THEMATIC DOSSIER: NATIONAL POLITICS AND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS AFTER THE “ARAB SPRING” AND THE EURO-MED POLICIES ON THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION
I. NATIONAL POLITICS AND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS AFTER THE “ARAB SPRING”

The External Actor’s Role within the Region

Question Q7 asks for an assessment of the response of different international actors in terms of the uprisings on the southern shore. By comparing averages among these actors there are significant differences between groups of actors. Thus, only two achieve an average above 5, Turkey (5.9) and the European Union (5.4), and of the remaining only the US and the Arab League are above 4 (4.9 and 4.4, respectively). The remaining actors are graded negatively by all respondents: Gulf Cooperation Council (3.7), Saudi Arabia and China (2.9), Russia (2.8) and Iran (2.2).

Graph 1: Assessing the international response of the following actors to the uprisings in the Southern rim (average on a scale of 0-10)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

The analysis of the results by different groups of respondents yields interesting data. For instance, in the case of the assessment of the role of the Arab League, European respondents (both Mediterranean [5.0] and non-Mediterranean [5.3]), Turkish (4.5) and Israeli (4.4) grade it much more positively than respondents from Arab countries, both from the Maghreb (3.2) and the Mashreq (3.8). Arabs assess their own League more negatively. This does not occur in the assessment of the role of the EU as the differences between groups are very small, with the only notable exception being the lower assessment of Turkish and Maghreb respondents (4.9) in the distribution by geographical area or that of the group of experts (5.0) in comparison with the two other groups, with grades around 5.5. In the case of the assessment of the role of Turkey, there are few differences by geographical area, as all (except Israel) give an average
grade above 5, and in all these cases it is the option with the highest grade. It is also noticeable that the US is graded more negatively by the Arab countries (Maghreb and Mashreq) while the average for the remaining groups is above 5.

Among the actors with more negative grades there are few differences between the groups of respondents. Iran is graded more negatively by all groups, with 29% of respondents grading the response of Iran with a 0. Also noticeable is the high percentage of “Don’t know” answers for the cases of China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (over 18%), especially among European respondents.

Je pense que le rôle de Ligue arabe qui "aurait dû être important" a été défaillant. L'Iran et l'Arabie Saoudite ont soutenu des régimes totalitaires pour renverser des tyrans. La Chine et la Russie ont ménagé leurs clients. Seul la Turquie, en tant que pays du sud s’est franchement démarqué. Quant à l’Union européenne et les USA, même si en arrière plan l’intérêt majeur est de défendre leurs sources d’approvisionnement et conquérir de nouveaux marchés, leur soutien a été important pour chasser des dictatures familiales.

Algerian respondent

Las respuestas han sido diversas en función de los intereses de cada actor. La UE por su parte no siempre ha transmitido una imagen de unidad y se ha puesto de relevancia la primacía de intereses individuales de algunos países europeos.

Spanish respondent

Clearly, there is a geopolitical shift not only within the region but also of outside players. Turkey tries to use the window of opportunity to increase its role and, in doing so, it seems to alienate its recent allies. Russia is desperate to maintain its actions and positions in the case of Al-Assad, which is simply shameful. The Arab League is to be commended for taking an active role in Syria.

Lithuanian respondent

Le printemps arabe a été très divers, et les réponses des acteurs ont été multiples selon les cas. Si le rôle des USA et de l’UE a été décisif en Libye, cela n’a pas été le cas pour la Tunisie, l’Egypte ou le Bahreïn, par exemple. La Chine et la Russie ont été constamment des soutiens aux régimes en place, y compris actuellement en Syrie. Quant à l'Iran, à l’Arabie Saoudite ou au CCG, personne n’en attendait rien puisque chacun à sa façon est un acteur de conservatisme et même de régression politique.

Moroccan respondent

The Arab League came late, but was effective, e.g. in Syria. China reacted opportunistically; Iran aggressively, Russia opportunistically, and Saudi Arabia is biased (towards Sunni interests); Turkey supported the western stranglehold on Libya; the USA played an immensely strong role behind the scenes in mobilising democratic support.

Dutch respondent
The EU’s Role

Question Q8 asks respondents about the role of the EU in each of the MPCs during the Arab Spring based on four options: EU support for the changes; EU support for the regime in power; lack of impact of EU policies; and lack of an EU policy because of internal divergences.

The overall results show how respondents understand that the EU has behaved differently in terms of MPCs. On the one hand, we have the countries where most respondents consider the EU has supported the political change: Libya and Tunisia. In another block formed by Egypt and Syria, respondents are mainly divided between those who consider that the EU supported the change and those who believe that the EU has not had an impact on domestic politics. A third block of countries is formed by Morocco and Jordan, where, according to most respondents, EU policies have supported the continuity of the regime or, to a lesser extent, have had no impact. The fourth group of countries comprises Algeria and Lebanon, in which, according to most respondents, EU policies have had no impact or, to a lesser extent, have supported the continuity. Finally, there is the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories where respondents are divided between those who consider that there has been no impact (31%), that there has been no European policy as a result of internal divergences (29%) and that the regime in force has been preserved (26%).

