BLOCK 2
TOWARDS A MULTIPOLAR NEIGHBOURHOOD

Main findings

• The EU still maintains a strong capacity to shape developments in the Mediterranean compared to other external and regional actors. Among them, only the US and Saudi Arabia are considered to be more influential than the EU in the future of the region.

• The EU’s influence as a trading and economic partner is considered most important. Its role as a promoter of regional integration and as a driver of governance reforms receives an intermediate assessment, while its capacity to act as a peace broker in the region is considered less likely.

• Preferences indicate that the EU has to work on the basis of the demands from the MPCs rather than intervening in their internal affairs. In countries with open conflicts or unstable scenarios, such as Syria or Palestine, the EU should act pro-actively and make its influence heard.

• The EU should behave as a central actor regardless of its limited capacity for the resolution of the Syrian crisis compared to other actors such as Turkey, the United States, Saudi Arabia or Iran.

The second block of questions focuses on the future role the European Union will have in the development of a multipolar neighbourhood; that is, the influence it can continue having in the MPCs after the political changes in the region.

At the start of the block, the future role of the EU in the region is compared with that of other external actors. As Graph 21 shows, the EU will continue to have a more outstanding role in the MPCs than Russia, Iran or China. However, it will have a similar influence to the Arab League and Turkey while Saudi Arabia and the USA will have a moderately more important role.
Graph 21: Assessing the EU’s future role in MPCs compared to other external and regional actors
(the graph below shows the EU’s relative capacity to influence regional developments compared to other actors)¹

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 4th Euromed Survey

This pattern of distribution is repeated, with some adjustments, if we look at MPC responses, but this is not the case with EU respondents (see Graph 22), where Turkey becomes a more important actor than the EU, with more influence than the Arab League and the USA. Moreover, they also consider that Russia, Iran and China will have a role inferior to the Survey average.

Graph 22: Assessing the EU’s future role in MPCs compared to other external and regional actors
(the graph below shows the EU’s relative capacity to influence regional developments compared to other actors)²

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 4th Euromed Survey

1. For the calculation of the distribution of answers, only those expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers) have been taken into consideration in order to show the distribution of respondents giving a substantial answer. The % of “Don’t know” answers is calculated on the basis of the total number of received answers.

2. For the calculation of the distribution of answers, only those expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers) have been taken into consideration in order to show the distribution of respondents giving a substantial answer. The % of “Don’t know” answers is calculated on the basis of the total number of received answers.
This question was also asked in the 2011 Survey, which allows us to compare the two years. It is interesting to see the evolution of the role of the external actors to the detriment of EU influence in the region.

Thus, countries such as Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the USA are credited with more influence than in 2011 with an increase of between 7 and 8% of responses indicating that they would have more influence than the EU. China and the Arab League maintain their assessment levels, while Turkey’s influence drops a notable 7% in comparison with the EU in the MPCs. This decrease is explained above all by the responses from southern Mediterranean countries, which give a less notable role to Turkey than their northern neighbours.

Graph 23: Assessing the EU’s future role in MPCs compared to other external and regional actors. Comparing 2011 and 2012 Survey results
(the graph below shows the EU’s relative capacity to influence regional developments compared to other actors)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 4th Euromed Survey

Question 6 focuses on the EU’s role in political and economic elements. In all the fields covered, the influence of the EU remains moderately significant, showing a trend towards greater influence as a trading and economic partner, more moderate in terms of strengthening Euro-Mediterranean regional integration, and as a driver of the reform of the rule of law and governance reform. Moreover, it will have relatively less capacity to act as a peace broker in the region.

3. For the calculation of the distribution of answers, only those expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers) have been taken into consideration in order to show the distribution of respondents giving a substantial answer. The % of “Don’t know” answers is calculated on the basis of the total number of received answers.
Graph 24: EU influence regarding the following aspects:
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for progressively less significant and 10 for increasingly more significant)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 4th Euromed Survey

Focusing on questions concerning the EU as a major trading and economic partner, it can be seen that there are very few variations between groups of countries. Only Maghreb countries stand out with an average of 6.9, above the Survey average. If we look at institution type, respondents from EU institutions give an average grade of 7 in this question.

In terms of the EU as a promoter of strengthened regional integration, there are also few variations from the Survey average, with a notably higher assessment from EU Mediterranean countries. In this case, respondents from international institutions (non-EU) and the media have a higher opinion than the average at 6.5.

