EUROMED SURVEY OF EXPERTS AND ACTORS

EURO-MEDITERRANEAN POLICIES IN THE LIGHT OF THE ARAB SPRING

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EURO-MEDiterranean Policies in the light of the Arab Spring
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The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) has been entrusted by the European Commission to conduct, for the period 2009-2012, a yearly Survey of actors and experts on European-Mediterranean relations. This activity is part of the programme “Promoting mutual awareness, understanding and cooperation between the EU and the European Neighbourhood Region (South)”, co-funded by the European Union through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) regional track.

This project is fully in line with the IEMed’s mission as a think tank devoted to the analysis of and proactive thinking about Euro-Mediterranean relations. This ambitious Survey has three main objectives:

- Assessing the progress, achievements and shortcomings of the various dimensions of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, encompassing both the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean;
- Developing an instrument for critical reflection able to mobilize experts and policy-makers operating in the design of Euromed policies;
- Identifying the main challenges and future issues at stake in the Mediterranean so as to be able to make appropriate policy recommendations.

Building on the experience gained from the two previous years, this third Survey opted for a shorter and more focused questionnaire, which dealt mainly with the aftermath of the Arab Spring, given the high relevance of the topic, and with the Political and Security basket of the Partnership, for its obvious links with the events that have occurred in the southern shore.

The fieldwork of the present Survey was conducted between December 2011 and January 2012, coinciding with the first anniversary of the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, at a time when political transitions in the region were under way and a new mapping of actors and regional power balances was still being shaped. A total of 695 experts, policy-makers and representatives of civil society from the 43 member countries of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) have participated in this year’s Survey, which represents a 16% increase compared to the last one.

This report summarises and discusses the results of this third Survey, bearing in mind that it is not a mere public opinion poll, but an attempt to identify and critically assess the major successes and shortcomings, as well as the potential, of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) from the point of view of experts and actors directly involved in the process.

As regards the structure, the report is divided into two main parts: a descriptive analysis of the quantitative data and a qualitative section meant to interpret and shed light on the results obtained. For the preparation of the qualitative section, which consists of twelve articles in total, 16 experts from different Mediterranean countries were contacted by the IEMed. They were briefed to analyse the results of the 2011 Survey in their contributions in the light of the Arab uprisings and the state of play in the Arab countries, while also taking into account the latest developments in the Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture.
The first Survey was marked by the setting up of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) as an attempt to revitalise and revamp the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) fifteen years after the launch of the Barcelona Process.

While building on the monitoring exercise of the state of play of the Partnership started in the 2009 Survey, the second Survey also included a section devoted to taking stock of the progress made towards the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA), as foreseen in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, by 2010.

This third Survey, while pursuing the monitoring exercise of the previous years for comparison purposes, also includes a thematic dossier focused on the implications of the Arab Spring for Euro-Mediterranean relations and for Arab countries’ internal dynamics, as well as on the Political and Security Cooperation basket of the Partnership, which was a key component part of the Barcelona Declaration.

Important changes have taken place in the southern shore of the Mediterranean since December 2010 – the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi on 17th December being the catalyst of the Tunisian Revolution and the wider Arab Spring, which led to a wave of protests and riots across the Arab countries against authoritarian practices and calls for dignity, justice and freedom. Meanwhile, the Union for the Mediterranean found itself at an impasse and was unable to react, mainly due to the tensions caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition to this, its institutional setting was seriously weakened since the co-presidency was partly represented by the very same leader against whom Egyptians were rebelling. This did nothing but undermine the legitimacy of this institution even more. In this respect, the recent rearrangements in its institutional architecture are expected to reinvigorate the UfM and give it back its credibility.

For its part, the EU did react relatively quickly to the Arab uprisings, although not always in a desired outspoken and coherent manner. In any case, what the Arab unrest has blatantly brought to the fore are the shortcomings of an EU policy towards the South based for too long on a political dialogue limited to the governmental elites, paying little or no attention to the claims of civil society.

As already pointed out in the last Survey, the time has come for the EU to rethink its strategy with regard to the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights, which is based less on political declarations than on clear and active support for the processes of democratic transitions under way.

Undoubtedly, a new opportunity has emerged for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Its success will depend on the EU’s capacity to readapt its strategy by listening to and taking on board the needs and demands of Arab civil society. This ability to empathise will be particularly challenging in times like these, when Europe is becoming increasingly self-concerned about the economic hardships it is going through. Yet the EU cannot afford to overlook the political developments in its southern neighbourhood, for both crises (the economic in the North and the political in the South) have a mutual impact on each other.
I. METHODOLOGY

Against the background of the so-called “Arab Spring”, this third Survey of Euro-Mediterranean relations is of exceptional relevance. It will help to assess the previous, current and future role of the manifold Euro-Mediterranean institutions and political frameworks that have been built since the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995.

For the present Survey the fieldwork was carried out from early December 2011 to late January 2012; that is, almost one year after the beginning of the “Arab Spring”. At that moment, transitions were still ongoing, with new scenarios after parliamentary elections in Tunisia and during the Egyptian ones, where political Islamism achieved power and thus the mandate to guide the democratic reforms. At the same time, Morocco, although not in a post-revolutionary scenario, brought yet another moderate Islamist party into power. The war in Libya was over but instability was still there, while Syria moved to open confrontation among its population.

Thus, an effort was made to continue this series of Surveys with the aim that they build one comprehensive project together. The Surveys conducted within this project are to be comparative, so that developments in perceptions can be detected and analysed on a mid-term basis. Therefore, the first set of questions on the “monitoring of progress and achievements of the EMP and UfM” contains similar questions to last year’s Survey but also new ones.

However, the changes in the region we have been witnessing since December 2010 are so fundamental that it was necessary to adapt this year’s Survey. Firstly, in order to better grasp the current developments, the Survey covers developments from January 2011 until December 2011.

Secondly, many actors have changed and in some countries and some cases it is not yet clear who the relevant actors could be. Since this Survey is not a public opinion poll but an exercise of assessment and identification of the main successes and difficulties, potential and shortcomings of institutionalised Euro-Mediterranean relations, only actors and experts involved are potential respondents within this project. To adjust the Survey to this new situation a major effort was made to identity them, not only at government level but also within societies, including for example the sphere of bloggers.

Finally, since this year’s Survey has a focus on the “political and security partnership”, here again there has been an adaptation. Apart from obvious questions related to the objectives that were mentioned in the first basket of the Barcelona Declaration, a series of questions focuses on the first responses provided by the EU regarding the Arab Spring. The answers to these and other rather detailed questions might cumulate in an answer to a much broader and overarching question: whether a reform within the given Euro-Mediterranean institutional structures and policies will be sufficient or perhaps more fundamental changes are to be expected to adapt Euro-Mediterranean relations to the new political environment.

The Survey finally offers an insight into the assessments of experts and actors involved in Euro-Mediterranean relations concerning mid- to long-term developments (prospects and policy recommendations).

As far as the methodology is concerned, every question includes a box for comments. Given the complexity of the current situation and the diversity of opinions, it was considered that it would be indispensable to offer this possibility to fine tune answers or to add, for instance, other proposals or options than those proposed in the questions. It should also be noted that the “Don’t know” option is of importance as it provides significant information in terms of the knowledge of the experts and actors of the variety of policies and actions proposed and implemented by the EU.
Given the success of the previous Surveys, both in terms of the number of respondents and quality of the proposals made and because of the significance of the current developments in the region and beyond, this questionnaire is indeed of particular importance. Therefore, experts and actors have a means to express their hopes and concerns but also the possibility of putting forward proposals that could help decision-makers to define and implement new changes to address the challenges of the democratic transition in the MPCs.

Given that developments in the region are very dynamic, this year’s Survey is something of a snapshot. Therefore, it is important to already keep in mind the 2012 Survey, which will focus on the social, cultural and human dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations. On a societal level, the “Arab Spring” has an important impact within and beyond national borders that might change traditional power relations. Intergenerational tensions transcending the established political rifts are obvious but the impact of the “Arab Spring” on gender relations, for example, is not so apparent. In general, it is not yet clear to what extent debates on tradition and modernity are affected. The important question to be raised is how, where and to what extent the EU has to support these changes on the basis of the demands from the MPCs.

II. SURVEY SAMPLE

Compared to the two previous Surveys in 2009 and 2010, this third one had a slightly reduced questionnaire and a thematic dossier devoted to the political and security dimension of the EMP and the implications of the Arab Spring for the region.

To conduct this Survey, a universe of 4,650 experts, actors and policy-makers from the 43 countries of the Mediterranean and the European Union was selected, all of whom received an invitation to participate. As in previous years, geographical distribution, institutional typology, field of knowledge and gender balance were the reference criteria for selecting the universe, as well as knowledge of and involvement in the Euro-Mediterranean Process. Out of this broad universe, a sample of 695 responses was received, which represents a 16% increase compared to the 2010 Survey.

Concerning the distribution of the answers, 49.2% came from the so-called “Mediterranean Partner Countries” (hereafter MPCs), including all the countries of both the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean, and 48.6% came from the EU-27 members.

Graph 1. Answers according to geographical origin: EU-27 and Mediterranean Partner Countries (EMP+UfM)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
As to the distribution of responses per region, the Mediterranean EU countries,\(^1\) the remaining EU countries and those of the Maghreb\(^2\) account for the bulk of the answers (with a 24%, 25% and 21% participation rate, respectively). Mashreq\(^3\) countries come in fourth position with 16% of responses, a slightly lower participation rate than in the previous Survey, when this region accounted for 19% of total responses. This regression is due, respectively, to stagnation and to a significant decrease in the number of answers from Egypt and Syria compared to last year. Concretely, the number of answers from Egypt has remained more or less stable at 36, though one would have expected it to increase given the bigger size of the sample analysed (i.e. 97 additional responses), while Syria has registered an almost 50% drop in its number of answers (i.e. from 15 in 2010 to 8 in 2011).

However, except for the Mashreq and the Mediterranean EU countries, all the other regional groups have registered an increase in the number of answers compared to the previous year. Actually, even the Mediterranean EU countries have registered a slight increase in absolute numbers of responses, but given the bigger size of the overall sample, their relative representativeness has decreased slightly. It is also worth noting that even the non-Mediterranean EU countries\(^4\) have registered an increase in the number of responses compared to the last Survey, when their aggregated participation rate amounted to 23%. The Arab Spring has probably been a key factor behind this higher mobilisation of central European and Atlantic European policy-makers on Mediterranean issues. On the whole, however, these small changes in the relative weight of the various regional groups have led to a more homogeneous and representative distribution than in the 2010 Survey.

**Graph 2. Breakdown of respondents by region (by number of respondents)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Answers 2010</th>
<th>Answers 2011</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Mediterranean EU Countries</td>
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<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of EU</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashreq</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European non-EU</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

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1. Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus, Greece and Slovenia. The first three alone account for nearly 70% of responses from this region.
2. Maghreb countries include Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya. The first three alone account for 95% of responses from this region.
3. Mashreq countries include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Syria.
4. Non-Mediterranean EU countries (i.e. rest of the EU) refer to Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the UK, Ireland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Germany, the UK, Belgium, Poland and Sweden make up more than half of the respondents from this region.
In the first block of questions, in addition to providing their country of origin, respondents were asked to indicate their gender and age range, the type of institution they belonged to (i.e. EU/international organisation, think tank, NGO, business sector, trade union, media, etc.), as well as their main and, where applicable, secondary field of specialisation.

As shown in the graphs below, the majority of respondents to the questionnaire can be understood as “experts”, an aggregated category which includes respondents from think tanks, media and, above all, academia. Altogether, these groups roughly account for 42% of the total number of responses. This umbrella category is followed by “policy-makers”, which embrace all responses from diplomatic bodies, European or international institutions, political parties and governments – this latter group accounting for the largest share of responses. Finally, the comparatively less but still well-represented category is “civil society”, encompassing trade unions, companies and mainly NGOs. Altogether, these groups account for more than a quarter of the total number of answers.

**Graph 3. Breakdown of respondents by type of institution**

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
When looking specifically at the individual groups (see graph 4 below), academia clearly emerges as the most represented institution (30.7% of total responses), followed by NGOs (19.8%) and governmental bodies (15.8%). Altogether, these groups account for almost two thirds of the total answers. If we then compare the relative participation of the different groups in 2011 with their participation in the last Survey, there seems to be an overall continuity, though a slightly higher response rate from EU institutions and diplomatic representatives can be seen.

Respondents were also asked about their main sector of activity and were given the opportunity to indicate one or two areas of specialisation. As shown in the graph below, which displays aggregated figures for main and secondary areas of specialisation, more than half of respondents operate in the area of “social, cultural and human exchanges”. “Economic and financial cooperation” ranks second as the main area of specialisation of respondents (36%), immediately followed by “political cooperation and security” (30%). Finally, “migration and justice affairs” comes in fourth place with only 11% of the votes.
When analysing the previous figures by factoring in the geographical dimension, we can conclude that overall MPCs are more interested in social, cultural and human exchanges, as well as in economic and financial cooperation, whereas EU countries are comparatively more focused on political cooperation and security issues.

**Graph 6. Breakdown of respondents by area of specialisation and by region**

![Graph 6](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

(Respondents could indicate one or two areas of specialisation. This graph displays aggregated totals for first and second choices as areas of specialisation. This is why the total percentage exceeds 100%).

Finally, to complete the description of the sample on which this Survey is based, it is important to note that more than half of respondents are aged between 46 and 65 (see graph 7) and that 30% of respondents are women, in line with the gender balance of the last Survey (see graph 8). When factoring in the North/South dimension, the aggregate proportion of women amounts to 25% for MPCs, while it increases to 34% for EU countries. By regional groups, the Maghreb stands out as an outlier with around 19% of female participation, while the other regions, including the Mashreq, fall within the overall gender ratio (see graph 9).

**Graph 7. Breakdown of respondents by age range**

![Graph 7](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

**Graph 8. Breakdown of respondents by gender**

![Graph 8](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
III. SURVEY FOLLOW-UP

The Euromed Survey forms part of a four-year programme which aims to carry out a Survey every year based on the same main sample of policy-makers and experts, with the objective of covering the main issues on the political agenda of the region and monitoring the progress in Euro-Mediterranean perceptions and policies.

The thematic dossiers on the different dimensions of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are structured in accordance with the following calendar. In 2009, the questions focused on the assessments and future prospects of the Union for the Mediterranean. In 2010, it tackled the economic and financial dimension (Euromed Free Trade Area, including services and agriculture, and sustainable development, energy, water, and so on). For the Survey this year – 2011 – the thematic dossier approaches the outcomes of the Arab Spring, as well as the political and security dimension.

The final Survey, in 2012, will cover the social, human and cultural dimension and, in particular, migration flows and immigration policies, gender issues, employment, education and culture.
SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS
I. Monitoring of Progress and Achievements of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean and European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011

**General assessment:** compared to the opinions on the UfM, the global assessment of the ENP and, more generally, of the EU initiatives towards its southern neighbours in 2011 looks slightly more hopeful, although it is still fairly modest. The graph below provides an overview of the responses to the first block of questions of the Survey and will be further discussed hereafter.

**Graph 1:** Monitoring the Progress and Achievements of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean and of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011
(average on scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for highly inadequate, and 10 for highly adequate)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

**A gloomy perception of the UfM/EMP.** The global assessment of the UfM/EMP in terms of results achieved has seen a significant regression compared to the previous Surveys, registering a continuous drop from 4.7 on average in 2009 to 4.6 in 2010 and down to 3.8 in 2011.

**Graph 2:** Assessment of the results achieved by the EMP/UfM
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for highly inadequate and 10 for highly adequate)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Despite growing disenchantment with the UfM, respondents remain hopeful about the Secretariat. Interestingly, in spite of the disappointing assessment of the UfM, respondents still give this institution, and in particular its Secretariat, some credibility – even though they are less enthusiastic in their expectations than in the previous Surveys.

**Unanimous support for an EU-led northern UfM co-presidency.** It is also worth noting that the need for the EU institutions to assume the northern co-presidency of the UfM was seen as particularly pressing for an overwhelming majority of respondents, which is consistent with the current institutional architecture.

**Graph 3:** EU institutions should assume the northern copresidency of the UfM, instead of the current system (one Member State from the North) (%)

![Graph showing support for EU institutions assuming the northern co-presidency of the UfM](image)

**Source:** Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

**EU financial perspectives 2014-2020:** there is a widespread support for the creation of a new instrument exclusively devoted to the southern Mediterranean partners, as opposed to the current European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), which also encompasses the Eastern neighbours. Such an opinion is particularly shared amongst respondents from MPCs and Mediterranean EU countries – and less so amongst respondents from non-Mediterranean EU countries.
II. Thematic Dossier

National Politics and Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the “Arab Spring”

The international response to the Arab uprisings: Turkey, the most pro-active actor. Of all the external actors, Turkey clearly emerges as the most engaged and supportive of the events in the southern shore, immediately followed by the European Union and the United States. Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and Iran are considered, in this order, to have played the weakest role in the region.

A different role of the EU depending on the target country. On the specific assessment of the role of the EU in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the Arab Spring, opinions vary depending on the country examined. EU policies are, for instance, perceived by a majority of respondents as having supported political change in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, while they are considered as having supported the preservation of the regimes in power in Morocco and in Jordan, or as having had no impact on domestic developments in Algeria and in Lebanon.
Graph 6: Assessment of the role of the EU in the Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

The aftermath of the “Arab Spring” and Euromed relations: speeding up reforms and a moderate EU leadership. Respondents consider the acceleration of the political and socioeconomic reforms foreseen in the ENP/EMP frameworks as the most probable long-term scenario in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. As regards the future impact of the EU in the region, responses point to a higher influence of the EU compared to the Arab League, China, Iran and Russia, and to a roughly similar or lower level of influence compared to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the US.

Graph 7: Assessing the EU’s future role in MPCs compared to other external and regional actors (the graph below displays the EU’s relative capacity to influence regional developments compared to other actors)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Southern partners’ internal dynamics: diverging democratic prospects and the rise of political Islam. Tunisia appears as the country with the most optimistic outlook in terms of democracy, followed by Lebanon and Morocco. Algeria and Syria offer in turn a rather discouraging picture, well below that of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Libya. Regardless of the prospects for democracy in the different MPCs, political Islam is expected to play a key role in the southern shore of the Mediterranean in the years to come.

Graph 8: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in the following countries (average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very improbable and 10 for very probable)

Positive assessment of the EU response to the changes in its neighbourhood: there is an overall positive reaction of respondents to all the priorities identified by the EU in its two Joint Communications on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, in response to the Arab uprisings. In particular, the initiatives meant to improve the mobility of people and to foster rural development are considered as the most relevant ones. The EU financial response to the uprisings (i.e. the SPRING programme) is also positively assessed, though less so compared to the previous initiatives. Finally, the overall assessment of the EU’s first response to Libya’s civil war can be considered as positive, particularly in the case of Israeli respondents, who seem quite satisfied with the EU’s action.
Graph 9: Assessing the relevance of the priorities that were identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”? (average on scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for not relevant and 10 for very relevant)

- Mobility – improve “visa facilitation”, conclude “Mobility Partnerships”, improve “people-to-people contacts”, “labour mobility” and enhance “students, researchers and business persons” mobility

- Create a European Neighbourhood “Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development”

- Market access – “consider allowing partners that have a fully functioning independent judiciary, an efficient public administration and have made significant progress towards eradicating corruption, into the non-regulated area of the [EU] Internal Market for goods”

- Create a “Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility”, “designed to strengthen the capacity of civil society to promote reform and increase public accountability in their countries” (€22 million)

- Conclude and implement new “Neighbourhood Agreements”, as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 8 TEU), which will establish Deep and Comprehensive Free trade Agreements (DCFTA)

- Money – reallocating/refocusing additional financial resources to support democratic transitions, institution building, civil society and the socio-economic needs of the countries. For instance the loss of income from tourism in Egypt and Tunisia (SPRING Programme € 350 million for 2011 and 2012)

- Create a “European Endowment for Democracy” (to “help political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners”)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

**Expected role of the EU with regard to domestic developments in MPCs:** the majority of respondents think the EU should remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs. However, preferences change when respondents are asked about the role that the EU should play in their own countries. Respondents from Egypt, Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories call, for instance, for a more pro-active role of the EU in their respective countries, while Algerian and Moroccan respondents favour a more neutral and less interventionist role of the EU in their homelands, as compared to respondents from other countries.

**Expected role of the EU towards democratic laggards and repressive regimes:** regarding countries shunning democratic reforms, there is major support for using positive conditionality on the basic of the so-called “more for more” approach. In contrast, regarding countries that implement repressive measures – be it against popular movements or against women’s rights and gender equality –, responses are more or less homogeneously distributed among “using positive conditionality”, “using negative conditionality” and “promoting a whole range of sanctions at international level / supporting civil society engaged in women’s rights”, while only a very low percentage believe that the EU should “remain neutral and not intervene in MPCs’ internal affairs”. Finally, with regard to the allocation of aid, the majority of respondents consider that the EU should support groupings regardless of their religious affiliation, while only a quarter believe it should only focus on organisations from the secular spectrum.
Graph 10:

**EU policy response towards countries failing to introduce democratic reforms**

- **The EU should use positive conditionality:** 66%
- **Don't know:** 3%
- **The EU should use negative conditionality:** 18%
- **The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPCs:** 13%

**EU policy response towards countries implementing repressive measures against popular movements**

- **The EU should promote the use of sanctions at international level:** 31%
- **Don't know:** 4%
- **The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPCs:** 6%
- **The EU should use positive conditionality:** 26%
- **The EU should use negative conditionality:** 16%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

**EU policy response towards countries implementing repressive measures against women rights and gender equality**

- **The EU should use negative conditionality:** 30%
- **Don't know:** 3%
- **The EU should support NGOs and individuals engaged in women rights:** 27%
- **The EU should use positive conditionality:** 34%
- **The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPCs:** 5%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Euromed Policies in the Field of Political and Security Cooperation

Negative perception of progress in the Political and Security basket of the Barcelona Declaration: with an average grade of 3.3 on a scale of 0 to 10 – where 0 stands for “not achieved at all” and 10 stands for “fully achieved” –, the perception of achievement of the general objective of the first Political and Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration – “establishing an area of peace and stability” – could not be more telling. Indeed, the majority of respondents, regardless of the regions, agree on the lack of progress achieved in this basket.

Progress has been mainly limited to cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organized crime: respondents having a clear perception of the Euromed policies on Political and Security Cooperation (37%) were asked to assess the progress achieved in the objectives set within the Political and Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. The majority of them believe that cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism (69%), the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking (59%) and the strengthening of political dialogue (58%) are the concrete objectives within this basket where most progress has been achieved. In turn, the objectives of creating a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, promoting regional security and respecting the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination have been mainly characterized by their lack of progress, or even regression.

Respondents were further asked to give their views on the progress achieved in the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the 2005 Five Year Work Programme. Fostering the role of civil society and extending political pluralism and participation by citizens are the two goals towards which respondents consider that most progress has been achieved, while enabling the implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions and enabling citizens’ participation in decision-making at the local level are considered as the least successful objectives so far (i.e. over half of respondents believe that no progress has been achieved in these areas).

EU programmes on Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation (PJSMC): progress registered, but still largely unknown. Two readings can be made of the assessment of the EU multilateral programmes on PJSMC: a worrying one, considering the high number of “Don’t know” answers, motivated by a lack of knowledge about the initiatives; and a more positive one considering only the answers from well-informed respondents, since a majority of them think that progress has been achieved in all the initiatives excluding the Middle East Peace Process which, in turn, is the best-known. In particular, EuroMeSCo stands out as the most successful initiative, followed by EuroMed Police II and the Malta Seminars for Diplomats. It is important to note that respondents from MPCs seem better informed overall about the initiatives than their European counterparts if we compare the percentages of “Don’t know” answers from both regions.

1. A filter was applied to question 22a in order to collect only the views of respondents knowledgeable about the Euromed policies in the field of Political and Security Cooperation. The rest of respondents (63%) could skip this question and go directly to question 22b on the Political and Security Partnership within the 2005 Five Year Work Programme.
Graph 11: Assessing the progress achieved in the following EU multilateral programmes on Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation

Programmes and projects

EuroMed Police II programme (July 2007-June 2010, €5 million) strengthening police cooperation between the EU and the MPCs, in the fight against all major types of organised crime.

EuroMed Justice I and II (2005-2007, €2 million, and 2008-2011, €5 million) supporting an open and modern justice system through strengthening the institutional and administrative capacity of MPCs and setting up an inter-professional community network.

Middle East Peace Process (2005-2007, €10 million and for 2007 to 2010, €10 million) aims to support the efforts to promote peace and cooperation between Israelis and Arabs, mainly through initiatives impacting on people’s lives.

Confidence-building measures, networks and facilities


Malta Seminars for Diplomats (2004-2008, €0.94 million)

Governance Facility under the ENP framework (€300 million, some €43m per year, on average) to provide additional support, on top of the normal country allocations, to acknowledge and support the work of those partner countries who have made most progress.

Euromed Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters (PPRD South; 2009-2011, €5 million)

III. Prospects and Policy Recommendations

Unanimous call for a more pro-active EU in conflict resolution: 93% of respondents on average think the EU should play a greater role in conflict resolution in the Mediterranean area. This percentage is even higher in the case of Maghreb and Mashreq respondents (roughly 97% in both cases).

Extremely bleak picture on conflict resolution in the Mediterranean: the Arab-Israeli conflict is regarded as the conflict in the Mediterranean with the least chances of finding a solution in the near future, followed by the conflict in Western Sahara. The Cypriot conflict offers somewhat more encouraging prospects of resolution, but still fairly pessimistic.

Mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean: increasing relevance of migration issues to the detriment of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The rise of legal and irregular migration from MPCs bolstering social tensions and xenophobic attitudes in Europe is identified by respondents as the most probable mid- to long-term scenario in the Mediterranean, followed by water scarcity and population and employment pressures. It is worth noting the remarkable loss of significance of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Mediterranean dynamics since the first Survey in 2009, when the conflict ranked second in terms of relevance, while in the 2011 Survey it has dropped to ninth position in the order of priorities. Water scarcity has also lost significance compared to the two past Surveys, where it was considered as the top priority.
The Palestinian UN application, likely to have a better impact on Euromed relations than on the conflict dynamics: respondents make a more positive assessment of the implications of the Palestinian application for UN membership on Euro-Mediterranean relations than on the Arab-Israeli conflict dynamics. Israeli respondents and respondents from European non-EU countries are particularly pessimistic about the implications of this action for the conflict dynamics.
DESCRIPTIVE REPORT
MONITORING OF PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP / UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AND EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY IN 2011
Euro-Mediterranean General Assessment

Question Q1 on the general adaptation of the EU initiatives towards the southern neighbours shows results very close to the average of 5 (4.9), which could be considered a neutral response. The distribution of percentages for each grade seems normal (see graph 2), with the largest number of respondents in the central grades. We could say that respondents see the EU initiatives aimed at its southern neighbours indifferently (neither good nor bad).

Graph 1: Global assessment of the results of the EU initiatives towards its southern neighbours in 2011
(average on a scale of 0-10)

Graph 2: Global assessment of the results of the EU initiatives towards its southern neighbours in 2011 (%)

Although the results vary slightly for the different groups of respondents, they are mainly close to the overall average. By geographical areas, Maghreb respondents give the lowest grade (4.6) along with Turkish respondents (4.0), while residents in European non-EU countries and Israelis have a higher average.1 Results by age show that the youngest grade these initiatives more positively. The results by type of institution reveal that experts grade these initiatives most negatively while political actors grade them more positively, always bearing in mind that the differences between groups are very small.

1. The disaggregated data of Israeli respondents must be regarded with due caution given the low number of respondents they represent.
Malgré la bonne volonté de l’Union européenne, le manque de visibilité de son action est criant, seuls les spécialistes reconnaissent ses initiatives et sa volonté, la population méditerranéenne n’a aucune idée de son réel engagement.

Tunisian respondent

Le printemps arabe a démontré le manque d’une vision méditerranéenne par l’UE et non une vision euro-méditerranéenne qui repose sur l’ancienne perception (mare nostrum) aussi son désengagement en ce qui concerne les principes déclarées (le co-développement, la démocratie, les droits de l’Homme, à titre d’exampl.

Moroccan respondent

EU initiatives were clearly unprepared to respond effectively to the Arab Spring, not to mention the fact that EU policies were not able to anticipate these and further developments.

Italian respondent

Les initiatives sont arrêtées le plus souvent en fonction des priorités européennes parmi les besoins des pays du sud, et non selon celles des pays intéressés.

Mauritanian respondent

When asked specifically about the UfM results in 2011 (Q2) the assessment is quite negative (average of 3.8), with 48% of respondents grading it below 4, clearly showing that the UfM’s performance has not even achieved a minimum level. In comparison to a similar question in the previous Survey, the grade has dropped from 4.5 to 3.8 on average. The instability of the UfM in terms of the figure of the Secretary General probably affects this assessment.

By regions, the most negative vision (as in the previous question) comes from Maghreb respondents in contrast to those from the Mashreq, who assess the UfM above the average (leaving aside the case of European non-EU respondents who give the only positive assessment, although it must be regarded cautiously due to the low significance in the pattern). EU respondents give average grades very close to the overall average.

Graph 3: UfM Global Assessment (average on a scale of 0-10)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Within the negative assessment, by type of institution experts assess the results of the UfM the most negatively while civil society representatives grade them above the average. By area of specialisation, the most critical respondents are those from the political and security field.

The UfM is poorly compatible with the objectives of the ENP. It offers a multilateral framework that lacks legitimacy and institutional credibility, compared with other initiatives.

French respondent

Again, the Arab Spring has brought the UfM to a standstill due to its close identification with the ancient regimes of the southern Med.

Greek respondent

The UfM suffered a tremendous blow in 2011 due to the events connected to the Arab Spring. In particular, it was completely discredited due to the fact that one of the Co-Presidents of the Union was the Egyptian former ruler, Hosni Mubarak. Another factor is connected to the total disregard for political dialogue and reform inside the UfM. This was a crucial mistake and a lost opportunity to understand the societal and political changes that have led to the Arab Spring.

Italian respondent

Il est certainement prématuré de parler des résultats obtenus. L’UPM est encore en phase de construction, avec un certain nombre de problèmes à surmonter pour asseoir sa légitimité et fédérer les partenaires autour de ses initiatives. Par ailleurs, la crise économique et financière actuelle a certainement fait évoluer les priorités annoncées depuis 2007 dans le cadre de l’UPM.

Moroccan respondent

The survival of the UfM through the current crises is an achievement in itself. Despite all these difficulties, including internal institutional ones, a number of projects are under way. The Mediterranean Solar Plan, the Gaza Desalination Facility and smaller projects in the field of gender equality are noteworthy examples.

Maltese respondent

When asked about the role of the UfM Secretariat in the Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture, the responses seem more positive, as the overall average is 5.2. By geographical areas, non-Mediterranean EU respondents (4.7) and Maghreb respondents (4.9) give a more negative grade while those from the Mashreq and Mediterranean EU respondents grade it more positively (5.4).

However, if we compare the overall results of 2011 with those of the 2010 Survey, we see that the positive perception of the results decreases, given that the grade on the role of the Secretariat has decreased in one year from 6.0 to 5.2. By geographical areas, grades are notably lower than one year ago, which seems to indicate that the Secretariat may no longer be considered a key institution in the Euro-Mediterranean process in the view of actors and experts. Nevertheless, the Secretariat of the UfM manages to maintain a slightly positive grade in overall answers and in the view of some groups, according to institutional affiliation, it will play a key role in the institutional architecture, as reflected by respondents from institutions linked to civil society who give an average grade of 6.1.
L’institution pourrait devenir opérationnelle, à condition d’être plus à l’écoute de l’opinion publique en Europe et au Maghreb. Peut-elle transgresser la bureaucratie de l’Union Européenne et faire valoir les relations avec le Sud?

Tunisian respondent

Puede desempeñar un papel importante, si refuerza su perfil técnico y es capaz de formular propuestas.

Spanish respondent

As long as the UfM Secretariat still depends on its relation with the governmental and political level and is reluctant to open discussion with civil society, the output will be limited. The Arab Spring shows the power of the community, and what we need is more discussion, cooperation and partnership between NGOs, civil society and parties and not between governments.

Egyptian respondent

The UfM Secretariat could play a key role but not by dictating how things should be, but by being a platform provider.

Turkish respondent

Moreover, question Q4 on whether the community institutions should assume the European co-presidency of the UfM (a decision which was finally adopted2 although after the fieldwork of the Survey) shows the highest level of agreement in this series of Surveys, as 73% of respondents support this change. Despite the large majority, we should point out that those with a lower percentage in favour are respondents from non-Mediterranean EU countries (66%) while the highest percentage corresponds to Turkish respondents (81%).

Graph 4: EU institutions should assume the northern co-presidency of the UfM, instead of the current system (one Member State from the North) (%)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

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2. In February 2012, the assumption by the European Commission of the co-presidency of the EU countries in the UfM was approved.
The two last questions of this block focus on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The first (Q5) asks respondents for an overall assessment of the ENP in 2011 and the average of the total of respondents is 4.85; in other words, very similar to that of the first question (overall assessment of EU initiatives) and above the assessment of the UfM. Moreover, they repeat the same pattern of differences by geographical area as in the first question, with Maghreb respondents assessing it most negatively. By type of institution, once again experts assess the ENP more negatively.

Graph 5: Monitoring the Progress and achievements of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean and of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011

(average on a scale of 0–10, where 0 stands for highly inadequate, and 10 for highly adequate)

- What is your global assessment of the EU initiatives towards its southern neighbours in 2011?
  - Average: 4.9

- What is your global assessment of the results achieved by the Union for the Mediterranean in 2011?
  - Average: 3.8

- Do you expect the Secretariat to play a key, moderate or negligible role in the new Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture in the near future?
  - Average: 5.2

- What is your global assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011?
  - Average: 4.9

- To what extent do you consider it necessary to create a new specific financial instrument devoted to the southern Mediterranean Partners only?
  - Average: 6.8

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey


French respondent

C’est un des rares outils de l’UE qui pourrait sortir renforcé des dernières révolutions arabes. Il a réussi, avec plus ou moins de succès, a intégrer dans ces plan d’action la quasi totalité des problématiques qui ont été à l’origine des révolutions en cours.

Lebanese respondent

En dépit de quelques signes envers le Maroc et la Jordanie, la PEV reste en deçà des espoirs initiaux et cette politique ne semble pas distinguer les pays liés à l’UE par des accords d’association et les autres pays de l’extrême Est de l’Europe et de l’Asie mineure, ce qui ne renforce pas la confiance des PSM à l’égard des initiatives européennes.

Algerian respondent
The second question (Q6) refers to the need to create a new financial instrument exclusively for MPCs. The average of the total of respondents is 6.8, and it would be even greater if it were not for the group of non-Mediterranean Europeans whose average remains at 5.4 while those of the remaining groups exceed 7. However, by type of institution, the highest percentages correspond to members of civil society and experts as well as those from the economic and socio-cultural field of specialisation.

Il est crucial de reconnaître la spécificité de l’enjeu euromed et de responsabiliser ses acteurs. Cela suppose des outils et même une institution financière de développement régional. Les enjeux sont de natures très différentes de ceux du Voisinage oriental. 

French respondent

It is very necessary because the united ENPI gives the MPCs the feeling that the eastern partners enjoy preferential treatment and advantages over them. Moreover, it is true that within the EU there are elements that favour the East over the South. In the wake of the Arab Spring it is a must to split the instrument into two separate ones as today the crises looming in the MPCs should give the latter greater priority in the realm of diverse assistance.

Israeli respondent

Either a new specific financial instrument or a clear separation/division between the southern and eastern partnerships’ financial budget so that they do not have to compete with each other.

Hungarian respondent

Most outstanding elements:

- Decrease of the overall assessment in relation to the previous Survey.
- The UfM below the ENP.
- UfM: “What results?” “Il y a trop de réunions et peu de résultats”.
- Prior approval of the co-presidency in the hands of the Commission.
- Need for a specific instrument for MPCs. (The importance of non-Mediterranean EU countries assessing it less positively.)
THEMATIC DOSSIER: NATIONAL POLITICS AND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS AFTER THE “ARAB SPRING” AND THE EURO-MED POLICIES ON THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION
I. NATIONAL POLITICS AND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS AFTER THE “ARAB SPRING”

The External Actor’s Role within the Region

Question Q7 asks for an assessment of the response of different international actors in terms of the uprisings on the southern shore. By comparing averages among these actors there are significant differences between groups of actors. Thus, only two achieve an average above 5, Turkey (5.9) and the European Union (5.4), and of the remaining only the US and the Arab League are above 4 (4.9 and 4.4, respectively). The remaining actors are graded negatively by all respondents: Gulf Cooperation Council (3.7), Saudi Arabia and China (2.9), Russia (2.8) and Iran (2.2).

Graph 1: Assessing the international response of the following actors to the uprisings in the Southern rim (average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis of the results by different groups of respondents yields interesting data. For instance, in the case of the assessment of the role of the Arab League, European respondents (both Mediterranean [5.0] and non-Mediterranean [5.3]), Turkish (4.5) and Israeli (4.4) grade it much more positively than respondents from Arab countries, both from the Maghreb (3.2) and the Mashreq (3.8). Arabs assess their own League more negatively. This does not occur in the assessment of the role of the EU as the differences between groups are very small, with the only notable exception being the lower assessment of Turkish and Maghreb respondents (4.9) in the distribution by geographical area or that of the group of experts (5.0) in comparison with the two other groups, with grades around 5.5. In the case of the assessment of the role of Turkey, there are few differences by geographical area, as all (except Israel) give an average
grade above 5, and in all these cases it is the option with the highest grade. It is also noticeable that the US is graded more negatively by the Arab countries (Maghreb and Mashreq) while the average for the remaining groups is above 5.

Among the actors with more negative grades there are few differences between the groups of respondents. Iran is graded more negatively by all groups, with 29% of respondents grading the response of Iran with a 0. Also noticeable is the high percentage of “Don’t know” answers for the cases of China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (over 18%), especially among European respondents.

Je pense que le rôle de Ligue arabe qui " aurait dû être important " a été défaillant. L'Iran et l'Arabie Saoudite ont soutenu des régimes totalitaires pour renverser des tyrans. La Chine et la Russie ont ménagé leurs clients. Seul la Turquie, en tant que pays du sud s'est franchement démarqué. Quant à l'Union européenne et les USA, même si en arrière plan l'intérêt majeur est de défendre leurs sources d'approvisionnement et conquérir de nouveaux marchés, leur soutien a été important pour chasser des dictatures familiales.

