

01

THE STATUS OF THE EMP


1.1. Overall Assessment

The answers to Questions 1.1 (on perceptions) and 1.10 (on results) lead to the conclusion that the assessment of the results of the EMP after fourteen years of operations are quite balanced, with a high concentration of responses (close to 50% in both cases) around the median values (4 to 6 on a 0-10 scale, not very disappointing but not very positive either) and a relatively similar distribution of the remaining answers at both ends of the spectrum (22% of respondents see the perceptions of the EMP as positive or very positive – 7-10 on the scale – and 26% as disappointing or very disappointing).

Question 1.1.

In your opinion, what is the perception of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in the 2005-2009 period amongst experts and actors involved in it?

10 = Very positive



1 = Very disappointing

Answers are slightly more negative for perceived results of the EMP than for perceptions as such: 27% of 0-3 answers against only 18% of 7-10 answers (Question 1.10). This is particularly the case for Maghreb respondents, 40% of whom consider the results of the EMP disappointing or very disappointing against only 13% positive or very positive, and in particular for Algerian respondents (56.4% against 0%). This probably has to do with the higher expectations and involvement of Maghreb countries as regards EU cooperation.

Question 1.10.

What is your global assessment of the results of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the 2005-2009 period?

	Very disappointing						Very positive					Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
General Assessment	6	16	25	46	66	57	70	43	16	3	0	348	4.68
	2%	5%	7%	13%	19%	16%	20%	12%	5%	1%	0%	100%	

“Among experts and technical/operational people the opinion is relatively high since the many projects and cooperation initiatives launched have brought a lot of good results. However, among the general public the opinion is much lower first because the visibility has not been very high and because much of the information disseminated by the media relates to the failure and to the political and security problems.”

Spanish respondent

“Les avis sont partagés. Il y a des gens qui trouvaient que le PEM est une bonne chose pour le pays, la région et le monde, d'autres le trouvent incapable de changer quoi que ce soit.”

Syrian respondent

“It's easy to forget that even the creation and sustaining of this kind of process with these participants is very impressive.”

Finnish respondent

“Le PEM place le volet sécuritaire au centre de ses préoccupations, mais se préoccupe peu de la mise en œuvre des réformes politiques, des droits humains et de la démocratisation dans la rive sud. Le processus de Barcelone n'a donc pas tenu ses promesses et a provoqué chez les partenaires de la rive Sud déception, voire méfiance; le PEM est décalé par rapport aux réalités sur le terrain.”

Moroccan respondent

“Little progress has been achieved related to the goals of the EMP. No political reform process apart from perhaps Jordan and Morocco. No real development in social and economic terms. No region building.”

German respondent

“The overall perception of EMP has been quite negative given the sluggish implementation of its projects: weak commitment of the EU to genuine reforms in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries and the lack of political will of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean regimes for real reform.”

Algerian respondent

“The EMP has practically disappeared from the academic radar screen since the disappointing outcome of the 10th Anniversary Summit and the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean.”

Swedish respondent

“La déception vient du fait que les résultats les plus visibles de la coopération euro-méditerranéenne se concentrent dans les domaines économique et sécuritaire.”

Tunisian respondent

Answers to Question 1.17 on the assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy show a very similar assessment to that of the EMP, which indicates a consolidation of the ENP as the bilateral instrument of EU cooperation with MPCs as well as the overcoming of the distrust or scepticism with which many actors and experts in the EMP received the ENP in its first stage (2003 to 2007). 49% of the respondents are concentrated in the 4-6 brackets. Again, Algerian respondents make the most negative assessment of the ENP (in which their country has decided not to participate), with 35% of respondents considering it very disappointing (0-1) and only 5% positive (7-10). Turkish and Israeli respondents have a much more positive view of the ENP (16% and 14% of respondents, respectively, consider it very positive, 9-10).

Question 1.17.

What is your global assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the 2005-2009 period?

	Assessments											Total	Aver.
	Very negative					Very positive							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
General Assessment	7	15	19	49	42	69	58	52	20	7	1	339	4.89
	2%	4%	6%	14%	12%	20%	17%	15%	6%	2%	0%	100%	

“Les efforts de la Politique européenne de voisinage durant la période 2005-2009 sont très significatifs et très intenses : par contre, les partenaires ne sont à la hauteur dans aucun domaine.”

Moroccan respondent

“L’approche bilatérale menée par la PEV semble mieux fonctionner que l’approche multilatérale, pour la simple raison que ce sont des pratiques de travail mieux connues par les pays voisins. L’absence de coopération Sud-Sud fait aussi que les pays se sentent souvent noyés dans le groupe et n’arrivent pas à s’investir.”

French respondent

“The main tools used during the ENP are national strategies. It is worth noting that they were not suggested in a proper manner after a real CSO participation. Moreover, the revision process lacks clarity and transparency, it is more about a formal session rather being a real consultation process.”

Lebanese respondent

“Effects are not the same as in the countries which have the possibility of joining the EU (enlargement process), which is understandable. There is widely shared opinion among the ENP countries that some form of EU membership should become the final target of the policy in the longer run.”

Croatian respondent

“Beneficiary countries are very heterogeneous: What are the similarities between Ukraine and Tunisia?”

Spanish respondent

This balanced overall assessment of the results of the EMP and the ENP gets somewhat more nuanced and positive for some fields of cooperation when we look at the answers to Questions 1.4 and particularly 1.11 (see Section 1.3 below), detailing the progress experienced in the different priority areas defined in the 2005 Barcelona Summit and the 2006 ENP European Commission Communication.

Profile of Very Negative and Very Positive Respondents

Given the high prevalence of extreme answers (0-2 or 8-10 on a 0-10 scale) in many of the questions, we undertook to identify those respondents who systematically chose the least negative or most negative answers among the 80 questions in the Survey asking for a 0-10 or a Progress-No Progress-Regression answer. The aim was to try to identify specific groups of extremely positive or extremely negative respondents.

The first conclusion of this analysis is that the number of those “extremists” is relatively small: only one respondent has answered at least 50% of the questions with a negative assessment (0-2 or regression), and even the number of respondents who answered more than a third of the questions negatively is low, only 14. 18 respondents answered more than half the questions with a positive assessment (8-10 or Progress); policy-makers, in particular diplomats and government representatives, are naturally overrepresented in this group, but no specific country group profile stands out. This confirms that most of the respondents of the Survey made rather nuanced assessments and also that the incidence in the results of extremist assessments is not significant enough to affect the general trends of the Survey.

1.2. Context and Obstacles

There seems to be a wide consensus on the magnitude of the difficulties that prevent the achievement of the EMP objectives. In this regard, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which in December 2008-January 2009 caused more than 1,300 deaths as a consequence of the Israeli campaign against the Hamas in the Gaza Strip,⁴ is cited by three in four respondents as one of the three main difficulties. Indeed, it effectively blocked the normal operation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the first half of 2009 and the convening of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs planned for November 2009.⁵ However, it is interesting to note that it is precisely in the Maghreb countries, the region farthest away from the conflict, where this is most often cited as an obstacle (82% of respondents), in particular in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia (86.8%) where arguably the main track of cooperation is bilateral (and hence not directly affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict) and not multilateral.