In the case of the EU as a driver of the rule of law and governance reform, non-EU European countries – Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania – assess it above the average at 6.3. At institutional level, responses from EU institutions make a more positive assessment in this field with a grade of 6.3.

The same dynamic is seen in the assessment of the EU as a peace broker in the region. Once again, non-EU European countries make a more positive assessment above the average of 5.8. Meanwhile, respondents from Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories give the EU a diametrically opposed role, with Israel giving the lowest grade at 4.3 and the Occupied Palestinian Territories the highest at 5.8 out of all participating countries. A similar case can be seen in responses by type of institution. While academics with a 4.1 assessment fall below the Survey average, government actors, with 5.2, are the type of institution that make a more positive assessment of the EU’s capacity to act as a peace broker in the region.

Question 7 examines the EU’s role within the domestic developments of the MPCS. This question was also asked in 2011, allowing us to contrast the responses made at a time when the impacts of the Arab Spring were still recent with a situation, such as that of late 2012, which was a time of uncertainty for democratising processes.
Graph 25: Assessment of the EU’s role with regard to domestic developments in the Mediterranean Partner Countries

Responses follow the same trend as in 2011; that is, the prevalent scenario among the responses obtained for each one of the MPCs is to “remain cautious and work on the basis of demands emanating from the MPCs”, a majority option for all countries except the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Syria.

In the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the most notable option as in 2011 is the one that sees the EU having a more pro-active and interventionist role. In the case of Syria, it evolves from seeing this pro-active role as the most notable option to the view that “the EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover by extremist parties”.

For this question it is particularly important to see the results of nationals on their own country, given that this classification has significantly changed.

Three groups of countries can be established according to the most notable scenario based on responses received from nationals assessing their own country. Among the countries that still believe that the most notable scenario will be the EU acting cautiously and only based on the demands of the country, we find Algeria and Morocco, maintaining the same logic as the overall responses to the Survey. However, it should be noted that 62% of Moroccans opt for this scenario, 15% less than the Survey average, relegating the second most favourable scenario – pro-active and interventionist role of the EU – to last place. This group of countries includes Syria, which substantially changes its assessment of the role the EU should have in Syria. In this respect, the percentage of responses proposing a pro-active and interventionist role drops greatly and the scenario of remaining cautious becomes the most favoured option, as in Algeria and Morocco.

4. For the calculation of the distribution of answers, only those expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers) have been taken into consideration in order to show the distribution of respondents giving a substantial answer. The % of “Don’t know” answers is calculated on the basis of the total number of received answers.
Graph 26: Assessment of the EU’s role with regard to domestic developments in Algeria, Morocco and Syria

This is not the case of Tunisia and Egypt, which form the second group of countries and, based on nationals assessing these scenarios of EU intervention for their own country, consider more favourably the scenario in which the EU should exercise its influence to avoid the growth of extremist political options.

Graph 27: Assessment of the EU’s role with regard to domestic developments in Tunisia and Egypt

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 4th Euromed Survey

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5. For the calculation of the distribution of answers, only those expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers) have been taken into consideration in order to show the distribution of respondents giving a substantial answer. The % of “Don’t know” answers is calculated on the basis of the total number of received answers.

6. For the calculation of the distribution of answers, only those expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers) have been taken into consideration in order to show the distribution of respondents giving a substantial answer. The % of “Don’t know” answers is calculated on the basis of the total number of received answers.
In the specific case of Tunisia and Egypt, there is a remarkable change in the assessment by Tunisians and Egyptians from the responses received in the 2011 Survey. As indicated by Graph 28, in the case of Tunisia the most positively assessed option changes from non-intervention to a scenario whereby the EU must exercise its influence to avoid the takeover by extremist parties. Meanwhile, the change seen in Egypt is notable for the grade given to the scenario of a pro-active and interventionist role of the EU, which has more than halved, while avoiding the takeover by Islamist parties has become the most positively assessed option.

Finally, there is a group of countries formed by Jordan, Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories for which the most notable option, according to nationals assessing their own country, is the scenario of a pro-active and interventionist EU; a trend that with respect to 2011 is repeated in the case of Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories but is new in the case of Jordan.

