Changing Euro-Mediterranean Lenses

The focus of this year’s Euromed Survey emerged from our assessment at the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) that Euro-Mediterranean relations continue to be too often dominated by Euro-centric perspectives and debates. It also originates from our commitment to rebalance and challenge prevailing narratives.

Too often, indeed, debates on the political and security situation of the Euro-Mediterranean space tend to limit themselves to the analysis of the security situation in the southern shore of the Mediterranean and how it affects Europe. The idea of the first set of questions (“Block 1”) was to reverse the approach, i.e. look at the situation of Europe and how it affects the southern shore and more generally Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Similarly, we observed that Euro-Mediterranean policies are too often understood as policies of the European Union (EU) towards the southern Mediterranean. Therefore, in the second block, questions focus instead on how Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries engage with the EU.

The questions of the third block relate mostly to existing frameworks such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), with the objective of identifying prevailing patterns in terms of perceptions, possible shortcomings and the way ahead.

This publication contains ten analytical articles that echo some specific set of results of the Survey in an analytical way. Emma Bonino explains how the European multifaceted crisis prompted from the EU a change of narrative and policies vis-à-vis its southern neighbourhood, which is at odds with some of its foundational principles. Youssef Cherif scrutinises some recent trends of Maghreb foreign policies and what they mean for the EU. Intissar Fakir explores the benefits the EU would draw from further engaging in good governance and the rule of law in Morocco, while Abdennour Bennantar and Mohamed Eljarh examine the EU’s role in Algeria and Libya. Jean-Pierre Filiu looks at to what extent the cherished European stability may feed insecurity in the Mediterranean. Anis Nacrour and Dimitris Bouris shed light on the ins and outs of the EU’s engagement in Syria. Both Chloe Teevan and Tasnim Abderrahim ponder over the concept of securitisation of the EU approaches vis-à-vis its southern neighbourhood and its consequences, while Assem Dandashly looks closer into the issue of democracy promotion and how it features in the EU’s approach to the region.

While the complete set of results can be accessed online, this publication also contains a descriptive report that provides a detailed picture of the most important and interesting results. Below we systematically summarise six patterns that emerged:

1. The EU is seen by respondents to be in poorer shape than it was when the Barcelona Declaration was signed in 1995. The European integration process is threatened mostly by internal phenomena (and in particular populism and nationalism) rather than external. The credibility of the EU in its southern neighbourhood is at stake. More precisely, inner divisions on key issues and a rebilateralisation of relations are the most significant factors affecting the credibility of the EU in the Mediterranean. Its weak role in conflict zones is especially assessed by respondents from SEM countries as a critical spoiler of the EU’s credibility.
2- The state of play of the EU has direct implications for the policies it implements. In some cases, situations or policies of the EU are likely to have a negative effect on SEM countries. The securitisation of migration policies or the support for authoritarian trends are mentioned prominently in this context. Respondents from SEM countries mention military interventions from some member states as particularly counterproductive. However, despite these spill-over effects, the EU as such is not seen as contributing to the instability of SEM countries. Results show that the EU is far from being considered as a spoiler in the region, especially in comparison with other countries, such as the USA.

3- More than this, the EU continues to be seen as an important player and expectations are still high. Overall, most respondents even consider that the EU has become more attractive among civil society actors in SEM countries since 2011. A significant majority of SEM respondents are also of the opinion that the EU is a foreign policy priority of their respective countries. The EU and its policies are seen by SEM respondents as the most appropriate partner across the board to achieve important objectives, especially when it comes to “Democracy promotion” and “Educational and cultural cooperation”, which are considered by SEM respondents the most important priorities of cooperation with the EU. When it comes to engaging with the EU, SEM respondents would want their respective governments to be more pro-active, in terms of agenda setting.

4- It is striking to see from the results that European respondents to the Survey are consistently less confident about the relevance and attractiveness of the EU’s foreign policy than their counterparts from SEM countries. They are also more inclined than their southern Mediterranean counterparts to assess that the situation of the EU has deteriorated since 1995. Lastly, European respondents seem to have more confidence in bilateral mechanisms and less in EU mechanisms than SEM respondents.

5- It would be a mistake to only measure Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in terms of institutional mechanisms. All too often, debates on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation tend to focus on the “container” rather than the content. The difference of interests among countries (within the EU itself, within the MENA or between both shores) leading to a lack of common vision and political will, regional instability and unresolved conflicts, and power asymmetries between both shores of the Mediterranean are some of the most recurrent issues mentioned by the respondents as an impediment to greater Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

6- Nevertheless, it is useful to assess existing frameworks. There are mixed assessments regarding the ENP and the UfM. The ENP, as reviewed in 2015, has not met the announced objectives. Respondents think that the ENP framework is still relevant but should be reviewed again in order to move further towards an equal footing partnership, better involve civil society actors, provide further financial assistance linked to political reforms, integrate a consistent approach regarding conflict resolution and offer more tools to differentiate approaches to different neighbours. Regarding the UfM, even though respondents point out that it has not significantly succeeded in meeting the main objectives as stated in the 2008 Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, a strong majority says that it should be empowered and its mandate extended. From the main areas of actions identified in the 2017 UfM roadmap, respondents think that “enhancing regional stability and human development” should be prioritised.
THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN EUROPE IS BAD NEWS FOR SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN AND EUROMEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS

EMMA BONINO
Senator of the Italian Republic

In the last ten years, Euro-Mediterranean relations have been witnessing structural and mostly irreversible changes. Diverse political, economic and diplomatic priorities have been rapidly re-arranged to manage the multiple crises that have hit the European Union (EU) and its neighbourhood since 2008.

The 2007 US subprime mortgage crisis severely impacted the very bases of the European financial and banking system. The EU was highly unprepared to face the pervasive consequences of that crisis, and such unpreparedness concurred with the weakening of the highly interrelated economies of EU member states, especially those in the South.

During these harsh years of crisis, EU member states’ relations have been read and understood mainly through the lens of economic strategies and priorities, aimed at preventing the largest EU economies from being battered by the contagion from the weakest member states.

Moreover, the intergovernmental management of the EU economic downturn eventually concurred with the national interests of the biggest EU countries to prevail on those of the most fragile ones, further deepening the North-South economic and social gap.

Hence, the kind of Europe that was slowly and irremediably approaching another time of emergency was an inherently divided one. Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, defending member states’ particular interests, mainly circumscribed to the realm of economic and foreign policy issues, has become a trademark of how EU politics and goals have been pursued both inside and outside its borders. What began as an economic crisis soon became a political one.

A few years later, the 2011 Arab Spring has brought foreign policy issues back to the fore. Once again, the EU supranational and national agendas began to be dominated by the need to conduct profitable diplomatic relations with third countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in an effort to stem the consequences of North-African public upheaval at home.

The Arab Spring uprisings had profound repercussions on the EU, especially in the growing number of people fleeing from war-torn Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. In particular, since 2011, the Syrian civil war, sparked by the Assad government’s bloody repression of the revolts, has forced more than 5 million Syrians to flee and internally displaced other 6.1 million people. Today, 13.1 million are in severe need of humanitarian assistance.

The migratory flow that ran over Europe from 2012 onwards reached its peak in 2015, when more than one million people crossed its southern borders. Since then, the EU has actively embarked on designing and implementing a complex and multifaceted set of policies aimed at reducing the negative spill-overs of these arrivals on both EU countries and their citizens.
However, as the results of the Euromed Survey show, the securitisation that has accompanied this shift in the EU approach towards migration is the most likely factor to have a negative impact on the stability of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (see Graph 1).

Graph 1: From the following options that relate either to the situation of the EU or to its policies, which ones are likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of SEM countries?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>SEM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Securitisation of migration policies</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to authoritarian regimes</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms exports from some EU member states</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military interventions from some EU member states</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor EU economic performance</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU home-grown “radicalisation” and foreign fighters coming from the EU</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Indeed, the incapacity and often unwillingness to adopt coherent and cohesive policy guidelines to cope with the consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings has heavily affected the capacity of the Union to perform as a credible diplomatic actor. Euro-Mediterranean relations between the EU and the MENA region have thus been markedly shaped by the way in which the EU has engaged or disengaged in those territories. The partnership agreements the EU has put in place, aimed at defining a wide array of development strategies for the countries mostly in need of infrastructural and economic recovery, have proved insufficient to pave a new path of stability and growth.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), established in 2003 and revamped in 2011 to face the consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings, governs the Union’s relations with 16 of its southern and eastern neighbours. In trying to shift from more development-based approaches, the revised ENP strategy has eventually prioritised regional stabilisation, from a political, economic and security point of view. Furthermore, the ENP also relies on the implementation of ENP Bilateral Action Plans (AP) aimed at operationalising EU interventions in partner countries that are tailor-made to the specific needs and realities on the ground. However, despite the overall framework and structure of the European policy, the member states failed in creating ad hoc and targeted policies which could meet each of the 16 countries’ specificities and peculiarities. Instead of differentiation, they opted for a unique approach to be used both for the southern and the eastern interlocutors. This also seems to contribute to eroding the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean. 15% of respondents to the Survey believe that the inconsistency of the EU’s approach vis-à-vis different Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries and the EU’s inability to renew its offer to the “Southern neighbourhood” (11%) impact on European credibility. Migratory issues have shifted EU attention from sustained efforts for African regional integration to the management of migrants’ flows from its northern countries.

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The revised ENP strategy has eventually prioritised regional stabilisation, from a political, economic and security point of view.
Regional integration has been the core of EU-Africa relations for decades: improving regionalism as a key development strategy was one of the main goals enshrined in the 2000 Cotonou Agreements, as well as in the 2007 EU-Africa Strategic Partnership. Today, with a large part of the 2015 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa being devoted to border controls and security, the aim of addressing the root causes of migration (one of the objectives the Trust Fund is set to achieve) is further downgraded to the bottom of the EU agenda of strategic priorities.

The progressive departure from an approach that focuses on the causes pushing migrants to embark on long and perilous journeys across the Mediterranean is also the direct and clear consequence of the securitised trend that the European political narrative on migration has acquired during these last three years.

The criticised 2016 EU-Turkey deal and the 2017 Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding represent the utmost example of the EU tendency to divert the management (in terms of first and second assistance) of migrants to extra-EU countries that could benefit from consistent financial transfers, in return for their operational and logistical support.

These ambiguous forms of collaboration are gaining increasing support as part of new nationalist and populist agendas in the majority of EU countries. Galvanised by and, at the same time, fomenting the anger of public opinion, exacerbated by years of difficult economic crisis, populist and nationalist parties have taken the lead of the current EU debate on migration and, more broadly, of EU foreign and security strategies. The launch, by former Trump advisor Steve Bannon, of the so-called “The Movement”, a sort of 21st Century Populist International, is just one of the latest examples of how Mediterranean and transatlantic relations are being re-written and risk being re-shaped by a marked right-wing and populist footprint. Internally, the Crimea question is not only showing how fragile the territorial integrity of Europe is – particularly after Brexit – but also emphasising our ever-lasting inherent incapacity to decisively face the Russian power in the normative war in which we are engaging. This situation resonates in the Euromed Survey results, where 34% of respondents considered populist and nationalist movements/trends as the main threat to European integration process (see Graph 2).

Graph 2: What is the main threat to the European integration process?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>SEM countries</th>
<th>EU countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Populism and nationalism</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of cohesion and unity</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability to reform the European Union and to make it closer to the citizens</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow economic growth, unemployment and inequalities</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability to threats from outside</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

In the background, new and unexplored environmental challenges are going to have, in the near future, unexpected repercussions on Euro-Mediterranean relations. The progressive desertifica-
tion of the Sahel region, the dramatic shrinking of Lake Chad, and the continuous water shortages in most central and eastern African regions are becoming crucial push factors of migration, helping to fuel human smuggling phenomena due to the renewed urgency to leave.

A consistent part of EU action in North Africa should thus focus on tackling the root causes of this growing vicious cycle, which is likely to endanger, by means of famine and drought, the life of millions of people in that regions. Cohesively engaging with key African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), such as the European Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and with international bodies, like the African Union (AU), will contribute to developing more coherent and long-lasting strategies for these countries. Still, it will be necessary to overcome the outdated development-based approach, by integrating it with a more solid security perspective that could evidently show the growing link existing between environmental stresses and the occurrence of conflicts. Re-launching regional cooperation and integration would also be crucial to ensuring a more uniform implementation of joint EU-Africa initiatives in those areas. To achieve this, the EU should start engaging with key regional and international actors as a single and unified entity in order to assert a more credible diplomatic role in the world scene.

In addition to this, from the other side of the Atlantic, Trump is completely de-structuring the international order as we have known it. As a matter of fact, respondents to the Euromed Survey identify the United States (US) as the actor “more likely to have a negative effect on the stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region” (as illustrated in Graph 3 below). From trade affairs to diplomatic relations and security strategies with key global actors, everything is being reshaped and re-dimensioned to fit the world’s new size: the national one. By withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Deal and undertaking ambiguous relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Trump is overtly telling the EU that it cannot benefit from a privileged interlocutor position anymore, thus disrupting decades of delicate diplomatic networking dating back to the beginning of the Cold War.

Graph 3: Which of the following actors are more likely to have a negative effect on the stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 7)

United States of America 31%
Gulf Cooperation Council countries 20%
Russia 18%
Iran 15%
Turkey 15%
European Union 11%
China 2%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

The European Union should learn to act as a single body, in a more supranational, rather than intergovernmental, fashion.
His destabilising stance on global and multilateral issues is also progressively eroding the trust the international order had acquired through the establishment of entities like the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Threatening to withdraw from multilateral agreements, as he did in the context of COP 21, and also denouncing countries that are vital parts of such accords, such as Germany and the tinier Montenegro, of internally sabotaging the functioning of such mechanisms, Trump is progressively spreading a hostile sentiment of mistrust in international relations today, jeopardising the global community management of current international emergencies.

2019 will be a decisive year for the future of the EU. The composition of the European Parliament will be completely mashed-up and new equilibriums will have to be found. This balance will inevitably shift towards a more securitised, nationalist and populist vision of the European order. We, as Europeans, are called to decide how to engage with this new political scenario by remembering which priorities we want to give voice to. It will be essential not to abandon a human rights perspective in a moment in which both regional and national rules are being re-written.

In the context of migration, it is necessary to reverse the trend that has seen illegitimate governments as proper interlocutors for the implementation of policy directives on the ground. Libya, for instance, does not have a recognised government at the helm of the country. This tendency fuels the proliferation of illegal and criminal settings, at the expense of migrants who are caught in the vicious cycle of violence and discrimination. In this framework, European and international legal norms are the linchpin around which our policies and strategies must turn. Migration is a structural and global phenomenon, and we must establish more legal channels to access Europe, with the aim of dismantling human smuggling networks and organisations.

More broadly, the EU should learn to act as a one single body, in a more supranational, rather than intergovernmental, fashion. A “light federation” should be progressively defined, paving the way to the United States of Europe. The diplomatic stalemate we are incurring when dealing with other powers on the world scene is primarily triggered by the opposite political stances the EU gives voice to. There is no uniform, shared and cohesive diplomatic position to tackle global issues. Hence, especially in light of the profound geo-political changes Euro-Mediterranean relations are currently undergoing, it is key to adopt a new, more effective and coherent approach for structuring EU politics.

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The Maghreb’s disengagement from Europe

Youssef Cherif
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Europe continues to be the Maghreb’s top trading partner and it ranks very high in Maghreb’s foreign policy-making considerations.

The Maghreb countries adapted an anti-European discourse for most of their postcolonial history. Half a century after independence, diatribes against France remain frequent in Algeria’s official rhetoric. Anti-Italian sentiments are strong in Libya, partly as a result of Gaddafi’s propaganda. Even the Westernised Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia and the Europhile Hassan II of Morocco engaged occasionally in strong campaigns against their former colonial masters.

However, Europe continues to be the Maghreb’s top trading partner and it ranks very high in Maghreb’s foreign policy-making considerations (see Graph 1).

Graph 1: The EU as a foreign policy priority (mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

The five North African countries therefore align largely on Europe’s security and migration policies. Gaddafi’s Libya for instance kept Italy as its main economic partner and positioned itself as a strong European ally on migration and counter-terrorism. Algeria, although very strict about its independence, accepts stopping migrants from crossing to Europe and being, perhaps unwillingly, a guardian of Europe’s south. Moreover, France is Algeria’s first economic partner, where most of its expatriates live and the place where the Algerian leadership goes for medical treatment, etc.
North Africa’s postcolonial autocrats therefore acted in a Joker mask: anti-colonial heroes for their populations and docile partners for their European neighbours. For Europe, the Maghreb countries were reliable allies that kept the southern borders safe (apart from the years when Gaddafi went rogue, i.e. 1970-1998). The “deal” was simple: as long as the regimes kept migration on leash and security stable, Europe would limit its criticisms and avoid imposing its human rights-based norms.

This “deal”, however, has not stopped these countries from looking for new partners over the years. Gaddafi’s Libya and Algeria, for instance, looked at the Soviet Union – then Russia – to arm their troops. Gaddafi even tried to build an anti-European African Union, and Morocco is building a strong pan-African network. Algeria invited the Chinese to invest and work in big numbers in its territory, and Asian cars started invading the markets of Tunisia and Morocco from the 1990s, etc.

**The Trend Has Accelerated After 2011**

Then came 2011. In fact, the events of 2011 should have encouraged more rapprochement with the European Union (EU). The popular movement was quickly dubbed the “Arab Spring” by European journalists, intellectuals and politicians. It reminded Europeans of the 1848 Spring of Nations and the 1968 Prague Spring. There was a European appropriation of the movement and a wave of enthusiasm was felt across Europe. The European intelligentsia imagined that the Arab world would soon join the club of Western democracies.

What happened later is well known. Civil wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen, international interventions of all kinds, coup and restoration in Egypt, political stagnation in Jordan and Morocco, economic crisis in Tunisia, diplomatic watershed in the Gulf, etc. Hope and enthusiasm ended in fear and despair.

And while the Middle East in the last century was the theatre of countless wars and political upheavals, North Africa was rarely so. But, after 2011, the region, which is historically and geographically closer to Europe than the central Middle East, started to shake.

Europeans, moreover, were not the only ones who felt emboldened by the regional change. Qatar and Turkey were quick to jump on the opportunity offered by the Arab Spring. They pushed their allies to the front row by means of financial, diplomatic or media support. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on the other hand, saw the Arab Spring as a threat to their national interests and went on a quest to save the falling regimes or restore authoritarian rule. Russia, while militarily overstretched between Ukraine and Syria, has also increased its economic exchanges with Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (and to a certain extent Mauritania), and started getting vocal on Libya. China, still politically absent, became Tunisia’s third export partner and has signed important contracts with Algeria and Morocco. Furthermore, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt announced their enrolment in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

These ties did not start in 2011. However, apart from a few exceptions, their post-2011 intensity is unprecedented. Europe’s leverage on North African governments is, conversely, diminishing. Some would argue that the neo-colonial umbilical cord is being cut, while others contend that a new neo-colonialism is emerging.

Values of democracy, peace and human rights, in theory, guide Europe. But the Old Continent remains the echo chamber of former colonial powers. Its approach is therefore easily perceived as paternalist and neo-colonial. Moreover, the EU takes a defensive attitude regarding its borders through fear of terrorism and mass migration. This in turn makes North Africans feel that they are in the dock, not on the allies’ list. Furthermore, the conditionality that comes with

Some would argue that the neo-colonial umbilical cord is being cut, while others contend that a new neo-colonialism is emerging.

Southern and Eastern Mediterranean populations see conditionality as a form of unwanted interference and a prelude to conspiratorial designs.
European aid and partnership is often cumbersome. EU values translate into complex legal procedures and political pressures that make partners uncomfortable. Because of the strong anti-European rhetoric that spread during the postcolonial period, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean populations see conditionality as a form of unwanted interference and a prelude to conspiratorial designs.

The non-European newcomers, on the other hand, make a different offer. They are led by autocratic regimes and do not have democracy promotion projects. They frequently resort to corruption to ease things or make them work, be it in their own countries or in their foreign deals. Their focus on good governance and the rule of law is accordingly limited. Most of these countries have themselves suffered from Western imperialism in the past, which opens common ground between them and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean nations. Also, because they are new global or regional powers, they are interested in undermining Western supremacy. Their growing economies, on the other hand, push them towards looking for new markets. Hence, they find in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries good candidates to maximise their power and resources. The Southern and Eastern Mediterranean governments are consequently interested in their offer, which looks more appealing and less burdensome. However, and as benevolent as these countries may look, they all have political agendas, if not now then in the future.

Arab and Muslim countries (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Turkey) play the Arab-Islamic brotherhood and fraternity card when interacting with their North African counterparts. But their politics is driven by classical realist goals and they are using North Africa to maximise their political and economic power. For the UAE, Qatar and Turkey, for instance, the region is an economic bonanza because of its natural resources (oil, gas, phosphate, etc.), agriculture, proximity to Europe and port facilities. And for the UAE and Saudi Arabia, North Africa is a theatre of their conflict with Qatar and Turkey and a place where they can challenge their enemies’ interests, etc. This has precipitated the 2013 coup in Egypt, complicated the civil war in Libya and deepened Tunisia’s political crisis. It is telling that the 9th Euromed Survey respondents see the Gulf countries as the second highest threat to Southern and Eastern Mediterranean stability, and actually the highest threat according to the Tunisian participants (they ranked Turkey third, see Graph 2).