In any case, it is clear from the answers to the Survey that this conflict is seen increasingly as a major obstacle to any progress in EU-MPC cooperation, and the prospects as seen by respondents are far from optimistic: as indicated in the answers to Question 4.2, 63% of respondents consider as high or very high the degree of probability that it will paralyse the EMP in the mid to long term (7 to 10 on a 0-10 scale of probability).

The two other obstacles to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP most often mentioned are revealing in this respect: the weak political will for reform in Mediterranean Partner Countries (mentioned by 43% of respondents, but with wide variations: less than 25% of Maghreb respondents mention it, against 51% of EU respondents) and the lack of South-South integration among them (42%; with a peak of 52.8% for Tunisian and Moroccan respondents but only 30% in the case of Algerian and Mashreq respondents); both are deeply rooted in the political systems of MPCs. Judging by the answers to the forward-looking questions in Question 4.2, these obstacles are not going to be removed in the mid to long term either: 50% of respondents consider a high degree of continuity in the political regimes in MPCs as probable or very probable (7-10 on a 0-10 scale).

4. See Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status & Progress 2009.
http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/10_02_25_Report_BCN_Progress_Lannon_Martin.pdf

5. Ibidem.

Question 1.2.

In your opinion, what are the main difficulties that the EMP has encountered to achieve its objectives in 2005-2009? Please indicate the three most important

Difficulties	Mentions	%
The global financial crisis	72	20%
The impact of international terrorism	54	15%
The US policy in the region (including the Iraq War)	103	29%
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict	259	73%
The surge of Islamism in the region	42	12%
The lack of South-South integration	151	42%
The lack of involvement of the EU due to its greater attention to Eastern Europe	104	29%
The weak political will for reform in Mediterranean Partner Countries	154	43%
The weak political will of EU countries for democratisation in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean	100	28%
The insufficient budget allocated to the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument	90	25%
The lack of consensus for the first proposals on the Union for the Mediterranean	77	22%
Total respondents	356	

Then we find two geopolitical factors: US policy in the region and lack of involvement of the EU due to its greater attention to Eastern Europe, each mentioned by almost one third of the respondents. This latter factor is considered as a key obstacle by Maghreb respondents (47% mention it, only second to the Arab-Israeli conflict). However, Mashreq respondents focus on US policy in the region as an obstacle (50% mention it, against only 22% in the Maghreb).

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the surge of Islamism (mentioned by only 12% of respondents, and only 8% of EU respondents) and the impact of terrorism in the region (15%) are hardly considered as major obstacles to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP, at least by the experts and actors to whom the Survey was addressed.

Among the obstacles not mentioned in the table provided in Question 1.2, respondents from the Southern Mediterranean tend to insist, in the open answers, on EU bureaucracy as an obstacle and on the structural asymmetry (both economic and political) between the EU and its Mediterranean Partner Countries.

Other Difficulties Identified by Respondents

“La burocracia y el protagonismo excesivo de la Comisión Europea.”

Spanish respondent

“La faible place accordée à la société civile.”

Tunisian respondent

“The divergent views of EU countries towards the process and how further empowerment of liberal and progressive representative government across the region can be achieved.”

British respondent

“The limited policy space for the partners to define their national priorities.”

Lebanese respondent

“The primacy given by the EU to business considerations over political and social considerations in its interactions with the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.”

Algerian respondent

“People don’t really understand what European policies are and what they really achieve!”

German respondent

“Lack of awareness of the concept of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.”

Egyptian respondent

“Les pays développés du Nord n’ont pas une volonté claire pour la défense de la Démocratie et les Droits de l’Homme dans le Sud de la Méditerranée ce qui les rend peu crédibles vis-à-vis des populations.”

Tunisian respondent

“There are two key issues blocking the implementation of the EMP: the Israel problem that hinders the EU-Arab world dialogue and the missing EU policy autonomy towards the US intrusion in the mesoregion.”

Danish respondent

“Les disparités entre le développement au nord et au sud de la Méditerranée sont trop importantes pour réaliser une harmonie de développement ; les politiques totalitaires au sud sont l’origine de la stagnation ; or, le PEM ne tient pas compte de l’absence de démocratie au sud sans elle, rien n’évoluera quels que soient les efforts consentis.”

Moroccan respondent

“Certains aspects sont évidemment bien mieux traités que d’autres. (...) je rappellerai le manque d’implication de la société civile et de l’opinion publique qui ne connaît que trop mal encore les affaires européennes et surtout les résultats de ses actions en euromed. Meilleure implication donc et un besoin essentiel de synergie, de concentration de l’ensemble des dispositifs existants pour davantage de clarté et d’efficacité. La multiplication des initiatives financées sans emploi ultérieur les rendent inefficaces ou stériles. Certains projets sont du coup montés plusieurs fois. Il s’agirait d’inventorier l’ensemble de ces initiatives (domaine culturel) et de les rendre cohérentes et accessibles au public. Pour les suivantes d’en valoriser la cohérence avec ce qui a déjà été fait (...)”

French respondent

1.3. Assessment by Areas and Priorities

The Survey Questionnaire allows for a detailed, fine-tuned assessment of progress and achievements in relation to the four main priority areas identified in the Barcelona 2005 Euro-Mediterranean Summit (Questions 1.3 and 1.4) and the objectives stated in the 2005 Five Year Work Programme for each of them (Question 1.4), as well as the multilateral programmes implemented in the framework of the EMP (Question 1.5). The same differentiated analysis can be carried out on the European Neighbourhood Policy and the different priorities identified in the 2006 Communication of the European Commission on strengthening the European neighbourhood policy (Question 1.11) and the new ENP multilateral programmes (Question 1.12).

The overall assessment of each of the EMP priority areas (Questions 1.3 and 1.4) is not very auspicious: achievements in Political and Security Cooperation, in Migration, Social Integration and Justice and Security and even in Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform are considered very poor. The assessment is particularly negative for cooperation in Migration and Justice and Security: 50% of the respondents consider that the achievements are disappointing or very disappointing (0 to 3 on a 0-10 scale), against only 6% considering them positive or very positive (7-10). For Maghreb respondents, this assessment is even more negative: 64%-4%. The same happens to a lesser extent in the other two areas: Political and Security Cooperation (39% consider it disappointing against 11% positive; here, paradoxically, the Maghreb respondents have a less negative view with 18% of respondents considering it positive or very positive) and Sustainable Development (30%-13%).

The assessment is slightly more positive, or at least more balanced, as regards the education and socio-cultural exchanges, in what is one of the major features of the results of the Survey. 27% of respondents grade the achievements as positive or very positive (7 to 10), against 21% considering them disappointing or very disappointing. However, this slightly positive overall assessment has no clear reflection in the assessment of progress in the achievement of the five concrete objectives stated in this field made later in the framework of Question 1.4, where again the lack of progress or regression answers largely outnumber the progress answers (see analysis below).

Question 1.3.

What are, in general terms, the achievements in the four priorities identified at the Barcelona 2005 Conference within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme?


