EUROMED SURVEY OF EXPERTS AND ACTORS

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN REGION

IEMed. EUROMED
EUROMED SURVEY OF EXPERTS AND ACTORS

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN REGION

Online access to the full version of the Survey results:
www.iemed.org/euromedsurvey
Euromed Survey

Director of the Survey
Josep Ferré, acting Director General, IEMed

IEMed Survey Research Team
Xavier Aragall, Technical Advisor on Euro-Mediterranean Policies Department, IEMed
Emmanuel Cohen-Hadria, Head of Euro-Mediterranean Policies Department, IEMed

Qualitative Analysis
Intissar Kherigi, Programmes Director, Jasmine Foundation
Aziza Moneer, PhD, Visiting Research Fellow, Nordic Africa Institute
Richard Youngs, Senior Fellow, Democracy, Conflict and Governance Program, Carnegie Europe
Jerzy Pomianowski, Executive Director, European Endowment for Democracy (EED)
Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal, Middle East and Maghreb Coordinator, Fundación Alternativas
Zaid Eyadat, Prof., Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

Technical Coordination and Assistance
Maria Seco, ODEC
INTRODUCTION
Josep Ferré

DESCRIPTIVE REPORT
(Xavier Aragall, Cristina Sala, Victoria Silva)
Taking the Pulse of Civil Society in the Euro-Mediterranean Region
Engaging with Civil Society: Policy Responses
Civil Society as a Driving Force of Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation and Integration

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
Civil Society in a Time of Transition. Intissar Kherigi
Environmental Activism in the Post-Arab Spring: It is not about a Mere Clean Environment. Aziza Moneer
The Reshaped Civic Politics of Euro-Mediterranean Relations. Richard Youngs
The Importance of Supporting Independent Media in the Southern Neighbourhood. Jerzy Pomianowski
Support for Civil Society as Window Dressing. A Critical Assessment of how the EU engages with Civil Society. Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal
Assessing the Counter-Productive Potential of Foreign Support of Civil Society Organisations in the Euro-Mediterranean Region. Zaid Eyadat
# ANNEXES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>I METHODOLOGY OF THE TENTH EUROMED SURVEY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>II LIST OF RESPONDENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>III SAMPLE OF THE SURVEY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>IV QUESTIONNAIRE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detailed results of the survey only available online at www.iemed.org/euromedsurvey
INTRODUCTION
Civil Society and Social Movements in the Euro-Mediterranean Region

The focus of this year’s Euromed Survey emerged from our assessment at the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) that the human dimension must be (re)placed centre-stage of Euro-Mediterranean relations. More generally, this premise is also driving our reflection ahead of the 25th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration later this year. Civil society is a key dimension in this regard, and its role and potential are addressed in this survey. The scope of the survey also extends to social movements that have shaped to a large extent the political agenda over the last years, both in the North and in the South of the Mediterranean.

With the objective to explore perceptions related to civil society and social movements, a first set of questions relates to the very concept, role, mission, means and focus of civil society and social movements. The second set of questions focuses on the policy environment in which civil society operates, the role of foreign entities vis-à-vis civil society organisations and, in particular, how the EU engages with civil society in southern and eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. Finally, the questions of the third block relate mostly to connections between civil societies on both sides of the Mediterranean, the existing Euro-Mediterranean frameworks offering some space for civil society’s inclusion, and the potential for civil society in boosting Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and integration.

This publication contains six analytical articles that echo some specific results of the Survey. Intissar Kherigi analyses the role of civil society in the context of the Tunisian transition, presenting a stimulating case study of the changing role of civil society organisations in the region. Another case study is presented in the contribution from Aziza Moneer who examines the issue of environmental activism in the Post-Arab Spring years. In a systematic manner, Richard Youngs looks closer into the reshaped civic politics in the region and its impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations. Jerzy Pomianowski offers an analysis of the challenges media face in the southern neighbourhood and calls for a re-set in crafting donor support to media in the EU neighbourhood. Itxaso Domínguez draws a critical assessment of EU’s engagement with civil society, while Zaid Eyadat evaluates the effects of foreign support to civil society, identifying the trend towards professionalized NGOs and the need to focus more on small and local social movements.

While the complete set of results can be accessed online, this publication also contains a descriptive report that provides an overall picture of the main results. In general terms, respondents are rather positive. Sharp criticism is expressed in open comments rather than transpire from the quantitative results. More than half of respondents consider for instance that the Partnership Priorities jointly defined by the EU and its partner countries as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) reflect the main concerns of the civil society. It is striking that European respondents to the Survey are consistently more critical than SEM respondents in many respects, including concerning the role of the EU as supporter to civil society and its capacity to include their concerns when defining joint partnership priorities with their partners. Another consistent finding across the survey is that answers from Tunisian respondents across the survey show distinct features from other respondents in the Southern Mediterranean, with a very acute awareness of the importance of civil society in their country and acute sense that Tunisia offers an enabling environment for civil society. Apart from these three general trends, let me highlight seven main take-away points:
1- What civil society is there for? Monitoring policies and watchdogging rights rather than substituting government and providing services not provided adequately otherwise.

2- Climate change should be the main priority of civil society in Europe (that should also keep human rights, democracy and the rule of law on its radar though). In South and East Mediterranean countries, human rights, democracy and rule of law come first in respondents’ answers.

3- Public mobilisations remain the most efficient mean for civil society to achieve its objectives.

4- Where is civil society facing the biggest obstacles? Syria, Egypt, Libya and Turkey. How about Europe? Hungary, Poland and Romania.

5- The EU is the number one source of foreign support to civil society in SEM countries. Its role in this regard is assessed positively. It should support civil society in Egypt, Palestine and Syria as a matter of priority.

6- Foreign support to civil society can be counterproductive in South Mediterranean countries.

7- Euro-Mediterranean civil society networks and subnational cooperation (rather than civil society cooperation mechanisms promoted by governmental institutions) are the most relevant frameworks.
DESCRIPTIVE REPORT
TAKing the pulse of civil society in the euromediterranean region

The first block of the Euromed Survey aimed to define the concept, role, mission, means and focus of civil society according to the respondents’ opinion. It also looked at specific civil society actors and social movements that have recently had a significant political impact on both shores of the Mediterranean.

Main findings:

• There is a strong consensus among respondents to the Survey that civil society is an important component of democracy.
• Respondents also agree, albeit less strongly and unanimously, with the assertion that civil society is playing an important role in their respective countries. Among all respondents, Tunisians strongly agree in the biggest proportions with the assertion that civil society is playing an important role in their country. Turks and Egyptians strongly agree with this assertion to a lesser extent.
• Civil society’s main mission should be monitoring policies and watchdogging citizens’ rights rather than substituting the government and offering services not provided adequately otherwise.
• Public mobilisations are seen as the main efficient means for civil society to achieve its objectives. Only a minority of respondents are of the opinion that reaching out to international audiences is efficient.
• Civil society in European countries should concentrate primarily on climate change. The second main focus should be on “human rights, democracy and rule of law”. In Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries, “human rights, democracy and rule of law” should be the main focus of civil society. The second main focus should be corruption.
• Of all categories of civil society actors, trade unions and human rights organisations are those most frequently identified as the most influential. European Union (EU) respondents identify environmental organisations as influential in their respective countries to a larger extent than SEM respondents. In turn, SEM respondents consider in bigger proportions than their European counterparts that women’s rights or youth organisations are influential in their respective countries.
• When it comes to the impact of specific social movements in EU countries, the most frequent answer from EU respondents is movements related to climate change, while SEM respondents are more prone to consider that the Gilets Jaunes have had the greatest impact in the EU.
• Asked about recent social movements with greatest political impact in SEM countries, respondents mentioned most frequently the recent Hirak movement in Algeria and more generally the 2011 Arab Spring.
DEFINING CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS ROLE

The first question of the Euromed Survey was designed to determine how experts, activists and policy-makers understood the concept of civil society. Most respondents (64%) favoured the UN definition: “Civil society is the ‘third sector’ of society, along with government and business. It comprises civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations.” The second preferred definition (35%) is the one that gives more weight to the concepts of “common interests” and “collective activity”, while only 1% of respondents chose to relate the concept of civil society only with “charitable organisations”.

Graph 1: From the following descriptions of civil society that come from authoritative sources, which one do you consider is the most appropriate?

Below there is a selection of some of the open comments formulated by some respondents in relation to this question:

Il est impératif de mettre en exergue la dimension ACTEUR en articulation avec l’État et le secteur privé. Sa fonction ne peut être limitée aux actions caritatives, remplissant le vide laissé par l’État ou corrigeant les méfaits du secteur privé.

Moroccan respondent

Civil society provides the opportunity to rebalance the current narrative of representation, and providing a voice at a time when populism is proving divisive.

British respondent

Civil society is dynamic, vibrant and influential. Definition and roles of civil society are changing. The main question that arises is what might the contextual environment for civil society look like in 2030? Therefore, how might models of engagement for civil society develop?

Tunisian respondent

There are no significant differences between southern and northern participants in this regard, although respondents from SEM countries seem to more consistently support the aforementioned UN definition.
Graph 2: From the following descriptions of civil society that come from authoritative sources, which one do you consider is the most appropriate?

![Image of bar graph showing responses to the question.]

- Civil society is the ‘third sector’ of society, along with government and business. It comprises civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations: 68% SEM respondents, 59% EU respondents.
- Civil society is a society considered as a community of citizens linked by common interests and collective activity: 31% SEM respondents, 39% EU respondents.
- Civil society is formed by charitable organisations whose aim is to provide material help to the less privileged: 2% SEM respondents, 1% EU respondents.

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey.

Questions 2 and 3 set out to determine how respondents perceived the importance of civil society’s role in their respective countries and how much civil society matters for democracy. Although there was almost unanimity around the assertion that “civil society is a defining pillar of democracy” (95% agree or strongly agree), the percentage of participants believing that it actually plays a significant role in their own societies is slightly lower (91%). The patterns of answers to both questions were quite similar in EU and SEM countries.

Graph 3a: Do you agree that civil society is playing an important role in your society?

- All respondents
  - Disagree: 4%
  - Neither agree nor disagree: 6%
  - Agree: 50%
  - Strongly agree: 40%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey.

Graph 3b: Do you agree that civil society is a defining pillar of democracy?

- All respondents
  - Strongly disagree: 1%
  - Neither agree nor disagree: 4%
  - Agree: 23%
  - Strongly agree: 72%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey.

A breakdown of answers per country shows an acute perception of the importance of civil society by Tunisian respondents (68% of Tunisian respondents strongly agreed that Tunisian civil society is playing an important role in society). In turn, percentages are significantly below the mean for respondents from countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Algeria.
In general, respondents were more prone to strongly agree that civil society is an important component of democracy than to consider it has an important role in their respective countries. However, here again respondents from Tunisia did so in bigger proportions than other countries from the region.
Graph 5: Do you agree that civil society is a defining pillar of democracy?
(% of strongly agree answers)

In their comments, some participants elaborated on the role and importance of civil society actors:

Dans notre pays, la société civile ne joue pas son vrai rôle, c’est-à-dire être le lien entre les autorités et le citoyen. Elle est en quelque sorte marginalisée.

Algerian respondent
The answer to this question mostly depends on how civil society is actually defined. For instance, they are less important or influential than social or classical media, but can make more of a difference in a specific area of activity.

Austrian respondent

Le développement de la société civile est l’instrument le plus adéquat pour sortir de la profonde crise de la démocratie politique et sociale qui alimente les groupes fondamentaux, xénophobes, racistes et violents.

Algerian respondent

Civil society represents a fundamental part of the democratic system for its ability to express controversial views; represent those without a voice; mobilise citizens into movements; promote transparency and responsibility in the political system.

Italian respondent

IDENTIFYING CIVIL SOCIETY’S MISSION, MEANS AND FOCUS

The fourth question invited participants to identify the two most important missions of civil society from four different options. More than a third of respondents (34%) chose monitoring and watch-dogging citizens’ rights as one of their two preferred options. Respondents were less inclined to consider that civil society’s main mission is to complement or substitute governments’ role.

Graph 6: What should be the most important mission of civil society?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 4)

Monitor policies and be a watchdog of citizens’ rights: 34%
Mobilise communities outside the institutions in order to influence politics: 25%
Participate in the design of public policies: 24%
Complement governments’ mandate, i.e. providing services not provided adequately otherwise, including to marginalised groups: 14%
Other: 3%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

In respondents’ comments, some elaborated on their answer, while others formulated alternative ideas.

Provide a sounding board and expression of ideas, which challenge and support all levels of government to make more informed decisions about public policy.

British respondent
To be independent is itself a mission and to avoid adapting to foreign donor’s official or unofficial policies in order to implement a real representation of the people or communities concerned.

Palestinian respondent

The ranking of civil society’s most important missions was quite similar on both shores of the Mediterranean. One of the findings that derives from the analysis of per country results is that Turkish respondents are the only ones to consider that civil society’s main mission is to participate in the design of public policies.

Graph 7: What should be the most important mission of civil society?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 4) respondents from:

Question 5 turned to the means civil society has at its disposal in order to achieve its objectives. More precisely, it invited respondents to assess which of those means were most relevant and efficient. Respondents were able to choose two out of five options. Organising public mobilisations was identified as the most efficient means and reaching out to an international audience the least efficient one. Answers showed a very tight margin between the four most preferred options: public mobilisations (25%), cooperation with central authorities
(21.8%), engagement with subnational entities (21.6%) and social media campaigns (19.6%). Only 9.8% of respondents chose international outreach as the most useful means for civil society to achieve its goals.

Construction de plateformes communes de plaidoyer auprès du gouvernement entre OSC travaillant pour la même cause : justice, égalité genre, équité sociale et économique, handicap…

Moroccan respondent

Building transnational/cross-regional networks with similar organisations/movements to increase its impact and outreach.

Polish respondent

Interestingly enough, offline activities seem to be perceived as more effective than online ones, particularly in the Mashreq, where only 16.3% of respondents chose social media campaigns as one of their two preferred options. A percentage that stands in contrast with the 23.2% in the Maghreb, where social media ranked as the second most relevant means, after public mobilisations.

Graph 8: Through which means is civil society in your country more likely to achieve the objectives it pursues? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 5)

Organise public mobilisations 25%
Engage with central authorities 21.8%
Engage at the subnational level 21.6%
Run social media campaigns 19.6%
Reach out to international audiences 9.8%
Other 2%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

Again, there were no significant differences in patterns between answers from SEM and EU countries, although the former seem to be a bit more prone to “reaching out to international audiences”.

Some notable cases are Morocco and Egypt, where respondents considered “engage with central authorities” as the first option. Algerian respondents chose “run social media campaigns”, while Turkish and Italian respondents put “engage at the subnational level” in first place.
The sixth question aimed to assess which topics should be the focus of attention for civil society in the EU, SEM and respondents’ home countries. Respondents considered that climate change; human rights, democracy and rule of law; and intercultural dialogue (in this order) should be the main areas of focus for civil society in the EU. In turn, they considered that human rights, democracy and rule of law; fighting corruption; and counter-extremism efforts should drive the agenda of civil society in SEM countries.
Respondents were also asked to identify what the focus of civil society in their own countries should be. Among other interesting findings, it is worth mentioning that Italian respondents stand together with their southern and eastern counterparts and consider that the promotion of human rights, democracy and rule of law should be the top priority for civil society working in their respective countries. Human rights, democracy and rule of law is also mentioned in the top three of other European countries, including Germany, France, Greece and Spain. Results also show human rights, democracy and rule of law comes first for Egyptians, Jordanians, Algerians, Moroccans and Turks, while fighting corruption comes first for Lebanese and Tunisians.
Graph 11: What should be the main focus of civil society in:

- **Algeria**
  - Social justice: 16%
  - Fighting corruption: 22%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 26%

- **Tunisia**
  - Social justice: 12%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 19%
  - Fighting corruption: 21%

- **Morocco**
  - Education: 18%
  - Fighting corruption: 20%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 21%

- **Lebanon**
  - Social justice: 12%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 19%
  - Fighting corruption: 21%

- **Jordan**
  - Social justice: 15%
  - Fighting corruption: 21%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 22%

- **Egypt**
  - Social justice: 14%
  - Education: 15%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 18%

- **France**
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 12%
  - Countering extremisms: 13%
  - Climate change: 21%

- **Germany**
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 15%
  - Countering extremisms: 17%
  - Climate change: 19%

- **Greece**
  - Social justice: 11%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 17%
  - Climate change: 20%

- **Spain**
  - Social justice: 14%
  - Fighting corruption: 14%
  - Climate change: 19%

- **Italy**
  - Fighting corruption: 14%
  - Climate change: 14%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 16%

- **Turkey**
  - Fighting corruption: 11%
  - Social justice: 12%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 31%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey
CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Questions 7 and 8 turned to the impact of specific civil society actors and social movements. Answers to question 7 provide useful insights into which civil society actors are seen as the most influential in respondents’ countries of origin. Answers to question 8 provide a picture of how the impact of social movements is assessed in EU and SEM countries. Both questions gave respondents the opportunity to name three specific actors or movements of their choice without any filter. The author of this report has been clustering those responses into general categories a posteriori.

Among the most influential civil society actors, the most frequently mentioned categories are trade unions and human rights organisations.

Graph 12: In my country, the most influential civil society actors are?
(all respondents) (categories developed from the open-ended answers)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey
EU respondents identified environmental organisations as the second most influential actor in their respective home countries (14.5%), just after trade unions (17.8%) and followed very closely by pro-democracy and civil rights movements (14.2%). In contrast, SEM respondents gave more prominence to human rights organisations (19.4%), followed by trade unions (18.8%) and pro-women’s rights organisations (12.5%).

It is worth observing that respondents from SEM countries are more likely to consider that women’s rights organisations are more influential than their European counterparts.

In general, there seems to be a greater dispersion among EU respondents’ answers, while SEM participants gave more homogenous responses.

**Graphs 13: In my country, the most influential civil society actors are?**

(categories developed from the open-ended answers)

When it comes to recent social movements, Euromed Survey participants considered that the ones with the greatest political impact in EU countries are climate change-related mobilisations (29.6%), such as the Fridays for Future, and the Gilets Jaunes movement in France (27.4%). In fact, SEM respondents cited this movement twice as often as environmental organisations, just the opposite of their northern counterparts.
Respondents cited a considerably greater number of specific social movements when talking about SEM countries. Thus, grouping them under different general categories was harder than in the case of EU countries. However, they agreed that the two most influential single movements in SEM countries are the Arab Spring and the Hirak in Algeria, both mentioned with a very similar frequency (around 15%) by respondents from both shores of the Mediterranean. SEM respondents cited social movements in Tunisia twice as often as EU respondents.
Graph 15: Among recent social movements, which ones do you consider had the greatest political impact?
In SEM countries (categories developed from the open-ended answers)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey
ENGAGING WITH CIVIL SOCIETY: POLICY RESPONSES

The second block was focused on the policy environment in which civil society operates, the role of foreign entities vis-à-vis civil society organisations and in particular how the EU engages with civil society in SEM countries.

Main findings:

• The domestic situation in European countries provides a more enabling environment for civil society than in SEM countries.
• Civil society faces the biggest obstacles in Syria, Egypt, Libya and Turkey when it comes to SEM countries, and in Hungary, Poland and Romania when it comes to the EU.
• Among SEM countries, Israeli, Moroccan and Tunisian respondents are the most positive regarding the enabling environment for civil society in their respective countries, while Syrian and Palestinian respondents are at the bottom of the list.
• In the EU, respondents from Poland, Croatia and Bulgaria are most critical of the situation of civil society in their respective countries.
• The main obstacles for civil society tend to be rather political in SEM countries and rather administrative in EU countries. SEM respondents are more concerned by "political pressure on civil society activists" than by "limited funding".
• The EU is the main source of foreign support to civil society in SEM countries according to SEM respondents, followed by the United States (US) and Qatar.
• A majority of respondents from SEM countries, in particular from Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, think that foreign support to civil society can be counter-productive.
• The role of the EU as a supporter to civil society in SEM countries is seen positively overall. However, EU respondents are more critical than SEM respondents in this respect. Respondents from SEM countries torn by conflicts are less positive regarding the role of the EU.
• Respondents agree that the EU has done “more to support civil society” over the last years, in line with the commitment it made when it revised the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2015.
• However, qualitative comments from respondents are rather negative about the role of the EU and how it calibrates its support to civil society.
• The EU should prioritise Egypt, Palestine and Syria in its support to civil society.
A RESTRICTIVE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT?

**Question 9** was aimed at assessing to what extent the overall context enables civil society to fulfil its missions in EU countries, SEM countries and the respective countries of the respondents. Regarding EU countries, the majority of respondents “agree” that the overall context allows civil society to fulfil its mission while more respondents are in disagreement with that statement in the case of SEM countries.

**Graph 16: Do you agree that the overall context enables civil society to fulfil its missions in the following countries?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In EU countries</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In SEM countries</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

Respondents from SEM countries tend to be slightly less critical than their European counterparts when assessing the environment in which civil society operates, both in SEM countries and in EU countries.

**Graph 17: Do you agree that the overall context enables civil society to fulfil its missions in:**

(\% of agree and strongly agree answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SEM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In SEM countries</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In EU countries</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

Broken down results taking into account the country of origin provide interesting insights on how respondents see the situation in their respective countries. Among respondents from SEM countries, Israelis and Tunisians are the most positive while Turkish and Syrian respondents are at the bottom of the list.
Respondents from EU countries are less critical overall of the domestic context in their respective countries. Results also show bigger variations from one country to another, with Swedish, Slovenian, German and Dutch respondents very positive, on the one hand, and Poles, Croats and Bulgarians more negative, on the other.
Graph 19: Do you agree that the overall context enables civil society to fulfil its missions in your country? (% of agree and strongly agree answers)

- **Swedish respondents**: 83%
- **Slovenian respondents**: 80%
- **Dutch respondents**: 80%
- **German respondents**: 80%
- **British respondents**: 75%
- **Austrian respondents**: 70%
- **Belgian respondents**: 69%
- **Spanish respondents**: 68%
- **Irish respondents**: 67%
- **Portuguese respondents**: 67%
- **Czech respondents**: 67%
- **French respondents**: 66%
- **EU respondents**: 63%
- **Latvian respondents**: 60%
- **Italian respondents**: 53%
- **Greek respondents**: 50%
- **Cypriot respondents**: 50%
- **Bulgarian respondents**: 43%
- **Croatian respondents**: 32%
- **Polish respondents**: 12%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey
Throughout their open comments, respondents dwelt on different aspects affecting the work of civil society organisations, including the hypocrisy of decision-makers, the difficult access to information, the criminalisation of the work of civil society or its politicisation:

L'impact de la société civile n’est pas encore pris suffisamment en compte par les pouvoirs décideurs dans les pays de l’UE et l’UE ‘fait semblant de prendre en compte’ – C’est de l’hypocrisie et un moyen de ne pas entrer en confrontation brutale. Dans les pays SEM, la forme est différente, le résultat est le même sauf il semble pour la Tunisie.

Belgian respondent

Dans les PSEM, dans certains domaines, la société civile n’a pas accès à l’information et ne peut pas jouer son rôle. Elle est cantonnée à des activités caritatives ou d’éducation où elle peut se développer sans trop de problèmes. Au Liban, le gouvernement lui confie même des tâches d’assistance sociales auxquelles il a renoncé.

Lebanese respondent

When it comes to the EU, we should make a distinction between Western European countries and Central and Eastern European countries, where the space for civil society has been significantly limited. This has led to their decreased capacity to reach its objectives and impact policies.

Polish respondent

In Palestine, civil society organisations working in economic development or human rights will not be able to fulfil their mission if the Israeli military occupation of Palestine continues.

