent ideology, remains and will be further promoted by either the same organisation or a new one.

Finish respondent

Daesh is a symptom of the illness of the entire Arab region: lack of democracy, lack of citizen rights, lack of economic development, lack of stability and peace.

Lebanese respondent

The next major threat may not even exist yet. Few predicted that Daesh would be the next big threat until it was.

UK respondent

Daesh n’est pas la seule cause. Il faut revenir à l’origine de l’émergence de telles organisations. À savoir, les pensées fondamentalistes wahhabites de quelques pays arabes et leurs alimentations pour d’autres agendas socio-économiques voire géopolitiques de la région en question.

Moroccan respondent

The defeat or weakening of Daesh might have an impact on the radicalisation of European Muslims (loss of a trend). However, in the whole Euro-Mediterranean region there are many other active violent extremist groups that can replace Daesh.

German respondent

L’extrémisme islamiste persistera encore une bonne vingtaine d’années comme phénomène sectaire minoritaire. Il trouvera toujours des jeunes fragiles psychologiquement pour mener des opérations meurtrières.

Algerian respondent

Of course it will be. Even if the idea of Daesh remains alive through the people, it won’t be so easy to believe in the power of this ideology if the state doesn’t exist. Fidelity in this case is based on the belief in the powerful.

Polish respondent

In this possible “post-Daesh” scenario, some existing organisations could take the lead or other organisations could come up, as mentioned repeatedly by respondents in their open comments. The objective of Question 10c was to enquire about which organisations are likely to raise their profile in such a scenario and become a major threat. Nine main categories can be established on the basis of respondents’ answers (see Graph 26).

Overall, more than 90% of respondents mentioned “Violent Islamist groups”. Seven percent of respondents mentioned extreme right and xenophobic groups. Al-Qaeda is undoubtedly the terrorist group that would most threaten the Euro-Mediterranean region in such a scenario according to 45% of respondents who cited it (they were given the possibility to name up to two) while another 11% cited the African branch AQIM. Twelve percent of respondents believe that the groups that become major threats will be small, isolated and Daesh-inspired groups and 9% mentioned “New forms of Jihadism”.

Respondents from EU countries as well as from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries agree on considering Al-Qaeda as the most significant threat (see Graph 26). The rather limited differences lie in the other categories. EU respondents tend to show more concern with the “Isolated (Daesh-inspired) groups” while respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries believe to a greater extent than EU respondents that major threats can derive from groups such as Ansar al-Sharia, Al-Nusra or Boko Haram, without forgetting the “New forms of Jihadism” that may appear.
Graph 26: In a “post-Daesh” scenario, which terrorist group(s) could become a major threat in the Euro-Mediterranean region? (categories developed from the open-ended answers)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

DEALING WITH FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

The last part of this block focuses on the figure of the foreign terrorist fighters. Question 11a asks if they represent the main aspect of the violent extremism threat, and Question 11b is about how to deal with this issue.

A majority of respondents seem to agree that foreign fighters are one of the most threatening manifestations of violent extremism. 61% of them agree that foreign terrorist fighters represent the biggest threat posed by violent extremism. Respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries and in particular in Maghreb countries (as illustrated in Graph 27) seem to be even more inclined to associate the violent extremism threat with foreign fighters than EU respondents (68% of the former and 55% of the latter agree that foreign terrorist fighters represent the main threat). Graph 27 shows that the threat of foreign terrorist fighters is perceived in a particularly acute manner among Tunisian respondents. Graph 27 also illustrates the variance in the answers given by EU respondents, in particular between French and Belgian respondents.
Graph 27: Do you agree that foreign terrorist fighters (as defined in the United Nations Security Council 2178 resolution) represent the biggest threat posed by violent extremism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Totally agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

In **Question 11b**, respondents were invited to assess to what extent a number of proposed options should be considered as priorities when it comes to dealing with foreign fighters. Respondents almost unanimously consider that the top priority should be to “Improve cooperation between countries (including information sharing)”. Graph 28 illustrates the intensity of the support for this priority but also the extent to which respondents consider that it is important to “Develop reintegration programmes for foreign terrorist fighters upon their return” and to “Better deal with crimes committed by foreign terrorist fighters in countries of destination”. In turn, respondents support much less the idea of scaling up the repressive response upon the return of foreign fighters and most of them disagree with the idea that foreign fighters should be prevented from returning to their country of origin.

Graph 28: What should be the priority when it comes to dealing with foreign terrorist fighters (as defined in the United Nations Security Council 2178 resolution)?

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
The answers are rather homogeneous across the board. The main gap appears in relation with the idea of preventing foreign terrorist fighters from returning: EU respondents seem to be a bit less reluctant with the idea than their counterparts from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean counterparts (see Graph 29).

Graph 29: What should be the priority when it comes to dealing with foreign terrorist fighters (as defined in the United Nations Security Council 2178 resolution)?
(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

Some open-ended answers illustrate the results above; others stress that the importance of the phenomenon of foreign fighters should not be overrated:

Few attacks have been conducted by foreign fighters. Most terror attacks were committed by home-grown terrorists.

Palestinian respondent

My main concern is not foreign terrorist fighters. I think that Europe’s perplexity comes from the fact that those who have attacked Paris, London or Brussels are European citizens.

Spanish respondent
CONFRONTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The third block of this Survey aimed to capture respondents’ assessments on various aspects related to the policy response to violent extremism. Questions 12 and 13 are rather general. Question 12 provides interesting insights on how respondents assess the overall efforts of confronting violent extremism in their respective countries. Question 13 aims at identifying what the main priority actions are in the eyes of respondents in order to effectively counter violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Question 14 is geared towards the multilateral initiatives taken to confront violent extremism while Question 15 has a more regional scope as it relates to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and Questions 16 to 18 are centred on the European Union more specifically.

Main findings

- A majority of respondents (65%) are of the opinion that efforts undertaken in their respective countries to counter violent extremism have been effective to a high extent or to a very high extent. Respondents from Algeria and Morocco assess the efforts of their respective countries as highly or very highly effective in bigger proportions than Tunisian and Egyptian respondents. Within the EU, respondents from Spain or Italy tend to rate the efforts of their countries slightly more positively than respondents from countries like France, Germany or Belgium.
- As a matter of priority, respondents think that so-called root causes should be addressed in the Euro-Mediterranean region, including socioeconomic ones. Security-oriented measures are not seen as the main priorities by respondents.
- Multilateral frameworks in particular could contribute to addressing these root causes (focus on the development agenda rather than focus on the security/counter-terrorism agenda). Respondents stressed the importance of communities, civil society and local actors as stakeholders in the fight against violent extremism. Indeed, promoting and funding projects targeting these categories is the recurrent choice of respondents when asked about what multilateral initiatives should be focusing on.
- Respondents unambiguously highlight the need for more regional Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on preventing and countering violent extremism, acknowledge that there is a deficit of cooperation between security agencies of Mediterranean northern and southern countries, and think that cooperation in this field should not remain only bilateral nor focus only on the security angle.
- A critical majority of respondents thinks that Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation fora to address violent extremism and exchange best practices are missing and a majority thinks that the Union for the Mediterranean could play a role in this regard.
- As far as the EU itself is concerned, scaling up security-focused measures within the European Union is not seen as a matter of priority. On the external front, respondents also agree that “Supporting good governance in non-EU countries in order to address underlying factors of radicalisation” is more of a priority than “Contributing to strengthening security capacities of non-EU countries”.
- There is a perception gap regarding the importance of countering discrimination in the European Union as a matter of priority. 34% of respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries have ranked “Countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin” as a number one priority, while 16% of European respondents did so.
“Contributing to solving conflicts outside the EU that provide fertile ground for violent extremism” is ranked first by EU respondents.

Respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries consistently rate the effectiveness of EU frameworks in higher proportions than their European counterparts. Targeted mechanisms such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Office or the cooperation with IT (Information Technology) and social media are seen as more effective than broad policy frameworks such as the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The fight against terrorist financing is seen as an important strand while the reinforced checks introduced in the Schengen context are assessed as least relevant when it comes to counter-terrorism purposes.

RESPONDENTS ASSESS THE EFFORTS TO CONFRONT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES

With Question 12, respondents were invited to assess how effective the efforts deployed to confront violent extremism have been in their respective countries. Overall, a majority of respondents (65%) acknowledge that efforts have been effective to a high extent or to a very high extent. Slightly more EU respondents (69%) than respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries (63%) have responded that way. However, views seem to be more polarised in Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries than in EU countries. In the former, 40% of respondents indicated that the efforts undertaken in their respective countries had been effective to a very high extent and 28% of respondents from the latter category did so. Similarly, very negative judgements of the efforts undertaken are found in higher proportions among respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries (13%) than among respondents from EU countries (7%) (see Graph 30).

Graph 30: To what extent do you consider that the overall efforts deployed so far in confronting violent extremism in your own country are effective?

A more detailed look into specific countries also offers interesting insights. It appears that respondents from Algeria and Morocco assess the efforts of their respective countries as highly or very highly effective in much bigger proportions than Tunisian and Egyptian respondents.
Graph 31: To what extent do you consider that the overall efforts deployed so far in confronting violent extremism in your own country are effective? (answers in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>22,9</td>
<td>28,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>70,3</td>
<td>11,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>19,1</td>
<td>66,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

La réconciliation nationale a contribué dans une large mesure au déclin de l’extrémisme violent en Algérie. À cela s’ajoutent les efforts déployés par les services de sécurité pour empêcher le recrutement pour les groupes terroristes et le démantèlement de cellules de recrutement.

Algerian respondent

Au Maroc, la « prévention » repose sur le renseignement et la dénonciation par les familles ; il existe aussi une surveillance étroite des propos tenus par des « professionnels » de la religion dans les mosquées au nom de l’Islam.

Moroccan respondent

Counter-terrorism strategies in Tunisia are not showing results so far. They focus mostly on security responses and are not comprehensive enough.

Tunisian respondent

Egyptian respondents are among the most negative ones regarding the efforts of their country. 42% of Egyptian respondents think that the efforts are effective to a low or very low extent.

Graph 32: To what extent do you consider that the overall efforts deployed so far in confronting violent extremism in Egypt are effective?

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Relying mainly on repression is not likely to be effective. Some use of force is required but it has to be embedded in an overall programme that combines social, political, financial and cultural dimensions.