Algerian respondent

Las respuestas han sido diversas en función de los intereses de cada actor. La UE por su parte no siempre ha transmitido una imagen de unidad y se ha puesto de relevancia la primacia de intereses individuales de algunos países europeos.

Spanish respondent

Clearly, there is a geopolitical shift not only within the region but also of outside players. Turkey tries to use the window of opportunity to increase its role and, in doing so, it seems to alienate its recent allies. Russia is desperate to maintain its actions and positions in the case of Al-Assad, which is simply shameful. The Arab League is to be commended for taking an active role in Syria.

Lithuanian respondent

Le printemps arabe a été très divers, et les réponses des acteurs ont été multiples selon les cas. Si le rôle des USA et de l'UE a été décisif en Libye, cela n'a pas été le cas pour la Tunisie, l'Egypte ou le Bahreïn, par exemple. La Chine et la Russie ont été constamment des soutiens aux régimes en place, y compris actuellement en Syrie. Quant à l'Iran, à l'Arabie Saoudite ou au CCG, personne n'en attendait rien puisque chacun à sa façon est un acteur de conservatisme et même de régression politique.

Moroccan respondent

The Arab League came late, but was effective, e.g. in Syria. China reacted opportunistically; Iran aggressively, Russia opportunistically, and Saudi Arabia is biased (towards Sunni interests); Turkey supported the western stranglehold on Libya; the USA played an immensely strong role behind the scenes in mobilising democratic support.

Dutch respondent
The EU’s Role

Question Q8 asks respondents about the role of the EU in each of the MPCs during the Arab Spring based on four options: EU support for the changes; EU support for the regime in power; lack of impact of EU policies; and lack of an EU policy because of internal divergences.

Graph 2: Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”

The overall results show how respondents understand that the EU has behaved differently in terms of MPCs. On the one hand, we have the countries where most respondents consider the EU has supported the political change: Libya and Tunisia. In another block formed by Egypt and Syria, respondents are mainly divided between those who consider that the EU supported the change and those who believe that the EU has not had an impact on domestic politics. A third block of countries is formed by Morocco and Jordan, where, according to most respondents, EU policies have supported the continuity of the regime or, to a lesser extent, have had no impact. The fourth group of countries comprises Algeria and Lebanon, in which, according to most respondents, EU policies have had no impact or, to a lesser extent, have supported the continuity.1 Finally, there is the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories where respondents are divided between those who consider that there has been no impact (31%), that there has been no European policy as a result of internal divergences (29%) and that the regime in force has been preserved (26%).

A more detailed analysis of the results of each country, especially according to origin of respondents, shows interesting differences with respondents as a whole. In the case of Algeria, most EU respondents consider that the EU has had no impact on domestic politics (55%), especially non-Mediterranean respondents (63%), while for those from the Mashreq this option only amounts to 36% (although it is the majority) with high percentages in the three other options. For Maghreb respondents (including Algerians) it seems that there is a clear dichotomy between those who believe that there has been no EU impact (41%) and those who consider that it has supported the continuity of the regime (37%). As for Algerian respondents, the percentages are 45% and 36%, respectively.

1. Note that in these two countries a quarter of respondents did not know which option to choose.
Egypt has curious results as in all geographical groups used (except Turkey) respondents mainly consider that the EU has supported the political change, including Mashreq respondents (46%). However, when analysing only Egyptian respondents, their perception changes radically as most of them consider that the EU has not had any impact (48%). Finally, we should point out that, while civil society respondents consider that the EU has supported the political change (54%), those in the “political actors” group are divided between those who consider that the EU has supported the political change and those who consider that it has had no impact (39%).

Jordan offers some outstanding elements in the analysis by areas. Thus, respondents from the Mediterranean EU are equally divided between those who believe there has been no impact and those who consider that the EU has supported the continuity of the regime, while most Turkish respondents choose the option of no impact. The remaining groups reflect the distribution of the whole, in which the majority option was support for continuity, especially Mashreq respondents (56%).

In Lebanon, the results by groups are more stable and in all cases the option with the highest percentage is the lack of impact of the EU on domestic affairs. In any case, the highest percentage is for youths (57%) and EU respondents (54%).

In Morocco the main differences between areas are reflected in those who believe that the EU has supported the continuity of the regime (main option for the whole of the Survey) and those who consider that the EU has supported the political change. Curiously, Moroccan respondents themselves differ from the general trend as 36% choose the second option and 31% the first. Other outstanding results show that respondents from the Mashreq, Turkey and non-Mediterranean EU represent a percentage above 50% in the option of support for continuity while among Maghreb and Mediterranean EU respondents this percentage is closer to 40%.

The greater dispersion of answers is found in the question on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, as it is the only country for which the option of the lack of a joint position within the EU is significant. In fact, it is the second option (29%), almost equal to the first option (that there is no EU impact on domestic politics, with 31%) and the third (support for continuity, with 26%). This dispersion means that there are small but significant differences by groups. Thus, the option most chosen by Maghreb respondents is that of the divergence in the EU (38%), while for the Mashreq it is support for continuity (38%) and for Turks it is the lack of impact (41%). The same happens among northern respondents, as Mediterranean Europeans choose in the first place the lack of impact of the EU on domestic politics (38%) while non-Mediterranean European countries opt for the option that there is no EU policy owing to the divergences between EU member countries (32%).

Syria, whose overall results are marked by the dichotomy between those who consider that the EU has supported the political change and those who consider that it has had no impact, maintains this dichotomy in the results by geographical areas. However, it is interesting to note how the perception of Europeans that the EU policies have had no impact is much higher among respondents from the Maghreb, Turkey and, especially, the Mashreq, who mostly consider that EU policies have supported the political change.

Finally, in Tunisia, the majority position that considers that the EU policies have supported the political change does not essentially vary when analysing the results by groups. However, it is notable that Turkish respondents represent the greatest percentage of those who believe that European policy has had no impact on the domestic situation of Turkey or that the highest percentage of respondents who believe that the European policies have supported the established regime is found among Maghreb countries.
Implications of the “Arab Spring” for Euro-Mediterranean Relations

The Survey seeks to measure the impact of the uprisings on Euro-Mediterranean relations through the probability envisaged by respondents that there are three future scenarios (Q9): one which considers that the reforms planned in the Partnership and the ENP will increase; another that the increased homogeneity will yield greater dialogue and the consolidation of a Euro-Mediterranean community; and, finally, a scenario that considers that the fragmentation and heterogeneity will impede Euro-Mediterranean integration.

For all respondents, the most likely scenario is that of the acceleration of reforms (5.6) above that of consolidation (5.1) and fragmentation (4.7). If we compare the measures of the MPCs and the EU we see an inversion of the tendency between the two most unlikely scenarios while those of the MPCs maintain the distribution of the whole although with more accentuated differences: 5.4 for consolidation and 4.4 for fragmentation. European respondents consider these two scenarios almost equally unlikely: 4.8 for the first and 4.9 for the second.

In the analysis by regions, it is notable that Mashreq respondents consider the two optimistic scenarios more likely, with acceleration achieving an average of 6 and consolidation an average of 5.8. Maghreb respondents also assess the optimistic scenarios more positively but more moderately than the whole. In contrast, non-Mediterranean Europeans make a more unequal assessment as they consider that the pessimistic scenario (5.2) is more likely than that of consolidation (4.6).
The Future Role of the EU in the MPCs

Respondents were asked if the future role of the EU would have lower or greater impact than other actors in Mediterranean regional development (Q10). The overall results of the Survey show that the EU will have less impact than the US (59%) and Turkey (55%), similar to that of the Arab League and Saudi Arabia (52% and 48%) and a greater impact than China (64%), Iran (68%) and Russia (74%).

When the results are analysed by geographical areas there are significant differences. While for respondents from the Maghreb and Mashreq only the US will have a greater impact than the EU in the region, according to EU, Turkish and US respondents, the Arab League, Saudi Arabia and Turkey will have a greater or similar impact.

Graph 3: Degree of probability attributed to the following long-term scenarios regarding the potential impact of the uprisings on Euro-Mediterranean relations (average on a scale of 0-10)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

It is also notable that the Arab countries themselves attach little importance to the Arab League as both in the Mashreq and the Maghreb it is less positively assessed (only 26% and 32% of respondents from these countries, respectively, consider that it will have greater impact than the EU). Turkey’s impact also varies greatly according to the area of origin of respondents: those from the Maghreb are most negative (56% consider that the EU will have more impact), while those from the Mashreq and Turkey consider that it will have a similar impact to the EU’s (almost 50% for both options). Moreover, 57% of respondents from European Mediterranean countries consider that Turkey will have more impact than the EU while for European non-Mediterranean respondents this reaches 70%, far greater than the US obtains. Among the remaining actors, Turkish respondents make a much more positive assessment than the others of the impact of Russia and Iran while Maghreb respondents make the most positive assessment of China’s impact, although always below the EU’s.

All the above stated actors have bigger regional or global influence compared to the EU. What is more important is that they all have consolidated foreign policy and have a clear stand toward the issues that the EU does not have.

Bosnia and Herzegovina respondent

Yet the EU has to decide whether or not it wants to be a global actor. In the present economic recession it might be difficult for the EU to re-develop its Euro-Mediterranean policy. At this stage cultural actors can play a key role.

Turkish respondent

Saudi Arabia is highly biased towards Sunni interests and so is the US. Turkey is a wild card: it may turn against Europe on separation of state and religion issues, where it would then move away from the French example and become less attractive to the francophone sub-region.

Dutch respondent
**Most outstanding elements:**

- Turkey and Europe are the only actors that exceed the average of 5 in the assessment of the response to the uprisings. Turkey is the most positively assessed by all groups.
- Low confidence of the Arab countries in the role of the Arab League.
- Although, according to southern countries, the US is the most influential actor in the region, it is more positively assessed by respondents from European countries.
- Russia, China and Iran are the most negatively assessed, as is Saudi Arabia.
- Respondents consider that the position of the EU during the “Arab Spring” has depended on the country, with a “lack of coherence at regional level.”
- Internal divergences of the EU in the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
- Impact of the Arab Spring in Euromed relations: slight optimism thanks to a possible acceleration of the reforms.
- The Arab countries consider that the role of the EU will be more important than Europeans themselves. The US maintains its influence in the region.
- Turkey’s influence is more positively assessed by Europeans than by Arabs.

**II. THE EU RESPONSE TO CHANGES IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD**

**Priorities Identified by the European Commission and the High Representative**

There has been a notably positive reception of the measures carried out by the EU in response to the changes brought about by the Arab Spring in the region. In fact, questions about the assessment of the relevance of the priorities indicated in the *Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”* are graded between 7 and 7.5 and the programmes and actions of the *Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”* obtain a similar result.

**Other priority projects identified by respondents**

**Accès à l’eau, rétablir la confiance entre les citoyens et leurs régimes politiques, efforts à faire dans le domaine de l’éducation.**

*French respondent*

**Aider la société civile dans les pays ayant connu des soulèvements populaires qui malgré leur participation à ces changements sont la cible des nouveaux dirigeants. Apporter une aide pour le développement de la démocratie dans les pays où les changements politiques sont en hibernation.**

*Algerian respondent*

**Contribute to culture and citizenship (based on education and learning opportunities); demography played a key role in the 2011 uprisings; jobless development is the main challenge.**

*German respondent*

**Education and health are the secret words for the future of the region and unfortunately they are not yet or not sufficiently addressed.**

*Egyptian respondent*

**Key missing element in EU policy is a serious educational partnership with the Arab world, specifically targeting post-graduate research and education, rather than focusing on primary and secondary education. Joining education and research initiatives is highly desirable.**

*Egyptian respondent*
L'Europe aurait la possibilité d'engager des actions en matière culturelle, domaine radicalement absent, et dans les coopérations, et dans la plupart des politiques et agendas des états cités, notamment au Maghreb.

French respondent

Soutenir l’enseignement dans les pays du Sud. De la qualité de l’enseignement dépend l’avenir de ces pays.

Tunisian respondent

The focus should be on empowering women and youth. These two sectors of the societies have been instrumental in bringing change to their countries.

Maltese respondent

The most pressing priority is to avoid duplication and to adopt, as far as possible, country-specific approaches. The needs of Tunisia are completely different from the needs of Libya, for example.

Italian respondent

**Graph 4: Degree of probability attributed to the following mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean**

(average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobility – improve “visa facilitation”, conclude “Mobility Partnerships”, improve “people-to-people contacts”, “labour mobility” and enhance “students, researchers and business persons” mobility</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a European Neighbourhood “Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development”</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market access – “consider allowing partners that have a fully functioning independent judiciary, an efficient public administration and have made significant progress towards eradicating corruption, into the non-regulated area of the EU Internal Market for goods”</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a “Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility”, “designed to strengthen the capacity of civil society to promote reform and increase public accountability in their countries”; (€22 million)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclude and implement new “Neighbourhood Agreements”, as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 8 TEU), which will establish Deep and Comprehensive Free trade Agreements (DCFTA)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money – reallocating/refocusing additional financial resources to support democratic transitions, institution building, civil society and the socio-economic needs of the countries. For instance the loss of income from tourism in Egypt and Tunisia (SPRING Programme €350 million for 2011 and 2012</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a “European Endowment for Democracy” (to “help political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners”)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

**Most outstanding elements:**

- Responses from both southern and northern countries more or less equally assess the political response of the EU.
- The initiatives related to the improvement in the mobility of people and support for rural development are the two best assessed options.

The SPRING programme is another outstanding initiative that also has a positive assessment but does not enjoy the same support as previous ones, with grades around 5.6. Once again, the assessments by groups of countries are located around this average, with the only higher grade in the case of Israel (7.7).

This same trend is seen in the assessment of the first answers given in relation to the civil war in Libya at the level of humanitarian aid, consular cooperation, evacuations, civil protection and FRONTEX border operations.
Intervention by a number of EU countries may have brought a quick end to the conflict and thus spared suffering to the Libyan population. However, Libya may be a weak state, practically divided in several parts, for some time to come.

*Egyptian respondent*

This reinforced the feeling of double standards in the EU policies.

*Palestinian respondent*

Il n’ y avait pas de politique européenne en Libye mais plutôt des politiques selon les intérêts de chaque pays.

*Jordan respondent*

The EU's Role with Regard to Domestic Developments

The role that should be played by the EU in the domestic affairs of the MPCs is reflected in the answers to Q16, where four scenarios are suggested, which propose the following: a) "be very pro-active and interventionist", b) "remain neutral", c) "remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from the MPCs", and finally d) "make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties".

Answers received suggest that in all MPCs the scenario with the most outstanding percentage is the EU action of remaining cautious and working on the basis of the countries affected. This trend is different in the case of Occupied Palestinian Territories and Syria, where the preferred option, although with low percentage points, is the pro-active and interventionist role of the EU.

Graph 5: Assessment of the EU's role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries

Graph 5 shows a group of countries with fairly similar distribution of scenarios (Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria and Tunisia). In the case of Egypt and Libya, the percentage of responses in favour of a greater influence of the EU on extremist parties is higher and accounts for almost a third of responses. Finally, Syria and the Occupied Palestinian Territories also have a similar distribution of scenarios in which, as previously indicated, intervention dominates.
However, it is important to note that if we analyse the answers of the participants about their own country there is an appreciable difference with overall answers. Thus, the countries with a similar distribution of scenarios differ if we focus on the answers from the nationals of the country in question.

The majority scenario changes for Lebanon and Egypt, where a pro-active and interventionist EU role becomes the main scenario for Lebanese and Egyptian participants. The case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories is notable, where this scenario, already a majority in the overall answers, becomes the predominant answer.

Graph 6: Assessment of the EU's role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries

The majority scenario also changes substantially in Jordan where, based on the answers from Jordanians, the most outstanding scenario, with a third of answers, is the one that proposes an influential EU to avoid strengthening the extremist parties. This scenario is also notable, although without being a majority, in the case of the answers from Tunisian participants.

Graph 7: Assessment of the EU's role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Finally, it is notable in the case of Morocco and Algeria that the scenarios that emerge from the Survey overall are almost the same and, in their turn, the scenarios resulting from the answers of Algerians and Moroccans about their own country are also very similar.

Graph 8: Assessment of the EU’s role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

Most outstanding elements:

- The majority of respondents think the EU should remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs, except for Syria and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, where a majority of respondents call for a more pro-active and interventionist role of the EU.

- However, preferences change when respondents are asked about the role that the EU should play in their own countries. Respondents from Egypt and Lebanon call, for instance, for a more pro-active role of the EU in their respective countries.
EU Policy Response

The policy response that the EU should carry out varies according to a) “response towards countries failing to introduce democratic reforms” or b) “response towards countries implementing repressive measures against popular movements” or c) “repressive measures against women’s rights and gender equality”.

A common element is the low percentage of answers obtained for the option that proposes neutrality of the EU: around 13% in the case of answers concerning failure in the introduction of democratising measures, and 5% for the cases of responding to repressive actions.

Graph 9: EU policy response towards countries failing to introduce democratic reforms

Il faut soutenir les régimes démocratiques, et non chercher les intérêts de l’UE même dans le cas des dictatures, comme c’est le cas du soutien de l’UE du régime Ben Ali.

Moroccan respondent

Many things would need to be defined before being able to give an answer; in the case the EU wants to return to the EMP principle of negative conditionality then it needs to signal that it will apply this principle to all countries in the same manner.

German respondent

The EU would potentially be perceived as turning its back if remaining neutral.

Finnish respondent

Given the unsuccessful implementation of democratising measures, around 70% of answers consider that positive conditionality2 should be the political response of the EU. In the case of the answers from the Maghreb and Mashreq, this percentage is around 60%.

If we analyse the political responses to repressive measures, we find a balance between promotion and support measures for the reforms (positive conditionality) and restrictive and penalising measures (negative conditionality3). But in these questions others measures were also introduced that also obtained significant support.

2. Positive conditionality on the basis of the “more for more” approach: “The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU” and vice versa.

3. The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country: freezing of political dialogue, restrictive financial measures, suspension of the implementation of EU agreement, assistance is primarily used to “support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratization process in partner countries”…)
Therefore, given the repression of the people's movements, the promotion of sanctions at an international level was also added to the positive conditionality (26%) and negative conditionality (27%), making it the most chosen option (31%). It is interesting to focus on groups of countries, where we find a remarkable difference of options according to the region.

Les deux conditionnalités seraient à recommander en fonction des pays Med. Approche more for more pour ceux qui ont déjà entamé un processus de démocratisation et mesures restrictives pour ceux qui bloquent encore sur les fondamentaux.

Moroccan respondent

The “more for more” approach should be tempered by a flexible management, to avoid the weakest countries getting less help.

Italian respondent

Funding must always be linked to delivery. Countries showing results for EU support must be considered for further funding opportunities. This will encourage countries to develop projects showing concrete results. However, when considering more funds, the EU should not specify the budget that will be allocated to the country before getting from the country itself what is actually needed for reform, i.e. a project proposal for funding and not formulate a project based on the funds that will be given.

Lebanese respondent

Graph 10: EU policy response towards countries implementing repressive measures against popular movements

In the Mediterranean EU countries, the most outstanding option is the promotion of penalising measures, which with 42% of answers doubles the percentage that this option receives among the respondents from the Mashreq (21%). Here the most outstanding option is the use by the EU of positive conditionality. It is also notable in this comparison that, in the countries of the Maghreb, the experts and actors who have responded to the Survey opt for a balance between the conditionals (positive and negative) and sanctions, with negative conditionality as the most positively assessed political response of the EU. In any case, very middling grades are given to a fourth option that envisaged promoting the use of repressive measures in the framework of the UN Security Council.
Focusing on the political responses of the EU to repressive measures at the level of women’s rights and gender equality, there is a balance between the three options put forward. This balance is also repeated when comparing the answers from the North and South.

L’UE doit utiliser la conditionnalité positive : elle soutiendra ceux qui avancent. Mais elle ne doit pas se priver de critiquer et de dénoncer les manquements de certains pays récalcitrants dans l’application des règles démocratiques. Toutefois, elle ne doit priver les acteurs non-étatiques de ces pays de son soutien.

Belgian respondent

Allocating EU Support to Civil Society

In response to the question about how the EU should distribute aid to civil society, a majority of more than two thirds consider that the aid should be carried out independently of religious affiliation of the organizations. However, it should be noted that 25% of answers opt for only helping secular organizations, a percentage which is slightly higher in the countries of the South, approaching 30%.

The point is helping to develop citizenship, responsible action, a culture of non-corruption and accountability to the public and to parliament (if free and fairly elected); this is less an issue of secular versus religious but of professionalisms and democratic ethics.

German respondent

Aid should go to serious groupings implementing needed activities, bearing in mind that there is huge funding availed to religious groupings from elsewhere.

Egyptian respondent

Graph 11: Degree of probability attributed to the following mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean (average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>Rest of EU</th>
<th>Mediterranean EU countries</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Mashreq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU should give support to groupings regardless of their religious affiliation</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should also give support to groupings from the religious spectrum</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should only give support to groupings from the secular spectrum</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Most outstanding elements:

EU policy response to countries that implement repressive measures:
- A low percentage of respondents believe that the EU should remain neutral and not intervene in the internal affairs of MPCs, both with regard to countries that implement repressive measures against people’s movements (6% of respondents) and to those that implement repressive measures against women’s rights and gender equality (5%).
- The remaining responses are more or less equally distributed among “using positive conditionality”, “using negative conditionality” and “promoting the use of sanctions at international level”. EU respondents are more in favour of the use of international sanctions, while MPC respondents rather advocate the use of positive conditionality based on the “more for more” approach.

EU policy response to countries failing to implement democratic reforms:
- An overwhelming majority of respondents think that the EU should apply positive conditionality (67%).
- The options of remaining neutral or using negative conditionality have received a similar level of support (13% and 16%, respectively).

Allocating EU support to civil society:
- The majority of respondents think that the EU should give support to groupings regardless of their religious affiliation (64% on average) and about a quarter of respondents believe that the EU should only support groupings from the secular spectrum.

III. EUROMED POLICIES IN REGARD TO POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION

Assessment of the achievement of the general objective of the first pillar (Political and Security basket) of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration to establish an area of peace and stability shows with 3.3 that these objectives are still far from being considered achieved. It is particularly notable that around 60% of the responses received range from 0 to 3 on a scale where 0 stands for “not achieved at all” and 10 for “fully achieved”.

Graph 12: Perception of achievement of the general objective of the first Political & Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration “establishing an area of peace and stability” (average on a scale of 0-10)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
The comparison of this average at a regional level shows minimum differences, except in the case of European non-EU countries, in which the average is 4.8. Respondents from Mashreq countries, Israel and Turkey assess it slightly above this average. Non-EU Mediterranean countries and those from the Maghreb are slightly more critical.

Stability and peace was achieved (with the exception of Palestine) - though with limited direct consequence of the Barcelona Declaration, but at the expense of freedom, democracy and human rights.

British respondent

An area of peace and stability has not been set up. Proof is the conflicts in Libya and Syria as well as the protest in Greece and elsewhere against the outcomes of economic policies.

Egyptian respondent

Il s’agit de deux questions distinctes: la solution des conflits et la promotion des droits de l’homme. Dans le premier volet, l’action européenne a été quasi nulle, c’est-à-dire les principaux conflits qui existaient en 1995 sont toujours là et certains, comme le conflit israélo-palestinien, se sont même aggravés. Concernant la promotion des droits de l’homme, l’action européenne a été contradictoire puisqu’elle travaille avec des régimes autoritaires et en même temps soutient des réseaux de défense des droits de l’homme.

Belgian respondent

Beaucoup d’efforts sont à fournir, surtout au niveau du dialogue politique et la promotion des droits de l’homme.

Moroccan respondent

While there was little progress in this basket, the dialogue has been maintained. On the other hand, one may argue that the EU’s soft power had an effect on the Arab transformations (leaving out any direct effects of the Barcelona Process of 1995).

Maltese respondent

Durante muchos años algunos regímenes totalitarios de la región han gozado del apoyo de la UE, lo que ha contribuido a su larga duración en el poder y a la situación a la que se ha llegado actualmente.

Spanish respondent

To obtain a detailed assessment of the progress of the objective of the Political and Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, a filter question was prepared aimed at those who considered they have a clear perception of these objectives. As a whole, only 37% of respondents answered this block of questions. For this reason, any disaggregation must be carried out with due caution (the sub-sample is reduced to 259 people).
Among the objectives put forward in 1995 by the Partnership in terms of political and security cooperation, the most positively graded by 70% of respondents is “strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism”. In the opposed extreme, the objective which has not only not progressed (55%) but has regressed (36%) is “create a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction”.

The remaining objectives can be grouped based on two tendencies: those which are positively graded; that is, answers that consider that there has been progress exceed 50% (“strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism”, “fight organized crime and drug trafficking” and “strengthen political dialogue”) and answers where the percentage of negative answers (no progress or regression) exceed the positive ones (“promote regional security”, “respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination”, “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms”, and “develop the rule of law and democracy”).

Finally, it should be noted that the answers by North-South regional groups follow the same pattern with minimal differences in percentage terms.
Graph 14: Evaluating the progress achieved by the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme

Certains progrès ont été enregistrés dans les domaines de l’État de droit, du respect des droits de l’homme, de la lutte contre la criminalité organisée et la lutte contre le terrorisme, mais sur tous les autres, peu de progrès, voire même régression comme concernant le droit à l’autodétermination, la dénucléarisation, et la promotion de la sécurité régionale.

Belgian respondent

The EU’s role was negative not only in preserving the autocratic regimes (including Libya before sanctions period and after 2003) but also in protecting the nuclear power of Israel.

Syrian respondent

Le Moyen Orient est de plus en plus armé et certains pays arabes pensent déjà au nucléaire pour contrer la menace de leur voisin iranien.

Tunisian respondent

Some states such as Israel and Iran are still out of control. The rest are moving between democratic and autocratic states and hope to soon move to democracy.

Jordanian respondent

La politique de l’UE en matière de non prolifération est discriminatoire. L’amalgame que l’UE entretient entre terrorisme et résistance nationale brouille les jugements. L’UE maintient une confusion néfaste dans ses principes.

Tunisian respondent

This section also assesses the evolution of the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme. The tendency to negatively assess the progress of the priorities established 12 years ago also stands out. There is also a notable degree of ignorance, around 20% of “Don't know” answers, among experts and actors involved in Euro-Mediterranean policy indicating the need to strengthen communication on the programmes and action priorities.
As in the case of the Partnership objectives, there is also a disparity of grades according to the priorities assessed. The most positively graded is “foster the role of civil society”, where 61% of respondents consider there has been positive progress. In contrast, “enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions” is the option most negatively assessed with 63% (54% consider that there has been no progress and 9% regression).

It should be pointed out that both “extend political pluralism and participation by citizens” (with 57%) and “ensure freedom of expression and association” (51%) have positive grades, while for the remaining option there are slightly negative grades.

Graph 15: Evaluating the progress achieved by the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme

Source: Compiled by the IEmed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

Again, if we compare the answers by participants from the North and South, they follow a very similar pattern with almost unnoticeable differences.

Il y a des progrès dans certains pays mais sans nécessairement la contribution significative du Partenariat politique et de sécurité dans le cadre du Programme de travail quinquennal de 2005.

Turkish respondent

The EU should understand it has an ill-conceived policy towards the Mediterranean.

Polish respondent

Progress is mostly localised in northern African countries, especially Morocco. Progress needs to be compared against effort/resources spent.

Lebanese respondent

In the 2009 Survey, the priorities of “Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme” were also assessed. In the case of those priorities whose aim was to broaden political and citizen rights, the answers denote a substantial improvement in the appreciation of the evolution of these objectives (see graph 29).
If we focus on the priorities concerning the participation of civil society, the improvement of civil rights and gender equality, it progresses positively, although tenuously, in the first two cases and regresses in the case of “increase the participation of women in decision-making”, which involves putting special emphasis on strengthening the measures leading to improving equality in gender relations.

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Most outstanding elements:

- There is a clearly negative assessment of the achievement of the general objectives of the first pillar (Political and Security basket) of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration to establish an area of peace and stability.
- However, both for the objectives of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and the priorities of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme, there is a more nuanced assessment, with programmes and objectives seen more positively.
- Among the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, respondents consider that there has been a positive evolution in “strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism”, “fight organized crime and drug trafficking” and “strengthen political dialogue”.
- Among the priorities of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme, “extend political pluralism and participation by citizens” and “foster the role of civil society” are positively assessed.
- Comparing results from 2009 and 2011 for the priorities of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme, only the evolution of “increase the participation of women in decision-making” regresses.

Assessment of the Progress Achieved in the Multilateral Programmes on Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation

The question on the progress achieved in the multilateral programmes on political, justice, security and migration cooperation, supported through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), allows a double reading: a rather worrying one, if we consider the overwhelmingly high percentage of “Don’t know” answers (accounting for over 50% of the responses in all programmes and projects save for the Middle East Peace Process), and a more optimistic one, if we concentrate only on the respondents who do know about these initiatives, since all of them – excluding the Middle East Peace Process – have registered progress according to the majority.

In any case, the high percentage of “Don’t know” answers point to the increasing difficulty even for experts and specialized actors to keep track of the various initiatives being simultaneously launched – as already noted in the previous Survey. This should encourage policy- and decision-makers in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to enhance the visibility and dissemination of the EMP actions.

Graph 18: Assessing the progress achieved in the development of the following programmes and projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes and projects</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>No progress</th>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euromed Justice I and II</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuroMed Police II programme</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence-building measures, networks and facilities</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta Seminars for Diplomats</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuroMeSCo, Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euromed regional Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Facility under the ENP framework</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Overall, EuroMeSCo (the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission) stands out as the most successful initiative according to 62% of respondents, excluding the “Don’t know” answers. In terms of progress registered, the EuroMeSCo initiative is followed by the EuroMed Police II Programme (59%), the Malta Seminars for Diplomats (57%) and the Euromed Regional Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Manmade Disasters and the Governance Facility, both on an equal footing with 53% of the votes. In contrast with this globally positive assessment of EU initiatives, the Middle East Peace Process – which appears as the most well-known initiative with less than 30% of “Don’t know” answers – is the initiative where the least progress (if any at all) has been achieved. Actually, according to 33% of respondents (excluding the “Don’t know” answers) it has registered regression.

Looking in a little more detail at the figures factoring in the North/South dimension, some interesting differences come to the fore. Although the global assessment is quite homogeneous for the various programmes and projects, there are some elements which are worth noting. The first remark to make is that, based on the “Don’t know” answers, respondents from MPCs seem overall to be somewhat better informed about most of the existing initiatives than EU respondents – even if in both cases the number of “Don’t know” answers is overwhelmingly high. The second remark is that EU respondents tend overall to be a bit more positive regarding the progress achieved in the different initiatives, with the exception of the Governance Facility and Euromed Justice I and II, where the assessment of their southern counterparts is somewhat more optimistic.

In the framework of civil protection and regional cooperation, achievements have been reached in terms of national civil protection capacities, regional networking and community building, also promoted by partnership among institutions.

Italian respondent

Peace in the Middle East turned cold because there were no real efforts by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, Euromed states were not that involved or interested. The Middle East case has to be solved as it is so dangerous if left as it is. It will explode at any time with no warning and destroy a lot of hopes and values in the MENA and Euromed states.

Jordanian respondent

Graph 19: Assessing the progress achieved in the development of the following programmes and projects: Mediterranean Partner Countries
By regional groups, respondents from Israel seem relatively satisfied about the results achieved so far through the Middle East Peace Process (27.8% of them, excluding the “Don’t know” answers, believe that progress has been made), compared to their counterparts from the Mediterranean EU countries (20%), the rest of the EU (8.7%), the Mashreq (7.9%), Turkey (4.8%) and the Maghreb (only 4.6% see some progress in this initiative). However, it should be noted that when factoring in the “Don’t know” answers, responses from Israel are more or less distributed evenly across the 4 categories – namely, “progress”, “no progress”, “regression” and “Don’t know” –, whereas responses from the Occupied Palestinian Territories are mainly concentrated in “no progress” (42.9%) and “regression” (38.1%), while the proportion of “Don’t know” answers is significantly lower compared to Israel (9.5% and 25%, respectively). Finally, in contrast to the rather disappointing general perception of the progress of the Middle East Peace Process initiative, respondents from non-EU countries offer a fairly positive outlook (61.5% of them – excluding the “Don’t know” answers – think it is a successful initiative in which progress has been achieved).
With reference to EuroMeSCo, namely the EU initiative having received the best overall assessment, there are a couple of elements which are worth noting. EU countries are generally more optimistic about the results this project has yielded so far than MPCs (respectively, 65% and 58%). The latter consider instead the EuroMed Police II programme to strengthen police cooperation between the EU and the MPCs as the most successful EU initiative (60%). Within MPCs, Turkey stands out as the most optimistic country regarding the progress achieved by EuroMeSCo (76.5% excluding the “Don’t know” answers). However, it should be noted that the number of “Don’t know” answers from Turkish respondents to this question is alarmingly high (57.5%), which points to a clear lack of information/understanding about this project by most respondents from this country. Finally, also notable is the positive assessment of the EuroMeSCo network by respondents from non-EU countries (88.9% excluding “Don’t know” answers, which are also quite numerous, accounting roughly for 55% of total responses from this regional group). As a more general remark, respondents from non-EU countries tend to be more positive about the progress achieved in each of the different EU initiatives than respondents from the other regional groups.
Most outstanding elements:

- 2 possible readings of the assessment of the progress achieved in the multilateral programmes on PJSMC: a worrying one, given the high number of “Don’t know” answers due to a lack of information on the initiatives; and a more positive one considering only the answers from well-informed respondents, since a majority of them think that some progress has been made in all the initiatives excluding the Middle East Peace Process.
- EuroMeSCo stands out as the most successful initiative overall (considering both responses from the EU and MPCs, though EU respondents are comparatively more hopeful).
- The Middle East Peace Process, despite being the most well-known initiative, is the worst assessed by respondents.
- Overall, MPC respondents are better informed about the existing initiatives than their EU counterparts – even if the percentage of “Don’t know” answers remains high in both cases.
- EU respondents seem overall more optimistic about the results of the various initiatives than MPC respondents.
- On the Middle East Peace Process, only respondents from non-EU countries make a positive assessment of the initiative. Israeli respondents are also somewhat positive compared to the general disappointing perception from the other regional groups.
Potential Hypotheses in the Medium and Long Term in the Mediterranean (in a Status Quo Scenario)

In question 26 respondents were asked to rank a number of hypothetical scenarios occurring in the Mediterranean in the medium to long term using a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being a highly probable scenario provided that there are no changes in the status quo. The rise of legal and irregular migration from MPCs to Europe was identified by respondents as the most probable factor intensifying social tensions and xenophobia in Europe, with an average of almost 7. Migration issues were immediately followed by water scarcity and population and employment pressures as main sources of conflicts and social unrest in the Mediterranean, with an average grade of 6.8 and 6.8, respectively. Surprisingly, the Arab-Israeli conflict, which ranked second as most probable scenario in the medium to long term in the Mediterranean in the 2009 Survey (see graph 2), comes only in ninth position in the present Survey. Such a remarkable regression is probably explained by the Arab uprisings last spring, which have shifted the order of priorities in the Mediterranean basin, while downplaying the significance of the conflict.

Graph 1: Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean (average on a scale of 0-10)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Graph 2: Degree of probability attributed to the following mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean (average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular migration from originating MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tensions</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>9th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime change will become the rule in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political regimes in MPCs will show a high degree of continuity</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council members will facilitate a higher degree of South-South economic cooperation in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>11th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The increased level of migration, economic and human exchanges will give way to the emergence of a common Mediterranean identity</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>12th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

The second set of most probable hypotheses are that “women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs” (6.4), followed by two gloomier hypotheses that “the current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period” (6.2) and that “environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States” (6.1). All in all, the hypotheses of a more optimistic outlook, save for the increasing participation of women in socioeconomic and political life, correspond to the least probable scenarios, namely that “the free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity” and that “MPCs will converge in the long term to EU levels of income”, each of which was given an average probability of 5.7 and 4.6, respectively.

By geographical region, it is important to note that respondents from the Mashreq consider it comparatively more probable that “population and employment pressures in the MPCs will increase and create social tensions”, that “regime change will become the rule in the Mediterranean” and that “water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions” (on average, 7.3, 6.6 and 7.3, respectively) than their Maghreb counterparts (6.45, 6.1 and 6.7, respectively). Israeli respondents also show strong support for the former scenario (7.6), while, together with Turkish respondents, they seem on average a little more sceptical about regime change becoming the rule in the Mediterranean (5.8 and 5.7, respectively).
Again, on the issue of migration and free movement of goods and workers the perceptions of the Mashreq and Maghreb respondents seem to differ notably. Maghreb respondents give an average prediction grade of 6.9 to the suggested scenario of "irregular migration from MPCs to Europe continuing to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose", whereas their Mashreq counterparts give it a lower average prediction grade of 6.6. Israeli respondents also point at this scenario as a highly probable one (7.8). Maghreb respondents also consider it comparatively more probable that "the free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean" than respondents from the Mashreq region and from Israel (6.9, 6.6 and 5, respectively). In contrast, the hypothesis that an "increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe" seems more plausible to Mashreq and Israeli respondents (7.2 and 7.7, respectively) than to their Maghreb counterparts (6.7). All in all, it can be argued that Maghreb respondents overall have a more optimistic opinion about the mid- to long-term scenarios in the Mediterranean area.

Finally, the open-ended questions, where respondents were given the opportunity to add their comments or further develop their views, partly confirm the outcome of the quantitative analysis, the rise of migration and the impact of the economic crisis being the two main factors leading to social tensions in the Mediterranean in the years to come.

La crise, plus que l’immigration - qu’elle soit légale ou non - est le facteur majeur d’intensification des tensions sociales et de la xénophobie, autant en Europe que dans les PPM.

Moroccan respondent

For migration and xenophobia I think that education (by introducing the concepts of rights of migrants and benefits they bring to the receiving societies) and raising the level of public awareness on both sides should be the focus of attention in the coming period.

Egyptian respondent

It is very difficult to tell as the Mediterranean basin is in transition and a lot depends on the quality and the speed of the process. A more concerted effort between EU member states, Euromed states and globally for a fast track development of the region will make a difference and then I would rate the above hypothesis more positively; at the moment globally all states are more concerned with how to survive the financial crisis and the consequences for their domestic affairs.

Maltese respondent

La questions migratoire est d’une actualité brûlante et sera l’épine dorsale qui conditionnera aussi le futur des relations entre les pays riverains de la Méditerranée.