Russia has considerable economic interests in North Africa (Libya, Algeria) and important geopolitical gains to make there, such as pressuring Europe from the south. North Africa might therefore find itself entangled in the cold war game that already opposes Russia to the West in Europe and the Middle East. There is already a Russian military presence in Egypt and news of Russian political or military involvement in Libya continues to pop up. Russian intelligence activities were uncovered in Tunisia, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used Tunis as a platform to defend his country’s Ukraine policy in March 2014. The relatively positive image of the country among the 9th Euromed Survey respondents from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries is possibly due to the massive Russian propaganda disseminated across the Arab world (see Graph 2).
Graph 2: Which of the following actors are more likely to have a negative effect on the stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 7)

![Bar graph showing the percentage of respondents from Tunisia, SEM countries, and EU countries for each actor.]

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

China’s hard politics is currently limited to its Asian hinterland, which may explain why very few people see it as a threat to stability in the 9th Euromed Survey. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, Beijing relies mainly on soft power. Yet Beijing is now gradually putting pressures on the indebted African countries to follow its political line, as witnessed recently in Kenya or Burkina Faso. Chinese activity has recently been increasing in North Africa. Algeria, for instance, is slowly becoming dependent on Chinese goods and services, and Beijing is becoming an important economic partner of Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. For China, North Africa is a link between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe and an important energy reserve. So while neutral at this point, China may start putting political pressures on the North African countries in the future if its interests are threatened or if its national interest requires it.

Hence, it is not surprising to see Egypt under President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi completely ignoring Europe’s pressures on issues related to human rights and democracy. In contrast to former President Hosni Mubarak, who was largely dependent on Western aid, Sisi has diversified his country’s relationships. Bailed out by the Saudis and the Emiratis, politically backed by the Russians and courted by the Chinese, Sisi can calmly look beyond Europe.

For Beijing, North Africa is a link between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe and an important energy reserve.

In the case of Libya, militias hold significant power and influence; they are completely out of Europe’s reach.
In Libya, which is divided in two, the United Nations (UN) backed — but weak and inefficient — Western government is considered close to Europe. But, even so, Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj can say “no” to Europe when he wishes. The Eastern warlord Khalifa Haftar frequently speaks out against Europe and follows Sisi’s example. He enjoys Saudi and Emirati backing and shows little interest in adopting European values. Haftar has even asked Russia to establish a military presence in Libya. He can therefore brave European threats and condemnations and continue his war. Europe ended up looking for a compromise with him. In the case of Libya, militias can also hold significant power and influence; they are completely out of Europe’s reach.

The Algerian position has not changed, but there are new patterns emerging in Tunisia and Morocco. Rabat, for instance, has severed ties with European institutions after the EU criticised its Western Sahara policies. Moreover, and although many European voices criticised what is described as setbacks for democracy and human rights, Morocco did not alter its course. Morocco, which established itself as a gate to Africa, and where China — along with Japan — is an important investor, can now take bold positions against Europe without facing retributions.

Tunisia remains relatively in Europe’s orbit, especially because its democratic institutions allow for political flexibility. Foreigners can criticise Tunisia without fearing immediate sanctions by the regime in Tunis and Tunisian decision-makers can blame any flaws in the relationship on the imperfection of democracy. Yet as Tunisia’s ties with non-European countries continue to increase, the government of Tunis may start changing its stance. Tunisia has for instance been continuously postponing the negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, disregarding European pressures, etc.

The Maghreb, a European zone of influence for more than two centuries, is slowly moving away. That is due more to Europe’s decline and the emergence of new forces than to an innate emancipation movement. How Europe will deal with this new reality and how the Maghreb will use it remain to be seen.

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WHAT MOROCCANS EXPECT FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION

INTISSAR FAKIR
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Morocco’s domestic challenges are giving greater urgency to certain aspects of the EU-Morocco relationship even as the traditional pillars of security, migration and trade remain important. EU policy-makers should be aware that many Moroccans are thinking beyond these traditional aspects. On these historical pillars, EU-Morocco relations have faced a number of challenges over the past few years, particularly tensions around migration and the status of the Western Sahara (Fakir, 2018). Yet many Moroccans seem eager for the relationship to also reflect internal challenges. Over the past two years, Morocco has been navigating a series of internal political and social crises, which at their heart are about the quality of governance: whether the palace or the elected government ought to be empowered to govern the country and, consequently, who ought to be held accountable for any failures.

The 2018 Euromed Survey revealed that Moroccans think democracy, rule of law and good governance should be the most important aspects of EU-Morocco relations (see Graph 1). Respondents also indicated that the EU’s support for authoritarian regimes is likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (Euromed Survey, 2018). That many Moroccans think democracy and effective governance should be part of the country’s EU relations is a result of circumstances that have been amplified since 2011.

Relative to other countries in the region, Morocco charted a more stable path forward during the 2011 protests. The Moroccan protest movement did not aim to topple the regime – the monarch, in this case – but rather called on it to reform. People envisioned the king playing a role in which he “reigned but did not govern”. Indeed, Mohammed VI, under pressure from the growing protest movement, promised constitutional reforms that passed in July 2011, ceding some historically royal privileges to the government and parliament. A timid implementation of the constitutional changes followed, but over the past two years there has been a clear reversal. In one notable example, the Islamist Party for Justice and Development (PJD), at the centre of the push and pull between monarchy and government about how much responsibility (and accountability) ought to be given to the government, won a second term in 2016. After its win, the monarchy became intent on regaining control of the political process by cajoling and intimidating the various political parties with which the PJD needed to ally to form a coalition. This orchestrated political crisis stalled the government formation process and resulted in a weak coalition led by a deeply damaged and compromised PJD. Morocco’s elected government returned to being a weak institution again, subject to citizens’ scorn.

The government formation crisis was the backdrop for a tense period in the Rif, where citizens protested their marginalisation and the failure of local and national governance. In the wave of protests in the Rif, citizens protested their marginalisation and the failure of local and national governance.

Popular unrest has highlighted the long-running frustration at uneven development in Morocco and the disaffection many feel toward politics and the current balance of power.
water. Also in Jerada, a town in Morocco’s eastern region, after two men perished while trying to mine coal they could sell to survive. More recently, since April 2018 a boycott campaign has been targeting three large companies that exemplify the influence of business on politics and vice versa (Fakir, 2018).

Graph 1: The most important aspects, when it comes to my country’s relationship with the EU should be: (respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 12)

![Bar chart showing the most important aspects of Morocco's relationship with the EU.]

This popular unrest has highlighted the long-running frustration at uneven development in Morocco and the disaffection many feel toward politics and the current balance of power. Morocco’s incongruous story is puzzling and endlessly frustrating to its own people. Morocco is a stable country with a growing economy where the government is engaged in a seemingly endless overhaul of everything from infrastructure to education. The government has undertaken a number of promising economic endeavours, including championing progressive reforms to encourage foreign direct investment. The government is also pioneering innovative approaches to alternative energy. Morocco recently completed setting up the largest solar production site in the world, the Noor Ouarzazate solar complex, which will contribute to meeting the country’s goal of producing 42% of the country’s electric power needs by 2020 (Xinhua, 2018).
While the country has developed significantly since the 1990s, these improvements have failed to meet the potential many Moroccans believe their country is capable of reaching. More remains to be done. The United Nations’ Human Development Report ranked Morocco 123 out of 189 countries, even behind Palestine and Iraq, two conflict-ridden nations (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2018). What remains a point of frustration for many Moroccans is the uneven development. Sophisticated green energy initiatives, an ambitious high-speed rail plan and increased foreign direct investment in certain parts of the country are juxtaposed with lack of roads, electricity or running water in other areas.

The country continues to lag behind and struggle with seemingly straightforward governance. Moroccans’ frustration has in the past manifested as political apathy. Most have long viewed participation in the political system as pointless and have accurately seen the monarchy – not elected officials – as the sole source of change. Since 2011 and particularly since 2016, however, this frustration is manifesting as anger and eagerness for action. This disappointment in the political elite and governing institutions also drives Moroccans’ view that democracy is or ought to be an important aspect of their country’s relationship with the EU. This belief underlies their desire to see political reform, better service provision and effective and accountable institutions in charge, in keeping with global progress.

The EU is not simply seen as a trade partner but also as an actor capable of helping to strengthen the country’s rule of law, democracy and governance. EU-Morocco cooperation is capable of promoting better governance and human development ahead of cooperation on security or migration (see Graph 1).

Equally important is the desire to see EU-Morocco engagement reflected in greater social development. Education is singled out as one of the obstacles to development. Inadequate service provision, inequitable development across the country, still-too-high levels of illiteracy and lack of economic and social opportunity have raised citizens’ anger in recent years. The government spends adequately on education: in 2018, 27.3% of the state’s budget went to education, including personnel costs (Draft Budget Law, 2018). However, this and various reform initiatives have failed to improve the lot of schools and students. The latest estimates still put illiteracy rates at a staggering 32.2%. While the country has come a long way, even just from 2000, when the illiteracy rate was 54.9%, education remains an issue, even among youth (Ibourk & Amaghouss, 2014). The latest available statistics indicate primary school enrolment has steadily risen to 96.8% among boys and 95.6% among girls, but this progress has not extended to secondary education. Only 37% of eligible students attend secondary school (UNICEF, 2012).

In the face of these challenges, the government has faltered on education. In 2009, an “Emergency Plan” sought to accelerate the National Plan for Education and Training, which was replaced with a new strategic plan in 2015. The 2015 strategic plan claims various successes: additional physical buildings in rural areas for the 2016-2017 school year (and more planned for 2018-2019) and expansion of school rooms. More recently, in August 2018 the ministerial council approved a framework law with a host of reforms targeting the education system, including vocational training and scientific research (Kasraoui, 2018). These plans made little difference in appeasing Moroccans’ concerns about the quality of education. The Higher Council for Education, Training and Scientific Research (CSEFRS) is also looking to provide vocational training to address the mismatch of available skills and employment needs. Higher education is another sore point where there is little political will to advance badly needed reforms (Chihab, 2018). University graduates regularly protest their lack of prospects upon graduation, and teachers protest poor pay. Most of the successes claimed by the CSEFRS are recent, leaving it unclear whether these are enough to address the issues at hand. Although the EU supports Morocco’s higher education reform efforts (Le Matin, 2018), support for these projects remains small compared to the amounts spent on security and migration.

This disappointment in the political elite and governing institutions also drives Moroccans’ view that democracy is or ought to be an important aspect of their country’s relationship with the EU.
Morocco recently received 272 million dollars from the EU to increase its border policing (Karam, 2018) after Morocco rejected the idea of hosting migrant screening centres or “regional disembarkation centres” for the EU (Rankin & Wintour, 2018). This all follows a feud surrounding EU court rulings in 2015 and 2016 to exclude the Western Sahara from fisheries and agricultural agreements. These rulings tanked relations, and although the agreements have been renewed to Morocco’s satisfaction, relations are barely on the mend. Through migration and security, the Moroccan government is able to wield significant influence on EU institutions and direct the relationship’s focus. Yet the degree to which Moroccans see security as a secondary concern whereas European counterparts see it as a primary one is noteworthy. That is not to say that Moroccans do not value their country’s stability, or their government’s role in that of the EU, but it reflects citizens’ preoccupation with improving their standards of living and seeing “dignity” available to them.

Putting greater focus on supporting development schemes that go to the heart of the governance issue would reflect Moroccans’ desired relationship with the EU. Contrary to EU established wisdom that vocal support for greater political reform risks undermining stability, clear EU support for meaningful reform would benefit Morocco’s stability by echoing Moroccans’ own wishes for their future. EU officials, as a matter of priority and style, often appear reluctant to push for greater political reforms or speak out against human rights violations and authoritarian tendencies, believing that would destabilise a country they see as comparatively stable. Yet speaking out against the undermining of freedom and democracy would not only put the EU on the side of the Moroccan people but would also benefit the long-term stability of the country. Increasingly, the risks to Moroccan stability stem from popular frustration with the government and the monarchy’s growing failure to govern the country effectively.

Signs that the Moroccan government is wooing Africa are unmistakable, driving the view that the country’s foreign priorities are increasingly looking southward. But the reality remains that the EU is a vital partner for Morocco, financially and strategically. In that sense, the EU can play an even larger role in nudging the leadership toward greater political reforms, and more crucially in supporting local development, thereby delivering an important message that the EU cares about Moroccans as much as it cares about the institutions that have failed them.

Through migration and security, the Moroccan government is able to wield significant influence on EU institutions and direct the relationship’s focus.

The EU speaking out against the undermining of freedom and democracy would not only put the EU on the side of the Moroccan people but would also benefit the long-term stability of the country.

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ALGERIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: UNCERTAINTIES OF A DENSE RELATIONSHIP

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Several lessons can be drawn from the Euromed Survey’s results. We will analyse the main ones before looking at the major challenges of the relations between Algeria and the European Union (EU) and concluding with the consequences for the Mediterranean region of the rise of populist and nationalist movements in Europe.

Main Sources of Instability for Europe – and its Mediterranean Neighbourhood

The Survey’s results reveal concerns regarding the evolution of the situation in Europe: 56% of Algerian respondents believe that the situation is in worse shape than it has been since the launch of the Barcelona Process. A situation that will inevitably have an impact on the Mediterranean region, where Europe is the main actor.

Graph 1: Compared to 1995 when the Barcelona Declaration was signed, overall the European Union today is in:

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
In contrast to perceived wisdom, political and social issues are more worrying than economic ones. It is interesting to see that Algerian, Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) and European respondents have the same view about the threat hanging over the European integration process: populism and nationalism. Meanwhile, vulnerabilities to threats from outside are seen as least important (see Graph 2).

Graph 2: What is the main threat to the European integration process?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

![Graph showing threat to European integration process]

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

The Survey’s results also show a clear interest from Algerian respondents in the cooperation mechanisms implemented by the EU with its Mediterranean neighbours. We can group these two factors – “Inconsistency of the EU’s approach vis-à-vis different Southern and Mediterranean countries” and the “Inability of the EU to renew its offer to the ‘Southern Neighbourhood’” – within the same category (see Graph 3) of the assessment of the European regional offer and its evolution. This is a major concern for Algerian respondents; an issue they view as the main factor affecting EU credibility in the Mediterranean. Their attitude shows both a concern and also regional expectations that the EU is supposed to meet. Their attitude could reflect a kind of “regional awareness”. The fact that the issue of European support to authoritarian regimes is ranked in second position (see Graph 3) also denotes their expectations and how they see the EU, i.e. a gap between what the EU does and what it is supposed to do, in their view.
Graph 3: What is most likely to affect the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 8)

- Inconsistency of the EU’s approach vis-à-vis different SEM countries: 17% (Algerian), 16% (SEM), 15% (EU)
- Support to authoritarian regimes: 15% (Algerian), 12% (SEM), 10% (EU)
- Inability of the EU to renew its offer to the “Southern neighbourhood”: 15% (Algerian), 12% (SEM), 11% (EU)
- Divisions within the EU on key issues and re-bilateralisation of relations between EU member states and SEM countries: 23% (Algerian), 15% (SEM), 10% (EU)
- Contractual asymmetry between the EU and its partners: 13% (Algerian), 10% (SEM), 9% (EU)
- Securitisation of migration policies: 19% (Algerian), 13% (SEM), 10% (EU)
- Weak role within conflict zones: 15% (Algerian), 11% (SEM), 9% (EU)
- Brexit: 7% (Algerian), 7% (SEM), 2% (EU)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Algerian participants rank the migration issue in sixth position, but the reality is quite different: this issue polarises, rightly or wrongly, the debates, stances and policies in Europe and quite recently in Algeria but far less intensely. The fact that the issue of support to authoritarian regimes is ranked second reflects a democratic conviction and an interest in Europe continuing to be a provider of stability and certainly to play a role of promoter of democracy in its Mediterranean neighbourhood.

According to Algerian respondents, the three factors linked to the situation in Europe and/or its policies that can have negative effects on stability in the Mediterranean region are different from other EU and SEM respondents (see Graph 4). It is worth noting the convergence of all respondents on the issue of arms exports from some EU member states to Southern Mediterranean countries: 17% consider them as having negative effects.
Graph 4: From the following options that relate either to the situation of the EU or to its policies, which ones are likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of SEM countries? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

- Military interventions from some EU member states: 31% for EU countries, 12% for SEM countries, 21% for Algerian respondents.
- Support to authoritarian regimes: 24% for EU countries, 19% for SEM countries, 18% for Algerian respondents.
- Securitisation of migration policies: 24% for EU countries, 17% for SEM countries, 17% for Algerian respondents.
- Arms exports from some EU member states: 17% for EU countries, 17% for SEM countries, 17% for Algerian respondents.
- EU home-grown ‘radicalisation’ and foreign fighters coming from the EU: 14% for EU countries, 12% for SEM countries, 8% for Algerian respondents.
- Poor EU economic performance: 13% for EU countries, 17% for SEM countries, 6% for Algerian respondents.

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Primacy of the Democratic Parameter

It is also interesting to note that educational, scientific and democratic considerations prevail over economic issues (trade and investments) and security issues (notably, the fight against terrorism). For Algerian respondents, the two main concerns in Algeria-EU relations should be, on the one hand, education and cultural and scientific cooperation and, on the other, the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and good governance (see Graph 5).

Meanwhile, trade and terrorism are regarded as far less important, with 10% each. Moreover, it is worth emphasising the marginal interest in mobility (see Graph 5), which is somewhat contradictory as logically it is involved in cultural and scientific mobility. In conclusion, the regional political agenda, dominated by security and economic issues, does not seem to influence the perceptions of Algerian respondents.
Graph 5: The most important aspects, when it comes to my country's relationship with the EU should be:
(respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 12)

- Education, and cultural and scientific cooperation: 22%
- Democracy promotion, rule of law, good governance: 20%
- Trade and investment: 12%
- Job creation and employment: 10%
- Counter-terrorism: 8%
- Foreign policy and security cooperation: 7%
- Mobility: 7%
- Financial and technical assistance: 5%
- Energy: 5%
- Climate change: 3%
- Regulatory convergence and approximation to the EU acquis: 3%
- Migration and border management: 3%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Algeria’s Top Partners: EU Privileged Status

For 42% of Algerian respondents, Europe is far and away Algeria’s top partner, followed by Africa and Russia. In contrast, only 2% consider the United States (US) as their country’s top partner whereas Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are completely dismissed (see Graph 6). These are perceptions that do not necessarily correspond to the reality.

While Europe is easily Algeria’s top partner, given the density of the economic, political, human, cultural, scientific and historical relations, the ranking for Africa does not correspond to reality. Algeria’s official political relations with sub-Saharan Africa are dense but human and economic relations are insignificant: Africa accounts for only 1.5% of Algeria’s foreign trade. The third position, occupied by Russia, can certainly be explained by the fact that it is Algeria’s main, and traditional, arms supplier. Finally, the attitude to the US and GCC countries also does not correspond to the reality of the political and security relations with the US and political and economic relations with the GCC (investments in Algeria).
Graph 6: As you see it, the top two foreign policy partners of your country are:
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 8)

Algerian respondents’ perceptions are supported by their view concerning regional stability. For them, the US and the GCC are the most likely to have a negative effect on stability in the Southern Mediterranean (see Graph 7). We note here a gap between the perceptions of Algerian respondents and those of SEM and European respondents, due to the national context. Only 2% of Algerian respondents consider that Russia can have a negative effect on security in the Mediterranean region compared to 15% for SEM respondents and 22% for European respondents.
Graph 7: Which of the following actors are more likely to have a negative effect on the stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 7)

- United States of America: 31% (SEM), 25% (EU), 42% (Algeria)
- Gulf Cooperation Council countries: 20% (SEM), 20% (EU), 38% (Algeria)
- Russia: 15% (SEM), 22% (EU), 2% (Algeria)
- Iran: 12% (SEM), 15% (EU), 7% (Algeria)
- Turkey: 11% (SEM), 17% (EU), 2% (Algeria)
- European Union: 7% (SEM), 5% (EU), 5% (Algeria)
- China: 2% (SEM), 1% (EU), 5% (Algeria)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

There is also a significant gap regarding the GCC, which is negatively seen by 20% of SEM respondents and 18% of European respondents, in comparison to 38% for those from Algeria. Finally, another gap is seen concerning the US, considered as a source of instability by 31% of SEM respondents and 25% of European respondents, in comparison to 42% for those from Algeria.

There are three main reasons that explain the negative assessment of the GCC by Algerian respondents. In the first place, the GCC countries are considered, in the Maghreb in general, as a source of both societal and political threat: a source of religious radicalism, mainly Wahhabi and its funding. Secondly, these countries are also considered as sources of instability in the Arab world in general bearing in mind their involvement directly and/or through allies intervening in several conflicts (Libya, Yemen, Syria). Indeed, the GCC countries today are involved in all the focuses of tension in the Arab world in one way or another. Finally, the current crisis between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on the one hand, and Qatar, on the other, has also become a source of regional instability polarising inter-Arab interactions.

Algerian respondents’ attitude to the US can be explained by the American policy in the Arab world and, more particularly, vis-à-vis certain issues that mobilise public opinion in Algeria, notably the Palestinian question and Iraq (its invasion and occupation of Iraq) and by its alliance with the GCC countries, which are seen as a destabilising factor both at a domestic (in each Arab country) and regional level. It is worth noting the gap between SEM and Algerian
respondents, on the one hand, and Algerian respondents, on the other. Although they are geographically far from the Middle-Eastern focuses of tension, the latter assess the US more negatively. The historical factor and the Algerian security imaginary, as well as the Libyan crisis, have also influenced their attitude.

In contrast, all respondents see the EU as a factor of stability given that only 7% of Algerian, 5% of SEM and 5% of EU respondents consider that it can have a negative effect on the region.

**Main Challenges of EU-Algeria Relations**

**Rebalance of economic relations**

For Algeria, economic relations with Europe are characterised by a "structural asymmetry" that should be corrected. According to a report by Algex (National Agency for the Promotion of Foreign Trade) on the impact of the association agreement, which entered into force in 2005, Algeria’s losses between 2005 and 2020 would amount to 19 billion dollars while losses for 2005-2014 would be 8 billion dollars. These losses are the consequence of the tax and customs benefits granted to European countries through the association agreement, which allow them to flood the Algerian market while local products cannot compete and even less so aspire to be exported to Europe. Along with these huge financial losses there are the consequences experienced by Algerian consumers: increased prices of imported products and therefore lower purchasing power. The association agreement is supposed to boost Algerian exports, other than hydrocarbons, but 13 years after its entry into force, the structure of the Algerian economy has not changed at all.