Palestinian respondent

The growth of the far right and racism and the criminalisation of solidarity is not the best context for the work of civil society.

Spanish respondent

**Question 10** elaborated on the obstacles facing civil society. Respondents identified political obstacles (“political pressure on civil society activists” and “lack of independence”) as the most significant ones in SEM countries and rather administrative obstacles as the main ones in EU countries (“limited funding” or “administrative hurdles”). However, asked about the situation in their own countries, SEM respondents did not identify “political pressure on civil society activists” in bigger proportions than “limited funding”.

Graph 20: What are the obstacles for establishing a successfully working civil society? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>In EU countries (all respondents)</th>
<th>In SEM countries (all respondents)</th>
<th>In your country (SEM respondents)</th>
<th>In your country (EU respondents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited funding</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative hurdles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political pressure on civil society activists</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of independence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited funding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political pressure on civil society activists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

In their open comments, a number of respondents pointed out the demobilisation trend in European societies, as illustrated in the first three quotes below, while others regretted that concerns by civil society were not reflected properly in policy agendas:

La démobilisation des opinions publiques européennes face à la rigidité des dirigeants. L'individualisme, l'embourgeoisement, la précarité des emplois, la difficulté à coopérer entre individus de niveau éducatif élevé.  

Lebanese respondent

Lack of sense of community and participatory citizenship.  

Italian respondent

Inactivity and common inertia – non-engaged, non-active citizens.  

Slovenian respondent
Question 11’s objective was to survey respondents on where they thought civil societies faced the biggest obstacles. Hungary, Poland and Romania are the three most-frequently mentioned countries by respondents when it comes to the EU.

Graph 21: In which countries of the European Union do civil societies face the biggest obstacles?
(respondents were asked to choose 4 options out of 28)

When it comes to SEM countries, Syria and Egypt come top of the list, followed by Libya and Turkey. Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon are among the least mentioned countries.
Graph 22: In which Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries do civil societies face the biggest obstacles?
(respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 15)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN ENTITIES

**Question 12** was only addressed to respondents from SEM countries with the objective of determining their perceptions regarding the origin of foreign support to civil society in their respective countries. Respondents identified the EU as the main source of foreign support to civil society, followed by the US and Qatar.

**Graph 23: In your country foreign support to civil society comes mainly from:**
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 7) Respondents only from SEM countries

There are some differences in patterns between responses from Maghreb and Mashreq countries. The EU still features as the main foreign supporter for both, but the US is stronger in Mashreq countries than Maghreb. Maghreb respondents are also more prone to identify Qatar as the main supporter of civil society than respondents from Mashreq countries.
**Graph 24: In your country foreign support to civil society comes mainly from:**
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 7)

- **European Union:** 46% (Mashreq), 47% (Maghreb)
- **United States of America:** 34% (Mashreq), 27% (Maghreb)
- **Qatar:** 11% (Mashreq), 1% (Maghreb)
- **Other:** 7% (Mashreq), 6% (Maghreb)
- **United Arab Emirates:** 4% (Mashreq), 4% (Maghreb)
- **Saudi Arabia:** 5% (Mashreq), 3% (Maghreb)
- **Turkey:** 2% (Mashreq), 1% (Maghreb)
- **Russia:** 0% (Mashreq), 0% (Maghreb)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

**Question 13** related to the previous question and dwelt on the issue of how counter-productive foreign support to civil society might be perceived. A relative majority of EU respondents are not concerned with foreign support in their respective countries while, in contrast, a similar majority of respondents from SEM countries think foreign support can be counter-productive.

**Graph 25: Do you consider that the support of civil society by foreign actors/donors can be counter-productive in your country?**

- **SEM respondents:**
  - Yes: 43%
  - No: 37%
  - I cannot say: 20%

- **EU respondents:**
  - Yes: 33%
  - No: 46%
  - I cannot say: 21%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey
Syrian respondents are most concerned with how counter-productive foreign support to civil society can be in their own country, followed by Albanian, Tunisian and Turkish respondents. At the bottom of the list, Israeli and Jordanian respondents are the least concerned.

Graph 26: Do you consider that the support of civil society by foreign actors/donors can be counter-productive in your country?
(% of YES answer)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEM</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

Question 13.1 was a follow-up question as it invited respondents to elaborate on their answer and possibly identify which kind of actor could produce counter-productive interferences. Respondents pointed out some governments – Russia (especially among respondents from northern European countries), the US, China, the Gulf monarchies and Turkey – but they also pointed out the EU and private donors.
As an illustration of counter-productive support, several respondents indicated that some organisations are distracted from their core activities and encouraged to adjust their work to match the donors’ priorities or requirements:

Les bailleurs de fonds sont exigeants en termes de montage et de mise en œuvre des projets, et les associations dans les territoires n’ont pas forcément les compétences pour accéder aux financements, par manque de compétences ou en raison de la barrière de la langue, et ceci peut créer plus de disparités entre le centre urbain et les collectivités territoriales, spécialement rurales et enclavées.

Moroccan respondent

In the case of the EU support to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society actors, this does not pose any particular problem, but this support is far from compensating the influence of the big lobbies on European decisions, particularly with regard to the pharmaceutical industry, pesticides or even foreign policy. In the case of support from the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, to Islamic movements, there is a definite fear of a harmful influence through the spread of a retrograde Wahhabi Islam.

Belgian respondent

Some of the funded NGOs are corrupt as they take funds and do not make real efforts in society. They do not have real effects on development in any sector.

Jordanian respondent

Respondents also stressed how foreign support to civil society organisations (CSOs) can expose them domestically:

Recently, the local authorities have been backlashing against civil society actors who are funded by foreign actors (mainly foreign embassies and development agencies). Tight control, threats and even judiciary prosecution are being conducted against them. They also created a culture in which common people learned to mistrust anyone who is working with foreigners, especially in a CSO context. We saw recently that CSO actors who usually work with foreign donors or participate in international events and programmes have been targeted on social media with a lot of fake news, in order to "convince" society that all similar profiles are "foreign agents", hence, affecting their credibility.

Algerian respondent

While civil society cannot survive without foreign funding in Egypt, it has now become a threat of being labelled as a spy, and using legal authoritarianism to prosecute individuals who receive funding for their NGOs.

Egyptian respondent

It confirms the paranoia of the ruling elites that civil society is not a bottom-up, grassroots movement but rather something financed by foreign powers, the "enemies of the state".

Polish respondent
HOW THE EU ENGAGES WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN SEM COUNTRIES

Question 14 opened a series of four questions on the specific role of the EU vis-à-vis civil society in SEM countries. This question surveyed the respondents on their overall perception of this role. Results are very positive overall and respondents from SEM countries are even more positive than their European counterparts. 71% of the former and 62% of the latter either agree or strongly agree with the positive role played by the EU in regards to civil society. Only 11% of respondents do not agree that the EU plays a positive role.

Graph 27: Do you agree that the European Union is playing a positive role in relation with civil society in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries?

When it comes to specific countries, Israel and Albania (which, as a candidate country, is a particular case in this list) are the most positive regarding the EU role in relation with civil society, followed by Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. Respondents from SEM countries torn by conflicts (Syria and Palestine) are less positive regarding the role of the EU.
Graph 28: Do you agree that the European Union is playing a positive role in relation with civil society in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries? (% of agree and strongly agree answers) respondents from:

- Israel: 94%
- Albania: 92%
- Morocco: 90%
- Tunisia: 89%
- Jordan: 88%
- Turkey: 87%
- Egypt: 83%
- Survey mean: 79%
- Algeria: 77%
- Lebanon: 77%
- Syria: 71%
- Palestine: 71%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

**Question 15** shows the extent to which respondents agreed with the statement that the EU did “more to support civil society” since it committed to do so with the review of the ENP in 2015. Generally, respondents tend to agree more than disagree with this statement, although EU responses are less straightforward than SEM responses.
Graph 29: In line with the EU’s 2012 Communication on civil society, the European Neighbourhood Policy reviewed in 2015 announced that the EU would “do more to support civil society” in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. Do you agree that this has been the case?

While the aforementioned results show a rather positive picture regarding the assessment of the EU’s role vis-à-vis civil society, critical statements prevail in the open comments that some respondents added:

The era of post-revolutions and uprisings in the Arab World has been marked with substantial withdrawal of EU effective policy pressure and engagement with Arab governments on critical matters like freedom of assembly, association and expression – core ingredients of thriving civic space.

Jordanian respondent

Unwillingness of the EU to alienate authoritarian regimes/move away from transformation paradigm to stability paradigm.

German respondent

The sensitive circumstances after 2011 in the southern countries require a new approach in civil society support and the EU is not implementing the programmes flexibly enough to adapt to the current demands and transformation needs of the SEM societies.

Spanish respondent

The EU projects an image of weakness and political impotence in SEM countries. Despite encouraging civil society in SEM countries, the EU is unable/unwilling to pressure governments of SEM countries to guarantee freedom of action for civil society organisations.

Italian respondent

Criminalisation of solidarity is quite strong both in the EU and in neighbouring countries. Most of the funding available is for providing the services, not for advocacy and watchdog activities.

Croatian respondent

La seconde révision de 2015 a consisté, rappelons-le, à hiérarchiser les objectifs de la PEV dans le contexte des mouvements massifs des réfugiés et d’une série d’attaques terroristes visant l’Europe et les régions voisines ; ainsi, le triptyque économique, valeurs, sécurité, a été conservé, la priorité étant cependant accordée au volet sécuritaire.

Tunisian respondent
**Question 16** was designed to assess the existing EU frameworks and channels in place to support civil society in SEM countries. Overall, respondents assess all instruments positively. Respondents assess bilateral programmes of direct support to civil society organisations as the most significant.

**Graph 30:** The EU uses the following frameworks in order to support civil society in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. Do you agree that they represent a significant contribution? (% of agree and strongly agree answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>% of Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral programmes of direct support to civil society organisations</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to regional CSO networks</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society organisations and local authorities (CSO-LA) thematic programmes</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy &amp; Human Rights (EIDHR)</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular consultations of civil society representatives through regional platforms (such as the Majalat project)</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Endowment for Democracy (EED)</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument contributing to stability and peace (IcSP)</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

Open comments show that, while respondents tend to have a positive opinion of these instruments, they also consider that they are not widely publicised and mainly addressed to the state rather than CSOs themselves.

Plusieurs instruments ne sont pas assez médiatisés, en plus du manque d’accès aux plateformes de ces instruments. À cela s’ajoute le handicap de la langue et/ou de la formation des acteurs pour y accéder.

**Moroccan respondent**

The EU should make sure that governments’ pressures do not interfere with these programmes and that support is not being given to government-dependent organisations.

**Belgian respondent**

The support helped in creating a sector of rich people from their projects without any proper monitoring or coaching.

**Palestinian respondent**
Lastly, **Question 17** turned to the issue of the geographic scope of EU support to civil society, by asking respondents which countries the EU should prioritise when engaging with civil society. A general tendency is that respondents from SEM countries consider that their own country should be the EU’s priority. The exception is Israeli respondents, who consider Turkey as the main priority.

Overall, the three countries that were most often mentioned by all respondents were Egypt, Palestine and Syria. The most common priority identified by European respondents was Turkey.
Graph 31: In terms of engagement with civil society, which countries should the EU prioritise? 
(respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 15)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

Tunisia is a fledgling democracy and should be supported. If there had been more EU support for Egyptian civil society, we wouldn’t have been where we are today.

---

Egyptian respondent

Israel and Turkey have been moving in political directions opposed to what I think should be core EU values; Tunisia has a high share of young people wanting to emigrate. There are urgent issues to be addressed in all other countries, too, however.

---

German respondent
On the path towards the potential accession of the Balkan states, it is important to reinforce civil society. The others are important as well, but proximity and the current context matter.

Luxembourgish respondent

Il faut soutenir plus fortement la Tunisie pour l’aider à réussir à compléter sa transition démocratique. Le soutien européen actuel est insuffisant au vu de la situation économique inquiétante de la Tunisie. Seul un soutien plus massif et une coopération basée sur le co-développement et une intégration économique plus équitable peuvent contribuer à soutenir la transition démocratique et un développement plus inclusif et durable qui garantit la stabilité et la cohésion du pays et de la région.

Tunisian respondent
CIVIL SOCIETY AS A DRIVING FORCE FOR EURO-MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

The third block of the Survey explored the connections between civil societies on both sides of the Mediterranean, the existing Euro-Mediterranean frameworks offering some space for civil society’s inclusion, and the potential for civil society in boosting Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and integration.

Main findings:

- When it comes to fostering cooperation between civil societies in the Euro-Mediterranean region, the most relevant frameworks are civil society networks or subnational cooperation rather than cooperation mechanisms promoted by governmental institutions.
- Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) labelled projects and policy dialogues sponsored by the UfM are an opportunity to enhance civil society’s inclusion, although a number of respondents pointed to some limitations of such participation mechanisms in their qualitative comments.
- More than half of respondents consider that the partnership priorities jointly defined by the EU and its partner countries as part of the ENP reflect the main concerns of civil society. However, European respondents are more sceptical overall than SEM respondents. Israeli and Lebanese are the most sceptical respondents among SEM countries.
- An overwhelming majority of respondents consider that civil society can make the difference in promoting dialogue, regional integration and peace in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Question 18 listed various existing frameworks bridging in one way or another civil societies on both sides of the Mediterranean. A majority of respondents identified Euro-Mediterranean civil society networks, as well as decentralised and subnational cooperation, as the most relevant frameworks, rather than civil society consultations fora convened by international or governmental institutions.
Graph 32: When it comes to cooperation between civil societies in the Euro-Mediterranean context, what is the most relevant framework?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 4)

- **Euro-Mediterranean networks** (40%)
- **Decentralised and subnational cooperation** (29%)
- **Civil society consultation/cooperation promoted by governmental institutions** (18%)
- **Diaspora community** (14%)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

In their open comments as a follow-up to the question, respondents elaborated on the importance of bottom-up and decentralised networks when it comes to cooperation between civil societies.

Il faudrait relancer les réseaux euro-méditerranéens de même qu’il faudrait mettre davantage le cap sur la coopération décentralisée en permettant aux collectivités locales de jouer un plus grand rôle dans ce domaine.

Algerian respondent

When collaboration is done with corrupt governments like ours, support is not reaching the places it should nor getting the impact it should. When these aids are decentralised and reach networks among different regions, I think it will be better spread and reach the people who need it most.

Moroccan respondent

Comments also point out some elements to improve the potential role of diaspora communities within this decentralised cooperation.

34 millions de migrants dont près de 20 millions extra-européens souvent citoyens des deux rives pourraient jouer un rôle central dans cette coopération.

Moroccan respondent

Connecting diaspora and decentralised bodies may be important; involving local power/authorities, etc. is crucial to achieve results, especially if they are to prove efficient in the long run.

Swedish respondent
Mobility of civil society actors is seen as a key factor for effective and successful cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

Il faut dire les choses clairement : l’absence de « libre circulation des personnes » constitue la pierre d’achoppement des échanges entre le Nord et le Sud de la Méditerranée. Les élites (tourisme) et leurs enfants (études) arrivent à circuler plus ou moins facilement. Le reste, la classe moyenne ou défavorisée, rencontre de grandes difficultés. D’où les frustrations et son lot d’envie et de haine pour l’Occident !

Moroccan respondent

**Question 19** focused on how and to what extent the UfM, despite its inter-governmental nature, involves civil society actors in its activities. Respondents acknowledged the potential of the UfM to involve civil society, both through UfM labelled projects and through policy dialogue platforms.

Graph 33: The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is an inter-governmental organisation. However, it does involve civil society actors through different channels. Do you agree that:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Agreement Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

Despite the positive results, the open comments point to some limitations of the mechanisms through which the UfM involves civil society and formulates some recommendations in this regard.

Il faudrait améliorer la communication sur les possibilités de participation de la société civile dans ces instances.

French respondent

Inclusion of civil society organisations in the UfM activities is limited to specific ones in the region.

Egyptian respondents

It is difficult to distinguish and see the added value compared to EU regional programmes.

Danish respondent
Il faut plus de visibilité à l’UpM qui paraît très en retrait.

French respondent

As the Mediterranean Youth Climate Network is supported by the UfM, I believe it is an actor that can greatly contribute to civil society cooperation in the Mediterranean. However, I also believe it should have a greater budget for that.

Algerian respondent

The Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum might serve as a good institutional model for the involvement of civil society of SEM countries in the UfM activities.

Slovak respondent

**Question 20** aimed to assess to what extent respondents perceived that partnership priorities agreed between the EU and governments from SEM countries in the framework of the ENP reflect the concerns of civil society. More than half of respondents consider that this is the case.

**Graph 34:** Under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU and its southern partners are set to define partnership priorities. Do you agree that these priorities reflect the main concerns of civil society?

![Pie chart showing responses to Question 20](chart.png)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

Overall, respondents from EU countries tend to be more sceptical regarding the matching between partnership priorities and concerns from civil society than respondents from SEM countries. From SEM respondents, Palestinians, Tunisians and Jordanians are most prone to think that both match, while Israeli and Lebanese respondents are more sceptical.
Graph 35: Under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU and its southern partners are set to define partnership priorities. Do you agree that these priorities reflect the main concerns of civil society? (% of agree and strongly agree answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey mean</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

Here is a sample of comments formulated by respondents that argued there is a gap between partnership priorities and civil societies’ concerns:

The EU should find ways to include representatives of civil society of SEM countries to be part of the debate and definition process.

Slovak respondent

La société civile n’a pas été associée aux consultations intergouvernementales.

Algerian respondent
I guess the background consultations with experts and stakeholders might reflect some of these priorities, but civil society has larger concerns.  

Egyptian respondent

Il faut renforcer les liens bilatéraux et les programmes de coopération décentralisée.  

Algerian respondent

Les priorités de la PEV ne reflètent pas les réels besoins des peuples. Elles reflètent les envies des ministères dominants.  

French respondent

The last question of the Survey shows an overwhelming consensus among respondents regarding the potential of civil society in promoting dialogue, regional integration and peace in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Graph 36: In an increasingly fragmented Euro-Mediterranean region, do you agree that civil society can make a difference when it comes to promoting dialogue, regional integration and peace?

As a follow-up to this question, some respondents formulated recommendations:

Promotion of civil society and civil society organisations should become an active part of foreign policy both at EU level and at national level in the EU countries.  

Italian respondent

Revitalising engagement on the third basket, and activities involving civil society on regional and subregional levels. Making better use of already existing frameworks in engaging civil society.  

Egyptian respondent

Les gouvernements œuvrent dans l’urgence, suivant des agendas et des contraintes conjoncturelles. Il est temps que la société civile se charge de promouvoir le dialogue, là où les instances officielles ont échoué ou, du moins, fait montre d’un désintérêt irresponsible. La PEV devrait se traduire aussi comme la promotion d’un vivre-ensemble régional.  

Tunisian respondent
Regional thematic platforms of structural dialogue between CSOs on the two shores of the Mediterranean can contribute actively to define and set a common solution for the region’s pressing challenges.

Algerian respondent

More focus on civil society’s sustainability and exchange of best and worst practices... also funding for needs assessment meetings at regional and sub-regional levels among CSO representatives.

Greek respondent

Yes but it needs to be South-South led and not sending SEM CSOs to Brussels to “learn” from EU civil society. The EU should encourage much stronger linkages between its grantees rather than “divide and rule” by making them compete against each other for the same EU funding.

Dutch respondent

Other respondents highlighted in particular the role of youth:

Civil society can make a difference through implementing youth and cultural projects and programmes, locally and regionally, promoting dialogue and exchanging cultures; youth mobilisation across the Euro-Mediterranean countries. This of course needs cooperation among NGOs in the different countries in addition to the funding needed.

Lebanese respondent

Civil society, especially youths, is a key actor, which can make a change and promote regional understanding and cooperation. Thus, more funds should be invested in exchanges (S-S/S-N) between youths to foster cross-regional links.

Polish respondent

Other respondents insisted on the importance of local and regional actors:

Collaboration with the regional non-governmental/CSO actors would provide more effective safeguards for the national/local civil society actors and, to a great extent, protect them from the risk of direct oppressive measures by the national authorities, or from the indirect measures such as hurdles of red tape.

UK respondent

It is precisely from the bottom that fragmented societies can re-unite again. Ensure and prepare a bigger budget on network building through fora, exchanges and cooperation between organisations from both sides of the Mediterranean could be a good beginning.

Jordanian respondent
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
CIVIL SOCIETY
IN A TIME OF TRANSITION

INTISSAR KHERIGI
Programmes Director, Jasmine Foundation

At a time when countries around the world are experiencing some form of transition – political, economic, technological, demographic, ecological – as well as increasing levels of distrust in political institutions, what is the role of civil society? How is civil society facing an increasingly challenging operating environment in a context of rapid change?

Civil society is broadly defined here to mean institutions, organisations and individuals undertaking collective action that is independent from the state and not designed to achieve private profit or public office. The civil society space includes highly structured organisations such as trade unions and professional associations through to mass social movements and online networks.

Tunisia is a useful case study through which to explore the changing role of civil society in a world experiencing multiple transitions. While Tunisia is going through a complex democratic transition that sets it apart in many respects, its civil society faces similar challenges to those to the South and North of the Mediterranean when it comes to operating in a context of dwindling trust in public institutions, rise in populist discourses, high levels of inequality, an urban/rural divide, and disengagement from traditional forms of political and social activism.

Civil society or civil societies?

The Tunisian revolution in 2010-11 and the ensuing wave of protests around the Arab region opened up the way for the proliferation of civil society by creating new spaces for citizens to mobilise. In Tunisia, the number of civil society organisations (CSOs) grew from 9,969 in 2011 to 22,844 in 2019; in Morocco from 44,711 in 2009 to 116,000 in 2014; and in Algeria from 81,000 in 2008 to more than 100,000 in 2019 (Desrues 2019, IFEDA Tunisia 2019, Bessadi 2019). This is alongside the emergence of social movements addressing a wide number of issues from natural resource management and regional development to women’s rights and socio-economic exclusion.

The Southern Mediterranean region has also witnessed the increasing pluralisation of civil society. While “old” civil society consisted mainly of established actors such as trade unions, employers’ groups, professional associations and human rights associations, recent decades have seen the emergence of new civil society actors who choose to mobilise outside these structures.

Tunisia and the wave of protests around the Arab region opened up new spaces for citizens to mobilise.

An example are the unions of unemployed graduates in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Another is the growing community of “start-uppers” in Tunisia, a network of young tech entrepreneurs who successfully campaigned for new legislation to make it easier to launch start-ups. Both of these examples demonstrate how civil society structures are changing in response to changing relations between labour and capital and growing demands for socio-economic inclusion.

The Southern Mediterranean region has witnessed the increasing pluralisation of civil society.

This pluralised civil society has also provided space for young people who do not see themselves reflected in older established CSOs, political parties or traditional union structures that tend to be dominated by an older generation. In Tunisia, a plethora of new organisations have
been established by young people on a range of political, economic and social issues. These range from civic education clubs in schools and local associations working on environmental protection to nation-wide social movements such as the ‘Manich Msameh’ campaign against the proposed bill on economic reconciliation.

While the emergence of a more pluralistic civil society is positive, we still need to ask, how representative and inclusive is civil society in the region? According to studies on the Arab region, participation in civil society structures tends to be lowest among youth who are less educated, unemployed or from rural areas (Mercy Corps, 2012). This means that the same groups who are under-represented in political institutions and public debate are also under-represented in organised civil society, resulting in double exclusion.