Tunisian respondent

**Most outstanding elements:**
- The increasing relevance of migration issues versus the notable loss of significance of the Arab-Israeli conflict since the first Survey in 2009.
- Maghreb respondents give an overall more optimistic outlook for the prospects/scenarios in the Mediterranean than respondents from the Mashreq.
- Despite ranking only sixth in the most probable mid-/long-term scenarios, the economic crisis is very likely to shape the dynamics in the Mediterranean according to the open-ended responses.
Implications of the Palestinian Application for UN Membership

When asked about the implications of the Palestinian application for UN membership, the majority of respondents believe that it will have a comparatively more positive impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations than on Arab-Israeli conflict dynamics. When looking specifically at the distribution of responses, it is worth noting that, on a scale of 0 to 10 — 10 being the most positive assessment —, almost 40% of responses regarding the implications for Euro-Mediterranean relations are concentrated at 8 (18%) and 5 (18%). The distribution of responses regarding the implications on the Arab-Israeli conflict matches the previous distribution, with 14% and 15% of the answers concentrated, respectively, at 8 and 5, namely that the Palestinian application for UN membership has had or will have either a very positive or a relatively positive impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

By geographical distribution, respondents from Turkey and the Maghreb countries give a positive assessment of the impact of the Palestinian application for UN membership on Arab-Israeli conflict dynamics, with average grades of 6.8 and 6.7, respectively, well beyond the Survey mean (5.8). Respondents from the Mashreq and from the EU-27 also give a rather positive assessment of the Palestinian UN application on the dynamics of the conflict, though more moderate (5.6 for both). In contrast, respondents from Israel and in particular from European non-EU countries think that this will have a negative impact on the conflict dynamics (4.4 and 4, respectively).
Graph 4: Assessment of the implications of the Palestinian application for UN membership on:
(average on a scale of 0-10)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

As for the implications for Euro-Mediterranean relations, Turkey and the Maghreb appear again as the most “optimistic” regions (with 7.4 and 7.8 as average grades, respectively), immediately followed by the broader category of MPCs (7.3) and respondents from the Mashreq, on the borderline of the Survey mean with an average grade of 6.95. Respondents from Israel remain moderate about the impact of the Palestinian UN membership application on Euro-Mediterranean relations, with an average grade of 5.5 — again below the Survey mean, yet slightly more optimistic than concerning its impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict (4.4). In contrast, the European non-EU countries, which were deeply pessimistic about its impact on the dynamics of the conflict (4), are fairly positive about its implications on Euro-Mediterranean relations (6.7).

Most outstanding elements:

• Turkey and Maghreb respondents are, on average, more optimistic about the impact of the Occupied Palestinian Territories’ application for UN membership, both on the Arab-Israeli conflict dynamics and on Euro-Mediterranean relations than their counterparts in the Mashreq.

• Israeli respondents and respondents from European non-EU countries are quite pessimistic about the implications that this action will have on the conflict dynamics. In turn, the latter are positive about its implications on Euro-Mediterranean relations.

The Role of the EU in Conflict Resolution in the Mediterranean and Potential Successes in the Near Future

On the probabilities of conflict resolution in the Mediterranean basin in the near future, respondents seem to be quite negative overall, all the more so with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Figures speak for themselves. On a scale from 0 to 10 — 10 being the highest score in terms of probability —, respondents have graded with an average of 2.2 the chances that this conflict will be solved in the near future. By geographical distribution, EU countries appear as slightly less pessimistic on average (2.3) than their southern neighbours (2.2), but the figures altogether remain extremely negative.
Looking more specifically at the regions, only respondents from Israel (3.2), from European non-EU countries (3.2), from Mediterranean EU countries (2.7) and from Turkey (2.5) seem less pessimistic about the prospects for an early resolution of the Arab-Israeli long-lasting conflict but figures remain very negative.

The conflict in Western Sahara seems to raise somewhat higher expectations of resolution in the near future, at least compared to the previous one, even though the overall assessment remains fairly pessimistic (3.5 on average). In contrast with the previous conflict, this time MPCs are more “optimistic” than their northern counterparts (an average of 3.9 and 3.2, respectively). Compared to the distribution of answers of the previous conflict, here the average grades per region are more homogeneous and fluctuate more closely around the mean (3.5). In this respect, the average assessment given by respondents from European non-EU countries (4.8), which can be seen as a rather “hopeful” outlook, appears as an outlier to the distribution.
Last but not least, the conflict in Cyprus seems to be, according to the figures, the one with better prospects for a resolution in the near future, even if the overall assessment still remains negative (3.8, on average). There are no big differences based on geographical distribution, the average perception of MPCs (4.0) being slightly more “positive” than the one from EU countries (3.8). The differences are not very significant either when looking more specifically at the various regions – the average grades showing very little fluctuations around the Survey mean. Only respondents from Israel, from European non-EU countries and from the Mashreq seem to be slightly more “hopeful” about the prospects for a near resolution of this conflict than the overall average, with averages of 4.6, 4.6 and 4.1, respectively.

Finally, the question on the role that the EU should play in conflict resolution in the Mediterranean basin has generated a unanimous response, namely that the EU should be more involved in the resolution of the abovementioned conflicts. An overwhelming majority of respondents from all the regional groups agree with such an opinion – respondents from the
Mashreq countries being the most unanimous of all the groups in terms of support (97.2%), while respondents from European non-EU countries appear comparatively as the “least” enthusiastic (85%).

Graph 9: The EU should play a greater role in conflict resolution in the Mediterranean Area (%)  

On a more general note, when looking at the open-ended responses, two main criticisms about the current role of the EU in conflict resolution in the Mediterranean stand out: first and foremost, that the EU still lacks a common foreign policy and, thus, a coherent strategy towards its southern partners (i.e. the ability to speak with “one single voice”), and secondly, that the EU is not always perceived as an impartial partner in the region, this diminishing its chances of having a real influence in its conflicts. As some respondents point out, if these shortfalls persist, the EU runs the risk of losing its influence in the region to the benefit of other more pro-active actors.

À condition qu’elle se donne une politique extérieure commune et qu’elle fasse de la résolution de ces conflits, notamment celui qui oppose l’Algérie au Maroc à propos du Sahara, des éléments moteurs pour une intégration effective au sud.  

Moroccan respondent

Il faudrait déjà avoir une politique étrangère commune et une vision commune.  

Lebanese respondent

Provided it plays a role of an honest broker not siding with one partner in a conflict against the other. It should do so in conjunction with the US and not adopt policies that cater to Soviet and Chinese influences in the area.  

Israeli respondent

The EU already pumps a considerable amount of money into initiatives, but its political positions are often incoherent and unstable over time. If the EU is to have more influence, then it needs to articulate and sustain a strategy that reflects European perceptions and interests.  

Belgian respondent
Provided it is not prejudiced in favour of one party against the other, namely for Palestine.
Lebanese respondent

But the EU needs to become a much more capable foreign policy actor first, and the EEAS needs to work better.
Swedish respondent

**Most outstanding elements:**

- Overall extremely bleak picture regarding conflict resolution in the Mediterranean – the Arab-Israeli conflict being the one with the least chances of finding a solution in the near future. More encouraging prospects for the conflict in Cyprus.
- EU countries seem a bit less pessimistic overall than MPCs about a near resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- In contrast, MPCs are a little more optimistic than EU countries regarding the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict and of the conflict in Cyprus.
- There is a unanimous call for a more pro-active role of the EU in conflict resolution in the Mediterranean.

**The EU's Future Role in the Mediterranean Compared to Other Actors**

When asked about the role that the EU will play in the Mediterranean in comparison to other external and regional actors, a significant majority of respondents (74%) believe that it is going to have a greater impact than its Eastern neighbour Russia. A prominent majority also thinks that the EU will be a more relevant actor to the region than Iran (68%) and China (64%). However, compared to other important regional powers, the role of the EU seems to be more balanced (48%, 52% and 45% of respondents believe that the EU will have a bigger impact on regional developments than, respectively, Saudi Arabia, the Arab League and Turkey). Finally, according to the outcome of this Survey, the US will continue to exert a stronger influence in the regional dynamics than the EU, with almost 60% of respondents supporting this.

Yet the EU has to decide whether or not it wants to be a global actor. In the present economic recession it might be difficult for the EU to re-develop its Euro-Mediterranean policy. At this stage cultural actors can play a key role.

Turkish respondent

It all depends on how long in the future we dare to look. In terms of regional cooperation I don’t think that China, Iran, Russia or Saudi Arabia will have that much to bring to the table, but that does not mean that these actors will impact developments and relations among other actors in the region. The US will probably have less and less to say, but it will still be a very influential actor in the future as well.

Swedish respondent

The regional powers which also share the Islam religion have various influences on the Mediterranean Partner Countries which cannot be entirely assessed. It is, however, obvious that the EU has more impact due to its geographical situation, its historic links, etc., than any other country outside the region (Russia, China). The US has of course an enormous impact on the Middle East conflict situation and thereby on many other aspects of the developments in the region via its support to Israel.

Dutch respondent
When taking the North/South dimension into account, some noteworthy variations concerning the relative role of the different actors in the region come to the fore. Though the overall picture remains the same — the US continuing to have stronger influence than the EU in the years to come, while Iran, Russia, China and the Arab League are expected to have comparatively much less influence according to both EU and MPC respondents —, there are some noticeable changes regarding the relative weight of some actors. For instance, respondents from MPCs predict a more prominent role of the EU in the region compared to Turkey, Saudi Arabia or the Arab League, while they slightly increase the relative influence of Russia. By countries, it is striking that Israel is the only country with a majority of respondents considering that Iran is going to have a stronger impact in the region than the EU.

Israeli respondents also attribute greater weight to the influence of Russia in the region compared to the general average of MPCs, even though they still consider the EU as playing a comparatively stronger role. Respondents from EU countries seem, on the contrary, more moderate about the role of the EU compared to the regional actors and give more relative weight to Turkey, Saudi Arabia and to the Arab League. Moreover, they further emphasise the stronger leverage of the US compared to the EU, while they minimize the relative influence of Russia.

Graph 10: Assessing the EU’s future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors. Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to: (MPC respondents)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey.
Graph 11: Assessing the EU’s future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors. Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to: (EU respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Less Impact</th>
<th>More Impact</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

Les échanges avec l’UE sont de loin supérieurs qu’avec chacun de ces pays. L’aide au développement est la plus importante pour la majorité des pays du sud. […] Enfin l’UE est perçue comme la plus respectueuse des structures politiques des nations. Sur un plan, il se peut que les faveurs aillent à l’un ou l’autre de ces pays, ou organisations. Mais dans l’ensemble il est difficile de supplanter l’UE.

Lebanese respondent

L’influence américaine et européenne dans la région semble s’équilibrer et aller dans le même sens, avec tout de même plus d’Amérique à l’Est de la Méditerranée et plus d’UE à l’Ouest. Quant à l’influence de la Turquie, elle semble boostée par la référence faite de plus en plus fréquemment au « modèle turc » notamment par des partis portés récemment par des élections comme celles qui ont eu lieu en Tunisie et au Maroc et qui ont mis au devant de la scène les partis islamistes d’Ennahda et du PJD.

Moroccan respondent

La Chine est très présente sur le plan économique, mais a moins d’influence politique que l’UE. Pays très conservateur, l’Arabie Saoudite, malgré de petits progrès récents, n’encourage pas la démocratie dans les autres pays arabes. L’UE a moins d’influence que la Turquie dans le monde arabe et l’on peut se demander si l’UE n’a pas d’intérêt à accélérer son intégration.

French respondent

Les changements en cours dans le monde arabe ne risquent pas de bouleverser la configuration des rapports de forces en cours. On assistera à un rôle accru de la Turquie, mais les acteurs traditionnels comme l’Arabie saoudite les, États-Unis continueront à peser de tout leurs poids sur les dynamiques régionales et locales.

Algerian respondent
Most outstanding elements:

- Overall, the EU is expected to play a much stronger role in the region than Russia, China and Iran, while its role is seen as more balanced/moderate when compared to the one played by other regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey or the Arab League.
- When considering the geographical dimension, some differences concerning the relative weight of some actors come to the fore: while MPCs attribute a greater role to the EU compared to other regional powers, respondents from the EU are more moderate about their role and give more relative weight to the regional actors (Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League).
- MPCs give Russia a stronger weight in the region — even if it is still expected to have less influence than the EU —, while respondents from the EU give it a minor role (i.e. the country exerting the least influence in the region).
- Israel is the only MPC country with a majority of respondents giving Iran a stronger role in the region compared to the EU.

Role of Political Islam and Prospects of Sustainable Democracy in the New Mediterranean Landscape

On the question about the prospects of sustainable democracy in the southern Mediterranean neighbours’ responses are quite varied depending on the country in question. Tunisia is by far the country with the best prospects for following a sustainable democratic path (with an average prediction of 6.75 on a scale of 0 to 10 — 10 being the most positive grade), followed by Lebanon and Morocco (on equal footing with an average of 5.63), Egypt (5.09) and Jordan (4.94). With average predictions of 3.86 and 3.48, respectively, Algeria and Syria are seen as the two countries with the lowest probabilities of developing sustainable democracies, even far below the chances of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (4.74) and of Libya (4.37).

Graph 12: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in the following countries
(average on a scale of 0-10)

When looking specifically at the distribution of responses to the prospects of democracy in each of the countries by regional groups, there are some commonalities which are worth noting. First of all, respondents tend to be over-optimistic about the prospects of democracy in their own countries compared to the general perception (see for instance Morocco, the Palestinian Occupied Territories and Syria in the graphs below) – an exception is made for Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia, where the Survey mean is higher than the average assessment given by their respective nationals.¹

¹. Note that there is no average assessment grade from Libyans about the prospects of a sustainable democracy in their country. This is due to a lack of a critical mass of respondents from that country which could be considered as representative.
Graph 13: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in:
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very improbable and 10 for very probable)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
The second feature which stands out in most of the graphs is the overall comparatively positive assessment of the prospects of sustainable democracies in the different MPCs given by Turkish and European non-EU respondents — an exception is made for the democratic prospects of the Palestinian Occupied Territories and of Tunisia in the case of European non-EU respondents, and of Morocco and Tunisia in the case of Turkish respondents, in which cases the Survey mean is higher than the average assessment given by them. The case of Tunisia is particularly notable in this regard, as respondents from all other regional groups have assessed the democratic prospects of this country quite positively with average grades over 6, all of them well above the average grades given by respondents from Turkey and from European non-EU countries.

Finally, one last salient feature which stands out in the figures is the comparatively positive assessment of Israel concerning the prospects of democracy in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (5.1), well beyond the Survey mean (4.7) and only below the Palestinian respondents' own assessment (6.3) and the average assessment provided by respondents from the Mediterranean EU countries (5.8).
Après la phase de découverte de la démocratie et l’engouement pour les tendances « islamistes », avec un effort de sensibilisation, d’éducation et de formation, la démocratie durable s’imposera inévitablement, c’est une question de temps et de formation.

Moroccan respondent

Unfortunately, the concept of democracy in the Arab countries does not exceed 10%. We need to educate in all areas of life to establish the concept of democracy, and this is the responsibility of educational and cultural institutions, and that is the responsibility of the state and by allowing for the establishment of political parties to compete for government.

Jordanian respondent

At this early stage, one can only be optimistic and hopeful. Success depends on the decisions which will be taken later. However, this is a historical paradigm shift among the Arab peoples and change is inevitable. The process of change is, however, very slow and any attempt at expediting reforms would be counter-productive.

Maltese respondent

En dehors des deux pays ayant une expérience démocratique (Palestine-Liban), pour l’instant seule la Tunisie a réuni les conditions politiques ; en Égypte le jeu est brouillé par l’armée aux commandes ; en Libye la situation n’est pas encore claire.

Egyptian respondent

Les situations sont très variables et les transitions seront encore longues avant d’atteindre une situation de stabilité politique et institutionnelle normalisée (hormis peut-être pour la Tunisie, Maroc et Palestine). La dégradation de la situation socio-économique est un facteur, dans le contexte actuel, favorable aux partis islamiques et islamistes

Belgian respondent

Regardless of the democratic outlook in the various MPCs, political Islam – the winner of the Tunisian, Moroccan and Egyptian elections, and more generally of the Arab Spring – is deemed to play a key role in the Mediterranean landscape according to respondents from all regional groups. On a scale from 0 to 10 — 10 standing for “key role” and 0 standing for “negligible role” —, respondents have assessed the future role of political Islam with an average grade of 7.28. In other words, they expect political Islam to play a very important role in the region in the coming years. When examining the responses on this issue per regional group, Israel appears clearly as the country whose respondents expect political Islam to play the greatest role in the Mediterranean basin (8.54). The second regional group to consider that political Islam will exert a strong influence in the region in the years to come is the one composed of respondents from the “Rest of the EU” (7.79), immediately followed by the group of respondents from the EU-27 (7.64) and from the Mediterranean EU countries (7.48). Respondents from the Maghreb, from Turkey and from European non-EU countries seem in contrast somewhat more moderate about the role of political Islam in the region, giving it average prediction grades of 6.49, 6.95 and 5.58, respectively — all of them below the Survey mean.

2. The label “Rest of the EU” embraces the following EU countries: Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the UK, Ireland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria — in other words, the non-Mediterranean EU countries.
Graph 14: Political Islam’s role in the future Mediterranean landscape

On the other hand, the information provided in the open-ended questions matches the conclusions of the quantitative analysis in that most respondents agree that moderate political Islam has been the clear winner of the Arab Spring and will continue to play a prominent role in the region. The fact that the majority of respondents expect political Islam to play an important role in the coming years does not, however, mean that they are necessarily enthusiastic about this change in the political Mediterranean landscape. Actually, several respondents seem quite wary about the current so-called “moderate” tradition of political Islam being overridden in the long run by a more fundamentalist doctrine. To counter this, some argue that the best policy is to offer support to the newly-elected Islamic governments, rather than trying to isolate them, as this would only make matters worse. Some others point at the Turkish example as a model for democracy in the Arab countries. The following quotes exemplify such views:

Les scores électoraux réalisés par les islamistes sont éloquents – la meilleure politique consisterait à soutenir et accompagner la démocratie « islamiste » plutôt que la provoquer. Se déclarer hostile aux islamistes au pouvoir les renforcera avantage.
Moroccan respondent

Existe un apoyo notable al Islam político debido a la aceptación y popularidad interna de la cual goza dicho sector que se traduciría en estabilidad interna por un tiempo. Y lo más seguro es que será necesario para el cambio en los países de la zona.
Spanish respondent

L’Islam politique jouera un rôle clé ; la réussite du modèle turc est un exemple que veulent suivre les pays du Sud, entre modernité et islam.
Tunisian respondent

Political Islam will be key in most countries in the region, but it will not be fundamentalist Islam. Al Qaeda has played no role at all and is conspicuous by its absence in the debate in every country. The Salafists in Egypt are in a minority and will remain so. Moderate Political Islam, with Turkey as a model, will be the dominant force, but with significant variation country by country.
British respondent
En dépit du vent en poupe qu’a actuellement le courant dit islamiste modéré, les partis qui se réclament de cette mouvance connaîtront des difficultés certaines dans la gestion des affaires publiques et seront sous la pression et les exigences de cercles islamistes plus radicaux. Je ne pense pas qu’il existe un islam politique modéré dès que des partis s’engagent dans la lutte pour le pouvoir. Il y a cependant un islamisme modéré et un islamisme extrémiste dans la pratique religieuse et dans la conception du projet de société.

Algerian respondent

**Most outstanding elements:**

- Tunisia is the country with the best prospects for democracy, while Algeria and Syria are seen as the countries with the lowest probabilities of following a sustainable democratic path.
- Respondents tend to be over-optimistic about the prospects of democracy in their own countries compared to the general perception (i.e. the Survey mean) – exception made for Jordanian, Lebanese and Tunisian respondents, who tend to be more moderate.
- Overall comparatively positive assessment of the democratic prospects in all MPCs given by Turkish and European non-EU respondents – exception made for the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Tunisia in the case of European non-EU respondents, and for Morocco and Tunisia in the case of Turkish respondents.
- Positive assessment of Israeli respondents about the prospects of democracy in the Occupied Palestinian Territories compared to the general perception.
- Regardless of the democratic prospects in each of the MPCs, political Islam (in its “moderate” approach) is expected to play a key role in the coming years according to respondents from all regional groups.
CONTEXT, PATTERNS AND NUANCES IN MONITORING THE PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (EMP) IN 2011

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Introduction

As with every survey, the socio-political background within which answers to questions are given and articulated matters. Although apparently far from over, the events of 2011 constituted a particularly challenging period for the Mediterranean. The strong wind of societal pressure for regime change blowing and affecting many countries across the southern Mediterranean, in close proximity to the European Union, has impacted significantly in many respects and challenged a number of myths: the myth of security and stability versus democracy and human rights, the myth that the “Arab world is immune to democracy” and, last but not least, the myth of Arab women being restricted to the walls of their houses. Evidence suggests though that the demise of the old regime is only the first step on a long and difficult journey towards freedom and a better life to which people aspire. In the northern Mediterranean a soaring public debt has given rise to questions about the viability of the Eurozone and the state of their economies. Overshadowing more or less all other matters, austerity packages have sparked waves of social protest and also, in some cases, political realignment. Given these contextual parameters, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), and more specifically the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM), and the southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) have inevitably suffered.

Taking a further step back, however, problems started earlier than 2011. A great deal of the current pessimism and disappointment about the EU’s Mediterranean policy initiatives are deeply rooted in these initiatives’ very nature and beginning, while others constitute political traits of the project that are more recent but still prior to 2011. As Bicchi (2011) suggested “the UfM was launched because a very small group cajoled an uninterested majority into yet another initiative for the Mediterranean,” while the “Arab-Israeli conflict has politicized and disrupted the agenda of the UfM, as national interests have come to the fore and democracy and human rights have receded.” In addition, the EU’s glorious announcements of a new era of Euro-Mediterranean relations became more sporadic, the language of important politicians on immigration became more strict and provocative and hands-on activity has decreased throughout the past years albeit with a more significant drop arriving in 2011.

Therefore, the overall gloomy picture that can be drawn from the results of the first six questions of the 2011 EuroMed Survey (variations notwithstanding) can be easily rationalized with reference to context — regional, international, political, economic, electoral — and structure. But, while the more specific results must not detract from this general reality, they do raise
some more nuanced points. These concern both the architecture and underlying factors of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the decisions and actions of given countries and EU institutions. In this paper we consider them in some depth.

A Comment on Aspects of the Gloomy Picture

Overall, the level of disenchantment with various aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is very high. The overall picture drawn from the responses in the Survey can be justifiably called gloomy in a triple sense:

1) Substantively, since the grades are low (slightly below or above 5/10), with the exception of the question regarding the potential creation of a new financial instrument devoted to the southern Mediterranean partners only;

2) Relatively, since the grades are lower than in the previous two Surveys;

3) Distribution-wise, since negative grades have a more or less equal territorial distribution. Importantly, negative responses do not only come, and not even mostly, from the southern Mediterranean.

Initiatives towards the South

The global assessment of Euro-Mediterranean policies is low and lower compared to the last Survey (4.89 on average on a scale from 0 to 10). Respondents also give the UfM a very low grade based on the progress achieved in 2011 (3.8 on average on a scale from 0 to 10 — 0 being the lowest grade). Compared to the previous Survey (2010), the number of disappointing responses has increased, whereas positive responses have decreased. Noteworthy is that grades for Q2 (regarding the UfM) are lower than those for Q1 (regarding the EMP) across the board. This implies that the UfM is seen as the weakest link in the EU’s overall strategy towards the South, although judging from the answers to the open questions the UfM has also been the initiative with higher expectations, thus partly explaining the higher negativity.

Graph 1: Monitoring the Progress and Achievements of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean and of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011

(average on a scale of 0–10, where 0 stands for highly inadequate, and 10 for highly adequate)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
In terms of geographical distribution, there are no substantial differences between the North and the South, or between the EU average and that of non-EU countries. In other words, disappointment is not a matter of area, but cuts across areas, as well as professions. The small increase of the average grade in the assessments of respondents from Israel (the only case where there has been an increase since 2010) may be due to: i) the fact that traditionally much less resistance to EU norms and methods of governance has been expressed in that part of the southern Mediterranean; ii) the fact that no real compromises have been forced on Israel by the EU.

The EMP confirms, perhaps more than other EU policy initiatives, that policy-making in the EU has multiple drivers, among which the inter-governmental is still crucially important. In the EMP, the credibility of the EU as a collective entity has been undermined due to a number of actualities, including the attitudes and interests of the individual member states. The expectations-assessment gap must relate at least in part to the evolution of the EU’s own strategy towards the southern Mediterranean partners, which gradually became less and less salient, less and less active, less and less coordinated. That the northern and eastern European countries have other priorities may at times make it easier to achieve results, because less veto points exist, but less participation on their behalf also means less willingness and need to participate, as well as lower socialization potential, which translates into a distanced, unengaged and thus colder stance.

Nevertheless, the problem with the UfM is more than simply an insufficient sharing initiative. More importantly, when events as politically and diplomatically determinant of bilateral country relations happened in the form of the Arab Spring, the responses of individual member states to them naturally gave precedence to national interest, at the expense of the logic and appeal of the EMP. This inevitably gave rise to a dissonance between what the EU did and what each of the member states did, as well as between the former and what the Mediterranean member states did. A distinction between initiative and implementation can be useful in shedding further light on this dissonance. At the level of initiative, despite a still persisting diversity, the EU did manage to proclaim unity in promoting ambitious and diverse political and policy goals regarding the Mediterranean, yet every time that these initiatives have to adjust on the ground in the face of new developments, this is done by paying little attention to the previously decided and collectively envisaged result. As a consequence, in 2011 the implementation of UfM programmes has been particularly slow.

Pessimism can be causally linked to the conviction that the current state of affairs is and will probably remain too inter-governmental and interest-driven. This becomes obvious when considering the Survey responses on the issue of the expected role of the UfM Secretariat. Although respondents still expect the UfM Secretariat to play a certain role in the years to come (5.2 on average, on a scale from 0 to 10), 5.2 is a low grade and also lower than in the previous Surveys (6.1 in 2009 and 6 in 2010). A number of potential explanations have to be assembled in order to account for this. For one, the past few years and especially 2011 have brought to the surface the multi-headed nature of EU external relations. Even the reinforcement of the CFSP has not managed to disperse doubts over intra-EU conflicts in the field of foreign policy. Secondly, the Secretariat was for two years essentially non-operational, its remit is still unclear today (with some insisting until recently on a political role, in addition to that of the implementer) and its structure is cumbersome (Aliboni, 2009).
The ENP in 2011

The assessment of the UfM is worse than that of the ENP (3.8 out of ten compared to 4.9).

Graph 2: Assessing the results achieved by the Union for the Mediterranean in 2011
(average on a scale of 0-10)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

Graph 3: Assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011
(average on a scale of 0-10)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

Already knowing a great deal about the ENP from past research, we can hypothesize that a reason for this is the realization of concrete results within the context of the ENP that have not been achieved within the UfM. While the promotion of EU-style democracy has consistently ranked high among the EU priorities towards the southern Mediterranean, little has been achieved within the context of the UfM. Indeed, achieving little on this front remains in the interests of the EU, which prefers stable authoritarian regimes with a western orientation to the uncertainty of true electoral competition, whereby political and social groups that are more hostile to the EU could gain power (Schimmelfennig, 2012: 19-20). Still, the effect of the UfM on the overall EMP can be quite disorienting. As Schimmelfennig (2012: 19) put it, “the EU’s consistent application of political conditionality in this region [Mediterranean] is further undermined by its efforts to build a multilateral partnership in the southern Mediterranean and to promote peace in the Middle East...”
The divergence in the evaluations of the UfM, on the one hand, and of the ENP on the other, can be to a certain extent understood by drawing on the distinction between bilateral and multilateral approaches. Certainly, neither the UfM nor the ENP have managed to pin down the complementarity in fields such as education, demography and agriculture, because the former is “multilateralism a la carte” and the latter is “narrowly bilateral” (Khader, 2010: 215). But within the context of bilateralism, incentives are more tangible and officials from the southern Mediterranean partners can make a more short-term assessment of interest satisfaction given that they have one main interlocutor and negotiator opposite them. At the least, it is now time to put on the table and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each approach both across sectors and on a sector-by-sector basis. Complementing rather than displacing bilateral initiatives may have been one of the official goals of the UfM, but it now seems that it was inevitable that the “conceptual underpinnings” of the EMP and ENP would be further “eroded” by a new different project in terms of organization (Balfour, 2009: 105).

These results should be viewed in tandem with the belief by an overwhelming majority of respondents (72.7%) that the EU should assume the northern co-presidency of the UfM, which matches the current system. Respondents’ grades range from 66% (rest of the EU) to 81% (Turkey), with those from Mediterranean EU countries (77%), Maghreb (77%) and Mashreq (71%) having little numerical difference between them.

Graph 4: EU institutions should assume the northern co-presidency of the UfM, instead of the current system (one Member State from the North) (%)

The collapse of a joint strategy on Water, still fresh in many people’s and officials’ mind, due to disagreement over the label to describe the Palestinian territories (“occupied”, or “under occupation”), proves that the UfM’s main problems are of a political kind and that they coincide with those faced by the projects and organizational structures that preceded it. It further shows that the UfM does not exist in a vacuum, but in an international and regional context where superpowers from other continents are also active, interested and influential in the Mediterranean and in its countries. In the light of this complex reality, it seems unlikely that any kind of unidimensional restructuring such as the EU assuming the northern co-presidency of the UfM would be both a necessary and sufficient condition for stalled projects to take off.
On Money

A majority of respondents support the creation of a new instrument devoted to the southern Mediterranean partners only (though less so in the case of non-Mediterranean EU countries).

Graph 5: Need to create a new specific financial instrument devoted to the southern Mediterranean Partners only (average on a scale of 0-10)

It must be remembered that the Mediterranean partners are mainly market economies with little exposure to international competition. If they are to remain market economies, as their economic elites desire, then either more financial aid or more equal access to EU trade must ensue. With the second option, the issue of inter-governmentalism emerges again: France has different trade interests than Spain, Greece specializes in different products than Italy, and so on. To put it simply, even among the southern member states, there is a certain degree of incongruence in terms of desired trade relations. But neither do things look any brighter in regard to aid. When the UfM’s Secretary General Ahmad Masa’deh resigned over a lack of financial resources to carry out projects, it was revealed again that the problem began at the level of the member states, some of which did not meet their financial pledges (EMWIS, 2011).

With the advent of the northern Mediterranean countries’ financial turmoil, the momentum to collect money for the implementation of UfM programmes has waned incredibly.

Unsurprisingly, the most positive response on this issue came from the Maghreb (7.82) and the Mashreq (7.29) followed by the EU Mediterranean countries (7.05). The average grade from the Rest of the EU is 5.35, which is the lowest, but it is still higher than 5 and is also higher than the grades of this group’s responses to the other questions in the Survey. We are thus led to believe that the issue of money may be determinant of the overall opinions on the EU’s initiatives towards the South. The analysis of the open questions seems to confirm this conclusion: as one answer from Italy succinctly put it, “the different economic and political situations of the southern Mediterranean partners demand specific financial instruments to cope with the specific Mediterranean challenges.” But political implications also accrue from this perception. If we take as a given that respondents are aware that a more targeted financial instrument for the southern Mediterranean partners (or even a more active role on behalf of the existing ENPI) will inevitably lead to more hands-on involvement by the EU in the domestic affairs of these countries, then an overall positive response to this last question we are dealing with can be seen as also implying a desire for the EU to export its political recipes as well. It is precisely here, on the balance between financial assistance and political intervention, that great attention is required. The EU’s past record has shown that channelling money alone is not enough but, at the same time, offering political support to segments of these countries’ political and social communities, especially in the area of democratization, can be paralyzed easily by even the slightest whiff of disagreement within the European Council.
Something that would warrant even more attention towards the decision to devote a separate financial instrument to the southern Mediterranean countries is that breaking financing into two can potentially: i) decrease the political significance on the EU’s policy agenda of each of these regions, thus leading to less interest on behalf of individual member states and subsequently to less aid; ii) weaken the political commitment of EU institutions and thus undermine implementation (Sadowski, 2010: 11). All in all, while certain proposals may at first seem straightforwardly more generous and attentive towards the southern Mediterranean neighbourhood, their true prospects become more ambivalent when analysed through the lenses of the EU realpolitik.

Conclusion

The gloomy picture of the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey and the credibility gap that the EMP is suffering can be attributed to both contextual and structural factors. There is an urgent need to work on these factors in parallel. There are few options the EU could choose to prevent the further deterioration of the situation. One is to acknowledge the shortcomings and inconsistencies of its policy, the inherently fragile balance of such initiatives and the need for more coherence. It also needs to address the gap between words and deeds, both in political and financial terms. Opening up to and reaching various segments of Arab civil society, addressing the new generation’s problems and challenges and channelling the various approaches of its member states towards a more equal partnership can only help at this point in time. The extent to which it can achieve this within the constraints of its own systemic logic of operation is of course open to theorizing and will partly be subject to developments occurring beyond its own sphere of influence. On the other hand, in the renewed neighbourhood policy Arab regimes need to adopt the basics of “good governance”; that is, to ensure the rule of law and promote the freedom and better life people are calling for. As ever, this will be partly determined by the nature and intensity of class-based divisions and, by extension, it will depend on whether economic development in the southern Mediterranean will be able to serve first and foremost the interests of its own people rather than prioritise those of EU and European elites.

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THE “ARAB SPRING”  
AND THE EXTERNAL ACTOR’S ROLE WITHIN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN REGION

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From the fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia to the graffiti painting youngsters in Daraa Syria, the Arab Spring has vividly demonstrated that the wish and drive for political change come from within the region itself. External actors from the European Union to the United States, from Russia to China, have all struggled to find a consistent response and a long-term strategy to events, which are changing by the day and sometimes by the hour. International actors arguably knew that how they ended up responding to these revolutionary events would affect their public image and their future role in the region. Indeed, the IEMed Survey confirms that those actors that have been the least supportive of political change – China, Russia and Iran – stand to lose influence in the region, just as those actors who are viewed as the most supportive during the Arab Spring – Turkey and the EU – stand to gain.

This paper will provide an analytical framework and possible explanation for these results. The first part will look at Turkey’s enhanced regional role and Iran’s dwindling influence, and will suggest that we are seeing a gradual emergence of a new normative order in the region. The second part will look at explanations for the relative positive assessment of EU policies compared to other international actors, particularly focusing on the EU’s role as a normative actor, while the third part will account for some of the less positive assessments of EU policies; describing some of the dilemmas that continue to haunt European policies on the southern Mediterranean. Finally, the paper will conclude that the EU is likely to play an enhanced role in the region.

Arab Spring: Turkish Harvest, Iranian Fall

Turkey has in recent years emerged as a regional heavyweight in the MENA region. A zero-problem foreign policy, enhanced trade relations and strong support for the Palestinian cause have given Turkey a new position in the Middle East and a positive image in the Arab world at large. The Arab uprisings have reinforced this picture and Turkey has so far come out as one of the winners of the transformations sweeping the region. Indeed, in the Survey results Turkey is remarkably ranked as the most supportive external actor during the Arab Spring; ahead of both the European Union and the United States.
Turkey is perceived as having strongly sided with political change, even when this has run counter to Turkish short-term security and trade interests. Although the Erdogan government held strong bilateral ties both with the Gaddafi regime in Libya and with Bashar al Assad in Syria, Turkey ended up supporting the opposition in both. Yet Turkey’s role has clearly been most visible with respect to the Syrian crisis. The Turkish foreign minister initially attempted to persuade Bashar al Assad to end the crackdown on the opposition yet, as no results materialized, Turkey cut off all bilateral ties with the Syrian regime. Since then, Turkey has housed the opposition in exile, provided for the Syrian refugees within Turkey itself, in addition to playing a leading role in the international efforts under the auspices of the Arab League, the UN and the Friends of Syria grouping.

Comparing Turkey’s results with Saudi Arabia, it is however clear that “active involvement” in the Syrian crisis cannot alone explain why Turkey's policies are viewed so favourably. Saudi Arabia, together with Qatar, has for instance played a very active role in the Syrian crisis, yet Saudi Arabia’s policies during the Arab Spring are not viewed positively (72 percent of the respondents giving a negative assessment). This points to another important factor about regional credibility: in order to be able to voice legitimate criticism of repressive governments and to be seen as a credible supporter of democratic change, any international actor needs to have its own house in order. In the Survey’s open questions, several respondents thus point to Saudi Arabia’s double standards both relating to its own political system and to its conduct in neighbouring Bahrain. And, conversely, those three international actors that themselves have well-functioning democracies — Turkey, the EU and the US — are also the ones who are ranked the most positively.

Domestic legitimacy problems also spill over into the regional arena in the case of Iran, which in the Survey remarkably comes at the bottom compared to all international actors. This arguably reflects that Iran has lost much regional legitimacy and power as a result of the Arab Spring. Iran has failed in its initial efforts to make the Arab revolts part of an Iranian revolutionary narrative.

Claiming that what took place in Tunisia and Egypt were mere repetitions of Iran’s own revolution in 1979, Iran initially sought to “seize” the Arab revolutions. According to the Iranian leadership, the Arab uprisings were rebellions against western-allied puppet governments and a new Islamic awakening. Yet, to most observers, Arab protesters resembled Iran’s Green movement of 2009 — which had been so thoroughly crushed by the regime – rather than the 1979 revolution. The subsequent uprisings in Libya and Syria made the Iranian narrative even more difficult to sustain, as both Gaddafi and Bashar al Assad were obviously not allies of western powers. And as Iran’s support for the brutal repression in Syria has grown ever more visible, Iran has clearly lost its remaining regional support.
In this respect, the very poor assessment of Iran’s policies is also an indication of a wider transformation of the region’s normative order and balances of power. Where Iran, Hezbollah, Syria and Hamas prior to the Arab Spring were popular “revolutionary” players in the region, these very same actors are now emerging as less popular status quo powers, insofar as they oppose the current democratic change and try to keep the old regional order intact. The new emerging revolutionary powers — those which have either undergone political change themselves such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya or have clearly sided with democratic change such as Turkey — have, on the other hand, gained both domestic and regional legitimacy.

Within this emerging new order, we also see an enhanced role for regional actors and a new regional assertiveness. It is clear from the Survey results that most respondents believe that the Arab Spring first and foremost has been an internally-driven process, and that the policies of external actors have not been the real drivers of change in the region. Both the US and the EU are given grades around average, and Russia and China are given very poor grades (2.8 and 2.9 out of 10). No doubt the latter obstructions in the UN Security Council over Syria have contributed to this negative perception of their role during the Arab Spring. Yet given the fact that the principle of non-intervention is usually held dear in the MENA region, it is remarkable that these two actors are given such a poor assessment, having been the main advocates of a conservative interpretation of the principle of state sovereignty and adversaries of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Interestingly, the low grades for China and Russia also holds when respondents assess the future impact of these two actors compared with the EU. Here, they once again hit the bottom together with Iran. In light of recent years’ academic debate on “emerging powers” and the enhanced role of BRIC countries, this is a remarkable finding, and may substantiate the liberal and constructivist claims that international power does not only derive from realist power capabilities, but also from norms and legitimacy.