A more detailed analysis of the results of each country, especially according to origin of respondents, shows interesting differences with respondents as a whole. In the case of Algeria, most EU respondents consider that the EU has had no impact on domestic politics (55%), especially non-Mediterranean respondents (63%), while for those from the Mashreq this option only amounts to 36% (although it is the majority) with high percentages in the three other options. For Maghreb respondents (including Algerians) it seems that there is a clear dichotomy between those who believe that there has been no EU impact (41%) and those who consider that it has supported the continuity of the regime (37%). As for Algerian respondents, the percentages are 45% and 36%, respectively.

1. Note that in these two countries a quarter of respondents did not know which option to choose.
**Egypt** has curious results as in all geographical groups used (except Turkey) respondents mainly consider that the EU has supported the political change, including Mashreq respondents (46%). However, when analysing only Egyptian respondents, their perception changes radically as most of them consider that the EU has not had any impact (48%). Finally, we should point out that, while civil society respondents consider that the EU has supported the political change (54%), those in the “political actors” group are divided between those who consider that the EU has supported the political change and those who consider that it has had no impact (39%).

**Jordan** offers some outstanding elements in the analysis by areas. Thus, respondents from the Mediterranean EU are equally divided between those who believe there has been no impact and those who consider that the EU has supported the continuity of the regime, while most Turkish respondents choose the option of no impact. The remaining groups reflect the distribution of the whole, in which the majority option was support for continuity, especially Mashreq respondents (56%).

In **Lebanon**, the results by groups are more stable and in all cases the option with the highest percentage is the lack of impact of the EU on domestic affairs. In any case, the highest percentage is for youths (57%) and EU respondents (54%).

In **Morocco** the main differences between areas are reflected in those who believe that the EU has supported the continuity of the regime (main option for the whole of the Survey) and those who consider that the EU has supported the political change. Curiously, Moroccan respondents themselves differ from the general trend as 36% choose the second option and 31% the first. Other outstanding results show that respondents from the Mashreq, Turkey and non-Mediterranean EU represent a percentage above 50% in the option of support for continuity while among Maghreb and Mediterranean EU respondents this percentage is closer to 40%.

The greater dispersion of answers is found in the question on the **Occupied Palestinian Territories**, as it is the only country for which the option of the lack of a joint position within the EU is significant. In fact, it is the second option (29%), almost equal to the first option (that there is no EU impact on domestic politics, with 31%) and the third (support for continuity, with 26%). This dispersion means that there are small but significant differences by groups. Thus, the option most chosen by Maghreb respondents is that of the divergence in the EU (38%), while for the Mashreq it is support for continuity (38%) and for Turks it is the lack of impact (41%). The same happens among northern respondents, as Mediterranean Europeans choose in the first place the lack of impact of the EU on domestic politics (38%) while non-Mediterranean European countries opt for the option that there is no EU policy owing to the divergences between EU member countries (32%).

**Syria**, whose overall results are marked by the dichotomy between those who consider that the EU has supported the political change and those who consider that it has had no impact, maintains this dichotomy in the results by geographical areas. However, it is interesting to note how the perception of Europeans that the EU policies have had no impact is much higher among respondents from the Maghreb, Turkey and, especially, the Mashreq, who mostly consider that EU policies have supported the political change.

Finally, in **Tunisia**, the majority position that considers that the EU policies have supported the political change does not essentially vary when analysing the results by groups. However, it is notable that Turkish respondents represent the greatest percentage of those who believe that European policy has had no impact on the domestic situation of Turkey or that the highest percentage of respondents who believe that the European policies have supported the established regime is found among Maghreb countries.
Implications of the “Arab Spring” for Euro-Mediterranean Relations

The Survey seeks to measure the impact of the uprisings on Euro-Mediterranean relations through the probability envisaged by respondents that there are three future scenarios (Q9): one which considers that the reforms planned in the Partnership and the ENP will increase; another that the increased homogeneity will yield greater dialogue and the consolidation of a Euro-Mediterranean community; and, finally, a scenario that considers that the fragmentation and heterogeneity will impede Euro-Mediterranean integration.

For all respondents, the most likely scenario is that of the acceleration of reforms (5.6) above that of consolidation (5.1) and fragmentation (4.7). If we compare the measures of the MPCs and the EU we see an inversion of the tendency between the two most unlikely scenarios while those of the MPCs maintain the distribution of the whole although with more accentuated differences: 5.4 for consolidation and 4.4 for fragmentation. European respondents consider these two scenarios almost equally unlikely: 4.8 for the first and 4.9 for the second.

