

BILATERAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The fourth block of the Survey was aimed to capture respondents' views on the bilateral, regional and international mechanisms of cooperation on migratory issues in the Mediterranean. In this block, questions 25, 26 and 27 were directed at those participants with advanced knowledge of specific elements of migration policies. These three questions were answered by 229 participants.

Main findings

- In general terms, the majority of respondents do not find that the established dialogues and cooperation frameworks in the field of migration are effective.
- In relative terms, though, a majority of respondents consider that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is the most useful regional policy framework to address migration-related challenges.
- In open answers, a number of respondents refer to the need to establish a truly Euro-Mediterranean mechanism of cooperation to deal with migration and human movements.
- A majority of respondents do not think that the main pillars of the EU-Turkey deal are adequate. In particular, the provision about the return of all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands has very limited support, in particular among the respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries.
- A large majority of the participants agree that the ENP could effectively be better connected to the overall migration architecture of the EU, be used as a framework for more effectively addressing the primary causes of migrations and could help promote a transregional approach.
- There is a certain degree of scepticism about the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, in particular among EU-28 respondents who are more critical than respondents from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean countries.


BILATERAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The first question of this block was aimed at understanding how the participants perceived the different existing regional cooperation mechanisms: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the 5+5 Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean as useful frameworks to improve the Management of Human Movements and Migrations in the Euro-Mediterranean Region, whether their mandate directly encompasses migration issues (ENP and 5+5 Dialogue on Migration) or not (UfM). Respondents were invited to rank the three mentioned frameworks on a scale from the most to the least useful.

In general terms, it is striking to note that none of these existing mechanisms is assessed as useful by the respondents. In relative terms, a majority of respondents consider that the ENP is the most useful framework to improve the Management of Human Movements and Migrations in the Euro-Mediterranean Region (see Graph 48). The 5+5 Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean is ranked in second place, followed by the UfM. While the UfM does not have a mandate on migration issues, it is quite remarkable that some respondents indicated that its intervention could be useful to improve the Management of Human Movements and Migrations in the Euro-Mediterranean Region.

There are no major differences between EU-28 and MPC respondents, apart from a little variance concerning the 5+5 Dialogue and the UfM. The former is perceived as slightly more useful in EU-28 than MPC eyes, while the latter is perceived as slightly more useful by MPC respondents than by EU-28 ones.


Graph 48: To what extent can the following regional cooperation mechanisms be useful frameworks to improve the Management of Human Movements and Migrations in the Euro-Mediterranean Region?
(Mean 1 – least significant to 5 – most significant)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 7th Euromed Survey/Question 23

Looking at differences along professional lines (see Graph 49), the number of policy-makers that consider the ENP as the most useful framework is more than 10 points higher than experts or Civil society. In turn, policy-makers are less prone than experts and civil society respondents to consider that the UfM is a useful framework to improve the Management of Human Movements and Migrations in the Euro-Mediterranean Region.

Graph 49: To what extent can the following regional cooperation mechanisms be useful frameworks to improve the Management of Human Movements and Migrations in the Euro-Mediterranean Region?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 7th Euromed Survey/Question 23

The comments accompanying Q23 are useful to illustrate this quantitative data, and introduce some ideas to be taken into account, including scepticism about some of these frameworks and the acknowledgement of a potential role for the UfM.

None of them is satisfactory for the time being. The problem of the ENP is that there is no co-ownership of the process among EU and non-EU countries. The problem of the 5+5 is that there is no dedicated structure and fund to implement the decisions. The UfM could be a useful framework to improve the management of the migrations and human movements if there were a political will to do so.

French respondent

Plus que les politiques actuelles, c'est un organisme Euro-Med sur les migrations et l'asile qu'il faudrait mettre en place et dont la fonction serait de traiter toutes les questions liées à ces deux sujets.

Palestinian respondent

Reduction of concurrent institutional frameworks is needed in any case.

Italian respondent

I think that the multilateral framework should be the most important. However, it faces great challenges that might make smaller frameworks more efficient.

Spanish respondent

The UfM would have to build the scheme anew but this would be an opportunity to give it some higher political relevance and focus its activities on functional multilateralism (rather than normatively bilateral ENP).