According to the Algerian Ministry of Trade, after the implementation of the association agreement, Algerian imports from the EU have increased by 200%, rising from 8.2 billion dollars (annual average) to 24.21 billion dollars in 2011. Algerian exports to the EU have increased by 140%, rising from 15 billion dollars (annual average) to 36.3 billion, of which 97% are hydrocarbons.

Because of the financial crisis it has experienced since 2014, following the drop of its oil and gas revenues, Algeria has imposed (provisional) restrictions on imports. This has caused tension with the EU, which considers that they contravene the association agreement, while for Algeria they are in line with the provisions set out in the agreement. This is exacerbated by a structural tension making economic issues a major challenge for EU-Algeria relations. It should be emphasised that the EU continues to be Algeria’s main partner. In 2017 it accounted for 44% of its trade (in comparison to 16% by China).

**The energy partnership**

The energy issue has a common strategic nature. For Algeria, the aim is to ensure its positioning in the European market benefitting from its geographical proximity. For the EU, the aim is to strengthen the links with a reliable supplier that guarantees it the security of provisions far from geopolitical hazards. However, this partnership, desired by both parties, encounters many obstacles: 1) Some European partners sometimes put pressure on Algeria by failing to guarantee the renewal of contracts, as was recently the case with Italy, which, from an Algerian perspective, damages the reliability of European partners, thereby creating mistrust. 2) Linking Algeria more to the European energy market means worsening its economic dependency on the EU, and the latter also seeks to reduce its dependency on its suppliers, including Algeria. 3) Bearing in mind its own increased domestic consumption, Algeria will be unable to maintain, in the long term, the steady rhythm of exports to Europe. Hence the intention of the Algerian government to exploit shale gas, which awakens strong opposition in the south of the country.
The migration issue
Europe is seeking to outsource the management of migration flows far from its borders by using the carrot and stick, often the stick, including interfering in the national legislations of its neighbours. Yet, the latter, notably Algeria, have become lands of emigration, immigration and hosting, after having been for a long time only lands of emigration. This makes the migration issue complex and causes tensions in Maghreb societies. Algeria has recently categorically opposed the European call to set up reception centres for sub-Saharan migrants in the Maghreb on behalf of Europe. The issue of mobility (visas), often at the core of discussions between Algeria and Europe (Union and member states), risks becoming more sensitive in the next few years bearing in mind the European pressures for total outsourcing of the management of migrant flows.

The security of the Algerian community in Europe
With the rise to power of right-wing movements in Europe, the security of the Algerian community will become a political challenge for relations between Algeria and Europe and probably have an impact on European interests in Algeria if the physical integrity of Algerian nationals living in Europe is threatened. This question concerns both Morocco and Tunisia.

Impact of the Rise of Populisms and Nationalisms in Europe on its Neighbourhood
As the Survey revealed, as if it needed saying, populism and nationalism are the main threats to the European integration process (see Graph 2). Let’s briefly look at what this teaches us and how this situation specific to Europe can have an impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Given its geographical proximity, the EU is considered a democratic benchmark for respondents from Arab countries that are not democracies and held up as a model by SEM citizens. Yet this is being undermined by the challenge to European democracy from the rise of populism and nationalism. The rise of populist and nationalist parties, some of which are openly Nazi or fascist, is a danger not only for Europe but also for its Mediterranean neighbours. Extremisms in Europe risk boosting and fuelling extremism in the Mediterranean countries. This can trigger a process of reciprocal manipulation, so much so that the Southern Mediterranean region is falling prey to extremisms with a religious connotation, even if they are not in power. The weakening of European democracy will therefore have destabilising effects on the political situation of its neighbourhood. It will have at least two opposed effects: to contribute to the authoritarian consolidation while strengthening extremisms that in their turn will feed off European extremism; and catastrophic situation will develop unless the rise of extremisms in Europe is halted, both at a societal and electoral level.

European extremist and xenophobic movements have always made the migrant the enemy and are openly anti-Arab and anti-Muslim. These movements exploit the attacks to try to manipulate societies in depth. Given that there is an important Arab/Muslim community or of Arab/Muslim origin, if populist and/or nationalist governments increase in Europe, the risks of political tensions in Euro-Mediterranean relations would be high. With such governments, the ethical considerations (promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights), already marginalised on the EU agenda, will be eliminated. In this respect, Mediterranean Arab authoritarian regimes could adapt to the populist and nationalist governments in European countries. Nevertheless, the xenophobia of these movements will expose these regimes to internal social tensions. The transitional Tunisia, which has recently passed a law to fight against discrimination and racism (the first in the Arab world) could be the source of an ethical demand from the South faced with the increased extremisms and racisms in the North.
In short, the evolution of Euro-Mediterranean relations, already confronted with structural problems, is now facing a tough test; that of the rise of European extremisms and nationalisms in an extreme othering process challenging European democracy and, by extension, the Euro-Mediterranean relations model. It is a time of uncertainties in the Mediterranean region: would Europe, a source of moderation and stabilisation – and a democratic benchmark – risk becoming a source of tension and instability?

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IS EUROPE EXPORTING INSTABILITY TO THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN?
LIBYA AS A CASE STUDY

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This paper looks at Europe’s role in Libya since 2011 by examining the consequences of the military intervention in Libya in which some European Union (EU) member states played a key role. The paper will go on to consider the current role of the EU in Libya by exploring the consequences of the securitisation of EU migration policies and the political divisions among members states involved in the Libyan conflict in some form. The end of the paper will look at local perceptions of the EU and its actions with regards to the current political situation in the country.

Introduction

In February 2011, the Gaddafi regime’s use of force against civilians created a severe crisis in Libya. A collective international action was deemed necessary to protect civilians to stop violence in the country. On 31 March, in accordance with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973, a crisis management mission was launched by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Unified Protector Operation. France and Britain took the lead, and the United States (US) shared military command with them providing the coalition with the support of American airpower. A total of 19 countries participated in this collective measure against the Gaddafi regime that lasted eight months and ended with bringing down the regime after Gaddafi was captured and killed on 21 October 2011.

However, the western coalition supported by Arab allies, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), sometimes referred to as coalition of the willing in 2011, failed to plan for the day after and did not have a post-intervention strategy to help rebuild the country and support Libyan society, which had lacked civic traditions for many decades. Libya had to undergo a transition encountered by tremendous obstacles and challenges including more than 20 million pieces of scattered weapons and hundreds of thousands of armed combatants and the threat of fundamentalist and extremist groups. Instead, NATO declared mission accomplished on 30 October 2011. Western countries supported hasty elections in July 2012, the first elections in Libya for more than four decades. Western leaders, in particular British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy wanted a quick celebration of what they deemed a successful campaign in Libya. They were overly naïve, as were Libya’s transitional leaders, about the enormity of the task ahead and the major risks and challenges facing Libya’s post-Gaddafi transition.

Consequences of the 2011 Military Intervention in Libya

The Coalition that took part in the NATO operation in 2011 that helped to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi has left the country deeply unstable, awash with weapons, creating a fertile environment for Jihadist groups. President Obama did not hide his frustration with the failures in
Libya, which was the result of underestimating the need for concerted effort after the fall of the Gaddafi regime. There were no plans for the day after Gaddafi was gone.

Security and living conditions started to deteriorate significantly for Libyans as various armed and political groups engaged in a struggle to control state institutions and resources. This struggle resulted in the crippling of Libya's oil and gas production between 2013 and 2015, with hundreds of billions of dollars in losses and a devastating economic and financial crisis.

The lack of a long-term post-intervention strategy resulted in devastating consequences for Libya, its neighbours and Europe. On 11 September 2012, extremists attacked the US Consulate in Benghazi and killed the US Ambassador to Libya Chris Stephens. The attack resulted in reduced and rather passive US engagement with the Libyan crisis. President Obama was reported referring to the situation in Libya as a "shit show", calling it his biggest foreign policy mistake and regretting the lack of a post-intervention plan. However, President Obama blamed his French and British counterparts for their failure to step up to the challenge, especially as the Obama Administration gave the French and British the lead in the 2011 campaign.1

The killing of Ambassador Stephens marked a significant shift for the path of Libya’s post-Gaddafi transition. Indeed, as early as 2011, Libya became a safe haven for extremist Islamist groups, multiple ideological militias were formed, and training camps were set up for Libyan and foreign fighters looking to join the struggle against the Assad regime in Syria. The increasing presence and operability of extremist groups in Libya created significant threats and challenges, not just for Libya but the wider region including Europe.

By the end of 2011, it became clear that the consequences of the intervention in Libya started to spill over to other parts of the region. The Libyan conflict started to spread across borders in the Sahel region with Mali paying the highest price so far following a coup by disgruntled soldiers in March 2012. The coup in Mali led to the expansion of extremist networks in Mali’s northern region imposing strict Islamic rule in the provinces they controlled following the coup. The situation prompted a military campaign by France that was later supported by the UNSC.

In the last five to six years, some of the terrorist attacks in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Europe were linked to extremist groups operating in Libya. The security and political vacuum in post-Gaddafi Libya played a role in the emergence of Islamic State (IS) as a major Jihadist network in the region. The cities of Derna and Sirte were the first IS strongholds to be established outside of Syria and Iraq, and many of the fighters that were trained in Libya and the weapons that were transferred from Libya played an important role in the establishment of IS in Syria and Iraq. Additionally, the conflict in Libya was instrumental in the revitalisation of Jihadist groups in the Sahel and Maghreb regions.

Another obvious consequence of the 2011 intervention and the toppling of the Gaddafi regime is the irregular migration crisis that continues to challenge the cohesion of the EU. The irregular migration crisis is a leading factor in the rise of far-right groups in various European countries. Libya was a hub for African migrant workers, especially in the last ten years of the Gaddafi regime after agreeing to settle the Lockerbie case and the handing over of the regime’s chemical weapons in return for the lifting of sanctions. Consequently, Libya was open for business to foreign companies, especially in the energy, telecommunication and reconstruction sectors, providing hundreds of thousands of jobs to migrant workers.

Current Role of the EU in Libya

Since the fall of Gaddafi, the EU and individual member states have supported successive Libyan authorities with funding for projects dealing with public administration, civil society, health and education as well as on security and technical and vocational education and training. According to the EU’s factsheet, there is currently close to €70 million in bilateral support to Libya in 23 projects across several sectors, such as civil society, governance, health, economy, youth and education, and support to the political process, security and mediation activities, mainly through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). Additionally, the EU is contributing tens of millions in humanitarian support to UN agencies operating in Libya. The EU is also engaged in providing focused support to Libya through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations including Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean and the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to help Libya with its border control and security.

However, the main issues that drive much of the policy planning and engagement by EU countries towards Libya are migration, security and energy. In this regard, the interests of member states such as France and Italy are divergent in Libya to the point that each of the two countries are supporting different sides in the ongoing conflict to safeguard interests. The relationship between Italy and France in the Libyan case is still marked by mutual mistrust and misunderstanding. This thorny relationship is a key obstacle to developing a common EU policy and plan to deal with the Libyan crisis. While France supports Gen. Haftar and the Libyan National Army in Eastern Libya, Italy supports groups in the cities of Misrata and Tripoli.

Italy’s biggest concern is to curb the flow of migrants transiting through the region to reach first the Libyan coast and then the Italian shores and ensure stability of the green stream gas pipeline to protect its energy security, while France’s main interests seems to be fighting Islamist terrorism and ensuring a general strategic stability in the Sahel. Nonetheless, competition over Libya’s natural resources is also a factor in this Franco-Italian rivalry. In a country divided into East and West by legitimacy claims, into North and South in terms of institutional and security dynamics, and overall affected by political fragmentation and lawlessness, the dispute between Rome and Paris is only adding fuel to the fire.

Perception of the EU and its Actions in Libya

There seems to be widespread belief in Libya that divisions among some EU member states involved in Libya is a destabilising factor contributing to the protracted conflict in the country. EU countries might have a common goal in Libya, but they lack common objectives to inform their engagement with and policy towards Libya. This perception is in line with the data generated by the Euromed Survey, whereby the two top likely factors impacting the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean are divisions among EU member states on key issues and the securitisation of migration policies.
Adding, there is fear among Libyans that the EU is dumping its biggest problem and challenge onto Libya. The Italian anti-migration policy supported by the EU that involves intercepting migrant boats and returning them back to Libya arguably represents a violation of international law and human rights. Migration is a flow and if the migration pipeline is blocked on one end and not the other, it means more and more migrants will arrive and be stranded in Libya under extremely difficult conditions and with high risk of human rights abuses.

This securitised and ad hoc approach to migration by the EU might result in quick wins in the form of significant reduction in number of migrant arrivals to Europe, but will have long-term implications and a destabilising effect on Libya and other North African countries with a knock-on effect for Europe, as shown in the Euromed Survey results.
Graph 2: From the following options that relate either to the situation of the EU or to its policies, which ones are likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of SEM countries? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

- Securitisation of migration policies: 21%
- Support to authoritarian regimes: 19%
- Arms exports from some EU member states: 17%
- Military interventions from some EU member states: 16%
- Poor EU economic performance: 15%
- EU home-grown "radicalisation" and foreign fighters coming from the EU: 13%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Instead of a securitised approach, Europe needs a coordinated and multilateral one to deal with the migration crisis that in addition to security includes an economic and development approach.

The Sophia Operation mandate could expand to include fuel and weapons smuggling activities, which are expensive for Libya.

Rivalry and competition between EU member states in the case of Libya is not an option; a common and integrated approach and policy is the only way for the EU to play a stabilising role in Libya. It is critical for the EU to provide a platform and mechanism through which the interests and concerns of various member states interested in Libya are reconciled to avoid clash and confrontation between EU member states on Libyan soil.

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WHEN THE “STABILITY” EUROPEANS ARE PROUD OF, FUELS INSECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

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What if the obsession of the European Union (EU) member states with “stability” in the Mediterranean paradoxically led to maintaining long-lasting insecurity in the region? This deliberately provocative suggestion is not reflected in the Euromed Survey results: only 5% of respondents, an identical percentage for both the north and south of the Mediterranean, consider that the EU may have “a negative effect on the stability” of the region, far behind the United States (28%), the Gulf oil monarchies (19%), Russia (18%), Turkey (14%) and Iran (13%).

Graph 1: Which of the following actors are more likely to have a negative effect on the stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 7)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
A "Stability" in Trompe l’Œil

However, although the EU is not seen as the most harmful actor for the region, some of its dynamics or the policies it promotes may have negative effects. For 19% of respondents, “Support to authoritarian regimes” by the EU worryingly contributes to instability in the Mediterranean (again an almost identical percentage for the north and south) and is the second option chosen after “Securitisation (sic) of migration policies” with 21%. “Arms exports from some EU member states”, which are often the logical consequence of support for dictatorships in power, are also emphasised by 17% of respondents, once again equally in the north and south of the Mediterranean (see Graph 2).

Graph 2: From the following options that relate either to the situation of the EU or to its policies, which ones are likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of SEM countries? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

![Graph showing the results of the Euromed Survey](image)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Even more revealing is the fact that this “Support to authoritarian regimes” is considered by 11% of respondents as one of the main reasons for the EU’s loss of credibility in the Mediterranean (see Graph 3). Other reasons for loss of credibility identified are: “divisions within the EU” (19%), the “inconsistency” of the European policy in the Mediterranean (15%) and the “weak role within conflict zones” (13%). These different factors taken together not only undermine the importance of the EU in the Mediterranean but also strengthen a default consensus between member states to the benefit of the status quo. Thus a very disturbing image is drawn of a Europe incapable of promoting a future vision in the Mediterranean, of a Europe that, for lack of anything better, clings on to a “stability” in trompe l’œil, based on the most brutal force at the expense of the most basic right.
Graph 3: What is most likely to affect the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 8)

- Divisions within the EU on key issues and re-bilateralisation of relations between EU member states and SEM countries: 19%
- Securitisation of migration policies: 16%
- Inconsistency of the EU’s approach vis-à-vis different SEM countries: 15%
- Weak role within conflict zones: 13%
- Inability of the EU to renew its offer to the “Southern neighbourhood”: 11%
- Support to authoritarian regimes: 11%
- Contractual asymmetry between the EU and its partners: 10%
- Brexit: 5%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

From 1995 to 2010, the Barcelona Process had already suffered from the European inability to consolidate a real “third pillar” of cooperation with Southern Mediterranean civil societies. The Arab dictatorships had steadily blocked any progress in this respect, either by stressing their demands for “sovereignty” or by fabricating NGOs controlled by the regime (and often known under the ironic oxymoron of GONGO for Governmental NGO). The democratic uprising that spread through the Arab world in early 2011 torpedoed this fateful illusion. Nevertheless, European policy-makers refused to accept that the fall of the “wall of fear” in the Arab world had been as important for EU security in the long term as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Instead of taking stock of such a historical turn of events, Brussels laboriously updated programmes already in force, adapting them under a new name to the democratic transitions in Tunisia and Egypt. Once again these two countries, where the people’s protest had overthrown the dictators in power, were not the only ones to benefit from an extremely measured generosity. They were connected by the EU to Morocco and to Jordan, the former as a result of the constitutional reforms introduced by the monarch and the latter for reasons more linked to the Near East equation than to real democratic openings. Today we assess to what extent this certificate of “liberalisation” awarded by the EU rested for these two monarchies upon questionable foundations. It said much, above all, about European blindness faced with the radical originality of the popular uprisings in the Arab world.

Despite this persistent feebleness, Brussels was notable for its will to impede the worst in Egypt in summer 2013. Mohammed Morsi, the first democratically-elected president in the history of Egypt, had soon compromised his political credibility by prioritising the interests of
his party, the Muslim Brotherhood, over those of the nation. The Egyptian army had fuelled a
broad protest movement that had enabled it to overthrow Morsi to the benefit of General Ab-
delfattah Sissi, Minister of Defence. Catherine Ashton combined the EU’s efforts with those of
John Kerry, the head of American diplomacy, to mediate between Morsi, held incomunicado,
and Sissi, the real “strong man” of the country. But the general who had led the coup soon put
an end to this mediation and, in mid-August, crushed the gatherings of his opponents in Cairo.
This blood bath was the worst outburst of violence in the capital since the invasion of Egypt
by Bonaparte in 1798.

The Regeni Scandal

Within the framework of the “Neighbourhood Instrument”, the EU allocated to Egypt aid amou-
ting to 115 million euros in 2014, 105 in 2015, 100 in 2016 and 100 in 2017. These amounts
may seem modest in comparison to the 1.3 billion dollars of military aid allocated each year by
the United States, as well as the billions of dollars in aid that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates poured into Sissi’s regime. But Brussels claims to frame its assistance to Egypt
within a partnership based on “a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the
rule of law and respect for human rights.” Such a grandiloquent proclamation sounds sinister
in Sissi’s Egypt, which is even more dictatorial than Moubarak’s, with tens of thousands of
political prisoners, a systematic and documented use of torture, an unprecedented level of
violence and public liberties in tatters.

Under Sissi, the repression apparatuses have even launched a “disappearance” campaign
with thousands of victims, historically related to the Latin American dictatorships and hitherto
unknown in Egypt. Faced with these crimes, the EU has preferred to put its head in the sand,
which has not prevented the torture of one of its nationals: Giulio Regeni, a 28-year old Italian
student conducting doctoral research for Cambridge on the independent trade unions, who
went missing in Cairo on the night of 25 January 2016. That night the capital was patrolled
more than ever by the security services, mobilised on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of
the anti-Moubarak revolution. Regeni’s body, bearing the marks of atrocious physical abuse,
was found some days later, thrown in the ditch on the road to Alexandria.

Crosschecked testimonies on Regeni’s arrest were published soon after his “disappearance”
in the premises of the much feared National Security, linked to the Ministry of the Interior. Rome
recalled its ambassador to Cairo, with the support of other European capitals in its demand
for the truth about the Regeni affair. This demand was taken up in the European Parliament
by a mass vote (588 against 10) in March 2016. The Egyptian authorities, put under pressure,
announced the death, in an encounter with the police, of four members of a “criminal gang”
to which Regeni’s kidnapping and murder had been attributed. Sissi’s regime has maintained
this official version since then. Such systematic obstruction bore fruit in summer 2017, with the
return of the Italian ambassador to Cairo. The EU and its member states, on the pretext of not
being more papist than the Pope, have also moved on from the Regeni case.

European leaders have therefore abandoned their principles in Egypt, to the extent of accep-
ting that unbridled repression against civil society led to the death of one of their nationals.
During the democratic uprising in 2011, European policy-
makers refused
to accept that the fall
of the “wall of fear”
had been so important
for EU security
in the long term.

For France, this shameful climb-down even comes with major arms supplies to Egypt, or the
provision of electronic material to control these last independent voices. Despite such evident
complacency, Sissi’s regime seems incapable of quashing the terrorist threat in his country,
busy as he is suppressing any form of opposition. The liberals and progressives who dare
criticise him are compared to Islamists, who are lumped in with Jihadists to crush them more
effectively. Meanwhile, Daesh has established in the strategic Sinai Peninsula the most im-
portant branch of its organisation since the fall, in summer 2017, of the pseudo-caliphate that it
had set up between Syria and Iraq.
The Mirages of the Status Quo

A European policy that thus fuels the Jihadist threat, by supporting dictatorial regimes that claim to combat it, can in no way drape itself in “realism”. The same applies to European passivity faced with the methodical dismantling of the “two-state solution” for Israel and Palestine. The EU, the first economic partner of Israel and first donor to the Palestinian Authority, would certainly not lack assets to contribute to a long-lasting settlement of this damaging issue. But the well-known adage in the Middle East according to which “Americans decide, Europeans pay and the United Nations feeds” is still relevant. An Obama administration that denied the EU any capacity for initiative concerning the Israel Palestinian dossier has been replaced by a Trump team that overtly despises its Western allies.