In the analysis by regions, it is notable that Mashreq respondents consider the two optimistic scenarios more likely, with acceleration achieving an average of 6 and consolidation an average of 5.8. Maghreb respondents also assess the optimistic scenarios more positively but more moderately than the whole. In contrast, non-Mediterranean Europeans make a more unequal assessment as they consider that the pessimistic scenario (5.2) is more likely than that of consolidation (4.6).
The Future Role of the EU in the MPCs

Respondents were asked if the future role of the EU would have lower or greater impact than other actors in Mediterranean regional development (Q10). The overall results of the Survey show that the EU will have less impact than the US (59%) and Turkey (55%), similar to that of the Arab League and Saudi Arabia (52% and 48%) and a greater impact than China (64%), Iran (68%) and Russia (74%).

When the results are analysed by geographical areas there are significant differences. While for respondents from the Maghreb and Mashreq only the US will have a greater impact than the EU in the region, according to EU, Turkish and US respondents, the Arab League, Saudi Arabia and Turkey will have a greater or similar impact.

Graph 3: Degree of probability attributed to the following long-term scenarios regarding the potential impact of the uprisings on Euro-Mediterranean relations (average on a scale of 0-10)

It is also notable that the Arab countries themselves attach little importance to the Arab League as both in the Mashreq and the Maghreb it is less positively assessed (only 26% and 32% of respondents from these countries, respectively, consider that it will have greater impact than the EU). Turkey’s impact also varies greatly according to the area of origin of respondents: those from the Maghreb are most negative (56% consider that the EU will have more impact), while those from the Mashreq and Turkey consider that it will have a similar impact to the EU’s (almost 50% for both options). Moreover, 57% of respondents from European Mediterranean countries consider that Turkey will have more impact than the EU while for European non-Mediterranean respondents this reaches 70%, far greater than the US obtains. Among the remaining actors, Turkish respondents make a much more positive assessment than the others of the impact of Russia and Iran while Maghreb respondents make the most positive assessment of China’s impact, although always below the EU’s.

All the above stated actors have bigger regional or global influence compared to the EU. What is more important is that they all have consolidated foreign policy and have a clear stand toward the issues that the EU does not have.

Bosnia and Herzegovina respondent

Yet the EU has to decide whether or not it wants to be a global actor. In the present economic recession it might be difficult for the EU to re-develop its Euro-Mediterranean policy. At this stage cultural actors can play a key role.

Turkish respondent

Saudi Arabia is highly biased towards Sunni interests and so is the US. Turkey is a wild card: it may turn against Europe on separation of state and religion issues, where it would then move away from the French example and become less attractive to the francophone sub-region.

Dutch respondent
Most outstanding elements:

- Turkey and Europe are the only actors that exceed the average of 5 in the assessment of the response to the uprisings. Turkey is the most positively assessed by all groups.
- Low confidence of the Arab countries in the role of the Arab League.
- Although, according to southern countries, the US is the most influential actor in the region, it is more positively assessed by respondents from European countries.
- Russia, China and Iran are the most negatively assessed, as is Saudi Arabia.
- Respondents consider that the position of the EU during the “Arab Spring” has depended on the country, with a “lack of coherence at regional level.”
- Internal divergences of the EU in the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
- Impact of the Arab Spring in Euromed relations: slight optimism thanks to a possible acceleration of the reforms.
- The Arab countries consider that the role of the EU will be more important than Europeans themselves. The US maintains its influence in the region.
- Turkey’s influence is more positively assessed by Europeans than by Arabs.

II. THE EU RESPONSE TO CHANGES IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD

Priorities Identified by the European Commission and the High Representative

There has been a notably positive reception of the measures carried out by the EU in response to the changes brought about by the Arab Spring in the region. In fact, questions about the assessment of the relevance of the priorities indicated in the Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” are graded between 7 and 7.5 and the programmes and actions of the Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” obtain a similar result.

Other priority projects identified by respondents

Accès à l’eau, rétablir la confiance entre les citoyens et leurs régimes politiques, efforts à faire dans le domaine de l’éducation.

French respondent

Aider la société civile dans les pays ayant connu des soulèvements populaires qui malgré leur participation à ces changements sont la cible des nouveaux dirigeants. Apporter une aide pour le développement de la démocratie dans les pays où les changements politiques sont en hibernation.

Algerian respondent

Contribute to culture and citizenship (based on education and learning opportunities); demography played a key role in the 2011 uprisings; jobless development is the main challenge.

German respondent

Education and health are the secret words for the future of the region and unfortunately they are not yet or not sufficiently addressed.

Egyptian respondent

Key missing element in EU policy is a serious educational partnership with the Arab world, specifically targeting post-graduate research and education, rather than focusing on primary and secondary education. Joining education and research initiatives is highly desirable.