Finnish respondent

To manage at the regional level, the current limits of bilateral approaches, which dominate in the ENP, must be overcome.

Italian respondent

Moreover, some respondents underline the need for a more balanced dialogue between the EU and MPC.

Dialogue must give equal opportunity to define topics discussed and solutions.

Danish respondent

La politique de gestion du phénomène des migrants doit être élaborée dans le cadre d'une coopération avec les pays de transit et non seulement des pays de l'UE.

Moroccan respondent

Une coopération méditerranéenne serait plus adéquate pour une meilleure gestion des réfugiés.

Algerian respondent

Il faut des programmes concertés entre la rive nord et celle du sud planifiés pour des durées plus longues.

Moroccan respondent

Some of the participants also underline the need for a change of focus in the existing frameworks, moving from a security approach to a broader and long-term inspired vision.

The ENP could also be more useful if its approach changed and included a different perspective on migration, not focusing on externalisation of border management. The whole EU migration policy should change, with a transformation from a management of the securitisation of migration to the governance of migration through an encompassing, resilient and inclusive model.

United Kingdom respondent

Some effective policies should be in cooperation with societies not governments, for example by supporting small firms, entrepreneurs, civil society efforts to improve socioeconomic positions for youths, more investments in extensive workers projects and factories in sub-Saharan countries.


Egyptian respondent

The second question of this block aimed to evaluate how the respondents assessed the main components of the EU-Turkey agreement: the return of all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as from 20 March 2016; the 1 to 1 deal (for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria); and the EU financial support as set out in the EU-Turkey joint statement on additional action points (March 2016), completing the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (November 2015).

Results show limited support for the three measures. None of these three measures receives high or very high answers above 50%. Still, the respondents consider that EU financial support is the most adequate measure of the three. In the case of the other two measures, the positive evaluation is significantly lower (see Graph 50). The positive evaluation by MPC respondents of the principle of the return of all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 is 10 points lower than EU-28 respondents (see Graph 50). Mashreq respondents are slightly less critical about the 1 to 1 deal than Maghreb ones, even if the general perception remains rather negative (see Graph Q24 Mashreq and Q24 Maghreb in Set of Results at www.iemed.org/euromedsurvey).

Graph 50: To what extent do you consider adequate the following measures set out in the EU-Turkey joint statement on additional action points (March 2016), completing the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (November 2015)? Respondents by group of countries.


(The graph below shows the % of high and very high answers)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 7th Euromed Survey/Question 24

Looking at professional affiliation, policy-makers have a better opinion about the adequacy of the three measures than experts and civil society respondents (see Graph 51). The latter have the most critical opinion about the adequacy of these three measures. EU financial support is still considered the best measure independently of the type of professional affiliation.

Graph 51: To what extent do you consider adequate the following measures set out in the EU-Turkey joint statement on additional action points (March 2016), completing the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (November 2015)? Respondents by institutional affiliation.
 (The graph below shows the % of high and very high answers)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 7th Euromed Survey/Question 24

A number of respondents expressed severe criticism of the overall EU-Turkey deal in their open answers.

I am against this EU-Turkey agreement and I do not think it will help improve the situation of refugees. I think there should be an alternative, legal and safe passage for refugees. I don't think this agreement is the right solution.

Syrian respondent

In principle, I think the agreement signed, and the readmission agreement signed previously, provides the path for the EU to abdicate their responsibility for this situation.

Jordanian respondent

Unless Turkey really becomes a third safe country for Syrian refugees this agreement will not be useful for anyone.

Jordanian respondent

The EU-Turkey statement and the previous action plan are both shameful ways to manage migration. It makes me doubt pro-European scholars who believed in the post-national model of free movement of the EU of the very nature of the EU project. And I strongly believe I am not the only disappointed pro-European. This policy has made nobody happy, neither the nationalists nor the post-nationalists.

United Kingdom respondent

The deal circumvents obligations of EU member states under international refugee law. Against payment, Turkey may keep a true refugee, whose living needs are not met, from trying to reach territory of the EU. This is practically equivalent to *refoulement*.