Graph 2: Assessing the EU’s future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors. Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to:

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
The EU’s Most Supportive International Actor

Normative power may also explain another remarkable feature of the Survey: namely, the relatively positive assessment of EU policies during the Arab Spring. The EU is ranked as the second most supportive actor, above the US and just after Turkey. In light of the often-voiced criticism of EU policies – being too late, too little and too uncoordinated – this is a notable finding that points to the relatively strong role and credibility of the EU in the region compared to other outside actors. The EU’s self-perception and identification as a “normative actor” no doubt play a significant part in this positive assessment, just as the EU’s historical, cultural, and geographical proximity to the MENA countries should also be taken into account. Moreover, the EU and leading European Heads of State have been relatively visible and active with regard to the revolutionary events in the Arab world – especially after the initial and somewhat hesitant responses to the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Since March 2011 the EU has introduced a string of new proposals and initiatives, among them the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, a revised Neighbourhood Policy, and a new Endowment for Democracy, just as European governments have been leading the international efforts with regards to Libya and Syria, while the US has self-consciously taken more of a backseat.

However, it should be stressed that the Survey confirms that the EU is above all seen as reactive rather than proactive in terms of events in the MPCs. The highest European grade when it comes to supporting political change thus coincides with the three countries that have seen a clear-cut regime change out of the Arab Spring (Libya 72%; Tunisia 58% and Egypt 48%). Whereas a relative majority of respondents regards the EU as having preserved the status quo in Morocco (45%) and Jordan (44%), the EU is seen as having had no impact on domestic developments in Algeria (49%) and in Lebanon (48%). Interestingly, the latter is at the same time viewed as one of the MPC countries with the greatest chances of developing a lasting democracy.

Graph 3: Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
These findings indirectly support the main considerations that have emerged in recent months in the public debate about the European response to the Arab Spring. The first is that the EU is seen as having acted upon the momentous developments in MENA only after the events, rather than in anticipation of them. Secondly, the EU response is seen as dependent on whether the countries in question experienced regime change or not, rather than on measures that the EU adopted on its own. The results also appear to confirm that the EU response suffered from an old problem with internal policy and strategic coordination. An explanation of these considerations becomes more evident in some of the qualitative answers offered by the respondents, which are worth pondering at some length.

The Bureaucracy-Diplomacy Gap

The uprisings in the MPCs provided a stark contrast to the discourse emanating from Brussels about growing foreign, security and defence policy coordination within the European Union. “The CFSP is still not visible,” argued one respondent; “the absence of a concerted policy is regrettable,” said another. This became especially evident, as the upheaval took place over one year after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty reforming the EU, whose main innovation was arguably the creation of a more coherent foreign policy for the EU, with the establishment of a foreign minister in everything but name, and of the European External Action Service, the EU’s putative diplomatic corps.

Aside from institutional inconsistencies, the Arab uprisings have also exposed the limits of a common European foreign policy, insofar as European governments continue to be seen as pursuing their own interests. Moreover, while Brussels may have earned some legitimacy on the basis of the policies that it implements (“some long-term programmes have recently empowered the local civil society,” said one of the respondents), its largely technocratic apparatus lacks the political punch that makes its policies very visible and effective in the region. As a consensus-based organization, the EU is typically slow in reacting to foreign policy crises. But the disconnection between a slow-moving Brussels bureaucracy and the diplomacy of key governments, often guided by economic interests and historical ties, has proven to be detrimental.

The “Integration-Security” Gap

On top of the institutional discrepancies of a multileveled organization, there is another more profound explanation at play. The EU strategy towards the MPCs has been traditionally driven by a strategy of gradual political and economic liberalization and closer integration into Europe. Thus, in the midst of the uprisings, on 25th May 2011, the EU presented key proposals to include the creation of “mobility partnerships” with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt aiming at facilitating travel for local students and businesspeople (European Commission, 2011). Similarly, on 17th August the EU announced €380m of new funds for the region – over one third of them for Morocco, whose constitutional reform was praised as a clear commitment to democracy.

However, the EU has at the same time been strongly focused on countering the perceived security challenges emanating from the MENA region. Radicalization, terror, and immigration have been regular items in the discourse on the Mediterranean emerging from key EU member states over the past two decades. It is remarkable that these arguments continued to play a central role during the revolutions. Writing in the Financial Times in mid-February 2011 (i.e. after the toppling of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt), Italian Foreign Minister Frattini argued for instance: “this ‘arc of crisis’ will lead to more illegal immigration, terrorism and Islamic radicalism” (Frattini, 2011).
During the uprisings, the security logic was particularly visible in relation to immigration. Hundreds of thousands of people have fled Libya (over 700,000, as of October 2011, IOM, 2011), most of them crossing the borders into neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt. In the spring of 2011, this led to a dispute between Italy and France (the principal destination of most Tunisians), which ended with Paris reintroducing checks at its border. Regrettably, there seems to be a direct correlation between social unrest on the other side of the Mediterranean and some European governments’ instinct to close off. This arguably makes the simultaneous European efforts to enhance stability by bringing neighbours closer to Europe ring hollow in the southern Mediterranean countries.

**Conclusion: Europe’s Responsibility**

The underlying tension between the EU’s short-term security policies and long-term support for democratization is likely to continue influencing future European policy in the region, creating well-known contradictions and dilemmas. Yet the Arab Spring and the relative positive assessment of EU policies compared to other external actors also create new opportunities for the EU in the region. Europe clearly does not start from scratch when it comes to supporting political reform in the Mediterranean, and can with the unfolding events speak with a much clearer voice than before. Moreover, with the US self-consciously withdrawing from the region, the EU is bound to play an even greater part in the region’s economic development, political reform processes and further integration with the European Union. In fact, there is no doubt that the southern Mediterranean countries expect it to do so.
THE ARAB SPRING, THE EU AND THE TENSION OF OPPOSITES

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Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS), Cairo

Introduction

The Arab Spring has dramatically ended long-held ideas of Arab exceptionalism. One after the other, countries of the region burst in popular protests against their autocratic rulers calling for democratic change, shaking domestic structures and reshaping the regional order. The political process which followed, although still ongoing, sobered the hopes of some for an Arab Spring. With a weakly contested rise of Islamist forces in many countries of the “Spring”, the reinstating of military figures in some and political turmoil in others, expectations became mixed and dispositions less clear.

The current wave of events seems thus to have ended the notion of Arab “immunity” to democratic influences, but with no clear indication of the direction of changes in the region. Varying from a steady – although not uncontested – march towards democracy in the “cradle” of the Spring in Tunisia, to a thorny and uncertain transition in Egypt, to even bleaker scenarios in Syria, Libya and Yemen.

Recent developments, namely in light of the first round of presidential elections in Egypt, show the ferment of a possible setback in democratic change in one of the main countries of the Spring. The runoff between a military figure and former Mubarak confidant and a Muslim Brotherhood (MB) candidate promises an intriguing trade-off between reinstating some kind of liberalized autocracy, or the take-over of the regime by the MB who constitute a majority in the legislature. This dichotomy in one of the most influential countries of the Spring puts to the test the EU’s principled approach and commitment to human rights and democracy, and would indeed have significant ramifications for the future of the EMP as a space, an idea and architecture.

At this point, the acceptance of the Euromed as a framework for regional cooperation and its impetus for sustained reform seems to endure. This endurance is, however, toned down by the limitations that this framework has exhibited in the past and the challenges it is bound to encounter in the future in order to maintain its space, redefine its character and galvanize its momentum.

An Uncertain “Spring”? 

The dubiousness of the future of the Euromed framework and its ability to promote democratic consolidation is embedded in the uncertainty of democratic transition in the region. In most countries of the “Spring”, the prospects for democratization are facing serious challenges; socioeconomic hardships, the dominant role of the military, the reconsolidation of previous elite networks and alliances, not to mention political violence and the prospects for a civil war in some of the transition countries. Thus, different contexts in individual countries make it very misleading to generalize or to ignore the diversity of structural domestic conditions characterizing transition.
At the moment, the state of transition exhibits all kinds of turbulence associated with transition from certain authoritarian rule to an “uncertain something else” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Uncertainty about the progress of democracy varies from high optimism in the case of Tunisia to bleak opportunities in the case of Syria and to ambivalence in the case of Egypt (prospects for the country took a plunge with the outcome of the first round of presidential elections, with a runoff between a military general and a Muslim Brotherhood candidate).

**Graph 1: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in the following countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

In response to this uncertain terrain, the EU has trodden carefully, giving mixed signals with little impact. EU Communications convey a positive though reluctant approach towards democratization in the region. In two Communications adopted following the popular uprisings, the EU called for “building deep democracy” and sustainable development that puts the people’s aspirations into perspective.\(^1\) However, the instruments developed to prioritize democracy in the EMP/ENP, namely through the “more for more” principle, are a mere mutation of the ENP’s “differentiated approach”, a policy that has had a meager record in promoting or inducing reform.\(^2\) In essence, the EU’s reaction to the Arab Spring has so far lacked a “clear-cut strategy” and opted to “play safe”,\(^3\) thus failing to put the EU’s normative plight behind democracy as a value, preferring to navigate as developments unfold.

This cautious stance towards political changes in transition countries is understandable given the fluid situation and the primacy of domestic factors and limited external leverage in shaping the future of transition. However, a clearer positioning in terms of the principled commitment to democracy in the region is both needed and still missing.

The message conveyed across the Mediterranean is thus that European partners remain ambivalent about democratic processes in the region, lest they result in a predominance of political Islam.\(^4\) Hence, “more for more” could serve as a flexible approach that allows for policies “à la carte”. It maintains the EU’s interest in political reform in the region, but in a “detached” and cautious manner, which allows the partnership to be a matter of fair weather, rather than a matter of principle!

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A Euromed Potential Viewed as “Possible” and Graded as “Pass”

It is strikingly evident that in every aspect, and by experts across the Mediterranean, assessment of the progress of the EU’s Mediterranean policies and its potential in promoting democracy is generally rated on a scale from 0 to 10 very close to 5; a “positioning” which connotes enduring survival of the EMP as a space and idea fraught with caution! This perception, which precedes the onset of revolutionary change in the region, lives on only with slightly higher optimism regarding the future role of the EMP/ENP as a catalyst for democracy and political reform, and a more modest global assessment of the EMP as a regional modality.

**Graph 2: Assessment of the results achieved by the EMP/UIF**

(Average on a scale of 0–10, where 0 stands for highly inadequate and 10 for highly adequate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expectations of the role of the UIF Secretariat in the new Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture in the near future</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global assessment of the results of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

A persisting pattern remains that respondents from non-EU European countries and Mashreq MPCs are the most enthusiastic about the future of the EMP and its reform spillover.

The future potential of EMP/ENP instruments in bringing about democracy is sobered in light of the legacy of the EU in democracy promotion in the region and perceived tensions between the EU’s principled and pragmatic approaches in this regard. Although a pro-reform outlook resonates throughout the Barcelona Declaration, achievements that could be attributed to the EMP in the field of reform are quite modest compared to the initial expectations. Engagements with the region have never provided enough linkage to foster or induce change, or sustainable leverage to push for it.5

Underneath the cautious optimism about the future of the EMP, nuanced expectations are held towards its potential as a catalyst for democracy promotion compared to its potential influence in brokering peace or bringing harmony across the region. This is reflected in a diminished prospect for the EMP to bring peace or “harmony”, compared to the possibilities of promoting democracy.

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Players and Cards in a Fluid Situation

Transformations of domestic structures in Arab states and societies are resonating into a “new” regional architecture, which in turn might reconfigure the EMP/ENP, especially through the rise of competing roles of regional or international powers.

New elites and public have expressed interest in diversifying foreign relations, independent ties and consolidated engagement with Arab and Islamic countries. However, a dramatic change in foreign policy based on identity politics is unlikely. Intensifying ties with regional circles through seeking closer political and economic ties with Turkey, for instance, or ameliorating prior animosities with Iran (although so far neither Tunisia nor Egypt have shown any signs of rapprochement) could be expected. However, an overhaul of foreign policy inclinations is unlikely.

Manifest changes are most notable in bringing public opinion back into foreign policy decision-making. A heightened sense of dignity and increased call for independence are central to the “new” regional and international relations. A coherent set of policies regarding specific regional or international actors is still amiss in almost all countries of the Spring. However, signs of shifting foreign policy patterns point to new tendencies in the relations among regional actors (revolutionary vs. conservative) as well as between the Arab and non-Arab regional actors (Turkey and Iran).

The future of the Euromed framework is thus hinging upon changes in the patterns of alliances in the region. The contending outlook is that the EU is expected to sustain its space in the region. Compared to international players, the EU’s influence comes second to that of the US, while surpassing Russia and China. Regionally, however, the rising role of “competing” regional actors is seen as surpassing that of the EU, where experts across the Mediterranean saw Saudi Arabia and Turkey in a better position to impact on changes in the region.

A strange irony in this regard is that Mediterranean countries expect more of the EMP than EU partners expect or think the framework is able to provide. This is reflected in MPC experts’ views which attribute a greater role to the EU compared to other regional powers, while experts from the EU are more modest about the EU’s role and assign more weight to the regional actors (Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League).
Graph 4: Assessing the EU's future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors. Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to:
(MPC respondents)

![Graph 4: Assessing the EU's future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors. Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to: (MPC respondents)](image)

Source: Compiled by the IEmed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

Graph 5: Assessing the EU's future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors. Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to:
(EU respondents)

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Source: Compiled by the IEmed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

The EU comes as the second most influential, a state of affairs which is hardly the result of the Arab Spring. The current perceptions connote that the US remains the global hegemon, and possesses more influence than the EU. The role of the US in the region is not entirely separable from that of the EU. Over the past two decades, a generally positive view of the EU has been held compared to rising anti-Americanism. However, when the EU or its member states on any account “failed” to act as a counter hegemon disappointment prevailed! The general perception being that the EU is more just but less powerful or willing than the US.6

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The secondary importance assigned to the role of China and Russia is embedded in the post-revolutionary context. However, this trend could be reversed in the case of significant setbacks in any of the countries of the Spring.

On the regional level, many intervening variables could consolidate or hinder the rising role of regional actors. Indeed, the power of Saudi Arabia to influence developments in the countries of the Spring is enhanced by Saudi financial leverage. The need for funds to ameliorate socio-economic crises gives direct leverage to regional and international powers that would be most willing to help while the EU is busy putting its own house in order and is short on credit. The perception of a rising influence of Saudi Arabia is directly related to its ability to provide relief funds on the one hand, but may also be related to its influence in aborting protests in Bahrain, and offering to forge closer links between the GCC and other regional monarchies.

It is noteworthy, however, that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and most Gulf countries have been unwilling to provide unconditional or generous support to countries of the Spring. Weariness with the influence of the MB and a possible revolutionary spillover made Gulf countries most reluctant to provide funds in the form of economic relief to post-revolutionary Egypt.

Moreover, Saudi influence is not unchallenged since the sense of dignity in the countries of the Spring did translate at times into antagonism towards regional conservative powers, which was manifest in the brief Egyptian-Saudi hang-up following the detention in Saudi Arabia of an Egyptian lawyer-activist. The resulting demonstrations and protests on the Egyptian side, and abrupt calling of the Ambassador on the Saudi side, reflect the tacit conservative-revolutionary fault-line in the region.

Graph 6: Assessing the EU’s future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors. Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to:

Hence, the emerging pattern of coalitions in the region and whether it comes at the expense of Arab-EU relations is not a foregone conclusion, and is much more complex than the allusions to new-found dignity and pan-Arab and pan-Muslim solidarity.

Rising influence of some regional actors has to do not only with the power of money and identity, but with the “effectiveness” or “efficiency” of these regional powers’ reaction to the popular uprisings, and alliances are forming with both economic as well as political rationales.
This is most notably the case for Turkey, whose quick adaptation and “answer” to the Spring positioned the country for a better future role. The Turkish promise of “help” and vow “to split our bread with Egyptians” following the rejection of an IMF loan is witness to the intervening role of responsive policies compared to deterministic convictions about the influence of identity politics.7

**Israel Stands Alone**

Within the general discourse of cautious hope in the region, Israel’s position and outlook regarding the Arab Spring is distinct, and reflects a heightened sense of isolation. In every aspect, the Survey shows Israeli perceptions standing in contrast to those expressed across the Mediterranean, conveying a dimmer outlook, sometimes being the only one to fall under the average grade of 5+ which experts across the board expressed.

Regarding the potential of the current revolutionary wave in producing political and socio-economic reforms foreseen by or compatible with those called for by the EMP/ENP, Israeli expectations are the most pessimistic, compared to cautious hopes across the Mediterranean and higher euphoria in countries of the Mashreq.

Israeli expectations regarding the future of the EMP/ENP are indeed the worst. In allusion to “fragmentation inherited from the uprisings” Israeli respondents are the first to render the future of regional integration in the Euromed framework unlikely or more difficult, EU member states and Turkey being cautiously hopeful, MPCs more optimistic and European non-EU the most forward-looking.

Graph 7: The Euro-Mediterranean regional integration process will no longer be suitable given the heterogeneity and fragmentation inherited from the uprisings

(Average on a scale of 0-10, when 0 stands for no probability and 10 for very high probability)

Similarly, regarding the potential of a more “homogenous” democratic Mediterranean, an allusion to the possibility of forging peace and stability, Israeli expectations remain the lowest.

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7. Statement by the Turkish Ambassador to Cairo, 20th May 2012.
Graph 8: The current situation will lead to a more homogenous, sustainable and democratic Mediterranean which, in turn, would trigger the political dialogue between the EU and the MPCs and the consolidation of a truly Euro-Mediterranean Community

(average on a scale of 0-10, when 0 stands for no probability and 10 for very high probability)

Moreover, Israel stands out as the only MPC country with a majority of respondents giving Iran a stronger role in the region compared to the EU. The Israeli disposition thus seems predominantly one of perceived danger, with diminished prospects of a “democratic dividend” in the region!

Conclusion

The Arab Spring calls into question the legacy of the EU’s leniency towards the region’s autocrats, as well as the depth of future EU commitment towards democracy given the current rise of Islamists. Outpacing the EU’s “reformist” approach towards democratization, popular uprisings have swept the old arrangements and brought into power new elites and a heightened public sense of dignity, thus bringing the prospects for democracy closer while shattering conventional modes of interaction across the Mediterranean.

The EU’s answer to these changes has so far been reactionary, cautious and ad hoc. Yet what has to materialize is an EU “normative” approach towards democratization in the region, including possible strategies towards relapses and setbacks, and a clear position towards the democratic process regardless of its consequences.

If the EU seeks to shape the structure of political opportunity in order to encourage, sustain or induce democratization in the region, far deeper changes need to be introduced on the strategic, instrumental and discourse levels. Foremost, the tension incurred by the possible rise of Islamists needs to be thought out and resolved and a clear message of siding with the people, not their previous or possible future autocrats, has to be formulated.

Developments in Egypt might constitute a counter-punch to the Spring and will definitely test the EMP/ENP principled approach and commitment to human rights and democracy.
PERCEPTIONS ON DEMOCRACY AND ISLAMISM: HYPOTHESES AND SECOND-GUESSED PREDICTIONS

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ELISABETTA CIUCCARELLI
Programme Officer of the Arab and Mediterranean Department

Assessing the perspectives for sustainable democracy in several Arab Mediterranean countries as well as the potential role of political Islam in the region were two of the questions put to the nearly 700 respondents from Europe and the Southern Mediterranean who participated in the 3rd Euromed Survey.

In both cases, the responses are based on individual perceptions drawing on the knowledge of respondents about the countries’ realities and on their own experience as citizens. This makes it difficult to properly evaluate the replies, as we do not know the personal profile of the respondents, which could explain to a great extent why they answer in one way or another. In any case, the overall “winners” in terms of democratic expectations are Tunisia – which leads the ranking with an average 6.7 out of 10 –, followed by Lebanon and Morocco (both occupying a second position with a 5.6, respectively). A second group of countries comprises Egypt (5.1), Jordan (4.9) and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (4.7). Finally, the group of democratic laggards is made up of Libya (4.4), Algeria (3.9) and Syria (3.5).

Graph 1: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in the following countries (average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very improbable and 10 for very probable)

First-glance conclusions: all the “revolutionary” countries which succeeded in toppling their dictators head each of the aforementioned groups. Amongst them, Tunisia emerges clearly as the country with the highest democratic expectations within the Arab World, while the outlook for Egypt raises more doubts and a lot of uncertainty in the case of Libya. A further (though possibly misleading) remark which can be made in light of these results: monarchies are not doing that badly, even if Jordan lags behind Morocco and Egypt. The most striking results re-
late to Lebanon – which ties with Morocco – and to the Occupied Palestinian Territories which, in spite of the stalemate of the negotiation process and their situation of vulnerable instability, almost “pass” with a 4.7. In turn, the Algerian failure – a dire 3.9 only beaten by Syria, which comes in last position due to the direction taken by the Syrian revolution, where repression is bringing the country closer to a civil war – is hardly surprising. One last remark: the overall mean of the 9 countries only fails by a small margin: 4.9. Could this figure be somehow related to the 7.3 (out of 10) attributed by respondents to the role that political Islam could play in the Mediterranean in the coming years? Whether there is a positive or negative correlation between the two is difficult to tell based on the available data, but this article will try to speculate on a number of hypotheses.

In order to provide more accurate explanations – albeit always tentative –, one needs to analyse each of the countries in more detail. At the forefront of democracy, Tunisia is well-perceived both externally and domestically, its citizens being optimistic with regard to the country’s democratic perspectives. 46% of Tunisian respondents assess with an 8 or a 9 their country’s democratic outlook, while an equal percentage of the total respondents give it a grade between 7 and 8. The countries most confident about Tunisia’s democratic prospects are its neighbours from the Maghreb, the Mediterranean European countries and Israel. There seems to be a consensus on Tunisia. Neither Ennahda’s victory in the October 2011 elections or its lack of political experience or later social unrest had managed, at the beginning of 2012, to dispel optimism about the Tunisian transition. Perhaps Ennahda’s alliance with the other two winning parties, namely Ettakatol and CPR in order to establish the so-called Tunisian “troika”, has been perceived as a step forward towards the long-awaited democracy. Or maybe the very manifestation of democracy implied in the Islamist victory has helped to convey this vision. The extent to which political Islam is seen as a factor supporting democratization is difficult to tell. Nonetheless, based on the responses to the second question it could be argued so, as 69% of Tunisians expect Islamism to play an important role in the region. When looking specifically at the distribution of responses, two separate “peaks” come to the fore: 24% of Tunisians attribute an 8 to this role, while 21% give it a 5, a result that could be interpreted as a reluctance to acknowledge such a role.

Graph 2: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in TUNISIA
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very improbable and 10 for very probable)

![Graph 2](image)

Role of political Islam in the future Mediterranean landscape
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for negligible role and 10 for key role)

![Graph 2](image)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

The external perception is a key factor in order to account for the results in Lebanon. National respondents themselves are the ones assessing their country’s democratic perspectives with the worst grades. Their opinions fall mainly in the range between 4 and 5 (59%) and between 1 and 2 (30%) – possibly reflecting the Lebanese awareness of the shortcomings of their own political system and the high degree of national and regional instability they are subject to. Such a negative assessment stands in sharp contrast with the overall external perception,
which places the country’s democratic perspectives mainly in the range between 5, 6 and 7 – Turkish respondents being the most optimistic ones, followed by their neighbours from the Mashreq. It is indeed surprising that in contrast with the Lebanese sense of pessimism, its neighbours have faith in its potential for democracy, with the exception of Israel, which interestingly enough is more in line with the Lebanese attitude, assessing its neighbour’s democratic prospects with a 4.3. As for the role of political Islam in the region, the answer in the case of Lebanese respondents does not raise the slightest doubt: 27% think it will be an 8 and a non-negligible 14% attribute it a categorical 10. Therefore, Lebanese respondents are well aware that political Islam will be a key actor in the region and seem sceptical with regard to its potential for democratization. In the light of these remarks, let everyone draw their own conclusions on whether there is a correlation or not between these two elements.

Graph 3: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in LEBANON
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very improbable and 10 for very probable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lebanese respondents</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic prospects</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Role of political Islam in the future Mediterranean landscape
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for negligible role and 10 for key role)

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<tr>
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<th>Lebanese respondents</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
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<tr>
<td>Islamism</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

The case of Morocco is interesting because the Moroccans themselves are the ones catapulting the final grade by giving their country a 7.2 in the question on democratic prospects, although the rest of respondents from other countries also give a pass grade to Morocco and to its “top-down” process of reform. All in all, the results show that either there is little dissidence in Morocco or it is poorly-represented in the sample. As to the role of Islamism, even if elections had been held and the victory of the PJD was already known by the time the Survey was conducted, responses are fairly homogeneously distributed (although most of them are found between 5 and 8), almost minimizing the faits accomplis. These results give grounds to suspect possibly biased responses.

Graph 4: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in MOROCCO
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very improbable and 10 for very probable)

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<th>Moroccan respondents</th>
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<td>6.5</td>
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Role of political Islam in the future Mediterranean landscape
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for negligible role and 10 for key role)

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<tr>
<td>Islamism</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Egypt is another example of a country whose citizens overestimate their country’s potential (6.9) compared to the external perception (5.1), and this despite the fact that when they answered this Survey they were in the midst of parliamentary elections, and that there had been new clashes between the military and the revolutionaries which pointed to the difficult course the Egyptian process was taking. On the role of Islamism, Egyptians were clearly well-aware of what was coming up: 29% gave it a 7 and another 29% gave a 9 to its future role in the region. Could it be on this basis that Israel only gave Egypt a 4.1 as a “democratic” grade?

Graph 5: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in EGYPT
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very improbable and 10 for very probable)

Graph 6: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in JORDAN
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very improbable and 10 for very probable)

Jordanian respondents are on average pessimistic about their country’s democratic outlook (3.7), though their replies show a strong polarisation of opinions (11% assess it with a 1, while 16% assess it with an 8). This can mean that some of them are very satisfied about the response provided to the uprising by the regime, while others are deeply disappointed about the outcome of the reform process. In turn, on the role of political Islam, notwithstanding some divergences, a remarkable 33% consider that it will play a prominent role and the majority of the responses tend to reflect the same view.
One of the most outstanding cases is that of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Palestinians are well-aware that Islamism is a key actor (since the first Islamist democratic victory came with Hamas in 2006) and they give their country an optimistic 6.4 in terms of democratic potential. And so do the European Mediterranean countries (5.8) and even Israel, which gives them a surprisingly hopeful 5.2. It is peculiar to see that the immediate neighbourhood still harbours hopes about the potential for democracy in Palestine in spite of the current situation, while the Balkan countries give it a gloomy 3.4. Could this be seen as an internal reading of the Palestinian conflict by the Balkan respondents?

Graph 7: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very improbable and 10 for very probable)

Role of political Islam in the future Mediterranean landscape
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for negligible role and 10 for key role)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

Leaving aside the Libyan responses due to the low representativeness of the sample, the article will now focus on the two “pending” countries: Algeria and Syria. Responses relating to Algeria, maybe due to the long-awaited change that never happens, reflect a very pessimistic view about the country’s future, notwithstanding the fact that Algerians improve the result by shifting the mean to the right (see graph below). The responses from Algerians show a certain polarization of opinions and a social dissent regarding their democratic path, coupled with a more moderate assessment of the role that political Islam will play in the region (6.2). This can certainly be seen as a reflection of Algerians’ own past traumas, of a regional interpretation of the question through a national lens and of a wish of not having their past experiences repeated. And yet in the case of Algeria, the elections held after the Survey show, indeed, that neither is the country experiencing a clear process of change, nor is political Islam a relevant actor in the country, in spite of the high expectations raised by the media prior to the elections.
Syria is an extreme example of a fragmented and confronted society: 13% assess the potential for democracy with a 1, whereas 38% attribute it a 9 and 26% a 4-5. The first impression in light of these results is that many of the Syrian respondents are loyal to Bashar al-Assad’s regime, while a minority of them are radical opponents and a non-negligible group in-between does not dare to take sides, lest it would have a negative impact on their status. However, these results could be interpreted the other way around, namely that most respondents come from the opposition and predict a close end to the current regime and a real potential to establish true democracy in the country. Whether such a view is linked or not to the remarkable role that Syrians attribute to political Islam in the region is more difficult to tell.

Last but not least, it should be noted that even though Islamism plays a fundamental role in democratic Turkey, the future of regional Islamism is toned down by Turkish respondents – light years away from the emphatic 38% of Israeli respondents predicting a highly probable role of political Islam in the region. Against the backdrop of the unfolding events and the rise of Islamism in all electoral processes, there are reasons to believe that Israelis have a sound knowledge of the political trends in the region. Whether they are satisfied with them is something we can imagine, but we cannot judge based on the data provided by this Survey.
PROSPECTS OF SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ISLAM: MOROCCO

ZOUHIR LOUASSINI
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It is once again the story of the half-empty, half-full glass. Something is changing in Morocco and this is for a good reason. Yet referring to it as a genuine democracy would be either exaggerated or seen as a lack a clear understanding of what this concept actually means. Views emphasizing the Moroccan experience are not seldom. Neither are those claiming that anything that happens in this North African country is to be seen as a manoeuvre whose ultimate goal is to preserve the power in the very same hands as ever, namely in the hands of the King.

Economic growth has probably favoured the spread of a certain optimism about the country’s prospects. Indeed, the transformations the social structures are experiencing have allowed for debates which were unthinkable a few years ago. Freedom of speech is starting to become a reality. The Monarchy seems to have finally understood it has to change its strategy. In this sense, the Tunisian and Egyptian lessons have given hands-on examples which have helped clarify the ideas of many. Yet the King’s opening-up in this regard has had a rather symbolic than real value. Still, in spite of the timid reforms it has introduced, the new Constitution is a proof of the willingness to change. These are the factors which have spared Morocco from the instability other countries touched by the Arab Spring are facing. Pressure coming from the public opinion through some protest movements such as the one of the February 20 have been a positive element in that regard, not least because they have pushed for an awakening, which is already an achievement in itself.

The responses provided by Moroccan experts to the questions of the 3rd Euromed Survey -in particular with regard to the country’s prospects for democracy, which they assess with an average value of 7.2 on a scale from 0 to 10- mirror the enthusiasm with which the country is living the recent reforms enacted by the Monarchy. Nonetheless, when comparing the assessment provided by Moroccan respondents with the survey mean and/or with the average assessments provided by each of the regional groups (see graph 1), it seems obvious that Moroccan opinions reflect an optimism bias.

In any case, it is worth noting the perceived potential harmony, or at least not necessary contradiction between political Islam and democracy. The fact that the rise of political Islam is not seen by Moroccan respondents as an impediment, but rather as having the potential of going hands in hands with the establishment of a democratic structure -as it can be inferred from a comparison between graphs 1 and 2-, is a tangible proof of the evolution experienced by this ideology in the Moroccan context. The transformation underwent by the Islamic parties has, indeed, been a determining factor in their ceaseless effort to come into power.
The celebration of free and “clean” elections for the first time in the country’s history have brought political Islam into power. However, the striking fact has been the low voter turnout, which points to a clear lack of confidence in the political game. In this sense, getting back the confidence in politics is Morocco’s main challenge today. Yet neither the government nor the opposition have much time left to persuade the citizenship about the reforms under way. To trust Morocco to be out of danger is the worst mistake the political class can possibly make.

The first days of Benkiran’s government have been quite efficient. The “colourful”, straightforward and often demagogic language used by the Islamist leadership has proved to be fruitful. and the impact of the measures adopted right after his arrival into power has translated into an immediate reduction of the social tension. It seems clear that the Justice and Development Party (PJD) of Islamic beliefs, has quickly learned to do more politics and less religion, a choice which has brought it closer to the people, following the model of the “Turkish brothers” of Erdogan instead of that of the Muslim brotherhood, namely the historical one.
The head of the government has also understood that in Morocco it is only possible to rule with the blessing of the King. Actually, up until now, all the actions taken by Benkirane have served to reinforce the message, in case it was not clear enough in the text of the new Constitution, that the real power in this Maghrebian country still resides in the Monarchy. Finding the right balance between the King and the Government can help to successfully overcome this transitory phase ultimately leading to the establishment of a true democracy in the country. For the time being there are several hopeful elements. The only doubt that still remains is to determine whether the measures advanced by the Islamist party in power are aligned with genuine democratic beliefs or they are just a mere strategy to “convert” the society to a narrow-minded ideology.

Anyways, everything seems to indicate that Morocco finds itself in a crucial time of its history. It is a paradox that the success of the PJD is vital if a sliding down into a more radical Islamist faction is to be avoided. Meanwhile, the Association for Justice and Charity is waiting on standby. Until now it constitutes the only well-organised alternative to the Islamists, as well as the only movement determined not to accept the rules of the game established by the Monarchy. The other historical parties, such as al-Istiqlal (included in the government) or the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (opposition party) have lost most of their strength and they no longer get to persuade the citizenry.

So far the Monarchy has managed to handle very well the situation in a shrewd fashion. The tandem Palace-PJD has saved Morocco from dangerous scenarios. Creating the right atmosphere in order to be able to implement the mechanisms needed to evolve into a parliamentary monarchy could be the safest way to ensure stability. To achieve this, the tactics and strategies aimed exclusively at preserving the power need to be left aside in favour of a courageous brand new system that brings Morocco closer to its European neighbours, while allowing it to preserve its own identity. Democracy has its own rules and there are a number of valid examples of parliamentary monarchies which can serve as inspiration. To trust the citizens as mature enough to be able to take this step forward could be a good starting point towards establishing a sustainable democracy. The reforms undertaken this year in Morocco are a good first step in that direction. Yet the journey has only begun.
TUNISIANS’ PERSPECTIVE ON DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL ISLAM: A MODERATE OPTIMISM

NADIA MARZOUKI
Jean Monnet Fellow, European University Institute

The Survey conducted by the European Institute for the Mediterranean examines, among other issues, the perceptions that diverse northern and southern Mediterranean countries have of the democratisation prospects in the Arab world and the role of political Islam in the region. As the Survey’s results indicate, the Tunisian point of view is notable for two particular aspects. Many participating Tunisian experts believe that the prospect for the establishment of a solid democracy in Tunisia is probable or even very probable (6.5 on average on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 stands for “very improbable” and 10 for “very probable”).

Graph 1: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in TUNISIA (average on a scale of 0-10)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

Graph 2: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in TUNISIA (%) Tunisian respondents

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Moreover, most Tunisian respondents believe that political Islam will play an important, or even central, role in this democratisation process.

Graph 3: Role of political Islam in the future Mediterranean landscape Tunisian respondents (%)

These results are in keeping with the characteristics of the Tunisian revolution and the changes that have led to the election of the Constituent Assembly. The revolution developed in a relatively peaceful and non-violent way, in comparison to the protest movements that took place in countries such as Libya and Syria. Tunisia was the first Arab country to remove its dictator, although it is undoubtedly the country where change seemed the least likely to happen. The election of the Constituent Assembly, on 23rd October 2011, took place with relative transparency and the turnout was remarkably high. Finally, the coalition government – the troika that unites two secular parties (CPR and Ettakatol) and the Islamist party Ennahda – which was established after the elections has been generally well accepted. Despite criticism, it is seen as a government of consensus representing the diverse preferences of the Tunisian people. The creation of several committees to investigate corruption and the reform of different sectors, the amendment of the Information Law to make it more liberal, the intensity of the exchanges within the Constituent Assembly, the discovery of freedom of expression and association and the abundance of local initiatives organisations and associations all reflect the trust and involvement of Tunisians in the process under way while also explaining their positive assessment of the democratisation prospects.

The Islamist party Ennahda emerged at once as an unquestionable actor of the democratic transition in Tunisia. The members and supporters of Ennahda, who were the main victims of Ben Ali’s repression, have had a positive image since the events of December 2010 and January 2011. When they returned from prison or exile, they were seen as uncorrupted figures who could play a key role in the moralisation of political life. Insofar as the rejection of the corruption (fasad) of Ben Ali’s clan was one of the triggers of the revolution, Ennahda’s “clean” image explains the success it enjoyed, at first, among some Tunisian people. This popularity of the Islamist party, and of its historical leader Rachid Ghannouchi, immediately awakened the concerns of numerous commentators and political actors in Tunisia, Europe and the United States. To assuage these concerns, the Ennahda leaders have endlessly insisted on their moderation and firmly committed to not reform the Personal Status Law, to not establish an Islamic state and to work for the development and modernisation of the country. After a stormy debate within the Ennahda movement, it has finally dismissed the idea of including in the preamble of the future constitution any reference to the Sharia. Article 1 of the past constitution, which simply referred to Islam, will remain unchanged. This anti-corruption image and these reassuring statements explain why a majority of Tunisians affirm that political Islam will play an important role in the construction of a democratic regime. It is also worth mentioning that most
Tunisians associate Ben Ali’s regime with the imposition of an authoritarian and feigned state secularism and the ferocious repression of any form of autonomous religious activity. One of the essential elements of the consolidation of Ben Ali’s power has indeed been the exploitation of the so-called Islamist threat. Today, the relative acceptance of the Islamist actors is therefore explained by the rejection of state interference in civil society affairs, whether religious or otherwise. Many accept the Islamist presence in power, not because they share the ideas and values of Ennahda but as a rejection of a restricted pluralism.