	Very disappointing										Very positive		Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
1. Political and Security Partnership	13	23	44	54	63	64	41	29	14	3	1	349	4.13	
	4%	7%	13%	15%	18%	18%	12%	8%	4%	1%	0%	100%		
2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform	5	19	40	45	74	66	56	35	6	2	0	348	4.33	
	1%	5%	11%	13%	21%	19%	16%	10%	2%	1%	0%	100%		
3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges	5	11	22	38	61	61	61	55	28	6	3	351	5.06	
	1%	3%	6%	11%	17%	17%	17%	16%	8%	2%	1%	100%		
4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security	23	37	43	69	73	38	39	14	4	5	1	346	3.56	
	7%	11%	12%	20%	21%	11%	11%	4%	1%	1%	0%	100%		

Indeed, if we focus attention on the results of Question 1.4, adding together the answers related to all objectives stated in the 2005 Five Year Work Programme in the four priority areas, the majority of respondents consider that there was no progress or even a regression in all fields of cooperation (see graphs below). Around a third of respondents see progress across the four priority areas.


Question 1.4.

What are, in general terms, the achievements in the four priorities identified at the Barcelona 2005 Conference within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme?


1. Political and Security Partnership




2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform



3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges



2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform



1.3.1. Political Cooperation (and Priorities)

Assessment of progress in the Political and Security Partnership is rather negative in relation to all the objectives stated in the 2005 Five Year Work Programme. Indeed, 73% of respondents considered that there has been no progress or even regression as far as enabling citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level is concerned, 71% for extension of political pluralism and participation by citizens, 69% for the promotion of freedom of expression and association and 68% regarding the promotion of the implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions. The only exceptions to this very negative assessment are fostering civil society and the increase of women's participation in decision-making, where 55% of respondents see a certain progress (the same percentage for women respondents as for the latter).

Question 1.4.


Among the priorities defined in 2005, for which do you consider progress was achieved and for which do you think that there was no progress or even regression?

1. Political and Security Partnership exchanges	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens	97	191	38	326	20	346
	30%	59%	11%	100%	6%	
Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level	85	204	25	314	33	347
	27%	65%	11%	100%	10%	
Increase the participation of women in decision-making	173	125	18	316	34	350
	55%	40%	6%	100%	10%	
Ensure freedom of expression and association	100	179	46	325	23	348
	31%	55%	14%	100%	7%	
Foster the role of civil society	181	126	22	329	18	347
	55%	38%	7%	100%	5%	
Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions	86	156	24	266	82	348
	32%	59%	9%	100%	24%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

1. Political and Security Partnership



The multilateral programmes launched in this field (see Question 1.5) are accordingly assessed in a rather negative manner: only 47% see progress in relation to civil protection (here there is a strong contrast between the Mashreq and Israeli respondents, where only 23% see progress, and EU respondents, where 58% see it), 38% in the Partnership for Peace (Middle East Peace Process Programme) and 39% in Justice, Security and Migration.⁶

Question 1.5.

Among the Euro-Mediterranean multilateral programmes, for which do you consider progress was achieved in their implementation and for which do you think that there was no progress between 2005 and 2009?

Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Confidence building measures: civil protection	139	144	12	295	58	353
	47%	49%	4%	100%	16%	
Confidence building measures: Partnership for Peace	112	155	31	298	52	350
	38%	52%	10%	100%	15%	
Justice, Security and Migration (JSM)	111	149	27	287	64	351
	39%	52%	9%	100%	18%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

1.3.2. Economic Cooperation (and Priorities)

As far as Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Economic Reform is concerned, the balance is more positive, at least in one respect. 60% of respondents consider that there has been progress in improving the business climate for SMEs in the Mediterranean Partner countries. But 80% see no progress or even a regression in reducing the poverty rate, 80% in reducing the prosperity gap and raising GDP growth rates to reduce the prosperity gap (an even larger percentage in Mashreq countries) and 76% see no progress or a regression in the creation of job opportunities for young people. More than 50% of respondents also see no progress or regression in the integration of women in employment in partner countries or the increase in North-South and South-South cooperation. In sum, the Partnership is perceived as benefiting mainly the business climate, but without this translating into job creation, women's integration into economic life or a convergence towards EU income levels. A reflection about the transformative power of current EU-promoted reforms and about the development model being implemented in MPCs seems a necessary corollary of these perceptions.

6. See *Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status & Progress 2009*, pp. 51-52.


Question 1.4.

2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Create more job opportunities for the increasing numbers of young people across the region	79	202	45	326	21	347
	24%	62%	14%	100%	6%	
Improve business climate, in particular for SMEs	187	110	17	314	36	350
	60%	35%	5%	100%	10%	
Reduce regional poverty rates	60	194	57	311	36	347
	19%	62%	18%	100%	10%	
Reduce the prosperity gap and raise GDP growth rates	61	191	55	307	39	346
	20%	62%	18%	100%	11%	
Increase in North-South and South-South regional cooperation	157	148	20	325	21	346
	48%	46%	6%	100%	6%	
Increase in the percentage of women in employment in partner countries	131	145	14	290	55	345
	45%	50%	5%	100%	16%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform



As far as the multilateral programmes in this field are concerned, all but one of them are very positively assessed, with 71% stating that there has been progress in the Technical Assistance and Risk Capital Support programme of FEMIP (80% of Maghreb respondents, against only 57% of Mashreq respondents; but one must also point out here the important number of "Don't know" answers, 39%), 70% in transport and energy cooperation (again, only 51% for Mashreq countries), 69% in relation to the development of the information society (Medib-tikar, Innovation and Technology) and an even higher percentage for beneficiary Maghreb and Mashreq countries, and 65% in investment promotion (ANIMA and Invest in Med). 59% make the same assessment in relation to environmental programmes. In contrast, the programmes aimed at promoting South-South regional economic integration are considered an outright failure (76% see no progress and 7% a regression; in the Maghreb, 93% see no progress).⁷

Question 1.5.

Sustainable Economic Development	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Investment promotion and reform denomination to attract investments	200	92	14	306	44	350
	65%	30%	5%	100%	13%	
Transport and energy cooperation	207	79	10	296	54	350
	70%	27%	3%	100%	15%	
South-South regional economic integration	50	234	22	306	43	349
	16%	76%	7%	100%	12%	
Environmental programmes	177	109	13	299	46	345
	59%	36%	4%	100%	13%	
Technical assistance and risk capital support from FEMIP	149	57	5	211	134	345
	71%	27%	2%	100%	39%	
Development of the information society	208	87	7	302	48	350
	69%	29%	2%	100%	14%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

1.3.3. Social and Cultural Cooperation (and Priorities)

The positive overall assessment of education and socio-cultural exchanges as a priority area of the EMP is reflected only in the clear positive assessment the respondents make of the increased awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilizations: 59% of respondents consider that there has been progress in this area (but the proportion is lower for Maghreb and Mashreq respondents: 51% and 47% respectively, against 64% for the EU). In contrast, respondents consider that there has been no progress or even regression in reducing disparities in education achievement between European and Mediterranean states (73%), in enhancing graduate employment through efficient, high quality higher education (70%) and in promoting equitable access to quality education (61%). The assessment is more balanced as regards halving the number of illiterate female and male adults and children (53% see no

7. See *Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status & Progress 2009*, pp. 53-54.

progress or regression, while 47% see progress), but here there is a clear disparity between Moroccan and Tunisian respondents, 57.7% of whom see progress in this area, and Algerian and Mashreq respondents, of whom less than 40% see progress; a majority of women respondents, 59%, also see no progress in this field. Significantly, a high percentage of respondents (12% on average) considered that they could not give an answer to this question.


Question 1.4.

3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Halve the number of illiterate female and male adults and children	137	147	8	292	56	348
	47%	50%	3%	100%	16%	
Promote equitable access to quality education	120	166	20	306	41	347
	39%	54%	7%	100%	12%	
Reduce disparities in educational achievement between Euro-Mediterranean states	80	180	35	295	54	349
	27%	61%	12%	100%	15%	
Enhance graduate employment through efficient, high quality higher education	90	188	23	301	46	347
	30%	62%	8%	100%	13%	
Increase awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilisations	197	103	34	334	18	352
	59%	31%	10%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges



Moreover, multilateral programmes in this field are considered a success. All of them are considered to have experienced progress by between half and two thirds of the respondents, in particular: on dialogue between cultures and cultural heritage (Euromed Heritage, Anna Lindh Foundation), with 68%, although here the assessment is less positive in Maghreb and Mashreq countries, where only 53% see progress, against 78% among EU respondents; the one on Information and Communication II (68%) and Euro-Med Youth (59%, particularly appreciated by women and EU respondents – 70% and 73%, respectively, see progress – and less so by Maghreb and Mashreq respondents – 42% and 35%, respectively – and the one on Gender Equality (59%, with a remarkable 68% for Maghreb respondents).⁸ The Survey does not allow us to attribute such progress in any of these fields to EU cooperation with MPCs or rather to internal dynamics in the latter.

Question 1.5.

Social Development and Cultural Exchanges	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Gender equality (participation of women in economic life)	186	119	12	317	33	350
	59%	38%	4%	100%	9%	
Civil society promotion and participation	178	130	19	327	26	353
	54%	40%	6%	100%	7%	
Information and communication II	197	88	10	295	56	351
	67%	30%	3%	100%	16%	
Euro-Med Youth	161	99	15	275	74	349
	59%	36%	5%	100%	21%	
Dialogue between cultures and cultural heritage	225	83	25	333	19	352
	68%	25%	8%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

1.3.4. Justice and Home Affairs (and Priorities)

In contrast, progress in this new field of cooperation (integrated in 2005 into the EMP) is assessed in a very negative way in all fields related to migration: 83% see no progress or even regression in addressing the “brain drain” caused by migration (96% in the case of Maghreb respondents, and only 64% for EU respondents), 71% in significantly reducing the level of illegal migration and trafficking of human beings (here the assessment is reversed: 42% of Maghreb and 40% of Mashreq respondents see progress in this area, for only 23% of EU respondents), and 69% in promoting legal migration opportunities (83% for Mashreq countries). In the field of migration, however, the assessment is more positive regarding the facilitation of the flow of remittance transfers (51% see progress in this field, but only 38% in the case of Mashreq countries and 40% in the case of Turkey).

8. See *Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status & Progress 2009*, pp. 55-56.

In the field of judicial cooperation there is a rather positive assessment of progress (57% of respondents) but, this notwithstanding, 69% consider that there has been no progress or a regression in the modernization and efficiency of the administration of justice.

In this field again, one of the most recent of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, the number of “Don’t know” answers is very high, 17% on average.


Question 1.4.

4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Promote legal migration opportunities	98	153	67	318	28	346
	31%	48%	21%	100%	8%	
Facilitate flow of remittance transfers	135	108	21	264	82	346
	51%	41%	8%	100%	24%	
Address “brain drain”	50	191	62	303	45	348
	17%	63%	20%	100%	13%	
Reduce significantly the level of illegal migration and trafficking in human beings	90	158	67	315	33	348
	29%	50%	21%	100%	9%	
Promote modernisation and efficiency of administration of justice	93	176	25	294	52	346
	32%	60%	9%	100%	15%	
Reinforce judicial cooperation	156	107	13	276	68	344
	57%	39%	5%	100%	20%	
Promote the ratification/implementation of the relevant UN conventions for organised crime	125	100	12	237	110	347
	53%	42%	5%	100%	32%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security



Proposals regarding multilateral programmes

A network focusing on political reform, based on diplomats, academics and other civil society actors, potentially regional in scope but allowing for reinforced cooperation.

Programmes ayant pour implication la mixité femmes hommes.

A specific programme for enhancing the role of science and technology in Med Countries.

The implementation of Info Points in Med Countries for cooperation in S/T, studies and events for enhancing the awareness of the importance of S/T could be part of a regional Project.

Des projets qui font participer les universités de façon plus opérationnelle, stages, formations, professionnalisation, auprès des entreprises européennes.

Capacity-building for local authorities.

Create more opportunities for exchange of information, know-how and experience in the areas of art, culture and media.

Donner une haute priorité à la coopération judiciaire et à l'amélioration de la justice.

La priorité est à l'environnement, à l'éducation et au transfert de savoir et de savoir faire.

Les questions cruciales dans les pays du sud : environnement, patrimoine, éducation, micro crédit, emploi, projets culturels.

More focus on media freedom and building independent and pluralistic media; there should be a dedicated media development line in the EMP.

Getting to know each other should be the priority.

Il s'agit aussi de renforcer le financement des programmes existant, qui est absolument insuffisant.

Sensibilisation de l'opinion publique et de la société civile aux programmes euromed et à leurs résultats.

Employment and social conditions had not been the focus.

Recherche sur l'histoire commune et le patrimoine commun.

Two existing programmes are of great importance. First is the South-South regional integration programme. More financial and intellectual resources should be allocated to it. The second is that of cultural sensitization and exchanges. One of the focuses of the programme should be the common Mediterranean heritage and history.

Une agence pour le développement et la coopération touristique méditerranéenne.

Un Programme en matière d'eau, un Programme de reboisement à grande échelle, un Programme de développement agricole, tenant compte des spécificités climatiques des régions méditerranéennes.

Empowerment of women at all levels, working with youth, raising awareness and capacity-building for them.

Il est intéressant de bien mettre en œuvre les projets en cours et de les améliorer avant de lancer de nouveaux programmes.

L'alphabétisation intégrale des membres de la société ; l'apprentissage de la démocratie.

1.4. Assessment of New ENP Multilateral Programmes

As far as the European Neighbourhood Policy priority areas are concerned, assessment of progress is clearly positive ("Progress" exceeding "No progress" plus "Regression" answers) for the following areas:

- Business-to-business contacts (73% against 27%).
- Educational, cultural, youth and research exchanges (72%-28%).
- Enhanced support for reforms and efforts to improve the trade and economic regulatory environment (66%-34%, and even more positive in the case of Mashreq respondents).
- Enhanced civil society participation in the ENP (59%-41%, with a wide variation between the very positive assessment of Mashreq respondents – 73% see progress – and Mediterranean EU Member States – only 47% see progress).
- Building the thematic (in particular energy and transport) dimension of the ENP (60%-40% on average, but Mashreq respondents have a much less positive view, with only 42% seeing progress for energy and transport networks, whereas EU respondents see progress in 71% of cases).
- Exchanges between regional and local authorities (57%-43%).