Egyptian respondent
Some variations can also be observed among EU countries. For instance, respondents from Spain or Italy tend to rate the efforts of their countries slightly more positively than respondents from countries like France, Germany or Belgium (see Graph 33):

**Graph 33: To what extent do you consider that the overall efforts deployed so far in confronting violent extremism in your own country are effective?**

(answers in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Spain has previous knowledge of terrorism on its soil. This has helped in preventing attacks. The experience should be considered.  
**Spanish respondent**

The political response has not been very good in France. Intelligence seems to have been better organised. There is a poor understanding of terrorism because it has become part of political and electoral confrontation.  
**French respondent**

Some open comments mention the effortsmade in different countries and offer useful insights into specific initiatives:

Violent extremism – especially the right-wing or hate behaviour towards Muslims – is more relevant in the Czech Republic than extremism inspired by religions (Islam, etc.). A good initiative is the Hate Free Culture Initiative.  
**Czech respondent**

Al-Azhar is currently responding to President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi’s call for renewal of religious discourse and addressing the distorted interpretations of Islam, which terrorist groups exploit in recruiting and justifying their crimes. Al Azhar Al-Sharif has established an international Observatory to respond to lies of the extremist groups; it also trains imams and preachers.  
**Egyptian respondent**

The Dutch government has created excellent awareness among professionals. There are multi-agency approaches and specialised programmes (family- and exit support) in place.  
**Dutch respondent**

Numéro vert de signalement des personnes en voie de radicalisation géré par l’UCLAT.  
**French respondent**
Through the organisation I Dare, we are already working on the issue of violent extremism through prevention and for that we are seeking behavioural change goals (positive community change behaviour).

Jordanian respondent

Satisfying religious need of communities through a formal education system such as the Turkish IMAMHATIP school is an interesting case for other Islamic countries.

Turkish respondent

Other comments are more critical:

Que ce soit en France ou en Belgique, la coopération entre les différents services de police fut défaillante, la première chose à faire est de mettre en place une plateforme pour gérer une meilleure collaboration.

Belgian respondent

Grassroots initiatives/community level engagement (and community-police engagement) are fairly effective. The overall contest strategy of the UK Government is ineffective.

UK respondent

WHAT PRIORITIES TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE EUROMED MEDITERRANEAN REGION?

Moving away from the perception of the efforts undertaken in specific countries, Question 13 looks into the perception of what should be done as a matter of priority in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Respondents were asked to choose and rank three of the 14 priorities proposed. No apparent typology of these priorities was proposed to respondents but overall one could distinguish three main categories of options: those that relate to so-called root causes (addressing economic and social root causes, promoting good governance and human rights, solving unresolved conflicts); those that relate to purely security-oriented actions (such as state of emergency, border control, etc.); and, finally, those that relate to softer measures (such as combating the spread of hate speech, engaging communities, fighting Islamophobia or proposing alternative narratives).

Among the first four priorities that respondents ranked as top priorities, three belong to the first category. In other words, it comes through quite clearly that respondents think that tackling root causes is the most effective way to counter violent extremism. More specifically, 29% of respondents ranked as number one priority “Addressing economic and social root causes” and the EU respondents did so in even higher proportions (32.1%) than respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries (25.4%). Conversely, more respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries (16.7%) mentioned the more political-related root cause priority “Promoting good governance, democracy and human rights” than EU respondents (10.2%). Last, “Solving unresolved conflicts” is the second most often ticked as a first priority by EU respondents (12.5%) and the fourth most often ticked as a first priority by respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries (9.3%) (see Graph 34).
Security-oriented measures (in dark blue in Graph 35) are not seen as the main priorities by respondents. The only exception seems to be “Better information sharing of intelligence between Euro-Mediterranean countries”, which has been identified as the number 1 priority in order to effectively counter violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region by 7.1% of respondents.
The last group of options corresponds to softer security measures. It is worth noting that respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries chose "Combating the spread of hate speech" and "Fighting Islamophobia" as top priorities in higher proportions than those from EU countries (see Graph 36).

**Graph 36: What should be the main priorities in order to effectively counter violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region?**
(results show the first choice out of four)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>SSM Respondents</th>
<th>EU Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combating the spread of hate speech, promotion of violence and dissemination of terrorist propaganda online</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk assessments and development of risk indicators</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Islamophobia</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaging communities: local initiatives can generate a climate of trust and enhance cooperation on the ground</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposing alternative narratives to propaganda developed by violent extremist groups</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

In their open comments, respondents elaborate on specific priorities, bring in further priorities and ideas or argue that all these priorities must be used in an integrated and balanced manner. Below is a sample of these comments:

The core should be a tailor-made approach of individual cases that is aimed at finding solutions for the often practical problems that set people on the path of violent extremism. One needs a local level approach and with the participation of professionals from different disciplines (municipality, school, police, health and child protection services). This is in fact the approach in the Netherlands. It is aimed at prevention. For cases where one is "too late", more repressive measures may be in order first.

* Dutch respondent

An integrated approach combining most of the above would be necessary. Neither a military solution, nor a political or economic solution is likely to work on its own. Need to integrate almost all of the above into a coherent approach that tackles the root causes (political, economic and social), the channels of recruitment (online, community), the operational level (intelligence sharing, military responses, etc.).

* UK respondent

Neutraliser les parties (organisations, partis politiques, individus…) responsables de l’embrigadement des « combattants » terroristes et dénoncer leurs soutiens étrangers.

* Tunisian respondent

Terror as a whole MUST be handled with an iron fist and ZERO TOLERANCE. Wake up Europe!!!

* Israeli respondent
AT THE MULTILATERAL LEVEL AND AT THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN LEVEL

Questions 14 and 15 focus respectively on multilateral initiatives undertaken to confront violent extremism and on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. The results to Question 14, where respondents were invited to identify what the primary concern of multilateral initiatives should be, are very much in line with the findings of Question 13. Overall, it appears that respondents think that multilateral initiatives should address root causes (“Focus on the development agenda”) to a higher extent than “Focus on the security/counter-terrorism agenda” (see in dark blue in Graph 37).

Graph 37: The need to address the rise of violent extremism at the multilateral level has been acknowledged and has materialised in a number of initiatives. To what extent should the primary concern of multilateral initiatives be to:

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Graph 37 also shows that respondents stressed the importance of communities, civil society and local actors as stakeholders in the fight against violent extremism. Indeed, promoting and funding projects targeting these categories is the most recurrent choice of respondents therefore a qualitative article on the civil society role in this context is included in this publication (see: Gervasoni “Building a Bridge: Engaging Civil Society in Preventing all Forms of Violent Extremism” p. 40).

A more detailed look into the results reveals slight nuances, whose importance should not be over-interpreted though due to the limited variations:

• Respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries are slightly more inclined than EU respondents to consider that focusing on the development agenda should be of primary relevance for the multilateral agenda.
Graph 38: The need to address the rise of violent extremism at the multilateral level has been acknowledged and has materialised in a number of initiatives. To what extent should the primary concern of multilateral initiatives be to:

(the graph below shows the % of “very high extent” answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU respondents</th>
<th>SSM respondents</th>
<th>Maghreb respondents</th>
<th>Civil society respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus on the development agenda</td>
<td>Focus on the security/counter-terrorism agenda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

• Israeli respondents think the security/counter terrorism agenda should be more of a concern for multilateral initiatives than the development agenda.

Graph 39: The need to address the rise of violent extremism at the multilateral level has been acknowledged and has materialised in a number of initiatives. To what extent should the primary concern of multilateral initiatives be to:

Israel respondents (mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Focus on the development agenda</th>
<th>Focus on the security/counter-terrorism agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

• Respondents from the Mashreq were more inclined to consider that the counter terrorism and security agenda should be a primary concern of multilateral initiatives than respondents from the Maghreb.

Graph 40: The need to address the rise of violent extremism at the multilateral level has been acknowledged and has materialised in a number of initiatives. To what extent should the primary concern of multilateral initiatives be to:

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mashreq respondents</th>
<th>Maghreb respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus on the development agenda</td>
<td>Focus on the security/counter-terrorism agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
In their open comments, some respondents also highlighted other important dimensions, as illustrated below:

**Strengthening international cooperation to stop financing terrorism or supplying it with weapons.**

Egyptian respondent

**Question 15** focuses specifically on the contribution of the Euro-Mediterranean level in confronting violent extremism. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with a series of five statements. The results converge in the same direction and unambiguously highlight the need for more regional Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on preventing and countering violent extremism at all levels, including among civil society organisations. The statement regarding cooperation among civil society organisations was the most agreed with by all categories of respondents with only slight variations (respondents from the Maghreb, civil society respondents and respondents from Turkey are, for example, above the mean).

**Graph 41: Do you agree with the following statements regarding Euro-Mediterranean cooperation?: Cooperation between civil society organizations working on the Prevention of Violent Extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean area should be reinforced.**

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

While 72% of respondents acknowledge that there is a deficit of cooperation between security agencies of Mediterranean northern and southern countries, 57% of respondents also think that cooperation in this field should not remain only bilateral, not focus on the security angle and therefore not primarily involve security and intelligence agencies.

**Graph 42: Do you agree with the following statements regarding Euro-Mediterranean cooperation?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Totally disagree</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation should remain mostly bilateral, focus on the security angle and therefore primarily involve security and intelligence agencies</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a deficit of cooperation between security agencies of Mediterranean northern and southern countries</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
However, a number of comments point to a certain degree of mistrust and highlight limits of the cooperation between security agencies as well as between civil society organisations:

European security agencies do not work well with Middle East counterparts. The latter are often blindly brutal and politically corrupt.

Greek respondent

Je n’ai pas confiance dans le rôle des sociétés civiles. Certaines sont suspectées de soutenir le terrorisme pour servir des intérêts.

Egyptian respondent

There is a problematic side to cooperation with southern Mediterranean security institutions, as these do not respect human rights standards.

Dutch respondent

A critical majority of respondents (76%) thinks that Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation fora to address violent extremism and exchange best practices are missing and a majority (64%) also thinks that the Union for the Mediterranean could play a role in this regard. Again, there are only minor variations across the board. Respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries seem to be slightly more inclined than their EU counterparts to think that regional fora are missing and that the Union for the Mediterranean could play a bigger role.

Graph 43: Do you agree with the following statements regarding Euro-Mediterranean cooperation?

