

05

PROSPECTS FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE FUTURE CONTEXT OF THE EMP

The Survey included a question aimed at gauging the degree of probability attributed by respondents to a series of key factors, strategic risks and policy challenges regarding the future of the Mediterranean (Question 4.2) assuming that the current level and framework of cooperation remains unchanged. Combined with the analysis within the Focus Group, this should allow for the construction of future scenarios for the Mediterranean and the design of alternative cooperation policies.

According to the results of the Survey, the prospects in the Mediterranean are decidedly bleak (see answers in Table below). More than 50% of respondents consider it probable or very probable that:

- the Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP (63%, with the exception of Israeli respondents where it is only 40%),
- water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions (61%),
- population and employment pressures will create dramatic social tensions (50%) and
- political regimes in MPCs will show continuity (50%).

As a consequence, irregular migration to Europe will continue to increase (50% see it as probable or very probable) and 47% of respondents consider it probable or very probable that the increased level of irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe. 35% see it as improbable or not probable at all that a common Mediterranean identity will emerge (against 20% that attribute some probability to it). Answers are generally even more negative in the case of Maghreb countries.

The “probable or very probable” answers double the “improbable or not probable at all” answers regarding the probability of:

- an environmental deterioration in the Mediterranean threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States (39% against 15%),
- the current global economic crisis reducing the development prospects of the Mediterranean for a long period (38% against 17%), which of course means that respondents consider it improbable or not probable at all that MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, hence, long-term convergence at the EU levels of income (40% against 13%).

The only positive development that will probably materialize in the future, according to the respondents, is the increased participation of women in economic, social and political life in MPCs (38% consider it probable or very probable against only 14% improbable).

Overall, it is clear that respondents consider that the current trends and status quo are not sustainable over the mid to long term. But expectations about the probability that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership will contribute to facing those challenges and solving the problems in the region (Question 4.1) are very limited, which should pose the question of the need for a change in paradigm in EU-MPC cooperation. 45% see a low or no probability of it leading to resolution of conflicts in the region (19% see a high probability of this happening), and 41% think the same for a reduction of the development gap across the Mediterranean (27% are positive about that probability).

Question 4.2.

What degree of probability do you attribute to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean under the present level and framework of cooperation?

	Degree of probability											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	No probability				Very high probability										
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP	6	3	14	19	27	26	20	43	67	46	41	312	6.75	4	316
	2%	1%	4%	6%	9%	8%	6%	14%	21%	15%	13%	100%		1%	
Political regimes in MPCs will show a high degree of continuity	3	5	9	13	20	44	54	62	47	20	17	294	6.28	28	322
	1%	2%	3%	4%	7%	15%	18%	21%	16%	7%	6%	100%		9%	
The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period	3	7	20	26	36	62	50	39	41	26	11	321	5.68	5	326
	1%	2%	6%	8%	11%	19%	16%	12%	13%	8%	3%	100%		2%	
Gulf Cooperation Council members will facilitate a higher degree of South-South economic cooperation in the Mediterranean	12	14	25	43	41	62	48	38	16	6	2	307	4.64	15	322
	4%	5%	8%	14%	13%	20%	16%	12%	5%	2%	3%	100%		5%	
Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States.	2	8	13	22	41	56	53	41	52	21	11	320	5.83	10	330
	3%	3%	4%	7%	13%	18%	17%	13%	16%	7%	3%	100%		3%	
Water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions in the Mediterranean	3	5	6	9	23	35	45	51	81	43	23	324	6.8	5	329
	1%	2%	2%	3%	7%	11%	14%	16%	25%	13%	7%	100%		2%	
Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs	2	5	16	18	30	49	77	52	55	13	4	321	5.85	6	327
	1%	2%	5%	6%	9%	15%	24%	16%	17%	4%	1%	100%		2%	
MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income	7	24	45	49	44	64	38	21	10	5	4	311	4.17	19	330
	2%	8%	14%	16%	14%	21%	12%	7%	3%	2%	1%	100%		6%	
Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tensions	1	4	9	11	34	52	49	69	41	37	14	321	6.32	9	330
	0%	1%	3%	3%	11%	16%	15%	21%	13%	12%	4%	100%		3%	
Irregular migration from originating MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose	4	9	5	18	31	35	55	62	51	30	20	320	6.29	8	328
	1%	3%	2%	6%	10%	11%	17%	19%	16%	9%	6%	100%		2%	

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	Degree of probability											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	No probability					Very high probability									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean	11	16	21	33	36	53	47	29	39	18	16	319	5.28	9	328
	3%	5%	7%	10%	11%	17%	15%	9%	12%	6%	5%	100%		3%	
Increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe	3	11	10	18	19	51	60	53	49	31	15	320	6.15	8	328
	1%	3%	3%	6%	6%	16%	19%	17%	15%	10%	5%	100%		2%	
The increased level of migration, economic and human exchanges will give way to the emergence of a common Mediterranean identity	23	18	30	39	50	43	45	23	25	10	7	313	4.48	13	326
	7%	6%	10%	12%	16%	14%	14%	7%	8%	3%	2%	100%		4%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