The White House has dealt a terrible blow to a negotiated solution by unilaterally deciding, in December 2017, to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The EU, however, showed its division at the UN General Assembly during a vote condemning such a decision, with most of its members voting in favour of the resolution while Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Rumania and Latvia abstained (it was adopted by 128 votes against 9, with 35 abstentions). European diplomacy has also chosen not to encourage the Palestinian Authority in its refusal to negotiate with the United States from now on, considering that Washington has always had most possibilities of making progress on peace.

Incapable of formulating an alternative to an American “peace plan” whose publication is regularly postponed, the EU has also failed to distinguish itself with its proposals for finding a way out of the terrible Gaza impasse. The Palestinian enclave, subject to a joint siege by Israel and Egypt, is sinking into catastrophic misery, the despair of the population playing into Hamas’ hands, which controls the territory with an iron fist. Over one hundred Palestinians were killed by the Israeli army in spring 2018 while trying to walk to the fence that encloses the Gaza Strip. Neither Israel nor Hamas want an open war, which would be even more devastating than the summer 2014 conflict, but the increasingly less controlled mistakes follow one after another, with a lack of future prospects. The EU could certainly calm the sharpest tensions by opening under its aegis a maritime route linking Gaza with Cyprus. However, it refrains from such a gesture, which, in close coordination with Israel, would put it back at the centre of the talks on the future of the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in power since 2009, is not content with congratulating himself for this European passivity. He positions himself openly at the side of his Hungarian counterpart, Viktor Orban, to plead in favour of a reorientation of EU policy on the arguments of Budapest, today denounced in Brussels. Make no mistake: the head of the Israeli government relies on European populists as he had relied in the past on American populists, a policy crowned by the electoral success of Trump. Such an aggressive mobilisation of the right-wing and the extreme-right in Israel recalls that, for the EU, the Mediterranean policy is not a “luxury” but a necessity that involves its values, interests and security. This is not the least of the lessons of the Survey conducted this year by the IEMed.

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THE INS AND OUTS OF THE EU’S SHORTCOMINGS IN SYRIA

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Security and European Neighbourhood Policy: from 2004 to 2015

Despite its revisions in 2011 and 2015, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has remained ill-equipped to deal with an unsustainable and fast-changing environment and the different geopolitical shifts unfolding in the neighbourhood. When assessing the ENP, a number of respondents to the Euromed Survey highlight precisely its difficulty to adapt to new challenges and contexts and the need for the European Union (EU) to better address conflict resolution. The case of Syria, where Russia’s military intervention in September 2015 completely changed the dynamics of the conflict, coinciding with the withdrawal of American military presence in the region, illustrates the EU’s unreadiness to take up the challenge.

In its inception, the ENP I was mainly conceived to respond to EU internal changes such as the so-called “big-bang” enlargement of 2004, which shifted the EU’s borders to the east but also to the south. The idea was to “share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being” (Commission of the European Communities, 2004, p. 3) and to create “a ring of friends, with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003, p. 4). The narratives of security and stability were among the most outstanding components of the policy and eventually led to cooperation, support and strengthening of different autocratic regimes both in its eastern and southern neighbourhood (Durac & Cava-torta, 2009). This was confirmed by Stefan Füle, former Commissioner for Enlargement and ENP, who admitted that “Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region. This was not even Realpolitik. It was at best, short-terminism” (Füle, 2011).

The ENP II was also initially conceived to adjust internally to the Lisbon Treaty and to the Arab uprisings unfolding in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. The “New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” document was presented in May 2011 and it was much more ambitious than the “original” ENP. The ENP II was again based on the principles of bilateralism, differentiation and positive conditionality (“more for more”) but for the first time it also indicated the EU’s readiness to use negative conditionality (“less for less”). The ENP II also introduced the idea of “deep and sustainable democracy”, which would go hand-in-hand with the infamous three Ms – money, market (access) and mobility. Among the innovations of the ENP II was also the creation of a Civil Society Facility and the European Endowment for Democracy, which were destined to provide non-registered NGOs as well as political actors and movements with EU funding (Schumacher & Bouris, 2017). Despite the positive innovations, however, the policy remained an inappropriate tool for geopolitics as it ignored the strength of other actors (Lehne, 2014, p. 7).
Conflicts in Libya, Syria and Ukraine, the growing terrorist threat from ISIS/Daesh and the refugee crisis forced the EU to revise the policy in 2015. The ENP III clearly moves away from discussions and efforts of democracy promotion and exclusively focuses (again) on the idea of stability (similarly to the ENP I), thus downgrading the EU's ambitions in its eastern and southern neighbourhoods (Schumacher, 2016). The ENP III abandons the principle of conditionality (“more for more” and “less for less”) and has negative repercussions with regard to the EU’s ambitions as a normative foreign policy actor. Although, for some, the ENP III is more “pragmatic” at the same time the end of ambition and the adoption of this “pragmatic” approach (by putting stability and security first) raises questions about the “perceived demotion of fundamental rights in the external action of a Union, that appears ill-equipped in matters of security” (Blockmans, 2017, p. 1). The ENP III document also goes hand in hand with the EU’s recent Global Strategy, which puts the idea of “principled pragmatism” and “resilience” at the heart, confirming the shift of the EU towards more Realpolitik.

The EU in Syria

For the past 15 years relations between Syrian governments and the West, but more specifically the EU, have been strained by tensions. Suspicion and potential disillusionment were regularly in the background of any given diplomatic initiative. The very few short-lived periods of relative diplomatic normalcy were often suspended or ended abruptly because of grave violations of human rights or political repression against Syrian opposition movements.

When Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in June 2000, he was credited by many European countries with the determination to open and modernise the country’s political system, civil society and institutions. During the first years of his tenure, he confirmed those early assumptions and allowed for a more active and engaged civil society in the political field. But what was known as “the Damascus Spring” did not last more than a brief season and a new fierce repression and massive arrests in the opposition ranks put an end to the very short experience.

Nevertheless, as soon as this political opening started to show signs of materialisation in 2003, the EU, within the framework of the newly-established ENP and with the ambition to stabilise and democratise the countries in its neighbourhood, launched a series of high level negotiations with the Syrian government aiming to modernise, reform and liberalise the Syrian economy and institutions. The principal incentive of the process was a “more for more” approach. All areas were considered open to cooperation. But soon the EU negotiators stumbled on human rights issues, a subject the Syrian government would not consider as a matter of substantive discussion. Moreover, the negotiations came to a deadlock because of the suspicion by some member states of the involvement of Syrian security apparatuses in the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister in February 2005. Hence, all prospects of EU cooperation with the Syrian government were suspended and all EU ministerial bilateral visits to Damascus cancelled.

In May 2007, with the election of President Sarkozy in France, the stigmatisation of the Syrian regime was overruled. In the summer of 2008, the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in Paris provided the occasion for the official return of President Assad in the mainstream of Euro-Mediterranean politics. He became an acceptable partner again. The suspended EU-ENP negotiations were resumed and concluded rapidly. Cooperation agreements were signed swiftly and the operational implementations started in all areas, such as reform of state institutions, civil society, gender equality, rule of law, judicial reform, education and tourism. During 2009 and 2010, Syrian society, with the approval but careful control and monitoring of the political authorities, was engaged in one of the most important European oriented metamorphoses.

Despite the positive innovations, though, the policy remained an inappropriate tool for geopolitics as it ignored the strength of other actors.

For the past fifteen years relations between Syrian Governments and the EU have been strained by tensions.

In 2005, all prospects of EU cooperation with the Syrian government were suspended and all EU ministerial bilateral visits to Damascus cancelled.
This blooming reformist season was cut short when those involved in implementing the different programmes came to a direct confrontation with the Syrian officials. Inspired by what occurred in Tunisia and Egypt in the early months of 2011, civil society activists organised peaceful demonstrations nationwide seeking the release of political prisoners, condemning torture, calling for political reform and freedom of expression. Despite President Assad’s declaratory promises of major structural reforms, the demonstrations were brutally repressed by the security apparatuses and resulted in a number of killings and massive random arrests. In May 2011, among other Western countries, the EU issued a strong statement condemning the repression of the peaceful demonstrations and calling for the liberation of the political prisoners. It also issued the first set of sanctions freezing assets and travel restrictions, against certain individuals affiliated or close to the regime.

The debates during the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) were tense as conflicting interests among member states were expressed regarding the management of the Syrian crisis. After the military operations in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi endorsed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1973, France and the United Kingdom (UK) advocated a military intervention and were supported by Germany and the Netherlands. But the majority of the other member states opposed the initiative and favoured a negotiated settlement. In August, after another major confrontation during a demonstration in Damascus, which resulted in the killing of 15 civilians and over one hundred casualties, the first HR/VP Lady Ashton in a statement endorsed by the member states called for President Assad to step down.

The decision of the HR/VP to suspend all operations in Syria and to withdraw the European expatriates working on Syrian projects was taken under strong pressure from France, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands. This statement and decision were contrary to clear recommendations from the EU Delegation in Damascus. In a previous preparatory working paper for the August FAC meeting, the Delegation firmly asserted that a call to the top of the leadership to step down would be equal to a point of no return. The paper also warned that this step should only be considered once the EU assesses that there is no chance of a positive contribution by the EU to a way out of the current situation. At this point, and after the first set of sanctions decided by the EU in May, large parts of the Syrian government perceived the EU as a “hostile entity”.

Retrospectively, the EU signed itself out of any active political role. It reduced its margin for manoeuvre as a funding partner and technical assistance provider to the United Nations (UN) mediation initiatives. Which it did with the three UN Special Envoys (Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi and Staffan de Mistura) and with the chemical disarmament UN/OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) missions. It might also be true that at that time the HR/VP gave priority to positioning the EU as a facilitator and player in the negotiations for the nuclear deal with Iran concluded in June 2015.

Later on, in March 2012, the HR/VP stood up against pressures from many member states (France, the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark) to close its Delegation to Syria and Lady Ashton announced that the Delegation would remain functioning in Damascus as long as the security situation permitted. After a short withdrawal to Beirut (December 2012/April 2013), the EU Delegation remained diplomatically operational until today. Maintaining contacts with MFA at the level of deputy ministers allows for EU positions to be clearly communicated (condemnation of human rights abuses, barrel bombs, besieged areas, specific cases of political prisoners, disappeared activists, etc.). Remaining actively engaged in Damascus gave the EU leverage on pressing the MFA to accelerate the access and the delivery to rebel areas of EU humanitarian assistance (ECHO) in cooperation with UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and international NGOs. The meetings with the MFA were often tense because of the questions raised and because of the ongoing and regular new set of sanctions. But at least the channel of communication was preserved. At a FAC meeting in November 2015, Mrs Federica Mogherini described the activities...
of the EU in Syria as “humanitarian diplomacy”. Despite the importance of the EU’s humanitarian contribution, though, Russia’s full military intervention in September 2015 completely changed the dynamics of the conflict and shifted the debate from trying to find a political solution to trying to find a military solution. Russia did not only enter militarily but also gathered the support of Iran and Turkey resulting to a consolidation of their own positions while working towards a political solution in the framework outside the UNSCR 7524 parameters and fightlining, if not undermining, the work of UN Syria Special Envoy.

At the same time, EU member states have stepped up their individual policies without any coordination at the EU level. As shown in the Euromed Survey, this lack of coordination would be affecting the EU’s credibility (see Graph 1).

Graph 1: What is most likely to affect the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 8)

In the summer of 2012, the EU Delegation in Damascus temporarily hosted four diplomats (Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands) accredited in Syria before their capitals decided to close their embassies or before being declared persona non grata. The Romanian and Czech embassies remained operating all through the crisis with an ambassador present in Damascus. Both embassies represent the consular interests of France (Romanian) and the United States, the UK and Canada (Czech). Austrian, Spanish, Swedish, Danish and Finnish chargé d’affaires based in Beirut regularly visit Damascus and conduct meetings with MFA officials. Hungary, Ireland, Bulgaria, Poland and Cyprus send envoys from their capitals or from regional diplomatic missions.

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Though morally and legally based on UNSC Resolution No. 2254 adopted in December 2015 calling for the formation of a transitional government within six months and parliamentary elections within 18, today’s EU stance towards the Syrian crisis could be equated to the role of the chorus in Greek tragedies. In this sense, Graph 1 shows the specific relevance that Southern and Eastern Mediterranean respondents to the Euromed Survey give to the “weak role of the EU in conflict zones” and how this affects the EU’s credibility.

The Syrian crisis could be equated to the role of the chorus in Greek tragedies.
As guardians of the Temple, EU statements remind and reassert the principled solution for the Syrian crisis adopted by the international community, i.e. a negotiated political transition under the UNSE, free and fair elections supervised by international observers, transfer to the International Criminal Court of all those who have committed war crimes and humanitarian violations. It also warns that any other solution, apart from being unacceptable, endangers Syria’s future stability and would be a threat to peace and security in the region. With this firm declaratory posture, the EU seems to be in a denial as it ignores the new balance of power in its southeastern neighbourhood. With the Russian fully-fledged military support for the Syrian regime, the Syrian government is far from being on the collapse track but more and more defiant.

The overwhelming military and diplomatic presence of the three former empires (Russian, Persian and Ottoman) in the Middle East leaves very little room, if any, for Europeans to influence the political outcome of the crisis. The void left by the American withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011 has been filled by external forces and not by the EU.

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THE SECURITISATION OF THE EU’S MIGRATION POLICIES: WHAT CONSEQUENCES FOR SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE EU?

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Introduction

Both shores of the Mediterranean region are confronted with ample challenges. Europe is grappling with the flow of irregular migration, Brexit and the rise of populism while its southern neighbours linger in political and economic uncertainties. Despite the strong historical, political and economic links that tie the northern and southern sides of the Mediterranean, migration is increasingly dominating discussions on Euro-Mediterranean relations, sometimes pushing aside or affecting cooperation in other policy areas. While migration concerns both sides of the Mediterranean, the challenge seems to be more compelling for the European Union (EU), where the migration question is shaping both internal and external dynamics. Internally, migration is increasingly influencing electoral outcomes and undermining EU solidarity, while externally it has, for instance, occupied the debate on the provision of external resources in the next Multiannual Financial Framework.

For the EU the migration question is shaping both internal and external dynamics.

The EU preoccupation with migration seems to be fostering a security-driven approach to migration. The evolving internal context in Europe has cemented a growing perception of migration as a security threat, and has resulted in more measures and policies geared towards stemming the migration flows. The Euromed Survey reveals that the securitisation of migration does not bode well for the EU’s relations with the southern neighbourhood. Departing from the Survey results, this article aims to shed some light on the securitisation of the EU’s migration policies as far as the Southern Mediterranean countries are concerned and reflect on the possible implications this carries for the future of the EU’s relations with its southern neighbours.

Contextualising the EU’s Response to Irregular Migration

In order to better understand the securitisation of the EU’s migration policies, it is necessary to first provide some context to the EU’s handling of the so-called migration crisis. In 2015, over one million migrants and asylum seekers reached Greece and Italy, many of whom then engaged in secondary movements to other EU countries. Between 2015 and 2016, asylum applications received by EU member states exceeded one million (Brekke & Staver, 2018). This new reality almost triggered “a complete meltdown” in the Schengen common travel area and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (Maiani, 2018). As member states’ reception and registration systems struggled to keep up and deal with this influx, the sustainability of the existing asylum and border control regime was put into question.

The Euromed Survey reveals that the securitisation of migration does not bode well for the EU’s relations with its southern neighbours.
In the midst of the crisis, many member states decided on unilateral measures and opted for reinstating border controls and for pushing back asylum seekers to other European countries. Establishing border controls not only defies the idea of a common space but also undermines compliance with the EU Asylum Procedures Directive and the Dublin Regulation (Maiani, 2018). Interestingly, this practice was by no means novel as France, for example, has been involved for years in pushback of migrants towards Italy. However, this practice has grown almost uncontestedly with more countries either engaging in or threatening pushback of migrants. Most recently, the Italian government even threatened to return migrants and asylum seekers to Libya after reaching Italy to put pressure on the EU and other member states to distribute the arrivals.

The migration issue thus “put the tension between national and supranational interests” and raised questions about member states’ ability to manage borders and control migration (Brekke & Staver, 2018). For the EU, tackling irregular migration is no longer about merely ensuring border security. The increasing struggle for power between far-right parties that are sceptical about the EU and pro-EU parties implied that the future of the EU was itself at stake. The idea that migration represents a threat to national security gained momentum, and the link established between irregular migration and infiltration of terrorists into EU territory has exacerbated concerns. This state of uncertainty and growing fears has put more pressure on EU leaders to address the issue.

These concerns about migration are justified as irregular migration “can legitimately be viewed as undermining the exercise of state sovereignty” (Koser, 2011). Concerns also relate to models of integration and social cohesion if the new arrivals come from different social or cultural backgrounds. As one EU official puts it: while the numbers have dropped this year, the crisis is starting inside Europe about how to deal with the migrants in the EU (statement of an EU official at an event in Brussels). However, beyond the mantra of stemming the flows, little solidarity could be found among EU member states on the migration dossier, especially on the question of reforming the CEAS. The unfruitful discussions on reforming the CEAS have recently, once again, shifted attention towards finding “practical solutions” to the challenge with the southern neighbours.

The Securitisation of Migration

The perception of irregular migration as a threat to national security has put defence and security at the heart of the EU’s approach to migration (Vökel, 2014). While this trend of securitising EU migration policies is by no means novel, it has significantly increased in the past few years. In the context of the southern neighbourhood, the securitisation and externalisation of migration management has always tended towards the transformation of North Africa into a buffer zone (Bach, 2010). This is best exemplified by the recent EU proposal to create “regional disembarkation platforms” in third countries in the southern Mediterranean. The EU essentially seeks to secure the cooperation of North African countries on the reception of migrants and asylum seekers in exchange for financial and technical support. It hopes that establishing such platforms would disincentivise migrants from embarking on the treacherous journey in the first place. And, if they do, they could be immediately returned to Africa. This proposal to establish disembarkation platforms seems to be based on the premise that once the southern neighbours assume responsibility for migrant reception, Europe would not need to grapple with the issue of internal solidarity (Maiani, 2018). However, this proposal is likely to face political and practical challenges. And, most importantly, North African countries have immediately rejected the proposal.

For the EU, tackling irregular migration is no longer about merely ensuring border security.

The EU seeks to secure the cooperation of North African countries on the reception of migrants and asylum seekers in exchange for financial and technical support.
This proposal comes to complement a series of externalisation measures initiated by the EU to tackle migration. The EU has sought to establish “an extensive system of security governance based on such instruments as readmission agreements, capacity-building, export of surveillance technology, or information exchange” with the southern neighbours (Völkel, 2014). Increasing return of migrants irregularly present in the EU has become a central priority under the New Partnership Framework. The EU currently aims to establish a stronger level of cooperation with Tunisia, the new largest exporter of irregular migrants, through for instance establishing an electronic platform for processing readmission applications, modelled on existing arrangements with some Asian countries (European Commission, 2018).

While sea crossings sharply dropped by mid-2018 and even returned to pre-2015 levels, the securitisation approach does not seem to wane. Moving beyond “the vicious cycle of permanent crisis management in the current political environment will require a lot of political courage and leadership” (Kausch, 2018). EU member states continue to introduce controversial ideas to stem the flows either over concerns about a new hike in departures from Libya or seeking to bolster their electoral wins. For instance, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz proposed deploying EU border guards in North Africa while Italy has shut its ports to migrant rescue ships. According to Marco Minniti, Italy’s former Minister of Interior, while Italy is no longer in a state of emergency, “the new government cannot say this because if they [do], they would start liberating Italians from their fears” (Minniti as cited in Reynolds, 2018).

While security-driven measures might seem to yield results in the short term, externalising migration management to a ring of neighbouring countries cannot be the right approach for several reasons. First, past research has warned that while quick security fixes might seem to produce results in the short term, these are not sustainable and risk exacerbating rather than solving the migration challenge. Second, security-driven approaches risk overlooking the needs of those who are fleeing conflicts and wars and thus need international protection. Third, securitisng migration comes at the expense of building genuine and fruitful partnerships with the southern neighbours.
Implications for Relations with the Southern Neighbourhood

The growing securitisation of migration can have implications for both the EU’s perception in and relations with the southern neighbours, as the Euromed Survey reveals. The Survey results indicate that the securitisation of migration policies emerges among the key factors that are likely to affect the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean (see Graph 1).¹

Graph 1: What is most likely to affect the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey</th>
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Statements on the idea to open "regional disembarkation platforms" in North African countries without due consultations with these partners “have been badly received in Southern Mediterranean countries” (Euromesco, 2018). Such proposals affect the EU’s image and credibility not only among government officials in the southern vicinity but also among the civil society and the wider public. This is inextricably linked to another finding of the Survey, which is that the securitisation of EU migration policy is among the key policy areas with a potentially negative effect on the stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (see Graph 2).

¹ 16% of respondents identified securitisation of migration as a key factor that can affect EU credibility in the Mediterranean. However, it is worth noting that respondents from EU countries (19%) were more likely than respondents from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (13%) to say so.
Graph 2: From the following options that relate either to the situation of the EU or to its policies, which ones are likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of SEM countries? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>SEM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Securitisation of migration policies</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to authoritarian regimes</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms exports from some EU member states</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military interventions from some EU member states</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poor EU economic performance</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU home-grown “radicalisation” and foreign fighters coming from the EU</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
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Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Exporting the challenges posed by the migrant smuggling business and difficulties in repatriating migrants from the EU to Northern African countries means that these problems are exported to more fragile countries.