![Graph 43](chart.png)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
Despite the unambiguous call for more regional cooperation that transpires from the results, some open comments shed a more realist light on the challenges that stand in the way:

Confidence building measures will help for a better exchange of intelligence and cooperation between northern and southern countries; cooperation is a two-way street!
Algerian respondent

Euromed has neither teeth nor a clear mandate to intervene.
Dutch respondent

Full cooperation requires full confidence, which regrettably does not exist between all Euro-Mediterranean countries.
Israeli respondent

Les gouvernements du Sud de la Méditerranée ne jouent pas le jeu de la coopération anti-terroriste. Ils instrumentalisent cette lutte pour leurs intérêts politiques. Il y a une volonté d’instrumentaliser le terrorisme pour négocier en rapport de force avec les pays européens.
Algerian respondent

The region requires more cooperation and trust between different countries and actors. Division and lack of trust between countries, security services and civil society actors has been a main asset for terrorist groups. But these kinds of relations are difficult to build. The Union for the Mediterranean can play this role but only if its partners believe in it. It does not seem to be the case for most of them.
Spanish respondent

**WHAT SHOULD THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES FOCUS ON AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY?**

Again, results to **Question 16** tend to show that respondents do not necessarily see that strengthening security-focused measures within the European Union is a matter of priority, although respondents from the European Union and respondents from the policy community do so in higher proportions than respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries and respondents from the civil society community (see Graph 44).
Graph 44: What should the EU and its member states focus on as a matter of priority? (results show the first choice out of three)

On the external front, respondents also agree that “Supporting good governance in non-EU countries in order to address underlying factors of radicalisation to violent extremism” is more of a priority than “Contributing to strengthening security capacities of non-EU countries”.

However, one of the most striking results is the perception gap on the importance of countering discrimination in the European Union as a matter of priority. 34% of respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries ranked “Countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin” as a number one priority (respondents from Turkey were in particular keen on identifying this as a priority as 77% of them indicated this as one of their 3 options), while 16% of European respondents did so.
Countering discrimination action in all fields should be the main priority. It is better to work on education and combating stereotypes and prejudices that nourish distrust and produce scapegoats and scarecrows.

Palestinian respondent

The EU should be more aware of its role in what the region is witnessing.

Italian respondent

EU countries need to recognize that the conditions on the ground for their own populations are creating vulnerabilities; it’s not just about other countries. EU countries do not have a single level of good governance. Even the most stable countries have pockets of unequal governance/discrimination/oppression/service for minorities.

Danish respondent

The most chosen option by EU respondents is “Contributing to solving conflicts outside the EU that provide fertile ground for violent extremism”. Outside the EU, it is worth noting that 65% of respondents from the Mashreq respondents indicated this as one of their three options.

It is not just about contributing to any solution of conflicts outside the EU that will help the EU in this case. How these conflicts, such as those in Syria and Iraq involving Daesh, are solved is as important as whether these conflicts are solved. If Assad stays but Raqqa is taken back, Mosul is taken back but Sunnis in Iraq are discriminated against and the “EU contributes” to this assuming that this is a “solution”, is that what the EU should be doing? I would not think so.

Turkish respondent

ASSESSING EU INSTRUMENTS

In Questions 17 and 18, respondents were asked to evaluate existing EU initiatives and more precisely the effectiveness of general frameworks (Question 17) dealing with violent extremism and more in detail the relevance of counter-terrorism internal lines of action (Question 18). Hyperlinks and footnotes were provided in the questionnaire to ensure proper information for respondents.

In Question 17, respondents were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of four very different EU frameworks and instruments, all contributing to some extent to the fight against violent extremism. While more respondents acknowledged their lack of proper knowledge in order to assess the effectiveness of the action of the Radicalisation Awareness Network, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Office and the Cooperation with IT and social media, respondents were also more numerous in assessing these three frameworks as effective to a high or very high extent than the broad policy framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy.
Graph 45: With these strands in mind, to what extent are the following EU frameworks effective? (answers in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with IT and social media companies in tracking terrorist-related content online</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

More significantly, it is interesting to note that respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries consistently rate the effectiveness of these four frameworks in higher proportions than their European counterparts.

Graph 46: With these strands in mind, to what extent are the following EU frameworks effective?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>SSM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with IT and social media companies in tracking terrorist-related content online</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey mean: 5.9  Survey mean: 6.4  Survey mean: 6.5  Survey mean: 6.5

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey

Assessment based on current performance. ENP has huge potential but now has an excessively defensive approach focused on stability and resilience and managing migration.

Spanish respondent

RAN is quite new. ENP is still based on a very liberal model of trade that is not appropriate. There is a need for other forms of cooperation and exchange.

Irish respondent
With **Question 18**, respondents were invited to evaluate more concrete initiatives undertaken by the European Union on the counter-terrorism front. Among the efforts undertaken over the last few years, respondents agree that “Strengthening the fight against terrorist financing” has a very high significance. 83% of respondents agreed that this strand is relevant to a high or very high extent. Results point to the fact that the reinforced checks introduced in the Schengen context are assessed as least relevant when it comes to counter-terrorism purposes, especially by civil society respondents.

**Graph 47: On the counter-terrorism front, the European Union has reinforced its internal and external action lines over the last few years with a series of initiatives. Some of the internal lines of action are mentioned below. In your opinion, to what extent are they relevant?**

The graph below shows again that non-European respondents seem to be slightly more confident in general with the relevance of EU counter terrorism initiatives than EU respondents themselves.
Graph 48: On the counter-terrorism front, the European Union has reinforced its internal and external action lines over the last few years with a series of initiatives. Some of the internal lines of action are mentioned below. In your opinion, to what extent are they relevant?
(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high)

Below is a sample of open comments:

L’approche sécuritaire a démontré ses limites. L’Union Européenne devrait opter pour d’autres mesures comme la lutte contre le discours haineux de part et d’autre.

Algerian respondent

Les mesures de contrôles ne sont importantes qu’à court terme, mais le renforcement de la lutte contre le financement du terrorisme est une solution préventive et plus radicale pour l’éradiquer.

Tunisian respondent

Les services occidentaux savent parfaitement qui finance le terrorisme. Nous mettons l’Occident officiel au défi de dénoncer, sans ambages, auprès de ses opinions publiques, les vrais commanditaires du jihadisme.

Tunisian respondent

Too many differences among EU member states in their internal and external actions against terrorism prevent the European Union using the right tools and efficient counter-terrorism policies.

Italian respondent
METHODOLOGY

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire had 18 general questions and was designed to capture some of the main dimensions of violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The questions are organised along three thematic blocks. The first one looks into the context and drivers of violent extremism. The second focuses on the impact of violent extremism. Questions from the third block cover several aspects related to policy responses.

The questionnaire combined open-ended questions and multiple-choice questions with predefined answers offering respondents the possibility to choose and rank among several options or the possibility to grade on a “very low” to “very high” scale. For these questions, an optional space was provided to elaborate on the answer. This open part is considered of great importance for a Survey of this kind as it contributes to improving the interpretation of its overall results and provides with additional valuable material.

Survey Sample

To conduct the Survey, a universe of 6,500 experts, actors and policy-makers from the 43 Union for the Mediterranean countries was selected. They received an invitation to participate. As in previous years, geographical distribution, institutional affiliation, field of knowledge and gender balance were the reference criteria for selecting the universe. In addition to experts involved in Euro-Mediterranean affairs in various capacities, some more specialised experts in violent extremism were identified.

Concerning the distribution by geographical origin, 53% came from the EU-28 and 45% from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean Countries (hereafter SSM).
The Mediterranean EU countries\(^1\) (29.8\%), the remaining EU countries and the Maghreb countries\(^2\) are the sub-regional groupings that account for the bulk of the responses. Mashreq\(^3\) countries come in fourth position with 13.5\% of respondents.

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1. Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Croatia and Slovenia. The first three alone account for nearly 82\% of responses from this region.
2. Maghreb countries include Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya. The first three alone account for 93\% of responses from this region.
3. Mashreq countries include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Syria.
Reaching a representative distribution by country continues to be a difficult task. Some countries are over-represented and others under-represented. In order to avoid bias in the results, we have weighted them according to distribution of the target by the countries in the sample (see annex II). With this weighting we avoid the over-representation of Spain, France, Italy Morocco and Tunisia largely determining the results of respondents overall.

Profile of Respondents

In the first block of questions, in addition to providing their country of origin, respondents were asked to indicate their gender and the type of institution they belonged to. As shown in the graphs below, the majority of respondents to the questionnaire are “experts”, an aggregated category that includes respondents from think tanks, media and, above all, academia. Altogether, these groups account for 53% of the total number of responses. The other categories “policy-makers” (embracing responses from diplomatic bodies, European or international institutions, political parties and governments) and “civil society” (encompassing trade unions, companies and mainly NGOs) account each for 23% of the total number of responses.

Graph 3: Breakdown of respondents by type of institution

When looking specifically at the individual groups (see Graph 4 below), academia clearly emerges as the most represented institution (35% of total responses), followed by NGOs (19.3%) and think tanks (16.2%). Altogether, these groups account for two thirds of the total responses.

4. Governmental, diplomatic, EU institution, other international organisation, political party, think tank, academic, media, NGO, trade union, company (business sector).
Respondents were also asked about their main sector of activity and were given the opportunity to indicate one or two areas of specialisation. As shown in the graph below, which features aggregated figures for main and secondary areas of specialisation, 35.5% of the respondents operate in the area of “Political cooperation and security”. “Social, cultural and human exchanges” ranks second as the main area of specialisation of respondents (34%), followed by “migration and justice affairs” 16.5%). Finally, “economic and financial cooperation” comes in fourth place with 14.1%
When analysing the figures above by factoring in the geographical dimension, one finds that
the main area of specialisation of European respondents is “political cooperation and security”
while most SSM respondents identified “social, cultural and human exchanges” as their area
of expertise.

Graph 6: Breakdown of respondents by area of specialisation and by region

Finally, to complete the description of the sample on which this Survey is based, it is important
to note that 34% of respondents are women, in line with the gender balance of the last Sur-
vey (see Graph 7). When analysing the North/South dimension, the aggregate proportion of
women amounts to 29.3% for SSM countries, while it increases to 37.5% for EU countries. By
regional groups, the Maghreb and Mashreq fall below the overall gender ratio (see Graph 8).