In contrast, there are some areas where assessment of progress is very negative:


- Facilitating mobility and managing migration (with 83% seeing no progress or even regression for visa facilitation, and slightly less for readmission and border management).
- Strengthening of financial cooperation, in particular maximizing the impact and leverage of scarce resources (efficiency, where 71% see no progress or even regression) and the Governance Facility (62%). In this regard, the percentage of “Don’t know” is always higher than 20%.
- Possibility of alignment with CFSP declarations (67%).
- More active EU role in regional or multilateral conflict resolution efforts (59%).

In all cases, Maghreb respondents have a less positive or more negative view of cooperation in the different fields, reflected in a typical 10-plus percentage point difference against the average in the number of respondents seeing progress in each area. Within the Maghreb, Algerian respondents have a much more negative assessment, with a typical 15 to 20 percentage point difference, sometimes even 30, against only a 5-7 point difference for Tunisian and Moroccan respondents. In some cases, however, all Maghreb respondents share a markedly more negative assessment, for instance in relation to the possibility of alignment with CFSP declarations, extension of EU transport and energy networks to neighbouring countries, participation in relevant Community agencies and programmes, maximizing the impact of scarce resources or improved coordination between Member States and EC assistance.


Question 1.11.

Among the priorities defined in 2005, for which do you consider progress was achieved and for which do you think that there was no progress or even regression?


Enhancing the economic and trade component




Facilitating mobility and managing migration




Promoting people-to-people exchanges




Building a thematic dimension to the ENP




Strengthening political cooperation



Enhancing regional cooperation



Strengthening financial cooperation



A particularly important evaluation relates to the new multilateral programmes launched in the framework of the ENP, since they have completed their first period of operations.⁹ Question 1.12 provides an assessment of their implementation. The first outstanding feature is the high level of “Don’t know” answers collected for most of these programmes, up to 40% of the answers in some cases, which is not surprising if one takes into account the fact that those programmes became operational during the last two years.

Beyond this widespread lack of knowledge, assessment of their implementation is balanced to positive, with typically less than 20% of respondents considering them disappointing or very disappointing (0-3) and slightly above 25% considering them positive or very positive (7-10 on a scale of 0-10). The exception is the Governance Facility, which provokes some scepticism: 31% judge it disappointing or very disappointing and only 18% positive or very positive. Looking at answers by groups of countries, it is worth mentioning that TAIEX has a rather negative image in Maghreb countries (30% consider it disappointing or very disappointing against 16% positive or very positive), the same as happens for twinning programmes (28% disappointing against 24% positive) and the promotion of education and student mobility (37% against 16%). Most but not all of this differentiated negative assessment is due to answers from Algerian respondents.

9. See *Report on the Status and Progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, pp. 37-40.

Question 1.12.

How do you assess the implementation so far of the new multilateral programmes of the ENP?

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Cross-Border Cooperation Programmes (Spain-Morocco Programme, Italy-Tunisia Programme and the Mediterranean Basin Programme)	0	8	11	19	31	56	49	45	18	6	1	244	5.36	88	332	
	0%	3%	5%	8%	13%	23%	20%	18%	7%	2%	0%	100%		27%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchanges) and SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management)	3	5	9	26	28	43	50	32	10	3	0	209	5.07	124	333	
	1%	2%	4%	12%	13%	21%	24%	15%	5%	1%	0%	100%		37%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Twinning programmes	2	3	11	24	32	45	45	34	21	6	2	225	5.33	97	322	
	1%	1%	5%	11%	14%	20%	20%	15%	9%	3%	1%	100%		30%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
NIF (Trust Fund Agreement for infrastructure interconnection of transport and energy, or environmental concerns, €250 million for 2007-2010)	2	2	8	22	23	43	45	33	15	2	3	198	5.35	135	333	
	1%	1%	4%	11%	12%	22%	23%	17%	8%	1%	2%	100%		41%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Promoting higher education and student mobility (scholarship scheme)	8	9	16	37	35	49	55	41	32	9	2	293	5.16	45	338	
	3%	3%	5%	13%	12%	17%	19%	14%	11%	3%	1%	100%		13%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
"Governance Facility" (€50 million a year for 2007-10)	9	9	20	32	38	33	46	28	10	5	1	231	4.63	103	4.63	
	4%	4%	9%	14%	16%	14%	20%	12%	4%	2%	0%	100%		31%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

1.5. Assessment of the UfM

The UfM inception (2007-July 2008) has been surrounded by intense polemics on its scope and structure, and in the year since it was established it has been blocked for political reasons for more than eight months.¹⁰ This means that any assessment is related, by definition, to the UfM as a *project* rather than to its implementation or progress as such. This may lend the assessment a certain positive bias, since it refers to promises and projects rather than reality and as the UfM purported precisely to address the shortcomings of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Answers to the question about the contribution of the general objectives of the UfM to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP (Question 3.2) show a moderate optimism, with, depending on the aspect considered, between 35% and 50% thinking that it will make a positive or very positive contribution and less than 25% attributing to it a negative or very negative contribution (see Table below). Up to 5% of the respondents are very positive (10 on the scale) regarding the fact that the Union for the Mediterranean is increasing the visibility of the EuroMed process (10% for EU Mediterranean countries); this is also true for the upgrading of the political level of the relations (3% at 10), the reinforcement of the institutional balance (3% at 10, 7% for Maghreb countries), the promotion of co-ownership (5% at 10, 9% for Maghreb respondents) and the concentration on some regional projects (5% at 10). On the other hand, for the same questions the level of very negative opinion (0 on the scale) is on average also at the 5% level. This shows very clearly a deep polarization in the opinions of the respondents. Mashreq respondents show a smaller incidence of very positive answers (1% on average) and Maghreb respondents a higher incidence of very negative ones (7% on average), but also of very positive ones.

Question 3.2.

In your opinion, what is the contribution of the general objectives of the Union for the Mediterranean in relation to the objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

	Very negative											Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Increase the visibility of the EuroMed Process	9	12	20	28	21	37	44	66	62	13	15	327	5.79
	3%	4%	6%	9%	6%	11%	13%	20%	19%	4%	5%	100%	
Upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners	16	11	12	27	25	46	58	66	42	14	10	327	5.56
	5%	3%	4%	8%	8%	14%	18%	20%	13%	4%	3%	100%	
Reinforce the institutional balance between the EU and the MPCs	20	13	22	22	28	52	52	52	34	18	10	323	5.28
	6%	4%	7%	7%	9%	16%	16%	16%	11%	6%	3%	100%	
Promote more co-ownership within EuroMed multilateral relations	17	6	20	32	22	44	57	53	42	13	16	322	5.52
	5%	2%	6%	10%	7%	14%	18%	16%	13%	4%	5%	100%	
Concentrate on some fundamental regional projects	12	9	14	18	19	55	42	68	44	28	15	324	5.94
	4%	3%	4%	6%	6%	17%	13%	21%	14%	9%	5%	100%	

The answer is less clear when it comes (in Question 3.3) to the contribution of the new partners of the EMP (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Mauritania and Montenegro). Answers tend to point to a low expected contribution of these new partners (with the exception of Croatia, for which 30% of respondents see a low or no contribution and 25% high or very high contribution, for all other new partner countries the percentage of respondents seeing a low or no contribution exceeds 40%, more than double the number of those who see a high or very high contribution). Mauritania seems to be the new partner country from which the lowest contribution is expected by all groups of respondents (interestingly, this lack of expectations is particularly strong among Algerian respondents). The same pattern applies for the assessment of the contribution of new Mediterranean European partners to the EMP: the most negative answers (except for Croatia) come from non-Mediterranean EU Member States.

The acceptance of the League of Arab States as a Permanent Observer in 2008 is seen with divided opinions: 27% of respondents think that it will not strengthen the EMP or will do so to a very low extent and 35% are positive about its integration into the EMP. Interestingly, Maghreb respondents have a slightly less positive view (with 12% of very negative answers: 0 on the scale) despite the fact that all Maghreb countries are members of the Arab League, whereas Mashreq countries have a slightly more positive view of it.

“Las cosas iban razonablemente bien a pesar del contexto político negativo hasta que la iniciativa Sarkozy, con una evaluación excesivamente negativa y poco documentada del Proceso de Barcelona, paralizó todas las actuaciones y a partir de ahí ni funciona lo mucho o poco que ya funcionaba ni se ha puesto en marcha nada nuevo.”

Spanish respondent

“It is difficult to understand in which respect the UfM is a union.”

Egyptian respondent

“By complementing EMP policies with very practical projects, the UfM has the chance to improve the perception of the EuroMed cooperation among the southern partner states.”

Hungarian respondent

“Si un partenariat réel et équitable était vraiment mis en oeuvre, comme annoncé par l’UpM, cela pourrait apporter un progrès. Aujourd’hui l’UpM n’apporte aucun progrès dans ce domaine par rapport au PB.”

French respondent

“The move to the UFM was a decision taken randomly without any former and in depth analysis.”

Lebanese respondent

“Some achievements were associated with the 2005 summit, despite the poor attendance by leaders from the South. Renewed interest was stimulated by the Sarkozy initiative, but the delay in implementing the UfM has been demoralizing for all.”

British respondent

Question 3.3.

To what extent do you think that the new partners of the EMP will strengthen it?

	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Not at all					To high extent									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Albania in 2006	17	29	32	35	25	40	23	27	15	2	3	248	4	71	320
	7%	12%	13%	14%	10%	16%	9%	11%	6%	1%	1%	100%		23%	
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2006	18	23	27	36	36	41	25	29	13	3	3	254	4.13	68	322
	7%	9%	11%	14%	14%	18%	13%	11%	10%	2%	2%	100%		18%	
Croatia in 2008	11	15	27	27	36	46	34	30	25	5	5	261	4.72	58	319
	4%	6%	10%	10%	14%	18%	13%	11%	10%	2%	2%	100%		18%	
Mauritania in 2005	26	26	31	35	20	44	30	25	11	4	3	255	3.93	63	318
	10%	10%	12%	14%	8%	17%	12%	10%	4%	2%	1%	100%		20%	
Montenegro in 2008	18	20	26	32	29	40	33	26	16	5	3	248	4.3	70	318
	7%	8%	10%	13%	12%	16%	13%	10%	6%	2%	1%	100%		22%	
League of Arab States as a Permanent Observer in 2008	27	11	12	24	24	47	35	31	39	15	15	280	5.22	37	317
	10%	4%	4%	9%	9%	17%	13%	11%	14%	5%	5%	100%		12%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

The contribution of the new projects approved in the framework of the UfM to the achievements of the objectives of the EMP is assessed positively by most of the respondents (more than 60% see a positive or very positive contribution of the Mediterranean Solar Plan and De-pollution of the Mediterranean, and between 50% and 60% of the other four projects (see table of answers to Question 3.7 below). Again, one should note here a not negligible percentage of very positive opinions (up to 11% for the De-pollution of the Mediterranean and for renewable energies, for example, and 10% for the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative). This must be seen in combination with the ranking of priorities for action in 2010 derived from answers to Question 5.2 (see Section 7). It seems to indicate that any concrete initiative, even if it does not correspond exactly to action priorities, is welcomed by experts and actors, as well as the positive bias affecting future projects as against already implemented ones.

By groups of countries, it is interesting to see that Maghreb countries, and in particular Moroccan and Tunisian respondents, see the potential contribution of the UfM projects to the achievement of the EMP objectives as significantly more positive than the average, and the contrary happens for Mashreq respondents: they see it as slightly but significantly less positive.

Question 3.7.

How do you assess the possible contribution of the regional projects selected at the July 2008 Paris Summit of the Union for the Mediterranean to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP?

	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Not at all					To a high extent									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
De-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea	6	4	9	15	23	29	39	65	60	24	33	307	6.58	21	328
	2%	1%	3%	5%	7%	9%	13%	21%	20%	8%	11%	100%		6%	
Maritime and land highways	3	7	9	14	20	38	33	57	57	24	20	282	6.4	31	313
	1%	2%	3%	5%	7%	13%	12%	20%	20%	9%	7%	100%		10%	
Civil protection initiatives to combat natural and man-made disasters	6	3	6	16	16	52	44	59	54	17	21	294	6.32	31	325
	2%	1%	2%	5%	5%	18%	15%	20%	18%	6%	7%	100%		10%	
Alternative energies: Mediterranean solar plan	4	6	10	8	16	32	30	49	79	31	32	297	6.83	24	321
	1%	2%	3%	3%	5%	11%	10%	16%	27%	10%	11%	100%		7%	
Higher education and research, Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia and Fez	3	6	3	14	19	48	41	60	60	28	25	307	6.57	22	329
	1%	2%	1%	5%	6%	16%	13%	20%	20%	9%	8%	100%		7%	
Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focusing on micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises	4	5	6	12	23	33	40	56	60	27	28	294	6.62	31	325
	1%	2%	2%	4%	8%	11%	14%	19%	20%	9%	10%	100%		10%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

In contrast, the probability that these projects will attract financial resources from outside the EU (Question 3.8), as planned in the Paris and Marseille Declarations,¹¹ is seen with slightly more scepticism and divided opinions by the experts and actors surveyed. 28% consider it improbable or very improbable, although another 27% think it is probable or very probable. Here, Mashreq respondents have a particularly optimistic view (37% think it probable or very probable against only 21% improbable or very improbable), whereas non-Mediterranean EU countries have a much more sober approach (37% see it as improbable or very improbable and only 13% as probable).

11. See *Report on the Status and Progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, pp. 31-32.

Question 3.8.

How do you assess the probability that the Union for the Mediterranean projects will attract financial resources from outside the EU (i.e. from Gulf countries, international private investors, international financial institutions or other sources)?