While the migrant smuggling business and difficulties in repatriating migrants represent a challenge to Europe, exporting these challenges to North Africa only means that the problems are being exported to more fragile countries. Potentially coercing North African states into hosting these facilities could lead to more dissatisfaction and anger at the governments in place, in an environment which is already marred by loss of trust in state institutions.

The EU’s approach towards North African countries has been underpinned by a contradiction between attempting to build strategic partnerships with these countries while at the same time seeking to turn them into a buffer zone (Bach, 2010). This contradiction has impeded a fruitful cooperation on migration, as in the case of negotiations on the double readmission and visa facilitation agreements with Morocco and Tunisia, the EU’s closest Southern Mediterranean countries. Despite several rounds of negotiations, progress has been limited. One of the contentious points in these negotiations relates to the clause on returning third country nationals – foreign migrants, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, who transited through North Africa to arrive in Europe – in the readmission agreement. Tunisia and Morocco have been reluctant to agree on this for many reasons, including that they see the inclusion of this clause as an attempt for the EU to outsource repatriations of migrants. Unless the EU thinks outside the crisis box, these negotiations risk being an endless tale.

The threat of deteriorating EU-North Africa relations due to securitisation of migration is even more prominent amidst a changing landscape of international cooperation. The current political environment is marked by “the empowerment of non-Western states, non-state actors, and individual citizens” and “shaped by a wider competition in terms of power, money, commerce, diplomacy, and influence both between and within polities” (Kausch, 2018). That is to say the EU faces competition from many actors in the region, and instrumentalising migration cooperation could potentially reduce the EU’s leverage with the southern neighbours. The EU thus needs to adapt its policies and instruments to this changing environment, and move...
beyond putting old wine in new bottles (Kausch, 2018). Reconsidering migration cooperation with the southern neighbours should be at the heart of this adaptation to the evolving environment. Enhancing EU-North Africa relations will need to forgo proposals that are likely to fuel tensions in southern countries and to channel distrust in the relationship. It has been argued elsewhere that Tunisia, for example, provides a convenient case to try more innovative and ambitious approaches in cooperation with the southern neighbourhood (Kaush, 2018; Zardo & Abderrahim, 2018).

Conclusion: Finding Hope in a Troubled Context

Despite current difficulties and challenges to fruitful cooperation in the Mediterranean, it is possible to overcome tensions and build a more lasting and balanced cooperation. This is primarily because the EU remains largely positively perceived in the southern neighbourhood. The results of the Euromed Survey are revealing in this regard: only 5% of respondents identified the EU as an actor that is more likely to have a negative effect on the stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region. This shows that the EU’s perception remains more favourable than other actors like the United States (USA), Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) or Russia.

Graph 3: Which of the following actors are more likely to have a negative effect on the stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 7)

Besides, the EU is a critical partner for the Southern Mediterranean countries: even if these countries diversify their partners – which they have started to do – (see Youssef “The Maghreb’s Disengagement from Europe” p. 56), there is no immediate alternative to the EU, which remains the largest trade partner for countries of the southern neighbourhood.
Both sides, the EU and the southern countries, need to show more willingness and political courage to take their cooperation forward and focus on points of mutual interest. When asked “What do you think that your government should do with regards to its relations with the EU?” many respondents in the Euromed Survey indicate that their governments need to work more with the EU on migration. This is to say that cooperation on migration per se is not undesirable, but this cooperation needs to take the interests and concerns of both sides into consideration. The EU needs to shy away from one-sided proposals that affect its perception and channel distrust in the relationship. At the same time, it is undeniable that irregular departures from Maghreb countries towards Europe have increased, and that these countries need to seriously invest in addressing issues that drive their young people to risk their lives at sea. While cooperation on border security is necessary, this should constitute one element of a broader multi-dimensional strategy that puts job creation and human development at the heart of the solution to irregular migration. Crisis-driven approaches should not be preferable to a lasting long-term partnership.

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CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECURITIZATION OF EU’S APPROACH TOWARDS THE MEDITERRANEAN FOR SOUTHERN AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

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The EuroMed Survey shows that a majority of experts surveyed believe that the securitisation of European migration policies is the factor likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (see Graph 1), while support to authoritarian regimes is a close second, and arms exports to these countries comes third. Yet, the strategy for dealing with migration through the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean that has been emerging lately clearly involves a further securitisation of migration and deeper support to authoritarian regimes.

Graph 1: From the following options that relate either to the situation of the EU or to its policies, which ones are likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of SEM countries? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
This strategy was outlined in Juncker’s State of the Union speech when he announced the deployment of a 10,000 strong border security force, and later in proposals to begin talks with Egypt about deepening cooperation on migration that Donald Tusk and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz advanced at Salzburg on 20 September 2018 (State of the Union, 2018. A strengthened and fully equipped, 2018. Salzburg Summit, 2018). The communiqué from Salzburg also suggested that cooperation with Egypt will pave the way for a model of cooperation that is likely to be rolled out to other willing countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, with the proposed EU-Arab League Summit next Spring likely to provide an opportunity for the EU to roll out this model more widely. The proposed regional disembarkation arrangements that European policymakers put forward during the Summit (Migration: Regional Disembarkation Arrangements, 2018) are unlikely to be accepted by the Southern neighbourhood countries, but this proposal is likely to resurface repeatedly.

Exactly what form this cooperation will take remains unclear, but what is emerging is the distinct possibility that the EU will funnel larger quantities of development funding to those countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean that agree to prevent migrants from departing North Africa. This was already informally the system in place for cooperation with countries like Egypt and Morocco, but the example of the Turkey-EU migration deal, combined with the economic and social difficulties faced by numerous countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean has clearly made others aware of the greater economic and political pay-offs that might be achieved.

The EU and member states should be careful how they proceed if they wish to strengthen the economies and societies of the region. The short-term migration gains that might be achieved by strengthening authoritarian governments in the region through enhanced cooperation and funding will most likely be outweighed by deepening political and economic instability if more is not done to develop inclusive political and economic structures. Clear conditions around transparency and inclusion should be included in any further European assistance to the region.

The increased importance of migration as a driving force in EU foreign policy priorities is very clear in the speeches and statements of Juncker and Tusk, but it is also clearly visible in the headings of the Commission’s proposed 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework. The proposed allocation for the Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) is €89.2 billion, which includes a clear focus on migration as a priority area.

This includes a horizontal spending target of 10% to tackle the root causes of migration and create channels for legal migration, a “flexibility cushion” worth €10.2 billion allowing the EU to respond to “emerging challenges and priorities,” and a rapid-response pillar, which includes the example of reacting to refugee situations created by conflict situations (EU Budget for the Future, 2018). These policy tools are of course likely to be used almost exclusively in sub-Saharan Africa and the Southern neighbourhood.

It is also clear that numerous member states have begun to allocate larger proportions of ODA to the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, and to the Sahel region, which is viewed through a similar security-migration prism as its Northern neighbours. Member states with important aid budgets, including Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, are increasing their aid to these regions due to migration concerns.

This is particularly clear in the case of Germany, where the budget of the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, which accounts for around 30% of German ODA, increased from €6.5 billion in 2015 to €8.5 billion in 2017, and German development policy has been very clearly framed in terms of a strategy of “fighting the root causes of displacement” (Germany Donor Profile, 2018).

The communiqué from Salzburg also suggested that cooperation with Egypt will pave the way for a model of cooperation that is likely to be rolled out to other willing countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.

Numerous EU member states have begun to allocate larger proportions of ODA to the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, and to the Sahel region.
North Africa also stands to benefit from the increase in international investment to Africa that is being encouraged to create jobs and stem migration, such as EU Commission President Juncker’s proposals regarding the Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs in his State of the Union, and the German “Marshall Plan with Africa” initiative (Strengthening the EU’s partnership with Africa, 2018. Africa and Europe – A new partnership, 2017). North African countries may gain from the new focus on investment in Africa, particularly given the self-positioning by certain states such as Morocco as the gateway to Africa. Merkel’s recent visit to Algeria, which clearly sat within the wider German strategy of investment as a means of stemming migration, raised hopes and even expectations of German investment there, but it is unclear what Germany promised in return for cooperation on accepting returns of failed Algerian asylum seekers (Mesbah, 2018. Mehenni, 2018).

Not only is EU and member state aid to the region likely to increase, but its composition is also likely to change and to be increasingly concentrated with regime actors. Even if the EU does not agree to large grants of funds on a par with what Turkey received, it is likely that countries such as Egypt or Morocco will only accept increased cooperation on migration if the EU delivers significantly more funds directly into the hands of their respective governments. This will potentially further weaken civil society actors and alternative elites within these countries. It is no surprise that surveyed representatives of civil society identified the “support to authoritarian” as particularly harmful for the stability of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region (see Graph 2). If further development funds are to be allocated to the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, methods should be devised to ensure continued inclusion of a diverse range of local actors in development planning and delivery.

Graph 2: From the following options that relate either to the situation of the EU or to its policies, which ones are likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of SEM countries? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

- Support to authoritarian regimes: 22%
- Arms exports from some EU member states: 18%
- Securitisation of migration policies: 21%
- Military interventions from some EU member states: 19%
- EU home-grown “radicalisation” and foreign fighters coming from the EU: 17%
- Poor EU economic performance: 17%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Egypt and Morocco each face very specific economic and social constraints at home. EU funds funnelled directly into the national budgets of these countries may allow governments to postpone hard decisions or to fund expensive development projects.
As market confidence in emerging markets falls, the Egyptian regime is facing increased difficulties accessing international loans, and thus EU funds could prove a vital source of short-term financing that might potentially be accessed without resorting to further painful reform measures in the near-term (Mohamed, 2018). However, while international confidence in Egypt has thus far prevented contagion of Turkey’s debt crisis, Egypt’s very swift accumulation of international debt (more than twice as high as Turkey’s), very low levels of gross fixed capital investment, and rising dollar interest rates have raised concerns about Egypt’s debt burden (Diab, 2018. Springborg, 2018).

Egypt needs much more deep-seated reforms than those macroeconomic reforms adopted to date as part of the IMF Extended Loan Facility, which fail to tackle underlying distortions that ultimately undermine sustainable growth and job creation (Teevan, 2018. Roll, 2018). Coupled with growing worries about Egypt’s international debt burden, this could lead to a highly worrying economic situation. The Egyptian government has already shown a resistance to any form of conditionality, as noted by many EU and member state officials in recent months, but if the EU funnels greater aid to Egypt without tackling underlying economic distortions, this aid is likely to further distort and destabilize an already unstable situation.¹

If EU policy-makers are determined to enter a deeper partnership with Egypt, they should push Egypt to adopt deeper economic reforms that would make the economy more transparent and competitive and divert spending away from wasteful projects such as the new national capital towards more productive forms of investment.

In recent weeks, Morocco has already stepped up its cooperation with the EU on migration as migration flows through that country began to increase. Spain is increasingly advocating for greater support and solidarity with the Kingdom at the EU level (Abellán & de Miguel, 2018). This comes against the backdrop of on-going social and economic unrest since the beginning of the Hirak in October 2016. Following this year’s boycott on key products, and protests following the condemnation of key Hirak leaders, King Mohammed VI announced a vast array of new reforms in his Crown Festival speech at Al Hoceima on Sunday 29 July (A Al Hoceima, Mohammed VI prononce, 29 July 2018). These reforms, which include schooling, medical cover, local administration, job creation and more, will be costly. Additional European funds could play an important role in paying for some of these initiatives. (see Fakir “What Moroccans Expect from the European Union” p. 62).

However, following the failure of many previous promises of reform, questions remain about how effective this new programme of reforms is likely to be. Of concern has been the failure of the Moroccan government to address key questions of exclusion and inequality. The King’s speeches have indicated a willingness to listen to the people on the national development question, but it remains to be seen how these consultations feed into the policy process. While local leadership of the development agenda is certainly key, European policymakers should be careful not to further empower a small elite by funnelling more money into government coffers without clear conditions around inclusion of youth and civil society in the design and implementation of the development agenda.

The securitization of the Mediterranean is already resulting in increased development aid being directed to the governments of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, and this tendency is likely to continue. However, given the deep socio-economic problems faced by some countries in the region, it is doubtful whether these funds will be enough to prevent further economic difficulties from emerging. Further, European funding is likely to be focused on the governments of the region that have thus far often shown themselves unable or unwilling to tackle the deep economic problems that their countries face.

¹ Interviews in Cairo, April 2018, Brussels and EU capitals, May-June 2018.
The EU and member states should not direct further development aid to the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean without clear conditions around how such aid will be used. Otherwise, the combination of support to existing elites and failing economic models may maintain a modicum of stability in the short-term, but by further constraining and disempowering youth in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, such policies can only lead to longer-term instability.

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Bibliography


Promoting Democracy in the Southern Mediterranean: Perceptions and Expectations

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Building on its values and norms that are based on democratic principles, liberal economy and peaceful relations, the European Union (EU) seeks to promote democracy, human rights, good governance, economic development, education, and so on, in its neighbours. However, in practice the EU’s democratisation efforts beyond its borders – among its eastern and southern neighbourhoods – have been limited. The EU influence on democratisation in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) region varies across countries from more advanced cooperation in the case of Morocco and Tunisia (post-Arab uprisings) to limited influence in most countries. Any success is based on the extent to which the member concerned is willing to cooperate with EU efforts.

Most of the literature on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and EU democracy promotion focuses on EU security concerns that undermine its will to push for democratic reforms and use negative conditionality for that purpose. Furthermore, the attempt to promote EU values and norms without differentiation or taking into consideration the main needs of the peoples of the Southern Mediterranean region and the different cultures in the neighbourhood, in addition to the “asymmetrical relationship between the EU and the southern partners, together legitimize the choice of the political elite to ignore the pressure coming from the EU for political reform” (Çelenk, 2009, p. 183). Thus, the EU programmes “show little sensitivity for national or local cultures and values, let alone an effort at exploring functional equivalents for Western democratic statehood in weak, failing, or failed states” (Börzel & Risse, 2004, p. 3). This situation leads to strengthening the resilience of those regimes against EU pressures, which are portrayed by those elites and the official media as a new form of colonisation.

Compared to other regional and international actors, the EU is viewed more positively in the SEM. In the Maghreb 56% of respondents vs. 49% in the Mashreq expressed trust in the EU, as reported by an opinion poll conducted in 2017 (EU Neighbours South, 2017). This positive attitude is due to the EU’s normative image (a force for good) compared to other players such as the United States (US). For instance, 62% of Maghreb respondents and 44% from the Mashreq said that they have a positive perception of the EU. Despite some minor differences between the Mashreq and Maghreb, respondents from both sides of the Mediterranean consider the EU to be closely associated with human rights, individual freedoms, equality, freedom of speech, democracy, etc. (EU Neighbours South, 2017). Thus, democracy and human rights are among the top items mentioned by SEM citizens to represent what the EU stands for. The results of the Euromed Survey echo this data as the EU is perceived as one of the least destabilising actors, compared to other international/regional actors and players.

Any democratisation success is based on the extent to which the member concerned is willing to cooperate with EU efforts.

The different interests of member states limit the ability of the EU to speak with one voice.
EU credibility in the Mediterranean

The EU’s capacity to continue promoting democratic principles depends on its credibility as a foreign policy actor. This credibility of the EU partly depends on its internal coherence and the ability of the EU to speak with one voice. The different interests of EU member states limit the ability of the EU to act, especially when it comes to the SEM region where various interests are in conflict. This is noticed not only among EU member states but also within the SEM countries. When asked what affects the credibility of the EU, 19% of those surveyed in both regions cited the lack of coherence among member states as well as conflicting interests (see Graph 1). This issue is recognised more as a problem for EU consistency within the EU, where 23% said the main issue affecting EU credibility is conflict of interests and inconsistency compared to 15% in SEM countries. Surprisingly, this issue is rated even higher than securitisation of migration, which came second with an average of 16% (13% in the SEM compared to 19% in the EU) or EU cooperation with authoritarian SEM regimes, with an average of 11% (12% in the SEM compared to 10% in the EU).

Graph 1: What is most likely to affect the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 8)

In addition to the lack of coherence and migration, respondents believe that the EU does not have a consistent approach vis-à-vis different SEM countries (see Graph 1). This inconsistency is the result of cooperating with authoritarian regimes on issues of security, economy and migration, while criticising the lack of democracy, human rights and freedoms without resorting to negative conditionality in cases of violations of democratic norms, freedoms and human rights. Furthermore, the lack of a firm approach to the Arab uprisings (aside from the cosmetic reviews of the ENP), especially when the events started in Tunisia, negatively influenced EU credibility. This brings us to another important issue: the conflict of interests regarding security/stability vs. democracy.
Stability vs. democracy?

The EU’s limited effect on democracy promotion has resulted partly from prioritising security and stability, even if that meant stabilising authoritarian regimes and cooperating with those regimes in fighting terrorism and illegal migration. Given the perceived negative correlation between democracy promotion and security and stability, the EU and other Western powers such as the US acted rationally in supporting the authoritarian regimes that maintained this fragile security. The hope that such support would bring stability seemed shaken with the Arab uprisings that resulted in the fall of several regimes in the region and the weakening of others. On the ground, the EU’s support of authoritarian dictators not only affected its credibility among SEM and EU citizens but was also perceived by them as producing the main negative effect on stability in the region (19%, see Graph 2). Security concerns have always been salient in both regions. Although the EU has been critical of the excessive use of force by Arab dictators against their neighbours and citizens, arms exports from EU countries have continued – an issue also considered to negatively influence stability in the region (17%). For example, while the EU has been critical of the war in Yemen, arms exports continue from EU member states to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Graph 2: From the following options that relate either to the situation of the EU or to its policies, which ones are likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of SEM countries?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

![Graph showing the percentage of respondents who consider each option to have the most negative effect on stability in SEM countries.]

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

The biggest problem of military interventions is the lack of a long-term strategy after toppling dictators, or even clarity on immediate next steps.

While securitisation of migration is still considered on average to be one of the main causes of instability in the SEM region, the various military interventions have also led to increased lack of security and stability (21% from the SEM compared to 12% in the EU). Notably, the intervention in Iraq resulted in widespread instability, not only in Iraq but also in other Arab countries, with the rise of terrorist groups such as Daesh. Moreover, the intervention in Libya has led to internal conflict and civil war after years of stability under Gaddafi. The major problem of military interventions is the lack of a long-term strategy after toppling dictators, or even clarity on immediate next steps.
Is the EU still attractive?

As mentioned above, promoting democracy and good governance requires committed partners, willing to cooperate. Similarly, it also requires that partners, including civil society organisations (CSOs), continue to perceive the European model as attractive. Therefore, the question is whether recent developments in the EU approach and the various reviews of the ENP after the Arab uprisings have affected the EU’s attractiveness in its southern neighbourhood. Prior to the Arab uprisings the EU engagement with the SEM region focused mostly on cooperating with Arab authoritarian regimes. The role of CSOs was in the best of cases limited due to the oppressive nature of the regimes that did not allow CSOs to be created or to operate freely. When the Ben Ali regime collapsed and Tunisia started the reform process, the role of CSOs increased. This is also reflected in the increased EU engagement with CSOs such as in Tunisia.

The strengthening of EU engagement with CSOs has been reflected in EU policies. Since 2012, “the EU decided to take its longstanding support to civil society a step further. Major policy changes have been adopted to support civil society organisations (CSOs) not only as implementers of development assistance but also as key development policy actors, in their own right,” according to Stefano Manservisi, the European Commission’s Director General for International Cooperation and Development (European Commission, 2017, p. 5). Euromed Survey results seem to indicate that this greater engagement with CSOs led to increased EU attractiveness for CSOs with 45% of respondents believing that EU attractiveness has increased following the Arab uprisings (see Graph 3). This is in sharp contrast with the position of governmental authorities, where 44% believed that EU attractiveness had decreased compared to 27% who said otherwise.

Graph 3: Overall, since 2011, the EU's attractiveness for the following actors has increased or decreased? (only SEM country respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil society</th>
<th>Governmental authorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>Decreased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Democracy Promotion is not an Outdated Concept

One of the lessons of the protests that erupted in Tunisia by the end of 2010 and spread to the rest of the region (e.g. Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain) is that the EU’s longstanding approach in the region has not been successful. This was reflected in EU reviews of the ENP; for example, the 2011 review stated the uprisings “have shown that EU support to political reforms in neighbouring countries has met with limited results” (European Commission, 2011, p. 1). The EU focus on security showed sharp contrast with the aspirations of the SEM people, whose main interests have been in democracy, equality, and education before any other policy (including trade, investments, migration, climate, mobility, assistance, energy, job creation and employment). This is reflected clearly in the results of the Euromed Survey, where the most recurrent dimension identified by SEM respondents as what the “most important aspect when it comes to my country’s relationship with the EU should be” is democracy promotion (see Graph 4). Democracy promotion, rule of law and good governance seem to be the most important aspects in relations with the EU across SEM countries and Turkey (see Graph 5).
Graph 4: The most important aspects, when it comes to my country's relationship with the EU should be:
(respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 12, only respondents from SEM countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory convergence and approximation to the EU acquis</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, and cultural and scientific cooperation</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and investment</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job creation and employment</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy and security cooperation</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and border management</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial and technical assistance</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory convergence and approximation to the EU acquis</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Graph 5: The most important aspects, when it comes to my country's relationship with the EU should be:
(respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish respondents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy promotion, rule of law, good governance</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and border management</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and investment</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb respondents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy promotion, rule of law, good governance</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, and cultural and scientific cooperation</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and investment</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashreq respondents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, and cultural and scientific cooperation</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy promotion, rule of law, good governance</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
To achieve the main aims of democracy promotion, rule of law and good governance, most respondents believed that EU actions under the ENP framework are the most suitable (43%) compared to 23% who believed non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are the most appropriate for implementing democracy promotion policies (see Graph 6). This result is due to the weak role NGOs have played over the years, given tight regime control over freedoms. This is changing slightly in some countries, such as in Tunisia, as a result of the uprisings and regime change.