However, these positive results cannot conceal the important concerns and doubts that exist within the Tunisian population in terms of the establishment of a lasting democratic regime and the role of political Islam. Two main challenges therefore emerge for the different political actors and the Islamist party in particular. International commentators have largely insisted on the risk posed by the presence of an Islamist party in the government for religious freedom and freedom of expression. The case of the burka at the University of Manouba, the trial of the Nessma TV channel following the screening of the film *Persepolis* or of the trial of two atheists in Mahdia are mentioned as proof of the risk of restricting individual freedoms. Even if these fears are justified, the main challenge for the Islamist party lies elsewhere. The Tunisian revolution was born out of social demands, focusing on the living conditions of unemployed graduates, the rejection of corruption, and dignity. However, after their arrival to government, Tunisian Islamists seem more interested in the political game than in rapidly implementing solutions to these social demands. One of the major challenges for Islamists is, therefore, how they can establish and construct themselves as a credible party, while contributing effective responses to social demands. The second essential challenge facing the Islamist party concerns the construction of a moderate image. Given the very strong concerns of the international community and the Tunisian public, Tunisian Islamists insist that they choose moderation in all respects. However, although this insistence on moderation is reassuring when it refers to the relation between religion and politics, we can wonder what it means in terms of the Islamists’ capacity to make decisions and, in short, to govern. Since their coming to power, Islamists have been criticised by Tunisians not so much for their ideological radicalism but rather because of the slowness with which they make decisions on the most urgent matters: economic and social issues. Therefore, remaining loyal to this commitment to ideological moderation, while making the often radical and urgent decisions required by politics, is indeed the second challenge facing Tunisian Islamists.
THE ISLAMISTS IN THE REALM OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION

RABHA SEIF ALLAM
Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies

As predicted right before Mubarak's fall, the Islamists have widely benefited from the power vacuum in Egypt. Despite the different position they have taken regarding the Egyptian revolution, they were the ultimate winners of all elections held till now. They also altered the public debate focusing on the identity of the state rather than on the reforms that should be introduced to build a new democracy. They were busy pursuing their potential share of power through building an alliance with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and distancing themselves from the revolutionary movement. By doing so, they have given the old despotic regime a precious chance to maintain its presence and launch a counter-revolution to recapture its loss. Nevertheless, the Islamists in Egypt should be carefully differentiated since they are neither adopting the same discourse nor allied over the same policy options.

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the oldest political Islamic movement in Egypt, has had extensive experience in elections since 1984 and a rigid organizational body which is highly effective in mobilization. The MB published several documents in 1996 and 2004 accepting democracy, citizenship and civil state values. However, their last platform published in 2007 has raised many controversies. That document has reflected a deep conflict within the MB, between a reformist trend aiming to evolve the MB's discourse and attitude to fully embrace democracy and a conservative trend preferring to preserve the MB's traditional discourse and elitist internal management.1 Hence, the 2007 platform was released in different versions but the official version was the most conservative, depriving women and non-Muslims from running for the presidency. After the revolution, most of the reformist leaders and youth have left or were expelled from the Brotherhood, and the conservative wing has fully controlled both the Brotherhood and the newly-founded Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).

Although the FJP's platform does not bear the same restrictions on citizenship, its political attitude does not show a real commitment to the values cited in the new platform. The MB was clever enough to issue several promises during the revolution to appease Egyptians' worries about the future, but it was not keen on keeping them. The MB announced in February 2011 that it will run for only 40% of the parliament's seats and will not present a presidential candidate. The Brotherhood has practically broken this promise by running for more than 70% of the lower chamber of parliament and getting 47% of the seats, and running for 96% of the higher chamber and getting 58% of the seats. Moreover, it is still mixing political with religious activism, excessively employing religious arguments in political discourse. It keeps attacking its opponents on religious grounds, practicing a hegemonic attitude towards its political opponents and partners as well, while introducing a softer approach when it comes to negotiating with the SCAF, the real power holder in Egypt today. And rather than consolidating its internal democracy, modernizing its structure and announcing its financial status, the MB was busy with punishing and expelling its reformist members. The Brotherhood has fired a large number of its members for disobedience, including Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, a reformist leader who had decided to run for the presidency, alongside all the MB youth who supported his candidacy.

On the other hand, the Salafi movements, which were prohibiting political activism, have found in politics a good playground to exploit their adherents after Mubarak’s fall. Fragmented in separated networks, they have formed three political parties, but the Al-Nour Party seems to be the most organized and best financed amongst them. After attacking for decades the notions of democracy, human rights and institutional diversity for being imported from western thought, they have integrated them into the Al-Nour Party’s platform, side by side with Islamic Shariah. But, again, the real commitment to these values is not well digested by the party’s leaders and masses. Al-Nour’s parliamentary members have made controversial statements insulting political figures, misleading their masses about different events and suggesting non-democratic policy options. Nevertheless, the official party spokesman was always keen to clarify the real position of Al-Nour and to apologize on behalf of its MPs.

Being new in the field with no previous experience to follow, the Salafis were kind of impressed by the organizational ability of the MB and decided to follow their position and imitate their attitude. But after the referendum results showing that the Yes camp that was interpreted to be Islamists won 77%, the Salafis started to think that their voting machine could successfully compete with the MB rather than cooperating with or following them. They refused to ally with them in parliamentary elections, opposed their candidates in many places and won 24% of the lower chamber and 31% of the higher chamber of the parliament. However, when the parliamentary sessions began, given their lack of experience the Salafis went back to following the FJP members.

According to the Survey of Experts and Actors on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 2011, a seemingly pessimistic Czech academic argued that the Islamists would not necessarily follow democratic rules, recalling that Hitler gained power through fair elections. However, a Tunisian academic is certain that Islamist rule will lead to despotism rather than democracy. A Maltese official agrees implicitly with this view, arguing that a major paradigmatic shift will definitely happen but the direction of this change cannot be predicted. This perspective supposes that democracy is not culturally entrenched in the region, as stated by a Jordanian business actor, hence a deep change in terms of education and culture is a precondition for democratic sustainability in the region. Therefore, the first regime to be established in a country will have a direct impact on the upcoming steps of democratic consolidation in that country, as stated by an Egyptian NGO activist. But since the Islamists, whose intentions regarding democracy are not clear, have accessed power after the first fair elections, the future of democracy in these countries is also not clear.

During the first few sessions, the Islamist parliamentary majority agreed on accrediting the government appointed by the SCAF, containing the criticism addressed by the liberals and leftists to the SCAF and reorienting the agenda to be merely Islamized rather than reformist. In the meantime, the Islamist majority was severely attacked by public opinion for dismissing the revolutionary demands, allying with the SCAF and giving a political cover to an inefficient government. Thus, in a way to repair their popularity, they entered into a clash with the SCAF over the government, requesting its dismissal.

But even during their short clash with the SCAF, the Islamists led by the MB continued their exclusionary attitude regarding the Constituent Assembly formation and wasted a chance to rebuild a national consensus with the liberal and revolutionary parties. By insisting on dominating the Constituent Assembly, they caused the withdrawal of the representatives of the liberals, leftists, Al-Azhar, churches and constitutional court. But only when a judicial appeal forced them to form a new Constituent Assembly based on fair criteria and balanced representation, have they called for national consensus.

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3. Ibid, row 79.
Unlike the referendum and the legislative elections, the Islamists are divided on the eve of the presidential elections. After their clash with the SCAF, the MB broke another promise and presented a presidential candidate. In all cases, the Brotherhood could not stand to be deeply divided if its masses were attracted to its defected reformist leader Abul-Fotouh, or to the independent Salafi candidate Abu-Ismael, who was later disqualified. The Muslim Brotherhood presented two candidates, El-Shater and Morsy, in case one of them was disqualified, in order to guarantee themselves a place at the top of the new system and not just a majority in parliament. But contrary to predictions, the Al-Nour party decided to challenge the hegemonic tendency of the MB and supported Abul-Fotouh, rather than Morsy, who survived the disqualification process. Although it was always introducing religious arguments to justify political choices, the Al-Nour Party argued on a rational basis when choosing Abul-Fotouh. Reacting to that, the MB’s leadership has severely criticized the Salafi choice, accusing them of supporting an “insufficiently” Islamist candidate. This pushed Abul-Fotouh to issue some conservative statements to address the Salafi masses, thereby losing some of his popularity among liberals and leftists. After he was considered as a reformist figure within the Islamist bloc, trying to present a collective project supported by all tendencies on the political sphere, Abul-Fotouh’s real position was questioned. Thus, despite being a minority, the Salafis could eventually alter the political discourse of other moderate Islamists, especially in an electoral context.

The role of political Islam is perceived as decisive in the democratization process, since it is a major factor in undermining it or guaranteeing its success. One Moroccan academic predicts that political Islam’s role will be crucial in the next five to ten years and then it will decline, while others tend to make a distinction between moderates who are ready to build and integrate into a democratic system and radicals who would eventually undermine this system. The Islamist identity could be generally growing, as stated by a French official, but political Islam is not a coherent phenomenon that could be treated as a whole. Hence, only the moderate wing will survive or, more precisely, the realpolitik will turn the Islamists into pragmatic politicians. Thus, the daily interests and needs of the people will play the greater role. In this regard, the Turkish model is quite attractive to the Arab Islamists, as an Algerian media actor predicted.

Undoubtedly, the divide amongst Islamists has lightened the polarization over identity and both the MB and Salafis have shown more flexibility and rationality than they did at the beginning of the process. However, the real attitude and conviction of both trends of political Islam still need to be examined through the drafting of the constitution and the establishment of the new political system. In the meantime, the competition between them could be exploited to consolidate democracy. But despite the importance of the economic factor in a successful transition, both trends are taking this issue lightly and have not yet shown their ability to face it.

A real challenge for democracy in Egypt, as stated by a Moroccan official, is being smashed between the iron fist of military rule and the Islamists’ hegemony in political institutions. Being in alliance since Mubarak’s ousting has not prevented the clash between the two parties, which started in late March 2012 and shadowed the presidential elections. Major topics of disputes were the dissolution of parliament right before the win by the MB’s presidential candidate Mohamed Morsy and the issuing of a restrictive constitutional declaration that removed many of the presidential prerogatives of the SCAF. Being deprived of their parliamentary majority and having decreased authorities for the presidency, the Islamists could not decide on the future of Egypt without the consent of the military, whose role in politics would continue after the transfer

6. Ibid, row 57.
8. Ibid, row 62.
10. Ibid, row 66.
of power to civilian authorities. The military plays a dual role in facing the hegemonic tendency of Islamists, which is positive, but at the same time it is freezing the will of the first freely-elected authority. Therefore, the delicate balance between these two powers could eventually lead to a sustainable democracy through a long track of altered competitive and cooperative relations. In the meantime, the secular political forces need to expand their popular roots within the society, contribute to the cultural change and act as a strong competitor that urges the Islamists to evolve or find their popularity eroded.

Accordingly, a sustainable democracy is not possible in the short term but has more chance in the long term. An Algerian academic is seemingly very convinced that the ultimate destination for the region is democracy since the absence of democracy was the main reason for this change to occur. According to a Turkish academic, the consolidation of democracy is a long process that engages free elections, rule of law, checks and balances, educational reform, secular laws, freedom of expression and women’s rights. Such a process typically needs strong institutions to implement it, and Egypt is amongst those countries with a real chance to succeed in this process, as a Moroccan academic stated. A French official suggests that Egypt’s chance to consolidate democracy is not affected by the fact of being governed by Islamists. An Algerian academic agrees with this opinion by stating that Egypt is culturally prepared to host a real democracy, while others place Egypt fourth, after Tunisia, Morocco and Lebanon, as major countries likely to achieve sustainable democracies.

Graph 1: Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in the following countries
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very improbable and 10 for very probable)

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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

13. Ibid, row 58.
15. Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy, on a scale of 0-10, Egypt received 5.09.
This ranking seems quite logical, since the Tunisian and Moroccan Islamists are more respectful of democratic rules than their Egyptian fellows. Having attained power before the Egyptian Islamists, the Tunisian and Moroccan experience of Islamist governments would have a great impact on the Egyptian experience.

**Graph 2: Role of political Islam in the future Mediterranean landscape**

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for negligible role and 10 for key role)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
THE RESPONSES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE CHANGES IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD

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Introduction

The first European Union (EU) responses to the Arab upheavals have been introduced within the framework of the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Much was expected from the EU which, just like its member states, was not prepared to face such major uprisings or even civil wars. All in all, the responses provided by the respondents concerning the EU’s initiatives were quite positive. However, this should be properly interpreted. First of all, the specificities of the sample have to be taken into account. It should also be underlined that this Survey is not a traditional opinion poll. Second, most of the initiatives taken by the EU to support transition are generally welcome as the demand for the EU to play an active role is considerable. Third, expectations are high so there could be important disappointments and frustrations if the EU fails to address this new challenge.

1. A broadly speaking positive assessment of the role played by the EU during the first phase of the Arab uprisings

The answers to the Euromed Survey reveal that, globally speaking, the assessment of the role played by the EU during the first phase of the Arab uprisings is positive.

1.1 The revision of the ENP and the priorities identified in the EU’s communications on “A new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”

As indicated in the Survey report, there is an “overall positive assessment” of the measures adopted by the EU in response to the Arab uprisings and following the revision of the ENP. The initiatives “meant to improve the mobility of people and to improve the rural development” are considered as the most important ones. This is no surprise as mobility has always been considered as a top priority in Euromed relations. The SPRING programme that aims at regrouping a number of EU initiatives to support the transitions is also positively assessed, though less so compared to the other initiatives. In terms of geographical breakdown, a more finely-tuned analysis of the answers reveals that generally speaking (i.e. for all sub-questions) the least enthusiastic respondents are the Turkish and Israeli ones (notably for the mobility issues, even if the average still remains positive: 6.9/10 and 6.5/10, respectively). The least popular initiative is the European Endowment for Democracy (a mean of 6.8/10) with Israel (average of 6.3/10) and the “rest of the EU” (average of 6.4/10) being the less enthusiastic. Note that Maghreb respondents are more positive (average of 7.4/10) than Mashreq respondents (average of 6.8/10) on this issue.

Graph 1: Assessing the relevance of the priorities that were identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”?

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for not relevant and 10 for very relevant)

Mobility – improve “visa facilitation”, conclude “Mobility Partnerships”, improve “people-to-people contacts”, labour mobility and enhance “students, researchers and business persons’ mobility”

Create a European Neighbourhood “Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development”

Market access – consider allowing partners that have a fully functioning independent judiciary, an efficient public administration and have made significant progress towards eradicating corruption, into the non-regulated area of the [EU] Internal Market for goods

Create a “Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility”, “designed to strengthen the capacity of civil society to promote reform and increase public accountability in their countries” (£22 million)

Conclude and implement new “Neighbourhood Agreements”, as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty (Article B TEU), which will establish Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)

Money – reallocating/refocusing additional financial resources to support democratic transitions, institution building, civil society and the socio-economic needs of the countries. For instance the loss of income from tourism in Egypt and Tunisia (SPRING Programme £250 million for 2011 and 2012)

Create a “European Endowment for Democracy” (to “help political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners”)

It is of course not possible at this stage of the implementation of the new EU initiatives in response to the Arab uprisings and of the revision of the ENP to analyse any kind of impact. The answers are thus based on the sole choice of policy priorities. If we go back to the previous Surveys we see that in general any action or initiative taken by the EU in favour of its Mediterranean Partners is positively received. The relatively lower enthusiasm shown for the European Endowment for Democracy could be explained by the fact that little information was available at the time of the publication of the Survey. Moreover, this initiative has generated a debate, notably on the modalities of this new initiative, contrary to other proposals made in the two communications.

The other priorities identified by respondents in the open comments relate mainly to the “educational issues” in a broad sense (professional training included) with an obvious link to youth, employment and women. A “serious educational partnership with the Arab World” has been proposed, for example. Moreover, “Research and Student Exchanges” are to be further developed. As this issue has already been addressed by the EU, some respondents again stressed that education should be one of the main priorities of the EU’s action. It is also important to underline that this is also a trend in the two previous Surveys. The second main theme identified in the open questions relates to the need to develop more the “intercultural dialogue” between the EU and its southern neighbours. Another recurring issue relates to the implementation phase of the projects and to the need, in the medium and long term, to develop a “strategy with a good monitoring system” accompanied by better communication, notably to reinforce “confidence” between the two shores.

The obvious recommendation that can be derived from the analysis and interpretation of the Survey results is that an extra effort is needed in terms of communicating to the public at large and to the Euromed community the strategy developed by the EU following the so-called “Arab Spring”. The strategy and its components are not sufficiently known and understood. Moreover, the priority of the priorities should be “education” at large with a special emphasis on youth and women. The new initiative related to rural areas has also been very welcomed, indicating an important need.
1.2 An EU financial response considered as being insufficient

The EU financial response to the Arab Spring was referred to in the Survey as the SPRING Programme (€350 million for 2011 and 2012) and the loans from the European Investment Bank (US $7.5 billion until 2013). Here, one should note that the negative answers (0-4 on the scale), i.e. respondents considering these amounts to be totally negligible to play a role in the current context, represents 28% of respondents, namely almost a third of the total. Up to 11% consider these amounts as highly negligible (0-2 on the scale). Israeli respondents are the most positive (average of 7.2/10), while the Turkish are the most negative (average of 5.3/10). It is thus obvious that a majority of respondents consider the EU financial effort as not being sufficient to play a (very) significant role in the support of the Arab Spring. This is no surprise as there is obviously a gap between the big financial effort that is needed and the limited amount of funds at the disposal of the EU, at least in terms of grants, and this before the next financial perspectives.

Graph 2: Assessing the EU financial response to the Arab Spring

(average on a scale of 0-10)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

The fact that the Arab uprisings occurred at the end of the first phase of the ENP corresponding to the current financial perspective (2007-2013) limited, on the one hand, the action of the EU (even if the EIB’s own budget was not affected). On the other hand, it gave the EU enough time to properly refine its financial strategy that will be implemented with the new European Neighbourhood Instrument3 from 2013 onwards, even if the current financial and economic crisis could limit again the EU’s capacity for financial intervention.

Two key issues are mentioned in the open comments of the respondents. First of all, the disbursement rate of the EU funds. One respondent notes for instance that the “absorption capacity is the issue here as well as the capacity for disbursement of the EU Institutions.” It is important, for example, to ensure that the “disbursement is timely scheduled, well monitored according to well-defined conditionalities”; another respondent stressed that “there is a gap between earmarked assistance and actual disbursement.” The ENI includes improvements at procedural level, so this will hopefully ease things, but a training programme on EU project financing and management would certainly also be welcome. Another recurring point in the open responses is that the breakdown of the financial amounts indicated are not clear enough, and neither are the modalities of the disbursement: “it is not quite clear how it will be shared

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among social partners and which will be its effective breakdown for countries and sectors”; the “main issue is how the funds will be used and where they go,” added another respondent. This thus confirms the previous conclusions on the need to develop new and more efficient communication tools on the side of the EU to better inform, even experts, about the decisions adopted by the EU. In such a crucial transition process, the EU should be as clear and as transparent as possible in terms of financing. Therefore, the visibility of the financial aid should certainly be reinforced. There is a clear need to show that the EU supports democratic transitions without reservations and to put forward concrete examples of the potential impact of the EU support both from EU and EIB budgets.

1.3 A rather positive assessment of the EU responses regarding the Libyan civil war

Concerning the assessment of the EU’s first responses regarding Libya’s civil war (i.e. humanitarian aid, consular cooperation, evacuations/civil protection and FRONTEX border control operations), 31% of the respondents are at first sight quite surprisingly negative (0-4 on a scale from 0 to 10), but a relative majority of them (56%) do consider the measures as positive (6-10 on the scale). 23% are actually very positive (8-10 on the scale). Thus, the overall balance is positive but the percentage of negative responses is not negligible, providing for a quite contrasted picture. In terms of geographical breakdown, Israeli respondents were the most positive (average of 7.2/10), while Turkish respondents were neither positive nor negative (average of 5/10). The Survey mean being 5.6, it seems clear that this issue is dividing the respondents as a whole and across geographical categories.

Even if the question addressed the non-military first responses regarding Libya’s civil war, certainly the reference to the FRONTEX border control operation played a key role in the results of the Survey as this was an issue that has been debated during and after the operations. The launch of the “EPN Hermes operation” and the proposal made by France and Italy to re-establish border controls has apparently been perceived as the consolidation of “fortress Europe”.

Moreover, it is clear in the open comments that the main issue here was that EU security interests prevailed over the humanitarian dimension in the South. Some comments are quite tough referring to a security “obsession” on the side of the EU. One respondent underlined the “political mistake when the first proposal made to the NCT is to support border control.” Regarding the humanitarian aspects, the generosity of Tunisia and Malta has been underlined. All in all, the assessment by the respondents is sometimes quite contrasted and the mix of security issues together with the humanitarian aspects of the crisis have not been well perceived, to the point that the issue of the “double standard approach” resurfaced in a number of comments.
It seems obvious that a reflection is needed at EU level to see to what extent it is possible to combine security initiatives like border control with humanitarian assistance operations. The attempt to launch a Petersberg military mission in support of the humanitarian assistance operations in this regard has failed, but this might be a good thing.

2. What kind of role could the EU play in the near future?

2.1 A proactive and cautious role

Question 16 of the Survey was of particular importance as it is related to the (non-)intervention of the EU in the various MPcs. According to the Survey report, the “majority of respondents think the EU should remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from the MPcs.” It is interesting here to detail the responses of experts and actors when they were asked to give their view on their own country for the question “should the EU make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of the extremist parties.” Below is the ranking of the results of the Survey:

Graph 4: Assessing of the EU’s role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries: The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties (responses of participants on their own country)

These results are interesting, but of course the specificities of the current sample need to be taken into consideration (i.e. the number of respondents per country and the breakdown of professional categories; see the Survey report in this regard). At one end of the spectrum, Syrian respondents are the ones that most want EU influence to be felt in their country to “avoid the

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takeover by the extremist parties." This is easily interpreted given the current dramatic situation on the ground. At the other end of the spectrum, few Egyptian respondents (11%) are in favour of this kind of action in Egypt. This clearly shows the difference of both situations: one civil war and a revolutionary process that has led to a constitutional reform and elections (with almost one third of representatives of a Salafist party being elected). It is thus perceived that, in certain specific cases, an overly strong EU political intervention could be counterproductive.

If one takes the group of respondents as a whole and all the countries mentioned above, one can see that:

- between 11% and 19% are in favour of the EU remaining neutral in all MPCs in general;
- between 31% and 48% are in favour of the EU remaining cautious and working on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs in all MPCs in general;
- between 16% and 34% are in favour of the EU being “very proactive and interventionist” in all MPCs in general;
- between 15% and 32% are in favour of the EU “making its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties” in all MPCs in general.

**Graph 5: Assessment of the EU’s role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries**

Here, the results are also of interest. First, it is clear that the majority of the respondents do not favour a neutral stance on the part of the EU. The highest percentages are to be found first in the category of “EU should remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands”, followed by the EU should be “very proactive” and even (in quite similar proportions) the EU should “make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties.” Generally speaking, the EU is thus asked to play a real and concrete role in the current situation in the Mediterranean. However, one should read this conclusion in the light of the results above, so this involvement should be highly differentiated and carefully thought out.

One key recommendation would be to deepen the first results of the Survey in order to get a more complete picture of the perceptions regarding the role the EU should or could play with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries. It would be, for instance, interesting to identify what are to be considered as the ultimate limits of the EU’s potential interventions or to identify mechanisms and procedures that could avoid any misunderstanding about the type and nature of intervention the EU can conduct in the framework of political transitions so as to avoid the “neo-colonialist” flavour mentioned by some respondents.
2.1.1 The use of positive conditionality when partners fail to introduce democratic reforms

Question 17 is about the type of policy response the EU should provide in relation to countries that fail to introduce democratic reforms. Three options were proposed to the respondents:

i) The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPC internal affairs;

ii) The EU should use positive conditionality (on the basis of the “more for more” approach: “The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU” and vice versa);

iii) The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country).

A fine-tuned analysis of the responses reveals the following: first of all, the percentage of respondents in favour of the EU remaining neutral is, indeed, low (the Survey mean is 13%). This is shared by MPCs and EU countries (14% and 12%, respectively). This confirms the results of question 16 (see above). The second conclusion to be inferred is that the respondents favour largely positive conditionality and therefore the use of incentives (the Survey mean is 67%). Here, there is a slight difference between the northern and southern partners, as EU countries are more in favour of positive conditionality than MPCs (71% and 64%, respectively). Finally, the negative conditionality is the least chosen option with a Survey mean of 16% and a slight geographical difference as MPCs are slightly more in favour of using this option than EU countries (18% and 15%, respectively). This is also interesting as 16% of responses is not negligible and as the question referred to a case where an MPC would have “only” “failed to introduce democratic reforms.” It thus confirms the demand for quite a strong role on the part of the EU even when this entails the use of negative conditionality.

Graph 6: EU policy response in relation to countries that fail to introduce democratic reforms (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediterranean Partner Countries</th>
<th>EU Countries</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPC internal affairs</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use positive conditionality (on the basis of the “more for more” approach: “The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU” and vice versa)</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>71%</td>
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<tr>
<td>The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country: freezing of political dialogue, restrictive financial measures, suspension of the implementation of EU agreement, assistance is primarily used to “support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratisation process in partner countries”...)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

In terms of sub-regions, Israel and the Maghreb countries are more in favour of using negative conditionality (25% and 21%, respectively), whereas the European non-EU countries are less in favour of this option (10%). There is a contradiction in the case of Maghrebian countries, as it is the sub-region that most favours the EU remaining neutral (18%). This shows that some experts and actors are divided on this issue even if a clear majority (59%) is in favour of positive conditionality. The same scenario applies to the Mashreq: a majority of respondents support the use of positive conditionality whereas an almost equal number of respondents are in favour of EU “neutrality” or of the “use of negative conditionality” (16% and 14%, respectively).
Since the events that started in Tunisia, the European Union has used negative conditionality in Libya, Syria and Tunisia, mainly in the form of restrictive measures (freezing of financial assets etc.), whereas positive conditionality has been used as the main strategy for the ENP since its inception. The answers of the Survey reveal that there is quite a significant variety of positions. Of course, it is very tricky to answer this question without having in mind a precise case study, but this confirms that conditionality remains a highly controversial issue.

As far as the open comments of the respondents are concerned, three main issues should be highlighted. First of all, a respondent stated that “a regulated shift between positive and negative conditionality may be required to best articulate the EU policy response.” This confirms the fact that both positive and negative elements can be combined and (re-)balanced depending on the situation. Second, the need to differentiate the approach on a country by country basis and to take into account specific contexts has been underlined. Finally, it has been mentioned that the “EU should be more cautious in general” vis-à-vis the sovereignty of the countries concerned and should bear in mind the risk of its policies being perceived as “neo-colonialist”.

In terms of policy recommendations, it seems obvious that a deep reflection is to be launched on the issue of conditionality in the current context. The new deep democracy criteria mentioned in the recent communications of the High Representative and of the Commission should for instance be specified more clearly and also better explained. There is a duty of pedagogy on the side of the EU to explain its strategy in the field of conditionality. There is sometimes a sense of double standard approach that might actually be motivated by the absence of any kind of military intervention in the case of Syria (see also question 18) and the emotions generated by the civil war in this country. However, it is not well known that a series of restrictive measures have been adopted by the EU and its member states vis-à-vis this country. Once again, a more dynamic communications strategy could certainly help to clarify and explain the EU’s positions and actions undertaken. This should be done in particular with regard to the general public, but also at the level of experts and actors of Euromed relationships.
2.1.2 A mix between positive and negative conditionality and the use of force as the last resort when countries implement repressive measures against popular movements

Question 18 of the Survey relates to the situation of several MPCs and could thus be considered with special interest by decision-makers. Here, more options were offered to respondents when they were asked about the type of response the EU should use when countries implement repressive measures against popular movements:

i) The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPC internal affairs;
ii) The EU should use positive conditionality;
iii) The EU should use negative conditionality;
iv) The EU should promote the use of the whole range of sanctions at international level;
v) The EU and its member states should promote the use of force within the framework of a UN Security Council resolution.

The overall results show that the least favoured options are i) and v), the most "extreme ones", namely neutrality and the use of force. The use of force is clearly the last resort (Survey mean: 5%) and neutrality is also not favoured by the vast majority of respondents (Survey mean: 6%). The majority of answers is, in general (see below) quite well distributed across options ii), iii) and iv), i.e. the EU should use "positive" and "negative" conditionality or even promote the use of the "whole range of sanctions at international level" in relation to countries that implement "repressive measures against popular movements."

Graph 8: EU policy response in relation to countries that implement repressive measures against popular movements (%)

This confirms the appropriateness of the reorientation of the ENP: i.e. reinforcing positive conditionality (incentives) and negative conditionality (restrictive measures) at the same time in order to face situations where MPCs implement "repressive measures against popular movements." In terms of geographical breakdown per sub-region, Turkish respondents are those who most support the use of force (10%) followed by Israeli respondents (8%) and by respondents from the rest of the EU (i.e. non-Mediterranean EU countries). This comes as no surprise since these two countries have both recently implemented military interventions in their neighbourhoods (Kurdistan, Palestinian Territories) and directly face important security/military challenges.
The need to proceed on a case-by-case basis taking into account specific contexts is highlighted by respondents. In terms of sanctions it has been noted that the “EU working with international organisations can be more effective.” This aspect of the international coordination has been referred to several times regarding EU cooperation with the Arab League, the GCC and with international (UN) and regional actors (such as Turkey). On the use of force, comments stress that this should only be possible in cooperation with the Arab League and international organisations. An important concern is also to avoid any impact on civilians.

The answers of the Survey reveal that respondents from the Maghreb are in general keener on interventions on the side of the EU than respondents from the Mashreq countries. This can be explained by the very sensitive situation of the region and the links with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the wider Middle East environment (i.e. Iraq and Iran). There is a clear need to implement a cautious differentiated approach in the two regions. Obviously, it could be very important to draw the lessons from the military operations conducted in Libya and to conduct an analysis to understand the current perceptions of the population of the South in the current context.

### 2.1.3 The use of a “conditionality mix” together with a broad support of NGOs when countries implement repressive measures against women’s rights and gender equality

This question focused on women as this cross-cutting issue is of special relevance to the current Survey. 4 options were proposed in the question “what should be the EU policy response in relation to countries that implement repressive measures against women’s rights and gender equality?:

i) The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPC internal affairs;

ii) The EU should use positive conditionality (ibid.);

iii) The EU should use negative conditionality (ibid.);

iv) The EU should support NGOs and individuals that are engaged in women’s rights promotion.
Taking the set of answers as a whole, it is clear that options ii), iii) and iv) are considered broadly as having the same importance (between 25-30% for each of the three options). The percentage of those in favour of neutrality is 5% for the Survey mean. The message is thus very clear: use all measures at the EU’s disposal equally to counter the adoption of “repressive measures against women’s rights and gender equality.” It is also important to highlight that the sub-regional breakdown shows that it is the Maghreb (9%) followed by the “rest of the EU” (7%) which are in favour of EU neutrality. This stands in sharp contrast to respondents from the Mashreq (4% in favour of neutrality). The lowest result being Mediterranean EU countries with only 2% in favour of a neutral EU position. This is not necessarily easy to interpret as local context matters. Moreover, the gender balance of the Survey sample must be taken into consideration for this specific question (see the Survey report).

Graph 10: EU policy response in relation to countries that implement repressive measures against women rights and gender equality (%)

In their comments, most of the respondents insisted on the need to support NGOs and individuals: for instance “a regulated shift between positive/negative conditionality may be required to best articulate an EU policy response while EU support towards NGOs and individuals should continue in parallel to other reactions.” The emphasis on open comments is more on the specific “rights of women” rather than on “gender equality” as such. The status of women is in fact considered as “fundamental” for the democratic transitions in the MPCs.

In terms of policy-orientated recommendations, it would therefore be very interesting to assess how the Moudawana experience in Morocco has been perceived in the country and in the region as a whole and to see to what extent it has promoted an emancipation of women in Moroccan society. Fears that the rights gained by Tunisian women might be lost if the political orientation of the recent elections were to be confirmed at constitutional level were raised by many observers. Moreover, the declaration about the role of Sharia in Libya confirms the need for the EU to continue to consider this issue as strategic for the promotion of the democratic transitions.5

2.2 Support for civil society regardless of religious affiliation

Question 20 related to the way the EU should allocate its aid in terms of support for civil society organisations (CSOs). Three options were proposed:

i) The EU should only give support to organisations from the secular spectrum;

ii) The EU should also give support to organisations from the religious spectrum;

iii) The EU should give support to organisations regardless of their religious affiliation.

According to the Survey report, “the majority of respondents think that the EU should give support to groupings regardless of their religious affiliation (64%, on average) and about a quarter of respondents believe the EU should only support groupings from the secular spectrum.” Actually, very few respondents (3% for the Survey mean) considered that the “EU should also give support to organisations from the religious spectrum.” Taking into account the geographical dimension, it is interesting to note that respondents from European non-EU countries are those who are the most in favour of providing support to “organisations from the religious spectrum” (10%), respondents from the Maghreb being the least enthusiastic (1%).

Graph 11: How should the EU allocate its aid in support of civil society (%)

Source: Compiled by the IEmed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

The religious organisations enjoy a certain degree of popularity in some “non-Mediterranean EU countries” or “other European non-EU countries”. This is due to the perceptions of the different roles played by Christians (both Catholics and Orthodox), but also Muslim organisations. The debates that surrounded the inclusion of a reference to Christianity in the EU draft Constitutional Treaty illustrated a clear division between some member states and candidate countries and this also seems to be reflected in this Survey. For Arab countries, the percentage of answers in favour of this option is very low. The lowest percentage (0%) paradoxically comes from Turkish respondents. It is a paradox that a political party of Islamic beliefs has been presiding over the destiny of this secular country for a number of years now.

Generally speaking, if respondents in the open comments are in favour of the fact that the EU could provide aid to “organisations regardless of their religious affiliation” this is to be subjected to clear conditionalities, notably in terms of human rights (including women’s rights) and international law. Moreover, a “deep understanding of religious issues is needed” together with a “real questioning of the definition of democracy.” Transparency and accountability are also mentioned by respondents and should be considered by the EU as being key elements of the new strategy.
Conclusion

The EU’s attention should be focused on the transparency and conditionality of financing mechanisms. As a new instrument for the ENP will soon be implemented, this should be taken as an opportunity to launch an information campaign vis-à-vis the potential beneficiaries of the actions foreseen in support of the socioeconomic and political transitions in the southern Mediterranean.

There is also an obvious need to better understand the perception of the initiatives launched by the EU to support the transitions in certain MPCs. A carefully thought out strategy based on differentiation is to be implemented in the coming months by the EU. The comments and answers provided at the occasion of this Survey shows that there can in fact be a great variety in the answers of the different categories of respondents regarding sensitive issues such as conditionality or support given to civil society.

Such a complex context requires a crystal-clear EU strategy based on a solid analysis and on a deep understanding of the various perceptions in the South. The results of the Survey give us much food for thought in this regard.
EUROMED POLITICAL 
AND SECURITY COOPERATION: 
A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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Introduction

One of the main results of the Euromed Survey 2011 is the positive assessment of Euromed cooperation in the fight against international terrorism and organized crime. 69% of the respondents think there has been progress in preventing and combating terrorism, 59% of them see progress in the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking. Security issues are on top of the EU’s policy agenda with regard to the MENA region and they also rank high on the policy agenda of old and new regimes in the South. At the same time, however, the assessment of developments in the field of democracy promotion and human rights is negative overall. 46% of the respondents cannot find any progress in the development of rule of law and democracy and 10% even think there is regression. A good deal worse is the assessment with regard to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Here 42% of the respondents negate progress and 16% come to the conclusion that there had been regression.

Graph 1: Assessing the progress achieved in the objectives set in the Political and Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Euro-Mediterranean Political and Security Cooperation can be analysed from various angles. The focus of this analysis is not so much on the achievements in the field of security policies as such, but rather on the presumed side effects of enhanced and successful security cooperation on other policy fields, especially the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights. My argument is that success in the security dimension of Euromed cooperation and failure in its normative dimension interrelate with each other. The results of the questionnaire back this assumption, as could be expected since it is not at all new. However, they also provide us with new and unexpected insights, thereby drawing a more nuanced picture of EU Mediterranean relations before, during and after the Arab Spring. This analysis is structured in five sections. Chapter two summarises the results of the questionnaire regarding the EU’s impact on political change in various countries of the MENA region. We wanted to know whether the EU is perceived as a supporter of political change or rather as a preserver of stability, which was, and in most countries still is, provided by longstanding autocratic regimes. Chapter three has a focus on the concept of security, including a gender-perspective. What does security mean for women in the MENA region and how do their demands impact on Euromed relations? In chapter five, a few basic policy recommendations will be drawn from the key findings of this analysis. Before that, however, a few things need to be said with regard to the methodological constraints of this Survey.

**Methodological Constraints**

This Survey is not a public opinion poll, but an exercise of assessment and identification of the main successes and difficulties, potential and shortcomings of institutionalised Euro-Mediterranean relations. Therefore, only actors and experts involved have been interviewed within this project. Against this background it is astonishing, if not worrying, how many people answered with “Don’t know” to some of the questions, especially those regarding specific programmes and budget lines. This confirms that the “Euromed machinery” is still a domain of experts that does not reach out to the people. But not only that; even within this elite group of experts we find more or less knowledge with regard to the various policy fields. To represent the different degrees of expertise, the statistical material drawn from the questionnaire differentiates between the answers given only by those who perceive themselves as experts in a specific policy field on the one hand, and the answers given by all respondents, including those who answered “Don’t know”, on the other. Unless stated otherwise, my analysis is based on the answers of the well-informed group. By doing so I am well aware that this group is extremely small and thus not representative in strict statistical terms. Furthermore, it is likely that the assessment of officials within the “Euromed machinery” is unduly positive since they are asked to assess their own work. Nevertheless, the opinion of this small, involved, and elitist group is decisive in assessing the state of affairs in Euromed relations since they are the ones who know the complexity of all the problems in hand.

Another thing that needs to be considered to put the results of my analysis into perspective concerns the rapid changes in the region that we have been witnessing since December 2010. Many actors have changed and in some countries it is not yet clear who the relevant actors will be. For us it was extremely difficult and in part simply impossible to detect the relevant actors and experts within the newly evolving political elites. It is quite likely that many of them either had not been asked or, when asked, could not answer in detail due to their lack of familiarity with institutionalised Euromed relations. All in all, we find among the respondents many people – in some countries presumably the majority – that are part of old regimes. When analysing answers in the context of the Arab Spring this needs to be taken into consideration, since their perceptions and interests are presumably antithetic to the perceptions and interests of change agents. Last but not least, the enlargement of institutionalised Euromed relations must not be forgotten. With the coming into being of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008, south-eastern Mediterranean countries, namely Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro, joined the club. The answers of representatives from these countries have little to do with the political changes in the Arab World and follow their own logics of action. Furthermore, attention
should be paid to comments of respondents criticizing the broadness of some of the questions. Firstly, because the differences between the countries are so big that questions concerning the region as such were sometimes problematic. Other respondents addressed the problem of causality. How can we know exactly where political change comes from? Internal and or external factors can trigger change but we have no means to quantify their impact.

Most of these methodological constraints are due to the exceptional circumstances in the region and therefore could not be avoided. In consequence, however, the data needs to be analysed with great care. No final results should be drawn from this Survey. It is rather a matter of detecting the relevant questions for a new research agenda to understand what is going on in this rapidly changing region and how Europe should (re-)act. Nevertheless, I will draw a few practical conclusions from my analysis with regard to those results that I perceive as sufficiently cogent.