Egyptian respondent

The arrangement with Turkey is the most outrageous and inefficient agreement signed. It is going to have very adverse effects on the EU, the weaknesses of which it has highlighted.

Lebanese respondent

The scheme is flawed, mainly due to the 1 to 1 deal; there is need for a substantial (!) alternative for refugees in order to (legally) reach the EU.

German respondent

Although the migration flows decreased in the Mediterranean, the 1 to 1 deal is an unfortunate solution over-passing the principle of respect for human rights.

Romanian respondent

Other respondents express their doubts regarding the sustainability of the deal.

Ces mesures ne peuvent être que transitoires en attendant une répartition équitable des migrants et réfugiés entre les pays ou la révision des engagements de l'UE quant aux réfugiés. On peut aussi envisager un rôle plus grand des organismes des Nations Unies.

Moroccan respondent

The EU-Turkey agreement cannot function when it comes to the return scheme. It has slowed down the influx of refugees from Turkey, but it is doubtful that it can continue that way.

Greek respondent

I'm afraid that voluntary return of migrants and refugees cannot be easily implemented, there should be other legal international and regional elements to cope with such very sensitive subject.

Lebanese respondent

Some respondents also note the difficulties linked to the evolution of the political situation in Turkey, as well as the changes in the broader relationship with the EU.

A prerequisite also remains that the internal situation in Turkey allows such programmes to be carried out as agreed.

Swedish respondent

The Joint Statement has succeeded in lowering the number of arrivals to Greek shores and in saving lives. However, it cannot provide a viable framework in the long run and depends on when and how Turkey's visa aspirations are satisfied.

Greek respondent

After the attempted coup in Turkey, the assessment is probably somewhat different from what it would have been before (but it was not a good and fair deal anyway).

Finnish respondent

Other respondents also signal the necessity for EU financial support to reach the target population effectively, despite difficulties.

Make sure the financial support is reaching the population "cible" of the refugees in order to make the disbursement more efficient.

Lebanese respondent

As long as EU financial support goes through governmental agencies, it may not reach the most needed, the refugees!

German respondent

The EU should ensure that the budget allocated to the Facility Refugees in Turkey is properly managed.

Spanish respondent

Some respondents, particularly from MPC, underline the need for EU financial support also for other countries too.

The expenditures should be for the receiving countries neighbouring Syria or sub-Saharan countries, not only for Turkey. Moreover, the EU can establish small projects for refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt supporting them with consultancy and experience-sharing.

Egyptian respondent

The special aid to Turkey is unfair given the needs of Jordan and Lebanon, which have both supported a much larger percentage of refugees to total local population than Turkey.

Lebanese respondent

This is not fair for all the Mediterranean countries as Turkey is the only country taking advantage of this agreement.


Lebanese respondent

With the assumption that one of the thematic priorities of the ENP review was to offer an intensified cooperation on both regular and irregular migration, Q25 aimed to understand to what extent respondents agreed with four statements:

- The ENP could effectively be better connected to the overall migration architecture of the EU, thereby contributing to the consistency between the EU internal and external dimension of migratory policies.
- The ENP could be used as a framework to more effectively address the primary causes of migrations.
- The ENP could help promote a transregional approach, i.e., a broader collaboration of EU countries and ENP countries with ENP neighbours and relevant international organisations.
- The ENP is an irrelevant framework to deal with migrations.

A very large majority of the participants agree to a high and very high extent with the first three statements, while less than 20% of respondents agree with the fourth one (see Graph 52). However, it has to be mentioned that MPC respondents are more critical towards the ENP than EU-28 respondents. Respondents from Mashreq countries are more convinced about the efficacy of the ENP for addressing the primary cause of migrations (see Graph Q25 Mashreq in Set of Results at www.iemed.org/euromedsurvey).


Graph 52: One of the thematic priorities of the ENP review is to offer an intensified cooperation on both regular and irregular migration. Do you agree with the following statements? Respondents by group of countries.
 (The graph below shows the % of agree and completely agree answers)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 7th Euromed Survey/Question 25

Civil society respondents are generally slightly more optimistic than policy-makers and experts about the possibilities of the ENP in the field of the first three proposals (see Graph 53).