Egyptian respondent
L'Europe aurait la possibilité d’engager des actions en matière culturelle, domaine radicalement absent, et dans les coopérations, et dans la plupart des politiques et agendas des états cités, notamment au Maghreb.

French respondent

Soutenir l’enseignement dans les pays du Sud. De la qualité de l’enseignement dépend l’avenir de ces pays.

Tunisian respondent

The focus should be on empowering women and youth. These two sectors of the societies have been instrumental in bringing change to their countries.

Maltese respondent

The most pressing priority is to avoid duplication and to adopt, as far as possible, country-specific approaches. The needs of Tunisia are completely different from the needs of Libya, for example.

Italian respondent

Graph 4: Degree of probability attributed to the following mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean (average on a scale of 0-10)

- **Mobility** – improve “visa facilitation”, conclude “Mobility Partnerships”, improve “people-to-people contacts”, “labour mobility” and enhance “students, researchers and business persons” mobility

- **Create a European Neighbourhood “Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development”**

- **Market access** – “consider allowing partners that have a fully functioning independent judiciary, an efficient public administration and have made significant progress towards eradicating corruption, into the non-regulated area of the [EU] Internal Market for goods”

- **Create a “Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility”, “designed to strengthen the capacity of civil society to promote reform and increase public accountability in their countries”. (€722 million)**

- **Conclude and implement new “Neighbourhood Agreements”, as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 8 TEU), which will establish Deep and Comprehensive Free trade Agreements (DCFTA)**

- **Money** – reallocating/refocusing additional financial resources to support democratic transitions, institution building, civil society and the socio-economic needs of the countries. For instance the loss of income from tourism in Egypt and Tunisia (SPRING Programme €350 million for 2011 and 2012)

- **Create a “European Endowment for Democracy”** (to “help political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners”)

**Source:** Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

**Most outstanding elements:**

- Responses from both southern and northern countries more or less equally assess the political response of the EU.

- The initiatives related to the improvement in the mobility of people and support for rural development are the two best assessed options.

The SPRING programme is another outstanding initiative that also has a positive assessment but does not enjoy the same support as previous ones, with grades around 5.6. Once again, the assessments by groups of countries are located around this average, with the only higher grade in the case of Israel (7.7).

This same trend is seen in the assessment of the first answers given in relation to the civil war in Libya at the level of humanitarian aid, consular cooperation, evacuations, civil protection and FRONTEX border operations.
Intervention by a number of EU countries may have brought a quick end to the conflict and thus spared suffering to the Libyan population. However, Libya may be a weak state, practically divided in several parts, for some time to come.

**Egyptian respondent**

This reinforced the feeling of double standards in the EU policies.

**Palestinian respondent**

Il n’ y avait pas de politique européenne en Libye mais plutôt des politiques selon les intérêts de chaque pays.

**Jordan respondent**

### The EU's Role with Regard to Domestic Developments

The role that should be played by the EU in the domestic affairs of the MPCs is reflected in the answers to Q16, where four scenarios are suggested, which propose the following: a) “be very pro-active and interventionist”, b) “remain neutral”, c) “remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from the MPCs”, and finally d) “make its influence felt to avoid the takeover of extremist parties”.

Answers received suggest that in all MPCs the scenario with the most outstanding percentage is the EU action of remaining cautious and working on the basis of the countries affected. This trend is different in the case of Occupied Palestinian Territories and Syria, where the preferred option, although with low percentage points, is the pro-active and interventionist role of the EU.

### Graph 5: Assessment of the EU's role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries

Graph 5 shows a group of countries with fairly similar distribution of scenarios (Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria and Tunisia). In the case of Egypt and Libya, the percentage of responses in favour of a greater influence of the EU on extremist parties is higher and accounts for almost a third of responses. Finally, Syria and the Occupied Palestinian Territories also have a similar distribution of scenarios in which, as previously indicated, intervention dominates.
However, it is important to note that if we analyse the answers of the participants about their own country there is an appreciable difference with overall answers. Thus, the countries with a similar distribution of scenarios differ if we focus on the answers from the nationals of the country in question.

The majority scenario changes for Lebanon and Egypt, where a pro-active and interventionist EU role becomes the main scenario for Lebanese and Egyptian participants. The case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories is notable, where this scenario, already a majority in the overall answers, becomes the predominant answer.

Graph 6: Assessment of the EU's role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries

The majority scenario also changes substantially in Jordan where, based on the answers from Jordanians, the most outstanding scenario, with a third of answers, is the one that proposes an influential EU to avoid strengthening the extremist parties. This scenario is also notable, although without being a majority, in the case of the answers from Tunisian participants.

Graph 7: Assessment of the EU's role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Finally, it is notable in the case of Morocco and Algeria that the scenarios that emerge from the Survey overall are almost the same and, in their turn, the scenarios resulting from the answers of Algerians and Moroccans about their own country are also very similar.