	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very improbable					Very probable									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
UfM Funds	14	16	28	27	27	66	43	46	16	17	4	304	4.91	24	328
	5%	5%	9%	9%	9%	22%	14%	15%	5%	6%	1%	100%		7%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

1.6. Added Value, Coherence and Articulation, Differentiation Strategies and Visibility of the EMP

This rather positive but divided view of the UfM is confirmed by the assessment of the added value of the UfM for the EMP and the ENP: 41% of respondents think it will bring a high or very high added value (7-10 on the scale), although another 27% attribute a low or very low added value (0-3 on the scale). This seems to confirm the view of the UfM as a step further in the Euro-Mediterranean Process.

Question 3.1.

Is the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) an added value for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy?

	Very disappointing					Very positive						Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
	Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)	17	31	24	20	29	36	42	56	33	26		
	5%	9%	7%	6%	9%	11%	13%	17%	10%	8%	6%	100%	

The assessment is much less positive, however, when respondents are asked about the coherence and articulation between the different layers of EU-MPC cooperation: the EMP, ENP, UfM and EU enlargement process (affecting Turkey and eventually Croatia) (Question 1.15). Here the results point to a clear perceived lack of coherence: 48% detect a partial or total lack of coherence (0 to 3 on the scale), whereas only a meagre 11% see coherence between those different schemes (7 to 10 on the scale). Only 1% see an excellent level of coherence (10/10). This assessment is even more marked among Maghreb respondents (62%-8%), in particular Algerian ones.

Question 1.15.

Do you think there is coherence and articulation between the EMP, the ENP, the Union for the Mediterranean and the EU enlargement process?

	Assessments											Total*	Aver.
	Total lack of coherence					Excellent level of coherence							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Coherence and articulation between the EMP, the ENP, the Union for the Mediterranean and the EU enlargement process?	17	32	42	67	38	47	50	17	13	4	2	329	3.9
	5%	10%	13%	20%	12%	14%	15%	5%	4%	1%	1%	100%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

At the same time, this critical assessment of the coherence between the different EU strategies towards its neighbouring countries does not prevent respondents from quite positively valuing the drive to differentiation and reinforced cooperation schemes inaugurated in the Mediterranean with the agreement on the Advanced Status of Morocco in the EU (Question 1.16). 37% of respondents think that this new development is beneficial or very beneficial to the EMP and the ENP (7-10 on the scale), and only 21% think it is detrimental or very detrimental (0-3). Again, the Maghreb respondents show a differentiated approach: 43% of Tunisian and Moroccan respondents assess differentiation and reinforced cooperation as beneficial against 22.3% as detrimental. Algerians are far more sceptical, with 59% seeing it as detrimental or very detrimental and no respondent seeing it as beneficial.

Question 1.16.

Do you think there is coherence and articulation between the EMP, the ENP, the Union for the Mediterranean and the EU enlargement process?

	Assessments											Total	Aver.
	Very detrimental					Very beneficial							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Added value of differentiation and strengthened cooperation	14	10	16	29	25	59	51	55	36	19	11	325	5.49
	4%	3%	5%	9%	8%	18%	16%	17%	11%	6%	3%	100%	

“It does not appear that there is sufficient coordination or understanding of how the different programmes are articulated. Rather they seem to sit in different political constituencies.”

British respondent

“Ces cadres de coopération se juxtaposent plus qu’ils ne se complètent. La multiplication des cadres laissent penser que les précédents sont peu efficaces.”

Algerian respondent

“Each policy contains elements that represent differing and even competing agendas, and it is not always clear whether this is by accident or by design. Policies often torpedo each other, thereby illustrating how member states continue to come to terms with what their actual common denominator in the Mediterranean is and by which methods these goals are best achieved.”

German respondent

“The ENP is not subsidiary to the EMP but substitutive of it. The limit of the EMP relies on the limits of its engagement and the implementation forms chosen for it (top-down and political conditionality). The evil of the ENP is not in the details but in its aims and methods: to destabilize other national economies and regional approaches.”

Danish respondent

“Too many structures have been established. It will probably create problems with coherence and overlapping.”

Polish respondent

“Not only is there a lack of coherence but the rapid succession in which these constructs emerged created confusion even among those closely following Euro-Mediterranean relations. Before the association agreements concluded under the EMP had borne any fruit, the ENP emerged. The ENP had barely been understood by the very few officials directly dealing with it when the Union for the Mediterranean was born.”

Egyptian respondent

«Es difícil que haya coherencia cuando alguna de las iniciativas es totalmente improvisada y no se ha dispuesto aún del tiempo suficiente para lograr articular el conjunto. Además, la PEV y la UpM responden a filosofías de partida muy distintas y ambas han venido a sobreponerse a la AEM que, a pesar de no funcionar con toda la eficacia deseada, contaba por lo menos con unas estructuras institucionales ya muy rodadas.»

Spanish respondent

“Une inflation d’initiatives qui dénote les divergences ente les pays de l’UE.”

Algerian respondent

1.7. Institutionalization of the UfM

1.7.1. The Co-Presidency

The working of the new institutional architecture of the EMP can hardly be assessed more than a year after its establishment, due to the political paralysis the UfM has suffered for most of its period of existence. This notwithstanding, the Co-Presidency system is perhaps the

only one of the new institutions which has remained operational over most of this time, and respondents again have a polarized view of how effective it has been in strengthening a true partnership and ownership. 30% of respondents think that it has been effective or very effective (7-10 on the scale), whereas 31% consider that the Co-Presidency system has been ineffective or very ineffective (0-3 on the scale). However, a high percentage (13%) consider it very ineffective (0-1) and 9% very effective (9-10), showing a high division of opinions on this new development.

Question 3.4.

In your view, how effective is the new Co-Presidency system introduced to strengthen a true partnership and ownership of the EMP?

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very ineffective						Very effective									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Co-Presidency system	24	15	25	27	30	39	42	48	13	22	4	289	4.81	38	327	
	8%	5%	9%	9%	10%	13%	15%	17%	4%	8%	1%	100%		12%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

In the open questions, respondents reflect the dilemmas surrounding the Co-Presidency. They see it as "a first step in the right direction" (Danish respondent) and "a sign of equality among people around the Mediterranean basin" (Algerian respondent) that gives "more responsibility to southern partners" (Italian respondent). However, at the same time, they express serious doubts about its operation: "it maintains a separation between North and South, and will possibly complicate the decision-making process, as well as South-South cooperation" (Algerian respondent), as well as the fact that "this depends on the institutional support each Co-Presidency gets" (Egyptian respondent). In any case, "It is still to be tested" (Tunisian respondent). Criticism of the way France and Egypt have exerted the Co-Presidency is frequent, in particular for having "their own agenda" (Spanish respondent), and the lack of transparency of the decision-making process. Criticism comes mainly from Maghreb respondents.

"Theoretically, it is a good idea but practically it is not clear for me which is the role of each one of the Co-Presidencies, or if its role is clearly defined."

Spanish respondent

"A Co-Presidency system is a sign of equality among people around the Mediterranean basin."

Algerian respondent

"A Co-Presidency system maintains a separation between North and South, and will possibly complicate the decision-making process, as well as South-South cooperation."

Algerian respondent

"Co-Presidency will heighten responsibility and feeling of own significance for the Southern Mediterranean countries. Well, they have been endeavouring from the very beginning to do this in order to co-share the process of Euromed partnership."

