Main findings

- Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is still a valid instrument to face some of the most pressing challenges in the region, including the strengthening of democracy in MPCs, enhancing human exchanges and promoting democracy and respect for human rights.

- Respondents remain sceptical about the role of Euromed cooperation in the resolution of conflicts. In the medium to long term, water scarcity and migration related issues are likely to be a major source of conflict in the Mediterranean.

- There is also a growing concern over the regression of women’s role in society, the lack of a common identity in the Mediterranean and the unlikely convergence of MPCs and the EU in economic terms.

The final block of the Survey is made up of two questions on prospective issues at the level of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and assessment of the probability of determined future hypotheses.

**Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation**

The first question focuses on the effect of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the long term. Respondents had to assess the probability that Euro-Mediterranean cooperation would lead to a series of scenarios. Of the six scenarios proposed (see Graph 42), the most likely for respondents (although with a relatively low probability [6.0 and 5.9 on average]) are the achievement of greater understanding and respect between cultures and religions in the region or the increase of human exchanges between the two shores. These elements are followed in probability by the strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights in the MPCs and the improvement in living conditions in the MPCs. Finally, the two options considered most unlikely are the reduction of the development gap between the North and South of the Mediterranean and the capacity of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation to resolve conflicts in the region.
The results by groups of origin of the respondents do not vary excessively although there are small differences to highlight. In four of the six scenarios proposed (resolution of conflicts, strengthening of democracy, improvement in living conditions and greater understanding between cultures) there is an almost identical pattern: the greatest probability corresponds to Maghreb respondents while those who attach the lowest probability to these scenarios are Israelis and non-Mediterranean Europeans. Meanwhile, in the scenario of reduction of the development gap, Maghreb respondents are closer to the average and to other groups such as those from the Mashreq, and the average of non-Mediterranean Europeans is also very close to the overall average. Finally, for the remaining scenario there are few differences between groups (except for Israelis who in all cases foresee the lowest probability). In any case, it is notable that Mediterranean European respondents see this scenario as the most likely.

Along with this distribution of the results by groups, we should also emphasise that within them there are slight variations on the most likely future scenarios. In the first place, we must stress that in those considered more unlikely there is no discrepancy by groups as they all consider it more unlikely that Euro-Mediterranean cooperation will contribute to reducing the conflicts in the region and that there will be a reduction in the gap between the North and South of the Mediterranean. In terms of the most likely, we should first point out that respondents from the Mashreq, Turkey or Mediterranean EU follow the same pattern as the overall Survey (better understanding between cultures, increase of human exchanges between the two shores, strengthening of democracy and improvement in living conditions). For Maghreb respondents, the scenario of intensification of human movements is the most unlikely of the four while the others follow the same order. For non-Mediterranean Europeans this scenario linked to human exchanges is the most likely of the six, ahead of greater understanding and the other two scenarios. For Israeli respondents, not only is the scenario of human exchanges the most likely but that of better understanding and respect falls to fourth position. In short, there are small yet significant differences in the regional framework.
Mid- to Long-Term Hypotheses

The last question of the Survey offers respondents the possibility of assessing the probability that 14 hypotheses will take place in the medium and long term. Among these hypotheses there are some of a markedly pessimistic nature and others more optimistic.

The overall results enable us to arrange the hypotheses in four groups. A first group of four hypotheses seen as very likely (with an average probability of around 7) include those which consider that water scarcity in the region will be a source of conflict, xenophobia will grow in Europe, irregular immigration will grow, and social tensions will increase because of pressures linked to democracy and the labour market. As can be noted, all of them are pessimistic about the future evolution of the Mediterranean. The second group is formed by another four future hypotheses considered likely although a little less than the previous (average between 6.4 and 6.1). This group includes the perception that the popular revolts will increase, the economic crisis will reduce development prospects, the Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP, and environmental deterioration will threaten the economic and living conditions of the riparian States. This second group of more likely hypotheses is also markedly pessimistic.

Graph 43: Degree of probability attributed to the following mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for no probability and 10 for very high probability)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 4th Euromed Survey
The third group is formed by another four statements which overall are still considered likely although less so (averages between 5.6 and 5.3). These statements are more optimistic and include the hypothesis that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will facilitate the development of South-South cooperation, women will increase their participation, migrations will push political reforms and the free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development. Finally, there is a group of two hypotheses that respondents consider improbable in the medium and long term (4.7 and 4.5, respectively on average): the emergence of a Mediterranean identity and the maintenance of growth in the MPCs will allow convergence with EU levels of income.

In conclusion, respondents have a vision of the mid- and long-term future clearly inclined to pessimism, at least on the issues addressed in the question.

While the Arab-Israeli conflict may paralyse the EMP at the political and/or higher levels, it is expected that technical exchanges at lower and expert levels continue. Regarding popular uprisings, these will increase in frequency if not in spread as it is quite certain that there will not be a popular acceptance of a return to despotism. North-South cooperation, in particular in the economic field, will increase, as will South-South cooperation, although at a slower pace. Water is a scarce resource in the Mediterranean and has the hallmarks of a conflict raiser. However, cooperation in this sector, including at sub-regional level such as the 5+5 dialogue, would also offer another opportunity for international cooperation. The same argument can be applied to other sectors such as migration and the environment.

Maltese respondent

The analysis of the results by geographical group of origin of respondents shows some divergence with respect to the Survey overall in almost every group although most of them are minimal. For instance, for all the groups of origin the two most negatively assessed statements by all respondents are Mediterranean identity and convergence although in some cases other statements are also seen as improbable, such as participation of women in the case of Turkish respondents, prosperity derived from free movement for Israeli respondents or the role of the GCC in South-South cooperation for Maghreb respondents.

As for the most likely hypotheses, the main groups (Maghreb, Mashreq, Mediterranean EU and remaining EU) consider water scarcity and tensions deriving from it as the most likely to happen while Turks and Israelis consider the increased xenophobia in Europe as the most likely hypothesis. In the Turkish case, this difference is slight as Turkish respondents choose the same block of four most likely hypotheses as all other respondents with few differences in relation to the average. In the Israeli case, it is more interesting as the increase of xenophobia in Europe is not only considered the most likely hypothesis but far ahead of the others. Moreover, the issue of water scarcity does not appear among the most likely for Israelis but rather occupies an intermediate position, with 6.0 on average. It is significant that in a country where water has been a source of conflict with its neighbours this hypothesis is seen as less important than by the remaining groups.

Among the other significant aspects of the results of the groups it is notable that for Mediterranean European countries assessments in most cases are a little lower than the average. Also notable is its distance from the average in issues such as the increase of xenophobia (although it remains one of the most likely) or the paralysation of the EMP due to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This issue is also considered more unlikely by Mashreq respondents in direct contrast with Maghreb respondents who not only consider that it is highly likely but for them it occupies the second position in terms of probability. Finally, it is worth noting that Mashreq respondents are more optimistic than respondents overall in relation to the free movement of goods and workers and its positive effects while Maghreb respondents consider the increase of the economic, political and social participation of women in the MPCs much more likely than any other group.