**The EU as a Change Agent in the South?**

As said in the introduction, there is a significant discrepancy between the positive assessment of Euromed cooperation in the realm of security (terrorism, organized crime and drug-trafficking) and a negative assessment of Euromed cooperation in the realm of democratization and respect for human rights. Both dimensions, security and democratization, interrelate with each other, since democracy promotion functions as a long-term instrument to foster stability in the EU’s neighbourhood. EU democracy promotion is not driven by normative considerations alone, but serves also – and perhaps even foremost – as a strategy of EU security policy. Inspired by the theorem of democratic peace, the European Security Strategy (2003) clearly mentions the EU’s interest in being surrounded by a “ring of democratic friends.” Democracies are believed to be more reliable and predictable than other regimes, using peaceful means of conflict resolution, at least between each other. With regard to its southern neighbours, however, the EU felt confronted with a dilemma. Being convinced that Arab autocracy is insuperable and misperceiving the aspirations and capabilities of modern Arab society, the EU opted for the autocratic regimes. They seemed to be the only reliable and predictable partners with regard to core interests of the community: keeping down political Islam, fighting international terrorism, holding back migrants, and serving Europe’s growing energy demands. With the inauguration of the strictly intergovernmental Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008, the EU seemed to have given up the political goal of democracy promotion, offering the autocratic regimes in its southern neighbourhood co-ownership and unconditioned cooperation in depoliticized functional projects.

Since the Arab Spring, it has become obvious that this policy was a failure, since it produced neither democracy nor stability, but a huge credibility gap. The 2011 Euromed Survey confirms this negative assessment, proving growing disenchantment with the UfM in the answers to question two. Lessons learned from this failure can be found in the EU’s renewed neighbourhood policy, which has re-strengthened the normative dimension of Euromed relations. According to the answers given to question nine, this policy change is welcomed by most of the respondents. So is the EU’s impact on political change, which is considered to be high at least with regard to the revolutionary countries. According to the answers given to question six, the EU has supported change in Libya (72%), Tunisia (58%), Egypt (48%) and Syria (42%). In contrast, EU policies with regard to those countries where a spill-over from the Arab Spring is restrained with a mix of modest reform and repression, no fundamental policy change can be detected on the side of the EU. Here, only a minority of respondents concede a positive impact of the EU on policy change: in Algeria (11%), Jordan (13%), the Occupied Palestinian Territories (14%), Lebanon (15%) and Morocco (24%). A prudent conclusion that could be drawn from this data is that the EU does not really follow a new approach with regard to the stability-democracy dilemma, but merely adapts its policy when forced to by the circumstances in specific countries. It seems as though the stability paradigm still prevails in EU Mediterranean politics, at the expense of democracy promotion, including respect for human rights.
**Graph 2: Assessment of the role of the EU in the Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”**

When analysing the results of the questions concerning security on the one hand and democratisation on the other, it is interesting to have a closer look at the “Don’t know” answers. Whereas 7% of the respondents feel unable to answer questions concerning progress in the fight against terrorism and 10% cannot assess progress in the fight against organised crime, people seem to be much more aware of the political situation in their countries. Only 1% could not assess the development of democracy and rule of law and only 2% answered “Don’t know” to the question concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms. Obviously, people can literally feel the lack of freedom in their everyday life. Freedom from fear is one of the criteria defining the concept of human security.

Even more interesting is the analysis of the “Don’t know” answers if we differentiate between men and women. Merely 4% of the men could not assess progress in the fight against terrorism compared to 15% of the women who had been asked. Concerning the fight against organized crime, the knowledge gap is even wider: 7% of the men could not answer this question, compared to 23% of the women. Security in the traditional sense is obviously a male domain.

**Graph 3: Evaluating the progress achieved in the field of the objectives of the Political and Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration**

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
In contrast, women seem to be extremely sensitive in their assessment of the normative dimension of Euromed relations. While the group of (well-informed) women assesses the development of democracy more positively than the (well-informed) group of men (progress is seen by 47% of women compared to 43% of men), they are more sceptical when it comes to human rights and fundamental freedoms. 37% of the female respondents see no progress in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and 25% even perceive regression, compared to 44% of the men who see progress in this field. It is quite likely that the lack of women’s rights, which in most MENA countries is more problematic than elsewhere in the world, can explain this divergence in male and female perspectives. Women’s security is threatened on various levels, be it through domestic violence, structural violence (e.g. personal status law) or repressive violence (e.g. “virginity tests”). The next Survey 2012 will have to be more sensitive with regard to this dimension of security, which cannot be de-coupled from democracy and human rights. The rather vague concept of human security is highly debated for well-known reasons. In the preparation of the Euromed Survey 2012, however, it might be useful to add this dimension.

Graph 4: Evaluating the progress achieved in the field of the objectives of the Political and Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

Expectations

Having neglected Arab civil society, and having antagonized political Islam, there are no established channels of communication between the EU and the new political actors in the Arab southern neighbourhood. The EU simply does not know them. Against this background, it is more than difficult for the EU to enter into a dialogue with the newly evolving regimes, which in most cases will have a strong Islamist bias, and the very heterogeneous spectrum of civil society, including the liberal vanguard of Tharir Square. After all, what could the EU say to the young rebels that tried to free themselves from rulers that had enjoyed decades of European backing? It is no surprise that the respondents are rather hesitant when asked about their expectations concerning future EU action. The majority of respondents think the EU should remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from the South. However, there are differences according to specific countries. Here, the results from the questionnaire confirm the EU’s new strategy to give up on regionalism and develop instead tailor-made programmes to meet the specific needs of each country. With the ENP Action Plans, the EU already started on this track in 2004 and will deepen it further. If this is the case, not the UfM but the ENP will be the decisive framework of future Euromed relations. However, according to the questionnaire, quite a lot of respondents, even those who denounce the UfM, still believe...
in its Secretariat. Since the Secretariat plays a major role in the administration of the technical projects, among others the solar plan, it is more than likely that this dimension of the UfM will survive. Yet the projects are a deliberately de-politicised domain of Euromed relations and will therefore not be the framework for the EU to impact on processes of transition in the South. All in all, countries like Tunisia that have already entered a process of transition, will be easier to approach than countries like Egypt where the power struggle has not yet come to an end, to say nothing of Syria, which is almost out of reach for the EU.

The overall demand for the proactive, yet cautious, involvement of the EU in southern partner countries contrasts with the discourse on this sensitive issue that seems to prevail in Euromed academic conferences and civil society meetings. Here much more scepticism can be felt among southern participants, embedded in fundamental criticism on past EU Mediterranean policy. Apart from the fact that this scepticism cannot be measured, it is worth considering that perhaps especially those respondents who work in the “Euromed Machinery”, be it as officials, NGOs, or entrepreneurs, demand an active EU involvement in the region.

Conclusions

For the EU, which so far has had extremely dense yet almost exclusively intergovernmental relations with its southern neighbours, the Arab Spring was an embarrassment, because it revealed the credibility gap between the EU’s normative rhetoric on democracy promotion and its realpolitik on the ground, supporting autocratic regimes at the cost of domestic change agents. Thus, it is time for a fundamental policy change. The analysis of the Euromed Survey 2011 gives a few hints on the direction to go:

1) The EU should give up the one-sided focus on stability. Although it is more than likely that processes of transformation in the MENA region will be lengthy and presumably also violent, change as such should not be perceived as a threat to European interests. Change is a precondition for long-term democratisation.

2) The EU should not trade stability against democracy and human rights anymore. Having adopted the renewed neighbourhood strategy with its strong normative dimension, which is welcomed by most of the respondents, words should be followed by deeds.

3) Avoid double standards: the EU will create a new credibility gap when supporting change agents in one country (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt) and not in others (e.g. Algeria, Jordan). People in the region are very well aware of such incoherencies.

4) If democracy is to come from within a country, the EU should give up on intergovernmentalism and open up to civil society. This includes the very heterogeneous spectrum of political Islam.

5) Make gender democracy part and parcel of EU democracy promotion and human rights. When doing so, however, it is important not to impose European concepts of gender democracy, but to stick to universal standards on the one hand (CEDAW) and the domestic gender discourses within each country on the other.

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On 18th December 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest against corruption and mistreatment by the Tunisian police force, the course of events which followed his self-immolation took both human rights activists, who had spent years monitoring human rights violations and oppression in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and policy-makers and journalists by surprise. Eric Goldstein (2012) from Human Rights Watch admitted that although they knew about the problems in the region, “we failed to see how quickly it could ignite into a region-wide revolt that is, in large part, a struggle for dignity.” This struggle seems to be far from ending. Violent clashes continue in Syria; following the presidential elections, reforms have not yet taken place in Yemen; protestors in Saudi Arabia are re-organizing by forming new alliances such as the women’s right to drive campaign; the tension in Tahrir is increasing, as the post-Mubarak interim government is still in power. As a protestors in Tahrir made it clear in November 2011, the MENA region is volatile: “This is our second revolution. We arrived with our dignity and we will leave with it. We are not weak now. We know our rights. I am going to stay here in our square until we change this government.”

This article will conduct a qualitative analysis of the Survey results in the area of political and security cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean region with the purpose of identifying contradictions, while hinting at new possible ways for cooperation within the existing approach.

The main finding of the qualitative analysis is that within the Euromed political and security partnership, the most well-known and developed areas of cooperation are those which have been prioritized by the EU member states. However, this can jeopardize the EU’s international identity as a promoter of values, which, in turn, can compromise its transformative role in world politics. In order to preserve its transformative role in its southern Mediterranean neighbourhood with the new popular regimes, the EU should adopt a more active role in promoting democracy, human rights, and international peace. The analysis starts with the examination of areas where “progress” was perceived by respondents. This is followed by a questioning of the role of the 2005 Five Year Programme in promoting democracy and human rights. Finally, the EU’s role as an international problem-solving actor will be discussed with specific reference to the Survey results about the on-going conflicts in the MENA region. The article will conclude with some policy recommendations.

1. Voices from the Arab Spring were collected by the BBC. It is available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15842158 [last accessed: 6th May 2012].
“Progress” in the Areas Prioritized by the EU Member States

One of the most striking results of the Survey is that the majority of respondents (63%) do not have a clear perception of the policies within the Political and Security Cooperation of the Barcelona Process. An analysis of the positive answers (37%) shows that in two areas of the Barcelona Process (strengthening cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism, and fighting organized crime and drug trafficking), “progress” is perceived the most. Curiously enough, both areas are prioritized by the EU and its member states. However, in the areas which have direct positive impacts on individuals’ lives in the southern Mediterranean (such as developing the rule of law and enforcing democracy and respecting human rights), it is the perception of “no progress” which comes to the fore (Graph 1).

Graph 1: Evaluating the progress achieved by the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme

This result can be seen as evidence of a long-lasting tension in Euro-Mediterranean political-security relations: whose interests dominate the Barcelona Process’ political agenda?

After the Cold War, the idea that Europe could not be safe if its neighbourhood was in turmoil became prevalent. In 1992, following a list of political and economic problems in the southern Mediterranean countries, the Commission (1992) stated that “these problems are also our problems – such is their influence on the region’s security.” The Barcelona Process was launched to address this concern in a way that EU policy-makers aimed to transform its southern neighbourhood without offering the membership perspective. The first basket of the Barcelona Declaration was originally designed to cover both political issues ranging from human rights promotion to self-determination and security issues including the prevention of the proliferation of the WMDs and resolution of military conflicts. In this basket, the EU aimed to ensure its security by promoting social and not just state interests in its southern neighbours, namely by enforcing democracy, human rights, and peace. However, within a very short period of time, this common security perspective faded in favour of policies primarily aligned with EU member states’ interests. This can also be inferred from the Survey results. When respondents are asked about the extent to which the general objective of the Barcelona Process regarding the establishment of an area of peace and stability has been achieved — excluding the “Don’t know” answers (11%) —, the Survey mean remains at only 3 on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for “not achieved at all”.

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
In this restructured political agenda, cooperation against terrorism and cross-border organized crime became the main priorities. This created a contradiction, which is still having repercussions for the EU today, namely the cooperation with authoritarian states in the southern Mediterranean as a means of addressing these problems in a more effective way. Counter-terrorism was included in the first basket as a “serious threat” in the 1998 Palermo and 1999 Stuttgart Euro-Mediterranean Councils, later on giving rise to the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism in 2005. Since then, EU support has advanced and now covers a wide variety of areas (Wolff, 2009a). While terrorism poses a threat to individuals in North Africa, what goes often unacknowledged by the EU is that some practices of authoritarian regimes to combat terrorism have generated serious human rights violations (Baracani, 2005; Galli, 2008). As a result, the perception has emerged in some sectors of North African public opinion that southern Mediterranean regimes do the “dirty work” of the EU (Bilgin and Bilgic, 2011: 7). Along these lines, an Algerian academic clearly stated that “the EU acts like a machine that seeks to promote its interests with undemocratic regimes in the name of ‘pragmatism’” (quoted in Bilgin, Soler and Bilgic, 2011: 19). This ultimately means that the high rate of “progress” responses in the aforementioned areas does not necessarily mean a positive outcome of the EU cooperation with the MENA countries.

One of the most important findings of the Survey relates to the perception of “regression” in the area of human rights promotion. Such a finding is a worrying one for the EU, not only because the promotion of human rights, democratic values and good governance were presented as the foundations of the first basket of the Barcelona Declaration (while “progress” in these areas has remained below 50%), but also because the EU international identity is built upon these values. In this sense, the number of responses pointing to a “regression” in the area of “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (16%) represents an important setback for an entity whose international identity and power are derived from these values. This setback is embodied in the words of an academic and activist from Egypt in relation to the rule of law and human rights: “the EU doesn’t apply the values it claims to believe in when it comes to countries outside of the EU” (quoted in Bilgin, Soler and Bilgic, 2011: 26).

As some authoritarian regimes were toppled in the MENA region, one would have expected the social groups which have been critical of the EU cooperative policies towards the overturned regimes to voice their concerns more. The Commission (2011) has acknowledged this possibility and has called for a new approach with emphasis on “deep democracy,” “partnership with societies” and “reinforcing human rights dialogues.” This new approach would not only correspond to the new political realities in the southern neighbourhood, but would also be an opportunity for the EU to revamp its image as a pioneer of values in world politics. This image is the core that defines the EU’s power.

A Critical Question: the 2005 Five Year Programme or the European Neighbourhood Policy?

One of the most outstanding findings of the Survey about the Five Year Work Programme is the considerably high number of “Don’t know” answers. Such a level of unawareness about this programme can partly be explained by the European Neighbourhood Policy, which has become the main arena of Euromed cooperation since 2004 (at least in terms of perceptions). Another interesting finding is the high rate of “progress” responses in the areas of democracy, political pluralism and human rights promotion (Graph 2).
Graph 2: Evaluating the progress achieved by the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme

However, a cautious interpretation is needed here. Considering the high level of unawareness of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme, progress in the aforementioned areas can be mainly attributed to the ENP. This is important for the EU because it shows that, through its bilateral approach and more ambitious democracy and human rights agenda, the ENP is likely to be more successful than the Barcelona Process in achieving its objectives.

Although it was presented as “complementary” to the Barcelona Process, the ENP was designed to amend the failures of the latter within the context of new political realities in the post-9/11 era. Dissatisfied with lack of political transformations in the southern neighbourhood, the Commission suggested a new framework for developing political relations with its neighbours in 2003. The ENP reflected the vision provided by the Commission. Unlike the EMP, the ENP was built upon two principles: bilateralism and differentiation. Contrary to the holistic multilateralism of the EMP, through the ENP, the EU has established relations with each neighbouring country on a bilateral basis. The EU objectives in relation to each partner have been differentiated depending on the political, social and economic conditions of the country in question. Therefore, the EU has abandoned the “one-size-fits-all” blueprint agenda for democratization.

The tools that the EU has been using are also different. Individual Action Plans, individually negotiated with each partner, and ENP Annual Country Reports and National Indicative Programmes published by the Commission have provided a more detailed agenda and guidelines in the areas of promotion of democratic pluralism and human rights. Hence, the Commission has been able to define the sectors for each partner in which reform is mostly needed. In addition, new financial tools were introduced such as the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. For example, in Egypt the latter has enabled important projects for civil society participation in politics (Wolff, 2009b).

The point is that the high level of perception of “progress” in the areas of political pluralism and increasing role of civil society can be seen as a consequence of the bilateral and differentiated agenda of the ENP rather than of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme. The former has devoted more efforts (both in political and financial terms) to political transformation in North Africa. The role of the EU in the Arab Spring remains a question: did the EU, as Benita Ferrero-Waldner once put it, sow “the seeds of change at the inside” in North Africa? If the answer is “Yes”, a less passionate political agenda (such as the one promoted in the Union for the Mediterranean) cannot be an option for the EU in the new MEDA region.

A Popular Expectation: A More Active EU in Conflict Resolution in the MENA Region

The figures concerning the likelihood of resolution of the Cyprus conflict, as opposed to those for the Western Sahara and the Middle East conflicts, can be read as “the EU effect” (Graph 3). The “EU effect” has two dimensions. Firstly, the EU can encourage the conflicting parties to approach the conflict through a new lens: as a common problem where parties should work together (not against each other) in order to find a solution. Secondly, the EU can use its close political and economic relations with the conflicting parties as a leverage to encourage them to engage in a constructive dialogue. All the sides in the Cyprus conflict (Turkey, Greece and Cyprus) are closely associated with the EU. However, the continuous ineffectiveness of the EU to create the conditions for the referred “EU effect” can change this perception and jeopardise its capacity as an international actor.

Graph 3: Assessing the probability that the following conflicts will be solved in the near future
(average on a scale of 0-10)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

The most important feature which differentiates the Cyprus case from the conflicts in the Western Sahara and the Middle East is the EU’s potential involvement in the resolution of this conflict. In the case of the Western Sahara, the EU’s first attempt to address the conflict was under the first basket of the EMP, which was hampered by the failure of the realization of the “Charter on Peace and Security in the Mediterranean” and by the 2002 Spain-Morocco almost military confrontation over Parsley Island. Through the ENP, the EU originally showed stronger political determination to solve the problem, mainly reflecting the vision enshrined within the 2003 European Security Strategy. However, the EU’s original commitment was watered down due to the hesitancy to take an active political role. In addition to member states’ divergence on the issue, the EU’s cautious stance of “not replacing the existing conflict resolution frameworks” (read: the UN) has eventually led to disengagement (Gillespie, 2010).

Similar hesitancy can be observed in the Middle East conflict. In this case, the ENP again promised a more active involvement of the EU. The Action Plans of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories included calls for a more constructive dialogue. However, some argue that rather than using its political and normative power to force parties to negotiate with the purpose of achieving a resolution, the EU seems to be more interested in political reforms in Palestine (Smith, 2005: 771). Another problem has to do with the lack of political dialogue between the EU and the democratically-elected government of the Gaza Strip. In line with the aforementioned criticisms of the EU’s perceived lack of interest in the human rights of non-EU citizens, “the perception in some Middle Eastern countries is that the Union’s failure to recognize Hamas just goes to show that the ’rules of the game’ are biased against the Arab world” (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008:94). These perceptions not only raise doubts about the EU’s international problem-solving role (reflected in the Survey results), but they can also damage the EU’s identity and power.
Respondents are relatively positive about the Cyprus conflict resolution. In relation to the EU, the most striking difference in this case is that all sides of the conflict are closely associated with the EU. Greece and Cyprus are both EU member states and Turkey is a candidate country. However, both sides seem to be frustrated with the EU’s lack of active engagement. While Cyprus is uncomfortable with the EU’s passivity concerning Turkey’s reluctance to recognize one of its member states, Turkey and Northern Cypriots are still waiting for the EU to keep the promises made to the Northern Cypriots during the 2004 Annan Plan referenda process. In addition, the accession negotiations of Turkey are on life support. The Cypriot Presidency in the second half of 2012 and Turkey’s refusal to conduct political dialogue with Cyprus can mean turning off life support. The EU is still expected to take an initiative before this potentially destructive scenario takes place.

In spite of the EU’s disengagement in all three cases, 93% of respondents expect the EU to play a greater role in conflict resolution in the Mediterranean area. However, this credit may not be unlimited.

**Recommendations for EU Policy-Making towards the New MENA Region**

Based on the analysis of the Survey results, the following recommendations can be made:

- The EU should adopt a more balanced approach between its interests in combating terrorism and cross-border organized crime and the interests of individuals in southern Mediterranean countries regarding democracy and human rights promotion. With new popular regimes in the region, this balanced approach can enhance the EU’s political effectiveness.

- The ENP’s bilateral and more ambitious political agenda seems to enjoy a positive perception from the southern Mediterranean partners. The EU should pursue its proactive approach, which was revitalized in 2011. In this sense, the Union for the Mediterranean with its limited approach is less likely to provide the political and security partnership that the new southern popular regimes seek.

- The perception of “regression” in the Survey results in the area of women’s participation is a worrying one. In the Arab Spring, women’s organizations have been playing an important role. The EU should establish more direct contacts with these organizations and put pressure on the new governments to facilitate women’s participation in politics.

- The EU should adopt a proactive approach with regard to conflict resolution in Cyprus. This would be a test for the EU’s international problem-solving role. It is obvious that allocating huge amounts of financial aid (as in the case of the Middle East conflict) is not enough. People in both the EU and its southern neighbourhood expect a greater political involvement from the EU in conflict resolution.
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PROSPECTS FOR EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS: INCREASING RELEVANCE OF MIGRATION MANAGEMENT AND THE SWITCH OF ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

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As in previous years, in question 26 of the third Euromed Survey respondents were asked to rank a number of potential scenarios in the medium to long term in the Mediterranean according to probability. For comparative purposes, most of the hypotheses listed were taken from past Surveys – “regime change becoming the rule in the Mediterranean” being the only new proposed outlook out of eleven. This article will present and discuss the most likely scenarios in the region in the coming years, with a particular emphasis on migration and on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which are the issues that have experienced the most remarkable variation in the ranking of probabilities over time.

When comparing the probabilities attributed by respondents to the various scenarios since the first Euromed Survey in 2009 (see graphs 1, 2 and 3), at least two general observations can be made. First of all, the top 5 scenarios remain, with some exceptions, more or less the same throughout the three-year period. Indeed, migration, water scarcity and population and employment pressures continue to be regarded by respondents as issues of great concern, even if their relative weight has varied somewhat over time. Secondly, the Arab-Israeli conflict and its negative impact on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which used to be the top scenario in terms of probabilities in 2009, has significantly lost its relevance over time, to the point that in the Euromed Survey 2011 it does not even rank amongst the top 5 – coming only sixth in the ranking of probabilities. A tentative hypothesis to be made here in order to account for such a dramatic drop is that, while the Arab-Israeli conflict will remain an ever present handicap for Euromed relations, it is no longer perceived as a particularly pressing matter, having loomed as it has over the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – and now over the Union for the Mediterranean – since the very beginning. Yet these preliminary conclusions should be carefully nuanced, as leaving aside their relative position in the ranking of probabilities, when comparing their actual average grades (see the rightmost side of the graphs displaying the average probability grade attributed to each of the proposed scenarios), some of these divergences appear as less clear-cut and conclusive.
For instance, while ranking first as most probable scenario in 2009, the Arab-Israeli conflict as an inhibiting factor for the EMP received an average probability grade of 6.7 on a scale from 0 to 10 – where 0 stood for “no probability” and 10 for “very high probability” (see graph 3). In contrast, this same scenario received a higher average grade of 7.1 (see graph 2), while it only came fifth in the ranking of probabilities. The same is true for the migration scenarios. Despite receiving an average grade of 7.3 in 2010, the scenario of migration as a source of increasing tensions in Europe came only second in the ranking, while in 2011 it emerges as the most likely scenario with a lower average probability grade (see graph 1). A tentative explanation here could be that in 2010 there was an overall higher sense of urgency in all the suggested scenarios compared to the other two Surveys, possibly due to the prevailing sense of unease prior to the Arab Spring. This can be seen in graph 4, which shows that in 2010 all scenarios
were attributed a higher probability grade than in 2011 and in 2009. Moreover, it is also worth noting that the sense of urgency has seen an increase in all scenarios since the first Euromed Survey in 2009 except for the Arab-Israeli conflict, as mentioned before. All in all, these results tell us that we should interpret the rankings with due care and not come to overly simplified conclusions.

Graph 4: Mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean
(on a scale from 0-10, where 0 stands for ‘no probability’ and 10 for ‘very high probability’)

Migration Management, Water Scarcity and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: a Closer Look

One of the elements that stands out in the monitoring of the answers since 2009 is the evolution of the classification of the hypotheses according to the average obtained, in which we see that those related with irregular immigration occupy the first two positions, ahead of water scarcity and the social tensions derived from the dysfunctions of the labour market in MPCs, notably emphasising elements such as the growing role of women in the political and social life of MPCs or the impact of the economic crisis on growth prospects.

Table 1:

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<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2009</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tensions and xenophobia in Europe</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Irregular migration from originating MPCs to Europe will continue to</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions in</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
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<tr>
<td>the Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>3rd</td>
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<td>dramatic social tensions</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>7th</td>
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<td>life of MPCs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>9th</td>
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<td>prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period</td>
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(This classification is based on the averages obtained for each of the elements in question 26 of the Survey).

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
In the 2011 results, although water scarcity does not come first, achieving an average of 6.8, it is necessary to keep in mind its central place and its possible effect on social instability in the Mediterranean in the medium and long term. Insufficient access to water affects both living conditions and food safety as it has an effect on agricultural production. But, above all, we should take into account that “the existence in the area of many international river basins and of common underground basins where different countries compete in a zero-sum game elevates the concrete risk of water conflicts aggravated by climatic change.”

Graph 5: Mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean Water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions
(% of respondents giving a 7 or a higher value to the probability of the following scenario)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

It is also worth noting in this classification the decrease in answers attaching a high probability to the hypothesis of the Arab-Israeli conflict having a potential effect on the paralysis of Euro-Mediterranean relations. As previously noted, the dual downward classification, in terms of the average and position with respect to the remaining hypotheses – from being first in 2009 it is ninth in 2011 –, can be explained by the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict has always been seen as an obstacle in the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Therefore, it is possible to speak of a structural blockage factor. Now that Euro-Mediterranean relations themselves take this blockage for granted, respondents may be focusing on other more circumstantial elements.

Graph 6: Mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP
(% of respondents giving a 7 or a higher value to the probability of the following scenario)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

In relation to the first two hypotheses that in 2011 place migrations at the centre of the prospective debate in the medium and long term, these results can be interpreted in two ways.

On the one hand, we find in first position the relations between migrations and social tensions and xenophobia, taking us to the debate on integration in Europe and, more specifically, the integration of the around six million immigrants from Mediterranean countries living throughout the EU. The evolution that we can see in the graph could be linked to two elements. The first element concerns the social tensions more related to the labour market and to access to social benefits as seen in the harshening of national legislation in this respect (Italy, France, Spain,

Greece) and the EU itself (Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Union on illegal immigration). The second element would be the rejection of immigrants (xenophobia), highly linked to the growing debate in Europe about inter-religious coexistence and the establishment of a European Islam.

**Graph 7: Mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean Increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe**

(% of respondents giving a 7 or a higher value to the probability of the following scenario)

On the other hand, the scenario placed in second position refers to a debate on migration flows in the region, more specifically on irregular flows and the growing EU strategy of trying to block the entry of these people. This result could be a reflection of the fact that, in the last few years, the Mediterranean has seen how migration management policies have become a major geopolitical element in the context of international relations in the region. Source and destination countries are developing their respective foreign policies bearing in mind the issues related to migration flows.

**Graph 8: Mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean Irregular migration from MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU imposes**

(% of respondents giving a 7 or a higher value to the probability of the following scenario)

In this context, the security border control and surveillance approach has gradually been established, mainly from the moment that border management became a key element for the internal security of the EU, and is conceived as a solution to the instability of the neighbouring or geographically close countries. Border management places itself at the centre of the foreign dimension of the JHA area and is included in most action plans of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Wolff, 2008).

In this respect, it will be interesting to see how Euro-Mediterranean programmes related to migrations are assessed in the fourth Euromed Survey as they could help to contrast the 2009 results, in which 51% of respondents considered that there had been no progress or a regression in the achievement of the priorities defined in the 2005 Working Programme in the migration field.²

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2. The summit on the occasion of the 10th anniversary in 2005 prepared a working programme for the next five years that represented a step forward to establish a significant basis for cooperation and management of the current challenges in the region. In this document, migration occupied a central place, as shown by the decision to encourage the creation of a fourth basket related to justice, security, migration and integration. This fourth basket was finally established in the 9th Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Lisbon (8th-9th November 2007) under the label “Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security”.

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Graph 9: Euromed 2009
Among the priorities defined in 2005 Five Year Programme, do you consider progress was achieved or there was no progress or even regression in: Reduce significantly the level of illegal migration and trafficking in human beings

Specifically, among the priorities in which there had been less progress was the objective of significantly reducing the level of irregular immigration and the trafficking of people, in which 71% of respondents negatively assessed the policies or programmes in this field ("no progress" and "regression"). Southern countries made a less negative assessment (57% in the Maghreb and 60% in the Mashreq). It is interesting to note how, with respect to the fight against irregular immigration, in the north the view is more critical – only 23% of the EU-27 respondents considered that there had been progress in this field –, while in southern countries the assessment almost doubled this view, reaching 42% in the Maghreb and 40% in the Mashreq. Finally, another poorly regarded field was the promotion of opportunities to emigrate legally, with a negative assessment of 70% (75% in the Maghreb and 83% in the Mashreq, compared to 64% in EU countries).

Graph 10: Euromed 2009
Among the priorities defined in 2005 Five Year Programme, do you consider progress was achieved or there was no progress or even regression in: Promote legal migration opportunities

We can conclude, in the light of the results analysed, that Euro-Mediterranean regional objectives such as the reduction of irregular immigration or the promotion of opportunities so that there is a legal way to emigrate, notably involving border management, have negative assessments of their evolution, indicating the need to redouble efforts to be able to advance towards a framework that provides regional coherence to migration management.
IMPLICATIONS OF PALESTINIAN APPLICATION FOR UN MEMBERSHIP ON EUROMED RELATIONS AND ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

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On 23rd September 2011, the President of the Palestinian National Authority and Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Mahmoud Abbas formally submitted an “application of the State of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations” simultaneously to both the Security Council (SC) and the General Assembly (GA). The Palestinian bid for UN membership is based on the Palestinian people’s “natural, legal and historic rights”; on the 181 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution of 29th November 1947 (“UN Partition Plan”), and on the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine of 15th November 1988, as well as on the UNGA’s acknowledgement of this Declaration one month later. It should be noted that over 135 states (i.e. 2/3 of UNGA) have recognized the State of Palestine, including most of the EU Partners in the Euromed zone and a number of the Eastern European states of the EU. Moreover, EU states such as Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom have all recently upgraded the Palestinian General Delegations in their capitals to diplomatic missions and embassies, a status usually reserved for states. In the UN membership application, Abbas “solemnly declares that the State of Palestine is a peace-loving nation and that it accepts the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and solemnly undertakes to fulfill them.” In an explanatory annex, Abbas further asserts the Palestinian people’s inalienable right to self-determination, as well as independence within the “vision of a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict” on the basis of the 4th June 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital and consistent with the rights of Palestinian refugees in accordance with international law and UN resolutions, in particular with the UNGA resolution 194 of 1948.

The Palestinian bid for membership was received with great fanfare within the UN, particularly since Lebanon — representing the Arab states’ overwhelming support for the application — chaired the rotating presidency of the Security Council (SC). A majority of the then-SC members had expressed their intention to move ahead with the vote, including China, Russia, and Brazil, but the United States was vehemently against it and threatened to use its veto to block any vote in the SC. President Barack Obama dismissed the application as “symbolic actions to isolate Israel in the United Nations,” while the US Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, echoed official Israeli sentiment by calling the bid a “dangerous diversion” to a bilateral “negotiation process” between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel. For its part, the EU, as well as most of the individual Member States, officially support the two-state solution, but they made it clear that they would not now support a full UN membership for Palestine outside the framework of a negotiated arrangement with Israel. Still, several European parliaments, such as those of Sweden and Spain, have urged their governments to recognize the Palestinian state, and the European Parliament passed a resolution stating that it “supports and calls
on Member States to be united in addressing the legitimate demand of the Palestinians to be represented as a state at the United Nations.”

Yet nearly a year after the submission of the Palestinian application for full UN membership to the SC, there has been little progress on the dossier, as the US has made sure that the SC sub-committee created to evaluate the bid stalls. The PA itself, under EU and US pressure, has consented to leave its bid on the back-burner for the time being, and has not brought the application for non-state membership to the General Assembly for a vote it could expect to win. This has, in turn, weakened the PA even more in the eyes of the Palestinian people, most of whom realizing just how toothless the PA really is given that it was created as a product of the failed Oslo Process serving Israeli occupation interests. The call for the dissolution of the PA and return to a national resistance struggle against occupation, and for a one state solution that would serve as a genuine democratic umbrella for both Palestinians and Jews, thus grows. The “Quartet”, composed of the UN, EU, US and Russia has, in the meantime, called once again for a resumption of the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks that have been stalled since Israel’s refusal to stop the construction of settlements and negotiate in good faith. The Quartet, however, has no credibility in the region and basically represents what many see as the willful failure of the US-led international community. This attempt to re-launch the formal negotiation process, even within the context of the Arab uprisings, has once again failed amidst unprecedented pessimism about the prospects for peace: Palestinians continue to live under unprecedented harsh occupation conditions, with Gaza under unlawful blockade since 2007, and Israeli settlement construction continues unabated in occupied Palestinian territory, including in East Jerusalem. Indeed, the US vetoed an otherwise unanimous SC resolution (supported by the EU) in February 2011 calling on Israel to stop such settlements.

The low average Survey mean reflects the overall caution respondents have regarding the implications that a Palestinian UN membership could have for the Arab-Israeli dynamic, and in particular for Palestinian-Israeli relations. Only Maghreb countries (especially Morocco and Algeria) and Turkey expressed relatively positive attitudes, as could have been expected given, on the one hand, the physical and geopolitical distance of the Maghreb from Palestine/Israel and, on the other, Turkey’s then role as a potentially influential regional mediator.

Graph 1: Assessment of the implications of the Palestinian application for UN membership on the Arab-Israeli conflict dynamics

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Mashreq countries and Israel were much more pessimistic about the impact of a Palestinian UN membership on the Arab-Israeli dynamics. Given its official hostility to the UN bid and its general sense of insecurity, it comes as no surprise that Israel has the lowest assessment, but it is interesting to note that the states having signed peace agreements with Israel (Egypt, Jordan and the OPT) were almost as pessimistic, as this reflects the clear popular discontent with these deals (and thus with international agreements in general involving Israel), which were largely perceived as benefiting only Israel to the detriment of the Arab people’s interests. It should be noted that Lebanese respondents had a relatively optimistic view, probably reflecting both a sense of continuing political triumph over Israel — which was forced to withdraw from southern Lebanon under fire, the only such case in the Arab-Israeli conflict — as well as a hope that the problem of Palestinian refugees could be finally resolved in a just manner. Overall, EU and Mediterranean Partner Countries were much more positive in their assessments of a Palestinian UN membership than the rest of the EU countries and, especially, of the European non-EU states, which registered the lowest grade of all Survey regional groupings.

Assessment of the implications of the Palestinian application for UN membership on the Arab-Israeli conflict dynamics

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very negative and 10 for very positive)

The Survey results reveal a clearly more positive view concerning the implications of UN membership on Euromed relations. Israel had by far the lowest grade, followed by Jordan, but the remaining Mashreq, Mediterranean Partner Countries, and particularly Maghreb countries were generally positive, at least in relative terms. The same is true for the EU and non-EU European countries. This relative positive outlook (with the exception of Israel) reflects the clear synergies that exist across the Euromed spectrum in cultural, historical and economic ties. There is little doubt that a natural community exists among these countries, particularly in the Mediterranean, but also that the Arab-Israeli conflict, and particularly the continued Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and its expansion of colonies, has held back this community’s potential for collaboration. The problem of Israel has, in this sense, held back the progress of an otherwise natural community within the Mediterranean between Arabs and Europeans. Against this background, Palestinian membership at the UN would be considered as a sign that the international community is, indeed, serious about resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would in turn have positive implications for Euromed relations.
Graph 3: Assessment of the implications of the Palestinian application for UN membership on the Euro-Mediterranean relations

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very negative and 10 for very positive)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
LIST OF RESPONDENTS
LIST OF RESPONDENTS

The European Institute of the Mediterranean ensures the absolute anonymity of the replies by participants. The data has been processed after codifying each questionnaire. In addition, there is a minimum number of respondents per country to ensure that the responses cannot be tracked back to any of them.

In addition, for this final list of participants, respondents had the option of not appearing on the list. 77 out of 695 respondents wish not to be included, therefore this list has a total of 618 names.