Graph 8: Assessment of the EU’s role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries

![Graph showing the assessment of the EU's role](image)

**Most outstanding elements:**

- The majority of respondents think the EU should remain cautious and work on the basis of the demands emanating from MPCs, except for Syria and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, where a majority of respondents call for a more pro-active and interventionist role of the EU.

- However, preferences change when respondents are asked about the role that the EU should play in their own countries. Respondents from Egypt and Lebanon call, for instance, for a more pro-active role of the EU in their respective countries.
**EU Policy Response**

The policy response that the EU should carry out varies according to a) “response towards countries failing to introduce democratic reforms” or b) “response towards countries implementing repressive measures against popular movements” or c) “repressive measures against women’s rights and gender equality”.

A common element is the low percentage of answers obtained for the option that proposes neutrality of the EU: around 13% in the case of answers concerning failure in the introduction of democratising measures, and 5% for the cases of responding to repressive actions.

Graph 9: EU policy response towards countries failing to introduce democratic reforms

![Graph](image)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

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Il faut soutenir les régimes démocratiques, et non chercher les intérêts de l’UE même dans le cas des dictatures, comme c’est le cas du soutien de l’UE du régime Ben Ali.

Moroccan respondent

Many things would need to be defined before being able to give an answer; in the case the EU wants to return to the EMP principle of negative conditionality then it needs to signal that it will apply this principle to all countries in the same manner.

German respondent

The EU would potentially be perceived as turning its back if remaining neutral.

Finnish respondent

Given the unsuccessful implementation of democratising measures, around 70% of answers consider that positive conditionality² should be the political response of the EU. In the case of the answers from the Maghreb and Mashreq, this percentage is around 60%.

If we analyse the political responses to repressive measures, we find a balance between promotion and support measures for the reforms (positive conditionality) and restrictive and penalising measures (negative conditionality³). But in these questions others measures were also introduced that also obtained significant support.

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2. Positive conditionality on the basis of the “more for more” approach: “The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU” and vice versa.

3. The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country: freezing of political dialogue, restrictive financial measures, suspension of the implementation of EU agreement, assistance is primarily used to “support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratization process in partner countries”…)
Therefore, given the repression of the people’s movements, the promotion of sanctions at an international level was also added to the positive conditionality (26%) and negative conditionality (27%), making it the most chosen option (31%). It is interesting to focus on groups of countries, where we find a remarkable difference of options according to the region.

Les deux conditionnalités seraient à recommander en fonction des pays Med. Approche more for more pour ceux qui ont déjà entamé un processus de démocratisation et mesures restrictives pour ceux qui bloquent encore sur les fondamentaux.

Moroccan respondent

The “more for more” approach should be tempered by a flexible management, to avoid the weakest countries getting less help.

Italian respondent

Funding must always be linked to delivery. Countries showing results for EU support must be considered for further funding opportunities. This will encourage countries to develop projects showing concrete results. However, when considering more funds, the EU should not specify the budget that will be allocated to the country before getting from the country itself what is actually needed for reform, i.e. a project proposal for funding and not formulate a project based on the funds that will be given.

Lebanese respondent

Graph 10: EU policy response towards countries implementing repressive measures against popular movements

In the Mediterranean EU countries, the most outstanding option is the promotion of penalising measures, which with 42% of answers doubles the percentage that this option receives among the respondents from the Mashreq (21%). Here the most outstanding option is the use by the EU of positive conditionality. It is also notable in this comparison that, in the countries of the Maghreb, the experts and actors who have responded to the Survey opt for a balance between the conditionals (positive and negative) and sanctions, with negative conditionality as the most positively assessed political response of the EU. In any case, very middling grades are given to a fourth option that envisaged promoting the use of repressive measures in the framework of the UN Security Council.
Focusing on the political responses of the EU to repressive measures at the level of women’s rights and gender equality, there is a balance between the three options put forward. This balance is also repeated when comparing the answers from the North and South.

L’UE doit utiliser la conditionnalité positive : elle soutiendra ceux qui avancent. Mais elle ne doit pas se priver de critiquer et de dénoncer les manquements de certains pays récalcitrants dans l’application des règles démocratiques. Toutefois, elle ne doit priver les acteurs non-étatiques de ces pays de son soutien.

Belgian respondent

**Allocating EU Support to Civil Society**

In response to the question about how the EU should distribute aid to civil society, a majority of more than two thirds consider that the aid should be carried out independently of religious affiliation of the organizations. However, it should be noted that 25% of answers opt for only helping secular organizations, a percentage which is slightly higher in the countries of the South, approaching 30%.

The point is helping to develop citizenship, responsible action, a culture of non-corruption and accountability to the public and to parliament (if free and fairly elected); this is less an issue of secular versus religious but of professionalisms and democratic ethics.

German respondent

Aid should go to serious groupings implementing needed activities, bearing in mind that there is huge funding availed to religious groupings from elsewhere.