However, Tunisia’s experience shows how democratisation can open space for the emergence of CSOs in marginalised regions suffering from the centralisation of economic and political power by authoritarian regimes. Since 2011, the number of CSOs has risen sharply in the South, Centre and North-West of Tunisia, where poverty rates are far higher than the capital. The number of new associations in Gafsa (in the Centre) doubled in 2011-12. In the Southern region of Medenine on the border with Libya, new associations created in 2011-12 represented 31.4% of CSOs in 2013 (Foundation for the Future, 2013). While there is still a big gap between urban and rural areas, marginalised regions are experiencing a civil society renaissance, with the emergence of networks of CSOs working together to make their voices heard at the national level, particularly on issues of regional development.

The socio-economic and urban/rural divides within civil society, alongside political and ideological ones, naturally reflect broader fault lines within society. International donors need to be sensitive to these dynamics and seek to engage with all categories of civil society actors equally. Civil society actors in Tunisia complain that international donors fail to engage adequately with regions beyond the capital, and that they demonstrate a bias towards secular civil society actors to the detriment of faith-based actors (Kausch, 2013). Such perceptions of discrimination or bias can deepen polarisation within civil society, undermining the capacity for coalition-building that could lead to more effective mobilisation around shared objectives (Debuysere, 2016).

**Changing forms of civic participation**

To the North and South of the Mediterranean, there has been a notable decline in civic participation through membership in formal organisations. The idea of a life-long commitment to one organisation is being increasingly replaced by more ‘free floating’ forms of civic participation, which may be no less intensive or committed but tend to be shorter in duration (MitOst, 2016).

The rise of social media has also produced new forms of civic participation in the North and South. Cyberactivism uses online spaces for expression and mobilisation, creating a virtual public sphere that is particularly valuable where access to a physical one is limited. An example is the vibrant online discussions around Morocco’s Hirak and Boycott movements, which the Moroccan regime has tried to crack down on by arresting activists and journalists.

However, questions remain as to whether virtual spaces help to promote democratic debate and change or simply reinforce divisions by creating ‘echo chambers’ in which we consume information that confirms our existing opinions. More individualised forms of civic participation may leave traditional civil society actors struggling to reinvent themselves and adapt to these transformations. A good example of where this is happening is in the field of Social and Solidarity Economy, where the MAIF (teacher’s mutual insurance fund) in France is supporting collaborative economy start-ups to develop new economic solutions that respond to social challenges.
The changing role of civil society in Tunisia

In an era of transformation, the roles and modes of functioning of civil society in Tunisia are changing. CSOs are still carrying out the traditional functions of advocacy and monitoring, seeking to hold governments and state institutions to account. In the context of a democratic transition that calls for strengthening new democratic institutions, civil society is also working with public officials to develop their skills and establish new democratic frameworks and practices. For example, Al Bawsala, a parliamentary watchdog, provides training for parliamentarians on a range of issues to support their legislative work. Jasmine Foundation, a CSO specialising in local governance, works to train and support newly elected municipal councillors to get to grips with their new powers, while also conducting citizen-led evaluations of municipal services to hold local government to account. Thus, Tunisian civil society is learning how to balance confrontation and collaboration in its relations with the state, supporting the building of a democratic culture while also holding public institutions to account.

However, there are certainly “no-go areas” in which it is proving hard for civil society to make a difference. One is security sector reform, a sensitive topic that CSOs engage in at their peril. Although continuing authoritarian practices in security institutions, particularly the police, are one of the biggest threats to Tunisia’s democratic transition, few CSOs or international donors have come up with creative approaches to promote security sector reform. Judicial reform is also an area in which few CSOs have developed real influence, other than professional associations such as judges’ and lawyers’ unions.

There is a real need for citizens who are the ultimate owners of public services – the justice, policing, education, health and transport systems, etc. – to develop associations that represent their interests and push for deep-rooted reforms. Educational reform, for example, is an issue that concerns not only teachers, who are represented through their unions, but also students and parents. Yet much of the discussions around this sector are conducted as a bilateral dialogue between government and unions, without involving vast sectors of society that are affected by policy decisions.

While civil society’s power to influence policies is growing, there is still a need for greater specialisation and for organisations to build their capacity to analyse and evaluate policies. Tunisian civil society needs more support for policy research to enable it to hold government to account more closely by analysing the impact of public policies on different social groups and proposing policy alternatives. Without the existence of a civil society that is able to simplify complex policy debates for the public, identify where policies are failing, and involve the public, policy debate will remain dominated by government and a small circle of ‘experts’. The growth of think tanks in Tunisia is an encouraging phenomenon in this regard (Kherigi and Amiri, 2015), although the MENA region as a whole still contains only 6% of think tanks in the world (McGann, 2019).

Structural challenges for civil society

While civil society is thriving in an era of increasing contestation of public policies, it faces significant challenges. As the Euromed survey shows, civil society in the EU and SEM share some common challenges, the most important being limited funding, political pressures, lack of independence, and administrative hurdles.

Shrinking civic space

In Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, political pressures are cited as the main challenge for civil society. Civic space has shrunk as regimes react to the initial successes
of the Arab Spring by clamping down on freedom of expression, association and assembly. Notable examples are Syria, Egypt and Libya, which were cited in the survey as the three SEM countries in which civil societies face the biggest obstacles.

Graph 1: In which Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries do civil societies face the biggest obstacles? (respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 15)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

Tunisia, Lebanon and Jordan are bright spots in this regard, rated among the SEM countries in which civil societies face the fewest obstacles. However, governments in the region have used an arsenal of restrictive laws and security apparatuses to crack down on civil society. In Egypt, new laws have made it practically impossible for CSOs to operate. In Jordan, Law 22/2009 allows the state to dissolve any CSO board or even the organisation itself on vague grounds, and subjects board members to security checks.
The policing of online space has become a particular challenge. In Algeria, Internet access was disrupted during recent protests for political reforms. In Morocco, press and antiterrorism laws have been used to shut down news websites reporting on protest movements, while in Lebanon, individuals have been arrested and prosecuted for online posts criticising government officials (Amnesty International, 2018).

These developments are not limited to the Southern Mediterranean region but are part of a worldwide trend. According to the International Centre for Non-for-Profit Law, 64 new restrictive laws and regulations were adopted worldwide in 2015-16, leaving global civic space ‘severely narrowed’ (ICNL, 2016). While the EU has much more ‘open’ civic space, civil society is experiencing political pressures in Eastern Europe, particularly Hungary. Even in Western Europe, there are growing concerns about the impact of counter-extremism policies on freedom of expression and association, and the use of CVE funding by government to steer civil society activity.

Financial sustainability
Another top preoccupation for civil society is financial survival. In the Northern Mediterranean, austerity policies have contributed to a decline in public civil society funding (CIVICUS, 2016). In the Southern Mediterranean, while the Arab Spring brought renewed interest and support in civil society among international donors, this has brought challenges of a different sort. Attitudes towards foreign funding remain ambivalent in many countries, which may not necessarily express a reservation to foreign funding per se but to its modalities and the way in which it impacts on the way CSOs carry out their work.

In a recent study on counter violent extremism and its impact on CSOs in Tunisia, many activists said they felt that a reliance on international funding undermines civil society’s independence and its capacity to set its own priorities. Many expressed concerns that current funding mechanisms promote a short-term project-based mode of work that does not allow civil society actors to focus on long-term deep-rooted change, leaving them stuck in a cycle of how to prove quantifiable results in a short space of time. Furthermore, this model pressurises them to be upwardly accountable to donors instead of downwardly accountable to the people they serve.
The financial sustainability challenge calls for new solutions and funding models. In countries with a more open civic space such as Tunisia and Lebanon, new funding models should be encouraged, whether via charitable foundations, corporate social responsibility programs or engagement with the diaspora. Crowdfunding has emerged as a promising source of civil society support in recent years. In Tunisia, a new law on crowdfunding is being discussed, which for the first time would provide a legal framework for crowdfunding platforms to be used inside Tunisia, with the potential to raise “10 million annually by 2020” (SwitchMed, 2015). Another potential source is social enterprise, which is developing in many parts of Europe. While it has existed for centuries in the Southern Mediterranean in the form of ‘awqaf’ (foundations), current legal frameworks remain restrictive in many countries.

Organisational sustainability

For new CSOs in particular, another challenge is organisational sustainability. The new CSOs that emerged in Tunisia after 2011 have faced challenges in building their structures and teams while operating in an uncertain domestic and regional environment. They have faced a steep learning curve. In 2013, a study of CSOs in Tunisia found that an estimated 75% of staff had not received any training on project management or management of associations (Foundation for the Future, 2013).

However, six years on, the civil society field is becoming more professionalised and structured. It is also providing economic opportunities for young people, some of whom use it a steppingstone to employment in other sectors, while others are increasingly seeing it as a long-term career option. Around the MENA region, civil society is providing a learning environment that helps address the deficits of formal educational systems that are excessively focused on memorisation and failing to prepare young people for the job market.

Conclusion

The ultimate challenge for civil society on both sides of the Mediterranean is to create lasting, structural change. The rise of social media and new forms of civic participation generate opportunities for more rapid dissemination of information, formation of networks, and virtual and physical mobilisation. At the same time, the rise of looser, more individualised forms of engagement raises questions over how to support sustained collective efforts for structural change, particularly in post-authoritarian contexts in which deep-rooted institutional reforms are needed.

A key challenge is to build bridges between traditional and new forms of civic engagement. Times of crisis and rapid change are an invitation to civil society to update its conceptual toolkit and modes of action. Civil society actors, whether organised structures or new social movements, must find ways to collaborate across divides for the common good and draw on their comparative advantages.

In the context of high public distrust in political institutions across Europe and the Southern Mediterranean, civil society has a big responsibility. While civil society must maintain its independence, it has an important role in encouraging citizens to be more politically informed and active. In the Southern Mediterranean, where issues of social and economic inclusion are particularly prominent, civil society has a role in developing an informed public debate on how to create a new social contract that sets aside the old authoritarian bargain and builds new inclusive democratic societies based on respect for human rights, the rule of law and social justice.
The survey also reveals that there is a desire for exchange between civil societies on both sides of the Mediterranean. Decentralisation reforms in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan in particular, have energised local civil society and present new opportunities for subnational cooperation. In order to make the most of these opportunities, international partners need to get to grips with the changing civic space in the Southern Mediterranean and review the rigid and short-term nature of current partnership frameworks in order to enable civil society to focus on long-term sustainable results.
Bibliography


KAUSCH, KRISTINA. (2013). Foreign Funding in Post-revolution Tunisia. AFA, Fride and Hivos.


ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM IN THE POST-ARAB SPRING: IT IS NOT ABOUT A MERE CLEAN ENVIRONMENT

AZIZA MONEER
PhD. Visiting Research Fellow, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden

Introduction: Long Lasting Environmental Stresses in the MENA Region

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region faces major environmental threats. There, geography and arid and semi-arid climatic conditions have led to a concentration of people in coastal zones and little valleys with ensuing environmental pollution, declining per capita water resources, increasing soil erosion, climate change and intensifying desertification, all creating environmental challenges (Tal & Linkov, 2004). In addition, the region lacks rigorous environmental institutions and legal frameworks that are essential to reverse the current state of environmental degradation. Climate change, for example, reveals the institutional inadequacies, as mirrored in policy debates on adaptive capacities and climate change resilience (Hoffmann, 2018).

These environmental challenges have been further aggravated by other socioeconomic processes, which characterise the MENA region and include: the huge population growth, rapid urbanisation process and the high rate of poverty. In this context, it seems that every time governments in the MENA region are faced with an apparent choice between economic development and jobs, on the one hand, and the protection of the environment, on the other, priority is always given to the former (Hilmi, Safa & Ketata, 2015).

The Post-Arab Spring and the Green Uprising

Given the aforementioned ecological and economic challenges, environmental activism – typically around issues affecting public health and livelihoods – has been on the rise in the region over the past few decades (Sowers, 2017). More recently and following the Arab Spring, environmental activism has been intensifying in the region. The Arab Spring could be described as a “green spring” as it brought not only political issues to the forefront of the public sphere but environmental issues as well (Loschi, 2019). According to the Euromed Survey, the causes that should be advocated by civil society in the MENA region include human rights, fighting corruption, social justice, education, and climate change. It could be said that people are taking advantage of the political opening that resulted from the Arab Spring to organise at grassroots levels and to enforce their political, social, economic and environmental rights.
For example, in Ain Salah, in the heart of the Algerian Sahara, a collective movement erupted in order to protest against shale gas exploration by the French oil company Total since 2013 (Petitjean & Chapelle, 2016). The campaign claimed that Algerian citizens were confronting not only the environmental and health hazards of fracking but also a form of neocolonialism. In this regard, the movement declared that while France has banned Total and other companies from using fracking in its territory, it is still pushing for it in its former colony Algeria and for these multinational companies to monopolise exploring and exploiting shale gas in Algeria in the future (Hamouchene, 2015). Two years later, the campaign has fostered a formal coalition representing local councils, the energy minister was forced to resign, and fracking operations remain stalled (Kinninburgh, 2015).

Ain Salah, in the heart of the Algerian Sahara protesting against shale gas exploration; the “We are not Trash” campaign and “Egyptians against Coal” are examples of environmental activism.
In Morocco, an environmental campaign called “We are not Trash” was formed in the wake of the government decision to import trash from Italy as a cheap alternative to fossil fuel (Miller, 2016). In particular, the controversy broke out when local media reported that cement firm Lafarge Maroc had imported 2,500 tonnes of Italian rubbish to burn for energy (Yaakoubi, 2016). The campaign managed to make the political corruption hyper-visible by not only investing in the symbolic capital of importing garbage from Italy as a cheap alternative to fuel but also by insisting on a notion of citizen efficacy grounded in a collective demand for an inclusive political system and subject to the rule of law.

In Egypt, the “Egyptians against Coal” campaign was formed in the wake of the Egyptian government’s decision to lift a long ban on using coal in Egypt. The movement managed to publicise the negative impacts of coal and attract sympathisers (Sowers & Zayed, 2014). For the environmental activists, the coal trauma is not only connected with adverse environmental and health impacts or entrenched socioeconomic injustices but is viewed as a battle to be waged against unsustainable energy sources. Moreover, climate change was found to be perceived as one of the most detrimental environmental impacts of coal (Moneer, forthcoming). This finding is very interesting as political discussions on the scientific legitimacy of climate change tend to ignore the enormous short-term consequences of relying on fossil fuels (including coal) for the most of energy consumption (Geels, 2014). It is true that Egypt is committed to the ambitious long-term goal of the Paris climate change agreement in 2015 to hold the increase in the global average temperature to below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels but the government has allowed for the import of coal into Egypt to generate electricity for both industry and households. This means that Egypt would be left stranded with a coal-reliant infrastructure for its energy needs without fulfilling its commitment to reduce CO₂ emissions (Bottom, 2016).

Environmental Movements in the MENA Region: The Quest for More than Shades of Green

Despite the different goals and mobilisation practices of the aforementioned environmental movements, they share a number of features: first, the social media played a key role in providing a platform to environmental activists and concerned citizens to voice their views and express their shared grievances. This result is in accordance with the outcomes of the Euromed Survey 2019, and in particular with the responses from Maghrebi respondents that are particularly keen on considering social media campaigns as the most efficient means to achieve civil society’s objectives. It could be said that the social media spurred a type of alternative communication that does not occur through the mainstream media. This alternative communication allows those who are affected by, for example, a cement factory to share their experience and create their media content away from the censorship of the mainstream media (Blakeman, 2011).
Second, these movements are far more significant in their political, social and cultural implications than it might otherwise appear. These movements are not calling for a mere clean environment. Rather the movements express the people’s frustration and discontent with bad governance, low quality of life, corruption, and marginalisation. Such movements have in large part been a response to, and a rejection of, the extreme forms of inequality and dispossession that have flowed from the shift to neoliberalism, particularly in the global south (Kapoor, 2007). Therefore, these struggles and their practices can be significant in shaping our understanding of nature-culture relations in the MENA region.

Third, the significant role of youths in these environmental mobilisations reflects their increasing awareness of environmental problems. It also denotes youths’ agency and willingness to enforce urgent and ambitious actions as a way to address not only the different environmental controversies in their respective countries but to contribute to a global dynamic environmental justice movement (Moneer, forthcoming). This conclusion contrasts with the stereotypical image of youth activists in the MENA region as being empathetic to environmental concerns, and adopting reasonable positions and predictable behaviours in relation to activism’s expected outcomes (Rice, 2006).

Fourth, the consistent pressure of these movements challenged the discourse of the state and its apparatuses whereby the economic growth was conceptualised as a priority. In this regard, by advocating for environmental causes, the environmental activists managed to challenge established power relations and question a lot of the current policies, such as the economic system of corporate capitalism, which is driven by patterns and practices of large-scale capital accumulation and fossil fuel extraction, and its inability to achieve the levels of decarbonisation necessary to avoid dangerous irreversible environmental impacts (i.e., climate change) (Bebbington, 2007).
Fifth, these environmental mobilisations underpin broader thinking about the relationship between the state and national and transnational corporations within a market-based economy. For example, while Egypt is committed to combat climate change and reduce its carbon emissions, the government decided to expand coal use in order to secure heavy industries’ investments and related revenues. This is among capitalism’s anti-ecological aspects whereby there is a potential for conflict and contradiction between ecological protection and the state’s role in ensuring conditions for continued capital accumulation. Within the capital system, the state depends on business investment to provide the tax revenues and employment opportunities necessary for legitimacy and re-election; hence the business demands for new investment opportunities typically trump ecological concerns when the two are in conflict (Newell & Paterson, 1998).

**Environmental Contestation in the MENA Region: What Does it Mean for Europe and How Should Europe React?**

The aspirations of young citizens in the MENA region to keep abreast with the ambitious international goals of abandoning fossil fuel and using green energy have significant ramifications on EU relations with its MENA neighbours in a number of ways.

**First:** As fossil fuel prices stagnate and European demand declines, Europe’s main suppliers – many of which are in its immediate neighbourhood in the MENA region – will face increasing pressures and domestic needs. These could put them at risk of economic and ultimately political instability, especially in the absence of strong financial buffers that mitigate lower fiscal revenues (Bergamaschi, Mabey, Ga Venta & Born, 2016). Achieving such transition and decarbonising economies that are heavily dependent on fossil fuel revenues will not be an easy task. It is also difficult to envisage how the EU will want to engage meaningfully in energy transition in its neighbouring countries while showing ongoing support for this fossil-dependent development model in the region, for example through the promise of new gas import infrastructure investment that might become stranded or lock in dangerous emissions (Bergamaschi & Sartori, 2018).

**Second:** The experience of the last few years suggests that cooperation between the EU and the MENA countries has been done on the basis of a Eurocentric approach. In other words, MENA countries frequently complain that the EU is engaged in a quick grab for large-scale renewable projects oriented toward exporting energy to European markets rather than in a genuine partnership to maximise renewables’ potential for host societies as well (Youngs, 2014). For example, the initiatives of Desertec and the Mediterranean Solar Plan – that were funded by the EU in the early 2000s – failed in less than a decade, largely because of a lack of commercial feasibility and political realism (Schmitt, 2018). More recently, in 2015 €38 million was provided through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) for the construction of the Ouarzazate solar power plant (Noor III project) in Morocco with ambitious goals to not only diversify Morocco’s energy mix but also export energy to the EU (Bianchi et al., 2018). TuNur solar project in Tunisia is a joint venture between Nur Energy, a British-based solar developer, and a group of Maltese and Tunisian investors, and plans to transmit electricity from the North African coast to Malta, central Italy and the south of France using submarine cable by 2020 (Neslen, 2017). However, obstacles that led to the failure of Desertec and the Mediterranean Solar Plan initiatives should be taken into consideration, notably the regulatory and commercial aspects of these projects.

**Third:** Observers also indicate that Europe’s domestic and external decisions need to avoid building in instability by promising import demand that will not materialise as Europe cuts its dependence from fossil fuels in the long run (Umbach, 2010). Instead, the EU should work together with fossil fuel producing countries in the MENA region to help diversify their economies and to make them more resilient to future climate shocks. In this regard, in November 2015, the European Commission (EC) launched a €1.8 billion “Emergency Trust Fund for

Fourth: Equally important, if Europe wants to succeed in staving off disorder in its neighbours and prevent future mass displacement of people, more needs to be done to shift investment priorities from high carbon to low carbon and resilient projects (Bergamaschi, Mabey, Ga Venta & Born). For example, between 2003 and 2012 the fossil fuel and non-tradable sectors of the MENA countries received twice the level of Foreign Direct Investment (FDIs) than the non-fossil fuels and commercial sectors (World Bank, 2013).
Bibliography


**Moneer, A.** (forthcoming). ‘Waging a war not only on coal but much more’: Types of Youth Activism within the Egyptians against Coal Movement. *POMPES Studies*.


THE RESHAPED CIVIC POLITICS OF EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS

RICHARD YOUNGS
Senior Fellow Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program.
Carnegie Europe - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The Euromed Survey 2019 reveals that the civil society dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) remains of pivotal importance but needs updating. In recent years, civil society has shifted shape in the southern Mediterranean, and indeed within EU member states too. While civil society has in some ways been on the defensive since the revolts of 2011, it has in some contexts taken on interesting new forms. The EU’s support for civil society has improved but remains behind the curve, as it struggles to keep pace with the emergence of dynamic innovations in civic activism. Key policy changes are currently in the pipeline that will have a significant impact on the EMP’s civil society component. The EU will need to consider a range of far-reaching changes if it is to improve its contribution to southern Mediterranean civil society.

A new civil society?

Mediterranean states were in the forefront of an intensive wave of social protests in the early 2010s. The revolts of the Arab spring came to symbolise the emergence of a more contentious form of civic politics. And this was a genuinely cross-Mediterranean phenomenon, as protests also erupted in many EU member states like Greece and Spain around the same time.

Of course, these citizen mobilisations did not achieve far-reaching political or economic change in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. Even where they were strong enough to push regimes from office, they did not lead to democratisation – with the one partial exception of Tunisia. Yet despite the disappointment of the Arab spring, a willingness to protest still exists across the region. Indeed, such is the current upswing in protest activity that talk abounds of a renewed momentum of Arab reform.

Recently, of course, this has been seen in Algeria, where large protests involving a diverse range of social actors got the military to push president Bouteflika from power. The Algerian protests have been especially notable for continuing over many months and for their organisational acuity. The country is, of course, still only in the foothills of prospective political change and protestors have begun to face the challenge of engaging military leaders over the sequencing of political changes.

Lebanon’s protests during October 2019 have been equally dramatic. These recent revolts came on the back of the 2015 You Stink protests that were triggered by the issue of refuse collection, but took on a broader set of policy concerns. It is these demands for a fundamental reshaping of Lebanon’s inter-denominational power-sharing system that dominate the current wave of protest. At the time of writing, these protests have succeeded in dislodging the government, while it remains unclear how far they will bring about structural political reform.

While the Algerian protests have been in the headlines, mobilisations also continue elsewhere, albeit at a lower level. Some protests have occurred recently under the current military-
controlled regime in Egypt. In Tunisia, thousands of small-scale protests now occur each year, triggered by a whole range of grievances from university conditions, job losses, terrorism and security concerns, uneven regional development, the stalling of democratic reforms and religion. Tunisian activists define them as non-movements, more locally focused and spontaneous than the 2011 uprising. In December 2017 the so-called Hassebhom movement orchestrated protests against the government’s proposed security law that would hand significant powers to the police. And in 2018 protests rocked a dozen Tunisian cities in response to price rises and tax hikes, orchestrated by a small informal movement called ‘What are we waiting for?’.

In the last two or three years large protests have flared sporadically in the Moroccan region of Rif, coordinated by the so-called Hirak movement – these have focused on issues of local infrastructure, health and education in contrast to the 2011 protests that homed in on constitutional change.

**Graph 1: Among recent social movements, which ones do you consider had the greatest political impact in SEM countries?**
(categories developed from the open-ended answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement/Issue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hirak Algerie</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Spring</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human/Civil rights movements</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminism/Women rights</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremism (discourses, organisations, parties)</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social movements in Tunisia</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy demands</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirak Rif</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement 20 février Maroc</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezi Resistance in Turkey</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumers boycott (Maroc)</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

While some protest ethos persists, most Arab governments have responded by trying to stifle civic politics. Civil society in the southern Mediterranean has in recent years faced more draconian repression. Regimes have introduced more severe restrictions on civil society organisations. While Egypt’s restrictive NGO laws are well known, even supposedly more open governments like those in Tunisia and Morocco have fond ways of constricting civil society operations. This is another common Euro-Mediterranean trend as many EU governments have introduced similar restrictions in an effort to limit and control civic activism.

*Southern Mediterranean governments have fond ways of constricting civil society operations. This is another common Euro-Mediterranean trend as many EU governments have introduced similar restrictions.*
The combination of these developments has spurred new forms of civic activism. As in other regions of the world, activists in Arab countries have begun to articulate more informal and community-rooted forms of civil society activity. Even if regimes contained the Arab spring protests, these revolts galvanised a new layer of dynamic activism that has moved away from the region’s larger, formal and best-known NGOs. New civic initiatives have sprung up across the region to organise local communities in providing food, medical assistance, and vocational training. Young people are turning toward social entrepreneurship and volunteerism as alternatives to engaging with NGOs.

Much of the new activism is about making communities more resilient by circumventing dysfunctional government institutions – rather than about advocacy campaigns linked to the policies of the international community. Alternative social networks have grown in the region in the years since 2011. This emerging activism is diverse in nature: some of it is driven by conservative religious activists, while much of it is strictly functional – based around groups of like street vendors, doctors or urban-renewal specialists.

This trend is in part a positive strategy to correct the perceived shortcomings of the bigger NGOs, but also in part a necessary adjustment to regime repression. Governments’ new measures to narrow the civic space have in places like Egypt effectively driven activists into more cautious, subterranean and less overtly politicised activity. Fluid and informal activism is the incipient strategy for getting round regime clampdowns on NGOs.

In Syria and Lebanon organisations have emerged to provide humanitarian relief within communities scarred by Syria’s conflict, relying on crowdsourcing for operational funds. Non-formalised civic groups have retained a deliberate looseness and fluidity of structure in an effort to push back against the Assad regime. In Lebanon, this kind of conflict-linked activism has distanced itself from the formal civil society organisations that are linked to the patronage of political families and notables.
In Palestine, new types of civic organisations are detaching themselves from the parameters of two-state peace talks and organising for de facto and functional local autonomy from Israeli influence. In Libya, kinship groups have become more important, as NGO-type structures have struggled to take root in the years since Colonel Qadafi was ousted from power. In Morocco, the February 20 Movement has moved from protest into so-called 'liquid' initiatives of self-organisation.

Taken together, these changes are significant, even if in many cases they are not a game-changer. In many ways, civil society is on the defensive, cornered by increasingly intrusive and repressive regime tactics, but there are also new avenues of civic dynamism and citizen initiatives to find more effective ways to influence local policies. Contrary to many assumptions, the uprisings of the Arab spring were not a one-off that have entirely subsided back into the status quo ante. Rather they have contributed, along with other factors, to alternative kinds of civic activism taking root, in some ways more dynamic and more locally resonant than the kind of formalised NGO campaigns that predominated before 2011. The formal NGO sector is still extremely important and has itself begun to adjust; but it is today one part of a more varied spectrum of civic politics across the southern Mediterranean.

The future of EU support

These trends suggest that the EMP’s civil society dimension is still relevant – and indeed increasingly so. The EU’s challenge is to keep pace with these civic changes if it is to offer effective support to Arab civil society. IEMed’s expert survey uncovers concerns that the union is not doing nearly enough to help protect and strengthen civil society in the southern Mediterranean – in particular due to its security priorities.

In many respects, the EU has begun to react to the new civic politics in recent years. It has increased its use of sub-granting, to make sure that funds move from larger NGO partners into smaller civic groups out of capital cities. The EU has made an effort to broaden its support beyond highly, formalised NGOs to engage with individuals and non-registered entities. The European Commission has begun to listen more to local Arab civic actors before defining its calls of proposals, in an effort to make its core funding procedure less top-down. It has also been exploring ways of providing CSOs with more core support rather than just funding one-off projects. The EU has moved towards a greater mainstreaming of civil society support by increasing support to civil society as part of its other areas of development aid.

The EU has introduced several innovations to get funds out more quickly to civil society activists, especially those facing arrest or physical attacks from their governments. Under a rapid response mechanism for civil society it can now get funds of up to 60,000 euros out to CSOs within two months. More of the EU’s funding now goes directly to protecting activists from state repression, in particular from its so-called Protectdefenders.eu initiative. Egyptian civil society has been the largest recipient of these funds anywhere in the world.

These changes are positive but for now remain tentative. In addition, there are on-going debates about funding levels for civil society. The European Commission’s proposals for the post-2020 budget promise to ring-fence 1.5 billion euros for civil society out of a 68 billion aid total – a 6 per cent increase on the current period. However, some in the southern Mediterranean have expressed concern because funds that up to now have been allocated specifically for the MENA countries will be folded into a single financial instrument covering all aid recipients worldwide (except candidate countries).
Graph 3: In your country foreign support to civil society comes mainly from: (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 7)

- European Union: 46% (Mashreq), 47% (Maghreb)
- United States of America: 27% (Mashreq), 34% (Maghreb)
- Qatar: 11% (Mashreq), 7% (Maghreb)
- Other: 6% (Mashreq), 7% (Maghreb)
- United Arab Emirates: 4% (Mashreq), 4% (Maghreb)
- Saudi Arabia: 3% (Mashreq), 5% (Maghreb)
- Turkey: 2% (Mashreq), 1% (Maghreb)
- Russia: 0% (Mashreq), 0% (Maghreb)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

The Commission insists that the single instrument will simplify funding procedures and allow funds to reach civic activists in the south more quickly and on more flexible terms. It also indicates that civil society could receive more money from the bilateral aid programmes for each recipient country than is currently the case. Yet, there is uncertainty over whether Arab civil society actors risk losing funds to other regions.

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) will benefit from a slightly increased amount of funding under the proposals. Through this, the EU will be able to fund projects without the consent of governments. In recent years, however, the EU has in practice been reluctant to do this in Arab countries, reducing the potential value of the EIDHR to Euro-Mediterranean relations. In the current political climate and with a security-first EU foreign policy, it is not clear that this is likely to change in any positive sense.

Even if there may be some gains for civil society actors under these proposals, there are remaining doubts. Many member states are pushing for changes to the Commission’s proposals. They want more flexibility to move funds away from civil society and human rights objectives into funding for security and migration-control purposes.

If the EU is to help retain a meaningful and forward-looking civil society strand to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership it will need to do more than simply guarantee a sufficient level of funding. The union will need to find ways of engaging helpfully with protests across the region. The EU cannot and should not seek to engineer protests and when these do occur it will often make sense to stand back and not interfere. But more could be done to help activists devise better strategies to keep reform momentum going after protests die down, to adopt more long-term political strategies and build broader alliances with other parts of society. These steps failed in the period after the Egyptian revolution in 2011; they will be
of vital importance in Algeria and Lebanon in the coming months and years and the union will face a crucial test case here.

The EU will need to add further to the flexibility of its funding to help reach the new forms of activism taking root across the southern Mediterranean. It should be able to ensure that a greater – perhaps even pre-set – share of its funding goes to new civic actors that have not previously received European support. It will need to rethink its traditional model of funding in an era when activists are often looking for more political support rather than the standard form of civil society capacity-building or training project. Part of this should entail helping civil society generate funds from local sources to reduce donor dependency. The EU will need to decide whether it has the political will to react as Arab regimes clampdown on the region’s dynamic activists in increasingly harsh fashion – the IEMed survey reveals concerns that the union needs to do this without being counter-productive in leaving civic actors more vulnerable. A promising idea would be to shift more EU funds to civil society as and when regimes abuse human rights commitments.

These kinds of changes would take on board the evolution of civic activism in the southern Mediterranean. It is far from certain that member states have the political will to agree to them, in large measure due to familiar security and geopolitical reasons.

A final reflection: while there is scope for EU civil society support to improve in the southern Mediterranean, a deeper and intriguing trend is that many of the same civic politics are today evident within EU member states. Protests occur with greater frequency, a more dynamic layer of community-level activism has gained traction, and in response most EU governments have sought to restrict civic space. This calls for far deeper and more intense linkages and coordination between European and MENA civil society, quite separate from what formal EU support may or may not exist. A genuinely Euro-Mediterranean civic space may be emerging – in both positive and less benign ways – and may prove capable of making the EMP’s civil society component more of a tangible reality than has previously been the case.

While there is scope for EU civil society support to improve in the southern Mediterranean, many of the same civic politics are today evident within EU member states. This calls for deeper and more intense linkages and coordination between European and MENA civil society.
THE IMPORTANCE OF SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA IN THE SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

JERZY POMIANOWSKI
Executive Director European Endowment for Democracy (EED)

The media is well placed to “monitor policies and be a watchdog of citizens’ rights”, which was considered by the respondents to this Survey as the most important mission of civil society.

Introduction

The media, be it considered part of civil society or not, plays a vital role in holding authorities to account, exposing corruption, providing information to citizens, offering a platform for debate, and shaping opinions. As such, it is well placed to “monitor policies and be a watchdog of citizens’ rights”, which was considered by the respondents to this Survey as the most important mission of civil society.

Graph 1: What should be the most important mission of civil society? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 4)

Monitor policies and be a watchdog of citizens’ rights 34%
Mobilise communities outside the institutions in order to influence politics 25%
Participate in the design of public policies 24%
Complement governments’ mandate, i.e. providing services not provided adequately otherwise, including to marginalised groups 14%
Other 3%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

These functions mean that independent media outlets are a particular target for authoritarian regimes and for other individuals in society with vested interests. In addition, in our “post-truth era”, where societies are manipulated by all kinds of propaganda and disinformation, many people are attracted by what is easy and familiar. This has meant a drive towards simple identities, polarised audiences and more and more echo-chambers, where individuals’ beliefs and “truths” are constantly reiterated to them in both the on and offline media.

In such a moment of disorientation, trust is becoming more important than the truth. Trust is a very important conservative value – it makes people believe each other – but when it surpasses truth, then democracy is in crisis.
That is why EED is investing in objective, independent, attractive and trusted media.

In the light of the Survey’s results, this article presents EED’s work in the area of independent media and reflects on lessons learned in media and democracy support. It offers an analysis of the worrying trends and challenges faced by the media today and calls for an urgent re-set in thinking about donor support to the media in the EU neighbourhood. The article also seeks to offer some recommendations.

**EED’s Media Support**

Over the past six years, EED has funded more than 230 media-based projects, 45 of them in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Most EED-supported media initiatives fall into one of two categories: small, start-up initiatives that operate more like NGOs and larger, professional media outlets.

The smaller initiatives often experiment with innovative ideas, reaching specific segments of society and contributing to media plurality.

Professional independent media outlets (or entities that aspire to this status) are often working in environments with no independent public broadcasters and they face uphill struggles to survive. Core operating costs are significant; quality journalism, especially investigative journalism, is a resource-intensive and long-term activity. Such media outlets require skilled employees and expensive technical equipment and are in direct competition with private or state-owned media. Typically, they have business models that involve subscriptions and/or advertising revenue but, for reasons as outlined below, will frequently be heavily reliant on donor support.

EED’s media work can broadly be divided into the following five thematic areas: ensuring media pluralism, supporting innovation, countering disinformation, investigative journalism and documentation, and media targeting specific audiences.

In addition, EED supports journalist associations, media capacity-building initiatives and efforts to support media legislation reform and to provide legal aid to journalists.

**Trends and Challenges**

In its World Press Freedom Index 2019, Reporters without Borders notes a deterioration in conditions for the media in many countries of the EU neighbourhood with increasing persecution of government critics and authoritarian control over news and information. This corroborates the finding of the Survey that the major obstacle for civil society as a whole in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries is “political pressure on civil society activists.”

These findings are backed up by the experience of EED partners, who report back to EED regularly on the challenges they face in their daily work. In the most restrictive environments, independent media outlets are banned, denied licences and harassed through denial of premises, raids on their offices, arrest and legal charges against journalists. Attacks and intimidation of journalists is common, often with apparent impunity, and self-censorship is often necessary for these media outlets to survive. In such contexts, independent media outlets have sometimes responded by moving their operations to portals managed from abroad or by using encrypted private platforms to disseminate content. While online platforms offer them a lifeline, they also come with their own challenges. In financial terms, the dominant online platforms such as Google, YouTube and Yandex siphon off a large share of potential advertising revenue from them, making financial self-sustainability all but impossible. There is also the relatively expensive cost of using Facebook or Twitter advertising, which is often
One of the major challenges for all independent media is financial survival. While it is clear that digitalisation has disrupted traditional business models, there are also other factors at play. Governments often deliberately create conditions to starve media of revenue as a way of asserting governmental control and forcing independent media out of business. The media operates in a competitive environment but in many countries, even in relatively open environments, media markets are distorted. Media outlets or platforms are often owned or financed by oligarchs, political figures or state actors that heavily subsidise the media in order to project a particular political viewpoint or narrative, thereby eliminating fair competition. In some countries, advertising cartels under political control have emerged that effectively cut independent or opposition media out of the media advertising market. Countries with small populations face additional challenges to deliberate market distortions due to the small size of the markets in which they operate. While pluralism exists, media outlets compete for shrinking resources and a limited audience, and this can lead to poor quality or politicised journalism resulting in public distrust of the media.

Ensuring Media Pluralism

A vibrant independent media is an integral feature of any democratic society. An independent media shines a light on the conduct of governments, holds authorities to account, and provides a diversity of opinions that enable people to make informed choices during elections. It is important to ensure that a plurality of voices is maintained and that reliable information is available, especially in fragile environments. Threats to media pluralism include government restrictions on independent media, deliberate distortion of media markets through political or oligarchic control of media outlets or the advertising markets they depend on, and self-censorship from independent media due to political contexts. An increasing threat also comes from media funded by single international sources with heavy political agendas. Independent media outlets serve as an important counterweight to such politicised media.

Supporting Innovative and Creative Media

New technologies such as social media, podcasting and private messaging channels provide opportunities for alternative media and are particularly important for media operating in restrictive environments. Often such informal types of media have come to the fore during times of political change, where the fast pace of events means that citizen journalists can emerge as the best sources for accurate, real-time reporting. The rise in internet connectivity is also changing the way people consume media. Young people increasingly consume media on mobile phones and through social networks, where algorithms can filter out or promote certain content. Social networking platforms can provide both opportunities for independent media and challenges as they adapt to a rapidly changing and largely unregulated space, and compete for attention with disinformation and clickbait. EED also supports media initiatives that use creative and artistic approaches to communicate with the public about political or social issues, using satirical cartoons, documentary photography or film.
Countering Disinformation

Disinformation – the deliberate spreading of false information intended to mislead – is a growing global problem. Although not a new phenomenon (states of all stripes have engaged in manipulation of the media, especially in the build-up to and during conflict), the ease and speed with which disinformation can now spread online via social media as well as the increasing sophistication of disinformation tactics has brought renewed focus to the issue. Disinformation can polarise societies and aggravate divisions and contribute to an overall distrust of the media. This makes support to truly independent media more vital than ever. EED research has found that this is often best done by concentrating on producing locally focused content, which is usually absent from the more geopolitically-focused disinformation. Quality content that is more relevant to people’s everyday lives can help attract audiences away from sources of disinformation. Other relevant actions include supporting fact-checking initiatives and efforts to increase critical thinking and media literacy.

Investigative Journalism and Documentation

Media initiatives that document human rights violations or expose corruption make an important contribution to democratic progress, yet they are among the highest risk activities for journalists. Investigative journalism is also increasingly under threat because of the cost and time involved in pursuing stories. With many media outlets struggling to make ends meet, it is often impossible to concentrate resources on a single story, and there are also the political and personal risks to both media outlets and journalists who expose malpractice. In conflict areas, human rights violations often go unreported or are misreported by the claims and counterclaims of parties to the conflict. Journalists who try to shine a light on the facts become targets themselves, as has tragically been seen all too often in Syria. Documenting the truth about abuses of human rights during conflict is also a way of preparing for future peace and reconciliation processes. Supporting the media in these contexts can therefore be seen as an investment in future peace and democracy processes.

Media Targeting Specific Audiences

As part of its efforts to support inclusive democracies, EED assists media initiatives that target specific populations such as ethnic or linguistic minorities, women and youths. Many such audiences are neglected by existing media, and supporting targeted media outlets is a way of promoting the democratic participation of these communities. Such outlets frequently require donor support for their core operations as they often target smaller and excluded audiences.

Examples from the MENA Region

- Daraj is an ambitious online media platform based in Lebanon that brings together smaller independent media outlets and professional freelance journalists from across the MENA region to produce high-quality and in-depth reporting. Set up by three experienced Lebanese journalists who wanted to provide an alternative to the politicised and polarised Arabic media on offer, Daraj currently boasts some 200 contributors, many of whom write under pen names for their own safety. Launched in late 2017, EED seed funding has enabled Daraj to build its brand and reputation. In its first 18 months, Daraj has already made its mark. An early success was its partnership with leading global media as part of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists that released the so-called “Paradise Papers”, which exposed the hidden offshore wealth of the global elite. In another high-profile report, in December 2018, Daraj exposed how a loans programme run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was...
being used to support members of pro-regime militias in Syria. The story led to the freezing of the programme and an internal UN investigation. According to CEO Alia Ibrahim, there is a real appetite for investigative reporting in the Arab world, with several long-form reports featuring in Daraj’s ten most-read items. As well as investigations, Daraj publishes opinion pieces, features on social issues, and is experimenting with formats such as video explainers on current affairs. Daraj is based on a hybrid business model that combines donor funding with a long-term ambition for self-sustainability. Its growing readership proves there is a real demand for independent media in the Arab world. But, as Ibrahim stresses, there is a need for continued support: “We need to be able to work strategically with a clear vision – for this we need long-term funding. We need to build the culture and to work with a true sense of partnership with our funders and other collaborators.”

- EED has supported the Al-Jumhuriya Collective, which was set up in 2012 by a group of pro-democracy writers and intellectuals to bear witness to the events of the conflict in Syria and to provide an independent Syrian analysis of what was happening on the ground in the country and in society.

- EED supported the online version of the Berlin-based Saiedet Souria magazine aimed at women in Syria and promoting women’s rights and their participation in the public sphere. EED also provided bridge funding to help the magazine continue during a period of fluctuating donor support.

- Working mainly on a volunteer basis and writing anonymously, the Lebanese collective of young journalists Megaphone uses social media platforms such as Instagram and Facebook to distribute tailored content targeted at youth audiences. “We noticed that mainstream media didn’t speak our language, that our narratives remained untold,” says Jamal, one of the co-founders of the Lebanese collective Megaphone. Using video explainers and bite-sized news reporting that appeal to tech-savvy youth audiences, they aim to provide alternatives in content as well as in form. For example, during the much-postponed legislative elections in 2018 – Lebanon’s first under a new proportional system – Megaphone provided information to help voters understand the new system as well as interviews with candidates who were excluded from the mainstream channels. In addition to writing for youth, Megaphone covers issues related to groups whose voices are marginalised by the politicised and sectarian Lebanese media establishment, such as refugees, Palestinian refugees, women and migrant workers. “We have an agenda,” they admit. “Our agenda is about promoting equality of rights, social justice, and civil liberties for both citizens and non-citizens in Lebanon, and holding the establishment to account.” As Megaphone tries to build on its successes to date, its biggest obstacle is funding. The young volunteers already come with a high level of technical expertise but, as Jamal acknowledges, they are competing with the big pockets of state media giants – a story that will be familiar to many of their counterparts in other countries.

- Sowt, a regional media group based in Jordan, was started in 2017 and produces high-quality podcasts on regional topics, such as the 1967 War, use of religion by the state, the Syrian revolution, and women artists. Taboo issues such as single parents and abortion, etc., are also covered, partly because the audio format allows anonymity, yet intimacy. Their objectives are to be independent, innovative and optimistic.

Policy Recommendations

Based on its own experiences and feedback from partners, EED drew up the following lessons learned as a contribution to the policy discussion and as good practices for other donors interested in supporting independent media in the EU neighbourhood:
1. Scale up support for independent media initiatives in recognition of their vital role and the costly nature of their work. A key aspect of this is taking a longer-term approach to media support, focused on core funding rather than project-based funding.

2. Be realistic about self-sustainability. Support the development of hybrid business models to increase and diversify revenue of media outlets while recognising the probable ongoing need for donor support. Support for media should be considered as a direct investment in democratic progress, not simply as a business investment.

3. Greater donor coherence, coordination and consistency. EED is able to act fast to provide seed funding, emergency support or bridge funding for media. To complement this, new modalities and funding mechanisms for professional media may be needed to fill the gap in funding for the mid- to longer-term support. Combined efforts and coordination between donors are needed to provide adequate funding and synergy of approach. Tailored indicators and evaluation mechanisms should be developed recognising the link between funds, results and impact.

4. See media as equal partners. In much of the EU neighbourhood, journalists and media professionals have a high level of skills and experience. Too often support is donor-driven rather than demand-driven, directing efforts into training that is not appropriate or needed or donor-preferred types of content production that may be simpler to monitor and/or come with fewer risks.

5. Be more political. Media support, especially in more restrictive environments, is a political rather than a technical activity. Donors should consider supporting overtly opposition media outlets where they demonstrate democratic values.

6. Ensure visible international political and diplomatic support to journalists and media outlets. This has been shown in many instances to offer a form of protection, protecting the well-being and life of journalists. The EU should exercise its political leverage to push for a more open media environment. At the same time, it should be recognised that donor support should not always be visible and some partners may not wish to communicate about their funding sources to the general public.

7. Keep the security dimension in mind when working with independent media. It is important to ensure a plurality of voices and that reliable information is available, especially in fragile environments. This is particularly important when independent media outlets compete with others that are receiving significant funding from single international sources with heavy political agendas, for example Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran.

8. Focus on local content. Local content that is relevant to people’s daily lives is often lacking. This can help build trust in the media and counter disinformation.

**Conclusions**

Despite the authoritarian backlash that has gripped the region and stifled almost all of the revolutionary movements, there is new energy in Arab media that has increased over time. People wish to define themselves and reflect on topics and problems in the modern Arab world, be it faith, identity, conservative society or terrorism. In the MENA region, journalism is much more than just reporting; it also means creating a sense of collective memory, especially during times of conflict. Independent Arab media can help both the EU and the youth of the region understand what is happening in their world, and empower them to be agents of positive change.
SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AS WINDOW DRESSING. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF HOW THE EU ENGAGES WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

ITXASO DOMÍNGUEZ DE OLAZÁBAL
Middle East and Maghreb Coordinator at Fundación Alternativas

The European Union (EU)’s approach to democracy promotion has long been, and to some extent still is, influenced by an institutionalist agenda stemming from the prevailing neoliberal framework under which most Western countries have designed their foreign policies. The Southern Mediterranean is thus perceived as a space in which the EU can inspire and shape the construction of liberal democratic and economic institutions through “value export” diplomacy. The Eurocentric frame rests on the “liberal peace” paradigm, according to which state-building and democracy promotion are only possible through exporting “successful” universally applicable models.

The launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) opened a new window of opportunity for standardised democratisation in the Southern Mediterranean based on “common values” (i.e., Western liberal values). Ironically, the Southern Mediterranean countries would share with the EU “all but institutions” but have ended up by being encouraged to import or replicate institutional frameworks inspired by European models. In this context, references to civil society have become pervasive in the EU’s policy discourses on democracy promotion. Since at least the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, the role of civil society has gained increased recognition by policy-makers in the last three decades and has led to the creation or strengthening of a number of instruments.

After years of EU neglect, in practice, of civil society actors in the years leading up to it, the 2011 revolts represented a turning point, at least on the rhetorical level. The 2011 ENP Review (European Commission, 2011a) and the Communication A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood (European Commission, 2011b) in the wake of the so-called “Arab Spring” implicitly acknowledged the EU’s disconnection with the events on the ground, partly as a consequence of the flaws and contradictions of its approach towards the Southern Mediterranean. The main avowed concern pointed at lack of support and understanding for civil societies, although references were also made to the interest-driven prioritisation of stability and subsequent collusion with authoritarian regimes. The post-2011 period, as evidenced by texts speaking of “partnership with the people” (European Commission, 2011c) and “deep democracy” (European Commission, 2011a), represented a juncture that could have led, at least on paper, to a truly horizontal partnership between EU institutions and civil society.

The EU, however, fell back on a fruitless institutionalist approach on two levels: when developing a strategy for the region in which civil society is factored in, and when devising and implementing programmes with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) as partners. In the first case, the “tick the box” exercise means civil society is considered but not as the central pil-
lar, most of the time not even as a pillar, but instead a necessary element in order for the EU to beautify, and thus legitimise, its strategy(ies). On a micro level, when the EU designs its relationships with civil society, it does so by embracing a “checklist approach” according to which very similar Eurocentric principles and procedures are applied to completely different contexts.

**A “Tick the Box” Approach to the Engagement with Civil Society in ENP Strategies**

The reproduction – with slight cosmetic changes – of a model deemed successful in other regions forced the EU to accommodate civil society when devising its strategies towards the Southern Mediterranean. The outcomes have been described as incoherent and inconsistent initiatives (Bicchi, 2014) whose transformative impact has remained rather moderate (Kostanyan, 2017).

One chief complication of the “tick the box” approach is that it has no clear conceptual underpinnings, and the ones it has miss the mark. Civil society is perceived on paper as a means to achieve democracy but also as an end in and of itself. Whereas the EU conceptualises civil society, albeit sometimes only at the rhetorical level, as a transformative actor, civil society actors might conceptualise their role differently, for instance in terms of social development, economic welfare or culture (Boiten, 2015). Moreover, the EU’s vision is not clearly outlined and hence does not specify either what the inclusion of civil society for a specific country or region means in practical terms or how it leads to the desired outcomes, notably democracy promotion.

The unremitting references to civil society dilute a strategy composed of patchy initiatives through which the EU “sends one message with one voice but pursues conflicting goals” (Börzel & Van Hüllen, 2014). Divergent goals are notably democratisation and stability. As was the case in the past, and given the recent reactions to revolts in countries such as Morocco, Egypt and Algeria, the presumption appears to be that democratisation could lead to instability – the worst of two evils – in the short and medium term. Patchiness has not been ironed out and, post-2011, there has not been an accurate recalibration of relations between North and South. Renovated, sometimes even new, tools have been designed but an old toolbox remains. As a consequence of a deeply incoherent blueprint, objectives and actions cancel each other out. In close association with this insufficiency, new mechanisms are most of the time realistic and attainable only to a certain degree.

In some ways a testimony to its blurry conceptualisation, civil society plays a functional role in making the implementation of EU policies more legitimate, not necessarily more effective. The EU has been accused of caring more about its public relations than about responding to the needs of local civil society (Kausch, 2013) in a continuum with the well-known gap between the EU’s rhetoric of civil society empowerment and a practice in which CSOs are not real partners but accessorial constituents. The perception is thus one in which Europe does not genuinely care about what CSOs can achieve but limits itself to funding CSOs in a unilateral “all good things go together” vision (Wetzel & Orbie, 2012).

At the practical level, CSOs are constrained to indirect normative promotion and utilised as service delivery agents (Dark, 2018), often complementing the role of state institutions, either within a development agenda or in an agenda based on free-market principles.
**Graph 1: What should be the most important mission of civil society?**
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 4)

- Monitor policies and be a watchdog of citizens’ rights: 35% SEM, 34% EU
- Mobilise communities outside the institutions in order to influence politics: 24% SEM, 26% EU
- Participate in the design of public policies: 25% SEM, 24% EU
- Complement governments’ mandate, i.e. providing services not provided adequately otherwise, including to marginalised groups: 15% SEM, 13% EU
- Other: 2% SEM, 3% EU

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

This sheds light on a prioritisation of state-building, sometimes unapologetically so, even if it repeatedly leads to effects contrary to genuine democracy promotion. The focus is on effective rather than democratic governance. Much assistance labelled as democracy promotion focuses on state institutions and not CSOs. State-building efforts conflict with democracy promotion when authoritarian regimes’ effective governance is ultimately strengthened.

2011 was a wake-up call for the EU’s approach to civil societies in the Southern Mediterranean. Brussels was forced to confront the rejection of an economic and social model inspired by Western institutions (Bergh, 2012). However, state-building efforts through civil society promotion have been – and still are – repeatedly linked to the urgency of advancing economic liberalisation. Hand in hand with the precedence of free market politics, security and stabilisation have been prioritised to boost foreign investors’ confidence. Objectives that may be deemed pressing to local needs, such as reinforcing gender equality or strengthening local governance, have been reduced to second-class apprehensions.

The much-vaunted concept of “principled pragmatism” has ultimately proven to be most of the time tantamount to realpolitik. There is lack of clarity in the strategies concerning the EU’s path of action when confronted with incompatible goals vis-à-vis democratisation and partnership with the respective governments. In Algeria, for instance, the EU has provided more capacity-building for the police force than for encouraging civil society projects (Van Hüllen, 2015). Incoherence can also be vertical as a consequence of member states’ strategic prioritisation of their interests and perspectives, as has recently been the case in Libya or Egypt. Civil society promotion might be implemented differently depending on the interests at stake and not on the particularities of the respective contexts. The EU-Turkey Statement to end irregular migration flows from Turkey to the EU is an example of prioritisation of both national and European interests and a blatant sidelining of CSOs’ concerns.

When it comes to the real issues, the EU ultimately sides with the status quo, seriously hamstringing its normative influence. This inconsistency, as well as the accusations of connivance with authoritarian regimes or figures (Huber and Paciello, 2018), has deepened in the years following the 2011 revolts. The EU has perpetuated a state-centred government-to-government approach.
The prospect of building true democratic structures ultimately rests with the regime’s willingness to do so. The EU rhetoric of CSOs’ empowerment and their insufficient inclusion in the policy dialogues and processes. Evidence includes the intergovernmental nature of the ENP’s Action Plan negotiations or the 2015 ENP reform’s suppression of progress reports.

Consequently, the EU finds itself in a situation in which it publicly and enthusiastically supports CSOs without truly backing up their work when they act as political opposition. Morocco stands as a manifest example. CSOs are thus at best complementary, if and when the respective regime somehow tolerates their stance and work. The financing of civil society actors is also a significant problem, for the state-centred approach also means that civil society projects must be developed within the framework of national law and that the EU has to consult with the partner’s regime over which projects to fund. Southern Mediterranean national authorities can also constrain CSOs in terms of bureaucracy as well as by supervising the flows of financial assistance and the registration processes, as evidenced by the dire state of Egyptian civil society.

The above does not mean the EU does not work with CSOs. It does so along safe lines and on “low political issues”, such as “climate change”, “intercultural dialogue” and “gender equality”.

Support for CSOs’ lacked teeth from its very inception and still does so after successive much-vaunted reforms. Negative conditionality has been used cautiously. At best, it has been used inconsistently, and not necessarily aimed at democracy promotion. Meaningful support for CSOs in Southern Mediterranean countries is, therefore, limited: neither are they autonomous nor do they have room for manoeuvre to have an impact on an eventual democratisation.

A “Checklist Approach” to Civil Society Support

“One-size-fits-all” is the mantra of EU democracy promotion also at a secondary level; that is, when the EU designs and implements its strategy towards civil society in every Southern Mediterranean partner. One of the reasons is that aid in the ENP context is instrument- and not demand-driven. Furthermore, funding is oftentimes based on “transition templates” characterised by an indistinct understanding of civil society as a standardised actor and a lack of knowledge of the individual components of every civil society, as we could – and can – see in the projects for the modernisation of the judiciary in Morocco and Tunisia.

Most of the time and despite the post-2011 acknowledgement of the need to engage more broadly with all kinds of civil society, the EU still misreads and simplifies the complexity of local civil societies. The EU ends up by imposing a recognisable notion of civil society, mostly composed of formal elite liberal-minded Western-fashioned individuals and organisations that did not play a key role in spearheading the 2011 revolts or the transition processes. This selective approach works as a “politics of in/visibility” in which many CSOs are either overlooked or straightforwardly sidelined (Burkner & Scott, 2019).

The selective approach is possible because the civil society agenda is primarily determined by the European side. The EU not only selects but also institutionalises and co-opts its partners. Selection, moreover, is not the output of consultative equilitarian processes that could help the EU identify local requirements. Consequently, it is expressed through a highly technical language and articulating a somehow aseptic grammar. Those CSOs more often than not lack sufficient knowledge of local dynamics.

Moreover, the EU discriminates against those actors with whom it deems there is a conflict of values (Nouira & Redissi, 2018), most notably faith-based (namely Islamic) as well as anti-
The EU tends to privilege organisations that cannot be categorically considered grassroots groups but consolidated entities that have spent years specialising in the process of building relationships with Western donors.

In its devising and implementing of civil society strategies in the Southern Mediterranean, one of the consequences has been the direct and indirect strengthening of authoritarian tendencies. A state-centric approach leads to favouring those CSOs that have been co-opted, or at least intimidated, by Southern Mediterranean regimes, ultimately supporting CSOs – the case of Algeria comes to mind – that will probably never become agents of transformative change. So-called “NGO-cracies” are not only close to the regime’s views and channel most EU’s funding (Catalano & Graciano, 2016) but are also consequently disconnected from the debates within grassroots organisations.
Moving Forward

The EU’s “checklist approach” when it comes to its relationship with civil societies on different levels erodes the Union’s credibility, worryingly restraining its potential in supporting democracy promotion, social development and sustainability in the Southern Mediterranean. One necessary, but almost unimaginable, goal would be to bolster a change of paradigm towards moving away from normative Eurocentric approaches and embracing the idea of true equality and co-ownership between partners, not just regimes but civil societies as well. That mindset would need to take into consideration similar and interrelated transnational dynamics and challenges, shared by North and South in a globalised context, as an opportunity and not a threat.

Focusing on more realistic “problem-solving” approaches does not consent the EU to waive the need to reflect on profound changes but could, in the short term, aim at achieving higher levels of coherence and effectiveness. In this regard, the goal would be to cease confusing democratisation with Europeanisation (Gunay, 2015), to put forward a comprehensive, comprehensible, consistent strategy and thus to put an end to the confusion on concepts, policies, objectives and mechanisms.

Recent events have shown that the kind of stability preached by authoritarian leaders is not sustainable in the long run, an excellent reason to go beyond securitised approaches and false democratisation-stabilisation dilemmas and look for ways of promoting a combination of genuinely democratic and effective governance. If the option appears unattainable, or unpalatable, in the short term, the cautious stance would be advancing more realistic – even if less pompous – grassroots projects and initiatives, and thus less ambitious, carefully crafted goals. Use of negative conditionality in the framework of the partnership agreements should be critical.

Civil societies should be systematically included – and consulted – in any ENP negotiation. Southern Mediterranean CSOs’ stance must be taken into account when devising future blueprints of partnerships with their respective countries. In that regard, the EU needs to make sure there is an effectively autonomous civil society (chiefly from a financial point of view, even if that implies risk-taking). Inclusiveness will, however, go beyond well-intentioned but ultimately cosmetic (and even so exceptional) gestures, such as the establishment of the Tunisian “tripartite dialogue” aimed at discussing the negotiations of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (Dandashly, 2018).

Disregard for local conditions is both a cause and a consequence of a deeply institutionalist approach. The EU needs to find a way to systematically differentiate its “one-size-fits-all” approach and put the ENP’s focus on reflecting more closely the specificities of each Southern Mediterranean society, actors and needs. This calls for broadening the concept of civil society striving to eschew cultural relativism and questions around civilisational narratives. In that regard, facilitating access to the respective registration, funding, participation and consultation procedures to a wide array of CSOs and other actors is an utterly strategic step. The chief requisite should be their meeting local, not necessarily democratisation-related, demands. Last but not least, factoring in gender and other intersecting factors should be a transversal need in all contexts, levels and stages.

Civil societies should be systematically included – and consulted – in any ENP negotiation.

The EU needs to find a way to systematically differentiate its “one-size-fits-all” approach and put the ENP’s focus on reflecting more closely the specificities of each Southern Mediterranean society, actors and needs.
Bibliography


ASSESSING THE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF FOREIGN SUPPORT OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN REGION

ZAID EYADAT
Prof. Director of the Center for Strategic Studies. University of Jordan

The answers to the question “Do you consider that the support of civil society by foreign actors/donors can be counter-productive in your country?” in the 10th Euromed Survey showed a significant difference in opinions between respondents in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and their European Union counterparts. This paper argues that the neoliberal NGOization of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in political discourse has resulted in many in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean viewing the organisations with distinct distrust and a reflection of geo-political dynamics.

Many, in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, view NGOs with distinct distrust and a reflection of geo-political dynamics.

This article first evaluates the nomenclature of “civil society” to understand the malevolent perception of foreign support for civil society in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region. Modern proliferations of the term “civil society” can be traced back to the 1980s and the post-Cold War period in an attempt to create civility in society, responding to global trends of despotism (Mohan, 2002, p. 193). Initially conceived as the creation of a space in which groups striving for a plural and diverse society can exist, the utopian and even magical formula for “civil society” and “CSOs” would soon be clouded in the complex realities of public policy. The notion of civil society establishes both a “social value and a set of social institutions” (Hall, 1995, p. 1), interacting with three basic actors, poetically described by Korten as: “the prince, who represents governmental power; the
merchant, representing economic power; and the citizens, who embodies the people’s power” (Korten, 1990, p. 96).

At least superficially, CSOs are institutionally defined by their voluntary composition governance and direction comes from citizens, without major government involvement (UNDP, 2013, p. 123). However, the term CSO is an incredibly broad one and reflects a diverse set of organisational structures, varying from small, community-centred organisations to high-profile international NGOs. According to organisations such as the UN, they, by nature, are independent of direct government control and management (UNDP, 2013, p. 125). This definition of CSOs does not reveal the whole picture.

This paper uses the Gramscian theory on “civil society” in its attempt to understand the critical views regarding the perceived interference of foreign actors. Briefly, civil society is a set of organisations through which society organised and represented itself autonomously from the state (Kurtz, 1999). However, for Gramsci, civil society functions as a direct consequence and expression of hegemony (articulated as a pattern of “established power relations among social groups in a given historical political situation” [Brighenti, 2016, p. 1]). Within a hegemonic superstructure, civil society is the object, battleground and outcome of different social and political groups in a specific historical context. It is a site that implicitly and explicitly involves itself in the production, circulation and consumption of discourse and, as such, is ideological. CSOs act as the practical embodiment of civil society. However, this framework should also appreciate the shift of civil society in the latter half of the 20th century with the proliferation of global social movements and NGOs that has led to the transformation from national to global civil society. One can therefore assume that these forces and imbalances have been amplified to a global level.

The structure of this paper consists of two parts: a literature review that theoretically tackles some of the underlying reasons why foreign actors/donors could be counter-productive, and a thematic driven analysis of the reasons given in the Survey.

The “NGOisation” of CSOs

When the people demanded civil society, what they received instead were NGOs (Chandhoke, 2003, p. 9). The growth of NGOs has coincided with the trends of neoliberalism throughout the West, with Petras arguing that NGOs have in reality become part of a devolved state sector, as the community face of neo-liberalism (Petras, 1997). It can be argued that NGOs, as the predominant subset of CSOs, are symptomatic of “shadow states” that function through contacts with governments and are increasingly used as channels for and “direct beneficiaries of development aid provided by national and foreign governments” (Unguschaval, 2016, p. 3). In relation to their governance, their interwoven relationship with state practices often results in an intense pull towards professionalism and being “colonized by governmental ways of doing business” (Harwood & Creighton, 2009, p. 19).

Lang therefore argues that the “NGOization” of civil society is the shift from loosely organised and broadly mobilising social movements to more professionalised, vertically structured NGOs (Lang, 1997; 2013). This has a largely detrimental effect on both the nature and role of CSOs, with the professionalisation displacing more socially-orientated groups with better run organisations that in turn creates preconceived notions of how civil society should operate (Edwards, 2014).

Geo-political funding has compounded this issue, with CSOs needing to ally themselves with the interests of their government, rather than a more localised emphasis. As long as these aims do not overtly collide with issues such as democratisation and good governance, CSOs should be seen to mirror these interests (Mohanty, 2002, p. 215).
As such, the growth of NGOs as the main strand of CSOs ends up legitimising a version of civil society that loses its ability to criticise the state and in doing so forgets its purpose to enact social change (Mohanty, 2002, p. 230). All of the above reinforces oppressive and hegemonic states, allowing them to wield their coercive power to further their own interests.

Data Analysis

The data provided by the 10th Euromed Survey shows divergent perceptions between Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries with their EU counterparts, observed by a gap of 10 percentage points when answering the question of whether they viewed the support of civil society by foreign actors/donors as counter-productive. About 43% of respondents from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries answered yes, whereas about 33% of EU countries responded yes. The graph below illustrates this difference and focuses in particular on the respondents from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries.

Graph 2: Do you consider that the support of civil society by foreign actors/donors can be counter-productive in your country?
(% of YES answer)
In their open comments, some of those respondents argue that foreign actors/donors are functioning as a destabilising force, acting as a democratic front for hidden agendas, maintaining a destructive status quo, and using a one-size-fits-all approach. Others focus in particular on the West, seen as ineffective at dealing with issues and concerned instead with reinforcing its own interests. This is most notably exemplified in the case of Palestine, with entries lamenting the ineffectuality of Western powers and their participation being conditioned by neo-liberal methods that support the occupation and the status quo.

Their funds are based and conditioned on political consideration and serve to endorse the occupation structure in the occupied Palestine, they do not support projects that challenge the occupation but instead adapt to it.

Palestinian respondent

US/EU/UK – Serving political agendas that mainly focus on neo-liberal methods that exclude the political context of the country (one tool fits all).

Palestinian respondent

These comments are to some extent symptomatic of feelings throughout the Global South that criticise the interventionist nature of the West, not only in supporting civil society but more generally in its foreign policy. The offset of the Global War on Terror has disproportionately affected the Muslim world, with many of the nations involved in this Survey characterising themselves as such. This is most potently identified by a Syrian civil society organisation which, whilst polemical, is reflective of the neorealist/liberal policies adopted in the aftermath of a vicious civil war, partly birthed by a power vacuum partly birthed by Western involvement in the region and sustained by interventionist methods:

[…] Take Syria for example. Everybody interfered in the affairs in this country: governments, civil society groups, Jihadists, warmongers… Humans are mere beasts. They never help each other. They think first of themselves.

Syrian respondent

Some respondents, including from the Maghreb, also expressed their suspicions regarding support for civil society coming from Gulf countries, echoing what Hamdi wrote regarding the “logic of hegemony and dependency that Saudi Arabia and the UAE” seeks to impose in working with other states (Hamdi, 2017, p. 1).

Les pays du Golfe sont de grands déstabilisateurs.

Algerian respondent

Pays de Golfe – À cause du risque à l’atteinte à la souveraineté, et de la manipulation intentionnée.

Algerian respondent

Les pays du Golfe – Une grande partie des ressources est mobilisée dans l’appui technique de cadres extra nationaux.

Moroccan respondent

In summary, it is interesting to note that some respondents from EU countries subscribe to a lazily prescribed view of the Muslim world that bears a distinct resemblance to Samuel Huntington’s infamous article “The Clash of Civilisations”. The text imagines a cataclysmic coming together of the two major global forces in the aftermath of the Cold War: Western
democracy and Islam. There is, in most instances, a cognitive dissonance of European political forces that ignores their implicit role in the spread of what they criticise: the spread of Islamism. This feeling has transcended specific policies and entered into general discourse that can be said to mirror and fuel the growth of anti-Islamic sentiment in Europe. This is observed in the following examples:

- Muslim countries and donor organisations. (Dutch respondent)
- The influence of radical interpretation of Wahhabi’s religious trend that originates [sic] in Saudi Arabia. (Spanish respondent)
- ... il y a une crainte avérée d’une influence néfaste de par la diffusion d’un Islam wahabite rétrograde. (Belgian respondent)

**Recommendations**

Given the rather critical framework this essay has chosen to adopt, it is difficult to make recommendations that will disrupt the growing trend of NGOization that exists in CSOs. Nonetheless, in analysing the data, the following recommendations might go a little way in changing the balance of power and, in doing so, reduce the perception of “counter-productivity” of foreign actors/donors.

- Increase monitoring of the political orientation of civil societies, free from “troublesome” ideological concerns.
- Targeted funding to small, local social movements as opposed to global CSOs that will likely implement an ineffectively broad strategy marshalled by economic concerns.
**Bibliography**


**Lang, S.** (1997). The NGOization of Feminism. In J.W. Scott, C. Kaplan & D. Keates (Eds.), *Transitions, Environments, Translations: Feminism in International Politics* (pp. 101-120). London: Routledge,

**Lang, S.** (2013). *NGOs, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


**UNDP.** (2013). Working with Civil Society in Foreign Aid: Possibilities for South-South Cooperation, United National Development Programme.

ANNEXES

I  METHODOLOGY OF THE TENTH EUROMED SURVEY

II  LIST OF RESPONDENTS

III  SAMPLE OF THE SURVEY

IV  QUESTIONNAIRE

SET OF RESULTS (only available online at www.iemed.org/euromedsurvey)
METHODOLOGY OF THE TENTH EUROMED SURVEY
METHODOLOGY

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire is organised into three thematic blocks and has been designed with the objective of assessing the role and potential of civil society and social movements in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

The first section explores from a comparative perspective general concepts such as the importance, focus and objectives of civil society and social movements. The second relates to the context in which civil society organisations and social movements operate as well as the role of domestic and foreign actors in this regard. The focus of the third section is on the connections between civil societies on both sides of the Mediterranean and the potential for civil society to drive Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and integration and possibly provide answers to growing divisions and conflicts.

The questionnaire combined open-ended questions and multiple-choice questions with predefined answers offering respondents the possibility to choose and rank among several options or the possibility to grade on a “very low” to “very high” scale. For these questions, an optional space was provided to elaborate on the answer. This open part is considered of great importance for a Survey of this kind as it contributes to improving the interpretation of its overall results and provides with additional valuable material.

Survey Sample

To conduct the Survey, a universe of 6,100 experts, actors and policy-makers from the 43 Union for the Mediterranean countries was selected. They received an invitation to participate. As in previous years, geographical distribution, institutional affiliation, field of knowledge and gender balance were the reference criteria for selecting the universe.
Concerning the distribution by geographical origin, 48% came from the European Union and 51% from Southern and Southeast Mediterranean Countries (hereafter SEM).

Graph 1: Breakdown of responses by geographical origin: EU-28 and Mediterranean Partner Countries

The Mediterranean EU countries\(^1\) (32%) and the Maghreb countries\(^2\) are the sub-regional groupings that account for the bulk of the responses. The remaining EU countries and Mashreq\(^3\) countries come in third and fourth position.

Graph 2: Breakdown of respondents by region (in %)

1. Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Croatia and Slovenia. The first three alone account for nearly 78% of responses from this region.
2. Maghreb countries include Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya. The first three alone account for 92% of responses from this region.
3. Mashreq countries include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Syria.
Reaching a representative distribution by country continues to be a difficult task. Some countries are over-represented and others under-represented. In order to avoid bias in the results, we have weighted them according to distribution of the target by the countries in the sample (see annex II). With this weighting we avoid the over-representation of Spain, France, Italy Morocco and Tunisia largely determining the results of respondents overall.

**Profile of respondents**

In the first block of questions, in addition to providing their country of origin, respondents were asked to indicate their gender and the type of institution they belonged to.

As shown in the graphs below, the majority of respondents to the questionnaire are “experts”, an aggregated category that includes respondents from think tanks, media and, above all, academia. Altogether, these groups account for 51% of the total number of responses. The other categories are “civil society” (encompassing trade unions, companies and mainly NGOs) account for 32% and “policy-makers” (embracing responses from diplomatic bodies, European or international institutions, political parties and governments) 17% of the total number of responses.

**Graph 3: Breakdown of respondents by type of institution**

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

---

4. Governmental, EU institution, international organisation, think tank, academic, media, NGO, company (business sector).
When looking specifically at the individual groups (see graph 4 below), academia emerges as the most represented institution (32% of total responses), followed by NGOs (28%) and think tanks (15%). Altogether, these groups account for two thirds of the total responses.

Graph 4: Breakdown of respondents by type of institution

Respondents were also asked about their main sector of activity and were given the opportunity to indicate one or two areas of specialisation. As shown in the graph below, which features aggregated figures for main and secondary areas of specialisation, 34% of the respondents operate in the area of “Social, cultural and human exchanges”.

“Political cooperation and security" ranks second as the main area of specialisation of respondents (31%), followed by "migration and justice affairs" with 16%. Finally, “economic and financial cooperation” comes in fourth place with 15%.

Graph 5: Breakdown of respondents by main area of specialisation

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

(Respondents could indicate one or two areas of specialisation. This graph shows aggregated totals for first and second choices as areas of specialisation. This is why the total percentage exceeds 100%).
When analysing the figures above by factoring in the geographical dimension, one finds that the main area of specialisation of European respondents is “political cooperation and security” while most SEM respondents identified “social, cultural and human exchanges” as their area of expertise.

**Graph 6: Breakdown of respondents by area of specialisation and by region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Specialisation</th>
<th>EU Respondents</th>
<th>SEM Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social, cultural and human exchanges</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political cooperation and security</td>
<td></td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and financial cooperation</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration, justice and home affairs</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey

Finally, to complete the description of the sample on which this Survey is based, it is important to note that 39% of respondents are women. When analysing the North/South dimension, the aggregate proportion of women amounts to 38% for SEM countries, while it increases to 44% for EU countries. By regional groups, the Maghreb fall below the overall gender ratio.

**Graph 7: Breakdown of respondents by gender**

- Women: 39%
- Men: 61%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey
Graph 8: Breakdown of respondents by gender and regional groups

- European non-EU: Men 50%, Women 50%
- Rest of EU: Men 53%, Women 47%
- Mediterranean EU: Men 57%, Women 43%
- Mashreq: Men 67%, Women 33%
- Maghreb: Men 69%, Women 31%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 10th Euromed Survey
LIST OF RESPONDENTS
LIST OF RESPONDENTS

The European Institute of the Mediterranean ensures the absolute anonymity of the replies by participants. The data has been processed after coding each questionnaire. In addition, there is a minimum number of respondents per country to ensure that the responses cannot be traced back to any of them.

In addition, respondents had the option of not appearing on this final list of participants. 114 out of 751 respondents chose not to be included; therefore this list has a total of 637 names.

ABBAS, ROULA. Civil Society Focal Point, Neighbourhood South. Operations Sections. Lebanon
AHDALLAH, MARWAN. Organization for Petroleum & Energy Sustainability (OPES). Lebanon
ABDELHALIM, AMIRA MOHAMED. Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. Egypt
ABDEL SAMEI, MARWA. Agir Ensemble. Morocco
ABDELWAHDI, WADII. Cairo University. Egypt
ABER, NAIMA. Algeria
ABO SHADY, RADWA. Egypt
ABOULLOUZ, ABDELHAKIM. Ibn Zohr University. Morocco
ABOUTAIEB, RACHID. Alliance Genèce pour les Droits de l'Homme. Morocco
ABUBAKR, AMGHAR MERIAM. Azgar Association. Libya
ABURUMMAN, NEMER. Spain
ADJABI, LOTFI. Association de l'Information et de Communication en Milieu de Jeunes - INFO-COM - Guelma. Algeria
ADOUANI, SAMI. FES Tunisie. Tunisia
AFZA, DRISS. ASTATIS Luxembourg. France
AI ALI, HASSAN. Université Hassan II Casablanca. Morocco
AI ALI, HASSAN. Université Hassan II Casablanca. Morocco
AI-ASMAR, WADIH. Lebanon
ALBERTI, FABIO. Un ponte per / Medlink. Italy
ALBINYANA, ROGER. European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed). Spain
ALDAMEN, YASMIN. Jordan
ALHADDADIN, REEM. Jordan
ALI EL DEAN, HILLAL. Cairo University. Egypt
ALIBONI, ROBERTO. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Italy
ALIGUE, ABDELMOUMEN. Algeria
ALLAM, RABHA. Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS). Egypt
ALLOUCH, AHMED. Youth Without Borders. Tunisia
ALMERMES, GUILLAUME. bgv. France
ALOQAIL Y, IRSHEID. Jordan
ALSHARAFAT, SAUD. Shorufat Center for Globalization Terrorism Studies. Jordan
ALSHGAIRAT, HUSSEIN. Dar Aleghwan for Studies and Research. Jordan
AL-THAWALBEH, HADEEL. Jordan
ALTUNA, SERGIO. Real Instituto Elcano. Spain
ALTUNISIK, MELIHA. Middle East Technical University. Turkey
AL Y, SAFAA. Egypt
AMBROSINI, MAURIZIO. DSSP, University of Milano. Italy
ANGELI, MARIA. The Spiral, Holistic Education, Human Values, Life Long Learning. Greece
ANTHONY, IAN. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Sweden
ARRAZAZAKIS, OTON. South East European Studies Programme - Oxford University. United Kingdom
ANDERSSON, ASTRID. Collège d’Europe. Belgium
ANGLI, MARIA. The Spiral, Holistic Education, Human Values, Life Long Learning. Greece
ANTHONY, IAN. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Sweden
AOURRAZ, RACHID. Morocco
ARSHARD, JORDI. FundiPau (Fundació per la Pau) Catalonia / Spain
AROUÉ, PIERRE-ANDRÉ. Spain
ARVANITI, PANAGIOTA. Kinisi Ethelonton Service Civil International-Hellas. Greece
ARVANITIS, RIGAS. Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (CEPED-IRD). France
ASIEDU, MICHAEL. Global Political Trends Center-Istanbul Kultur University, Austria
ASSAF, NABIL. UN. Algeria
ATF, AZZOUNA. Université de Tunis El Manar. Tunisia
ATHANASIADIS, KONSTANTINOS. Metropolitan College. Greece
ATRAN, SCOTT. CNRS (France), University of Oxford. France
ATTAR, SAMAR. Syria
ATTINÀ, FULVIO. Jean Monnet Euro-Med Centre, Università di Catania. Italy
AUBARELL SOLDUGA, GEMMA. Ministry for Foreign Action. Government of Catalonia. Spain
AUMAITRE BALADO, ARIANE. Collège d'Europe. Italy
AVDYLI, DRITA. National Chamber of Mediation. Albania
AVGERINOU KOLONIAS, SOFIA. Université Technique Nationale d’Athènes. Greece
AYADOUN, SIDAHMED. Association Jeunesse Volontaire - Sidi Bel Abbes. Algeria
AYBEY, ALI. Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA). Turkey
AYOUB, MOHAMMAD. NAHNOO. Lebanon
AYOUB, RITA. GLADIC. Lebanon
AYTUG, RANA. United Kingdom
AZIZ, EN HAILI. Tolerance. Canada
AZZAM, LARA. Lebanon
AZZARIO CHIESA, MARIA PAOLA. Forum des Femmes de la Mediterranee. Italy
AZELLMAT, MARWA. OCP Policy Center. Morocco
BAGHZOUZ, AOMAR. Algeria
BACH, ROUGUIYATOU. Mauritania
BACARIA, JORDI. CIDOB-Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. Spain
BADDAWI, DINA. Jordan
BADER, HANAN. Freie Universität Berlin. Germany
BADRAN, MAI. Egypt
BAGHZOUZ, ABDELHAK. Algeria
BAOU, AHMAD. Al Akhawayn University. Morocco
BAOU, AMER. AMER. Al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development. Jordan
BARBERÀ I MAS, MANEL-ENRIC. RENFE Operadora. Spain
BARCHE, SAMIR. UN Women Country Office. Jordan
BARRAS TEJUDO, RAQUEL. Spain
BARREÑADA BAJO, ISAÚS. Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Spain
BARREÑADA BAJO, ISAÚS. Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Spain
BAŞARAN, BEGÜM. Turkey
BASSOU, ABDELHAK. OCP Policy Center. Morocco
BAYANER, AHMED. Turkey
BECYS, ANDRIUS. TEMA. Lithuania
BÉDRAANI, SLIMANE. École Nationale Supérieure d’Agronomie. Algeria
BEDREDDINE, CHERIF. Association Étoile Culturelle d’Akhou. Algeria
BEKHDADHI, HOUARIA. Association NOUR. Algeria
BELAIĐ, OULED ABDALLAH. Institut National du Travail et des Études Sociales. Tunisia
BELFER, MITCHELL. Euro-Gulf Information Centre. Italy
BELGAID, MOHAMMED AMINE. Université Mohammed I, Oujda. Morocco
BELGHIT, AMLI. Association de Développement des Capacités des Jeunes (ADCI) – Biskra. Algeria
BELGAMRA, HAMID. College of Europe, Natolin Campus, Warsaw-Poland. Algeria
BELIS, HANA. Tunisia
BEN AMAL, HANA. Tunisia
BEN ISMAIL, RIM. Psychologues du Monde Tunisie - OMCT. Tunisia
BEN NAYA, WENNES. Tunisia
BEN TAHAR, MOEZ. CEMAFI. Tunisia
BENABDALLAH, LEILA. France
BENACHI, RIZLAINA. Jossour Forum des Femmes Marocain. Morocco
BENARI, AMILA. Association AMAL. Femmes en Mouvement pour un Avenir Meilleur. Morocco
BENBRAHIM, ABDESSLAM. Réseau Euromed des ONG Maroc. Morocco
BENDI, JACOPO. Italy
BENDANA, KMAR. Tunisia
BENDRIOUCH, ABDELGHANI. Université Internationale de Casablanca. Morocco
BENHIMA, NOUR-SADATE. Morocco
BENKETIRA, NADIRA. Association Graine de Paix – Oran. Algeria
BENLAHOUSSINE, EZZAHRA. Morocco
BENZAKOUR, ANISSA. Centre de Recherches Méditerranéennes. France
BENZENINE, BELKACEM. CRASC. Algeria
BERBERI, BLERINA. Ekphrasis Studio. Albania
BERGERET, PASCAL. CIHEAM-Institut Agronomique Méditerranéen de Montpellier. France
BERGH, SYLVIA I. International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam. The Netherlands
BERRADA, KATHYA. Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis. Morocco
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization/Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BERRADA, RAJAA</td>
<td>Centre d’Information et d’Observation des Femmes Marocaines. Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BERTHELOT, PIERRE</td>
<td>Cercle des Chercheurs sur le Moyen-Orient. France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BESSEDIK, MADANI</td>
<td>Université de Tlemcen. Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BILLION, DIDIER</td>
<td>Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques. France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINGLEY, DORIS</td>
<td>National Council of Women. Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLINDA, MOHAMMED</td>
<td>PLAN BLEU - Regional Activity Centre. France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLLE, MICHAEL</td>
<td>Free University of Berlin. Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLUK, GULDEN</td>
<td>CERMC - Economic Research Centre on Mediterranean Countries. Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BONELLI, PATRIZIA</td>
<td>Scholé Futuro – MIO-ECSDE. Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BONIFACE, JÉRÔME</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSSUYT, JEAN</td>
<td>European Centre for Development Policy Management. Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUBEKEUR, AMEL</td>
<td>Université Pierre-Mendès-France Grenoble 2. France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUCHADDAKH, TAHAA</td>
<td>Djerba for Solidarity and Development. Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUFEKROUNE, AHCENE</td>
<td>Fédération Algérienne des Personnes Handicapées (FAPH). Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUGHZALA, MONGI</td>
<td>Université de Tunis Elmanar. Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUMGHRAR, MOHAMED YAZID</td>
<td>Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée pour le Développement (CREAD - Algerie). Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUNOUSA, CHAIB</td>
<td>Université de Tlemcen. Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOURAQUI, SOUKAINA</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOURDET, YVES</td>
<td>Department of Economics, Lund University. Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOURGUIBA, TAOUFIK</td>
<td>Université de Sousse Tunisie. Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUSSAD, AICHE</td>
<td>Université Mouldou Mammeri de Tizi-Ouzz. Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUTAIIBI, NADIA</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUZID, AMAR</td>
<td>Institut National d’Études de Stratégie Globale. Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOZKUR, SEVIN</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUÇAR, MAJA</td>
<td>Center of International Relations (CIR). Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVUMBURAH, HEDWIG</td>
<td>Cross Culture International Foundation CCIF. Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACHIA, JEAN CLAUDE</td>
<td>Institute for European Studies, University of Malta. Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARRERAS, CARLES</td>
<td>University of Barcelona. Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARUSO, IMMACOLATA</td>
<td>Institute of Studies on the Mediterranean Societies, Italian National Research Council. Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASANOVAS, MONTSERRAT</td>
<td>Consultora. Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASTLES, STEPHEN</td>
<td>The University of Sydney. Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECEN, NESLIHAN</td>
<td>Youth Inclusion Association. Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERVERA, ROCIO</td>
<td>North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, COE. Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAABAN, HASSAN</td>
<td>DGLMT-Lebanon. Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAFIAI, ABDDELHAKIM</td>
<td>Université Hassan II, Casablanca. Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAFIK, JILLALI</td>
<td>Fédération Royale Marocaine de Chasse Amicale des oeuvres sociales. Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAHBI, SABRINE</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHATER, MOHAMMED</td>
<td>INSEA. Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHERIF, YOUSEFF</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHERRAT, ISSAM</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHYSOGELOS, NIKOLAOS</td>
<td>Anemos Ananeosis / Wind of Renewal. Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICIC, MURIS</td>
<td>School of Economics and Business, University of Sarajevo. Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIESLIK, ANDRZEJ</td>
<td>Warsaw University. Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBHAM, DAVID</td>
<td>Heriot Watt University. United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COHEN-HADRIA, EMMANUEL</td>
<td>European Institute of the Mediterranean (IIME). France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLOMBO, SILVIA</td>
<td>Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONDYLIS, HÉLÈNE</td>
<td>Université Nationale et Kapodistrienne d’Athènes. Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COURBAGE, YOUSSEF</td>
<td>Institut National Études Démographiques. France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUSTILLIERE, JEAN-FRANÇOIS</td>
<td>Association Euromed-IHEDN. France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREA, ANTONINO</td>
<td>European Commission - DG NEAR. Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSICSMANN, LASZLO</td>
<td>Corvinus University of Budapest. Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CULLMAN, LINVÉA</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURATOLO, FLAVIA</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ĆURKO, BRUNO</td>
<td>Association of Petit Philosophy, Udruga Malia Filozofija. Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D’ASPREMONT, GEOFFROY</td>
<td>European Institute for Research on Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA). Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAHLGREN, SUSANNE</td>
<td>University of Helsinki. Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAKROUB, KARIM</td>
<td>Cooperative Association for Arts and Education. Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAOU, FADI</td>
<td>Adyan Foundation. Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAOUDOV, MURAT</td>
<td>Middle East Development Network (MDN). Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAVCHEVA, LEAH</td>
<td>Centre for Intercultural Learning, Education and Research. Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAVUTOGLU, PERISA</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBOUK, ZEINA</td>
<td>Makassed Charitable Institution. Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE GUGLIELMO, GIUSEPPE</td>
<td>Congregation of Don Orione Shkoder. Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEBUYSERE, LOES</td>
<td>CEPS - Centre for European Policy Studies. Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEGIMBE, ERIC</td>
<td>Comité Européen de Coordination. Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEGIRMEN, SULEYMAN</td>
<td>Mersin University. Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DERBAL, ABDELKADER</td>
<td>Oran University. Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DERRY, SIMON</td>
<td>BBC World Service. United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESSI, ANDREA</td>
<td>Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Italy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DHAHRI, ADEL. Impact Foundation for Research and Development. United Kingdom
DHAOUI, IYAD. Tunisia
DI BENEDETTA, CARLO. Community of Mediterranean Universities (CMU). Italy
DIAFAT, ABDERRAHMANE. Université Ferhat Abbas Sétif. Algeria
DIENDORFER, GERTRAUD. Demokratiezentrum Wien / Democracy Centre Vienna. Austria
DIMITROVA, TATIANA. Unit B3 CIVES-ARLEM, Decentralised Cooperation. Belgium
DINGU-KYRKLUND, ELENA. Stockholm University. Sweden
DJELOUL, GHALYLA. Belgium
DJEILI, SAMIR. Algeria
DJILLALI, FARADJI. Association des Personnes Handicapées d’Igli - Bechar. Algeria
DOKOS, THANOS. ELIAMEP. Greece
DOMÍGUEZ MARTÍNEZ, ORIOL. Spain
DOMINGUEZ, ITXASO. Spain
DOWAIKAT, NABIL. Women’s Centere for Legal Aid and Counselling. Palestine
DREVON, JÉRÔME. University of Oxford. France
DRILL, MICKY. FES Israel. Germany
DRIS-AÏT-HAMADOUCHE, LOUISA. Université d’Alger. Algeria
DUBESSY, FRÉDÉRIC. Econostrum. France
DUCHENE, GÉRARD. Université Paris Est Créteil. France
DUGAN, COSMIN. Black Sea University Foundation. Romania
DUJMOVIĆ, KRŠEVANANTUN. Institute for International Relations. Croatia
DULEBA, ALEXANDER. Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA). Slovakia
DÜVELL, FRANCK. Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS). Germany
EBAÏD, HANAA. Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS). Egypt
EL ABBASSI, IDRISS. Université Mohammed V – Agdal. Morocco
EL BERNOUSSI, ZAYNAB. GERMAC. Morocco
EL BIKRY, MOHAMMED. Spain
EL DIFRAOUI, ASIEM. France
EL HAIRAN, ZOUHAIR. Spain
EL HAJRI, ABDERRAZAK. Migration et Développement. Morocco
EL JAAFARI, SAMIR. Président de la Confédération des Associations de Consommateurs du Maroc. Morocco
EL KARM, AHMED. Amen Bank. Tunisia
EL KHISSASSI, ABDELKADER. Union for the Mediterranean. Spain
EL MANSI, RASHID. Popular Aid for Relief and Development. Lebanon
EL MOUKHI, HAJAR, Université Mohammed V Rabat. Morocco
EL OUAIJ, NOUREDINE. AFAK-Tangier for Citizenship and the Development. Morocco
EL QASEMY, MOHAMED. Morocco
ELAGATI, MOHAMED. Lebanon
ELAOUNI, MOHAMMED. Organization for Freedom of Information and Expression. Morocco
EL BADAWI, OMAR. Center for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe. Egypt
EL BELTAGY, ADEL. International Drylands Development Commission (IDDC). Egypt
EL-HAIRAN, ZOUHAIR. GRITIM – Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration. Spain
ELJAFARI, MAHMoud. Al-Quds University-Jerusalem East Jerusalem, Palestine. Palestine
ELWAKEEL, RANA. College of Europe. Egypt
EMILIANI, TOMMASO. Belgium
ENTRENA ROVERS, ALEXANDRA. European Parliament. Belgium
ERDOGAN, AYFER. Turkey
ERKARSLAN, ONDER. Izmir Institute of Technology. Turkey
ESCOBAR STEMMANN, JUAN JOSÉ. Spanish Foreign Ministry. Spain
EZZINE, ABDELFATTAH. Institut Universitaire de la Recherche Scientifique. Morocco
FABBRI, FRANCESCA. Belgium
FAHAMI, MOHAMED. Centre International de Cooperation Sud Nord. Morocco
FARES, RACHID. Centre d’Études et de Recherches en Sciences Sociales (CERSS). Morocco
FAYAD, MURAD. Libya
FEIDY, LILY. Israel
FERNÁNDEZ ARIBAS, JAVIER. atalayar.com. Spain
FERNÁNDEZ MOLINA, IRENE. University of Exeter. United Kingdom
FERRAGINA, ANNA. University of Salerno (DISES and CELPE). Italy
FEUER, SARA. Israel
FISUNOGLU, H. MAHIR. Çukurova University Department of Economics Adana. Turkey
FLORENSA, SENÉN. European Institute of the Mediterranean. Spain
FOX, ANNE. Bloggers Network. United Kingdom
FRANCH, PERE. Blanquerna School of Communication and International Relations. Ramon Llull University. Spain
FRANCO, MARC. Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations. Belgium
FRITI, NOUREDIN. Alarabiya News Channel. Belgium
GAD, ABD-ALLA. National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences (NARSS). Egypt
GALLER, GERARD. Belgium
GARCIA DEL MORAL, LUCIA. Spain
GARDAN, EMMANUELLE. Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean. Spain
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization/Institution</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GARRIGUES, ANTONIO</td>
<td>J &amp; A Garrigues</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GÄRTNER, HEINZ</td>
<td>Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GASPARDONE, LUIGI</td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAUGUET, ALIKOSCHIS</td>
<td>Fam Hellas (Femme-Art-Méditerranée)</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAZZO, YVES</td>
<td>Ordre souverain de Malte</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEORGES, ZOUAIN</td>
<td>GAIA-heritage</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERVASONI VILA, LUCA</td>
<td>NOVACT</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEZKA, ERGYS</td>
<td>Liburnetik Organisation</td>
<td>Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHALI, GEORGE</td>
<td>Association Libanaise pour l’Éducation et la Formation</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHALI, SOFIANE</td>
<td>Université de Tunis</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHARBI, IKBAL</td>
<td>Université Zitouna</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHARIB, SHERIN</td>
<td>Austrian Institute for International Affairs</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHARJOUM, MOHAMMED</td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHOMARI, TAIBI</td>
<td>Université de Mascara</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIANNAKOPOULOS, IRENE</td>
<td>Women’s Cultural Association of Thalaria – Aegiali – Amorgos</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIANNARELLI, PAOLO</td>
<td>Università Internazionale dell’Arte</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GJURIC SMREKAR, IVA</td>
<td>Lot’s box</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIANOULIS, IAKOVOS</td>
<td>Hellenic Ministry of Environment and Energy</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GÖL, EDGAR</td>
<td>IZT - Institute for Future Studies and Technology Assessment</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOMES, RUI</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GÓMEZ LÓPEZ, AINARA</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GÓMEZ, LUZ</td>
<td>Universidad Autónoma de Madrid</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA DE PAREDES, MARTA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONZÁLEZ HERNANDO, JIMENA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONZALEZ, RICARD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOREN, NIMROD</td>
<td>Mitvim - The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAIS, WAFIK</td>
<td>Nahda Advisors</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAMMATIKOPOULOU, ANGELIKI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior of Greece.</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRASMANNIS, EGILS</td>
<td>Gribu palidžêt bêqêlem</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEN, SARAH</td>
<td>University of Helsinki</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREGORI GARCIA, VICENT</td>
<td>Mostra Viva del Mediterrani</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUEBACHE, KHADJIA</td>
<td>CCMO - Cercle des Chercheurs sur le Moyen-Orient</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUENNOUN, IHSSANE</td>
<td>OCP Policy Center</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUIZANI, MOUHA</td>
<td>CEMI</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GÜLÖZBAKIR, ZEYNEP</td>
<td>PODEM</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GÜNAY, CENGIZ</td>
<td></td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADJIANTONIOU, PHAIDON</td>
<td>Ex employee at the Centre for the Preservation of Mount Atho</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADŽIC, LEJLA</td>
<td>Cultural Heritage without Borders</td>
<td>Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAILU SENBETA, ABHEY</td>
<td>Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAJLAOUI, KALED SGHAIER</td>
<td>Municipalité de Pise</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMDY, ASHRAF</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMMAD, MAHMOUD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMMAMI, AMEL</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HANATLEH, ABDULLAH</td>
<td>Rights and Development Center</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HANELT, CHRISTIAN</td>
<td>Bertelsmann Stiftung</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HASSOUNI, FATHIA</td>
<td>Social and Civil affairs Division</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEDDA ELOUZEU, DONIA</td>
<td>Cabinet Maître Donia Hedda ELOUZEU</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEISTEIN, ARI</td>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HÉNIA, ABDELHAMD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERMAN, LIOR</td>
<td>Hebrew University of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERNÁNDEZ, ELVIRA</td>
<td>Secretariat of the GUE/NGL Group</td>
<td>European Parliament, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI, MIGUEL</td>
<td>Facultad de Humanidades de Toledo (Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha).</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEWADI, AHMED G. HUSSAIN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HILL, ADAM</td>
<td>Consult and Design International</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HILLALI, MIMOUN</td>
<td>Institut Supérieur International du Tourisme</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HÖHN, CHRISTIANE</td>
<td>European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUDRET, ANNABELLE</td>
<td>German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE).</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRGA, KAROLINA</td>
<td>Center for Women’s Studies</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUBER, DANIELA</td>
<td>IAI</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUBER, MARÍKA</td>
<td>Mediterranean Bank Network</td>
<td>Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HULSMAN, CORNELIS</td>
<td>Center for Intercultural Dialogue and Translation</td>
<td>Egypt. The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAKOVOU, CHROSTOS</td>
<td>Cyprus Research Centre</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IELITE, INETE</td>
<td>Women’s NGOs Cooperation Network</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRERA, DANIELA</td>
<td>University of Catania</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISBOUJA, YASSINE</td>
<td>The Mediterranean Forum for Youth (FOMEJE).</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IZERROUKEN, SMAIL</td>
<td>Association de Solidarité et de Lutte Contre la Pauvreté et l’Exclusion El Ghaith - Bba. Algeria</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JABNOUNI, OUMAYMA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAFFAL, AREF</td>
<td>Arab World Democracy and Electoral Monitor (Al Marsad)</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMAL, KHALIL</td>
<td>Université Hassan II</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JARMELA PALOS, MANUEL</td>
<td>Immigration and Border Service</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAY, CLEO</td>
<td>SOAS</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JAYOUSI, NEDAL. National Erasmus Office in Palestine. Palestine
JAYOUSSI, RASHED. Palestine
JEBARI, SIHEM. Institut National de Recherche en Génie Rural, Eaux et Forêts - INRGREF. Tunisia
JEBLAOUI, EMNA. Institute of Human Development. Tunisia
JIMÉNEZ, IGNACIO. Jordan
JOFFÉ, GEORGE. Centre of International Studies. University of Cambridge. United Kingdom
JOURCHI, SALAHEDINE. Forum Eljahedh. Tunisia
JUENEMANN, ANNETTE. Helmut-Schmidt University. Germany
KACEM, ABDELAZIZ. Association des Études Internationales. Tunisia
KAHLOUN, HATEM. Organisation Association Tunisienne des Urbanistes. Tunisia
KALAYCIÖGLU, ERSIN. Istanbul Policy Center, Sabancı University. Turkey
KAMAL, MOUSTAFA. Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. Egypt
KAMEL, LORENZO. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Italy
KAMPANI-BALTA, DANAI. IASIS NGO. Greece
KANDIL, AHMED. Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. Egypt
KAOUECH, ASMA. Fanni Raghman Anni. Tunisia
KARAJ, LEDIO. United Nations Youth Association Albania. Albania
KASELI, BRANKA. Community Foundation Sligalica. Croatia
KAWAKIBI, SALAM. France
KENTEL, FERHAT. Istanbul Sehir University. Turkey
KERANS, MARY ELLEN. United Kingdom
KERDOUDI, JAWAD. Institut Marocain des Relations Internationales (IMRI). Morocco
KHERKENI, EZZEDDINE. Association des Études Internationales. Tunisia
KHACHANI, MOHAMED. Université Mohammed V Rabat. Morocco
KHADER, BICHARA. Belgium
KHADRA, ROULA. Centre Resources for Women “Marta”. Latvia
KHOUY, EDLIEN. Jordan Forum for Business & Professional Women. Jordan
KHANDRA, ROULA. CIHEAM-Mediterranean Agronomic Institute of Bari. Italy
KHALIL, DINA RAOUF. Association of Upper Egypt for Education and Development (AUEED). Egypt
KHAOUA, NADJI. Université d'Annaba. Algeria
KHAWALDEH, KHALID. Dana and Qadisiyah Local Community Cooperative, Jordan
KHECHA, ABDEHADDAD. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Algeria. Algeria
KHIHIR, ABDELRASHID. Jordan Forum for Business & Professional Women. Jordan
KLEIN, MENACHEM. Bar Ilan University. Israel
KOUND, ABDERRAHIM. Le Centre UNESCO Droits et Migrations (CUDM). Morocco
KOVACEVIC, SNJEZANA. Ants · Youth Association Osijek. Croatia
KRECA, MILANA. Civil Rights Project Sisak. Croatia
KREUER, DAVID. University of Leipzig. Germany
KREUTZ, MICHAEL. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Münster. Germany
KUIMOVA, ALEXANDRA. SIPRI · Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Sweden
KUTTAB, DAOUD. Al-Monitor. Jordan
KYRIAKOU, MARILENA. NGO Support Centre & Rooftop Theatre. Cyprus
LAAFFI, AHMED. Université Hassan II. Morocco
LABII, BELKACEM. Université Constantine 3. Algeria
LABNOUJ, AHMED. Interpeace. Morocco
LACE, ILUTA. Association Resource Centre for Women “Marta”, Latvia
LAGRESA, ALVARO. Spain
LAGRO, ESRA. Turkey
LAHOUAR, ADDI. Université de Lyon, IEP. Algeria
LANDABURU, ENEKO. Jacques Delors Institute. Spain
LANQUAR, ROBERT. CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research. Spain
LAVOUX, THIERRY. Plan Bleu. France
LAZARIDOU, PAULINA. ANTIGONE – Information and Documentation Centre on Racism, Ecology, Peace and Non Violence. Greece
LAZZERI, YVETTE. CNRS-Aix Marseille Université. France
LEBBOS, AMINE. CADMOS. Lebanon
LECKA, IZABELLA. University of Warsaw Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies. Poland
TEGRAND, VINCENT. Goupe d’Études et Recherches sur le Monde Arabe Contemporain (GERMAC). Belgium
LEHTI, MARKO. Tampere Peace Research Institute, University of Tampere. Finland
LEITZINGER, ANTERO. Finnish Immigration Service. Finland
Lemonakis, DIMITRIS. Piraeus Chamber of Commerce & Industry. Greece
LERARI, SOUMEYA. IDOM Consulting, Engineering and Architecture. Spain
LINDENSTRAUSS, GALLAU. INSS · Institute for National Security Studies. Israel
LISNEY, TIM. Council of Europe. France
LOUAILI, RAFIK. Association Mobadara pour le Développement Social · Initiative · Bou-Saâda. Algeria
LOVEC, MARKO. Centre for International Relations. Slovenia
LOZANO, CARLOS. ESMED (Euro-Mediterranean Social Economy Network). Spain
LUZZI, ANTONIO. Terrorism Prevention Branch, UNODC. Austria
MADDAH, MERAY. Lebanon
MAERK, JOHANNES. Ideaz. Institute for Intercultural and Comparative Research. Austria
MAGRI, PAOLO. ISPI. Italy
MAHI, AYOUB. Morocco
MAHITAB, MOHAMED. Agence de presse du Moyen-Orient (MENA). Egypt
MAHJOUB, AZZAM. University El Manar. Tunisia
MAJEELI EL MANSOURI, SOULEIMA. Le Centre de la Femme Arabe pour la Formation et la Recherche, CAWTAR. Tunisia
MAKDISI, SAMIR. FEMISE. Lebanon
MAKEIL, ROULA. Lebanon
MAKHLOUF, SANAA. The American University in Cairo. Germany
MAKHZOUMI, MAY. Makhzoumi Foundation. Lebanon
MAKRAM EBEID, MONA. The American University in Cairo. Egypt
MAMULA, MAJA. Centre for Sexual Rights, Zagreb. Croatia
MANS, JAN H. The Netherlands
MANSOUR, JAWIDA. Belgium
MANSOUR, SANDRINE. Cercle des Chercheurs sur le Moyen-Orient (CCMO). France
MARIANI, MARIA ANTONIETTA. Strane straniere. Italy
MARK, JOHANNES. Ideaz. Platform for Intercultural and Comparative Research. Austria
MARKOVIC, ANJA. Association for Civil Society Development Bonsai. Croatia
MARONE, FRANCESCO. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), University of Pavia. Italy
MARTI FONT, JOSEP Mª. Freelance. Spain
MARTÍN, IDAFE. Clarín. Spain
MARTINEZ, RAMIRO. REMOB. Spain
MARTINEZ GONZALEZ, MARIA TERESA. Spain
MAS, LAURA. CEI International Affairs. Spain
MASBAH, MOHAMMED. Chatham House. Morocco
MASRI, MEIR. Israel
MATOUSZEWICZ, RÉGIS. Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne. France
MCGANN, JAMES. Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania. United States of America
MECKY, MARIAM. Egypt
MEDJAHED, MOURAD. Algeria
MEDZINI, ARNON. ORANIM Academic School of Education. Israel
MEHDI, LAHLOU. INSEA - Rabat. Morocco
MEHDI, RAIS. Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Morocco
MELASUO, TUOMO. Finland
MELHA, AHMED. Association Nationale de Volontariat. Algeria
MELLOR, NOHA. Bedfordshire University. United Kingdom
MENHEM, SUZANNE. Université Libanaise, Institut des sciences sociales. Lebanon
MENKARA, SAMI. MUT Al-Manar University of Tripoli. Lebanon
MERZOUGUI, TOUHAMI. Agence de Développement Local - ADL - Béni Abbes. Algeria
MESLOHI, FATIMA. Le Centre UNESCO Droits et Migrations (CUDM). Morocco
MESSAOUDI, ALAIN. Université de Valenciennes et du Hainaut Cambrésis. France
MESTEK, LAMINE. Association des Intellectuelles et des Étudiants en Sciences Économique et Commercial (AIESEC). Algeria
MHANNA, AYMAN. Samir Kassir Foundation - SKeys Center for Media and Cultural Freedom. Lebanon
MICHAEL, KOBI. Israel
MIEHE, LUCA. SWP. Germany
MIKHAEL, DREW. Samir Kassir Foundation. Northern Ireland
MILLAN, JOAQUIM. Eurolocal. Spain
MIQUEL, SERGE. France
MOKADDEM, LATIFA. Ministère de la Culture. Tunisia
MOKRANI, ALI. Director Cooperation with EU and European Institutions in Charge of Euromed Issues. Morocco
MOLINARO, ENRICO. Rete Italiana per il Dialogo Euromediterraneo. Italy
MONDRAGON VIAL, SANTIAGO. Committee of the Regions. Spain
MORAN, JAMES. CEPS. Belgium
MORERAS, JORDI. Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Spain
MUEHLBERGER, WOLFGANG. Finnish Institute for International Affairs (FIIA). Finland
MÜLLER-VERWEYEN, MICHAEL. Goethe Institut. Germany
MUÑOZ ARBONA, JUAN LUIS. Ceuta’s Agency for Social and Economic Development (ADESC). Spain
MUÑOZ, JOSE. Suez. France
MUSBAH, SALIMA. Women & Youth Empowerment Forum (WYEF). Libya
MZID, NOURI. Université de Sfax - Tunisie. Tunisia
NACOUR, ANIS. France
NADER, MANAL R. University of Balamand. Lebanon
NARDINI, KRIZIA. Spain
NASRALLAH, NASSER. IAAF. Lebanon
NATHANSON, ROBY. The Macro Center for Political Economics. Israel
NATORSKI, MICHAL. Maastricht University/UNU-MERIT. The Netherlands
NAZEER, MARWA. NCSCR. Egypt
NEZAJ, ILIR. MFA. Switzerland
NICHOLSON OF WINTERBOURNE, EMMA. United Kingdom
NICOLOSI, PIERRETTE. Artistes contre le mur. Belgium
NORTHEY, JESSICA. United Kingdom
OCCHIUTO, ANTONIO. Italy

List of Respondents
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERTO-RADICS, ISTVAN</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFEIR, JIHANE</td>
<td>Université Libre de Bruxelles</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAABAN, RASHA</td>
<td>National Museums of World Culture</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHABAN, OMAR</td>
<td>Pathink for Strategic Studies</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAFIQ SALEH, MOHAMED AHMED</td>
<td>Delta Centre for Human Rights</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAHIRA MOHAMED, AMIN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAKHRIR, NADIR</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAMSEDDINE, RAMI</td>
<td>Will Association</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHEEHAN, TONY</td>
<td>Triskel Arts Centre</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDLO, KATARZYNA</td>
<td>CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SILVESTRI, STEFANO</td>
<td>Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLIM, BOUZID</td>
<td>EMHRF</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLH, ABDUL NASSER</td>
<td>Institut d'Études Islamo-Chrétiennes</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORIA, JAVIER</td>
<td>Embassy of Spain in Amman</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOSTERO, GIULIA</td>
<td>ALDA - European Association for Local Democracy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRANGIS, DAVIDE</td>
<td>Conférence des Régions Périphériques Maritimes d’Europe</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUAREZ, ANGELA</td>
<td>Universidad de Salamanca</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUKRU, ERDEM</td>
<td>Akdeniz University</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSSKIND-WINBERGER, SIMONE</td>
<td>Member of the Brussels Regional Parliament</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŠVEDKAUSKAS, ŽILVINAS</td>
<td>House of Europe</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZUSZCZYKIEWICZ, ALEKSANDRA</td>
<td>National Security Bureau</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TADIC, TONCI</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Forum</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAHAROI, M’HAMMED</td>
<td>Institut National de Statistique et d’Économie Appliquée</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAL, ABRAHAM</td>
<td>A. TAL Satellite Imagery</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TALBIOU, SOUMYA</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TALBOT, VALERIA</td>
<td>ISPI</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAMAYO, LÉO</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARRIUS, ALAIN</td>
<td>Université de Toulouse - Jean Jaurès</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAYEBI, TAHA</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEKIN, ASLIHAN</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THIEUX, LAURENCE</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THOMAS, CLAIRE</td>
<td>Minority Rights Group International</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLEMÇANI, RACHID</td>
<td>Faculté de sciences politiques de l’Université Alger III</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORJMANE, SALMA</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTH, RICHARD</td>
<td>Slovak representation to the EU</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOVIAŠ, ALFRED</td>
<td>Hebrew University</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRABELSI, MONIRA</td>
<td>Association Tunisienne des médias alternatifs</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIANTAPHYLLOU, DIMITRIOS</td>
<td>Kadir Has University</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIFONOVA, TIHOMIRA</td>
<td>Center Immigration and Integration</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURK, MARTA</td>
<td>Association of Slovene Entrepreneurs - GIZ PODJETNOST</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHLMANN, MILENA</td>
<td>BAMF</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULIED, AGUSTIN</td>
<td>ESADE Business School</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAN DER VALK, INEKE</td>
<td>Leiden University</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VARELA ORTEGA, CONSUELO</td>
<td>Universidad Politecnica de Madrid</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VARELLA, EVANGELIA</td>
<td>Aristotle University of Thessaloniki</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VARVELLI, ARTURO</td>
<td>ISPI - Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VASCONCELOS, ALVARO</td>
<td>Arab Reform Initiative, Universidade de Coimbra</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAZ, RODRIGO</td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAZBIENÉ, LIANA</td>
<td>Permanent Representation of Lithuania to the EU</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VELICHKOV, KAMEN</td>
<td>University of Sofia</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VESA, UNTO</td>
<td>Tampere Peace Research Institute, University of Tampere</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIDAL, EMILIE</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VON LOSSOW, TOBIAS</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALEGREN, STEN</td>
<td>The Gate</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEIPERT-FENNER, IRENE</td>
<td>Peace Research Institute Frankfurt</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WERENFELS, ISABELLE</td>
<td>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIDERSHOVEN, CYRIL</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINDOLPH, KLAUS</td>
<td>Proterra Project Cooperation</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOERTZ, ECKART</td>
<td>CIDOB</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YACOUBI, RIM</td>
<td>Faculté des Sciences Humaines et Sociales de Tunis</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAAOUR, MONIR</td>
<td>IFJ</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAGAGLIA, BARBARA</td>
<td>Università Politecnica delle Marche</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAHARLIEVA, TSVENTINA</td>
<td>Youth and Civil Initiatives in the Rose Valley</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAHREDDINE, IBRAHIM ABBAS</td>
<td>Organisation Mediterranean Eco-operation Program</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAJAC, JUSTyna</td>
<td>University of Warsaw</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAJEC, ROMANA</td>
<td>APIS Institute</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPATA, RICARD</td>
<td>Universitat Pompeu Fabra</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZEKRI, AHMED</td>
<td>Université Mohamed V Rabat</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZGUIDANE, RIADH</td>
<td>Euromed/UPM</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIADA, DALIA</td>
<td>Liberal Democracy Institute</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIRARI, HAYAT</td>
<td>Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines Ben m’Sik</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZISSERT, EYAL</td>
<td>Tel Aviv University</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOROB, ANJA</td>
<td>Institute of Development Research and Development Policy, Ruhr-University</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOUBIR, YAHIA</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOUIHIRI, NABILA</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUGHOOL, SAMAR</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SAMPLE OF THE SURVEY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Total Survey</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Total Survey</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Total Survey</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Total Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total MPCs</strong></td>
<td>354</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia (from 2014 onwards)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total EU</strong></td>
<td>432</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>807</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Other 2019: respondents from Ghana, Iraq, United States of America, Russia, Serbia, Sudan and Switzerland
IV

QUESTIONNAIRE
COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE
In order to facilitate the data processing and to improve the statistical analysis, we would be very pleased if you could provide us with the following information:

**Gender**  
☐ Male   ☐ Female

**Nationality**
- ☐ Albania
- ☐ Algeria
- ☐ Austria
- ☐ Belgium
- ☐ Bosnia and Herzegovina
- ☐ Bulgaria
- ☐ Croatia
- ☐ Cyprus
- ☐ Czech Republic
- ☐ Denmark
- ☐ Egypt
- ☐ Estonia
- ☐ Finland
- ☐ France
- ☐ Germany
- ☐ Greece
- ☐ Hungary
- ☐ Ireland
- ☐ Israel
- ☐ Italy
- ☐ Jordan
- ☐ Latvia
- ☐ Lebanon
- ☐ Lithuania
- ☐ Luxembourg
- ☐ Libya
- ☐ Malta
- ☐ Mauritania
- ☐ Montenegro
- ☐ Morocco
- ☐ Netherlands
- ☐ Palestine
- ☐ Poland
- ☐ Portugal
- ☐ Romania
- ☐ Slovakia
- ☐ Slovenia
- ☐ Spain
- ☐ Sweden
- ☐ Syria
- ☐ Tunisia
- ☐ Turkey
- ☐ United Kingdom
- ☐ Other

**Position** (optional)

**Institution** (optional)

**Sector**
- ☐ Governmental
- ☐ EU institution
- ☐ International organisation
- ☐ Think tank
- ☐ Academic
- ☐ NGO
- ☐ Media
- ☐ Company (Business sector)
- ☐ Other

**What is your main area of specialisation?**
- ☐ Political Cooperation and Security
- ☐ Economic and Financial Cooperation
- ☐ Social, Cultural and Human Exchanges
- ☐ Migration Justice and Home Affairs
- ☐ Other
BLOCK 1

TAking the pulse of civil society in the euro-mediterranean region
Q1. From the following descriptions of civil society that come from authoritative sources, which one do you consider is the most appropriate?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>“Civil society is the ‘third sector’ of society, along with government and business. It comprises civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>“Civil society is formed by charitable organisations whose aim is to provide material help to the less privileged.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>“Civil society is a society considered as a community of citizens linked by common interests and collective activity.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

---

Q2-3. Do you agree that civil society is…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Playing an important role in your society</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>A defining pillar of democracy</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

---

Q4. What should be the most important mission of civil society? (please choose two options)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Monitor policies and watchdog of citizens’ rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Complement governments’ mandate, i.e. providing services not provided adequately otherwise, including to marginalised groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Participate in the design of public policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Mobilise communities outside the institutions in order to influence politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Other 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Other 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q5. Through which means is civil society in your country more likely to achieve the objectives it pursues? (please choose two options)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European Union countries</th>
<th>Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries</th>
<th>Your country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Charitable work</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Climate change</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Countering extremisms</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Culture</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Education</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fighting corruption</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Gender equality</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Human rights, democracy, rule of law</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Intercultural dialogue</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Peace-building</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Religion</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Social justice</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Other 1</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Other 2</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q6. What should be the main focus of civil society in: (please choose three options for each column)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European Union countries</th>
<th>Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries</th>
<th>Your country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Charitable work</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Climate change</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Countering extremisms</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Culture</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Education</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fighting corruption</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Gender equality</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Human rights, democracy, rule of law</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Intercultural dialogue</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Peace-building</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Religion</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Social justice</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Other 1</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Other 2</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
1. Social movements are one of the forms of expression of civil society. Social movements are widely described as informal groupings of individuals or organisations acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in society.

Q7. In my country, the most influential civil society actor(s) is (are)? (please name up to three)

1. 
2. 
3. 

Q8. Among recent social movements,1 which ones do you consider had the greatest political impact?

In European Union countries (please name up to three)

1. 
2. 
3. 

In Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries (please name up to three)

1. 
2. 
3. 

Why:

Comments:
ENGAGING WITH CIVIL SOCIETY:
POLICY RESPONSES
Q9. Do you agree that the overall context enables civil society to fulfil its missions in the following countries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree (1)</th>
<th>Disagree (2)</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree (3)</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. In EU countries</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. In SEM countries</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. In your country</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Go to Q10 if Q9.1; 9.2 and/or 9.3 = 1 to 3 (strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree)

Q10. What are the obstacles for establishing a successfully working civil society? (please choose two options for each column)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU countries</th>
<th>SEM countries</th>
<th>Your country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Administrative hurdles</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lack of independence</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Limited funding</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mobility restrictions</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Political pressure on civil society activists</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Other 1</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other 2</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Q11. In which countries of the European Union do civil societies face the biggest obstacles? (please name four countries)

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### In which Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries do civil societies face the biggest obstacles? (please name three countries)

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>15.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Q12. Only for respondents from southern and eastern mediterranean (sem) countries

#### Q12. In your country foreign support to civil society comes mainly from: (please choose two options)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Other 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Other 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q 13. Do you consider that the support of civil society by foreign actors/donors can be counter-productive in your country?