Graph 7: Breakdown of respondents by gender
Graph 8: Breakdown of respondents by gender and regional groups

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 8th Euromed Survey
SET OF RESULTS
COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE
Graph 1: Breakdown of responses by geographical origin

- EU countries: 53%
- SSM countries (i.e., Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monaco): 45%
- Other: 3%
- EU non-Med countries: 43%
- EU-Med countries: 57%
- Mashreq: 30%
- Maghreb: 50%
- Turkey: 10%
- Israel: 7%

Graph 2: Breakdown of respondents by region (in %)

- Mediterranean EU countries: 29.8%
- Rest of EU (i.e., EU non Mediterranean): 22.8%
- Maghreb: 22.7%
- Mashreq: 13.5%
- Turkey: 4.7%
- Israel: 3.2%
- European non EU (i.e., Balkan countries and Monaco): 0.8%
- Other: 2.5%

* Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Monaco.
Graph 3: Breakdown of respondents by type of institution

- Policy-makers: 23%
- Civil society: 23%
- Experts: 53%
- Academic: 35%
- NGO: 19%
- Think tank: 16%
- Governmental: 11%
- Political party: 0.5%
- Media: 2%
- Company: 3%
- Diplomatic: 3%
- EU institution: 3%
- Other international organisation: 6%
- Other international organisation: 6%

Graph 4: Breakdown of respondents by type of institution

- Academic: 35% (2017: 37.4%)
- NGO: 19.3% (2017: 16.5%)
- Think tank: 16.2% (2017: 13.3%)
- Governmental: 11.1% (2017: 10.3%)
- Other international organisation: 6.2% (2017: 5.7%)
- EU institution: 2.6% (2017: 2.8%)
- Company (Business sector): 3.2% (2017: 3.6%)
- Diplomatic: 4.1% (2017: 3.1%)
- Media: 2.1% (2017: 2.3%)
- Trade union: 0.2% (2017: 0.3%)
- Political party: 0.1% (2017: 0.3%)
Graph 5: Breakdown of respondents by area of specialisation

- Political cooperation and security: 35.5%
- Economic and financial cooperation: 14.1%
- Social, cultural and human exchanges: 33.9%
- Migration and justice affairs: 16.5%

Graph 6: Breakdown of respondents by area of specialisation and by region

- EU countries:
  - Migration and justice affairs: 17%
  - Social, cultural and human exchanges: 11%
  - Economic and financial cooperation: 29%
  - Political cooperation and security: 43%

- MPC:
  - Migration and justice affairs: 16%
  - Social, cultural and human exchanges: 17%
  - Economic and financial cooperation: 22%
  - Political cooperation and security: 40%

Graph 7: Breakdown of respondents by gender

- Men: 67%
- Women: 33%

Graph 8: Breakdown of respondents by gender and regional groups

- Rest of EU:
  - Men: 61%
  - Women: 39%

- Mediterranean EU:
  - Men: 64%
  - Women: 36%

- European non-EU:
  - Men: 67%
  - Women: 33%

- Maghreb:
  - Men: 69%
  - Women: 31%

- Mashreq:
  - Men: 70%
  - Women: 30%
BLOCK 1

CONTEXT AND DRIVERS
OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM
TERRITORIALISING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Q1. Which of these countries* are likely to become targets or continue being targeted by violent extremism in the upcoming years? Please choose three and rank them.

Which of these countries* are likely to become targets or continue being targeted by violent extremism in the upcoming years? (results show the first choice out of three)

* Respondents had a drop-down menu with the 43 Euro-Mediterranean countries (members of the Union for the Mediterranean) as well as Russia, the US and the Gulf countries, Iran and Iraq.

**SSM respondents**

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

**EU respondents**

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

* Respondents had a drop-down menu with the 43 Euro-Mediterranean countries (members of the Union for the Mediterranean) as well as Russia, the US and the Gulf countries, Iran and Iraq.
Q2. In your opinion, which actor(s) (governmental or non-governmental) has (have) a particular responsibility for the surge of violent extremism?

In your opinion, which actor(s) (governmental or non-governmental) has (have) a particular responsibility for the surge of violent extremism?

(categories developed from the open-ended answers)
Q3. In which environments and contexts are recruiters more likely to successfully turn an individual into a violent extremist? Please choose three and rank them.

In which environments and contexts are recruiters more likely to successfully turn an individual into a violent extremist? (results show the first choice out of three)

- Conflict zones: 32.6%
- Internet and social media: 19.6%
- Marginalised urban areas: 13.3%
- Prisons: 12.2%
- Religious communities: 10.1%
- Refugee camps/shelters: 4.3%
- Neighbourhood, family and friendship networks: 4.2%
- Educational institutions (school, university…): 3.6%
- Professional environment: 0.3%

In which environments and contexts are recruiters more likely to successfully turn an individual into a violent extremist? (results show the first choice out of three)

- Conflict zones: 37%
- Internet and social media: 20%
- Marginalised urban areas: 15.6%
- Prisons: 14%
- Religious communities: 16.4%
- Refugee camps/shelters: 6.9%
- Neighbourhood, family and friendship networks: 4.8%
- Educational institutions (school, university…): 5.4%
- Professional environment: 0.5%
### Q4. To what extent could the following measures contribute to curbing radicalisation processes in prisons?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isolation of radicalised detainees to avoid contact with the others</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation for reintegrating into society</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional training and skills learning during prison (for detainees)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological support</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious counselling inside the prison</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness-raising and training of prison personnel</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

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To what extent could the following measures contribute to curbing radicalisation processes in prisons?

![Bar chart showing the extent to which different measures contribute to curbing radicalisation processes in prisons.](chart.png)
Q4. To what extent could the following measures contribute to curbing radicalisation processes in prisons?

To what extent could the following measures contribute to curbing radicalisation processes in prisons?
(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

- Awareness-raising and training of prison personnel: 7.7
- Preparation for reintegrating into society: 7.5
- Professional training and skills learning during prison (for detainees): 7.6
- Psychological support: 7.5
- Religious counselling inside the prison: 6.4
- Isolation of radicalised detainees to avoid contact with the others: 5.7
- Awareness-raising and training of prison personnel: 7.9
- Preparation for reintegrating into society: 7.6
- Professional training and skills learning during prison (for detainees): 7.7
- Psychological support: 7.7
- Religious counselling inside the prison: 6.7
- Isolation of radicalised detainees to avoid contact with the others: 5.8
Q5. Below there are some drivers that provide fertile ground for the development of violent extremism. For each column (country or group of countries) please choose the most significant driver.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drivers provided fertile ground for the development of violent extremism. (% of the most significant driver in group of countries)</th>
<th>SSM countries</th>
<th>EU countries</th>
<th>Your own country (EU respondents)</th>
<th>Your own country (SSM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic exclusion and limited opportunities</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the country of residence: political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression, Islamophobia</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role and impact of global geopolitics, including perception of political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression of certain groups in other countries</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak state capacity and failing security</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drivers providing fertile ground for the development of violent extremism.
Q5. Below there are some drivers that provide fertile ground for the development of violent extremism.

Drivers providing fertile ground for the development of violent extremism.
(% of the most significant driver in group of countries)

- Weak state capacity and failing security: 21% (own country SSM respondents), 10% (own country EU respondents)
- Role and impact of global geopolitics, including perception of political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression of certain groups in other countries: 22% (own country SSM respondents), 27% (own country EU respondents)
- In the country of residence: political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression, Islamophobia: 12% (own country SSM respondents), 31% (own country EU respondents)
- Economic exclusion and limited opportunities: 31% (own country SSM respondents), 45% (own country EU respondents)
Q6. In addition to an enabling environment, to what extent can the following elements help to explain why an individual turns to violent extremism? Please choose three and rank them.

In addition to an enabling environment, to what extent can the following elements help to explain why an individual turns to violent extremism? (results show the first choice out of three)

- Perception of humiliation and discrimination from the society in the country of residence on ethnic, national, linguistic or religious grounds
  - SSM respondents: 20%
  - EU respondents: 30.1%

- Experiences of state repression or exclusion from rights
  - SSM respondents: 17.6%
  - EU respondents: 31%

- Lack of socioeconomic integration
  - SSM respondents: 16.1%
  - EU respondents: 18.5%

- Psychological vulnerability
  - SSM respondents: 10.1%
  - EU respondents: 18.1%

- Normalisation of violence
  - SSM respondents: 14%
  - EU respondents: 10.7%

- Personal causes (divorce, breakup, loss of job...)
  - SSM respondents: 3.8%
  - EU respondents: 3.6%

- Thrill of adventure
  - SSM respondents: 3.6%
  - EU respondents: 2.7%
ON SECURITY AND STABILITY

Q7 a. To what extent do you consider that the following phenomena threaten the stability and security of your own country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomena</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian trends on the rise</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing extremism and Islamophobia</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on the rise</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Islamist extremism</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

To what extent do you consider that the following phenomena threaten the stability and security of your own country?

Authoritarian trends on the rise

Right-wing extremism and Islamophobia on the rise

Violent Islamist extremism

(%) 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent

To what extent do you consider that the following phenomena threaten the stability and security of your own country?

(%) SSM respondents EU respondents

To what extent do you consider that the following phenomena threaten the stability and security of your own country?

(%) SSM respondents EU respondents
Q7 b. To what extent do you consider that the following phenomena threaten the stability and security of the Euro-Mediterranean countries and societies as a whole?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomena</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian trends on the rise</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing extremism and Islamophobia on the rise</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Islamist extremism</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>746</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers
Q8. In addition to the harm caused by terrorist attacks as such, to what extent do you consider that the following indirect effects of violent extremism threaten the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean space and your own country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuels Islamophobic and nationalist discourses (in the Euro-Med region)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuels Islamophobic and nationalist discourses (in your own country)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuels sectarian tensions, in particular Sunni-Shia (in the Euro-Med region)</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuels sectarian tensions, in particular Sunni-Shia (in your own country)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimates authoritarian regimes (in the Euro-Med region)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimates authoritarian regimes (in your own country)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undermines cohesion in culturally diverse societies (in the Euro-Med region)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undermines cohesion in culturally diverse societies (in your own country)</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>280</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>746</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>9%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>55%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>157</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don’t know" answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including "Don’t know" answers

In addition to the harm caused by terrorist attacks as such, to what extent do you consider that the following indirect effects of violent extremism threaten the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean space and your own country?
Q8. In addition to the harm caused by terrorist attacks as such, to what extent do you consider that the following indirect effects of violent extremism threaten the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean space and your own country?

In addition to the harm caused by terrorist attacks as such, to what extent do you consider that the following indirect effects of violent extremism threaten the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean space and your own country?