Egyptian respondent

**Graph 11: Degree of probability attributed to the following mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean**

(average on a scale of 0-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Survey mean</th>
<th>Rest of EU</th>
<th>Mediterranean EU countries</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Mashreq</th>
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<td>The EU should give support to groupings regardless of their religious affiliation</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
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<td>The EU should give support to groupings from the secular spectrum</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should only give support to groupings from the religious spectrum</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Most outstanding elements:

EU policy response to countries that implement repressive measures:
• A low percentage of respondents believe that the EU should remain neutral and not intervene in the internal affairs of MPCs, both with regard to countries that implement repressive measures against people’s movements (6% of respondents) and to those that implement repressive measures against women’s rights and gender equality (5%).
• The remaining responses are more or less equally distributed among “using positive conditionality”, “using negative conditionality” and “promoting the use of sanctions at international level”. EU respondents are more in favour of the use of international sanctions, while MPC respondents rather advocate the use of positive conditionality based on the “more for more” approach.

EU policy response to countries failing to implement democratic reforms:
• An overwhelming majority of respondents think that the EU should apply positive conditionality (67%).
• The options of remaining neutral or using negative conditionality have received a similar level of support (13% and 16%, respectively).

Allocating EU support to civil society:
• The majority of respondents think that the EU should give support to groupings regardless of their religious affiliation (64% on average) and about a quarter of respondents believe that the EU should only support groupings from the secular spectrum.

III. EUROMED POLICIES IN REGARD TO POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION

Assessment of the achievement of the general objective of the first pillar (Political and Security basket) of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration to establish an area of peace and stability shows with 3.3 that these objectives are still far from being considered achieved. It is particularly notable that around 60% of the responses received range from 0 to 3 on a scale where 0 stands for “not achieved at all” and 10 for “fully achieved”.

Graph 12: Perception of achievement of the general objective of the first Political & Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration “establishing an area of peace and stability” (average on a scale of 0-10)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
The comparison of this average at a regional level shows minimum differences, except in the case of European non-EU countries, in which the average is 4.8. Respondents from Mashreq countries, Israel and Turkey assess it slightly above this average. Non-EU Mediterranean countries and those from the Maghreb are slightly more critical.

Stability and peace was achieved (with the exception of Palestine) - though with limited direct consequence of the Barcelona Declaration, but at the expense of freedom, democracy and human rights.

British respondent

An area of peace and stability has not been set up. Proof is the conflicts in Libya and Syria as well as the protest in Greece and elsewhere against the outcomes of economic policies.

Egyptian respondent

Il s'agit de deux questions distinctes: la solution des conflits et la promotion des droits de l’homme. Dans le premier volet, l’action européenne a été quasi nulle, c’est-à-dire les principaux conflits qui existaient en 1995 sont toujours là et certains, comme le conflit israélo-palestinien, se sont même aggravés. Concernant la promotion des droits de l’homme, l’action européenne a été contradictoire puisqu’elle travaille avec des régimes autoritaires et en même temps soutient des réseaux de défense des droits de l’homme.

Belgian respondent

Beaucoup d’efforts sont à fournir, surtout au niveau du dialogue politique et la promotion des droits de l’homme.

Moroccan respondent

While there was little progress in this basket, the dialogue has been maintained. On the other hand, one may argue that the EU’s soft power had an effect on the Arab transformations (leaving out any direct effects of the Barcelona Process of 1995).

Maltese respondent

Durante muchos años algunos regímenes totalitarios de la región han gozado del apoyo de la UE, lo que ha contribuido a su larga duración en el poder y a la situación a la que se ha llegado actualmente.

Spanish respondent

To obtain a detailed assessment of the progress of the objective of the Political and Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, a filter question was prepared aimed at those who considered they have a clear perception of these objectives. As a whole, only 37% of respondents answered this block of questions. For this reason, any disaggregation must be carried out with due caution (the sub-sample is reduced to 259 people).
Among the objectives put forward in 1995 by the Partnership in terms of political and security cooperation, the most positively graded by 70% of respondents is “strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism”. In the opposed extreme, the objective which has not only not progressed (55%) but has regressed (36%) is “create a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction”.

The remaining objectives can be grouped based on two tendencies: those which are positively graded; that is, answers that consider that there has been progress exceed 50% (“strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism”, “fight organized crime and drug trafficking” and “strengthen political dialogue”) and answers where the percentage of negative answers (no progress or regression) exceed the positive ones (“promote regional security”, “respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination”, “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms”, and “develop the rule of law and democracy”).

Finally, it should be noted that the answers by North-South regional groups follow the same pattern with minimal differences in percentage terms.
Certains progrès ont été enregistrés dans les domaines de l'Etat de droit, du respect des droits de l'homme, de la lutte contre la criminalité organisée et la lutte contre le terrorisme, mais sur tous les autres, peu de progrès, voire même régression comme concernant le droit à l'autodétermination, la dénucléarisation, et la promotion de la sécurité régionale.