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YOUSEF HABASH, Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network, Occupied Palestinian Territories
TAEB HADHR, Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques (ITES), Tunisia
PHAIION HADIANTONIOU, Greece
ROBERT HALL, Suderbyn Permaculture Ecovillage, Sweden
BACHIR HAMDOUCHE, Université Mohamed V Agdal, Morocco
ASHRAF HAMDI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt
YARON HARIEL, Bar Ilan University, Israel
TAHAR HAROUN, Université de Batna, Algeria
DONIA HEDDA, Cabinet Hedda Ellouze, Tunisia
ABDELHAMID HENIA, Université de Tunis, Tunisia
BERTRAND HERVEU, Ancien Secrétaire Général, Centre International des hautes études agronomiques méditerranéennes (CIHEAM), France
ADAM HILL, Consult and Design International, United Kingdom
MIMOUN HILLAL, Institut Supérieur International du Tourisme, Algeria
ARAB HOBALLAH, UNEP DTIE, France
JENNIFER HOFFMANN, HFF – Hochshule für Film und Fernseh “Konrad Wolf”/Insight out, Germany
KLAUS HOFFMANN, Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Spiel & Theater e. V., Germany
JAKOB HORST, Institute for International Politics, Helmut-Schmidt-University, Hamburg, Germany
BEN-REEB HOSNI, Comité des Initiatives de Développement Euro-Méditerranéen (C.I.D.E.M.), Tunisia
ANNE HOUTMAN, Représentation de la Commission Européenne en France, EU institutions civil servant
MARIKA HUBER, Mediterranean Bank Network, Malta
SERENE HULELEH, The Arab Education Forum, Jordan
DIANA HUNT, University of Sussex, United Kingdom
JANA HUNTEROVA, Swallow Club, Czech Republic
DORIT INBAR, Greenhouse / New Foundation for Cinema & Television, Israel
EFRAIM INBAR, Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, Israel
BELKACEM IRANI, University of Algiers, Algeria
RAMI ISAAC, Lecturer in Tourism Development Studies, Netherlands
ANNELI JAATTEENMAKI, European Parliament, Finland
Markus Loewe, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Germany

Alejandro Lorca, Asociación Grupo de Estudios Europeos y Mediterráneos (AGREEM), Spain

Hussein Mohamed Lotfy, Speedo Trans, Egypt

Khaled Louhichi, League of Arab States, Egypt

Ann Luttrell, The HoN in Ireland Triskel Arts Centre, Ireland

Rachid Maaloui, SNAPAP — Maison des Syndicats, Algeria

Mostafa Maatoui, Commune Rurale Sidi Boumehdi, Morocco

Nadia Mabrouk, Euromed Foundation for Intercultural Dialogue and Exchanges, Netherlands

Atif Maddi, Follow Up Committee on Arab Education, Israel

Jamila Maidera, Former Member of the European Parliament, Portugal

Johannes Maerk, Ideaz. Institute for Intercultural and Comparative Research, Austria

Driss Maghraoui, Al Akhawayn University, Morocco

Iman Mahdy, Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC), Egypt

Ahmed Mahiou, Institut de Recherches et d’Études sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman (IREMAM), Algeria

Borut Mahnic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, Slovenia

Saniaa Makhlouf, American University in Cairo, Egypt

Gerasimos Makris, Panteion University, Greece

Paolo Malanima, CNR-ISSM, Italy

Nives Malenica, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Croatia, Croatia

Helene Malmyg, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Denmark

Nermin Mammadov, Water Resources Department, CEDARE, Egypt

Laila Mandi, Centre d’Études et de Recherche sur l’Eau, Université Cadi Ayyad, Morocco

Jan Mans, COPPEM, Mayor of Maastricht, Netherlands

Vladislava Marane, Latvian National Youth Agency, Latvia

Marc Marchador, CDTI, Morocco

Maria Antonietta Mariani, Fondazione CENSIS, Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali, Italy

Romani Marie, MedPAN, France

Henry Marty-Gauquie, Bureau de Paris, Banque européenne d’investissement, France

Raphaël Mathy, SPF Affaires Étrangères, Commerce Extérieur et Coopération au Développement, Belgium

Torsten Matzke, Institute of Political Science, University of Tubingen, Germany

Ken McCue, Sport against Racism Ireland, Ireland

Radhi Meddeb, Comète Engineering, Tunisia

Mourad Medjahed, Institut National d’Études de Stratégie Globale, Algeria

Tuomo Melasuo, TAPRI, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Finland

Ugo Melchionda, International Organization for Migration, Italy

Noha Mellor, School of Humanities, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Kingston University, Denmark

Sami Menkara, Bureau de CGLU (Liban, Jordanie), Lebanon

Joseph Mifsud, Euro-Mediterranean University, Slovenia

Tarzan Milošević, Mayor of Bijelo Polje, Montenegro

Serge Miquel, Institut Méditerranéen de l’Eau (IME), France

Nilgün Mirze, Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts, Turkey

Najat Mjid, ONG BAYTI, Morocco

Madalina Mocan, Ratiu Center for Democracy, Romania

Mbareck Mohamed Abdelahi, Mauritania

Jessica Montell, B’Tselem, Israel

Radville Morkunaite-Mukuleniene, European Parliament, Lithuania

Ilona Morzol-Ogorek, Polish National Commission for UNESCO, Poland

Lama Moulayed Bissat, OECD — Institute of Finance, International institutions civil servant

Samymouley, Institut Tunisien de la Compétitivité et des Etudes Quantitatives (ITCEQ), Tunisia

Mohamed Mostafa Rostom, Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), Egypt

Nader Mraik, Jordan

Zakia Mri, Association Ennakhil pour la femme et l’enfant, Morocco

Hanou Mjadidi, Women Centre for Legal Aid ad Counselling, Occupied Palestinian Territories

Seyyeddin Muaz, FEMISE, Jordan

Muhammad Mursi Mursh, Professor of International Relations, Misr University for Science and Technology, Egypt

Peter Paul Muscat, Directorate for External Relations and Mediterranean Affairs — Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malta

Jakob I. Mysschetzy, Inklusion, Denmark

Mohammad Nablusi, Economic and Social Council, Jordan

Laszlo J. Nagy, University of Szeged — Department of Modern History and Mediterranean Studies, Hungary

Erzsebet Nagyne Rozsa, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA), Hungary

Muamar Nakhlal, Watan TV, Occupied Palestinian Territories

Pasquolina Napoletano, Member of the European Parliament, Italy

Nilüfer Narlı, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Bahcesehir University, Tunisia

Roger Nasnas, Conseil économique et social du Liban, Lebanon

Roby Nathanson, The Macro Center for Political Economics (former IESR), Israel
JOSEPH R. SCHECHLA, Habitat International Coalition: Housing and Land Rights Network, Egypt
JOHANNES SCHLICHT, Expert for EU-affairs and relations, Government of Thuringia, Germany
WALTER SCHWIMMER, World Public Forum – Dialogue of Civilizations, Austria
PETER SEEBERG, Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies, Denmark
PETER SEIDENHECK, Forum Syndical Euromed, Germany
GIUSEPPINA SEIDTA, Italian Federation of Business and Professional Women (FIDAPA), Italy
MARIANNE SEILER, heimaten e.V. - Netz für Chancengerechtigkeit, Germany
TAREK HASSAN SELIM, The American University in Cairo, Egypt
MOUHAD SELAMI, Le Quotidien, Tunisia
RAMI SEMAAN, SITRAM Consultants sarl, Lebanon
NARCIS SERRA, CIDOB, Spain
MUSTAFA EMRAH SEYHANOGLU, Human Rights Association, Turkey
OMAR SHABAN ISMAIL, PalThink for Strategic Studies, Occupied Palestinian Territories
MUHAMAD SHABAREK, Syrian Enterprise and Business Centre, Syria
MOHAMED SHAIMED, Union Générale des Travailleurs du Maroc, Morocco
VERONICA SHENSHIN, University of Helsinki, Finland
BROM SHOLOMO, The Institute for National Security Studies, Israel
KHAREDIN SHUKRI, Economic and Social Council of Jordan, Jordan
ABDELKADER SID AHMED, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne – I.R.D, Paris, Algeria
DAH SID AHMED, Réseau Démocratie et Citoyenneté, Mauritania
SLOBODAN SKOPELA, Association Mi, Croatia
TOMAS SMETANKE, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic
JAN SNAIDAUF, Association for International Affairs, Czech Republic
EMILIA SOARES, North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, COE, Portugal
WAFAA SOBYH, Vice-Chairman, General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, Egypt
PERLUIGI SODDU, PPRD South, Italy
EDUARDO SOLER, Centre d’Informació i Documentació Internacionals a Barcelona (CIDOB), Spain
GIANLUCA SOLERA, Anna Lindh Foundation, Italy
ALUA SOLMAN, AIT Consulting Ltd, Egypt
CARLOS SOUSA, National Tempus Office, Portugal
CHARLOTT ASPARRE, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, Sweden
ALEXANDER SPRINGER, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, Austria
VANJA STAROVLAH, Union of Municipalities of Montenegro, Montenegro
ALFRED STEINHERR, FEMISE, Germany
YOAV STERN, Haaretz Newspaper – Perez Center for Peace, Israel
STEPHAN STETTER, University of Bielefeld, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität der Bundeswehr München, Germany
ANDREA STOCCHIERO, Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, Italy
LISE STORM, University of Exeter, Denmark
SANA STRIKOVIC, Center for Culture, Education, Protection and Promotion of Human Rights IDENTITY, Montenegro
MARIA SVENSSON, Culture Clinic, Sweden
JERIS SWEISS, City of Fuheis, Jordan
TAMAS SZIGETVARI, Institute of World Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary
TONI TADIC, Euromediterranski Forum, EMEF, Croatia
RACHID TAFASSI, Association Al Boughaz, Morocco
HAMDI KANAN TAHER, Jordan Center for Public Policy Research and Dialogue, Jordan
VALERIA TALBOT, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), Italy
YEHUDA TALMON, Economic and Social Council, Israel
SEIFALLAH TARCHOUNI, Centre de Carthage pour le Dialogue des Civilisations, Tunisia
MERAD TAREK, Union du Maghreb Arabe, Morocco
YAVUZ TEKELIOGLU, Economic Research Centre on Mediterranean Countries (ERCMC), Turkey
SERGE TELLE, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes, France
JEAN-LAURENT TERRAZZONI, Monaco Méditerranée Foundation, Monaco
FILIPPO TERRUSO, Committee of the Regions, Italy
MICHAEL THOSS, Allianz Kulturstiftung, Germany
MEHMET NECDET TIMUR, Turkey
RDHA TULL, Institut National du Patrimoine Tunisie, United Kingdom
REETTA TOVANEN, University of Helsinki, Finland
ALBERTO TONINI, Università degli Studi di Firenze, Italy
JYRKI TORMI, EU EEAS Delegation Syria, EU institutions civil servant
MIGUEL TORRES, Associação Cultural e Recreativa de Tondela (ACERT), Portugal
YIANNIS TOUMAZIS, Cyprus
TONI TOUMAZIS, KYKEM – Cyprus Research Centre, Cyprus
KADIATA TOURE, Département administratif et financier de la commune de Sebkha, Mauritania
JEAN CLAUDE TOURRET, Institut de la Méditerranée – CMCI, France
LESLIE TRAMONTINI, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Germany
ELIZABETH TRATNIK, SKOP, Malta
DIMITRIOS TRANTAPHYLLOU, Kadir Has University, Greece
NADA TRUNK, EMUNI, Slovenia
DAPHNE TSIMHONI, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
ERDEM TURKEKUL, Turkelk Law Office, Turkey
MIREM TURSINOVIC, Youth Resource Centre, Bosnia and Herzegovina
LÁSZLÓ TUSKE, The Avicenna Institute for Middle-Eastern Studies, Hungary
AGUSTI UJED, ESADE, Spain
FATMA UNSAL, Baskent Kadin Platformu Capital City Women’s Platform, Turkey
PETER VAN ELSUWEGE, Department of European Law, Netherlands
PETER VAN HAM, Netherlands Institute for International Relations – Clingendael, Netherlands
VERA VAN HÜLLEN, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany
EVANGELOS VARELLAS, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
MICHAL VASECKA, Center for the Research of Ethnicity and Culture, Slovakia
MARINA VASILARA, Peace Players-Cyprus, Cyprus
HANS VERSCHOOR, EC Monitoring Programme, Ukraine
BERNARD VIDEAU, Ministère de l’Écologie, de l’Énergie, du Développement Durable et de la Mer, France
ELIZABETH VILLAGÓMEZ, Almenara Estudios Económicos y Sociales, S.L., Spain
WARD VLOEBERGHS, Centre de Recherche sur l’Afrique et la Méditerranée / Centre for Research on Africa and the Mediterranean (CERAM), Belgium
STEN WALEGREN, The gate, Sweden
CATHERINE WINTOL DE WENDEN, CNRS, France
STEFAN WINKLER, Goethe-Institut, Germany
ORNAY YARMUT, CoPro — Documentary Marketing Foundation, Israel
NEICE YILDIZ, Faculty of Architecture, Eastern Mediterranean University, Cyprus
ESMERAY YOGUN ERCEN, Freelance consultant, Turkey
MARCEZ ZABOROWSKI, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Poland
PETRA ZAGORICNIK MARINIC, Euro-Mediterranean University, Slovenia
JUSTYNA ZAJAC, University of Warsaw, Institute of International Relations, Poland
KELMEND ZAIZI, NALAS, Republic of Macedonia
HAIK ZAKRZEWSKI, Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE), Poland
MOHAMED ZARIF ELKHOULY, Cultural Development Fund (CDF), Egypt
AHMED JIDDOU ZEINE, Anadelp, Mauritania
MAHJOU ZEHMOURI, Institut d’architecture d’Algérie, Algeria
SALEM ZENIA, Algerian journalist and writer in Tamazight language. Hosted in Barcelona by Catalan PEN, ‘Refuge Writer’ Programme, Algeria
HACHAMI ZERTAL, Cirta Films, Algeria
LEFGOUAM ZIAD, Association Culturelle TUSSNA, Algeria
OGNAN ZLATEV, Media Development Center, Bulgaria
MOHAMED ZOGLAMI, La Financière Interactive, France
ANIA ZOROB, Institute of Development Research and Development Policy (IEE), Germany
GEORGES ZOUAIN, Gaia Heritage, Lebanon
YAHYA ZOUBIR, Euromed Management, Algeria
ZELJANA ZOVKO, Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina
TARGET AND EFFECTIVE SAMPLE OF THE SURVEY
### SAMPLE OF THE SURVEY

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<th>Answers 2009</th>
<th>Answers 2010</th>
<th>Answers 2011</th>
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<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>1.3%</td>
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<td>0.5%</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>0.3%</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td><strong>Total EU</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
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<td>371</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>International Institutions</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL OTHERS</strong></td>
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</table>
QUESTIONNAIRE
SURVEY OF EXPERTS AND ACTORS ON THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP 2011
The European Institute of the Mediterranean ensures the absolute anonymity of the replies by participants. The data will be processed after codifying each questionnaire. In addition, there will be a minimum number of respondents per country to ensure that the responses cannot be tracked back to any of them.

However, a final list of participants will be included in the final report. If you do not wish to appear in this list, please let us know:

- [ ] I do not want to appear in the list of participants.

In order to facilitate the data processing, and to improve the statistical analysis, we would be very pleased if you could provide us with the following information:

**Gender**

- [ ] Male
- [ ] Female

**Age**

- [ ] From 20 to 35
- [ ] From 36 to 45
- [ ] From 46 to 55
- [ ] 56 to 65
- [ ] 66 and more

**Nationality**

[Here a menu with a list of countries with open question]

**Position**


**Institution**


**Institution of affiliation**

- [ ] Governmental
- [ ] Diplomatic
- [ ] EU institution
- [ ] Other international organisation
- [ ] Political party
- [ ] Think tank
- [ ] Academic
- [ ] Media
- [ ] NGO
- [ ] Trade union
- [ ] Company (Business sector)
What is your main area of specialisation (you can indicate one or two)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main area of specialisation</th>
<th>2nd Area of specialisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Cooperation and Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Financial Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social, Cultural and Human Exchanges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and Justice Affairs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Albania
- Algeria
- Austria
- Belgium
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Bulgaria
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Egypt
- Estonia
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Hungary
- Ireland
- Israel
- Italy
- Jordan
- Latvia
- Lebanon
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Libya
- Malta
- Mauritania
- Montenegro
- Morocco
- Netherlands
- Occupied Palestinian Territories
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Spain
- Sweden
- Syria
- Tunisia
- Turkey
- United Kingdom
- Other
MONITORING OF PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP / UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AND EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY IN 2011
**General Assessment**

Q.1 What is your global assessment of the EU initiatives towards its southern neighbours in 2011?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly inadequate</th>
<th>Highly adequate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

Comments:

**Union for the Mediterranean**

Q.2 What is your global assessment of the results achieved by the Union for the Mediterranean in 2011?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly inadequate</th>
<th>Highly adequate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Q.3 Do you expect the UfM Secretariat to play a key, moderate or negligible role in the Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture in the near future?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negligible role</th>
<th>Key role</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Q.4 Do you think that the EU institutions should assume the northern co-presidency of the UfM, instead of the current system (one Member State from the North)

Yes

No
**European Neighbourhood Policy**

Q.5 What is your global assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly inadequate</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>3</th>
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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Comments:

**EU Financial Perspectives 2014-2020**

Q.6 To what extent do you consider it necessary to create a new specific financial instrument devoted to the southern Mediterranean Partners only? (The current ENPI applies to the southern and eastern Partners)


The ENPI covers bilateral (country allocations) and multilateral fundings (Regional Cooperation, Interregional Cooperation and Cross Border Programmes). For each type of cooperation a Strategy Paper (2007-2013) and two series of (National & Regional) Indicative Programmes (2007-2010 and 2011-2013) have been prepared by the European Commission.


All programming documents of the European Commission are accessible via the following web page: [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#5](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#5)

Note that the European Investment Bank (EIB) activities are financed with the EIB’s own resources not through the ENPI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not necessary</th>
<th>Very necessary</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
NATIONAL POLITICS
AND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN
RELATIONS AFTER
THE “ARAB SPRING”
**The External Actor’s Role within the Region**

Q.7 How would you assess the international response of the following actors to the uprisings in the Southern rim?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Very disappointing</th>
<th>Very positive</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Q.8 How do you assess the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EU policies supported political change</th>
<th>EU policies supported the preservation of the regime in power</th>
<th>EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments</th>
<th>There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
The Implications of the “Arab Spring” on Euro-Mediterranean Relations

Q.9. What degree of probability do you attribute to the following long-term scenarios regarding the potential impact of the uprisings on the Euro-Mediterranean relations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenarios</th>
<th>No probability</th>
<th>Very high probability</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political and socio-economic reforms foreseen in the ENP/EMP frameworks will be accelerated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current situation will lead to a more homogenous, sustainable and democratic Mediterranean which, in turn, would trigger the political dialogue between the EU and the MPCs and the consolidation of a truly Euro-Mediterranean Community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Euro-Mediterranean regional integration process will no longer be suitable given the heterogeneity and fragmentation inherited from the uprisings.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Q.10. How would you assess the EU’s future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors? Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU impact on the region compared to</th>
<th>Less impact</th>
<th>More impact</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
### Mediterranean Partner Countries Internal Politics

**Q.11 How would you assess the prospects of sustainable democracy in the following countries?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Very improbable</th>
<th>Very probable</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**

**Q.12. Do you expect political Islam to play a key, moderate or negligible role in the future Mediterranean landscape?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Key role</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negligible role</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key role</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**
The EU Response to Changes in its Neighbourhood

Q.13 How would you assess the relevance of the following priorities that were identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”?

For further information on the ENP review document:
“A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”

For further information on the EU roadmap in response to the recent developments that have taken place in the Southern, please see:
Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative on a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Not relevant</th>
<th>Very relevant</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money: reallocating/refocussing extra financial resources to support the transition to democracy, institution building, support civil society and the socio-economic needs of countries. For example the loss of tourism income in Egypt and Tunisia (SPRING Programme €350 million for 2011 and 2012, see box hereinafter for more information)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market access: “consider allowing partners that have a fully functioning independent judiciary, an efficient public administration and have made significant progress towards eradicating corruption, into the non-regulated area of the [EU] Internal Market for goods”</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility: improve “visa facilitation”, conclude “Mobility Partnerships”, improve “people-to-people contacts”, “labour mobility” and enhance “students, researchers and business persons” mobility</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conclude and implement new “Neighbourhood Agreements” as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 8 TEU) that will establish Deep and Comprehensive Free trade Agreements (DCFTA)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a “Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility”, “designed to strengthen the capacity of civil society to promote reform and increase public accountability in their countries”. (€22 million)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a “European Endowment for Democracy” (to “help political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners”)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a European Neighbourhood “Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development”</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please mention other priority projects in your view:


Q.14 How would you assess the EU financial response to the Arab Spring (SPRING Programme €350 million for 2011 and 2012, US $7.5 billion from the European Investment Bank in the form of loans until 2013)?

The SPRING programme (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth), adopted by the Commission on 27 September 2011. Under this flagship initiative, the Commission will provide support for the southern Neighbourhood countries for democratic transformation, institution building and economic growth in the wake of the “Arab Spring”. Support provided through SPRING will be tailored to the needs of each country. The total value of this initiative is €350 million to cover the years 2011 and 2012.

EU response to the Arab Spring: the SPRING Programme MEMO/11/636

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly inadequate</th>
<th>Highly adequate</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Q.15 How would you assess the EU first responses regarding Libya’s civil war (humanitarian aid, consular cooperation, evacuations/civil protection and FRONTEX border control operations)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly inadequate</th>
<th>Highly adequate</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Q.16 Which role should the EU play with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remain neutral</th>
<th>Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs</th>
<th>Be very pro-active and interventionist</th>
<th>The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
**Q.17 What should be the EU policy response in relation to countries that fail to introduce democratic reforms?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPCs internal affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use positive conditionality (on the basis of the “more for more” approach: “The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU” and vice versa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country: Freezing of political dialogue, restrictive financial measures, suspension of the implementation of EU agreement, assistance is primarily used to “support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratisation process in partner countries”…)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

**Q.18 What should be the EU policy response in relation to countries that implement repressive measures against popular movements?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPCs internal affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use positive conditionality (on the basis of the “more for more” approach: “The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU” and vice versa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country: Freezing of political dialogue, restrictive financial measures, suspension of the implementation of EU agreement, assistance is primarily used to “support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratisation process in partner countries”…)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should promote the use of the whole range of sanctions at international level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU and its Member States should promote the use of force within the framework of a UN Security Council resolution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

**Q.19 What should be the EU policy response in relation to countries that implement repressive measures against women rights and gender equality?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPCs internal affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use positive conditionality (on the basis of the “more for more” approach: “The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU” and vice versa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country: Freezing of political dialogue, restrictive financial measures, suspension of the implementation of EU agreement, assistance is primarily used to “support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratisation process in partner countries”…)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should support NGOs and individuals that are engaged in women rights promotion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
Q.20 How should the EU allocate its aid in support to civil society?

The EU should only give support to groupings from the **secular spectrum**

The EU should also give support to groupings from the **religious spectrum**

The EU should give support to groupings **regardless of their confessional affiliation**

Don’t know

Comments:

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**The Euromed Policies in Regards to Political and Security Cooperation**

*(Conflict prevention and crisis management, political dialogue, cooperation in the field of democratisation and human rights promotion)*

Q.21 To what extent do you consider that the general objective of the first Political & Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration "establishing an area of peace and stability" was achieved?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not achieved at all</th>
<th>Fully achieved</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

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Q.22 Do you have a clear perception on the Euromed policies regarding Political and Security cooperation?

Yes [ ] (if you have this clear perception please go to Q.22.a)

No [ ] (if it is not the case skip Q.22.a and go to Q.22.b)
Q.22. a. How would you evaluate the progress achieved in the field of the objectives of the Political and Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>No progress</th>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen political dialogue</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop the rule of law and democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect human rights and fundamental freedoms</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight organized crime and drug trafficking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote regional security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Q.22 b. Among the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme, for which do you consider progress was achieved and for which do you think that there was no progress or even regression?

For further information on the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme.

Five Year Work Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>No progress</th>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the participation of women in decision-making</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure freedom of expression and association</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster the role of civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
Q.23 How do you assess the progress achieved in the development of the following programmes and projects?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes and projects</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>No progress</th>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>supporting an open and modern justice system through strengthening the institutional and administrative capacity of MPCs and setting up an inter-professional community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuroMed Police II programme (July 2007-June 2010, €5 million) strengthening police cooperation between the EU and the MPCs, in the fight against all major types of organised crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Peace Process (2005-2007, €10 million and for 2007 to 2010, €10 million) aims to support to the efforts to promote peace and cooperation between Israelis and Arabs, mainly through initiatives impacting on people’s lives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence building measures, networks and facility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta Seminars for Diplomats (2004-2008, €0.94 million)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a network of foreign policy institutes carrying out studies on the EMP and ENP issues and considered as an EMP confidence-building measure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euromed Regional Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters (PPRD South; 2009-2011, €5 million)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Facility under the ENP framework (€300 million [some €43 m per year, on average] “to provide additional support, on top of the normal country allocations, to acknowledge and support the work of those partner countries who have made most progress in implementing the agreed reform agenda set out in their Action Plan”)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
Q.24 Do you think that it is probable or not that the following conflicts will be solved in the near future?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Not achieved at all</th>
<th>Fully achieved</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Israeli conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q.25 Do you think that the EU should play a greater role in conflict resolution in the Mediterranean Area?

Yes

No

Comments:
BLOCK D

PROSPECTIVE AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Q.26 What degree of probability do you attribute to the following mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>No probability</th>
<th>Very high probability</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime change will become the rule in the Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions in the Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tensions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular migration originating from MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: 

Q.27 How do you assess the implications of the Palestinian application for UN membership on:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Very negative</th>
<th>Very positive</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean relations?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arab-Israeli conflict dynamics?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
BLOCK A

COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE
Respondents by type of Institution (% of total respondents)

- Civil Society: 27%
- Policy-makers: 31%
- Experts: 42%

Policy-makers

- Governmental: 50%
- EU Institution: 18%
- Other International Organisation: 18%
- Diplomatic: 13%
- Political Party: 1%

Civil Society

- NGO: 77%
- Company (Business Sector): 23%
- Trade Union: 3%

Experts

- Academic: 75%
- Media: 5%
- Think Tank: 23%
Respondents by geographical origin (% on total respondents)

North-South

- Mediterranean Partner Countries: 49%
- EU: 49%
- Others: 2%

Respondents by country group

- Rest of EU (i.e. EU non-Mediterranean): 25%
- Mediterranean EU countries: 24%
- Maghreb: 21%
- Mashreq: 16%
- Turkey: 6%
- Israel: 3%
- European non-EU (i.e. Balkan countries & Monaco): 3%
- Other: 2%

Respondents by gender (% on total respondents)

- Women: 30%
- Men: 70%

EU Countries

- Women: 34%
- Men: 66%

Mediterranean Partner Countries

- Women: 25%
- Men: 75%
**Composition of the Sample**

**Respondents by gender and regional group (%)**

- **Maghreb**: 81%, 19%
- **Mashreq**: 70%, 30%
- **Mediterranean EU countries**: 69%, 31%
- **European non-EU**: 65%, 35%
- **Rest of EU**: 63%, 37%

**Respondents by age group (%)**

- **From 20 to 35**: 15%
- **From 36 to 45**: 23%
- **From 46 to 55**: 27%
- **From 56 to 65**: 26%
- **66 and over**: 9%

**Respondents by age and regional group (%)**

- **Total Survey**: 15%, 23%, 27%, 26%, 9%
- **Rest of EU**: 28%, 21%, 22%, 20%, 10%
- **Mediterranean EU countries**: 12%, 26%, 27%, 28%, 7%
- **Mashreq**: 11%, 28%, 27%, 26%, 8%
- **Maghreb**: 7%, 16%, 36%, 32%, 9%
Respondents by main area of specialisation (%) Respondents could indicate one or two areas of specialisation. These are totals for first and second areas, therefore aggregated % add up to more than 100.

Main area of specialisation by region (%)

- EU countries: 11% Pol. Cooperation and Security, 28% Econ. and Financial Cooperation, 37% Social, Cultural and Human Exchanges, 23% Migration and Justice Affairs
- Mediterranean Partner Countries: 12% Pol. Cooperation and Security, 23% Econ. and Financial Cooperation, 42% Social, Cultural and Human Exchanges, 37% Migration and Justice Affairs

Main area of specialisation by type of institution (%)

- Experts: 12% Pol. Cooperation and Security, 37% Econ. and Financial Cooperation, 42% Social, Cultural and Human Exchanges, 10% Migration and Justice Affairs
- Policy-makers: 9% Pol. Cooperation and Security, 42% Econ. and Financial Cooperation, 39% Social, Cultural and Human Exchanges, 10% Migration and Justice Affairs
- Civil Society: 13% Pol. Cooperation and Security, 26% Econ. and Financial Cooperation, 81% Social, Cultural and Human Exchanges, 10% Migration and Justice Affairs
BLOCK B

MONITORING OF PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP / UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AND EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY IN 2011
**Global Assessment**

Q.1 What is your global assessment of the EU initiatives towards its southern neighbours in 2011?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly inadequate</th>
<th>Highly adequate</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

**Global assessment of the results of the EU initiatives towards its southern neighbours in 2011**
(average on a scale of 0-10)

- **Mediterranean Partner Countries**: 4.9
- **EU-27**: 4.9
- **Survey mean**: 4.9
- **Maghreb**: 4.6
- **Mashreq**: 5.0
- **Mediterranean EU Countries**: 4.8
- **Rest of EU**: 5.0
- **European non-EU**: 6.1

**Global assessment of the results of the EU initiatives towards its southern neighbours in 2011 (%)**
Global assessment of the results of the EU initiatives towards its southern neighbours in 2011
(average on a scale of 0-10)

Union for the Mediterranean

Q.2 What is your global assessment of the results achieved by the Union for the Mediterranean in 2011?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly inadequate</th>
<th>Highly adequate</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

Assessing the results achieved by the Union for the Mediterranean in 2011
(average on a scale of 0-10)
**UfM Global Assessment (%)**

Very positive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Euromed Survey 2010</th>
<th>Euromed Survey 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Very disappointing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Euromed Survey 2010</th>
<th>Euromed Survey 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UfM Global Assessment**

(average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Euromed Survey 2010</th>
<th>Euromed Survey 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashreq</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European non-EU</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean EU Countries</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of EU</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Euromed Survey 2010**: How would you assess progress made regarding the setting up of the UfM Secretariat between November 2008 and September 2010?

**Euromed Survey 2011**: What is your global assessment of the results achieved by the Union for the Mediterranean in 2011?
### Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean

Q.3 Do you expect the Secretariat to play a key, moderate or negligible role in the new Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture in the near future?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negligible role</th>
<th>Key role</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of the UfM</td>
<td>23 43 70 72 54 62 57 100 68 33 46</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>67 695</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4% 7% 11% 11% 9% 10% 9% 16% 11% 5% 7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10% 100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

#### UfM Secretariat’s role in the new Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture in the near future

(average on a scale of 0-10)

- Mediterranean Partner Countries: 5.4
- EU-27: 5.0
- Survey mean: 5.2
- Maghreb: 4.9
- Mashreq: 5.4
- Mediterranean EU Countries: 5.4
- Rest of EU: 4.7
- European non-EU: 2.7

#### UfM Secretariat’s role in the new Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture in the near future

Comparing 2011 and 2010 results (%)

- Key role
  - 10: 0% 10% 10% 10%
  - 9: 0% 0% 0% 0%
  - 8: 0% 0% 0% 0%
  - 7: 11% 11% 11% 11%
  - 6: 9% 9% 9% 9%
  - 5: 13% 13% 13% 13%
  - 4: 9% 9% 9% 9%
  - 3: 11% 11% 11% 11%
  - 2: 7% 7% 7% 7%
  - 1: 4% 4% 4% 4%

- Negligible role
  - 0: 4% 4% 4% 4%
UfM Secretariat’s role in the new Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture in the near future
Comparing 2011 and 2010 results (average on a scale of 0-10)

Q.4 Do you think that the EU institutions should assume the northern co-presidency of the UfM, instead of the current system (one Member State from the North)

EU institutions should assume the northern co-presidency of the UfM, instead of the current system (one Member State from the North) (%)
**European Neighbourhood Policy**

Q.5 What is your global assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENP Assessment</th>
<th>Highly inadequate</th>
<th>Highly adequate</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly inadequate</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly adequate</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011
(average on a scale of 0-10)

- Mediterranean Partner Countries: 4.7
- EU-27: 5.0
- Survey mean: 4.9
- Maghreb: 4.2
- Mashreq: 5.1
- Mediterranean EU Countries: 4.9
- Rest of EU: 5.1
- European non-EU: 5.9

**Assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011 (%)**
Assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011
(average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Mashreq</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>European non-EU</th>
<th>Mediterranean EU Countries</th>
<th>Rest of EU</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EU Financial perspectives 2014-2020**

Q.6 To what extent do you consider it necessary to create a new specific financial instrument devoted to the southern Mediterranean Partners only? (The current ENPI applies to the southern and eastern Partners)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly inadequate</th>
<th>Highly adequate</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Financial perspectives 2014-2020</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Need to create a new specific financial instrument devoted to the southern Mediterranean Partners only
(average on a scale of 0-10)
Need to create a new specific financial instrument devoted to the southern Mediterranean Partners only (%)

Need to create a new specific financial instrument devoted to the southern Mediterranean Partners only (average on a scale of 0-10)
BLOCK C

NATIONAL POLITICS
AND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN
RELATIONS AFTER
THE “ARAB SPRING”
The External Actor’s Role Within the Region

Q.7 How would you assess the international response of the following actors to the uprisings in the Southern rim?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Very disappointing</th>
<th>Very positive</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>57 53 60 85 63 93 84 75 53 20 11</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>91 102 88 73 60 85 31 18 13 5 5</td>
<td>571 124 695</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>12 23 50 61 78 114 96 116 78 36 12</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
<td>58 63 80 79 71 72 59 38 31 10 6</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>128 695</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>173 104 90 72 50 60 16 9 9 6 2</td>
<td>591 104 695</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>106 108 106 81 62 70 21 28 12 7 3</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>119 91 91 78 67 65 51 27 18 5 4</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>18 21 40 41 36 102 102 103 92 60 30</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>37 43 59 47 71 129 88 87 62 28 15</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessing the international response of the following actors to the uprisings in the Southern rim
(average on a scale of 0–10)
**EU's Role in MPCs**

Q.8 How do you assess the EU's role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EU policies supported political change</th>
<th>EU policies supported the preservation of the regime in power</th>
<th>EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments</th>
<th>There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>13%</td>
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<td>28%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>305</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>78</td>
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<td>166</td>
<td>695</td>
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<td>48%</td>
<td>13%</td>
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<td>24%</td>
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<td>86</td>
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<td>65</td>
<td>695</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<tr>
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<td>45%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>150</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers
Assessment of the EU's role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”

- **EU policies supported political change**
- **EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments**
- **EU policies supported the reservation of the regime in power**
- **There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states**
Q.8 How do you assess the EU's role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”? 

### Assessment of the EU's role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: ALGERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU policies supported political change</th>
<th>EU policies supported the preservation of the regime in power</th>
<th>EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments</th>
<th>There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria (Survey results)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria (Algerian respondents)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don't know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

### Assessment of the EU's role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: EGYPT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU policies supported political change</th>
<th>EU policies supported the preservation of the regime in power</th>
<th>EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments</th>
<th>There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (Survey results)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>305</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (Egyptian respondents)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don't know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

### Assessment of the EU's role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: JORDAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU policies supported political change</th>
<th>EU policies supported the preservation of the regime in power</th>
<th>EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments</th>
<th>There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan (Survey results)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan (Jordanian respondents)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don't know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

---

**Legend:**
- EU policies supported political change
- EU policies supported the reservation of the regime in power
- EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments
- There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states

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**Notes:**
- The data presented is based on survey results and includes respondents' assessments of the EU's role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring.”
- The percentages are calculated based on the total number of respondents, including those who chose “Don’t know.”
- The survey results are further broken down by country, with specific data on Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan.

---

**IEMed.**
Q.8 How do you assess the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: LEBANON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU policies supported political change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (Survey results)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (Lebanese respondents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: MOROCCO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: MOROCCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU policies supported political change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (Survey results)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (Moroccan respondents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU policies supported political change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O. Palestinian T. (Survey Results)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O. Palestinian T. (Palestinian respondents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

EU policies supported political change
EU policies supported the preservation of the regime in power
EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments
There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states
Q.8 How do you assess the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”

| Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: SYRIA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU policies supported political change | EU policies supported the preservation of the regime in power | EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments | There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states | Total* | Dkn | Total** |
| Syria (Survey results) | 258 | 57 | 217 | 79 | 611 | 84 | 695 |
| | 42% | 9% | 36% | 13% | 100% | 12% | 0% |
| Syria (Syrian respondents) | 6 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| | 75% | 0% | 13% | 13% | 100% | 0% | 0% |

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: TUNISIA

| Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: TUNISIA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU policies supported political change | EU policies supported the preservation of the regime in power | EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments | There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states | Total* | Dkn | Total** |
| Tunisia (Survey results) | 363 | 67 | 138 | 57 | 625 | 70 | 695 |
| | 58% | 11% | 22% | 9% | 100% | 10% | 0% |
| Tunisia (Tunisian respondents) | 19 | 7 | 8 | 1 | 35 | 0 | 35 |
| | 54% | 20% | 23% | 3% | 100% | 0% | 0% |

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers
The Implications of the “Arab Spring” on the Euro-Mediterranean Relations

Q.9 What degree of probability do you attribute to the following long-term scenarios regarding the potential impact of the uprisings on the Euro-Mediterranean relations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>No probability</th>
<th>Very high probability</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political and socio-economic reforms foreseen in the ENP/EMP frameworks will be accelerated</td>
<td>11 17 40 68 91 111 126 79 38 13</td>
<td>2% 3% 6% 10% 9% 14% 17% 19% 12% 6% 2%</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current situation will lead to a more homogenous, sustainable and democratic Mediterranean which, in turn, would trigger the political dialogue between the EU and the MPCs and the consolidation of a truly Euro-Mediterranean Community</td>
<td>22 39 64 72 51 105 104 83 69 37 17</td>
<td>3% 6% 10% 11% 8% 16% 16% 13% 10% 6% 3%</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Euro-Mediterranean regional integration process will no longer be suitable given the heterogeneity and fragmentation inherited from the uprisings</td>
<td>29 57 77 64 71 98 64 57 69 36 17</td>
<td>5% 9% 12% 10% 11% 15% 10% 9% 11% 6% 3%</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Degree of probability you attribute to the following long-term scenarios regarding the potential impact of the uprisings on the Euro-Mediterranean relations

(average on a scale of 0-10)

Degree of probability you attribute to the following long-term scenarios regarding the potential impact of the uprisings on the Euro-Mediterranean relations

(average on a scale of 0-10)
The Implications of the “Arab Spring” on the Euro-Mediterranean Relations

Q.9 What degree of probability do you attribute to the following long-term scenarios regarding the potential impact of the uprisings on the Euro-Mediterranean relations?