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

Undermines cohesion in culturally diverse societies (in your own country) - 5.6
Undermines cohesion in culturally diverse societies (in the Euro-Med region) - 7.3
Legitimates authoritarian regimes (in your own country) - 6.7
Legitimates authoritarian regimes (in the Euro-Med region) - 6.9
Fuels sectarian tensions, in particular Sunni-Shia (in your own country) - 3.1
Fuels sectarian tensions, in particular Sunni-Shia (in the Euro-Med region) - 5.6
Fuels Islamophobic and nationalist discourses (in your own country) - 6.3
Fuels Islamophobic and nationalist discourses (in the Euro-Med region) - 7.3
### TERRORIST ATTACKS AND TERRORIST GROUPS

Q9. In your opinion, which terrorist attack(s) do you consider the most harmful to the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole over the last few years?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attacks</th>
<th>24%</th>
<th>8%</th>
<th>8%</th>
<th>7%</th>
<th>6%</th>
<th>6%</th>
<th>6%</th>
<th>6%</th>
<th>6%</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paris attacks Nov 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>68</td>
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<td>63</td>
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<td>62</td>
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<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia Bardo</td>
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<td>Tunisia Sousse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charlie Hebdo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK-London attacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA attacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border between Egypt and Libya</td>
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<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attacks against religious +/-</td>
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<tr>
<td>minorities</td>
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<td>ISIL/Daesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Berlin-Germany</td>
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<td>MENA attacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border between Egypt and Libya</td>
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<td>State Terror, Right-wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt Church attacks, religious</td>
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<tr>
<td>minorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>No answer, None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attacks in all Europe/European capitals</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q9. In your opinion, which terrorist attack(s) do you consider the most harmful to the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole over the last few years? (categories developed from the open-ended answers)
Q9. In your opinion, which terrorist attack(s) do you consider the most harmful to the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole over the last few years?

In your opinion, which terrorist attack(s) do you consider the most harmful to the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole over the last few years?

(categories developed from the open-ended answers)

- Paris attacks Nov 2015: 22.2% (SSM respondents), 23.8% (EU respondents)
- Brussels: 7.8% (SSM), 8% (EU)
- Nice: 7.2% (SSM), 8% (EU)
- Tunisia Bardo: 6.8% (SSM), 7.4% (EU)
- Turkey: 5.5% (SSM), 6.7% (EU)
- Tunisia Sousse: 5.1% (SSM), 6.6% (EU)
- Charlie Hebdo: 5.3% (SSM), 6.2% (EU)
- Syria: 5.7% (SSM), 6% (EU)
- Egypt Church attacks, religious minorities: 5.7% (SSM), 5.1% (EU)
- UK - London attacks: 5% (SSM), 6.2% (EU)
- France: 4.1% (SSM), 5.1% (EU)
- Iraq: 3.5% (SSM), 3.2% (EU)
- Attacks in all Europe/European capitals: 1.2% (SSM), 2.1% (EU)
- Berlin-Germany: 1.8% (SSM), 3.1% (EU)
- 11 S: 1.2% (SSM), 1.6% (EU)
- ISIL/Daesh: 1.4% (SSM), 4.3% (EU)
- MENA attacks: 1% (SSM), 1.1% (EU)
- State Terror, Right-wing: 0.4% (SSM), 0.9% (EU)
- Border between Egypt and Libya: 1% (SSM), 0.4% (EU)
- Attacks against religious +/- minorities: 0.4% (SSM), 0.4% (EU)
- Al-Qaeda: 0.8% (SSM), 0.2% (EU)
Q10. Regarding specific terrorist groups: Do you agree that Daesh is likely to be completely defeated soon?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Totally disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Totally agree</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
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<td>21%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>56</td>
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<td>305</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Regarding specific terrorist groups: Do you agree that Daesh is likely to be completely defeated soon?

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)
Q10 b. Do you agree that defeating or weakening Daesh will be a major contribution to the eradication of the violent extremism threat in the Euro-Mediterranean region?

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Agree</th>
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<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
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</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Do you agree that defeating or weakening Daesh will be a major contribution to the eradication of the violent extremism threat in the Euro-Mediterranean region?

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)
Q10 c. In a “post-Daesh” scenario, which terrorist group(s) could become a major threat in the Euro-Mediterranean region?

In a “post-Daesh” scenario, which terrorist group(s) could become a major threat in the Euro-Mediterranean region? (categories developed from the open-ended answers)
**DEALING WITH FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS**

Q11. Do you agree that foreign terrorist fighters (as defined in the United Nations Security Council 2178 resolution) represent the biggest threat to violent extremism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Totally agree</th>
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<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
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<tr>
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<td>118</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

---

Do you agree that foreign terrorist fighters (as defined in the United Nations Security Council 2178 resolution) represent the biggest threat to violent extremism?

---

---

Do you agree that foreign terrorist fighters (as defined in the United Nations Security Council 2178 resolution) represent the biggest threat to violent extremism?

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

---

---

---
Q11 b. What should be the priority when it comes to dealing with foreign terrorist fighters (as defined in the United Nations Security Council 2178 resolution)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better deal with crimes committed by foreign terrorist fighters in countries of destination</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop reintegration programmes for foreign terrorist fighters upon their return</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further efforts by the country of origin to prevent them from leaving</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve cooperation between countries (including information sharing)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve the repressive response for foreign terrorist fighters upon return to the country of origin</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent foreign terrorist fighters from returning (revocation of citizenship or exclusion orders)</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

What should be the priority when it comes to dealing with foreign terrorist fighters (as defined in the United Nations Security Council 2178 resolution)?

- Better deal with crimes committed by foreign terrorist fighters in countries of destination: 7% Very low extent, 10% Low extent, 14% Neither low nor high extent, 28% High extent, 42% Very high extent
- Develop reintegration programmes for foreign terrorist fighters upon their return: 12% Very low extent, 9% Low extent, 10% Neither low nor high extent, 24% High extent, 46% Very high extent
- Further efforts by the country of origin to prevent them from leaving: 5% Very low extent, 7% Low extent, 10% Neither low nor high extent, 23% High extent, 55% Very high extent
- Improve cooperation between countries (including information sharing): 2% Very low extent, 1% Low extent, 3% Neither low nor high extent, 12% High extent, 81% Very high extent
- Improve the repressive response for foreign terrorist fighters upon return to the country of origin: 13% Very low extent, 15% Low extent, 15% Neither low nor high extent, 23% High extent, 34% Very high extent
- Prevent foreign terrorist fighters from returning (revocation of citizenship or exclusion orders): 34% Very low extent, 15% Low extent, 9% Neither low nor high extent, 16% High extent, 27% Very high extent

Don't know: 8%
Q11 b. What should be the priority when it comes to dealing with foreign terrorist fighters (as defined in the United Nations Security Council 2178 resolution)?

What should be the priority when it comes to dealing with foreign terrorist fighters (as defined in the United Nations Security Council 2178 resolution)?

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>SSM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevent foreign terrorist fighters from returning (revocation of citizenship or exclusion orders)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further efforts by the country of origin to prevent them from leaving</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop reintegration programmes for foreign terrorist fighters upon their return</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve the repressive response for foreign terrorist fighters upon return to the country of origin</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better deal with crimes committed by foreign terrorist fighters in countries of destination</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further efforts by the country of origin to prevent them from leaving</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improve cooperation between countries (including information sharing)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
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BLOCK 3

CONFRONTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
### GENERAL

Q12. To what extent do you consider that the overall efforts deployed so far in confronting violent extremism in your own country are effective?

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<th></th>
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<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
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<tr>
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<td>71</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>83</td>
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<td>145</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>335</td>
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</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

To what extent do you consider that the overall efforts deployed so far in confronting violent extremism in your own country are effective?

To what extent do you consider that the overall efforts deployed so far in confronting violent extremism in your own country are effective?

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)
What should be the main priorities in order to effectively counter violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region?

(results show the first choice out of four)

- Addressing economic and social root causes (unemployment, inequalities) - 29%
- Promoting good governance, democracy and human rights - 13.3%
- Combating the spread of hate speech, promotion of violence and dissemination of terrorist propaganda online - 11.8%
- Solving unresolved conflicts - 11.1%
- Better information sharing of intelligence between Euro-Mediterranean countries - 7.1%
- Engaging communities: local initiatives can generate a climate of trust and enhance cooperation on the ground - 5.9%
- Risk assessments and development of risk indicators - 4.7%
- Proposing alternative narratives to propaganda developed by violent extremist groups - 3.9%
- Fighting Islamophobia - 2.9%
- Increasing border control - 2.7%
- Military response against terrorist groups - 2.5%
- Facilitating information circulation between security/intelligence services and local authorities/religious communities - 2.5%
- Increasing the number of law enforcement members in order to monitor the whereabouts of suspected individuals - 1.9%
- Maintaining state of emergency in countries at risk - 0.7%
Q13. What should be the main priorities in order to effectively counter violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region? Please choose four and rank them.

What should be the main priorities in order to effectively counter violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region? (results show the first choice out of four)

- Addressing economic and social root causes (unemployment, inequalities) - 25.4% (SSM respondents), 32.1% (EU respondents)
- Promoting good governance, democracy and human rights - 10.2% (SSM respondents), 16.7% (EU respondents)
- Solving unresolved conflicts - 9.3% (SSM respondents), 12.5% (EU respondents)
- Better information sharing of intelligence between Euro-Mediterranean countries - 6.3% (SSM respondents), 7.9% (EU respondents)
- Combating the spread of hate speech, promotion of violence and dissemination of terrorist propaganda online - 9.9% (SSM respondents), 14.3% (EU respondents)
- Proposing alternative narratives to propaganda developed by violent extremist groups - 3.3% (SSM respondents), 4.6% (EU respondents)
- Military response against terrorist groups - 2.4% (SSM respondents), 2.8% (EU respondents)
- Risk assessments and development of risk indicators - 3.6% (SSM respondents), 6.3% (EU respondents)
- Engaging communities; local initiatives can generate a climate of trust and enhance cooperation on the ground - 4.2% (SSM respondents), 7.4% (EU respondents)
- Increasing the number of law enforcement members in order to monitor the whereabouts of suspected individuals - 1.8% (SSM respondents), 2% (EU respondents)
- Maintaining state of emergency in countries at risk - 0.6% (SSM respondents), 0.8% (EU respondents)
- Increasing border control - 2.4% (SSM respondents), 2.8% (EU respondents)
- Fighting Islamophobia - 1.5% (SSM respondents), 4.8% (EU respondents)
- Facilitating information circulation between security/intelligence services and local authorities/religious communities - 2.7% (SSM respondents), 2% (EU respondents)
MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL

Q14. The need to address the rise of violent extremism at the multilateral level has been acknowledged and has materialised in a number of initiatives. To what extent should the primary concern of multilateral initiatives be to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
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<tr>
<td>Exchange best practices among experts</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>730</td>
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<td>28%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus on the development agenda</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>22%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus on the security/counter-terrorism agenda</td>
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<td>81</td>
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<td>729</td>
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<td>28%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote and fund capacity-building initiatives targeting national authorities</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>28%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote and fund projects targeting communities and civil society and local actors</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>161</td>
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<td>728</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>22%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set up parameters of action (offering a framework for national and regional action plans)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>45%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>5%</td>
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(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

The need to address the rise of violent extremism at the multilateral level has been acknowledged and has materialised in a number of initiatives. To what extent should the primary concern of multilateral initiatives be to:
Q14. The need to address the rise of violent extremism at the multilateral level has been acknowledged and has materialised in a number of initiatives. To what extent should the primary concern of multilateral initiatives be to:

The need to address the rise of violent extremism at the multilateral level has been acknowledged and has materialised in a number of initiatives. To what extent should the primary concern of multilateral initiatives be to:

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
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<th>SSM respondents</th>
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<tr>
<td>Promote and fund projects targeting communities and civil society and local actors</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus on the development agenda</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
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<td>Exchange best practices among experts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promote and fund capacity-building initiatives targeting national authorities</td>
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<td>7.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus on the security/counter-terrorism agenda</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Set up parameters of action (offering a framework for national and regional action plans)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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</table>

SSM respondents | EU respondents
Q15. Do you agree with the following statements regarding Euro-Mediterranean cooperation?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation should remain mostly bilateral, focus on the security angle and therefore primarily involve security and intelligence agencies</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation between civil society organizations working on the Prevention of Violent Extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean area should be reinforced</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation fora to address violent extremism and exchange best practices are missing</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Union for the Mediterranean could play a role in this regard</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a deficit of cooperation between security agencies of Mediterranean northern and southern countries</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers
Q15. Do you agree with the following statements regarding Euro-Mediterranean cooperation?

Do you agree with the following statements regarding Euro-Mediterranean cooperation?
(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

Cooperation between civil society organizations working on the Prevention of Violent Extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean area should be reinforced

There is a deficit of cooperation between security agencies of Mediterranean northern and southern countries

Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation fora to address violent extremism and exchange best practices are missing

The Union for the Mediterranean could play a role in this regard

Cooperation should remain mostly bilateral, focus on the security angle and therefore primarily involve security and intelligence agencies

SSM respondents

EU respondents
**EUROPEAN UNION**

**Q16. What should the EU and its member states focus on as a matter of priority? Please choose three and rank them.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Focus</th>
<th>All survey</th>
<th>EU countries</th>
<th>SSM countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to solving conflicts outside the EU that provide fertile ground for violent extremism</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to strengthening security capacities of non-EU countries</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering terrorist propaganda and hate speech online</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deradicalisation, disengagement and reintegration strategies</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focusing on targeted preventive measures</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting inclusive education and EU common values</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security-focused measures within the European Union</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting good governance in non-EU countries in order to address underlying factors of radicalisation</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q16. What should the EU and its member states focus on as a matter of priority? Please choose three and rank them.

What should the EU and its member states focus on as a matter of priority?
(results show the first choice out of three)

- Countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin (34%)
- Contributing to solving conflicts outside the EU that provide fertile ground or violent extremism (21%)
- Security-focused measures within the European Union (22%)
- Deradicalisation, disengagement and reintegration strategies (16%)
- Promoting inclusive education and EU common values (12%)
- Focusing on targeted preventive measures (11%)
- Countering terrorist propaganda and hate speech online (9%)
- Supporting good governance in non-EU countries in order to address underlying factors of radicalisation (8%)
- Countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin (6%)
- Security-focused measures within the European Union (6%)
- Countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin (4%)
- Supporting good governance in non-EU countries in order to address underlying factors of radicalisation (3%)
- Countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin (2%)
- Contributing to solving conflicts outside the EU that provide fertile ground or violent extremism (2%)
- Deradicalisation, disengagement and reintegration strategies (9%)
- Promoting inclusive education and EU common values (7%)
- Focusing on targeted preventive measures (7%)
- Countering terrorist propaganda and hate speech online (6%)
- Supporting good governance in non-EU countries in order to address underlying factors of radicalisation (6%)
- Countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin (4%)
- Security-focused measures within the European Union (3%)
Q17. With these strands in mind, to what extent are the following EU frameworks effective?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with IT and social media companies in tracking terrorist-related content online</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

With these strands in mind, to what extent are the following EU frameworks effective?
Q17. With these strands in mind, to what extent are the following EU frameworks effective?

With these strands in mind, to what extent are the following EU frameworks effective?
(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

- Cooperation with IT and social media companies in tracking terrorist-related content online: 6.8
- The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator: 7
- Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN): 6.7
- European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP): 6.4

SSM respondents  | EU respondents  | All survey
Q18. On the counter-terrorism front, the European Union has reinforced its internal and external action lines over the last few years with a series of initiatives. Some of the internal lines of action are mentioned below. In your opinion, to what extent are they relevant?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Low extent</th>
<th>Neither low nor high extent</th>
<th>High extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directive on combating terrorism</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Counter Terrorism Centre</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced checks in the Schengen context</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the fight against terrorist financing</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

On the counter-terrorism front, the European Union has reinforced its internal and external action lines over the last few years with a series of initiatives. Some of the internal lines of action are mentioned below. In your opinion, to what extent are they relevant?
Q18. On the counter-terrorism front, the European Union has reinforced its internal and external action lines over the last few years with a series of initiatives. Some of the internal lines of action are mentioned below. In your opinion, to what extent are they relevant?

On the counter-terrorism front, the European Union has reinforced its internal and external action lines over the last few years with a series of initiatives. Some of the internal lines of action are mentioned below. In your opinion, to what extent are they relevant?

(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)
SAMPLE OF THE SURVEY
# Sample of the Survey

The table below provides a breakdown of the survey responses by country for four different years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Answers 2013/14</th>
<th>Answers 2015</th>
<th>Answers 2016</th>
<th>Answers 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>85 (10.1%)</td>
<td>72 (9.5%)</td>
<td>70 (8.7%)</td>
<td>63 (7.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>40 (4.8%)</td>
<td>41 (5.4%)</td>
<td>36 (4.5%)</td>
<td>27 (3.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>43 (5.1%)</td>
<td>30 (3.9%)</td>
<td>39 (4.8%)</td>
<td>35 (4.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>46 (5.5%)</td>
<td>41 (5.4%)</td>
<td>37 (4.6%)</td>
<td>35 (4.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>42 (5.0%)</td>
<td>45 (5.9%)</td>
<td>44 (5.5%)</td>
<td>68 (8.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>15 (1.8%)</td>
<td>11 (1.4%)</td>
<td>12 (1.5%)</td>
<td>6 (0.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>21 (2.5%)</td>
<td>21 (2.8%)</td>
<td>20 (2.5%)</td>
<td>24 (3.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>25 (3.0%)</td>
<td>23 (3.0%)</td>
<td>21 (2.6%)</td>
<td>16 (2.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>33 (3.9%)</td>
<td>26 (3.4%)</td>
<td>37 (4.6%)</td>
<td>24 (3.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>26 (3.1%)</td>
<td>12 (1.6%)</td>
<td>15 (1.9%)</td>
<td>20 (2.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>7 (0.8%)</td>
<td>5 (0.7%)</td>
<td>9 (1.1%)</td>
<td>6 (0.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1 (0.1%)</td>
<td>2 (0.3%)</td>
<td>3 (0.4%)</td>
<td>5 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>5 (0.6%)</td>
<td>3 (0.4%)</td>
<td>5 (0.6%)</td>
<td>3 (0.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>6 (0.7%)</td>
<td>3 (0.4%)</td>
<td>5 (0.6%)</td>
<td>2 (0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
<td>3 (0.4%)</td>
<td>1 (0.1%)</td>
<td>1 (0.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>1 (0.1%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MPCs</td>
<td>400 (47.7%)</td>
<td>338 (44.5%)</td>
<td>354 (43.9%)</td>
<td>335 (44.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>71 (8.5%)</td>
<td>77 (10.1%)</td>
<td>59 (7.3%)</td>
<td>52 (6.4%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>59 (7.0%)</td>
<td>57 (7.5%)</td>
<td>66 (8.2%)</td>
<td>63 (7.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>49 (5.8%)</td>
<td>54 (7.1%)</td>
<td>73 (9.0%)</td>
<td>68 (8.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>43 (5.1%)</td>
<td>40 (5.3%)</td>
<td>35 (4.3%)</td>
<td>35 (4.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>17 (2.0%)</td>
<td>17 (2.2%)</td>
<td>17 (2.1%)</td>
<td>21 (2.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>11 (1.3%)</td>
<td>9 (1.2%)</td>
<td>14 (1.7%)</td>
<td>13 (1.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10 (1.2%)</td>
<td>10 (1.3%)</td>
<td>9 (1.1%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>20 (2.4%)</td>
<td>18 (2.4%)</td>
<td>27 (3.3%)</td>
<td>12 (1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12 (1.4%)</td>
<td>8 (1.1%)</td>
<td>7 (0.9%)</td>
<td>15 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>17 (2.0%)</td>
<td>14 (1.8%)</td>
<td>13 (1.6%)</td>
<td>14 (1.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>7 (0.8%)</td>
<td>8 (1.1%)</td>
<td>7 (0.9%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5 (0.6%)</td>
<td>5 (0.7%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
<td>7 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>7 (0.8%)</td>
<td>11 (1.4%)</td>
<td>10 (1.2%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>11 (1.3%)</td>
<td>9 (1.2%)</td>
<td>7 (0.9%)</td>
<td>10 (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>13 (1.6%)</td>
<td>9 (1.2%)</td>
<td>10 (1.2%)</td>
<td>8 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9 (1.1%)</td>
<td>7 (0.9%)</td>
<td>8 (1.0%)</td>
<td>6 (0.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
<td>6 (0.7%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10 (1.2%)</td>
<td>8 (1.1%)</td>
<td>8 (1.0%)</td>
<td>9 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>9 (1.1%)</td>
<td>8 (1.1%)</td>
<td>9 (1.1%)</td>
<td>5 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
<td>2 (0.2%)</td>
<td>3 (0.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>10 (1.2%)</td>
<td>8 (1.1%)</td>
<td>9 (1.1%)</td>
<td>6 (0.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3 (0.4%)</td>
<td>2 (0.3%)</td>
<td>3 (0.4%)</td>
<td>2 (0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>7 (0.8%)</td>
<td>5 (0.7%)</td>
<td>9 (1.1%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>3 (0.4%)</td>
<td>3 (0.4%)</td>
<td>1 (0.1%)</td>
<td>1 (0.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>5 (0.6%)</td>
<td>6 (0.8%)</td>
<td>6 (0.7%)</td>
<td>2 (0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2 (0.2%)</td>
<td>2 (0.3%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>3 (0.4%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
<td>2 (0.9%)</td>
<td>3 (0.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>8 (1.0%)</td>
<td>7 (0.9%)</td>
<td>7 (0.2%)</td>
<td>8 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total EU</td>
<td>429 (51.2%)</td>
<td>414 (54.5%)</td>
<td>432 (53.5%)</td>
<td>392 (52.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9 (1.2%)</td>
<td>8 (1.1%)</td>
<td>21 (2.6%)</td>
<td>19 (2.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>838 (100%)</td>
<td>760 (100%)</td>
<td>807 (100%)</td>
<td>746 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE
In order to facilitate the data processing and to improve the statistical analysis, we would be very pleased if you could provide us with the following information:

**Gender**
- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female

**Nationality**
- ☐ Albania
- ☐ Algeria
- ☐ Austria
- ☐ Belgium
- ☐ Bosnia Herzegovina
- ☐ Bulgaria
- ☐ Croatia
- ☐ Cyprus
- ☐ Czech Republic
- ☐ Denmark
- ☐ Egypt
- ☐ Estonia
- ☐ Finland
- ☐ France
- ☐ Germany
- ☐ Greece
- ☐ Hungary
- ☐ Ireland
- ☐ Israel
- ☐ Italy
- ☐ Jordan
- ☐ Latvia
- ☐ Lebanon
- ☐ Lithuania
- ☐ Luxemburg
- ☐ Libya
- ☐ Malta
- ☐ Mauritania
- ☐ Montenegro
- ☐ Morocco
- ☐ Netherlands
- ☐ Occupied Palestinian Territories
- ☐ Poland
- ☐ Portugal
- ☐ Romania
- ☐ Slovakia
- ☐ Slovenia
- ☐ Spain
- ☐ Sweden
- ☐ Syria
- ☐ Tunisia
- ☐ Turkey
- ☐ United Kingdom
- ☐ Other

**Position (optional)**

**Institution (optional)**

**Sector**
- ☐ Governmental
- ☐ Diplomatic
- ☐ EU institution
- ☐ Other international organisation
- ☐ Political party
- ☐ Think tank
- ☐ Academic
- ☐ Media
- ☐ NGO
- ☐ Trade union
- ☐ Company (Business sector)

**What is your main area of specialisation?**
- ☐ Political Cooperation and Security
- ☐ Economic and Financial Cooperation
- ☐ Social, Cultural and Human Exchanges
- ☐ Migration Justice and Home Affairs
CONTEXT AND DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM
### TERRITORIALISING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

In the drop-down menu, you will find the 43 Euro-Mediterranean countries (members of the Union for the Mediterranean) as well as Russia, the US and the Gulf countries, Iran and Iraq.

#### Q1. Which of these countries are likely to become targets or continue being targeted by violent extremism in the upcoming years? Please choose three and rank them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You may want to justify your choice or add a comment:

#### Q2. In your opinion, which actor(s) (governmental or non-governmental) has a particular responsibility for the surge of violent extremism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You may want to justify your choice or add a comment:

#### Q3. In which environments and contexts are recruiters more likely to successfully turn an individual into a violent extremist? Please choose three and rank them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Environment/Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Conflict zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Educational institutions (school, university…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Internet and social media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Marginalised urban areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Neighbourhood, family and friendship networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Prisons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Professional environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Refugee camps/shelters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Religious communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other options or specific comments regarding your country:

---

You may want to justify your choice or add a comment:
**Q4. is only for those who selected Q3.7 in Q3. (it will be automatically done by the questionnaire app)**

Q4. To what extent could the following measures contribute to curbing radicalisation processes in prisons?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isolation of radicalised detainees to avoid contact with the others</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation for reintegrating into society</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional training and skills learning during prison (for detainees)</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological support</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious counselling inside the prison</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness-raising and training of prison personnel</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

---

1. The categories below come partly from the typology established by Global Counter Terrorism Forum’s (GCTF) Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders.
### DRIVERS

**Q5.** Below there are some drivers that provide fertile ground for the development of violent extremism. For each column (country or group of countries) please choose the most significant driver.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic exclusion and limited opportunities</th>
<th>Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries</th>
<th>EU countries</th>
<th>Your own country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the country of residence: political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression, Islamophobia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role and impact of global geopolitics, including perception of political exclusion, discrimination, injustice or repression of certain groups in other countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak state capacity and failing security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other options or comments regarding one option or specific countries if you want to introduce some distinction within regional groups:

**Q6.** In addition to an enabling environment, to what extent can the following elements help to explain why an individual turns to violent extremism? Please choose three and rank them.

1. Experiences of state repression or exclusion from rights
3. Thrill of adventure
4. Perception of humiliation and discrimination from the society in the country of residence on ethnic, national, linguistic or religious grounds
5. Personal causes (divorce, breakup, loss of job…)
6. Psychological vulnerability
7. Socioeconomic lack of integration

Other options or specific comments regarding one option or specific situations in your country:

[^2]: Normalisation refers here to social processes through which violence comes to be seen as ‘normal’ and is taken for granted or ‘natural’ in everyday life.
Q7 a. To what extent do you consider that the following phenomena threaten the stability and security of your own country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian trends on the rise</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3</td>
<td>☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing extremism and Islamophobia on the rise</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3</td>
<td>☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Islamist extremism</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3</td>
<td>☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other options or specific comments on threats to the stability and security of your country:

Q7 b. To what extent do you consider that the following phenomena threaten the stability and security of Euro-Mediterranean countries and societies as a whole?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian trends on the rise</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3</td>
<td>☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing extremism and Islamophobia on the rise</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3</td>
<td>☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Islamist extremism</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3</td>
<td>☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other options or specific comments on threats to the stability and security of the region:
Q8. In addition to the harm caused by terrorist attacks as such, to what extent do you consider that the following indirect effects of violent extremism threaten the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean space and your own country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fuels Islamophobic and nationalist discourses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Euro-Med region</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your country</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fuels sectarian tensions, in particular Sunni-Shia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Euro-Med region</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your country</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimates authoritarian regimes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Euro-Med region</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your country</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undermines cohesion in culturally diverse societies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Euro-Med region</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your country</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other options or specific comments on one category:

Q9. In your opinion, which terrorist attack(s) do you consider the most harmful to the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole over the last few years?

1. 
2. 

Could you please explain why?
Q10. Regarding specific terrorist groups: 
Do you agree that Daesh is likely to be completely defeated soon?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Totally disagree</th>
<th>Totally agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ 0</td>
<td>☐ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 2</td>
<td>☐ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 4</td>
<td>☐ 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 6</td>
<td>☐ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 8</td>
<td>☐ 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 10</td>
<td>☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Q10 b. Do you agree that defeating or weakening Daesh will be a major contribution to the eradication of the violent extremism threat in the Euro-Mediterranean region?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Totally disagree</th>
<th>Totally agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ 0</td>
<td>☐ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 2</td>
<td>☐ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 4</td>
<td>☐ 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 6</td>
<td>☐ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 8</td>
<td>☐ 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 10</td>
<td>☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Q10 c. In a “post-Daesh” scenario, which terrorist group(s) could become a major threat in the Euro-Mediterranean region?

1. 
2. 
Q11. Do you agree that foreign terrorist fighters (as defined in the United Nations Security Council 2178 resolution) represent the biggest threat to violent extremism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Totally disagree</th>
<th>Totally agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

☐ 0  ☐ 1  ☐ 2  ☐ 3  ☐ 4  ☐ 5  ☐ 6  ☐ 7  ☐ 8  ☐ 9  ☐ 10  ☐ Don’t know

Q11 b. What should be the priority when it comes to dealing with foreign terrorist fighters (as defined in the United Nations Security Council 2178 resolution)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Very low priority</th>
<th>Very high priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Further efforts by the country of origin to prevent them from leaving</td>
<td>☐ 0  ☐ 1  ☐ 2  ☐ 3  ☐ 4  ☐ 5  ☐ 6  ☐ 7  ☐ 8  ☐ 9  ☐ 10  ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better deal with crimes committed by foreign terrorist fighters in countries of destination</td>
<td>☐ 0  ☐ 1  ☐ 2  ☐ 3  ☐ 4  ☐ 5  ☐ 6  ☐ 7  ☐ 8  ☐ 9  ☐ 10  ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve the repressive response for foreign terrorist fighters upon return to the country of origin</td>
<td>☐ 0  ☐ 1  ☐ 2  ☐ 3  ☐ 4  ☐ 5  ☐ 6  ☐ 7  ☐ 8  ☐ 9  ☐ 10  ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop reintegration programmes for foreign terrorist fighters upon their return</td>
<td>☐ 0  ☐ 1  ☐ 2  ☐ 3  ☐ 4  ☐ 5  ☐ 6  ☐ 7  ☐ 8  ☐ 9  ☐ 10  ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent foreign terrorist fighters from returning (revocation of citizenship or exclusion orders)</td>
<td>☐ 0  ☐ 1  ☐ 2  ☐ 3  ☐ 4  ☐ 5  ☐ 6  ☐ 7  ☐ 8  ☐ 9  ☐ 10  ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve cooperation between countries (including information sharing)⁴</td>
<td>☐ 0  ☐ 1  ☐ 2  ☐ 3  ☐ 4  ☐ 5  ☐ 6  ☐ 7  ☐ 8  ☐ 9  ☐ 10  ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other options or specific comments on one category or the challenge in your own country:

---

3. In September 2014, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted the 2178 resolution Condemning Violent Extremism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Support for Foreign Terrorist Fighters. The resolution expressed a grave concern over the acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, namely individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, preparation of or participation in terrorist acts or providing or receiving terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.

4. As in terms of the 2178 resolution, increased cooperation to improve regional and sub-regional cooperation, if appropriate through bilateral agreements, to prevent the travel of foreign terrorist fighters from or through their territories, including through increased sharing of information for the purpose of identifying foreign terrorist fighters, sharing and adoption of best practices, and improved understanding of the patterns of travel by foreign terrorist fighters.
GENERAL

Q12. To what extent do you consider that the overall efforts deployed so far in confronting violent extremism in your own country are effective?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ 0</td>
<td>☐ 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 1</td>
<td>☐ 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 2</td>
<td>☐ 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 3</td>
<td>☐ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 4</td>
<td>☐ 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 5</td>
<td>☐ 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 6</td>
<td>☐ 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 7</td>
<td>☐ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 8</td>
<td>☐ 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 9</td>
<td>☐ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 10</td>
<td>☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments, including on a specific initiative (local or national) that you find particularly effective or on the efforts of other countries:

Q13. What should be the main priorities in order to effectively counter violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region? Please choose four and rank them.