However, for the whole sample the balance is clearly in favour of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership leading to a greater intensity of human exchanges across the Mediterranean (39% see it as probable, against 21% improbable) and, in particular, to a greater understanding and respect between cultures and religions (43% against 18%). But perceptions are clearly less positive in Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries, in particular in the Maghreb (where only 31% see an increase in human exchanges as probable against 33% improbable and only 33% see a greater understanding between cultures as probable, against 24% improbable). In this context, the answers to Question 4.2 consider how far these contributions will manage to counter the negative trends identified by respondents (in particular, the increase in xenophobia in Europe; see above). Opinions are divided over the contribution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to improving employment and living conditions of people or the strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights.

“L’essentiel n’est pas dans l’émergence d’une nouvelles identités mais dans le respect des identités existantes et les synergies rendues possibles par une politique d’intérêts mutuels.”

Tunisian respondent

“Le conflit arabe-israélien paralysera à jamais le PEM. Il est impératif que la politique des pays européens par rapport à ce conflit (particulièrement la cause palestinienne) soit juste.”

Algerian respondent

“Ce n’est pas les textes qui créent l’échange et l’idée d’entité, ce sont les hommes, par leurs déplacements et les liens qu’ils tissent.”

French respondent

“Si l’immigration n’est pas bien contrôlée/accompagnée, les risques seront réels. Les échanges culturels, campagnes... entre le nord et le sud sont essentiels pour permettre aux citoyens des deux rives de mieux se connaître et pour ainsi éviter les dérives (notamment xénophobes) qui pourraient en résulter par manque d’information. Les immigrés devront également être accompagnés dans leur pays d’accueil pour éviter qu’ils se retrouvent dans des situations précaires.”

Belgian respondent

“Lamento el pessimisme, però l’actual situació amaga des del meu punt de vista un proper lustre poc donat a l’expansió econòmica, i és previsible l’augment progressiu de les tensions.”

Spanish respondent

“The long-running effort for greater economic and societal interdependence is in line with global pressures and likely to bear fruit. The ‘macro-political’ outlook remains poor and this could wreck the broader societal project.”

Irish respondent

“Je prévois une évolution linéaire avec maintien de la configuration des rapports de forces entre les deux rives. La situation dans les PTM risque de ne pas évoluer, les régimes en place favoriseront le statu quo pour assurer leur survie.”

Algerian respondent

“La question de l’immigration constitue l’un des soucis majeurs de l’UE. L’une de ses préoccupations essentielles est de contenir l’immigration en provenance des pays du Sud et de l’Est de la Méditerranée vers l’UE. Ce fléau tend à s’accroître devant l’aggravation des conditions politiques, économiques et sociales dans les PPM.”

Moroccan respondent

“Internal factors are more important than external ones.”

Egyptian respondent

Question 4.1.

What degree of probability do you attribute to the prospect that current Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (within the frameworks of the EMP, ENP and UfM) is leading, in the long term, to:

	Degree of probability											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	No probability					Very high probability									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
The resolution of conflicts in the region	29	23	40	51	35	37	44	31	16	7	6	319	4.12	7	326
	9%	7%	13%	16%	11%	12%	14%	10%	5%	2%	2%	100%		2%	
The strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights in the Mediterranean Partner Countries	13	9	35	50	43	35	47	51	25	9	5	322	4.8	5	327
	4%	3%	11%	16%	13%	11%	15%	16%	8%	3%	2%	100%		2%	
A higher level of employment, an improvement in living conditions and a reduction of poverty in Mediterranean Partner Countries	7	9	25	40	49	60	65	46	20	4	5	330	4.95	5	335
	2%	3%	8%	12%	15%	18%	20%	14%	6%	1%	2%	100%		1%	
A reduction of the development gap between the North and the South of the Mediterranean	12	10	29	50	51	60	35	53	10	13	5	328	4.73	5	333
	4%	3%	9%	15%	16%	18%	11%	16%	3%	4%	2%	100%		2%	
A greater intensity of human exchanges between the North and the South of the Mediterranean	6	6	20	36	43	38	55	74	29	15	9	331	5.5	5	336
	2%	2%	6%	11%	13%	11%	17%	22%	9%	5%	3%	100%		1%	
A greater understanding and respect between cultures and religions in the Mediterranean	7	11	15	27	28	52	48	61	38	29	14	330	5.8	5	335
	2%	3%	5%	8%	8%	16%	15%	18%	12%	9%	4%	100%		1%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers