
MONITORING OF PROGRESS
AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP/
UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN
IN 2008-2010 AND ASSESSMENT
OF PROSPECTS 2010-2012

Global Assessment

The global assessment of the performance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean (EMP/UfM) for the period July 2008-September 2010 is slightly negative. 51.2% of respondents assess the performance of the UfM negatively.

By institutional affiliation, policy-makers and experts make an average assessment lower than actors from civil society, who give pass grades to the UfM performance (averages of 4.4, 4.2, and 5.3, respectively). Specifically, the low grading by policy-makers is based on the assessments made by diplomats and members of European institutions who give the lowest grades in all categories (averages of 2.75 and 3.52, respectively). In relation to experts, the average assessment of think tank members is significantly lower than that of academics. On the other hand, NGO members assess the UfM performance more positively (over 54% grade it above 5).

By main area of specialisation, respondents working in “political cooperation and security” give an average lower grading than those from other professional areas related to the Euro-Mediterranean space (i.e., “economic and financial cooperation”, “social, cultural and human exchanges” and “migrations and justice affairs”). In fact, 49% of respondents specialising in political cooperation grade the performance of the EMP/UfM below 4, and more than 65% below 5.

L'initiative de l'UfM, conçue pour redynamiser le partenariat euro-méditerranéen, a contribué en réalité à le paralyser davantage. Mais elle a mis en avant certains problèmes (par exemple, la tension entre acteurs gouvernementaux et civils) qui pourraient devenir des facteurs de refondation des relations transméditerranéennes.

French respondent

La persistance de la crise du Moyen-Orient et ses dernières complications, notamment, la guerre de Gaza et la situation au Liban, ont influencé négativement sur la marche de l'UpM.

Tunisian respondent


Creo que no está llegando a los ciudadanos, sobre todo a los de la ribera sur del Mediterráneo que, en mi opinión, se sienten totalmente ajenos y desconocen prácticamente en su totalidad la existencia de un proyecto de asociación euromediterránea.

Moroccan respondent

Finally, it is worth noting that by geographical areas, the lowest assessment corresponds to respondents from Mediterranean EU countries, where more than 40% of respondents grade the performance of the EMP/UfM below 4, and from the Maghreb, where 30% of respondents grade them below 4. It is significant that these two groups represent the highest degree of knowledge (i.e., a lower percentage of “Don't know” answers) in comparison to the remaining sub-regions. In contrast, respondents from the Balkans, Israel and the Mashreq make relatively more positive assessments.

Graph 1: Global assessment of the results of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean in the July 2008-September 2010 period

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very disappointing, and 10 for very positive)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

BOX 1: The global assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (2009-2010)

Although the questionnaires for the 1st and 2nd Euromed Surveys are different from each other, repeating certain questions allows us to compare results.

By geographical areas, two facts stand out. On the one hand, EU respondents, and very especially those from Mediterranean EU countries, make the most negative assessment of EMP/UfM activities in the period 2008-2010, closely followed by Maghrebian respondents, who had made the most negative assessment of the EMP in the previous Survey. Meanwhile, respondents from the remaining Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) assess the period 2008-2010 more positively than the period 2005-2009.

According to results from the 1st and 2nd Euromed Surveys, the average global assessment of EMP/UfM activities during the period 2005-2009 and July 2008-September 2010 is very similar. Specifically, the grading corresponding to the second period has been slightly lower (4.57 for the period 2008-2010 and 4.68 for the period 2005-2009, on a scale of 0-10). However, the close similarity of the averages conceals the distribution of answers. While in 2009, 55% of answers focused on middle grades – between 4 and 6 –, in 2010 this percentage decreases to 41%. In the current Survey, the difference seems to be distributed above and – to a greater extent – below middle grades. This new distribution, possibly influenced by the polarisation of views on the launching of the UfM, may indicate a radicalisation of perceptions of the EMP/UfM, both for positive and negative aspects.

The detailed analysis of the polarisation reveals how, in the case of EU countries, Spain and France account for the growth of the negative assessment as they experience a notable growth in answers between 0 and 3 (a highly negative assessment that increases by 40% in the case of Spain and almost 15% in the case of France). At the other extreme, the very highly positive assessment between 8 and 10 increases by 7%, driven mainly by the remaining Mediterranean EU countries (specifically based on answers from Greece and Slovenia).

The answers from the Maghreb and the Mashreq reflect this polarisation. In this case, the percentage of positive answers is double that of the previous year (from 8% to 16% in the Mashreq, and 4% to 8% in the Maghreb) (see graphs in Annex 1).

These results suggest that Southern Mediterranean Countries see the introduction of the multilateral operation of the UfM positively with a notable increase of ownership while Mediterranean EU countries would prefer the bilateral conception put forward by the UfM.

* See graphics p. 48-49, Box 1.

Assessment of the EU Presidencies and the EU and MPC Co-Presidencies

An initial surprising fact from this set of questions is the high level of ignorance, both about the European presidencies and the EU co-presidencies, revealed by a significant percentage of “Don’t know” answers (which varies between 17% and 28%).

In terms of EU presidencies, the Spanish Presidency is the best graded (6.2 on average) over the French (5.7) and the Swedish (5.5). The Czech Presidency is graded below 5 (4.3). By institutional affiliation, there is a slight trend for experts to assess all the presidencies more negatively than actors from civil society and policy-makers.

Also notable is the good assessment of the French EU Presidency by EU Mediterranean countries (not exclusively although highly influenced by French respondents) in comparison to the low assessment by Turkish respondents; and the good assessment of the Swedish EU Presidency in the Mashreq or the fact that, within its good results, the Spanish EU Presidency is more positively assessed by non-Mediterranean EU countries and those of the Mashreq.

The French and Egyptian Co-Presidency of the UfM is, in general, more negatively assessed than their European counterparts. Average assessments reveal middle positions in both cases although slightly higher in the case of France (5.0, more than half a point lower than the assessment of its European Presidency period) than Egypt (4.6). By institutional affiliation, the results follow a similar pattern to answers related to the European presidencies (i.e., grades slightly lower in the views of the group of experts).

The respective presidencies were unable to get the political machinery moving in order to enable the key technical projects. Furthermore, political uncertainties and conflict greatly hindered the political process to advance. Due to this blockage, very little was achieved under the various presidencies.

United States respondent

Il n'y a plus aucune visibilité de l'action des présidences au niveau de l'espace Euromed.

Tunisian respondent


La copresidencia ha adolecido de falta de liderazgo colectivo.

Spanish respondent

By geographical areas, the assessment of the Egyptian Co-Presidency of the UfM reveals that, with the exception of the view of Egyptians surveyed who raise the average of the Mashreq group to over 5, the remaining sub-regions have average grades of below 5 (in the case of Maghrebians respondents, the grade decreases to 3.15). Moreover, the French Co-Presidency of the UfM is more negatively assessed by Maghrebians and Turkish respondents, while it is more positively graded by respondents from the Mashreq, Israel and the Balkans. The average assessment of the French Co-Presidency by the Mediterranean EU countries is around the global average (including French respondents who, in general and similarly to the remaining respondents, assess the Co-Presidency of the UfM more negatively than the European Presidency).

Graph 2: Grading the action of the different EU Presidencies and Co-Presidencies of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very disappointing, and 10 for very positive)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

Union for the Mediterranean Secretariat

With an average of 4.5 out of 10 and 50% of respondents under 5, the progress achieved in the launching of the UfM Secretariat is generally assessed as insufficient.

The assessment of the progress in establishing the UfM Secretariat does not show major differences either by area of specialisation or institutional affiliation. The only notable aspect is that civil society respondents assess this progress more positively (global average of the category is the only one that reaches 5). In addition, the analysis by geographical areas does not reveal significant divergences, although again the most negative assessments by respondents from the Maghreb and Mediterranean EU countries stand out.

However, the expectations of the role that the Secretariat will play in the new institutional architecture are more optimistic.¹ Among those who have a formed view in this respect, more than 55% grade the future contribution of the Secretariat above 5 and more than 30% above 7.

It could play a meaningful role if there is a clear roadmap with targets, specific actions and monitoring.

Belgian respondent

Due to the slow political process, and the fragility of the Secretariat (no funding allocated), we can expect that the UfM will give guidelines and objectives for the integration process, but will have little impact on the implementation side.

Egyptian respondent

Fondé sur un principe intergouvernemental, le secrétariat risque de connaître la paralysie en raison des tensions inter étatiques. Pour l'instant, il ne semble être qu'une bureaucratie déconnectée des réalités.

Italian respondent


1. Question B4, "How would you assess progress made regarding the setting up of the UfM Secretariat between November 2008 and September 2010?", was asked after the resignation of the Secretary General of the UfM.

It is worth noting that the expectations of the “experts” (think tank analysts, academics and journalists) are slightly less optimistic. In relation to area of specialisation, the professionals of “political cooperation and security” are the respondents with the lowest expectations in relation to the role of the UfM.

By regions, it is significant that EU respondents – both Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean – anticipate, along with Turkish respondents, the worst prospects for the future of the Secretariat. Meanwhile, respondents from the Maghreb and the Mashreq countries, along with Israel, anticipate the best.

Graph 3: Assessment of progress made regarding the setting up of the UfM Secretariat between November 2008 and September 2010


(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very disappointing, and 10 for very positive)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

Graph 4: UfM Secretariat's role in the new Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture in the near future

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for negligible role, and 10 for key role)




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

BOX 2: Assessment of the UfM Secretariat: 2009 and 2010

The question about the future role of the UfM Secretariat on a scale between negligible (0) or key (10) shows how the average is practically identical between the two Surveys. This similarity is curious given that in the 2009 Survey the Secretariat had not yet been implemented while in 2010 it had already had a Secretary General since January. The poor visibility of the Secretariat's activity (or scarce activity) could explain this low variation. Moreover, the comparison according to geographical origin of the respondents shows that in all regions the grades of the average assessments increase – to a greater or lesser extent – except in the case of respondents from Mediterranean EU countries, who more positively graded the role of the Secretariat in 2009 (along with Maghrebians) and now assess it most negatively. Finally the Turks, both in 2009 and 2010, were the most critical of the Secretariat

Graph 5: UfM Secretariat's role in the new Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture in the near future. Comparing 2009 and 2010 results

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for negligible role, and 10 for key role)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

Union for the Mediterranean Summits

In relation to the role of Euro-Mediterranean summits, there are no significant differences between respondents by institutional affiliation or by area of professional specialisation. By geographical areas, there are also no great differences, with the exception of Maghrebians, who are more sceptical than others about the importance of these summits.

Summits create media buzz, which helps create awareness and potentially a UfM identity.
German respondent

La importance théorique est très haute car c'est au cours de ces sommets que devrait se mettre en place en place la politique de l'UpM. Malheureusement, de reports en reports, ces sommets deviennent virtuels et la politique de l'UpM le faut également.

French respondent

Les réunions des Chefs d'Etat donnent l'illusion d'une intégration. Quand un projet n'avance pas on multiplie les réunions au sommet pour laisser croire que les choses avancent, alors que sur le terrain peu de progrès sont faits.

Algerian respondent

Progress Achieved in the Implementation of the Following Euro-Mediterranean Sectoral Strategies and Action Plans

The question about the sectoral strategies and action plans covers two aspects: on the one hand, their importance in relation to the Euro-Mediterranean objectives and, on the other, progress in their implementation. Firstly, it is worth pointing out the high level of ignorance about the sectoral strategies at around 20% when the question focuses on their importance for achieving the Partnership's objectives. This percentage doubles in the question about progress in the implementation of such strategies (the percentage of respondents that claim ignorance about the level of implementation oscillates at around 40%). Thus, despite the importance of these fields, the visibility of the specific Euro-Mediterranean plans is very limited.

The percentage of "Don't know" answers to the questions about these plans is greater for policy-makers and actors from civil society than experts when the results are analysed by institution. By area of specialisation, professionals of the socio-cultural field express greater ignorance of the plans; a more than logical result considering their mainly economic nature. By geographical areas, the regions with a higher "Don't know" percentage in all questions related to strategies and action plans are the Mashreq, Israel, non-Mediterranean EU countries and the Balkans.

Sans disposer d'informations pertinentes il est difficile de se positionner dans une échelle de valeurs.


Moroccan respondent

In relation to the assessment of their importance to the objectives of the Partnership, it should be noted that all of them are important for respondents (average above 7 in all cases). The most important are related to the fields of water (8.3) and energy (7.9). Transport and employment come next (7.6), followed by industrial cooperation, the role of women and maritime strategy (7.4). Finally, tourism has an average of 7.1.

Tous ces plans sont importants, mais les moyens mis en oeuvre restent dérisoires.

Algerian respondent

Graph 6: Importance of the Euro-Mediterranean action plans and sectoral strategies for Euromed objectives
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very disappointing, and 10 for very positive)




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

In the analysis according to origin of respondents, there are also no major differences, although EU respondents tend to assess them more positively than those from MPCs (except in industrial cooperation and tourism). It is also notable that the average of participants from the Maghreb is always below the global average and there are no major differences according to the sector about which they are asked. In contrast, in the Mashreq, tourism or employment programmes are more positively assessed in comparison with water or gender programmes, which are assessed more negatively.

It should be noted that EU countries assess the importance of gender programmes above the average while MPCs make a below average assessment. Among MPCs there are also significant differences such as in relation to the Working Programme on Tourism. Its importance is very positively assessed in the Mashreq and especially in Turkey (almost 70% of Turkish respondents grade it 8 or more. In contrast, among Maghrebians this percentage does not reach 40%).

In terms of the progress of these initiatives, it is significant that in only two of the eight initiatives over 50% of respondents say that there has been progress (Istanbul Action Plan on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society, and Priority Action Plan on Energy). In relation to the implementation of the six remaining initiatives, most respondents consider that there has been no progress or, even, regression. In this respect, the least positively assessed initiatives are: the Mediterranean Maritime Strategy, the Mediterranean Water Strategy and, mainly, the Employment Framework of Actions. The latter, despite its importance, has the highest regression percentages (21%) and lack of progress (59%).

Graph 7: Assessment of the progress achieved of the Euro-Mediterranean action plans and sectoral strategies



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

Gender, employment and water are very important strategies that should be addressed properly and quickly in order to secure progress in the other sectoral strategies.

Lebanese respondent

Ces objectifs sont tous importants mais ne bénéficient d'aucune action concrète supplémentaire. Les progrès enregistrés le sont de façon quasi indépendante du processus.

French respondent

Unfortunately, the free circulation of people as well as the encouragement of the democratization process of the regimes in the southern shore of the Mediterranean seems to be neglected.

Algerian respondent

If we analyse the results on the progress of sectoral strategies and plans according to institutional affiliation, we see important differences; thus, 50% of policy-makers consider that cooperation has progressed. This is repeated in the assessment by experts of the Transport Action Plan or among actors from civil society when assessing the programme on tourism.

By area of specialisation, the most common differences are in grades within the same general trend. There are, however, exceptions. Such is the case of the assessment of the Istanbul Action Plan which, for most professionals surveyed from the field of “political cooperation and security” and in contrast to the general trend, has not progressed.

By regions, the assessment of the implementation of plans does entail differences. In terms of the Istanbul Action Plan there seem to be more doubts about its progress in the Maghreb and the Mediterranean EU than in other groups. As for transport, in contrast, there is a clear division between EU respondents (who mostly consider that there has been progress) and MPC respondents (with the exception of Turkey) who mainly believe the contrary. Differences between regions also emerge when dealing with the Tourism Programme, as most respondents, both from the Maghreb and the Mediterranean EU, consider that there has been no progress, in contrast to the other regions. This critical assessment (to which in this case Turkish respondents are added) is repeated for the assessment of industrial cooperation. In the remaining action plans and strategies, differences between regions, although they exist, do not feature such high levels.

Manque de transparence et d'effet tangible ressenti par les populations.

Tunisian respondent

Manque une évaluation d'impact de la plupart des projets.

Moroccan respondent

Union for the Mediterranean Projects


The question about the UfM projects follows the same pattern: its importance for achieving the Partnership objectives and its progress are assessed. Firstly, it is important to note that, in general, 15% of respondents are unfamiliar with their importance and between 28% and 40% do not know their level of implementation. Secondly, it is important to note that, despite the high level of ignorance, the UfM projects seem to enjoy greater visibility than the programmes and action plans of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

By institutional affiliation, the level of knowledge of the projects is slightly higher among experts. By area of specialisation, there is a trend to greater knowledge by respondents who are professionals in the economic field. This difference increases in the case of the project focused on small- and medium- sized enterprises.

In relation to the assessment of their importance for achieving the objectives of the Partnership, it is worth emphasising that all of them are important for respondents. The average grade for the importance of the different projects is not only very high but has very few variations (between 7.7 and 8). It is highly significant that there are also no important variations in these assessments by institutional affiliation or by area of specialisation (beyond the slightly more positive assessment of the Mediterranean Solar Plan by respondents from the socio-cultural field or the more positive assessment by professionals from the economic field of the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focused on small- and medium- sized enterprises). The differences by geographical origin of the respondents are also very small.

Graph 8: Assessment of the importance of the six projects selected in the framework of the UfM for Euromed objectives

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for no importance, and 10 for very high importance)




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

However, in relation to respondents' perception of the progress achieved in the six UfM projects there are major differences. In only two of the six projects – the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the Euro-Mediterranean University – more than half of the respondents consider that there has been progress. In contrast, only 46% sees progress in the initiative aimed at SMEs and less than 40% believes that there has been progress in the remaining projects. Significantly, the projects considered to have progressed most are also the best known.

Graph 9: Assessment of the progress achieved of the the six projects selected in the framework of the UfM

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for no importance, and 10 for very high importance)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey


By areas of specialisation of respondents, it is significant that the “social and cultural cooperation” professionals see greater progress, compared with the other professional specialities, in the projects related with maritime and land highways, civil protection, Euro-Mediterranean University and – together with the professionals of economic and financial cooperation – support for SMEs.

By geographical origin of respondents, there is more diversity in the assessment of the progress of some projects. For example, the Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) has progressed much more for respondents of the Mashreq, Turkey and the non-Mediterranean EU than for respondents from the Maghreb or Mediterranean EU countries. This pattern is repeated (although with smaller variations) when assessing the SME initiative. The contrary, both in grades and regions involved, is seen in the assessment of maritime and land highways and civil protection projects, in which respondents from the Maghreb and the Mediterranean EU consider that it has progressed more than other regions.

New Projects of the Union for the Mediterranean

When respondents were asked to assess the importance of nine proposals that could be future UfM projects, they assessed all proposals positively (the least positively assessed obtained an average of 6.3). Respondents considered more important the proposal to create a Mediterranean Youth Office to facilitate the mobility of Mediterranean students (more than 25% of respondents grade its importance with a 10) and the creation of a Mediterranean Junior Erasmus Programme. Moreover, the project to strengthen participation of women in public life also obtains a high grade. In contrast, the least positively assessed projects are the creation of a cultural TV channel for the Mediterranean and the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean arbitration court.

Graph 10: Assessment of the importance of other new projects proposed for the UfM
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for no importance, and 10 for very high importance)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

The disaggregated data by groups – institutional affiliation, area of professional specialisation and geographical origin of respondent – does not show relevant differences.

It should be noted that the “Mediterranean Investment Guarantee Convention” is most positively assessed by professionals surveyed in the economic and financial field, while low grades by respondents from the political ambit stand out, both for the cultural TV channel and the “Mediterranean Cancer Plan”. The differences in the assessment of the two proposals related

to gender equality by sex of the respondent are also significant (women assessed them as more important).

By geographical origin, it is notable that while EU respondents grade the “Erasmus Euromed” proposal more positively (7.9) than MPC respondents (7.6), respondents from Mediterranean countries prioritise other proposals, such as the “Mediterranean Cancer Plan” (7.6 out of 10), the “Mediterranean Youth Office” (8.1), the “Mediterranean Agency for Urban Development” (7.7) or the “Mediterranean Women’s Foundation” (7.9) (in which the importance given by Turkish respondents stands out).

A “Mediterranean Agency for Urban Development” would be relevant and contributory only if it sought alternatives to urbanization and redistributed assets to rural development and relieving indebted small farmers.

United States respondent

Any project for enhancing democracy in Mediterranean countries.

Jordan respondent

Anything relating to youth, migration and adult education.

Turkish respondent

Creación de una agencia euromediterránea de innovación, y generar una mayor participación de los países del sur del Mediterráneo en los programas europeos de cooperación tecnológica.

Spanish respondent

Création d'une banque d'investissement euro-méditerranéenne

Algerian respondent

Mise en place d'une Banque Euro-méditerranéenne d'Investissements

Tunisian respondent

Gestion des flux migratoires, renforcement de la société civile, initiatives en faveur de la garantie de la liberté d'expressions démocratie et droits de l'homme

Tunisian respondent

Rather than taking on new projects and diluting its agenda, the UfM should focus on the existing ones which have made little progress.

German respondent


Impact of the Eastern Partnership²

When respondents are asked to assess the impact of the Eastern Partnership on Euro-Mediterranean relations, it is surprising that, in addition to a high level of “Don't know” answers especially among the MPCs (25%), respondents do not seem to have a clear idea of the impact of this partnership on Euromed relations, opting for middle grades (an global average of 5.2 and over 56% of answers between 4 and 6). In any case, it is significant that the results by geographical origin show that respondents from the Maghreb are the most pessimistic in terms of this impact, while a higher proportion of Turks and non-Mediterranean Europeans believe that the impact will be positive.

2. The Eastern Partnership was launched in March 2009 between the EU and six Eastern European states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Georgia, Moldavia and Ukraine).

Graph 11: Impact of Eastern Partnership between the EU and six Eastern European States on the development of Euro-Mediterranean relations

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very negative impact, and 10 for very positive impact)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

Será inevitable un giro de la atención europea hacia el Este, cuando sería necesario mantener la atención centrada en el Mediterráneo, como punto fundamental en el futuro tricontinental.

Spanish respondent

Both are elements of the EU's efforts to ensure stability in its neighbourhood. It seems that the Eastern Partnership is a bit more productive.

German respondent

It will, on the one hand, be positive by showing better strategies and cooperation that can be a role model for any regional organisation. On the other hand, it will take too much energy for the EU to handle and deliver meaningful results.

Slovenian respondent

L'Europe a favorisé le développement de ses relations avec les pays de l'Est au détriment de ses relations avec les pays de la rive sud et est de la Méditerranée.


Tunisian respondent

European External Action Service

On the effect of the new EU external action on Euro-Mediterranean relations, respondents maintain a moderate optimism (average of 6.5) with few variations in relation to institutional affiliation, area of specialisation or geographical origin of the respondent. However, the difference between respondents from the Mashreq and the Maghreb is notable. The Mashreq has the most positive assessment (an average of 7 and 60% of respondents grading it with 7 or higher) while the Maghreb has the lowest average together with Mediterranean EU countries (6.3 average and almost 25% grading it with 4 or lower). It is also worth noting that 23% of participants are unable to assess the impact of the new European External Action Service.

Graph 12: Impact of the future European External Action Service on the Euro-Mediterranean relations

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very negative impact, and 10 for very positive impact)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

Annexing foreign aid to the external policy can have some negative impact on the policy of aid and investment because this reflects the concern to tie aid and solidarity to the political agenda of the EU foreign policy.

Lebanese respondent

Positif à condition que la Commission Européenne joue un rôle important et les diplomaties nationales n'entravent pas l'action du service européen.


Italian respondent

EU Financial Prospects 2014-2020

In relation to the current financial instruments and modalities of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, an overwhelming majority is in favour of their revision. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 stands for no need and 10 for very necessary, 80% of respondents graded it 7 or higher. The analysis by institutional affiliation, area of professional specialisation and origin of respondents yields average high results in all categories. However, it is notable that both “political and security cooperation” professionals and respondents from EU Mediterranean countries assess them least positively.

Graph 13: Need for a review of the current financial instruments and modalities (regardless of the amount allocated) for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument and FEMIP)

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for no heed, and 10 for very necessary)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

The situation is now very different. The EU will not grow much further. As the majority of MPCs are not accession candidates, completely new instruments and policy frameworks are absolutely necessary.

German respondent

La FEMIP devrait se transformer en Banque Euro-Méditerranéenne pour donner plus d'élan à l'action dans cette zone.

Tunisian respondent

There is need to unify some of the instruments into one or two. Equally significant, however, is the policy of crediting those MPCs, like Morocco, by reinforcing such already existing benefits as the *statut avancé* and extending them to other countries that make progress on the political and civil society fronts.

Israeli respondent

Priority and Probability of New Financial Instruments in the Mediterranean

The question on new types of financial instruments that could be implemented in the area (macroregion, participation of the MPCs in EU structural funds or a new Regional Programme in the framework of the ENPI) had a dual nature: it asked about the priority given to each of the proposals and also the probability of their implementation.


According to the priority level given, the experts and policy-makers surveyed were quite clear: the priority is a new regional programme in the framework of the ENPI (7.5 on average), followed by the mechanisms to ensure participation of MPCs in the structural funds (6.7) and finally the Mediterranean macroregion (6.0). This priority is repeated without great variations independently of institutional affiliation, area of professional specialisation or geographical origin of the respondent. As an exception to this, we must note the case of non-Mediterranean EU respondents who positively assess the macroregion more than access to structural funds.

However, respondents are sceptical about the possible creation of the aforementioned instruments. First, the average perception of the probability of implementing each instrument is significantly lower than the average importance given to the future instrument. It seems that the Euro-Mediterranean process is perceived by respondents as little inclined to abandon the status quo. In accordance with the available data, the creation of the new Regional Programme is considered more feasible than the inclusion of the MPCs in the structural funds or the creation of a Mediterranean macroregion (the respective average probabilities are 6.0, 5.3 and 5.2).

Just as in the priorities, there are no significant differences between the average answers of the different categories of analysis.

Graph 14: Level of priority and level of probability to new financial instruments which could eventually be implemented in the Mediterranean

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for less, and 10 for more)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

Other Instruments Proposed:

ENPI should focus on the social and economic development and it should be revised based on the rights-based approach.

Lebanese respondent

Investing in cross-regional infrastructure projects through well-planned public-private partnerships projects

Croatian respondent

Look for opportunities and strategies of attracting Gulf countries direct or indirect capital investments to UfM projects.

Turkish respondent

The Baltic region is a good example of bottom-up design and strategy.


Italian respondent

Probability of Increased Funds for Financial Cooperation of the EU with SMEs

For respondents, the probability that the new financial prospects will increase funds for SMEs could be called rather pessimistic (average 4.7). The fact that the results draw almost a normal curve around 5 reflects the doubts about the possibility of resources increasing. It is significant that EU respondents (i.e., those from countries providing these funds) are the most pessimistic in terms of this possibility while those from receiving countries are more optimistic (especially those from the Mashreq).

Graph 15: Probability of new Financial Perspectives increasing substantially (i.e., more than 30%) the available funds for EU-Mediterranean Partner Countries' financial cooperation (i.e., the financial envelope for the ENPI-South)

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for low probability, and 10 for very high probability)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

Potential Hypotheses in the Medium and Long Term in the Mediterranean (Maintaining the Current Level and Modes of Cooperation)


Question B14, also in the previous Survey, asked respondents to determine the probability of a series of hypotheses occurring in the medium term. Among the different hypotheses proposed to respondents were scenarios both favourable and unfavourable for the future of the region. According to the average probability given to each of the possible scenarios, there are three sets of hypotheses: the most probable (averages above 7.0), probable (averages between 6 and 7) and least probable (averages below 6).

Included in the block of most probable hypotheses are, firstly, that *“water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions in the Mediterranean”* (7.5), followed by the hypothesis that an *“increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe”* (7.3), that an *“increased level of migration will push for political reforms in the Mediterranean Partner Countries”* (7.1), that *“the Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP”* (7.1) or that *“population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tensions”* (7.1). It is notable that all the scenarios seen as most probable have a strong negative outlook directly related to the development of tensions and conflicts.

The following block of probable hypotheses includes more “pessimistic” scenarios, such as the possibility that *“environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States”* (6.6), that *“political regimes in MPCs will show a high degree of continuity”*³ (6.9) or that *“the current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period”* (6.3) together with others that are more “optimistic”, such as the view that *“women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs”* (6.7) or that *“free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean”* (6.1).

3. The Survey was conducted between October and December 2010.

Graph 16: Degree of probability attributed to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean under the present level and framework of cooperation
 (average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for low probability, and 10 for very high probability)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

The other hypotheses – of a more clearly optimistic outlook – are considered the least plausible. Thus, the possibility that “MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income” (5.2), that “Gulf Cooperation Council members will facilitate a higher degree of South-South economic cooperation in the Mediterranean”, (5.5), that the “increased level of migration will push for political reforms in the Mediterranean Partner Countries”(5.6) or “the increased level of migration, economic and human exchanges will give way to the emergence of a common Mediterranean identity” (5.2) do not achieve grades above 6. Results by geographical origin of respondents have significant variations. In the Maghreb the idea that “water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions” takes second place behind the paralysation of the EMP by the Arab-Israeli conflict, which becomes the most probable hypothesis in the region. Meanwhile, in other areas – such as the Mediterranean EU, Turkey or Israel – the most probable prospect is that an “increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe.” Curiously, this last hypothesis has an average above 7 in all regions analysed except for respondents from the Maghreb (whose average prediction – 6.6 – occupies ninth position, out of fourteen, in the ranking of contingencies).

Maghrebian respondents also consider it comparatively more probable that prosperity thanks to the free movement of people and goods and the participation of women in the public sphere will increase; an aspect that coincides with respondents from the Mashreq. Notable among

respondents from the Mashreq, however, is the appearance of social tensions due to population and employment pressure, as a very probable scenario (7.8).

Notable in European Union respondents' assessments of the hypotheses on economic convergence between the MPCs and the EU – although less positive than those of the MPCs –, are the creation of an area of shared prosperity, development of a shared Mediterranean identity or participation in public life of women from the MPCs.

Moreover, it is important to note that, in comparison with policy-makers and experts, actors from civil society consider it less probable that the political regimes will show continuity or that the Arab-Israeli conflict will end by paralysing the EMP and more probable that migrations will finally foster political reforms in the MPCs. Meanwhile, policy-makers' assessments are more similar to the global average and experts consider both the emergence of a Mediterranean identity and the creation of an area of shared prosperity highly improbable.

By area of specialisation, it is notable that professionals in the field of “political and security cooperation” consider the paralysation of the EMP by the conflict or the continuity of the political regimes more probable than the other categories, while they consider both the emergence of a Mediterranean identity and the economic convergence of the MPCs at European levels improbable.

Other Potential Hypotheses in the Medium and Long Term

Il faut transformer la migration, le niveau des échanges économiques et humains en moteur ou une force de construction de l'espace méditerranéen.

French respondent

La participation des femmes a la vie économique sociale et politique des PPM est de plus importante en dehors même de toute coopération Euromed devrait intégrer cette réalité pour mieux contribuer à ce scénario

Algerian respondent


The global economic prospects for the Mediterranean are not bad but there is no sign of sufficient progress to ameliorate the social and political tensions.

Irish respondent

In relation to the contribution of current cooperation to macroeconomic convergence in terms of GDP per capita, most respondents do not see the impact of economic cooperation on the convergence of income levels clearly. By geographical origin of respondents, there are also few differences. However, it should be noted that respondents from the Mashreq assess more positively the contribution of Euromed cooperation (5.5) while the other regions have grades below the average, especially in the case of non-Mediterranean EU countries.

Graph 17: Assessment of the contribution of the current Euro-Mediterranean economic and financial cooperation (including Euromed Free Trade Area 2010, sectoral cooperation and ENPI) to real convergence of income levels (measured in GDP per capita) across the Mediterranean.

(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for no contribution, and 10 for high contribution)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 2nd Euromed Survey

GDP is not a relevant indicator. Gini rates and redistribution will be the criteria of progress.

Egyptian respondent

Free trade benefit means equal chances if the countries have the same economic size or performance and have comparative advantage in production, but southern Mediterranean countries have no technology, low knowledge, and inefficient education system.

Moroccan respondent

Mejor que exista que no lo contrario, aunque aún está por hacerse una evaluación sobre la convergencia que producen esos fondos.

Spanish respondent

BOX 3: Future hypotheses 2009 to 2010

The question on the probability that there will be a series of hypotheses in the medium or long term has been included in the two Euromed Surveys. Globally, we see that in 2010 all the hypotheses put forward are regarded as more plausible than in the 2009 Survey (i.e., the average probability of all the options has significantly increased).

Ranking of probability attributed to distinct potential hypotheses in the medium and long term in the Mediterranean (comparative results 2009-2010)

	2010	2009
Water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions in the Mediterranean	1 st	1 st
Increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe	2 nd	6 th
Irregular migration from originating MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose	3 rd	4 th
The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP	4 th	2 nd
Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tensions	5 th	3 rd
Political regimes in MPCs will show a high degree of continuity	6 th	5 th
Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs	7 th	7 th
Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States	8 th	8 th
The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period	9 th	9 th
Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean	10 th	10 th
Gulf Cooperation Council members will facilitate a higher degree of South-South economic cooperation in the Mediterranean	11 th	11 th
MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income	12 th	13 th
The increased level of migration, economic and human exchanges will give way to the emergence of a common Mediterranean identity	13 th	12 th


The most outstanding elements of the comparison between the results of 2009 and 2010 are:

- Water scarcity and the associated conflicts and tensions are still the main concern.
- The consequences of irregular immigration, both in destination societies and in migratory management policy in the region, appear as the new most outstanding elements in the medium and short term.
- The impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the EMP is losing significance.
- There is practically no variation in the other elements between the Surveys.

BOX 1: The general assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (2009-2010)


General Assessment of the EMP/UfM

(% of answers on a 0-10 scale, where 0 stands for very disappointing, and 10 for very positive)




Maghreb

(% of answers on a 0-10 scale, where 0 stands for very disappointing, and 10 for very positive)




Mashreq

(% of answers on a 0-10 scale, where 0 stands for very disappointing, and 10 for very positive)




European Union

(% of answers on a 0-10 scale, where 0 stands for very disappointing, and 10 for very positive)




Mediterranean EU Countries

(% of answers on a 0-10 scale, where 0 stands for very disappointing, and 10 for very positive)



Spain

(% of answers on a 0-10 scale, where 0 stands for very disappointing, and 10 for very positive)



France

(% of answers on a 0-10 scale, where 0 stands for very disappointing, and 10 for very positive)