Belgian respondent

The EU’s role was negative not only in preserving the autocratic regimes (including Libya before sanctions period and after 2003) but also in protecting the nuclear power of Israel.

Syrian respondent

Le Moyen Orient est de plus en plus armé et certains pays arabes pensent déjà au nucléaire pour contrer la menace de leur voisin iranien.

Tunisian respondent

Some states such as Israel and Iran are still out of control. The rest are moving between democratic and autocratic states and hope to soon move to democracy.

Jordanian respondent

La politique de l’UE en matière de non prolifération est discriminatoire. L’amalgame que l’UE entretient entre terrorisme et résistance nationale brouille les jugements. L’UE maintient une confusion néfaste dans ses principes.

Tunisian respondent

This section also assesses the evolution of the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme. The tendency to negatively assess the progress of the priorities established 12 years ago also stands out. There is also a notable degree of ignorance, around 20% of “Don't know” answers, among experts and actors involved in Euro-Mediterranean policy indicating the need to strengthen communication on the programmes and action priorities.
As in the case of the Partnership objectives, there is also a disparity of grades according to the priorities assessed. The most positively graded is “foster the role of civil society”, where 61% of respondents consider there has been positive progress. In contrast, “enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions” is the option most negatively assessed with 63% (54% consider that there has been no progress and 9% regression).

It should be pointed out that both “extend political pluralism and participation by citizens” (with 57%) and “ensure freedom of expression and association” (51%) have positive grades, while for the remaining option there are slightly negative grades.

Graph 15: Evaluating the progress achieved by the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

Again, if we compare the answers by participants from the North and South, they follow a very similar pattern with almost unnoticeable differences.

Il y a des progrès dans certains pays mais sans nécessairement la contribution significative du Partenariat politique et de sécurité dans le cadre du Programme de travail quinquennal de 2005.

Turkish respondent

The EU should understand it has an ill-conceived policy towards the Mediterranean.

Polish respondent

Progress is mostly localised in northern African countries, especially Morocco. Progress needs to be compared against effort/resources spent.

Lebanese respondent

In the 2009 Survey, the priorities of “Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme” were also assessed. In the case of those priorities whose aim was to broaden political and citizen rights, the answers denote a substantial improvement in the appreciation of the evolution of these objectives (see graph 29).
If we focus on the priorities concerning the participation of civil society, the improvement of civil rights and gender equality, it progresses positively, although tenuously, in the first two cases and regresses in the case of “increase the participation of women in decision-making”, which involves putting special emphasis on strengthening the measures leading to improving equality in gender relations.

Graph 16: Evaluating the progress achieved by the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme (comparing 2009 and 2011 results)

Graph 17: Evaluating the progress achieved by the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme (comparing 2009 and 2011 results)
Most outstanding elements:

- There is a clearly negative assessment of the achievement of the general objectives of the first pillar (Political and Security basket) of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration to establish an area of peace and stability.
- However, both for the objectives of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and the priorities of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme, there is a more nuanced assessment, with programmes and objectives seen more positively.
- Among the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, respondents consider that there has been a positive evolution in "strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism", "fight organized crime and drug trafficking" and "strengthen political dialogue".
- Among the priorities of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme, "extend political pluralism and participation by citizens" and "foster the role of civil society" are positively assessed.
- Comparing results from 2009 and 2011 for the priorities of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme, only the evolution of "increase the participation of women in decision-making" regresses.

Assessment of the Progress Achieved in the Multilateral Programmes on Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation

The question on the progress achieved in the multilateral programmes on political, justice, security and migration cooperation, supported through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), allows a double reading: a rather worrying one, if we consider the overwhelmingly high percentage of “Don’t know” answers (accounting for over 50% of the responses in all programmes and projects save for the Middle East Peace Process), and a more optimistic one, if we concentrate only on the respondents who do know about these initiatives, since all of them – excluding the Middle East Peace Process – have registered progress according to the majority.

In any case, the high percentage of “Don’t know” answers point to the increasing difficulty even for experts and specialized actors to keep track of the various initiatives being simultaneously launched – as already noted in the previous Survey. This should encourage policy- and decision-makers in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to enhance the visibility and dissemination of the EMP actions.

Graph 18: Assessing the progress achieved in the development of the following programmes and projects

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Overall, EuroMeSCo (the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission) stands out as the most successful initiative according to 62% of respondents, excluding the “Don’t know” answers. In terms of progress registered, the EuroMeSCo initiative is followed by the EuroMed Police II Programme (59%), the Malta Seminars for Diplomats (57%) and the Euromed Regional Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Manmade Disasters and the Governance Facility, both on an equal footing with 53% of the votes. In contrast with this globally positive assessment of EU initiatives, the Middle East Peace Process – which appears as the most well-known initiative with less than 30% of “Don’t know” answers – is the initiative where the least progress (if any at all) has been achieved. Actually, according to 33% of respondents (excluding the “Don’t know” answers) it has registered regression.