Political and socio-economic reforms foreseen in the ENP/EMP frameworks will be accelerated (average on a scale of 0-10)

The current situation will lead to a more homogenous, sustainable and democratic Mediterranean which, in turn, would trigger the political dialogue between the EU and the MPCs and the consolidation of a truly Euro-Mediterranean Community (average on a scale of 0-10)
The Euro-Mediterranean regional integration process will no longer be suitable given the heterogeneity and fragmentation inherited from the uprisings

(average on a scale of 0-10)
### The EU’s Role in MPCs

Q.10 How would you assess the EU’s future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors? Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Less Impact</th>
<th>More Impact</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessing the EU’s future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors. Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to:
**The EU’s Role in MPCs**

Q.10 How would you assess the EU’s future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors? Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to: (MPC respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Less Impact</th>
<th>More Impact</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessing the EU’s future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors. Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to: (MPC respondents)
### The EU’s Role in MPC

#### Q.10 How would you assess the EU’s future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors? Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to: (EU respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Less Impact</th>
<th>More Impact</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

---

Assessing the EU’s future role in the Mediterranean Partner Countries compared to other external and regional actors. Will the EU have more or less impact on regional developments compared to: (EU respondents)
### Mediterranean Partner Countries internal politics

**Q.11 How would you assess the prospects of sustainable democracy in the following countries?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Very improbable</th>
<th>Very probable</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>105</td>
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<td>108</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

---

### Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in the following countries

(average on a scale of 0-10)

- **Algeria**: 3.9
- **Egypt**: 4.1
- **Jordan**: 4.9
- **Lebanon**: 5.6
- **Libya**: 4.4
- **Morocco**: 5.6
- **Occupied Palestinian Territories**: 4.7
- **Syria**: 3.5
- **Tunisia**: 6.7
Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in ALGERIA (average on a scale of 0-10)

Algerian respondents: 5.0
Mediterranean Partner Countries: 3.9
EU-27: 3.8
Survey mean: 3.9
Maghreb: 3.7
Mashreq: 4.2
Mediterranean EU Countries: 3.9
Rest of EU: 3.8
European non-EU: 4.7
Israel: 3.5
Turkey: 4.3

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in ALGERIA (%)

Don’t know: 9%
Very probable: 1%
Very improbable: 0 - 10

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in ALGERIA (%) Algerian respondents

Don’t know: 2%
Very probable: 2%
Very improbable: 0 - 10
Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in EGYPT (average on a scale of 0-10)

- Egyptian respondents: 6.9
- Mediterranean Partner Countries: 5.3
- EU-27: 4.9
- Survey mean: 5.1
- Maghreb: 6.0
- Mashreq: 6.1
- Mediterranean EU Countries: 5.1
- Rest of EU: 4.9
- European non-EU: 5.4
- Israel: 4.1
- Turkey: 5.2

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in EGYPT (%)

Very probable
- 10: 1%
- 9: 4%
- 8: 9%
- 7: 13%
- 6: 18%
- 5: 16%
- 4: 16%
- 3: 11%
- 2: 7%
- 1: 3%
- 0: 2%

Very improbable
- 0: 3%
Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in JORDAN (average on a scale of 0-10)

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in JORDAN (%)

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in JORDAN (%) Jordanian respondents
Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in LEBANON (average on a scale of 0-10)

Lebanon respondents: 3.9
Mediterranean Partner Countries: 5.8
EU-27: 5.1
Survey mean: 4.9
Maghreb: 4.5
Mashreq: 5.5
Mediterranean EU Countries: 5.4
Rest of EU: 5.3
European non-EU: 5.2
Israel: 4.3
Turkey: 5.6

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in LEBANON (%)

Don't know: 7%
Very improbable: 0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in LEBANON (%) Lebanese respondents

Don't know: 11%
Very improbable: 0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in MOROCCO (average on a scale of 0-10)

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in MOROCCO (%) moroccan respondents

Very probable
Don't know
Very improbable

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in MOROCCO (%)

Don't know
Very probable

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in MOROCCO (%) Moroccon respondents

Don't know
Very probable

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (average on a scale of 0-10)

Occupied Palestinian Territories respondents: 6.4
Mediterranean Partner Countries: 4.9
EU-27: 4.7
Survey mean: 4.7
Maghreb: 4.8
Mashreq: 5.1
Mediterranean EU Countries: 5.8
Rest of EU: 4.6
European non-EU: 3.4
Israel: 5.2
Turkey: 4.9

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (%)

Very probable
9: 3%
8: 8%
7: 12%
6: 14%
5: 19%
4: 14%
3: 10%
2: 10%
1: 6%
0: 0%

Very improbable
0: 9%
1: 0%
2: 3%
3: 8%
4: 12%
5: 19%
6: 14%
7: 10%
8: 0%
9: 0%
10: 0%

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (%) Palestinian respondents

Very probable
9: 30%
8: 15%
7: 10%
6: 10%
5: 20%
4: 5%
3: 0%
2: 0%
1: 0%
0: 0%
Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in SYRIA (average on a scale of 0-10)

Syrian respondents: 6.6
Mediterranean Partner Countries: 3.7
EU-27: 3.4
Survey mean: 3.5
Maghreb: 3.4
Mashreq: 4.0
Mediterranean EU Countries: 3.4
Rest of EU: 3.3
European non-EU: 3.9
Israel: 2.7
Turkey: 3.9

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in SYRIA (%)

Very probable: 10
Very improbable: 0
Don't know: 10

Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in SYRIA (%) Syrian respondents

Very probable: 38%
Very improbable: 0%
Don't know: 38%

Average scores:
- Syrian respondents: 6.6
- Mediterranean Partner Countries: 3.7
- EU-27: 3.4
- Survey mean: 3.5
- Maghreb: 3.4
- Mashreq: 4.0
- Mediterranean EU Countries: 3.4
- Rest of EU: 3.3
- European non-EU: 3.9
- Israel: 2.7
- Turkey: 3.9
### Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in TUNISIA (average on a scale of 0-10)

| Region                  | Average
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisian respondents</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashreq</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean EU Countries</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of EU</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European non-EU</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in TUNISIA (%)

#### Tunisian respondents

| Probability Level | Percentage
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very probable 10</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very probable 9</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very probable 8</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very probable 7</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very probable 6</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very probable 5</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very probable 4</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very probable 3</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very probable 2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very probable 1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very improbable</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assessing the prospects of sustainable democracy in TUNISIA (%)

#### Euro-Mediterranean partners

| Region                  | Percentage
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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</table>

#### Mediterrean EU Countries

| Region                  | Percentage
<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
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<td>7.0</td>
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<td>Mediterranean EU Countries</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of EU</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>European non-EU</td>
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<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### European non-EU

| Region                  | Percentage
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<td>Mediterranean EU Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest of EU</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>European non-EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Rest of EU

| Region                  | Percentage
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>Maghreb</td>
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<td>Rest of EU</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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#### European non-EU

| Region                  | Percentage
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
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<td>Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Rest of EU</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>European non-EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Turkish

| Region                  | Percentage
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<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mediterranean EU Countries</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<td>Rest of EU</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<td>5.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Mediterranean Partner Countries internal politics**

Q.12 Do you expect political Islam to play a key, moderate or negligible role in the future Mediterranean landscape?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negligible role</th>
<th>Key role</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Islam role in the future Mediterranean landscape</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

---

**Role of political Islam in the future Mediterranean landscape**

(average on a scale of 0-10)

- Mediterranean Partner Countries: 6.9
- EU-27: 7.6
- Survey mean: 7.3
- Maghreb: 6.5
- Mashreq: 7.3
- Mediterranean EU Countries: 7.5
- Rest of EU: 7.8
- European non-EU: 5.6
- Israel: 7.0
- Turkey: 8.5

---

**Role of political Islam in the future Mediterranean landscape (%)**

- Don’t know: 3%
- Key role:
  - 10: 10%
  - 9: 15%
  - 8: 25%
  - 7: 23%
  - 6: 11%
  - 5: 8%
  - 4: 4%
  - 3: 2%
  - 2: 1%
  - 1: 1%
  - Negligible role: 1%
## The EU response to changes in its neighbourhood

Q.13 How would you assess the relevance of the following priorities that were identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”?

### Not relevant | Very relevant | Total | Dkn | Total
---|---|---|---|---
Money – reallocating/refocusing additional financial resources to support democratic transitions, institution building, civil society and the socio-economic needs of the countries. For instance the loss of income from tourism in Egypt and Tunisia (SPRING Programme €350 million for 2011 and 2012)
| 8 | 9 | 19 | 26 | 26 | 55 | 78 | 119 | 90 | 90 | 661 |
| 1% | 1% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 8% | 12% | 18% | 21% | 14% | 14% | 100% | 5% |
Market access – consider allowing partners that have a fully functioning independent judiciary, an efficient public administration and have made significant progress towards eradicating corruption, into the non-regulated area of the [EU] Internal Market for goods
| 4 | 8 | 14 | 17 | 31 | 52 | 66 | 103 | 134 | 112 | 101 | 642 |
| 1% | 1% | 2% | 3% | 5% | 8% | 10% | 16% | 21% | 17% | 16% | 100% | 8% |
Mobility – improve “visa facilitation”, conclude “Mobility Partnerships”, improve “people-to-people contacts”, “labour mobility” and enhance “students, researchers and business persons” mobility
| 6 | 8 | 17 | 26 | 26 | 54 | 47 | 86 | 121 | 127 | 147 | 665 |
| 1% | 1% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 8% | 7% | 13% | 18% | 19% | 22% | 100% | 4% |
Conclude and implement new “Neighbourhood Agreements”, as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 8 TEU), which will establish Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)
| 3 | 12 | 20 | 27 | 23 | 72 | 50 | 14 | 140 | 105 | 91 | 647 |
| 0% | 2% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 11% | 8% | 16% | 22% | 16% | 14% | 100% | 7% |
Create a “Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility”, “designed to strengthen the capacity of civil society to promote reform and increase public accountability in their countries” (€22 million)
| 6 | 16 | 18 | 19 | 27 | 51 | 62 | 106 | 111 | 106 | 132 | 654 |
| 1% | 2% | 3% | 3% | 4% | 8% | 9% | 16% | 17% | 16% | 20% | 100% | 6% |
Create a “European Endowment for Democracy” (to “help political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners”)
| 20 | 17 | 25 | 35 | 29 | 67 | 59 | 85 | 80 | 109 | 129 | 655 |
| 3% | 3% | 4% | 5% | 4% | 10% | 9% | 13% | 12% | 17% | 20% | 100% | 6% |
Create a European Neighbourhood “Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development”
| 2 | 9 | 14 | 21 | 25 | 50 | 63 | 102 | 124 | 95 | 138 | 643 |
| 0% | 1% | 2% | 3% | 4% | 8% | 10% | 16% | 19% | 15% | 21% | 100% | 7% |

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessing the relevance of the priorities that were identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”? (average on a scale of 0-10)

- **Money**: 7.0
- **Market access**: 7.3
- **Mobility**: 7.5
- **Conclude and implement new “Neighbourhood Agreements”**: 7.1
- **Create a “Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility”**: 7.3
- **Create a “European Endowment for Democracy”**: 6.8
- **Create a European Neighbourhood “Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development”**: 7.4
Q.13 How would you assess the relevance of the following priorities that were identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”?

Assessing the relevance of Money – reallocating/refocusing additional financial resources to support democratic transitions, institution building, civil society and the socio-economic needs of the countries (average on a scale of 0–10)

Assessing the relevance of Money – reallocating/refocusing additional financial resources to support democratic transitions, institution building, civil society and the socio-economic needs of the countries (%)
Q.13 How would you assess the relevance of the following priorities that were identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”?

Market access – "consider allowing partners that have a fully functioning independent judiciary, an efficient public administration and have made significant progress towards eradicating corruption, into the non-regulated area of the [EU] Internal Market for goods" (average on a scale of 0-10)
Q.13 How would you assess the relevance of the following priorities that were identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”?

Mobility – improve “visa facilitation”, conclude “Mobility Partnerships”, improve “people-to-people contacts”, “labour mobility” and enhance “students, researchers and business persons” mobility (average on a scale of 0-10)

Mobility – improve “visa facilitation”, conclude “Mobility Partnerships”, improve “people-to-people contacts”, “labour mobility” and enhance “students, researchers and business persons” mobility (%)

Survey mean

Mediterranean Partner Countries
EU-27
Maghreb
Mashreq
Mediterranean EU Countries
Rest of EU
European non-EU
Israel
Turkey

Don’t know
Very relevant

8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

75
74
77
76
75
74
72
65
70
4%
22%
19%
18%
13%
7%
8%
4%
4%
4%
3%
1%
1%
Q.13 How would you assess the relevance of the following priorities that were identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”?

Conclude and implement new “Neighbourhood Agreements”, as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 8 TEU), that which establish Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)

(average on a scale of 0-10)
Q.13 How would you assess the relevance of the following priorities that were identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on "A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood" and "A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean"?

Create a “Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility”, “designed to strengthen the capacity of civil society to promote reform and increase public accountability in their countries” (€22 million)
(average on a scale of 0-10)

Create a “Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility”, “designed to strengthen the capacity of civil society to promote reform and increase public accountability in their countries” (€22 million) (%)
Q.13 How would you assess the relevance of the following priorities that were identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”?

Create a “European Endowment for Democracy” (to “help political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners”) (average on a scale of 0–10)

Create a “European Endowment for Democracy” (to “help political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners") (%)
Q.13 How would you assess the relevance of the following priorities that were identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” and “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”? 

Create a European Neighbourhood “Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development” 
(average on a scale of 0-10) 

Mediterranean Partner Countries 
EU-27 
Survey mean 
Maghreb 
Mashreq 
Mediterranean EU Countries 
Rest of EU 
European non-EU 
Israel 
Turkey 

Create a European Neighbourhood “Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development” (%) 

Don’t know 7% 
Very relevant 21% 
9 15% 
8 19% 
7 16% 
6 10% 
5 9% 
4 8% 
3 3% 
2 2% 
1 1% 
Not relevant 0%
Q.14 How would you assess the EU financial response to the Arab Spring (SPRING Programme €350 million for 2011 and 2012, US$ 7.5 billion from the European Investment Bank in the form of loans until 2013)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessing the EU financial response to the Arab Spring</th>
<th>Highly inadequate</th>
<th>Highly adequate</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing the EU financial response to the Arab Spring</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessing the EU financial response to the Arab Spring (average on a scale of 0-10)

- Mediterranean Partner Countries: 5.7
- EU-27: 5.7
- Survey mean: 5.7
- Maghreb: 5.4
- Mashreq: 5.9
- Mediterranean EU Countries: 5.6
- Rest of EU: 5.8
- European non-EU: 6.1
- Turkey: 5.2
- Israel: 7.2

Assessing the EU financial response to the Arab Spring (%)

- Don’t know: 13%
- Key role: 4%
- Negligible role: 2%
Q.15 How would you assess the EU first responses regarding Libya’s civil war (humanitarian aid, consular cooperation, evacuations/civil protection and FRONTEX border control operations)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly inadequate</th>
<th>Highly adequate</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessing the EU first responses regarding Libya’s civil war
(average on a scale of 0-10)

- Mediterranean Partner Countries: 5.6
- EU-27: 5.7
- Survey mean: 5.6
- Maghreb: 5.3
- Mashreq: 6.0
- Mediterranean EU Countries: 5.6
- Rest of EU: 5.7
- European non-EU: 6.0
- Turkey: 5.0
- Israel: 7.2

Assessing the EU first responses regarding Libya’s civil war (%)

- Don’t know: 10%
- Key role: 4%
- 9: 8%
- 8: 11%
- 7: 16%
- 6: 17%
- 5: 15%
- 4: 10%
- 3: 9%
- 2: 9%
- 1: 4%
- Negligible role: 2%
### The EU response to changes in its neighbourhood

**Q.16 Which role should the EU play with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Remain neutral</th>
<th>Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs</th>
<th>Be very pro-active and interventionist</th>
<th>The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

### Assessment of the EU’s role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries

![Graph showing the assessment of the EU’s role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries](image-url)
Q.16 Which role should the EU play with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries?

Remain neutral  Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs  Be very pro-active and interventionist  The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Remain neutral</th>
<th>Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs</th>
<th>Be very pro-active and interventionist</th>
<th>The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Algeria (Survey results)</strong></td>
<td>105 17% 6%</td>
<td>279 14% 12%</td>
<td>108 18% 16%</td>
<td>116 19% 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Algeria (Algerian respondents)</strong></td>
<td>12 26%</td>
<td>14 33%</td>
<td>6 14%</td>
<td>11 26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: **ALGERIA**

- Algeria (Algerian respondents):
  - 28% Remain neutral
  - 33% Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs
  - 14% Be very pro-active and interventionist
  - 26% The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties

- Algeria (Survey results):
  - 17% Remain neutral
  - 46% Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs
  - 18% Be very pro-active and interventionist
  - 26% The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties

- Don’t know: 4%

---

Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: **EGYPT**

- Egypt (Egyptian respondents):
  - 17% Remain neutral
  - 33% Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs
  - 18% Be very pro-active and interventionist
  - 30% The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties

- Egypt (Survey results):
  - 12% Remain neutral
  - 41% Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs
  - 16% Be very pro-active and interventionist
  - 39% The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties

- Don’t know: 5%

---

Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: **JORDAN**

- Jordan (Jordanian respondents):
  - 28% Remain neutral
  - 17% Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs
  - 22% Be very pro-active and interventionist
  - 39% The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties

- Jordan (Survey results):
  - 18% Remain neutral
  - 48% Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs
  - 18% Be very pro-active and interventionist
  - 39% The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties

- Don’t know: 5%
Q.16 Which role should the EU play with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Description</th>
<th>Lebanon (Survey results)</th>
<th>Lebanon (Lebanese respondents)</th>
<th>Libya (Survey results)</th>
<th>Libya (Lebanese respondents)</th>
<th>Morocco (Survey results)</th>
<th>Morocco (Moroccan respondents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remain neutral</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be very pro-active and interventionian</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”:

### LEBANON

- **Lebanon (Survey results)**
  - Remain neutral: 11%
  - Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs: 34%
  - Be very pro-active and interventionist: 23%
  - The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties: 32%

- **Lebanon (Lebanese respondents)**
  - Remain neutral: 19%
  - Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs: 46%
  - Be very pro-active and interventionist: 20%
  - The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties: 15%

### LIBYA

- **Libya (Survey results)**
  - Remain neutral: 11%
  - Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs: 34%
  - Be very pro-active and interventionist: 23%
  - The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties: 32%

- **Libya (Lebanese respondents)**
  - Remain neutral: 19%
  - Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs: 46%
  - Be very pro-active and interventionist: 20%
  - The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties: 15%

### MOROCCO

- **Morocco (Survey results)**
  - Remain neutral: 17%
  - Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs: 35%
  - Be very pro-active and interventionist: 20%
  - The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties: 15%

- **Morocco (Moroccan respondents)**
  - Remain neutral: 26%
  - Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs: 35%
  - Be very pro-active and interventionist: 17%
  - The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties: 22%
Q.16 Which role should the EU play with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remain neutral</th>
<th>Remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs</th>
<th>Be very pro-active and interventionist</th>
<th>The EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O. Palestinian T. (Survey Results)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O. Palestinian T. (Palestinian respondents)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU policies supported political change</th>
<th>EU policies supported the preservation of the regime in power</th>
<th>EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments</th>
<th>There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria (Survey results)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria (Syrian respondents)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: SYRIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU policies supported political change</th>
<th>EU policies supported the preservation of the regime in power</th>
<th>EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments</th>
<th>There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia (Survey results)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia (Tunisian respondents)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessment of the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”: TUNISIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU policies supported political change</th>
<th>EU policies supported the preservation of the regime in power</th>
<th>EU policies had no impact on the domestic developments</th>
<th>There was no EU-policy due to diverging positions of EU-member states</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia (Survey results)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia (Tunisian respondents)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q.17 What should be the EU policy response in relation to countries that fail to introduce democratic reforms?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Response</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>MPC</th>
<th>EU countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPCs internal affairs</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13%)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use positive conditionality (on the basis of the “more for more” approach: “the more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU” and vice versa)</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(67%)</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country: Freezing of political dialogue, restrictive financial measures, suspension of the implementation of EU agreement, assistance is primarily used to “support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratisation process in partner countries”…)</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16%)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3%)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(‡) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

**EU policy response in relation to countries that fail to introduce democratic reforms (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>MPC</th>
<th>EU countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Countries</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EU policy response in relation to countries that fail to introduce democratic reforms (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>MPC</th>
<th>EU countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashreq</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean EU Countries</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of EU</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European non-EU</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPC internal affairs
- The EU should use positive conditionality (on the basis of the “more for more” approach: “the more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU” and vice versa)
- The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country: Freezing of political dialogue, restrictive financial measures, suspension of the implementation of EU agreement, assistance is primarily used to “support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratisation process in partner countries”…)
- Don’t know
Q.18 What should be the EU policy response in relation to countries that implement repressive measures against popular movements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Response</th>
<th>Survey Mean</th>
<th>MPC</th>
<th>EU Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPC internal affairs</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use positive conditionality (on the basis of the “more for more” approach: “the more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU” and vice versa)</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country: Freezing of political dialogue, restrictive financial measures, suspension of the implementation of EU agreement, assistance is primarily used to “support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratisation process in partner countries”…)</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should promote the use of the whole range of sanctions at international level</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU and its Member States should promote the use of force within the framework of a UN Security Council resolution</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

EU policy response in relation to countries that implement repressive measures against popular movements (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Survey Mean</th>
<th>Mediterranean Partner Countries</th>
<th>EU Countries</th>
<th>Mediterranean EU Countries</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Mashreq</th>
<th>Rest of EU</th>
<th>European non-EU</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPC internal affairs</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use positive conditionality (on the basis of the “more for more” approach: “the more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU” and vice versa)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country: Freezing of political dialogue, restrictive financial measures, suspension of the implementation of EU agreement, assistance is primarily used to “support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratisation process in partner countries”…)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should promote the use of the whole range of sanctions at international level</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q.19 What should be the EU policy response in relation to countries that implement repressive measures against women’s rights and gender equality?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Response</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>MPC</th>
<th>EU countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU should remain neutral and not intervene in MPC internal affairs</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use positive conditionality (on the basis of the &quot;more for more&quot; approach: &quot;the more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU&quot; and vice versa)</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country: freezing of political dialogue, restrictive financial measures, suspension of the implementation of EU agreement, assistance is primarily used to “support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratisation process in partner countries” …)</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should support NGOs and individuals that are engaged in women rights promotion</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Don’t know

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers
Q.20 How should the EU allocate its aid in support of civil society?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>MPC</th>
<th>EU countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>448</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

How should the EU allocate its aid in support of civil society (%)
The EU response to changes in its neighbourhood

Q.21 To what extent do you consider that the general objective of the first Political & Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration “establishing an area of peace and stability” was achieved?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not achieved at all</th>
<th>Fully achieved</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Perception of achievement of the general objective of the first Political & Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration “establishing an area of peace and stability” (average on a scale of 0-10)

Perception of achievement of the general objective of the first Political & Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration “establishing an area of peace and stability” (%)
Euromed Policies in the field of Political and Security Cooperation

Q.22 Do you have a clear perception on the Euromed policies regarding Political and Security cooperation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clear perception on the Euromed policies regarding Political and Security cooperation</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>259</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>62.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clear perception on the Euromed policies regarding Political and Security cooperation (%)

- Mediterranean Partner Countries: 40% Yes, 60% No
- EU-27: 34% Yes, 66% No
- Survey mean: 37% Yes, 63% No
- Maghreb: 40% Yes, 60% No
- Mashreq: 47% Yes, 52% No
- Mediterranean EU Countries: 34% Yes, 66% No
- Rest of EU: 34% Yes, 66% No
- European non-EU: 30% Yes, 70% No
**Euromed Policies in the field of Political and Security Cooperation**

Q.22.a How would you evaluate the progress achieved in the field of the objectives of the Political and Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>No Progress</th>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen political dialogue</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop the rule of law and democracy</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect human rights and fundamental freedoms</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight organized crime and drug trafficking</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote regional security</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessing the progress achieved in the objectives set in the Political and Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration

![Progress chart depicting the assessment of progress achieved in various objectives.](chart.png)
Assessing the progress achieved in the objectives set in the Political and Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration:

MPC respondents

- Strengthen political dialogue: 55% Progress, 33% No progress, 12% Regression
- Develop the rule of law and democracy: 44% Progress, 46% No progress, 10% Regression
- Respect human rights and fundamental freedoms: 45% Progress, 38% No progress, 17% Regression
- Respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination: 31% Progress, 54% No progress, 14% Regression
- Strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism: 69% Progress, 23% No progress, 8% Regression
- Fight organized crime and drug trafficking: 59% Progress, 30% No progress, 11% Regression
- Promote regional security: 37% Progress, 61% No progress, 12% Regression
- Create a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction: 13% Progress, 52% No progress, 35% Regression

EU respondents

- Strengthen political dialogue: 61% Progress, 31% No progress, 8% Regression
- Develop the rule of law and democracy: 44% Progress, 46% No progress, 10% Regression
- Respect human rights and fundamental freedoms: 38% Progress, 46% No progress, 14% Regression
- Respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination: 31% Progress, 50% No progress, 19% Regression
- Strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism: 72% Progress, 23% No progress, 5% Regression
- Fight organized crime and drug trafficking: 60% Progress, 29% No progress, 11% Regression
- Promote regional security: 22% Progress, 62% No progress, 16% Regression
- Create a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction: 5% Progress, 56% No progress, 39% Regression
### Euromed Policies in the field of Political and Security Cooperation

**Q.22 b.** Among the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme, for which do you consider progress was achieved and for which do you think that there was no progress or even regression?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Progress achieved</th>
<th>No progress</th>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens</td>
<td>320 (57%)</td>
<td>225 (40%)</td>
<td>21 (4%)</td>
<td>129 (19%)</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level</td>
<td>232 (43%)</td>
<td>285 (52%)</td>
<td>28 (5%)</td>
<td>150 (22%)</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the participation of women in decision-making</td>
<td>275 (49%)</td>
<td>250 (44%)</td>
<td>39 (7%)</td>
<td>131 (19%)</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure freedom of expression and association</td>
<td>288 (51%)</td>
<td>242 (43%)</td>
<td>39 (7%)</td>
<td>129 (18%)</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster the role of civil society</td>
<td>356 (61%)</td>
<td>197 (34%)</td>
<td>27 (5%)</td>
<td>115 (17%)</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions</td>
<td>178 (37%)</td>
<td>258 (54%)</td>
<td>41 (9%)</td>
<td>218 (31%)</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

### Perception of the progress achieved in the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme

- Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens
- Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level
- Increase the participation of women in decision-making
- Ensure freedom of expression and association
- Foster the role of civil society
- Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions
Perception of the progress achieved in the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme: MPC respondents

- Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens: 57% Progress, 39% No progress, 4% Regression, 20% Dkn
- Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level: 40% Progress, 55% No progress, 5% Regression, 19% Dkn
- Increase the participation of women in decision-making: 47% Progress, 44% No progress, 9% Regression, 19% Dkn
- Ensure freedom of expression and association: 52% Progress, 40% No progress, 8% Regression, 18% Dkn
- Foster the role of civil society: 61% Progress, 33% No progress, 5% Regression, 16% Dkn
- Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions: 41% Progress, 50% No progress, 9% Regression, 30% Dkn

Perception of the progress achieved in the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme: EU respondents

- Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens: 57% Progress, 39% No progress, 4% Regression, 17% Dkn
- Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level: 45% Progress, 50% No progress, 5% Regression, 24% Dkn
- Increase the participation of women in decision-making: 51% Progress, 44% No progress, 5% Regression, 20% Dkn
- Ensure freedom of expression and association: 48% Progress, 45% No progress, 6% Regression, 18% Dkn
- Foster the role of civil society: 61% Progress, 35% No progress, 4% Regression, 18% Dkn
- Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions: 35% Progress, 67% No progress, 8% Regression, 34% Dkn
### Euromed Policies in the field of Political and Security Cooperation

Q.23 How do you assess the progress achieved in the development of the following programmes and projects?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes and projects</th>
<th>Progress achieved</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euromed Justice I and II</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euromed Police II programme</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence-building measures, networks and facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta Seminars for Diplomats</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euromed regional Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters (PPRD South; 2009-2011, €5 million)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Facility under the ENP framework (€300 million (some €43m per year, on average) <em>to provide additional support, on top of the normal country allocations, to acknowledge and support the work of those partner countries which have made most progress in implementing the agreed reform agenda set out in their Action Plan</em>)</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

### Assessing the progress achieved in the EU multilateral programmes on Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation

![Progress, No progress, Regression, Dkn chart]

- Programs and projects:
  - Euromed Justice I and II: 42% Progress, 54% No progress, 5% Regression
  - EuroMed Police II programme: 59% Progress, 37% No progress, 3% Regression
  - Middle East Peace Process: 12% Progress, 55% No progress, 33% Regression
  - Confidence-building measures, networks and facilities:
    - Malta Seminars for Diplomats: 57% Progress, 40% No progress, 3% Regression
    - EuroMeSCo, Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission: 62% Progress, 32% No progress, 6% Regression
    - Euromed Regional Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters: 53% Progress, 42% No progress, 5% Regression
    - Governance Facility under the ENP framework: 53% Progress, 42% No progress, 6% Regression

- Don't know: 53%
Assessing the progress achieved in the EU multilateral programmes on Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation:

**MPC respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes and projects</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>No progress</th>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Euromed Justice I and II</td>
<td>43%</td>
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<td>EuroMed Police II programme</td>
<td>60%</td>
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<td>Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>35%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confidence-building measures, networks and facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malta Seminars for Diplomats</td>
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<td>44%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EuroMeSCo, Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>36%</td>
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<td>49%</td>
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<td>58%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>5%</td>
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Assessing the progress achieved in the EU multilateral programmes on Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation:

**EU respondents**

<table>
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<th>Programmes and projects</th>
<th>Progress</th>
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<th>Regression</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
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<td>40%</td>
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<td>EuroMed Police II programme</td>
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<td>Confidence-building measures, networks and facilities</td>
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<td>Malta Seminars for Diplomats</td>
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<td>37%</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EuroMeSCo, Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission</td>
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<td>28%</td>
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**Euromed Policies in the field of Political and Security Cooperation**

Q.24 Do you think that it is probable or not that the following conflicts will be solved in the near future?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>No probability</th>
<th>Very high probability</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Israeli conflict</td>
<td>157 149 128 81 49 40 24 20 9 4 5</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>157 149 128 81 49 40 24 20 9 4 5</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>157 149 128 81 49 40 24 20 9 4 5</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessing the probability that the following conflicts will be solved in the near future

- Arab Israeli conflict
- Cyprus
- Western Sahara

![Graph showing the assessment of probability for each conflict](image-url)
Q.24 Do you think that it is probable or not that the following conflicts will be solved in the near future?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>No probability</th>
<th>Very high probability</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Israeli conflict</td>
<td>157 149 128 81 49 40 24 20 9 4 5</td>
<td>Total 666</td>
<td>24% 22% 19% 12% 7% 6% 4% 3% 1% 1% 1% 100%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Assessing the probability that the Arab Israeli conflict will be solved in the near future
(average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Probability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashreq</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean EU Countries</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of EU</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European non-EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing the probability that the Arab Israeli conflict will be solved in the near future (%)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
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</tr>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>24%</td>
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</table>
Q.24 Do you think that it is probable or not that the following conflicts will be solved in the near future?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No probability</th>
<th>Very high probability</th>
<th>Total*</th>
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<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
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<td>2%</td>
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<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Assessing the probability that the Cyprus conflict will be solved in the near future
(average on a scale of 0-10)

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Assessing the probability that the Cyprus conflict will be solved in the near future (%)

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</table>
Q.24 Do you think that it is probable or not that the following conflicts will be solved in the near future?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No probability</th>
<th>Very high probability</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
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<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)
** Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Assessing the probability that the Western Sahara conflict will be solved in the near future
(average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
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<td>604</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
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<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>604</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mashreq</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mediterranean EU Countries</td>
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<td>European non-EU</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>604</td>
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</table>

Assessing the probability that the Western Sahara conflict will be solved in the near future (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high probability</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No probability</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Euromed Policies in Regards To Political And Security Cooperation

Q.25 Do you think that the EU should play a greater role in conflict resolution in the Mediterranean Area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The EU should play a greater role in conflict resolution in the Mediterranean Area</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>646</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The EU should play a greater role in conflict resolution in the Mediterranean Area (%)

Mediterranean Partner Countries: 94% Yes, 6% No
EU-27: 93% Yes, 7% No
Survey mean: 93% Yes, 7% No
Maghreb: 97% Yes, 3% No
Mashreq: 97% Yes, 3% No
Mediterranean EU Countries: 95% Yes, 5% No
Rest of EU: 90% Yes, 10% No
European non-EU: 85% Yes, 15% No
### Prospective and Policy Recommendations

Q.26. What degree of probability do you attribute to the following mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>No probability</th>
<th>Very high probability</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime change will become the rule in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>53</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
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<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>54</td>
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<td>8%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tensions</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular migration from originating MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers
Degree of probability attributed to the following mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean
(average on a scale of 0-10)

- The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP: 5.8
- Regime change will become the rule in the Mediterranean: 6
- The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period: 6.2
- Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States: 6.1
- Water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions in the Mediterranean: 6.9
- Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs: 6.4
- MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income: 4.6
- Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tension: 6.8
- Irregular migration from originating MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose: 6.9
- Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean: 5.7
- Increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe: 7.0
The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP.

The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period.

Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States.

Water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions in the Mediterranean.

Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs.

MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income.

Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tensions.

Irregular migration from originating MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose.

Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean.

Increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe.

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean (average on a scale of 0-10):
Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:
The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP (average on a scale of 0–10)

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:
The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP (%)

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:
The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP (average on a scale of 0–10)
Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

**Regime change will become the rule in the Mediterranean**
(average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Probability (out of 10)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashreq</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean EU Countries</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest of EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>European non-EU</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

**Regime change will become the rule in the Mediterranean (%)**

Don't know 6
Very positive
9
Very positive
8
Very positive
7
Very positive
6
Very positive
5
Very positive
4
Very positive
3
Very positive
2
Very disappointing
1
Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period (average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediterranean Partner Countries</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Mashreq</th>
<th>Mediterranean EU Countries</th>
<th>Rest of EU</th>
<th>European non-EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Very high probability</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>No probability</th>
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</thead>
</table>

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid-to-long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period (average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Rest of EU</th>
<th>Mediterranean EU countries</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Mashreq</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
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</thead>
</table>
Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of the riparian States

(average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediterranean Partner Countries</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Mashreq</th>
<th>Mediterranean EU Countries</th>
<th>Rest of EU</th>
<th>European non-EU</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>6.1</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States (%)

Don't know

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very high probability</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
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<th>No probability</th>
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</table>

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States

(average on a scale of 0-10)
Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid-to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:
**Water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions in the Mediterranean**
(average on a scale of 0-10)

**Mediterranean Partner Countries**
- EU-27: 6.9
- Survey mean: 6.9
- Maghreb: 6.7
- Mashreq: 7.3
- Mediterranean EU Countries: 6.7
- Rest of EU: 7.0
- European non-EU: 4.2

**Don't know**
- EU-27: 4%
- Survey mean: 2%
- Maghreb: 7%
- Mashreq: 5%
- Mediterranean EU Countries: 11%
- Rest of EU: 7%
- European non-EU: 7%

**No probability**
- EU-27: 2%
- Survey mean: 2%
- Maghreb: 7%
- Mashreq: 3%
- Mediterranean EU Countries: 2%
- Rest of EU: 3%
- European non-EU: 2%
Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:
Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs
(average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Mashreq</th>
<th>Mediterranean EU Countries</th>
<th>Rest of EU</th>
<th>European non-EU</th>
</tr>
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<td>Mediterranean EU Countries</td>
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<td>Rest of EU</td>
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<td>European non-EU</td>
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</table>

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:
Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs (%)

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
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<td>Low probability</td>
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Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:
Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs (average on a scale of 0-10)
Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

**MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income** (average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediterranean Partner Countries</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Mashreq</th>
<th>Mediterranean EU Countries</th>
<th>Rest of EU</th>
<th>European non-EU</th>
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Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

**MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of probability</th>
<th>Euromed Survey 2011</th>
<th>Euromed Survey 2010</th>
<th>Euromed Survey 2009</th>
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<td>16%</td>
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</table>

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

**MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income** (average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediterranean Partner Countries</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Mashreq</th>
<th>Mediterranean EU Countries</th>
<th>Rest of EU</th>
<th>European non-EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:
Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tensions
(average on a scale of 0-10)

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:
MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income (%)

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:
Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tensions
(average on a scale of 0-10)
Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:
Irregular migration from MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose (average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashreq</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean EU Countries</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of EU</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European non-EU</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean
Irregular migration from MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No probability</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:
Irregular migration from MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose (average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of EU</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean EU countries</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashreq</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

**Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean** (average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediterranean Partner Countries</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Mashreq</th>
<th>Mediterranean EU Countries</th>
<th>Rest of EU</th>
<th>European non-EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

**Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of probability</th>
<th>Euromed Survey 2011</th>
<th>Euromed Survey 2010</th>
<th>Euromed Survey 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high probability</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No probability</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

**Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean** (average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediterranean Partner Countries</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Mashreq</th>
<th>Mediterranean EU countries</th>
<th>Rest of EU</th>
<th>European non-EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Note:** The diagrams and tables represent the degree of probability attributed to the hypothesis that free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean. The data is presented in the form of bar charts and percentage distributions.
Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period
(average on a scale of 0-10)

Mediterranean Partner Countries
EU-27
Survey mean
Maghreb
Mashreq
Mediterranean EU Countries
Rest of EU
European non-EU

Don't know
Very positive

Very disappointing

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period (%)

Survey mean
EU-27
Rest of EU
Mediterranean EU countries
Maghreb
Mashreq
Israel
Turkey

Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean:

The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period
(average on a scale of 0-10)
**Prospective and Policy Recommendations**

Q.27. How do you assess the implications of the Palestinian application for UN membership on:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very negative</th>
<th>Very positive</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean relations</td>
<td>10 10 13 15 21 111 75 90 116 95 84</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 18% 12% 14% 18% 15% 13%</td>
<td>101%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arab-Israeli conflict dynamics</td>
<td>24 26 37 58 40 93 74 74 87 57 62</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4% 4% 6% 9% 6% 15% 12% 12% 14% 9% 10%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

**Assessment of the implications of the Palestinian application for UN membership on:**
(average on a scale of 0-10)

- **Mediterranean Partner Countries**
  - Mediterranean EU Countries: 6.8
  - Mediterranean EU Countries: 6.8
  - Rest of EU: 6.2
  - European non-EU: 6.8

- **EU-27**
  - Survey mean: 5.6
  - Turkey: 5.8
  - Israel: 4.4
  - Maghreb: 5.6
  - Mashreq: 5.0

- **The Arab-Israeli conflict dynamics**
  - Average: 6.1
  - Average: 73

- **Euro-Mediterranean relations**
  - Average: 5.6
  - Average: 6.6

**Assessment of the implications of the Palestinian application for UN membership on:** (%)

- **Don’t know**
  - Very disappointing: 2%
  - Very negative: 8%
  - Very positive: 10%
  - Total: 13%

- **Very disappointing**
  - Very disappointing: 2%
  - Very negative: 8%
  - Very positive: 15%
  - Total: 18%

- **Very negative**
  - Very disappointing: 2%
  - Very negative: 8%
  - Very positive: 14%
  - Total: 18%

- **Very positive**
  - Very disappointing: 2%
  - Very negative: 8%
  - Very positive: 14%
  - Total: 18%