Graph 28: Assessment of the EU’s role with regard to domestic developments in Jordan, Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Question 8 looks at the Syrian conflict and asks about the main international actors that can be essential to a final resolution of the conflict. The results obtained are not very disperse but rather show a gradation from actors more likely to be key actors – Turkey and the USA (6.6 on average) – to less significant actors – China and Egypt (5 and 4.7, respectively).

7. For the calculation of the distribution of answers, only those expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers) have been taken into consideration in order to show the distribution of respondents giving a substantial answer. The % of “Don’t know” answers is calculated on the basis of the total number of received answers.
Graph 29: Probability attributed to the following regional and international actors to progressively become a key actor for a final resolution to the Syrian conflict
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for no probability and 10 for very high probability)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 4th Euromed Survey
Main findings

• The Arab Spring is considered to have a potential positive impact on the Euro-Mediterranean integration process in the long run. However, there is still room for improvement regarding the role of the Union for the Mediterranean as a promoter of multilateral relations in the region.

• When classifying the priorities of the Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”, Market access is seen as the first priority.

• Among the cooperation instruments proposed in the Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” there is a clear preference for the civil society facility.

• The visibility and impact of the EU’s action towards MPCs receives a slight tendency to consider more impactful than visible the EU’s work in the region. Clearly above the mean are the Balkan countries which are members of the Union for the Mediterranean (Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina), while Mashreq countries also show a more positive perception of EU’s impact and visibility in the region.

The third block of the Survey explores questions related to the Euro-Mediterranean integration process. As in previous Surveys, this block seeks to monitor and assess the regional policies and programmes developed during 2012.

Question 9 asks about the impact of the Arab uprisings on the Euro-Mediterranean integration process and has an average assessment of 6.4 on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for negative impact and 10 for positive impact. It is notable that 50% of respondents give a grade of 7 and 9, thus assessing it very positively. By country groups, the balance of the average Survey assessment is maintained.

On the mid- and long-term role of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the Survey average is around 5. The percentage of responses around the middle grades (4 to 6) accounts for 50% of responses. In terms of responses by country groups, there is a balance around the Survey average. However, it should be noted that Maghreb and Mediterranean EU countries are slightly above the average, as European non-EU countries give a notably high assessment to the key role of the UfM in the region (6.7).
Vu les complexités du contexte économique et politique en mutation, c’est peu probable que cette structure régionale pourrait jouer un rôle décisif dans la région. C’est bien d’avoir ce genre d’organisme de coopération et de régulation, mais il est encore trop tôt de le considérer comme acteur important dans la région.

Moroccan respondent

The UfM has the potential to play a key role on the condition that 2013 will be the year of concrete, very concrete, projects with a direct impact on citizen life.

Austrian respondent

On Question 11 concerning the assessment of the transfer of the northern UfM co-presidency to the EU, the average is 6.4, with 25% of respondents indicating that they have no knowledge to respond to this question.

There are positive effects, i.e. a more balanced approach of the northern partner countries, remembering the different engagement of certain EU-MS; but also disadvantages, referring to the starting point and philosophy of the Paris Summit (“...establish a co-presidency in order to improve the balance and the joint ownership of their cooperation...”). Results and added value remain to be proved!

German respondent

Question 12 focuses on ranking according to priority the three components identified in the renewed neighbourhood policy, specifically in the Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”. As can be seen in the graph of the three Ms identified in the document (Money, Market, Mobility), in general there is a trend towards a balance of priorities as each one obtains around a third of responses. However, slight differences can be noted enabling a classification of them. Thus, the element with highest priority would be Market access, which accounts for 38% of responses.

Graph 30: Classification of priorities identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”

(answers as first priority in %)

Money – reallocating/refocusing extra financial resources to support the transition to democracy, institution building, supporting civil society and the socio-economic needs of countries

Market access – “consider allowing partners that have a fully functioning independent judiciary, an efficient public administration and have made significant progress towards eradicating corruption, into the non-regulated area of the [EU] Internal Market for goods”

Mobility – improve “visa facilitation”, conclude “Mobility Partnerships”, improve “people-to-people contacts” and “labour mobility”, and enhance the mobility of “students, researchers and business persons”

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 4th Euromed Survey
A comparison between EU countries and MPCs does not show great differences but it does reveal remarkable trends. In this respect, 40% of EU respondents choose the priority of Market access as the first option, while in the case of responses from the MPCs the situation is almost equal, where Market access is the first option for 34% and Money and Mobility are given a priority of 33% (see Graph 32).