Graph 53: One of the thematic priorities of the ENP review is to offer an intensified cooperation on both regular and irregular migration. Do you agree with the following statements? Respondents by institutional affiliation. (The graph below shows the % of agree and completely agree answers)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 7th Euromed Survey/Question 25

Some criticism of various aspects of the ENP emerges from a number of open answers. Some of the respondents hint at ENP limitations that the implementation of existing measures illustrated, while others suggest the need to develop new ones.

So far, the ENP has been irrelevant to deal with migration. All one can say is that it could achieve the first three objectives if appropriate measures are introduced in the ENP and then effectively implemented.

Egyptian respondent

It does not cease to amaze that available instruments are not strengthened or used. The panic mode in which decisions have been made relate to less developed countries, not to the EU.

Spanish respondent

The ENP is not irrelevant in dealing with migration. It is ineffective in general, which is a different question.

Turkish respondent

The ENP should be strengthened in order to better integrate the Euro-Mediterranean dimension of the EU.

Finnish respondent

Implication réelle des partenaires sociaux, mise en relation des marchés de travail Sud-Sud et Sud-Nord.

Tunisian respondent

Il faut mettre en œuvre et de manière volontariste le concept « Co-développement » pour rendre la PEV plus réactive et moins sécuritaire.

Moroccan respondent

La politique de voisinage pourrait (au conditionnel) être connectée à l'architecture migratoire globale. Il faut un organisme séparé des grandes politiques européennes qui prendrait en charge la question migratoire dans une perspective d'un avenir Euro-Med commun et d'aspirations communes. Dans l'état actuel de crispation, les choses ne s'annoncent pas sous un bon jour.


Palestinian respondent

Moreover, in Q26 respondents were also asked to assess five more specific dialogue and cooperation mechanisms established with Southern Mediterranean countries:

- The dialogues on migration, mobility and security proposed to Southern Mediterranean countries
- The Mobility Partnerships (Morocco, 2013; Tunisia and Jordan, 2014)
- The Euromed Migration programmes I, II and III
- The Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development with Western and Central African countries (the Rabat Process)
- The EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (the Khartoum Process)

Overall, none of these mechanisms is considered as effective or very effective by more than 50% of the respondents, independently of their origin or professional affiliation, with the exception of policy-makers (see Graph 55). In relative terms, the Euromed Migration programmes I, II and III are the best-assessed instrument by all respondents, independently of national origin and professional affiliation (see Graphs 54 and 55).

Graph 54: How do you assess the following dialogue and cooperation mechanisms established with Southern Mediterranean countries? Respondents by group of countries.
 (The graph below shows the % of agree and completely agree answers)




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 7th Euromed Survey/Question 26

Some significant differences emerge when comparing EU-28 and MPC assessments of the effectiveness of the Rabat and Khartoum Process, where the former are less sceptical. At the same time, MPC respondents are less convinced than EU-28 respondents about the effectiveness of mobility partnership and Euromed migration programmes.

Graph 55: How do you assess the following dialogue and cooperation mechanisms established with Southern Mediterranean countries? Respondents by institutional affiliation.

(The graph below shows the % of agree and completely agree answers)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 7th Euromed Survey/Question 26

Open-ended answers from some participants underline the problem of a security-oriented approach from the European side.

The problem is the EU "securitisation" approach to migration policy and border controls. Dialogues with regional, intraregional and national partners are always good tools but policy-makers should change their approach to migration. Then, of course, there are the issues of the kinds of governments available to cooperate with, factors that the EU cannot really control.

United Kingdom respondent

The continuing concern with migration is evidence that these mechanisms have not been effective. One cause of the lack of effectiveness is the securitisation approach that essentially imprints each of these mechanisms.

Egyptian respondent

The North-South divergent approach on the readmission agreements is also mentioned.

Le PPM est conditionné par la signature d'un accord de réadmission, proposition irrationnelle et qui fait supporter aux pays du Sud le poids d'un problème européen.

Moroccan respondent

Some other respondents underline the need for better implementation of existing mechanisms.

These multilateral dialogue and cooperation mechanisms should be reinforced in order to be really efficient.