Graph 6: In order to achieve Q9 most important priorities, the most important partners or frameworks should be:

- One or some specific EU member states
- EU policies (in particular under the ENP framework)
- The Union for the Mediterranean
- Non-governmental actors

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

**Conclusion**

Despite the importance of democracy promotion in EU documents in its relation with the SEM region, EU democracy promotion efforts have not been successful due to divisions among member states and the focus on security and stability at the expense of democracy. While this is considered to affect EU credibility, as reflected in the EuromedSurvey, the EU is still the most attractive player in the SEM region compared to other international and regional players such as the US, Russia, Gulf countries and Turkey. The EuromedSurvey showed that the peoples of the SEM region aspire to functioning democratic systems, which they consider to be the most important aspect in relations with the EU.

In light of this Survey, the EU should take the SEM people’s aspirations more seriously in relations with the region. Furthermore, the EU should be consistent in its democracy promotion approach and should not use it as a tool but as a goal. In other words, the EU should not promote democracy only when it feels its interests (such as security and stability) are protected but this strategy should be a priority throughout the SEM region.

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References


**THE STATE OF EUROPE**

The first block of the Survey aimed to assess the opinion of respondents about the political and security situation of the European Union (EU) as well as its impact on Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries and more generally on Euro-Mediterranean relations.

**Main findings:**

- The majority of respondents believe that the EU is in worse shape than in 1995.
- Respondents from the EU are more inclined than their Southern Mediterranean counterparts to assess that the situation of the EU has deteriorated since 1995.
- Internal phenomena (and in particular populism and nationalism) rather than external phenomena threaten the European integration process.
- Inner divisions on key issues and re-bilateralisation of relations are the most significant factors affecting the credibility of the EU in the Mediterranean. Respondents from Southern Mediterranean countries are more prone than European respondents to identify the EU’s weak role in conflict zones as a factor affecting the EU’s credibility.
- Overall, the EU is not seen as contributing to the instability of the SEM region in comparison with other countries. The USA is identified as the most disruptive foreign player.
- However, some dynamics within the EU or some of its actions can have negative effects on the stability of its southern neighbourhood, in particular “Securitisation of migration policies”. For SEM respondents “Military interventions from some EU member states” are the main destabilising factor while for EU respondents “Securitisation of migration policies” comes first.

**THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND MAIN THREATS TO ITS INTEGRATION PROCESS (Q1-2)**

With **Question 1**, the aim was to find out how respondents perceive the EU, in comparison to 1995 when the Barcelona Declaration was signed.

Results show that a majority of respondents think that the EU today is in worse shape now than it was in 1995 (see **Graph 1**).

**Graph 1:** Compared to 1995 when the Barcelona Declaration was signed, overall the European Union today is in:

- Better shape: 32%
- Worse shape: 54%
- I cannot say: 14%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
Respondents from the EU and in particular from European Mediterranean countries are more inclined than their Southern Mediterranean counterparts to assess that the situation of the EU has deteriorated since 1995 (see Graph 2 and 3). This result resonates with other findings related to European or Euro-Mediterranean mechanisms from this Survey as well as from previous years, which quite consistently point to a more critical stance from EU respondents than from Southern Mediterranean respondents.

Graph 2: Compared to 1995 when the Barcelona Declaration was signed, overall the European Union today is in:

- Better shape: 35% SEM respondents, 30% EU respondents
- Worse shape: 48% SEM respondents, 60% EU respondents
- I cannot say: 17% SEM respondents, 10% EU respondents

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Graph 3: Compared to 1995 when the Barcelona Declaration was signed, overall the European Union today is in:

- Better shape: 8% Respondents from Mediterranean EU countries, 13% Respondents from the rest of EU countries
- Worse shape: 68% Respondents from Mediterranean EU countries, 49% Respondents from the rest of EU countries
- I cannot say: 24% Respondents from Mediterranean EU countries, 39% Respondents from the rest of EU countries

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

The comments formulated by some European respondents give useful insights in order to interpret these results:

*Internal cohesion is lost. The EU has given itself ambitious aims that it cannot realize because of the weakness of its legal base and institutional structure as well as because of the lack of political will of the member states.*

Belgian respondent
The EU reduced its impetus towards an EU constitution and a real federal project; we do not yet have a fiscal union, or a solid and credible voice in external action. In parallel, there is a rise in Euroscepticism and populism, Brexit, new security challenges, geopolitics at Eastern and Southern borders, complex relations with the USA, emerging challenges to face... However, the EU has initiated an excellent transition towards a more sustainable development and climate friendly policies but pretends to do much more overall without increasing the budget, and still without a strong push for own resources.

Italian respondent

In contrast to the above-mentioned quotes, a number of comments, in particular from Southern Mediterranean respondents, help qualify this negative diagnosis:

We can list many weaknesses of the European Union (global security, defence, external policy, nationalism, etc.) but in terms of weight in the international scene with only 7% of the world’s population, Europe accounts for 20% of global R&D investment; the EU became an actor in its own right acting independently alongside its member states.

Syrian respondent

Firstly, the EU today is more institutionalized and organized. Secondly, the EU policies towards the region have been developed and are more comprehensive. They turned into some sort of “tailor-made” approach.

Turkish respondent

The patterns of the answers also vary depending on the professional background of respondents. Policy-makers are in particular less critical than other groups.

**Question 2** focused on assessing respondents’ opinions on the main threats – internal or external – to the European integration process. They were invited to choose two options among six. The most-recurrent threat identified by the respondents appears to be “Populism and nationalism” (see Graph 4).

Some open-ended answers point to the destructive effects of populism and nationalism on European cohesion (the lack of cohesion and unity is itself the second most recurrent answer given by the respondents) and on the European value basis:

Populism and nationalism destroy the value basis on which the EU is built […] The EU lost the socioeconomic principles on which it was built in the ’50s: social market economy, with the government acting as a correcting, redistributing mechanism, based on the solidarity and protection of the weakest. Austerity, individualism and egoistic nationalism have become the key drivers of EU policy.

Belgian respondent

The rise of nationalism and populism is highly affecting the process of European cohesion by bringing back a rhetoric of division and power within the borders. Furthermore, slow economic growth, especially in the southern states, make people believe that the EU is no longer placed to address their needs.

Italian respondent
Other open-ended answers highlight the existing correlation among the options as the main cause of the rise of populisms and nationalisms as well as the need for a reform:

Le manque d’harmonisation socioéconomique pourrait être à l’origine de l’accélération des inégalités et du chômage, un terrain fertile à la recrudescence des populismes et des nationalismes, d’où la nécessité d’une refonte qui prendrait en charge ces problématiques sine qua non au projet européen.

Algerian respondent

Others point to the need to tackle inner threats in order to fight outside threats:

While vulnerability to threats from the outside, especially violent extremism and terrorism, is a considerable threat, tackling populism and nationalism and a better reform of the EU to bring it closer to its citizens will reinforce the union and make it strong in tackling all other threats.

Moroccan respondent

Overall, it is worth highlighting that the four main threats selected by the respondents are related to the internal situation of the EU. Only a few respondents considered that the EU integration process was mainly threatened from outside (see Graph 3).

It seems that the biggest threats for EU integration come from the inside rather than the outside of the Union. The challenges that have arisen with the Brexit process, terrorist attacks that hit the European capitals that were perpetrated by EU nationals, rising nationalism, racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia in the EU members prove this.

Turkish respondent

Graph 4: What is the main threat to the European integration process?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
As shown in Graph 5, there are no major differences in the patterns of answers from European and Southern Mediterranean respondents, even though European respondents are slightly more concerned with the consequences related to the inability to reform the EU and Southern Mediterranean respondents are slightly more sensitised to the effects of the socioeconomic situation or to the threats coming from outside.

Graph 5: What is the main threat to the European integration process?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

- Populism and nationalism: 34% (SEM) / 35% (EU)
- Lack of cohesion and unity: 20% (SEM) / 22% (EU)
- Inability to reform the European Union and to make it closer to the citizens: 17% (SEM) / 23% (EU)
- Slow economic growth, unemployment and inequalities: 14% (SEM) / 19% (EU)
- Vulnerability to threats from outside: 6% (SEM) / 10% (EU)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
**THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN**

**Question 3** intends to identify which of the policies or situations of the EU are perceived as affecting its credibility most in the Mediterranean. Respondents were asked to choose two out of eight different options. Respondents identify inner divisions on key issues and re-bilateralisation of relations between member states and SEM countries as the most detrimental factors affecting the EU’s credibility (see Graph 6). This option is followed closely by “Securitisation of migration policies” and “Inconsistency of the EU's approach vis-à-vis different SEM countries”.

**Graph 6: What is most likely to affect the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean?**

(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 8)

- Divisions within the EU on key issues and re-bilateralisation of relations between EU member states and SEM countries: 19%
- Securitisation of migration policies: 16%
- Inconsistency of the EU’s approach vis-à-vis different SEM countries: 15%
- Weak role within conflict zones: 13%
- Inability of the EU to renew its offer to the “Southern neighbourhood”: 11%
- Support to authoritarian regimes: 11%
- Contractual asymmetry between the EU and its partners: 10%
- Brexit: 5%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey.
Nevertheless, there are some differences in response patterns (see Graph 7). European respondents are more prone than their counterparts from SEM countries to consider that inner divisions on key issues and re-bilateralisation of relations between EU member states and SEM countries or that the securitisation of migration policies are likely to affect the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean. In turn, respondents from SEM countries (especially Israeli respondents) are more prone to consider that the EU’s weak role in conflict zones affect the EU’s overall credibility in the Mediterranean.

Graph 7: What is most likely to affect the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 8)

![Graph 7: What is most likely to affect the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean?](image)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

First, there is a noticeable imbalance in the relation between the southern neighbourhood and the EU; a top-down approach that does not treat the countries like equal partners. Moreover, the lack of agreement and consistent policy of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has majorly damaged the image and relation of the EU in the Southern Mediterranean, which have also failed to provide a structural and long-term approach to migration.

Albanian respondent

**THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE STABILITY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN: CONNECTING THE DOTS**

The objective of Question 4 was to sound out the respondents about which countries are more likely to negatively affect the stability of the Mediterranean. Respondents were asked to select two countries or groups of countries from a list of seven.

As Graph 8 illustrates, the USA, GCC countries (respondents pointed mostly to Saudi Arabia) and Russia rank in first, second and third positions, respectively.
La politique de la nouvelle administration américaine avec ses décisions concernant le transfert de son ambassade à Jérusalem, son retrait de l’accord sur le nucléaire Irano, a fragilisé encore plus la région du Moyen Orient, et pourrait favoriser malheureusement le radicalisme dans toute la région.

Tunisien respondent

Russia is in a continuous proxy war to maintain and expand its former USSR sphere of influence and it is ready to use proxy (and maybe conventional) war for this reason (Georgia and Ukraine, intervention in Balkans and military domination in Syria). In terms of energy and economic game, China is invading the East slowly but effectively with its energy projects in the Eurasian region and it invests now in the Balkans railways towards Central Europe to guarantee easier transfer of its products towards the old EU partners. China is challenging the role of the EU in Africa too with its non-conditionality partnership approach.

Tunisien respondent

Only a few respondents identified the EU as an actor generating instability in the Mediterranean.

Neither regional powers nor local forces are capable of bringing about stability. Major powers have the final word, and in my opinion there is a grand role for the EU, which was not involved in the negative aspects of the events of the last decades.

Polish respondent

Graph 8: Which of the following actors are more likely to have a negative effect on the stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 7)

United States of America: 28%
Gulf Cooperation Council countries: 19%
Russia: 18%
Turkey: 14%
Iran: 13%
European Union: 5%
China: 2%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
Respondents from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries are more prone than European respondents to perceive the USA, GCC countries or Iran as a harmful actor, while the opposite happens in the case of Russia and Turkey, which are perceived as having a more significant negative impact by EU respondents (see Graph 9).

Graph 9: Which of the following actors are more likely to have a negative effect on the stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region?
(respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>SEM countries</th>
<th>EU countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council countries</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Respondents from some countries identify Iran as one of the major sources of instability. According to Israeli respondents, the major source of instability in the region is Iran (33.3%), followed by Turkey (27.1%) and Russia (22.9%). Iran ranked third according to Maghreb respondents (12.5%).

En plus des impacts négatifs du conflit Israélo-Palestinien sur la région, s’ajoute aujourd’hui le conflit direct entre Israël et l’Iran qui tourne autour du projet de la domination régionale par l’Iran.

Moroccan respondent

It is also worth noting that respondents from civil society institutions ranked Turkey second.

Question 5 aimed at determining which situation or policy of the EU is more likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of SEM countries. Respondents were invited to choose two options out of six. “Securitisation of migration policies” came up as the most common answer (see Graph 10) and European respondents were more prone than their Southern Mediterranean counterparts to choose this option (see Graph 11).
Graph 10: From the following options that relate either to the situation of the EU or to its policies, which ones are likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of SEM countries? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

Securitisation of migration policies 21%
Support to authoritarian regimes 19%
Arms exports from some EU member states 17%
Military interventions from some EU member states 16%
Poor EU economic performance 15%
EU home-grown “radicalisation” and foreign fighters coming from the EU 13%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

In the open comments, some respondents elaborated on the effects of the securitisation of migration policies:

L’UE a toujours poursuivi une politique très friileuse dans le sud et l’est de la Méditerranée. Elle ne cherche pas à s’impliquer réellement dans des dossiers sensibles comme l’immigration, par exemple. La sécurisation des politiques migratoires a eu pour effet direct la limitation des flux migratoires et une surveillance très stricte des frontières. Par conséquent, ce sont des pays sud-méditerranéens comme le Maroc qui supportent la pression migratoire, en particulier, subsaharienne.

Moroccan respondent

Securitization of migration policies has been an immediate response, but failing to address the root causes and fight migration as a trend. There is a need for a human approach to migration, respecting human rights and dignity, while funding opportunities and quality education in the SE Mediterranean.

Albanian respondent

The security approach of the European migration policy is built on the intention of stopping migration. As much as it seems stronger day by day, it does more harm than good to both the host and receiving countries. It is an unaffordable human cost for Europe.

Moroccan respondent

Les interventions militaires sans alternatives politiques ont tendance à exacerber les conflits, ce qui favorise le climat d’instabilité, de radicalisation et de circulation d’armes (le cas de Libye est illustratif). Le soutien aux régimes autoritaires tout comme le renversement abrupt de ces derniers sans offre politique est des facteurs dont l’effet est négatif sur la stabilité des pays du sud et de l’est de la Méditerranée.

Algerian respondent
The abovementioned options are interrelated. Poor EU economic performance might be seen as an underlying factor, making EU relations with partner countries more difficult in all other areas (trade, migration), since the EU can no longer be as generous as in the past (for objective reasons, as well as reasons related to public opinion in EU member states). This, combined with radicalisation and the subsequent securitisation of migration policies, provides the background for instability (which could be triggered by one of the other factors mentioned above).

Greek respondent

The most significant discrepancy in the patterns of results concern “Military interventions from some EU member states”. This option was ranked first by respondents from SEM countries while it was one of the least common answers from European respondents.

Graph 11: From the following options that relate either to the situation of the EU or to its policies, which ones are likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of SEM countries? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options out of 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>SEM countries</th>
<th>EU countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military interventions from some EU member states</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to authoritarian regimes</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securitisation of migration policies</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms exports from some EU member states</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU home-grown “radicalisation” and foreign fighters coming from the EU</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor EU economic performance</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

A more detailed analysis of the results shows that respondents affiliated with civil society institutions consider that “Support to authoritarian regimes” is likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of SEM countries.
Graph 12: From the following options that relate either to the situation of the EU or to its policies, which ones are likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries? (respondents were asked to choose 2 options)

- Military interventions from some EU member states
- Support to authoritarian regimes
- Securitisation of migration policies
- Arms exports from some EU member states
- EU home-grown "radicalisation" and foreign fighters coming from the EU
- Poor EU economic performance

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
ENGAGING WITH EUROPE

The second block of the Survey was focused on policies and strategies developed by SEM countries vis-à-vis the EU and other partners. To this end, the questionnaire had some specific questions for SEM participants and others for EU participants, with one question on the attractiveness of the EU, which could be answered by all participants. Thereby, the questions of this block provide useful insights regarding how the EU is perceived in SEM countries but also how EU respondents think the EU is perceived in SEM countries.

**Main findings:**

- Overall, a majority of respondents considered that the EU gained attractiveness among civil society in SEM countries while a majority of respondents assessed that it declined in the eyes of governmental authorities in SEM countries.
- However, EU respondents are consistently less confident about the EU's attractiveness than SEM respondents. The latter think in higher proportions than the former that both civil society and governmental authorities in their respective countries find the EU more attractive now than in 2011.
- A significant majority of SEM respondents are also of the opinion that the EU is a foreign policy priority of their respective countries. The EU is seen as the top foreign policy partner by Maghreb respondents while it only comes in second and third place for Mashreq and Turkish respondents respectively.
- European respondents are less confident with the foreign policy relevance of the EU for SEM countries than respondents from SEM countries themselves. In turn, European respondents seem to overrate the foreign policy relevance of the EU for Turkey and underestimate its relevance for Palestine or Egypt.
- When engaging with the EU, SEM respondents would want their respective countries to be more pro-active, in terms of agenda setting (i.e. coming up with proposals of issues to be prioritised in the cooperation) and in terms of promoting more symmetric and balanced agreements.
- “Democracy promotion” and “Educational cooperation” are the most important priorities of cooperation with the EU according to SEM respondents.
- The EU and its policies (in particular under the ENP framework) are seen by SEM respondents as the most appropriate framework across the board to achieve all the different aspects mentioned. In second place “One or some specific EU member states”, particularly in counter-terrorism aspects, is the most relevant partner identified by the respondents. The UfM has its higher percentages in aspects related to climate change and migration management.
- European respondents seem to be more confident with bilateral mechanisms and less with EU mechanisms than SEM respondents.
**ON THE ATTRACTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**Question 6** was directed to all respondents with the objective of assessing whether the attractiveness of the EU had increased or not since the 2011 juncture. The results are mixed. It appears that a majority of respondents considered that the EU gained attractiveness among civil society in SEM countries while a majority of respondents assessed that this attractiveness declined in the eyes of governmental authorities in SEM countries (see Graph 13).

**Graph 13: Overall, since 2011, the EU’s attractiveness for the following actors has increased or decreased?**

The picture is different and more positive for the EU when the respondents from SEM countries are invited to evaluate the EU’s attractiveness in their respective countries. Overall, it appears that respondents from SEM countries seem to be more positive than their European counterparts regarding the EU’s attractiveness. The former do not think in particular that “Governmental authorities in SEM countries” find the EU less attractive today than in 2011. However, there are some differences of patterns between Maghreb and Mashreq respondents: Mashreq respondents are a bit less prone than their Maghreb counterparts to think that the EU’s attractiveness has increased in the eyes of civil society in their respective countries (see Graph 14).

**Graph 14: Overall, since 2011, has the EU’s attractiveness for the following actors increased or decreased?**

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
ENGAGING WITH THE EU: SEEN BY RESPONDENTS FROM SOUTHERN AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

Questions 7 to 10 were only made available to participants from SEM countries and provide interesting insights into how the EU is perceived in this part of the Mediterranean.

**Question 7** shows the extent to which the EU is seen as a foreign policy priority. A significant majority of respondents are of the opinion that the EU is a foreign policy priority of their respective countries (see Graph 15).

**Graph 15: To what extent is the European Union a priority for your country’s foreign policy?**

(only respondents from SEM countries)

- **Very high extent**: 53%
- **High extent**: 25%
- **Neither low nor high extent**: 10%
- **Low extent**: 8%
- **Very low extent**: 4%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Respondents from Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Jordan particularly consider that the EU is a priority foreign policy partner for their respective countries, with a significant percentage of “Very high extent” answers (see Graph 16). Israel, Turkey and Syria have the lowest values.
Graph 16: To what extent is the European Union a priority for your country’s foreign policy?
(only respondents from SEM countries)

Pour le pays, l’UE ne peut-être qu’une priorité dans sa politique étrangère, surtout pour la frange moderniste du gouvernement et de la société civile. Pour les islamistes au pouvoir et la société civile qui lui est rattachée, les rapports avec l’UE représentent une vitrine d’apparence moderniste pour une acceptation de leur existence et participation au pouvoir, mais restent fondamentalement rétrogrades et hostiles à tout ce qui provient de l’occident apostat non musulman.

Tunisian respondent

Morocco is reorienting its foreign policy to Africa. Including migration policy, which is now used as a diplomatic offense to regain the trust of the African continent.

Moroccan respondent

Les changements climatiques, les besoins énergétiques et les changements de modèles de consommation, dont les NTIC et leur place dans la gouvernance, en plus de tout le développement technologique et l’innovation, l’UE a toute sa place dans la politique extérieure de mon pays.

Algerian respondent

Israel, wrapped in a friendly American hug, is not taking the EU as a priority and disregards its recommendations. The EU is considered a main trade partner. Additionally, it is a “battleground” to combat BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) campaign.

Israeli respondent

Half of the population in Turkey is liberal and democrat, whose priority is full accession into the EU. The remaining part (which population growth has increasing) has no EU priority at all.

Turkish respondent

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
Question 8 was an open-ended and broadly formulated question where respondents from SEM countries were invited to elaborate on how the governments of their respective countries should engage with the EU. Several categories were developed from these open-ended answers. Most of the answers relate to rather methodological aspects. Other comments relate to priority issues that should be considered in the cooperation (Graph 17).