Looking in a little more detail at the figures factoring in the North/South dimension, some interesting differences come to the fore. Although the global assessment is quite homogeneous for the various programmes and projects, there are some elements which are worth noting. The first remark to make is that, based on the “Don’t know” answers, respondents from MPCs seem overall to be somewhat better informed about most of the existing initiatives than EU respondents – even if in both cases the number of “Don’t know” answers is overwhelmingly high. The second remark is that EU respondents tend overall to be a bit more positive regarding the progress achieved in the different initiatives, with the exception of the Governance Facility and Euromed Justice I and II, where the assessment of their southern counterparts is somewhat more optimistic.

In the framework of civil protection and regional cooperation, achievements have been reached in terms of national civil protection capacities, regional networking and community building, also promoted by partnership among institutions.

Italian respondent

Peace in the Middle East turned cold because there were no real efforts by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, Euromed states were not that involved or interested. The Middle East case has to be solved as it is so dangerous if left as it is. It will explode at any time with no warning and destroy a lot of hopes and values in the MENA and Euromed states.

Jordanian respondent

Graph 19: Assessing the progress achieved in the development of the following programmes and projects:
Mediterranean Partner Countries

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey
Graph 20: Assessing the progress achieved in the development of the following programmes and projects: EU Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes and projects</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>No progress</th>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euromed Justice I and II</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuroMed Police II programme</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence-building measures, networks and facilities</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta Seminars for Diplomats</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuroMeSCo, Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euromed Regional Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Facility under the ENP framework</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey

By regional groups, respondents from Israel seem relatively satisfied about the results achieved so far through the Middle East Peace Process (27.8% of them, excluding the “Don’t know” answers, believe that progress has been made), compared to their counterparts from the Mediterranean EU countries (20%), the Occupied Palestinian Territories (10.5%), the rest of the EU (8.7%), the Mashreq (7.9%), Turkey (4.8%) and the Maghreb (only 4.6% see some progress in this initiative). However, it should be noted that when factoring in the “Don’t know” answers, responses from Israel are more or less distributed evenly across the 4 categories – namely, “progress”, “no progress”, “regression” and “Don’t know” –, whereas responses from the Occupied Palestinian Territories are mainly concentrated in “no progress” (42.9%) and “regression” (38.1%), while the proportion of “Don’t know” answers is significantly lower compared to Israel (9.5% and 25%, respectively). Finally, in contrast to the rather disappointing general perception of the progress of the Middle East Peace Process initiative, respondents from non-EU countries offer a fairly positive outlook (61.5% of them – excluding the “Don’t know” answers – think it is a successful initiative in which progress has been achieved).
With reference to EuroMeSCo, namely the EU initiative having received the best overall assessment, there are a couple of elements which are worth noting. EU countries are generally more optimistic about the results this project has yielded so far than MPCs (respectively, 65% and 58%). The latter consider instead the EuroMed Police II programme to strengthen police cooperation between the EU and the MPCs as the most successful EU initiative (60%). Within MPCs, Turkey stands out as the most optimistic country regarding the progress achieved by EuroMeSCo (76.5% excluding the “Don’t know” answers). However, it should be noted that the number of “Don’t know” answers from Turkish respondents to this question is alarmingly high (57.5%), which points to a clear lack of information/understanding about this project by most respondents from this country. Finally, also notable is the positive assessment of the EuroMeSCo network by respondents from non-EU countries (88.9% excluding “Don’t know” answers, which are also quite numerous, accounting roughly for 55% of total responses from this regional group). As a more general remark, respondents from non-EU countries tend to be more positive about the progress achieved in each of the different EU initiatives than respondents from the other regional groups.
Most outstanding elements:

- 2 possible readings of the assessment of the progress achieved in the multilateral programmes on PJSME: a worrying one, given the high number of “Don’t know” answers due to a lack of information on the initiatives; and a more positive one considering only the answers from well-informed respondents, since a majority of them think that some progress has been made in all the initiatives excluding the Middle East Peace Process.
- EuroMeSCo stands out as the most successful initiative overall (considering both responses from the EU and MPCs, though EU respondents are comparatively more hopeful).
- The Middle East Peace Process, despite being the most well-known initiative, is the worst assessed by respondents.
- Overall, MPC respondents are better informed about the existing initiatives than their EU counterparts – even if the percentage of “Don’t know” answers remains high in both cases.
- EU respondents seem overall more optimistic about the results of the various initiatives than MPC respondents.
- On the Middle East Peace Process, only respondents from non-EU countries make a positive assessment of the initiative. Israeli respondents are also somewhat positive compared to the general disappointing perception from the other regional groups.