1. Addressing economic and social root causes (unemployment, inequalities)
2. Better information sharing of intelligence between Euro-Mediterranean countries
3. Combating the spread of hate speech, promotion of violence and dissemination of terrorist propaganda online
4. Engaging communities: local initiatives can generate a climate of trust and enhance cooperation on the ground
5. Facilitating information circulation between security/intelligence services and local authorities/religious communities
6. Fighting Islamophobia
7. Increasing border control
8. Increasing the number of law enforcement members in order to monitor the whereabouts of suspected individuals
9. Maintaining state of emergency in countries at risk
10. Military response against terrorist groups
11. Promoting good governance, democracy and human rights
12. Proposing alternative narratives to propaganda developed by violent extremist groups
13. Risk assessments and development of risk indicators
14. Solving unresolved conflicts

Other options or comments on one specific measure or specificities regarding your own country:
**MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL**

**Q14.** The need to address the rise of violent extremism at the multilateral level has been acknowledged and has materialised in a number of initiatives. To what extent should the primary concern of multilateral initiatives be to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exchange best practices among experts⁵</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10</td>
<td>☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on the development agenda</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10</td>
<td>☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on the security/counter-terrorism agenda</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10</td>
<td>☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote and fund capacity-building initiatives targeting national authorities</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10</td>
<td>☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote and fund projects targeting communities and civil society and local actors⁶</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10</td>
<td>☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set up parameters of action⁷ (offering a framework for national and regional action plans)</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10</td>
<td>☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other options or comments on one specific dimension:

---

⁵ For example, under the umbrella of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), the Hedayah Global Centre for Excellence in Countering Violent Extremism works to strengthen the capacity to counter violent extremism globally and to connect practitioner.

⁶ A public-private partnership, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund was established to serve as the first global effort to support local, community-level initiatives aimed at strengthening resilience against violent extremist agendas. Operating at the nexus of security and development, GCERF is committed to working in partnership and consultation with governments, civil society, and the private sector in beneficiary countries to support national strategies to address the local drivers of violent extremism.

⁷ The UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism for instance proposes an Agenda for Action and also Recommendations on Preventing Violent Extremism. It recommends in particular the development of national plans of action setting national priorities.
Q15. Do you agree with the following statements regarding Euro-Mediterranean cooperation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Completely agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation should remain mostly bilateral, focus on the security angle and therefore primarily involve security and intelligence agencies</td>
<td>[ ] 0 [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3 [ ] 4 [ ] 5 [ ] 6 [ ] 7 [ ] 8 [ ] 9 [ ] 10 [ ] Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation between civil society organizations working on the Prevention of Violent Extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean area should be reinforced</td>
<td>[ ] 0 [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3 [ ] 4 [ ] 5 [ ] 6 [ ] 7 [ ] 8 [ ] 9 [ ] 10 [ ] Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation fora to address violent extremism and exchange best practices are missing</td>
<td>[ ] 0 [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3 [ ] 4 [ ] 5 [ ] 6 [ ] 7 [ ] 8 [ ] 9 [ ] 10 [ ] Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Union for the Mediterranean could play a role in this regard</td>
<td>[ ] 0 [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3 [ ] 4 [ ] 5 [ ] 6 [ ] 7 [ ] 8 [ ] 9 [ ] 10 [ ] Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a deficit of cooperation between security agencies of Mediterranean northern and southern countries</td>
<td>[ ] 0 [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3 [ ] 4 [ ] 5 [ ] 6 [ ] 7 [ ] 8 [ ] 9 [ ] 10 [ ] Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other options or comments on one specific dimension:

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8. There are already initiatives in this regard. In January 2017 for instance, civil society organisations from 22 countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region, gathered in Barcelona and adopted a “Plan of Action of the Euro-Mediterranean civil society to prevent all forms of violent extremism”.

9. Prevention of extremism and terrorism features in the roadmap for the strengthening of regional cooperation, endorsed by the Union for the Mediterranean Member States during the Ministerial meeting organized in Barcelona in January 2017. The document refers, among other things, to the adoption of the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on counter terrorism in 2005 and the need to update it.
Violent Extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean Region

Q16. What should the EU and its member states focus on as a matter of priority? Please choose three and rank them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Priority focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Countering discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or belief, race or ethnic origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Countering terrorist propaganda and hate speech online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Contributing to solving conflicts outside the EU that provide fertile ground for violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Security-focused measures within the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Focusing on targeted preventive measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Deradicalisation, disengagement and reintegration strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Promoting inclusive education and EU common values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Contributing to strengthening security capacities of non-EU countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Supporting good governance in non-EU countries in order to address underlying factors of radicalisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other options or comments on one specific dimension:

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11. As highlighted in the Communication “Delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine Security Union”, member states can for example take security measures to prevent young people from going to conflict zones to join terrorist groups. These include measures such as travel prohibitions, the criminalisation of travelling to a third country for terrorist purposes, but also measures through which families and friends can call upon the help of public authorities such as hotlines.
12. The EU counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the European Council in 2005 is focused on four main pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. The priority of a preventive strategy is to identify and tackle the factors that contribute to radicalisation and the processes by which individuals are recruited to commit acts of terror. In January 2014 the Commission submitted a Communication on Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism and, in December 2014, justice and home affairs ministers adopted a series of guidelines for the Revised EU Radicalisation and Recruitment Strategy. These guidelines set out a series of measures to be implemented by the EU and member states. Moreover, the EC encourages all member states to develop coherent prevention strategies, action plans and cooperation mechanisms involving all relevant stakeholders.
13. These strategies provide disengagement and deradicalisation support programmes to members of extremist groups in every EU country. Despite their effectiveness, such programmes are not available in the vast majority of EU member states at present. The Commission will earmark up to 20 million EUR between 2014-2017 for the “Knowledge Hub” and other prevention-related and centrally managed activities, including activities of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) and support exit programmes in member states.
14. In the relations between the EU and third countries, the counter-terrorism agenda is present in many ways, through high level political dialogues, the adoption of cooperation clauses and agreements, or specific assistance and capacity-building projects with strategic countries. The EU cooperates on counter-terrorism with countries in the Western Balkans, the Sahel, North Africa, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and North America, as well as in Asia.
Q17. With these strands in mind, to what extent are the following EU frameworks effective?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with IT and social media companies in tracking terrorist-related content online&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP)&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force for Outreach and Communication in the Arab world&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments on those frameworks or other EU specific initiatives:

15. There are two main initiatives in this field:

   1. The EU internet forum for terrorist propaganda, conducted by DG Home, in cooperation with social media companies such as Twitter, Facebook or YouTube, aims at curbing the spread of terrorist content online. It has two main objectives: to reduce accessibility to terrorist content online and to empower civil society initiatives on creating positive counter-narratives.

   2. Code of conduct on hate speech: based on the Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008, combating racist and xenophobic discourse, the code of conduct aims at associating the IT companies in the fight against illegal hate and speech. Under this code of conduct, the IT companies commit to condemn hateful speech and to push for positive values online.

16. The European Neighbourhood Policy provides the EU’s partner countries with a comprehensive cooperation framework. Under the revised ENP framework, the partnership focuses on stability and security policies to help the partner countries develop in an inclusive way, with the participation of the civil society and main priorities adapted to each national context. The indicative EU funding planned for the Southern Neighbourhood region for 2014-2020 under the European Neighbourhood Instrument is between €7.5 and €9.2 billion, including for development of media cooperation, civil society, youth exchange programmes and intercultural dialogue.

17. The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) brings together practitioners from around Europe working on the prevention of radicalisation. It is a network of frontline or grassroots practitioners from around Europe who work every day with people who have already been radicalised, or who are vulnerable to radicalisation. Practitioners include police and prison authorities, but also teachers, youth workers, civil society representatives, local authorities’ representatives and healthcare professionals.

18. The establishment of the Task Force for Outreach and Communication in the Arab world is part of several steps taken by the European Union aimed at designing a more strategic vision for engaging with stakeholders in the Arab world. Strategic communication is developed by the Strategic Communications Division (“StratComms”) and leads the European Union’s efforts on the public dimension of European diplomacy and its communication on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as its external action more broadly. The EU Strategic Communication Service aims at promoting the EU’s core values and key policies as well as trying to counteract propaganda, particularly from ISIL, by addressing a counter-narrative on positive values.
Q18. On the counter-terrorism front, the European Union has reinforced its internal and external action lines over the last few years with a series of initiatives. Some of the internal lines of action are mentioned below. In your opinion, to what extent are they relevant?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Very low extent</th>
<th>Very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directive on combating terrorism 19</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Counter Terrorism Centre 20</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive 21</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced checks in the Schengen context 22</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the fight against terrorist financing 23</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments on those frameworks or other EU specific initiatives:

19. Directive on combating terrorism adopted on 2 December 2015. The European Commission presented its proposal for a directive on combating terrorism, replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, as amended by Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA, and updating its provisions in response to the new patterns of terrorism. One of the proposal’s overarching goals is to integrate the latest international terrorism-related instruments, among them UN Security Council Resolution 2178(2014) on foreign terrorist fighters, the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism and the updated Financial Action Task Force Recommendations on terrorist financing into EU law. Finally, in March 2017, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted the definitive Directive on combating terrorism. The new rules strengthen and widen the scope of the existing legislation and help prevent terrorist attacks by criminalising acts such as undertaking training or travelling for terrorist purposes, as well as organising or facilitating such travel. They also strengthen the rights of the victims of terrorism.

20. European Counter Terrorism Centre, set up in January 2016, provides operational support to member states in investigations, such as those following the Paris, Nice and Brussels attacks. It cross-checks live operational data against the data Europol already has, quickly bringing financial leads to light, and analyses all available investigative details to assist in compiling a structured picture of the terrorist network. The ECTC’s specialist teams of analysts and experts collate operational information from law enforcement from all member states as well as from third parties. The teams work on this information to establish the wider EU perspective on counter-terrorism for both operational and strategic goals.

21. Passenger Name Record (PNR) data is personal information provided by passengers and collected and held by air carriers. On 21 April 2016 the Council adopted a directive on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. The directive aims to regulate the transfer from the airlines to the member states of PNR data of passengers of international flights, as well as the processing of this data by the competent authorities.

22. For instance, on 7 March 2017, the Council adopted a regulation amending the Schengen borders code to reinforce checks against relevant databases at the external borders.

23. As part of the European Commission’s 2016 action plan to strengthen the fight against terrorist financing, the directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing adopted in May 2015 was amended. The proposed amendments, among other issues, address the possible threats linked to the use of new technologies in financial transactions, strengthen and harmonise checks on financial flows from high-risk third countries, increase transparency, and confer more powers on national financial intelligence units.