Market access and Mobility both require a certain national institutional framework for their success and function. Assistance, including financial assistance, is necessary for the building of this framework.

Maltese respondent

La mobilité devrait permettre une convergence plus rapide et plus efficace. Idéalement, on devrait attaquer de front les trois éléments cités.

Algerian respondent

Graph 31: Classification of priorities identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” (answers as first priority in %)

Question 12 had a second part asking about the Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”. It also asked participants to rank the priorities established in this regional initiative.

As shown by Graph 33, of the four options, the main priority is to “create a ‘Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility’, ‘designed to strengthen the capacity of civil society to promote reform and increase public accountability in their countries’” which 34% of respondents put in first place when establishing an order of priorities.

Graph 32: Classification of priorities identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on: “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” (answers as first priority in %)

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Graph 33: Classification of priorities identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on: “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” (answers as first priority in %)

Conclude and implement new “Neighbourhood Agreements” as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 8 TEU) that will establish Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)

Create a “Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility”, “designed to strengthen the capacity of civil society to promote reform and increase public accountability in their countries” (*€22 million)

Create a “European Endowment for Democracy” (to “help political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners”)

Create a European Neighbourhood “Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development”

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 4th Euromed Survey
D’abord une intégration régionale approfondie, avec un intérêt tout particulier pour l’agriculture et le développement rural. La facilité de soutien à la société civile est dérisoire par rapport aux besoins : il faudrait augmenter la dotation. Le Fond européen pour la démocratie est une réplique d’un instrument américain : il faut double emploi avec la facilité de soutien à la société civile.

Belgian respondent

More than formal agreements, what may be particularly useful at present is allowing the political processes to function effectively and fairly. Criteria for using resources should only be respect for and adherence to pluralistic and human rights values. Apart from that, the EU should abstain, and be seen to abstain, from interference in the political processes.

Egyptian respondent

In contrast to the assessment of the priorities of the initiatives for the Changing Neighbourhood, those of the Partnership for Democracy obtain more heterogeneous results. On the one hand, there is a more acute polarisation in the choice of priorities and, on the other, a more acute difference between the priority options of the northern and southern Mediterranean countries. Thus, the signing of the neighbourhood agreements is the priority chosen as the first option by 38% of respondents from EU countries, while it is only 26% for MPCs. For the latter, the creation of a “Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility” is a priority.

As shown by Graph 34, the two remaining options – “European Endowment for Democracy” and the “Neighbourhood Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development” – are seen as less of a priority, with percentages fairly distanced from the first options.

Graph 33: Classification of priorities identified in the Communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”
(answers as first priority in %)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 4th Euromed Survey

This block monitors the assessment of the principles of the renewal of the ENP and its financial instrument. The general assessment is very high, especially for the role of women, both in the redefinition of policies and in society. The partnerships that are not only limited to governments but also extend to the diverse civil society actors also have a very positive assessment. The averages analysed by regions vary little from the overall Survey average.
The Principles outlined are not new, and their “relevance” will depend fundamentally on pathways to implementation. The EU has a credibility deficit in democracy-promotion in the southern neighbourhood, and the problem with that is that it’s well-deserved. Unless it lives up to the spirit of proposed reforms (e.g., socio-economic and political inclusion) there is no reason to believe its reputation or effectiveness will change.

British respondent

Finally, this block closes with the assessment of the impact and visibility of the EU’s actions in MPCs. Both are placed around 5, on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 stands for a very negative assessment and 10 for very positive, with a slightly positive assessment of impact over visibility. If we compare the averages at regional level, there are notably no variations except in the assessments from European non-EU countries.

Donner plus de visibilité aux actions de l’UE dans les ppm à travers la responsabilisation des acteurs politiques et aussi à travers la médiatisation pour l’information et l’explication des stratégies de développement de l’UE à l’étranger

Moroccan respondent

Create European Information Centres in every capital city, enhance visibility and understanding of how the EU works, promote professional exchanges between different groups and joint actions (Euromed Heritage was a good example).

Romanian respondent

Graph 34: Assessing the visibility and impact of the EU’s actions in MPCs in 2012.
(average on a scale of 0-10, where 0 stands for very negative and 10 for very positive)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 4th Euromed Survey