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I cannot say</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Go to Q13.1 If you answer 1=Yes

Q13.1. Why? Which foreign/s actor/s in particular?

Q14. Do you agree that the European Union is playing a positive role in relation with civil society in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Q15. In line with the EU’s 2012 Communication on civil society, the European Neighbourhood Policy reviewed in 2015 announced that the EU would “do more to support civil society”2 in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. Do you agree that this has been the case?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree (1)</th>
<th>Disagree (2)</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree (3)</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. All respondents SEM countries</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SEM respondents only In your country</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Go to Q15.1 If Q15 = 1 to 3 (strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree)

---

2. “Sub-national, national and intra-regional civil society should be supported further, both through direct means and through facilitating other organisations’ involvement. The European Endowment for Democracy can play an important role in this regard. The EU should support developing the capacities of civil society professionals and leadership in the neighbourhood, using programmes such as Civil Society fellowships, recognising the important role of young people in that regard.” (JOIN(2015) 50 final).
Q15.1. In your opinion, why hasn’t it been the case?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>In SEM countries:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>In your country:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q16. The EU uses the following frameworks in order to support civil society in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. Do you agree that they represent a significant contribution?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree (1)</th>
<th>Disagree (2)</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree (3)</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Bilateral programmes of direct support to civil society organisations³</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Civil society organisations and local authorities (CSO-LA)⁴ thematic programmes</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy &amp; Human Rights (EIDHR)⁵</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to stability and peace (IcSP)⁶</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Regular consultations of civil society representatives through regional platforms (such as the Majalat project)⁷</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Support to regional CSO networks⁸</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The European Endowment for Democracy (EED)⁹</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments on these frameworks or on other initiatives the EU should take in order to support civil:

---

3. For example, according to a report published in May 2018 (https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/blank_document_191.pdf), in Tunisia, “The EU programme supporting civil society has facilitated the regularisation of more than 1,000 associations and can improve the management of non-governmental organisations.”

4. CSO/LA programme encourages civil society (i.e. non-state actors, non-governmental organisations [NGOs] and citizens’ organisations [CSOs]) and local authorities [LA] to play a greater role in development strategies. Its objective is to foster “support to” and “participation of” CSOs and LAs in pursuit of internationally agreed goals and development effectiveness.

5. The EIDHR is a thematic funding instrument for EU external action aiming to support projects in the area of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy in non-EU countries. This instrument is designed to support civil society to become an effective force for political reform and defence of human rights.

6. The IcSP is the EU’s main instrument supporting security initiatives and peace-building activities in partner countries. One of its main objectives is to enhance the EU capacity for crisis-preparedness, conflict prevention and peace-building in cooperation with international, regional and civil society organisations and member states.

7. The objective of the Majalat project is to create and promote a space of encounter and constructive dialogue between the civil society of the South of the Mediterranean and the European Union (EU).

8. Such as the Anna Lindh Foundation, which promotes intercultural and civil society dialogue, or EuroMed Rights, which seeks to develop and strengthen partnerships between NGOs in the Euro-Mediterranean region, to advocate for human rights values.

9. The EED supports civil society organisations, movements and individual activists working towards a pluralistic democratic political system. The EED is a joint initiative of EU member states and institutions that fosters and encourages democratisation and deep and sustainable democracy in countries facing democratic transitions or democracy deficits in the EU neighbourhood region and beyond.
Q 17. In terms of engagement with civil society, which countries should the EU prioritise? (please name 3 countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
BLOCK 3

CIVIL SOCIETY AS A DRIVING FORCE OF EURO-MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION
Q18. When it comes to cooperation between civil societies in the Euro-Mediterranean context, what is the most relevant framework? (please choose two options)

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean networks&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Diaspora community&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Civil society consultation/cooperation promoted by governmental institutions&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Decentralised and subnational cooperation&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Other 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Other 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Q19. The Union for the Mediterranean (UFM) is an inter-governmental organisation. However, it does involve civil society actors through different channels. Do you agree that...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>UFM projects&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt; are an opportunity for civil society’s involvement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>UFM regional dialogue platforms&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt; contribute to enhancing civil society’s participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments on civil society inclusion in UFM activities:

---

10. “Such as the Anna Lindh Foundation, which promotes intercultural and civil society dialogue, or EuroMed Rights, which seeks to develop and strengthen partnerships between NGOs in the Euro-Mediterranean region, to advocate for human rights values.

11. Community of people of one specific country (or ethnic or religious group) settled in different countries, connected through networks of social relations sustained across borders.

12. Cooperation between civil society organisations can indeed also be incentivised through structured consultations organised by bodies such as the European Union (e.g. Project Majalat already mentioned in Q16).

13. [pop-up] Cooperation between subnational administrations from different countries, which may involve CSOs, such as in the framework of ENI CBC Med.

14. The UFM’s goal is to enhance regional cooperation, dialogue and the implementation of concrete projects and initiatives with tangible impact on citizens.

15. The UFM’s policy dimension is structured around regional dialogue platforms involving not only representatives from governmental institutions and experts but also regional and international organisations, local authorities, civil society, private sector and financial institutions.
Q20. Under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU and its southern partners are set to define partnership priorities. Do you agree that these priorities reflect the main concerns of civil society?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Go to Q20.1 if Q20 = 1 to 3 (strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree)

Q20.1. In your opinion, why hasn’t it been the case?

1. Why not?
2. What should be done to ensure this is the case

Q21. In an increasingly fragmented Euro-Mediterranean region, do you agree that civil society can make a difference when it comes to promoting dialogue, regional integration and peace?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments (including on how to achieve this):
SET OF RESULTS
COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE
Graph 1: Breakdown of responses by geographical origin

- SEM countries 51%
- EU countries 48%
- Other 1%
- EU non-Med countries 33%
- EU-Med countries 67%
- Mashreq 33%
- Maghreb 50%
- Israel 5%
- Turkey 8%

*Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monaco.

Graph 2: Breakdown of respondents by region (in %)

- Mediterranean EU countries 32%
- Maghreb 26%
- Mashreq 17%
- Rest of EU (i.e. EU non-Mediterranean) 16%
- Turkey 4%
- Israel 2%
- European non-EU (i.e. Balkan countries and Monaco) 2%
- Other 1%
Graph 3: Breakdown of respondents by type of institution

- Think tank: 15% (2019), 14% (2018)
- Governmental: 9% (2019), 8% (2018)
- International organisation: 6% (2019), 6% (2018)
- EU institution: 3% (2019), 3% (2018)
- Experts: 51% (2019), 17% (2018)
- Policy-makers: 17% (2019), 3% (2018)
- Civil society: 32% (2019), 4% (2018)

Graph 4: Breakdown of respondents by type of institution
Graph 5: Breakdown of respondents by area of specialisation

- Social, cultural and human exchanges: 34%
- Political cooperation and security: 31%
- Migration and justice affairs: 16%
- Economic and financial cooperation: 15%

Graph 6: Breakdown of respondents by gender

- Women: 39%
- Men: 61%

Graph 7: Breakdown of respondents by gender and regional groups

- European non-EU: 50% Men, 50% Women
- Rest of EU: 53% Men, 47% Women
- Mediterranean EU: 57% Men, 43% Women
- Mashreq: 67% Men, 33% Women
- Maghreb: 69% Men, 31% Women
BLOCK 1

TAKING THE PULSE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN REGION
Q1. From the following descriptions of civil society that come from authoritative sources, which one do you consider is the most appropriate?

From the following descriptions of civil society that come from authoritative sources, which one do you consider is the most appropriate?

- Civil society is the ‘third sector’ of society, along with government and business. It comprises civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations. 64% (SEM respondents)
- Civil society is a society considered as a community of citizens linked by common interests and collective activity. 35% (EU respondents)
- Civil society is formed by charitable organisations whose aim is to provide material help to the less privileged. 1% (SEM respondents)

From the following descriptions of civil society that come from authoritative sources, which one do you consider is the most appropriate?

- Civil society is the ‘third sector’ of society, along with government and business. It comprises civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations. 59% (EU respondents)
- Civil society is a society considered as a community of citizens linked by common interests and collective activity. 39% (EU respondents)
- Civil society is formed by charitable organisations whose aim is to provide material help to the less privileged. 2% (EU respondents)

SEM respondents
EU respondents
Q2. Do you agree that civil society is playing an important role in your society?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU respondents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEM respondents</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don’t know" answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including "Don’t know" answers

Do you agree that civil society is playing an important role in your society?
Q3. Do you agree that civil society is a defining pillar of democracy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU respondents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEM respondents</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Do you agree that civil society is a defining pillar of democracy?

![Bar chart showing responses to Q3.](chart.png)
Q4. What should be the most important mission of civil society?

What should be the most important mission of civil society?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 4)

- Monitor policies and be a watchdog of citizens’ rights: 34%
- Mobilise communities outside the institutions in order to influence politics: 29%
- Participate in the design of public policies: 24%
- Complement governments’ mandate, i.e. providing services not provided adequately otherwise, including to marginalised groups: 14%
- Other: 3%

What should be the most important mission of civil society?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 4)

- Monitor policies and be a watchdog of citizens’ rights: 35%
- Mobilise communities outside the institutions in order to influence politics: 26%
- Participate in the design of public policies: 25%
- Complement governments’ mandate, i.e. providing services not provided adequately otherwise, including to marginalised groups: 15%
- Other: 2%
Q5. Through which means is civil society in your country more likely to achieve the objectives it pursues?

Through which means is civil society in your country more likely to achieve the objectives it pursues? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 5)

- Organise public mobilisations: 25%
- Engage with central authorities: 22%
- Engage at the subnational level: 22%
- Run social media campaigns: 20%
- Reach out to international audiences: 10%
- Other: 2%

Through which means is civil society in your country more likely to achieve the objectives it pursues? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 5)

- Organise public mobilisations: 26%
- Engage with central authorities: 23%
- Engage at the subnational level: 22%
- Run social media campaigns: 20%
- Reach out to international audiences: 11%
- Other: 3%

SEM respondents vs EU respondents
Q6. What should be the main focus of civil society in:

What should be the main focus of civil society in:
(respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 12)

- Climate change: 19% SEM, 11% EU
- Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 21% SEM, 15% EU
- Intercultural dialogue: 7% SEM, 13% EU
- Countering extremisms: 11% SEM, 11% EU
- Social justice: 11% SEM, 10% EU
- Education: 10% SEM, 7% EU
- Peace-building: 6% SEM, 6% EU
- Gender equality: 8% SEM, 5% EU
- Fighting corruption: 12% SEM, 5% EU
- Charitable work: 2% SEM, 2% EU
- Culture: 3% SEM, 4% EU
- Religion: 1% SEM, 1% EU
- Other: 1% SEM, 1% EU

- Other: 1% SEM, 1% EU

- Other: 1% SEM, 1% EU

- Other: 1% SEM, 1% EU
What should be the main focus of civil society in:
(respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 12)

- Algeria
  - Social justice: 16%
  - Fighting corruption: 22%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 26%

- Tunisia
  - Social justice: 12%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 19%
  - Fighting corruption: 21%

- Morocco
  - Education: 18%
  - Fighting corruption: 20%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 21%

- Lebanon
  - Social justice: 12%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 19%
  - Fighting corruption: 21%

- Jordan
  - Social justice: 15%
  - Fighting corruption: 21%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 22%

- Egypt
  - Social justice: 14%
  - Education: 15%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 18%

- France
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 12%
  - Countering extremisms: 13%
  - Climate change: 21%

- Germany
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 15%
  - Countering extremisms: 17%
  - Climate change: 19%

- Greece
  - Social justice: 11%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 17%
  - Climate change: 20%

- Spain
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 14%
  - Fighting corruption: 14%
  - Climate change: 19%

- Italy
  - Fighting corruption: 14%
  - Climate change: 14%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 16%

- Turkey
  - Fighting corruption: 11%
  - Social justice: 12%
  - Human rights, democracy, rule of law: 31%
Q7. In my country, the most influential civil society actor(s) is (are)?

In my country, the most influential civil society actor(s) is (are)?
(all respondents) (categories developed from the open-ended answers)

- Trade unions: 18%
- Human rights organisations: 15%
- Democracy/civil rights movements and organisations: 11%
- Women's rights: 10%
- Environmental organisations/movements: 9%
- Charity: 9%
- Local/community based: 9%
- Religious institutions: 8%
- Youth/students: 5%
- Culture: 4%
- Other: 1%
In my country, the most influential civil society actor(s) is (are)?
(categories developed from the open-ended answers)

- Human rights organisations: 19% SEM, 12% EU
- Trade unions: 19% SEM, 18% EU
- Women's rights: 12% SEM, 12% EU
- Local/community based: 10% SEM, 7% EU
- Charity: 9% SEM, 7% EU
- Youth/students: 2% SEM, 7% EU
- Democracy/civil rights movements and organisations: 7% SEM, 14% EU
- Religious institutions: 6% SEM, 11% EU
- Culture: 5% SEM, 3% EU
- Environmental organisations/movements: 4% SEM, 14% EU
- Other: 1% SEM, 2% EU
Q8. Among recent social movements, which ones do you consider had the greatest political impact?

In EU countries (categories developed from the open-ended answers)

- Climate change/environment: 30% (All), 42% (EU), 5% (SEM)
- Gilets jaunes (France): 27% (All), 27% (EU), 16% (SEM)
- Feminism/women’s rights: 5% (All), 6% (EU), 5% (SEM)
- Extremism (discourses, organisations, parties): 1% (All), 3% (EU), 3% (SEM)
- Migrant/refugee rights: 3% (All), 3% (EU), 3% (SEM)
- Eurosceptic movements (Brexit, etc.): 3% (All), 3% (EU), 3% (SEM)
- Human/civil rights movements: 3% (All), 3% (EU), 3% (SEM)
- Social movements in Southern Europe (Greece, Spain, Italy): 3% (All), 3% (EU), 3% (SEM)
- Anti-migrant/refugee movements: 2% (All), 1% (EU), 2% (SEM)
- Other: 21% (All), 17% (EU), 24% (SEM)
Among recent social movements, which ones do you consider had the greatest political impact?

In SEM countries (categories developed from the open-ended answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Movement</th>
<th>EU Respondents</th>
<th>SEM Respondents</th>
<th>All Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hirak Algerie</td>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Spring</td>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human/civil rights movements</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminism/women's rights</td>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremism (discourses, organisations, parties)</td>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social movements in Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy demands</td>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirak Rif</td>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement 20 février Maroc</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezi Resistance in Turkey</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumers boycott (Maroc)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chart visualizes the percentage distribution of responses across EU and SEM respondents, with a breakdown for all respondents.
ENGAGING WITH CIVIL SOCIETY: POLICY RESPONSES
Q9. Do you agree that the overall context enables civil society to fulfil its missions in the following countries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In EU countries</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In SEM countries</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your country</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Do you agree that the overall context enables civil society to fulfil its missions in the following countries?

![Bar chart showing the distribution of responses in EU countries, SEM countries, and your country.](chart)
Do you agree that civil society is a defining pillar of democracy?
(mean 1-strongly disagree, 5-strongly agree)

Do you agree that civil society is a defining pillar of democracy?
(mean 1-strongly disagree, 5-strongly agree)
Q10. What are the obstacles for establishing a successfully working civil society?

What are the obstacles for establishing a successfully working civil society?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 4)

- Limited funding
- Administrative hurdles
- Political pressure on civil society activists
- Lack of independence
- Mobility restrictions
- Other

What are the obstacles for establishing a successfully working civil society?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 5)

- Limited funding
- Administrative hurdles
- Political pressure on civil society activists
- Lack of independence
- Limited funding

Set of Results

10 EUROMED SURVEY
Q11. In which countries of the European Union do civil societies face the biggest obstacles?

In which countries of the European Union do civil societies face the biggest obstacles?
(respondents were asked to choose 4 options out of 28)

- Hungary: 17%
- Poland: 13%
- Romania: 12%
- Bulgaria: 9%
- Italy: 6%
- Greece: 5%
- Czech Republic: 4%
- Slovakia: 4%
- France: 3%
- Croatia: 3%
- Cyprus: 3%
In which countries of the European Union do civil societies face the biggest obstacles? (respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 15)

- Syria: 20%
- Egypt: 20%
- Libya: 16%
- Turkey: 11%
- Palestine: 9%
- Algeria: 8%
- Israel: 5%
- Morocco: 2%
- Albania: 2%
- Bosnia & Herzegovina: 2%
- Mauritania: 2%
- Lebanon: 1%
- Jordan: 1%
- Tunisia: 1%
- Montenegro: 0%
Q12. In your country foreign support to civil society comes mainly from:

In your country foreign support to civil society comes mainly from:
/respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 7 Respondents only from SEM countries

- European Union: 47%
- United States of America: 31%
- Qatar: 7%
- Other: 6%
- United Arab Emirates: 3%
- Saudi Arabia: 3%
- Turkey: 2%
- Russia: 0%

In your country foreign support to civil society comes mainly from:
/respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 7

- European Union: 46%
- United States of America: 34%
- Qatar: 11%
- Other: 7%
- United Arab Emirates: 4%
- Saudi Arabia: 5%
- Turkey: 2%
- Russia: 0%
Q13. Do you consider that the support of civil society by foreign actors/donors can be counter-productive in your country?

Do you consider that the support of civil society by foreign actors/donors can be counter-productive in your country?

- **Yes**: 43% (SEM) 33% (EU)
- **No**: 37% (SEM) 46% (EU)
- **I cannot say**: 20% (SEM) 21% (EU)

Do you consider that the support of civil society by foreign actors/donors can be counter-productive in your country? (% of YES answer)

- **SEM**:
  - Syria: 57%
  - Egypt: 39%
  - Jordan: 31%
  - Lebanon: 40%
  - Libya: 40%
  - Libya: 39%
  - Morocco: 41%
  - Palestine: 47%
  - Algeria: 45%
  - Tunisia: 50%
  - Turkey: 50%
  - Tunisia: 50%
  - Syria: 57%

- **EU**:
  - Syria: 57%
  - Egypt: 39%
  - Jordan: 31%
  - Lebanon: 40%
  - Libya: 40%
  - Libya: 39%
  - Morocco: 41%
  - Palestine: 47%
  - Algeria: 45%
  - Tunisia: 50%
  - Turkey: 50%
  - Tunisia: 50%
  - Syria: 57%
Q14. Do you agree that the European Union is playing a positive role in relation with civil society in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All respondents</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU respondents</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEM respondents</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Do you agree that the European Union is playing a positive role in relation with civil society in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries?
Do you agree that the European Union is playing a positive role in relation with civil society in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries?
(mean 1—strongly disagree, 5—strongly agree) respondents from:

- Maghreb: 3.9
- SEM: 3.8
- Mashreq: 3.7
- EU: 3.6
- Albania: 4.2
- Jordan: 4.1
- Tunisia: 4.0
- Morocco: 3.9
- Turkey: 3.9
- Lebanon: 3.9
- Israel: 3.9
- Palestine: 3.8
- Algeria: 3.8
- Egypt: 3.5
- Libya: 3.3
- Syria: 3.1
- Mauritania: 3.0
Q15. In line with the EU’s 2012 Communication on civil society, the European Neighbourhood Policy reviewed in 2015 announced that the EU would “do more to support civil society” in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. Do you agree that this has been the case?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU respondents</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEM respondents</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

In line with the EU’s 2012 Communication on civil society, the European Neighbourhood Policy reviewed in 2015 announced that the EU would “do more to support civil society” in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. Do you agree that this has been the case?
In line with the EU’s 2012 Communication on civil society, the European Neighbourhood Policy reviewed in 2015 announced that the EU would “do more to support civil society” in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. Do you agree that this has been the case?
Q16. The EU uses the following frameworks in order to support civil society in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. Do you agree that they represent a significant contribution?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral programmes of direct support to civil society organisations</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society organisations and local authorities (CSO-LA) thematic programmes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy &amp; Human Rights (EIDHR)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument contributing to stability and peace (IcSP)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular consultations of civil society representatives through regional platforms (such as the Majalat project)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to regional CSO networks</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Endowment for Democracy (EED)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

The EU uses the following frameworks in order to support civil society in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. Do you agree that they represent a significant contribution?
The EU uses the following frameworks in order to support civil society in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries.
Do you agree that they represent a significant contribution?
(mean 1-strongly disagree, 5-strongly agree)
Q17. In terms of engagement with civil society, which countries should the EU prioritise?

In terms of engagement with civil society, which countries should the EU prioritise?
(respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 15)
CIVIL SOCIETY AS A DRIVING FORCE OF EURO-MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION
Q18. When it comes to cooperation between civil societies in the Euro-Mediterranean context, what is the most relevant framework?

When it comes to cooperation between civil societies in the Euro-Mediterranean context, what is the most relevant framework? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 4)

- Euro-Mediterranean networks: 40%
- Decentralised and subnational cooperation: 29%
- Civil society consultation / cooperation promoted by governmental institutions: 18%
- Diaspora community: 14%

When it comes to cooperation between civil societies in the Euro-Mediterranean context, what is the most relevant framework? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 4)

EU respondents:
- Euro-Mediterranean networks: 38%
- Decentralised and subnational cooperation: 31%

SEM respondents:
- Euro-Mediterranean networks: 41%
- Decentralised and subnational cooperation: 26%
Q19. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is an inter-governmental organisation. However, it does involve civil society actors through different channels. Do you agree that…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UfM projects are an opportunity for civil society’s involvement</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UfM regional dialogue platforms contribute to enhancing civil society’s participation</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is an inter-governmental organisation. However, it does involve civil society actors through different channels. Do you agree that…

- **UfM projects are an opportunity for civil society’s involvement**
- **UfM regional dialogue platforms contribute to enhancing civil society’s participation**

UfM projects are an opportunity for civil society’s involvement (mean 1-strongly disagree, 5-strongly agree)

- All respondents: 3.7
- SEM respondents: 3.8
- EU respondents: 3.5

UfM regional dialogue platforms contribute to enhancing civil society’s participation (mean 1-strongly disagree, 5-strongly agree)

- All respondents: 3.5
- SEM respondents: 3.6
- EU respondents: 3.4
Q20. Under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU and its southern partners are set to define partnership priorities
Do you agree that these priorities reflect the main concerns of civil society?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU respondents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEM respondents</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)
(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU and its southern partners are set to define partnership priorities
Do you agree that these priorities reflect the main concerns of civil society?

---

Strongly disagree: [3%], Disagree: [19%], Neither agree nor disagree: [26%], Agree: [44%], Strongly agree: [8%], Total: [100%], Don't know: [13%]

EU respondents:
Strongly disagree: [1%], Disagree: [21%], Neither agree nor disagree: [32%], Agree: [41%], Strongly agree: [4%], Total: [100%], Don't know: [16%]

SEM respondents:
Strongly disagree: [4%], Disagree: [18%], Neither agree nor disagree: [21%], Agree: [46%], Strongly agree: [11%], Total: [100%], Don't know: [10%]
Q21. In an increasingly fragmented Euro-Mediterranean region, do you agree that civil society can make a difference when it comes to promoting dialogue, regional integration and peace?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Dkn</th>
<th>Total**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU respondents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEM respondents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

In an increasingly fragmented Euro-Mediterranean region, do you agree that civil society can make a difference when it comes to promoting dialogue, regional integration and peace?

- All respondents: 51% Agree, 41% Neither agree nor disagree, 5% Strongly disagree
- EU respondents: 53% Agree, 41% Neither agree nor disagree, 4% Strongly disagree
- SEM respondents: 52% Agree, 37% Neither agree nor disagree, 7% Strongly disagree

Don't know: 1% in all groups.