Graph 17: In general, what do you think that your government should do with regards to its relations with the EU?
(categories developed from the open-ended answers, only respondents from SEM countries)

On methodology, it appears that respondents expect their respective governments to be more pro-active in the cooperation with the EU, in terms of agenda setting (i.e. coming up with proposals of issues to be prioritised in the cooperation) and in terms of promoting more symmetric and balanced agreements (in particular for Moroccan, Algerian and Lebanese respondents – see Graph 18).

La diplomatie marocaine se base dans ses relations avec l’UE sur des pays partenaires comme la France et l’Espagne ; il faut donc renforcer une diplomatie Maroc-UE.

Moroccan respondent


Tunisian respondent
First, the Egyptian government should focus on bilateral relations with key EU countries. To a lesser degree, work with the EU on development issues and, finally, maintain a dialogue with the EU on security and culture in the Mediterranean.

Egyptian respondent

On priority issues to be considered in the cooperation, open answers could be regrouped into three main categories: enhance good governance, enhance status of civil society (in particular for respondents from Turkey), and strengthen economic ties.

I think the Algerian government should engage in a more inclusive and long-term partnership with the EU, with more political and deep economic reforms, fighting bureaucracy and corruption, offering an easier investment ecosystem and transparency.

Algerian respondent

While the economic ties between my country and the EU are expanding, the current government is constantly demonizing the EU involvement in the region. Thus, it ought to be more honest about the EU role in our economy.

Israeli respondent

De manière plus volontariste. En anticipant les événements au lieu de les subir. En mettant en place des réformes substantielles de son système de Gouvernance politique et économique.

Moroccan respondent

Graph 18: In general, what do you think that your government should do with regards to its relations with the EU?
(categories developed from the open-ended answers, only respondents from SEM countries)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
Question 9 was conceived to sound out the respondents on those aspects that are considered most important in the relationship of their respective countries with the EU. “Democracy promotion” and “Educational cooperation” gather 37% of all answers (see Graph 19) while “Counter-terrorism” and “Migration/border management” that tend to make headlines were mentioned by only 15% of the respondents.

Graph 19: The most important aspects, when it comes to my country’s relationship with the EU should be: (respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 12, only respondents from SEM countries)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
Results clustered according to the geographical origin of the respondents show some variations (see Graph 20 to 22). The most recurrent option given by Turkish respondents for instance is “Democracy promotion, rule of law and good governance” while “Migration and border management” comes in second place (see Graph 20).

Graph 20: The most important aspects, when it comes to my country’s relationship with the EU should be:

**Turkish respondents** (respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 12)

- Democracy promotion, rule of law, good governance: 24%
- Migration and border management: 14%
- Trade and investment: 13%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Graph 21: The most important aspects, when it comes to my country’s relationship with the EU should be:

**Maghreb respondents** (respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 12)

- Democracy promotion, rule of law, good governance: 20%
- Education, and cultural and scientific cooperation: 19%
- Trade and investment: 10%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Graph 22: The most important aspects, when it comes to my country’s relationship with the EU should be:

**Mashreq respondents** (respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 12)

- Education, and cultural and scientific cooperation: 18%
- Democracy promotion, rule of law, good governance: 17%
- Counter-terrorism: 10%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
With **Question 10** the Survey asked SEM respondents which partners or frameworks are most important in order to achieve the priorities identified in Q9. The EU and its policies (in particular under the ENP framework) are seen as the most appropriate framework across the board to achieve all the different aspects mentioned in Q9 (see Graph 23).

In second place “One or some specific EU member states”, particularly in counter-terrorism aspects, is the most relevant framework identified by the respondents. The UfM has its higher percentages in aspects related to climate change and migration management.

**Graph 23: In order to achieve Q9 most important priorities, the most important partners or frameworks should be:**

(only respondents from SEM countries)

Cooperation on counter-terrorism at the EU level has not been at the most desired level yet, particularly because it is related to the EU countries’ exclusive competences. Therefore, specific EU member states are more important than others. Regarding migration and border management, EU level policies are of particular importance. As for education and cultural and scientific cooperation, non-governmental actors should be the most important partners since they are more effective and independent when implementing and suggesting the latest developments in related areas.

**Turkish respondent**

Les ONGs portant les valeurs d’égalité et de démocratie peuvent être des groupes de pression voire des facteurs de changement.

**Tunisian respondent**

Au lieu de 5 + 5, il vaut mieux avoir un cadre uniifié pour dialoguer : l’Union pour la Méditerranée. Mais le statut de cette Union née avant terme doit être revu pour sortir du cadre étroit des premiers membres fondateurs.

**Moroccan respondent**
In Question 11, echoing and complementing Question 7, respondents from SEM countries were invited to identify the top two foreign policy partners of their respective countries. The EU was the most recurrent answer, followed by the USA (see Graph 24).

Graph 24: As you see it, the top two foreign policy partners of your country are:
(respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 12, only respondents from SEM countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council countries</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

However, a closer look at the results based on the geographic origin of the respondents shows a slightly different and nuanced picture. The EU is seen as the top foreign policy partner by Maghreb respondents while it only comes in the second place for Mashreq and Israel respondents and third place for Turkish respondents (see Graph 25).

The world is being reconfigured. Reaching out to a variety of partners is important. Traditional partners are bound to see their relative importance decrease.  

Egyptian respondent

L'Europe doit revoir ses cartes pour que le Maroc puisse jouer un rôle d'union et de rapprochement entre l'Afrique et l'Europe, et ce pour accélérer la cadence des projets de coopération entre les deux continents.

Moroccan respondent
Graph 25: As you see it, the top foreign policy partners of your country are (respondents were asked to choose 3 options out of 12, only respondents from SEM countries)

Q12 and Q13 were only targeting EU respondents with the idea of identifying how they perceive the way SEM countries engage with the EU.

Question 12 mirrored Question 10 to some extent, with the objective of finding out the opinion of European respondents regarding the relevance of partners and frameworks for SEM governments. A comparison between the results deriving from Question 12 and 10 tends to show that European respondents seem to be more confident with bilateral mechanisms and less with EU mechanisms than SEM respondents (see Graph 26).
Graph 26: In general, to what extent do you think the following partners or frameworks are relevant to Southern and Eastern Mediterranean governments?

![Graph showing relevance of partners and frameworks](image)

Q12 to what extent do you think the following partners or frameworks are relevant to SEM governments? (mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent, EU respondents only)

Q10 In order to achieve main policy priorities, the most important partners or frameworks should be (results in %, SEM respondents only)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

EU policies are undefined, poorly communicated and have had little impact on the ground. Only individual EU member states still remain relevant.

German respondent

De nouveau, la question est focalisée sur les gouvernements des pays du Sud et de l’Est. La question posée pour leurs résidents, notamment les moins représentés dans les dialogues euro-méditerranéen, donnerait des réponses différentes, justement celles qui manquent à l’UE et aux preneurs de décisions.

French respondent

As to the order of significance, I would specify both bilateral cooperation of EU member states and related Mediterranean governments, as well as non-governmental actors, as the most effective frameworks. They appeal to the public in particular countries.

Polish respondent

Finally, the results of Question 13 show to what extent European respondents think that the EU is a priority for SEM countries. Answers show that two Maghreb countries (Tunisia and Morocco) are seen as those where the EU is a strong priority in terms of foreign policy.

Overall, European respondents are less confident with the foreign policy relevance of the EU for SEM countries than respondents for SEM countries themselves. In turn, European respondents seem to overstate the foreign policy relevance of the EU for Turkey and underestimate its relevance for Palestine or Egypt.
The prioritization of external partners including the EU changes dynamically in the foreign policies of most countries of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean.

Bulgarian respondent

This question does not imply easy answers that can be synthesized in a number. The priority of certain EU countries for this group of EU partner countries is much higher than the EU itself (look for instance at how strong relations between France and Egypt are at the moment). On the other hand, Turkey is not an EU partner country, as it is still an accession country. Therefore, it follows a different pattern, precisely because of its accession perspectives (or lack of) and the EU-Turkey statement.

Spanish respondent
REINVENTING
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN
RELATIONS

The third block of the Survey aims to be more operational than blocks 1 and 2. Questions relate mostly to existing frameworks such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Questions 15 to 19) or the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) (Questions 20 to 24). More generally, this also touches upon the obstacles and shortcomings of Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Main findings:

- The difference of interests among countries (within the EU itself, within the MENA or between both shores) leading to a lack of common vision and political will, regional instability and unresolved conflicts, power asymmetries between the North and the South of the Mediterranean are some of the most recurrent issues mentioned by the respondents as impediments to greater Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.
- The ENP as reviewed in 2015 has not met the announced objectives.
- The ENP framework remains relevant but should be reviewed again in order to move further towards an equal footing partnership, better involve civil society actors, provide further financial assistance linked to political reforms, integrate a consistent approach regarding conflict resolution and offer more tools to differentiate approaches to different neighbours.
- Regarding the UfM, even though respondents point out the fact that it has not significantly succeeded in meeting the main objectives as stated in the 2008 Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, a strong majority states that it should be empowered and its mandate extended.
- From the main areas of actions identified in the 2017 UfM roadmap, respondents think that “Enhancing regional stability and human development” should be prioritised.
- Turkish respondents are the less critical category of respondents with existing Euro-Mediterranean policy cooperation frameworks.

THE IMPEDIMENTS TO FURTHER STRENGTHENING EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS (Q14)

Question 14 was an open question where respondents were invited to identify major impediments to further strengthening Euro-Mediterranean relations. Based on those answers, some categories were defined, as illustrated in Graph 28. The most common issue mentioned in answers is related to the divergence of interests between Euro-Mediterranean players (within the EU itself, within the MENA or between both shores) leading to the incapacity to come up with a long-term vision of Euro-Mediterranean relations. A significant number of answers also relate to unresolved conflicts and in particular the Palestine-Israel one, regional instability and in some cases the responsibilities of EU countries. Third, a large number of respondents blamed political trends in Southern Mediterranean countries. Power asymmetry also came up as a common pattern in answers, as did migration challenges.
Graph 28: What is the major impediment to further strengthening Euro-Mediterranean relations?

Here is a sample of some responses, illustrating the main patterns mentioned above but also the diversity of the answers:

La focalisation sur le volet sécuritaire qui impose le soutien des pouvoirs autoritaires.

Syrian respondent

I think there has been an ensemble of issues, including:
- Lack of coherence between human rights and economic interests.
- Securitization of migration and growing lobby by military and security European companies, using "old" discourses and models, which are proved as not working, diverting ODA funds, etc.
- Change of global stability with Trump in USA + CETA negotiations and loss of relevance as an actor in real politics. Growing criticism of the EU as benefiting from neo-colonial policies, etc.

Spanish respondent

Le rapport de force entre l’UE et les autres pays méditerranéens, les crises durables ainsi que le soutien des régimes autoritaires du sud et arabes par l’UE qui retarde la mise en œuvre de réformes politiques, économiques, sociales et institutionnelles afin de construire des États démocratiques, de droit, de la bonne gouvernance et de respect des droits de l’Homme.

Moroccan respondent
It is difficult to identify "the" major impediment to strengthening Euro-Mediterranean relations. The way in which the EU has reacted to the Eurozone and refugee-cum-migration crises has undoubtedly weakened its appeal in the eyes of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean partners, suggesting they look elsewhere. The EU’s insistence on promoting reforms, economic and political, that have patently failed and are arguably part of the problem contributes to this growing distance, creating the space for other actors (especially GCC countries, but also China and to a lesser extent Russia) to become more credible partners in the eyes of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean rulers.

Italian respondent

Le contexte politique actuel en Méditerranée du sud avec un retour des vieux modèles de fonctionnement pour l’UE (soutien aux régimes dictatoriaux de peur d’avoir de nouveau de l’instabilité socio-économique pouvant déboucher sur de nouvelles migrations) n’est qu’une vision à court-terme. Si l’UE n’arrive pas à conditionner son soutien au respect des droits de l’Homme et ne prend aucune mesure à l’égard des violations commises par les régimes en place, cela créera de nouveau un cycle de violences dans quelques années car les inégalités continuent, elles, à se creuser.

French respondent

La stratégie de l’UE, qui consistait à améliorer les relations politiques et économiques avec ces régimes comme base pour favoriser les changements démocratiques, n’a pas porté ses fruits. Le principal obstacle à un renforcement des relations euro-méditerranéennes est lié à la complexité architectonique de la coopération euro-méditerranéenne.

Mauritanian respondent

ON THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY (ENP) AND ITS REFORM

Answers to Questions 15-19 provide a picture on how the ENP is perceived both in EU and SEM countries.

Question 15 invited the respondents to evaluate the efficiency of the ENP more than two years after its 2015 review and, more precisely, to express their opinion regarding the degree of achievement of the main objectives mentioned in the review. Overall, the average support represented in Graph 28 points to a rather weak endorsement from the respondents, who do not seem to be very impressed with the achievements since 2015. Respondents are slightly less critical when it comes to acknowledging that the reviewed ENP has led to stepping up cooperation in security matters and in ensuring a differentiated approach to partners (see also Q19).
Graph 29: More than two years after the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), to what extent has it been able to fulfil its main objectives:
(mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

- Stepping up work on security sector reform, conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation policies: 5.7 SEM, 5.3 EU
- Ensuring a differentiated approach to partners: 5.8 SEM, 5 EU
- Offering more flexibility in the use of EU instruments: 5.4 SEM, 4.9 EU
- Intensified cooperation on both regular and irregular migration: 5.1 SEM, 5.1 EU
- Greater involvement of EU member states in the ENP: 4.9 SEM, 4.9 EU
- Contributing to economic development for stabilisation: 4.8 SEM, 4.9 EU
- Enhancing joint ownership based on both partners’ needs and EU interests: 5 SEM, 4.9 EU

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Algeria and Israel are the countries that evaluate these ENP objectives most negatively. Jordan, in contrast, is more positive.

As a natural follow-up to Question 15, Question 16 aimed to analyse the extent to which the ENP framework either remains relevant or should be reviewed again. A clear majority of respondents stated that another review is desirable in order to build more effective neighbourhood partnerships (see Graph 29). A higher percentage of SEM respondents consider the ENP as an unsuited design.
Graph 30: To what extent would you agree with the following statement: There is a need for yet another review of the European Neighbourhood Policy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>All survey</th>
<th>Eu countries</th>
<th>SEM countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very low extent</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low extent</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither low nor high extent</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High extent</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high extent</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

In order to properly understand the ENP shortcomings and how they should be addressed, those who answered that the ENP should be newly reviewed (either to a high or very high extent) were invited to express their views on how it should be redesigned and what the main focus should be (Question 17).

Some of the recurrent answers touched upon the following issues:

- A more equal footing partnerships: 14%
- Promote economic development: 11%
- Democracy and Human Rights Promotion: 11%
- Involve civil society actors in the negotiation processes: 10%
- More cultural cooperation and education: 6%
- Greater financial assistance/more investments: 8%
- Migration management: 9%

Here is a sample of the answers:

A new ENP should be freed from normative, Eurocentric approaches, which does not necessarily mean that it should be free of any norms and values. It should take the debates, expectations and grievances in the South more into consideration and include a “mutual-learning” instead of “our size fits all” approach.

Austrian respondent
1. Prendre en considération les intérêts de tous les partenaires.
2. Cesser de soutenir aveuglément Israël par crainte de représailles avec les États-Unis.
3. Cesser d'imposer aux Pays du Sud de la Méditerranée le rôle de gendarmes des frontières de l'Europe.
4. Réinventer le dialogue Nord-Sud.

Moroccan respondent

Le paramètre essentiel consisterait à changer de paradigme. La coopération doit cesser d'être *top-down* (EU-Sud), mais le fruit d'un compromis. Le point central c'est la concertation en amont. Ceci étant, cette réforme serait nécessaire mais insuffisante.

Algerian respondent

The EU should be ready to implement more tailor-made approaches (diversify the strategies) towards the countries of the region and stop seeing the Mediterranean through the prisms of migration and security alone. Education and youth unemployment are major common challenges in the region as well as the need for strong political and economic institutions and a resilience against state capture. The countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, on the other hand, should be assisted in identifying their actual needs and demands, and how the EU can try to fill some of these gaps.

German respondent

The policy should be based on a consultative approach with the neighbour countries including civil society. Projects and programmes should be prepared in close cooperation with beneficiary countries on a peer-to-peer approach.

Moroccan respondent

More directed towards enhancing civil society and political reform. Financial assistance should be linked to political reform. This should be done consistently, not according to the interests at stake.

French respondent

While the ENP should be reformed, answers to **Question 18** show that respondents are not keen on replacing the ENP framework as such. A greater proportion of EU respondents, compared to SEM respondents, believe the current framework is worth maintaining (see Graph 31).

**Graph 31: Do you think that the ENP should be replaced by another framework?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
<th>SEM respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

It is interesting to highlight the fact that Turkish and Israeli respondents stand out from the mean with a very high percentage of negative responses, i.e., supporting the ENP. 80% and 87.5% of the respective respondents stated that this framework should not be replaced by another one.
Those who answered that it should be replaced with another framework were asked two additional questions: why and what do you propose instead (Question 19).

There are some repeated patterns among the answers. Most respondents state that the evidence has shown that the ENP has not yielded relevant results, that there is a lack of a long-term vision, and that power asymmetries are too strong in the current framework.

On a l’impression qu’elle est conçue pour éviter les problèmes, pas pour créer les bases d’un avenir commun.

Algerian respondent

The ENP is also seen as an instrument unable to adapt as fast as needed to the new challenges and contexts:

Parce qu’il n’est pas approprié à la nouvelle donne, changement climatique, migration, chômage des jeunes, montée du fondamentalisme, lutte contre le terrorisme, exil des compétences, fuite des cerveaux...

Tunisian respondent

Among those who answered the what do you propose instead question, some 23% mentioned the need to apply differentiated approaches to different regional neighbours as a way to better adapt to different realities, away from the “one-size-fits-all” rationale.

La Méditerranée ne nous intéresse pas au même titre que la Baltique. Eliminer cette idée des macro-régions. Prendre en considération les particularismes culturels, les spécificités historiques.

French respondent

First things first: an EU real Defence Policy and an EU basic consensus on what it wants in its relationships with the region. There should be a split: an ENP for the West Mediterranean and another for the East. There is no wholesale “neighbourhood”. The EU should think pragmatically, tackling each set of problems depending on each country or geographical position, instead of big universal one size-fits-all mentality.

French respondent

Here are some other thoughts about why and how the ENP should be replaced:

Parce qu’elle continue à ignorer le troisième volet de la Déclaration de Barcelone, le volet social, culturel et humain.

Moroccan respondent

A framework that is not based on a fortress Europe and everything but institutions.

Israeli respondent
THE ROLE OF THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN (UFM)

In Questions 20 to 24, the Survey turned to the role of the UfM, how it is perceived, what its shortcomings are and how they could be overcome.

Question 20 took as a point of reference the three main objectives to give a new impulse to the Euro-Mediterranean region as stated in the 2008 Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean. Respondents were invited to indicate to what extent the UfM had succeeded in meeting those objectives. The results point to a rather negative assessment (see Graph 31). Responses do not significantly differ geographically, even though EU respondents tend to be slightly more critical across the board.

A more detailed analysis of the results reveals some specific features. In relative terms, Turkish respondents are those who think in biggest proportions that the UfM successfully met the three objectives.

Graph 32: To what extent has the Union for the Mediterranean succeeded, as stated in the Joint Declaration, in newly encouraging the following? (mean 0-very low extent, 10-very high extent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>SEM respondents</th>
<th>EU respondents</th>
<th>Turkish respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading the political level of the EU’s relationship with its Mediterranean partners</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing for further co-ownership to our multilateral relation</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making multilateral relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

In Question 21, the departing point is the 2017 UfM roadmap, and more precisely the four main areas of actions identified therein. Respondents were invited to rank those and identify which one should be prioritised. “Enhancing regional stability and human development” is the most common answer. North-South answers show some slight differences in the order of priorities.
Graph 33: Which ones of the four main areas of action identified in the Union for the Mediterranean roadmap adopted by the Union for the Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 23 January 2017 in Barcelona should be pursued as a matter of priority?

- Ensuring the contribution of UfM activities to regional stability and human development: 36% SEM respondents, 27% EU respondents.
- Strengthening regional integration: 21% SEM respondents, 24% EU respondents.
- Enhancing political dialogue among the member states: 16% SEM respondents, 19% EU respondents.
- Strengthening UfM capacity for action: 33% SEM respondents, 25% EU respondents.

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

In a more general way, Question 22 aimed to assess the eagerness of the respondents for a further empowerment of the UfM and an extension of its mandate. As Graph 34 shows, a large majority of respondents call for an extension of the UfM mandate.

Graph 34: Do you think that the Union for the Mediterranean should be empowered and its mandate should be extended?

- EU respondents: 70% yes, 30% no.
- SEM respondents: 81% yes, 19% no.

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Policy-makers are the group of respondents that state to a greater degree that the UfM should not be further empowered and its mandate should not be extended (31% of policy-makers answered “no” to Question 22, compared to 19% for civil society respondents).

Graph 35: Do you think that the Union for the Mediterranean should be empowered and its mandate should be extended?

- Experts: 75% yes, 25% no.
- Policy-makers: 69% yes, 31% no.
- Civil society: 81% yes, 19% no.

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey.
Those who answered *yes* were asked *how*. Below is a sample of some answers:

Il faudrait d’abord revoir ses principes fondateurs et ses objectifs initiaux. L’ouvrir véritablement aux instances non-gouvernementales et à la société civile, lui donner plus de moyens politiques et financiers, et la charger des vrais questions de développement et de démocratisation des pays et sociétés du Sud de la Méditerranée.