Czech respondent

“Il s'agit d'un échec total. Les décisions sont prises de manière non transparente au risque de voir un désengagement des pays membres du partenariat. Il convient de définir enfin les compétences de ce système afin de restaurer la confiance.”

Luxembourg respondent

“La co-présidence nous paraît une très bonne chose à la condition d’y associer les différents experts de la société civile, mais également d’avoir des retours qualitatifs des programmes développés dans ces partenariats euro méditerranéens et des places et rôles de ces mêmes acteurs.”

French respondent

“It gives the impression that the EuroMed relation stands on an equal footing, which is essential and crucial for further development.”

Lebanese respondent

“This depends on the institutional support each Co-President will get. Obviously, the institutional capabilities of European and SEM countries differ. If the European chair of the UfM gets support from the European Commission, the gap in capabilities will be even wider.”

Egyptian respondent

The work of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), which has been in operation since 2004,¹² is judged with less indulgence by the actors and experts surveyed: 30% of them (42% for Maghreb respondents) consider it disappointing or very disappointing (0-3 on the scale), against only 18% who consider it positive or very positive (7-10 on the scale). The number of “Don’t know” answers is quite high (24%) showing a clear lack of visibility of the initiatives of this institution (38% in the case of Turkey and 34% for non-Mediterranean EU countries), which is confirmed by the free comments of respondents. The latter stress the problems of democratic legitimacy, representativeness and effectiveness of the EMPA.

Question 2.2.

What is your assessment of the work achieved by the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) in 2005-2009

	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative						Very positive								
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly	8	19	26	24	37	53	41	25	14	5	1	253	4.52	79	332
	3%	8%	10%	9%	15%	21%	16%	10%	6%	2%	0%	100%		24%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

12. See *Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status & Progress 2009*, p. 21.

“The EMPA, a lot of talk, no follow-up.”

Romanian respondent

“You rarely hear about the EMPA.”

Italian respondent

“Cette instance n’a pas assez de poids pour influencer les décisions prises par les gouvernements.”

Algerian respondent

“Agissant à titre consultatif, l’APEM n’est pas du tout visible sur la scène politique.”

French respondent

“Les parlementaires des PPM ne sont pas représentatifs ; les thèmes discutés ne reflètent pas les vraies priorités des PPM. Du moins les parlementaires du Sud prennent-ils conscience de leurs limitations à la faveur des contacts avec les confrères européens. La prise de conscience peut produire un effet positif à long terme.”

Tunisian respondent

“The European Parliament, within the clearly defined European integration process, took decades to assert for itself roles and functions. It cannot be conceivable that the Parliamentary Assembly does effective work in the EMP. An additional reason that Parliaments in many countries, of which the Parliamentary Assembly is an emanation, are only formal bodies with no real legislative or control functions.”

Egyptian respondent

In this respect, it is interesting that the assessment of the potential contribution to the EMP of the new Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (EMRLA),¹³ designed to be a channel of political representation of local and regional authorities in the EMP following the model of the EMPA, receives a more positive welcome. According to the results of Question 3.6, 40% of respondents see it as a potential major improvement in the EMP (7-10 on the scale), against 25% seeing it as little or no improvement (0-3 on the scale). Again, new projects and developments receive a vote of trust by experts and actors in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

“It is just another institution; it would be more important to make the currently existing structures work.”

German respondent

“It might improve the EMP, but it depends on the position of the local and regional authorities in their own countries (South and East Mediterranean), as well as their participation in the decision-making process.”

Polish respondent

13. See *Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status & Progress 2009*, p. 23.

1.7.2. The Secretariat of the UfM in Barcelona

The establishment of the UfM Secretariat based in Barcelona is the most innovative institutional change in the EMP system brought about by the UfM. Because of the political paralysis of the UfM until July 2009, its actual establishment has suffered a delay, but negotiations regarding its Statutes are well on course, so that it might begin operating in early 2010. This is the only new institution to be created which seems not to have a role for the whole EMP, but only for the UfM projects. Its functions will be limited, in principle, to the identification and follow-up of UfM projects, the promotion of new projects and the search for funding and for implementation partners. The Secretariat will have a separate legal personality with an autonomous status and its mandate will be of a technical nature subject to the guidelines of Senior Officials, but it will be composed of seconded officials from participants in the process. It will have one Secretary General and six Deputy Secretary Generals.

Expectations about its role in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are quite high, with 52% of respondents expecting it to play an important or key role in the EMP (7-10 on the scale; 19%, 9-10), against 19% considering that it will play a negligible role (0-3 on the scale). This optimism about the future role of the Secretariat is stronger among Maghreb respondents (61% expect an important or key role) and Mediterranean EU country respondents (54%).

Question 3.5.

Do you expect that the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean, to be established in Barcelona as approved in the Marseille Conference, will play a key, moderate or negligible role in the new institutional architecture of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

	Role of UfM in the new institutional architecture											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Negligible role						Key role								
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
The role of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean	6	11	18	22	24	32	34	50	47	38	18	300	6.07	30	330
	2%	4%	6%	7%	8%	11%	11%	17%	16%	13%	6%	100%		9%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Beyond those assigned in the Marseille Conference, the other functions respondents would attribute to the Secretariat include the following:

"Veiller à la formation et à l'émergence d'une conscience méditerranéenne."

Tunisian respondent

"To help South-South cooperation."

Italian respondent

"Tiene que llegar a ser el centro impulsor, generador de ideas, gestor de proyectos y centro visible de una incipiente organización regional mediterránea."

Spanish respondent

“The UfM is an intergovernmental process, not an integration one. Secretariats of intergovernmental processes do not play the active role that organs such as the EU Commission carry out. Their role is made more difficult when there are differences in interests, in addition to conflicts between some members.”

Egyptian respondent

“La gestión de los fondos multilaterales de vecindad europeos.”

Spanish respondent

“Very badly designed, constrained by political problems, no selection of staff with serious expertise criteria, too politically biased and controlled. No place for objectivity, transparency and substance.”

Lebanese respondent

“A la condition qu’il puisse avoir les moyens de fonctionner, d’être une institution de proposition, et aussi d’être un acteur de promotion dans ces politiques des relations euro med. Promotion au travers de rencontres régionaux, tout en associant une participation des sociétés civiles mais aussi de trouver des points relais tels que des experts locaux.”

French respondent

“Le risque est de constituer une administration de bureaucrates qui aura à gérer des projets physiques sans cohérences par rapport aux objectifs finaux de l’Union.”

Algerian respondent

“De toutes les façons tout dépend de l’envergure et de la compétence de la personnalité qui en assume la responsabilité.”

Moroccan respondent

“Aggressively pursue a policy of promoting human rights and democracy in Southern Mediterranean States.”

Italian respondent

“The real functioning of the UfM will depend on the efficiency of the Co-Presidency which needs the technical support of the Secretariat. The future Secretariat in Barcelona will have important functions in terms of technical support and the role of the link between different parties. Barcelona as a seat for the Secretariat is well chosen (symbolic meaning as a reward for the Barcelona Process).”

Croatian respondent