Finnish respondent

The available funding for these agreements and programmes is limited and much less than it should be. It cannot be compared to the funding Turkey alone obtained and promised in just one year.

Egyptian respondent

Unless stronger conditionality is applied, none of these mechanisms will be effective.

Slovakian respondent

I have rated these programmes on the low side. Again, the outsourcing to third countries is not very effective, especially if there is a high level of corruption in most of them. I am wondering if the evaluations of these programmes actually deal with the issue of corruption.

Spanish respondent


The last question of the Survey was related to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, launched by the European Commission in the framework of the Valletta Action Plan (November 2015). Respondents were asked to react to the following statements:

- The projects that have been selected so far are relevant to the most urgent needs in the field of migration.
- These projects are well-connected to the more global goals supported by EU development assistance.
- The administrative process set up to manage the Trust Fund is genuinely promoting close coordination between all the actors that need to be involved (EU Commission, EEAS, EU member states, African partners,...) and efficiently delivering appropriate actions where needed.

Results show that only a limited proportion of the respondents agrees to a high or very high extent with these three statements: only a third agrees that the selected projects are relevant to address the most urgent needs and are well connected to the global goals of EU development assistance. Respondents are even less convinced that the actors involved coordinate properly (see Graph 56). In general terms, EU-28 respondents are more critical than MPC respondents of all three statements, and particularly the last one (difference of 13 points).

Graph 56: In the framework of the Valletta Action Plan (November 2015) the European Commission launched an “Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa” made up of €1.8 billion. In relation to the EU Emergency Trust Fund, do you agree with the following questions? Respondents by group of countries.

(The graph below displays the % of high and very high extent answers)




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 7th Euromed Survey/Question 27

Important differences also emerge when looking at professional affiliation of Survey participants. In general terms, policy-makers have a significantly better perception concerning the first two statements, more than 10 points higher than other respondents, while civil society is slightly less critical of the last statement (see Graph 57).

Graph 57: In the framework of the Valletta Action Plan (November 2015) the European Commission launched an “Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa” made up of €1.8 billion. In relation to the EU Emergency Trust Fund, do you agree with the following questions? Respondents by institutional affiliation.

(The graph below displays the % of high and very high extent answers)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 7th Euromed Survey/Question 27

In general terms, respondents from Mashreq countries are less critical of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa than those from European and Maghreb countries (see Q27 Mashreq and Q27 Maghreb in Set of Results at www.iemed.org/euromedsurvey).

Open-ended answers point out some of the limitations of the Emergency Trust Fund. The missing involvement of civil society actors comes up in several comments.

It should be more accessible to civil society stakeholders.

Italian respondent

La société civile doit être largement impliquée et bénéficiaire de ces Fonds fiduciaires en travaillant en collaboration autour de consortium pour pouvoir bénéficier des fonds fiduciaires qui sont de grandes enveloppes.

Mauritanian respondent

Les fonds sont dépensés d'une façon totalement opaque, voire incohérente ou carrément pillés.

Moroccan respondent

Some of the participants also note that there are problems connected with the logic underpinning this tool and with the consequent orientation of the funds.

The EU Emergency Trust Fund is exchanging aid for a "better" control of transiting migrants in third countries of transit: but this can translate into much more violence that transiting persons will experience, as the EU Commission knows very well and as it has stated considering the possible shortfalls of this action. However, the document does not explain how to counter these possible shortfalls.

United Kingdom respondent

Again, this is an attempt to outsource. Not the right approach, also better communication among EU delegations of the sending and receiving countries would have to be improved for minimum effectiveness but the root causes are not being dealt with, including very high levels of corruption.

Spanish respondent

Pour traiter des causes profondes des migrations irrégulières, ce n'est pas seulement une question d'argent. C'est une implication réelle de l'UE dans la recherche de solutions diplomatiques pour les conflits qui ravagent l'Afrique et le Moyen-Orient.

Palestinian respondent

I doubt that the projects actually address the aspirations of the people (jobs, income and income stability, career opportunities, good governance, etc) who subsequently decide to migrate.

United Kingdom respondent

The results of new initiatives and instruments, like the EU Trust Fund, should be expected only in the medium and long term.

Spanish respondent