Moroccan respondent

It has to be more down to earth and to establish concrete rules and projects.

Egyptian respondent

En traitant les conflits politiques qui rendent ladite Union inopérante sur le terrain ; de la sorte, en séparant clairement les volets politique et technique (développement coopération), on contribuera à éviter que cette organisation continue d’agir comme un outil paradiplomatique supplémentaire aux mains des différents États membres.

French respondent

Those who answered *no* were asked *why*. Below is a sample of some answers:

Comme pour la PEV : Elle a démontré ses limites, elle a été initiée par une ou deux personnalités politiques, est excessivement stato-centrée et basée sur les intérêts européens. De ce fait, peut-être que son mandat devrait se concentrer uniquement sur le dialogue politique de haut niveau, et non sur le reste. Son mandat ne devrait pas être étendu.

French respondent

It failed on all fronts. It is an inadequate structure to deal with the regional challenges. The strategy it adopted is the wrong one. It is aimed at normalizing relationships between partners on the wrong bases. The major obstacle is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As long as the conflict exists, integration and full cooperation between members will remain a myth.

Palestinian respondent

Because it is quite hybrid as an institutional construct and its usefulness is questionable. At the same time, it seems to channel some of the energy and resources that should be dedicated to cooperation. It makes institutional relations more confused.

Portuguese respondent

As a framework for action it is empowered enough and has a sufficient mandate. Maybe the problem is to find ways to be more effective, and this is a matter of political will and determination.

Spanish respondent
METHODOLOGY

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire is organised into three thematic blocks and has been designed with the objective of assessing Euro-Mediterranean relations, while moving away from a Eurocentric approach. Indeed, in Euro-Mediterranean fora, the focus is most often on the state of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and its impact on the European Union.

Instead, the first block of the Survey is geared towards capturing the perceptions of Euro-Mediterranean experts about how recent developments in Europe affect the southern shore of the Mediterranean and, more generally, Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Similarly, Euro-Mediterranean policies are too often understood as policies of the European Union towards the Southern Mediterranean. The questions of the second block mainly relate to policies and strategies developed by Southern Mediterranean countries vis-à-vis the EU and other partners.

The questions of the third block provide an opportunity to assess the current frameworks that underpin Euro-Mediterranean relations and identify possible new avenues of cooperation.

The questionnaire combined open-ended questions and multiple-choice questions with pre-defined answers offering respondents the possibility to choose and rank among several options or the possibility to grade on a “very low” to “very high” scale. For these questions, an optional space was provided to elaborate on the answer. This open part is considered of great importance for a Survey of this kind as it contributes to improving the interpretation of its overall results and provides with additional valuable material.

Survey Sample

To conduct the Survey, a universe of 4,500 experts, actors and policy-makers from the 43 Union for the Mediterranean countries was selected. They received an invitation to participate. As in previous years, geographical distribution, institutional affiliation, field of knowledge and gender balance were the reference criteria for selecting the universe. In addition to experts involved in Euro-Mediterranean affairs in various capacities, some more specialised experts in violent extremism were identified.
Profile of respondents

A total of 817 responses were received, which can be considered a representative sample. Concerning the distribution by geographical origin, 49% came from the European Union and 50% from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (hereafter SEM) countries.

Graph 1: Breakdown of responses by geographical origin: EU-28 and Mediterranean Partner Countries

The Mediterranean EU countries1 (29%), the remaining EU countries and the Maghreb countries2 are the sub-regional groupings that account for the bulk of the responses. Mashreq countries3 come in fourth position with 14% of respondents.

1. Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Croatia and Slovenia. The first three alone account for nearly 78% of responses from this region.
2. Maghreb countries include Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya. The first three alone account for 92% of responses from this region.
3. Mashreq countries include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Syria.
Graph 2: Breakdown of respondents by region (in %)

- Mediterranean EU countries: 29%
- Rest of EU (i.e. EU non Mediterranean): 20%
- Maghreb: 28%
- Mashreq: 14%
- Turkey: 4%
- Israel: 3%
- European non EU (i.e. Balkan countries and Monaco): 1%
- Other: 2%

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Reaching a representative distribution by country continues to be a difficult task. Some countries are over-represented and others under-represented. In order to avoid bias in the results, we have weighted them according to distribution of the target by the countries in the sample (see annex III). With this weighting we avoid the over-representation of Spain, France, Italy Morocco and Tunisia largely determining the results of respondents overall.

In the first block of questions, in addition to providing their country of origin, respondents were asked to indicate their gender and the type of institution they belonged to.4

As shown in the graphs below, the majority of respondents to the questionnaire are “experts”, an aggregated category that includes respondents from think tanks, media and, above all, academia. Altogether, these groups account for 54% of the total number of responses. The other categories “policy-makers” (embracing responses from diplomatic bodies, European or international institutions, political parties and governments) and “civil society” (encompassing trade unions, companies and mainly NGOs) account each for 25% of the total number of responses.
When looking specifically at the individual groups (see graph 4), academia clearly emerges as the most represented institution (38% of total responses), followed by NGOs (20%) and think tanks (14%). Altogether, these groups account for two thirds of the total responses.

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
Respondents were also asked about their main sector of activity and were given the opportunity to indicate one or two areas of specialisation. As shown in the graph below, which features aggregated figures for main and secondary areas of specialisation, 32% of the respondents operate in the area of “Political cooperation and security”. “Social, cultural and human exchanges” ranks second as the main area of specialisation of respondents (33%), followed by “economic and financial cooperation” 19%. Finally, “migration and justice affairs” comes in fourth place with 17%.

When analysing the figures above by factoring in the geographical dimension, one finds that the main area of specialisation of European respondents is “political cooperation and security” while most SEM respondents identified “social, cultural and human exchanges” as their area of expertise.
Finally, to complete the description of the sample on which this Survey is based, it is important to note that 35% of respondents are women, in line with the gender balance of the last Survey (see graph 8). When analysing the North/South dimension, the aggregate proportion of women amounts to 30% for SSM countries, while it increases to 41% for EU countries. By regional groups, the Maghreb fall below the overall gender ratio (see graph 8).

Graph 7: Breakdown of respondents by gender

![Graph showing gender distribution](image)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey

Graph 8: Breakdown of respondents by gender and regional groups

![Graph showing gender distribution by region](image)

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 9th Euromed Survey
LIST OF RESPONDENTS

The European Institute of the Mediterranean ensures the absolute anonymity of the replies by participants. The data has been processed after coding each questionnaire. In addition, there is a minimum number of respondents per country to ensure that the responses cannot be traced back to any of them.

A. MOHAMED AL-KUT, AL BASHIR. Tripoli University, Libya
ABBES, OUSSEMA. University of London, Tunisia
ABDEL SABOUR, MOHAMED. Ministry of Transport, Project Coordinator, Egypt
ABDALLA, NADINE. Arab Forum for Alternatives (AFA), Egypt
ABDALRAHMAN, MAHDI. Passia, Palestine
ABDEL SAMAD, ZIAD. Arab NGO Network for Development, Lebanon
ABDEL SAEEM, MOHAMED. Ministry of Transport, Project Coordinator, Egypt
ABDEL SAMEI, MARWA. Cairo University, Egypt
ABDELAZIZ, KACEM. Association des Études Internationales, Tunisia
ABDELAZIZ, YASSER. Ministry of Manpower and Migration, Egypt
ABDERRAHIM, TASNIM. Centre Études Méditerranennes Internationales (CEMI), Tunisia
ABEDRABBO, RAED E. Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ), Palestine
ABOU EL-ENEIN, MOHAMMED. Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM), Egypt
ABOULLOUZ, ABDELHAKIM. Ibn Zohr University, Morocco
ABUELREESH, AHMED Y. Association of Green Land, Palestine
ABUSROUR, ABDELFATTAH. Alrowwad Cultural and Arts Society, Palestine
ADAMEH, SALAH. Al Quds University, Palestine
ADAOUI, ZOUHIRE. Université Moulay Ismail Meknès, Morocco
ADOUANI, SAMI. FES Tunisie, Tunisia
AFZA, DRISS. ASTATIS Luxembourg, France
AHOUATE, LAHCEN. Association of Lutte Contre l’Érosion, la Sècheresse et la Désertification au Maroc (ALCESDAM), Morocco
AIT ALI, HASSAN. Université Hassan II, Morocco
AIT MHAND, FATIMA. Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, Morocco
AIT-CHAALAL, AMINE. Centre d’Études et Recherches sur le Monde Arabe Contemporain (CERMAC), Belgium
AJJOUTI, DRISS. Morocco
AKGÜN, MENSUR. Global Political Trends Center, Turkey
AKL, ZIAD. Al-Ahram Center For Political and Strategic Studies, Egypt
AKROUT, SALEH. Unité de Gestion du Programme d’Appui à l’Accord d’Association et du Plan d’Action Voisinage, Tunisia
AKSOY, OKTAY. Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, Turkey
AL ACHKAR, RANI. Centre Libanais pour la conservation de l’énergie (LCCE), Lebanon
AL HMAIDI, MOHAMD. Water Sector Regulatory Council, Palestine
AL JOUNDI, SOURA. ONG Rescate, Syria

In addition, respondents had the option of not appearing on this final list of participants. 103 out of 817 respondents chose not to be included; therefore this list has a total of 714 names.

AL KHOURI, RIAD. GeoEconomica GmbH, Jordan
AL MANSOUR, NATALIA. Permanent Representation of Slovenia to the EU, Slovenia
AL SAAD, ZIAD. Yarmouk University, Jordan
ALAGHA, JOSEPH. Haigazian University, Lebanon
AL-ATTAR, SAHAR. Le Commerce du Levant, Lebanon
ALBINYANA, ROGER. European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), Spain
ALESSANDRINI, SERGIO. University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy
ALI, MOEZ. UTIL, Tunisia
ALI, OMAR. Accounting Management Marketing Consulting, Lebanon
ALIGUE, ABDELMOUMEN. Algeria
ALJABER, IYAD. I-Dare for Sustainable Development, Jordan
ALJUMAILI, MAYSA. International Organisation for Migration, Tunisia
ALKAN, DAVID. A.D. Engineering Systems, Israel
ALMERAS, GUILLAUME. France
ALTUNA, SERGIO. Real Instituto Elcano, Spain
ALTUNISIK, MELIHA. Turkey
ALVAREZ- OSSORIO, IGNACIO. University of Alicante, Spain
AMMENDOLA, CARMELITA. Ministry of Interior, Italy
AMMOR, FOAUD. Groupement d’Études et Recherches sur la Méditerranée (GERM), Morocco
AMOUZAY, LAHOUCINE. Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe, Morocco
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AVELLAN, CHRISTOPHE. Pôle de compétitivité Mer PACA. France
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BADIA, ANNA MARÍA. Spain
BADRAN, MAI. Anna Lindh Foundation. Egypt
BARJAOU, AHMAD. Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane. Morocco
BÁLÁZS, DÉRI. ELTE Budapest. Hungary
BANIA, RADOSLAW. Africa University of Lodz. Poland
BAQAIN, BASY. Motivators for Training. Jordan
BARGHOUTY, REEM. Jordan Forum for Business and Professional Women. Jordan
BARHOUM, SAMIR. The Jordan Times. Jordan
BARKAOUI, MILOUD. Université Badji Mokhtar-Annaba. Algeria
BARNEA, AARON. Parents Circle - Families Forum Bereaved Israeli-Palestinian Families Forum for Peace and Reconciliation. Israel
BARRAS, RAQUEL. Spain
BÉDRAANI, SLIMANE. École nationale supérieure d'agronomie. Algeria
BEGAG, ERMAL. Albanian Center for Oriental Studies (ACFOS). Albania
BELHAROUI, MILOUD. Université Badji Mokhtar-Annaba. Algeria
BELGAGA, MOHAMED AMINE. Université Mohammed I d'Oujda. Morocco
BERGH, SYLVIA I. Erasmus University Rotterdam. Sweden
BÉDRAANI, SLIMANE. École nationale supérieure d'agronomie. Algeria
BÉDRA, Ouled ABDALLAH. Institut national du travail et des études sociales. Tunisia
BELFÉRI, MITCHELL. Euro-Gulf Information Centre. Czech Republic
BELGAID, MOHAMMED. Centre d'Études et de Recherches en Sciences Sociales. Morocco
BOJNOVIC FENKO, ANA. Centre for International Relations (CIR). Slovenia
BOSSMAN, PETER. ARLEM. Slovenia
BOSTAN UNSAL, FATMA. Hak Inisiyatif Derneği, Baskent Kadin Platformu Derneği. Turkey
BOTTARELLI, MARIA LUDOVICA. Italy
BOUCHACHI, MOSTEFA. Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme. Algeria
BOUDJEMA, GHECHIR. Réseau des Démocrates dans le Monde Arabe. Algeria
BOUFRIKHA, ANIS. We Love Sousse. Tunisia
BOUGHZALA, MONGI. Université de Tunis Elmanar. Tunisia
BOUJBIR, MOUNA. Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane. Morocco
BOULASRI, HASNA. Collège d’Europe. Morocco
BOUMGHRAR, MOHAMED YAZID. Centre de Recherche en Économie Appliquée pour le Développement (CREAD). Algeria
BOUNADAR, MOHCIN. International Youth Federation. Morocco
BOURAOUI, SOUKEINA. Centre de la Femme Arabe pour la Formation et la Recherche (CAWTAR). Tunisia
BOURDET, YVES, Lund University. France
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BRATANEK, ALFRED. Embassy. Austria
BUJARNEK, ALFRED. Cooperation and Development Institute. Albania
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CHAIB, BOUNOUA. Université de Tlemcen. Algeria
CHAMS, DALIA. Al-Ahram Hebdo. Egypt
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COUTILLIERE, JEAN-FRANÇOIS. Association Euromed-IHEDN. France
CRAIN, ANTONINO. European Commission - DG NEAR. Italy
CRETU, GABRIELA. Romanian Parliament - Senate. Romania
CRISS, JEFF. University of Oxford and Chatham House. United Kingdom
CRISTE, ADRIAN. Dublin City Interfaith Forum / Center for Migration Studies, New York. Ireland
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EL CADI, LATIFA. Morocco

ELHIZALDI, MIGUEL ANGEL. CEI International Affairs. Spain

ELJAFARI, MAHMOUD. Alquds University of Jerusalem. Palestine

ELKORY OUMRANE, FATMA. Ntic et Citoyennete - Maurifemme. Mauritania

EL MADMAD, KHADJA. Université Hasan II Ain Chok. Morocco

EL MAGHRABY, MOHAMED. Institute of National Planning. Egypt

ELNUR, IBRAHIM. American University in Cairo. Egypt

EL SHOBAKI, AMR. Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. Egypt

EL WAKEEL, RANA. College of Europe. Egypt

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EMILIANI, TOMMASO. Italy

ENGELKES, SIMON. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Germany

ENHAIJI, AZIZ. Tolerance.ca. Morocco

ENNODI, MOHAMED. Coordination Maghrébine des Organisations des Droits Humains (CMODH). Morocco

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ERKARSLAN, ONDER. Izmir Institute of Technology. Turkey

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ESCOBAR, JUAN JOSÉ. Spanish Foreign Ministry. Spain

EVIN, AHMET. Istanbul Policy Centre. Turkey

ESSINE, ABDELFAATTIH. Institut Universitaire de la Recherche Scientifique. Morocco

FABBRI, FRANCESCO. European Policy Centre (EPC). Italy

FAHIM, ZAKARIA. BDO (Business Angels). Morocco

FAHMI, GEORGES. European University Institute. Egypt

FALHI, ASMAA. Morocco

FARES, RACHID. Centre d’Études et de Recherches en Sciences Sociales (CERSS). Morocco

FARIZA, BESIAO. Civilas. Palestine

FARRE, SERGI. Embassy of Spain in Belgium. Spain

FATHI, ABID. University of Sfax. Tunisia
FATHIA, HAMMEDI. Tunisia

FERNÁNDEZ, IRENE. University of Exeter. Spain

FIBLA, CARLA. Fundación Vicente Ferrer. Spain

FKI, MAHER. Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie du Commerce et de l’Artisanat. Tunisia

FLORENSA, SENÉN. European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed). Spain

FOERCH, CHRISTINA. Fighters for Peace. Lebanon

FONTAINE, SYLVIE. European Commission. Belgium

FRANCO, PERE. Ramon Llull University. Spain

FRANCO, MARC. Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations. Belgium

FREIGANG, JAN. European External Action Service (EEAS) - Delegation Israel. Germany

GACEM, NADIA. Institut National d’Études de Stratégie Globale. Algeria

GAD, ABD-ALLA. National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences (NARSS). Egypt

GAFIUC, PETRU VASILE. Bucovina Institute. Romania

GALAI, AHMED. Institut Arabe des Droits de l’Homme. Centre de Bizerte. Tunisia

GALLER, GERARD. European Commission - DG CONNECT. Luxembourg

GAMAL EL DIN, KARIM. Studio Masr. Egypt

GARDAN, EMMANUELLE. Union for the Mediterranean. France

GARRIGUES, ANTONIO. J & A Garrigues. Spain

GASSER, KHALED. EGREEN - Egyptian Renewable Energy Co. Egypt

GAUB, FLORENCE. EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS). Germany

GEORGIOU, KYRIAKOS E. University of Nicosia. Cyprus

GERVASONI, LUCA. International Institute for Nonviolent Action (NOVACT). Spain

GHACHEM, MOURAD. Association Vigilance et Égalité des Chances (AVEC). Tunisia

GHAEBAF, KHALID. Université Zitouna. Tunisia

GHARBI, IKBAL. Université de Tunis. Tunisia

GHARIB, SHERIN. Austrian Institute for International Affairs. Austria

GHOMARI, TAIBI. Université de Mascara. Algeria

GHOSSEINI, NOUHA. Lebanese University. Lebanon

GILLESPIE, RICHARD. University of Liverpool. United Kingdom

GMEINER, SIMON. International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group). Germany

GÖLL, EDGAR. IZT - Institute for Future Studies and Technology Assessment. Germany

GOMBÁR, EDUARD. Charles University. Czech Republic

GOMBÁROVÁ, JANA. Czech-Arab Society. Czech Republic

GOMES, RUI. Council of Europe. Portugal

GONÇALVES, LUISA. Ministry of Interior of Portugal. Portugal

GONZALEZ, RICARD. Spain

GOREN, NIMROD. Mitvim - The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. Israel

GOUD, ABDEL-KHALEK. Faculty of Economics and Political Science. Egypt

GRAÇA, VITOR. Portuguese Human Rights League. Portugal

GRAIS, WAFIK. Nahda Advisors. Egypt

GRAMMATIKOPOULOU, ANGELIKI. Ministry of Interior of Greece. Greece

GRANADOS, MARCOS. European External Action Service (EEAS). Spain

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GREGUROVIC, SNJEZANA. Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies. Croatia

GUEBACHE, KHADJA. Cercle des Chercheurs sur le Moyen-Orient. France

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GÜNAY, CENGIZ. Austria

HABACHE, YOUSEF. Comités pour le Développement et le Patrimoine (CDP). Palestine

HABBIDA, NABILA. European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). France

HADJIANTONIOU, PHAIDON. Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace (retired). Greece

HADZIBEGOVIC, AJSA. Gradjanska Alijansa-Civic Alliance. Montenegro

HALIM, AMIRA. Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. Egypt

HAL, ROBERT. ECOLISE. Sweden

HAMMAMI, AMEL. Maghreb Economic Forum. Tunisia

HAMMAMI, SADOK. Centre Africain de Perfectionnement des Journalistes et Communicateurs (CAPIC). Tunisia

HANDEL, CHRISTIAN. Bertelsmann Stiftung. Germany

HARBIBI, CHAIMA. Université de Tunis. Tunisia

HAREL, YARON. Bar Ilan University. Israel

HARRELL-BOND, BARBARA. Refugee Studies Centre. University of Oxford. United Kingdom

HASSAN, ALLOD. Coordination Maghrébine des Organisations des Droits Humains (CMODH). Morocco
HASSOUN, MOUNA. Arab Academy for E-Business. Syria

HAZIM, FOUAD. Bremen Branch of Germany’s Office of the Protection of the Constitution. Germany

HEDDA ELLOUZE, DONIA. Tunisia

HEDIA, BELHAY YOUSSEF. Centre of Arab Women for Training and Research. Tunisia

HEISTEIN, ARI. Institute for Nation Security Studies. Israel

HÉNIA, ABDELHAMID. Tunisia

HERMAN, LIOR. Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Israel

HERNÁNDEZ, ELVIRA. Secretariat of the GUE/NGL Group, European Parliament. Spain

HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI, MIGUEL. Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha. Spain

HEYDT, JEAN-MARIE. Centre Nord-Sud du Conseil de l’Europe. Portugal

HILL, ADAM. Consult and Design International. United Kingdom

HILLAL, ALI EL DEAN. Cairo University. Egypt

HILLALI, MIMOUN. Institut Superieur International du Tourisme. Morocco

HMIMNAT, SALIM. Mohammed V University in Rabat. Morocco

HOFFMANN, KLAUS. Germany

HOLDEN, PATRICK. Plymouth University. Ireland

HOUCINE, RHILI. Tunisia

HOUDRET, ANNABELLE. German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). Germany

HUBER, MARIKA. Mediterranean Bank Network. Malta

HUBERT, DANIELA. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Germany

HULEILEH, SERENE. The Arab Education Forum. Jordan

IAKOVOU, CHRISTOS. Cyprus Research Centre. Cyprus

IRRERA, DANIELA. University of Catania. Italy

ISAC, RAMI. NHTV Breda University. Palestine

ISBOUIA, YASSINE. The Mediterranean Forum for Youth (FOMEJE). Morocco

JABBOUR, SUZANNE. Restart Center. Lebanon

JABNOUNI, OUMAYMA. Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme. Tunisia

JAD, ISLAM. Bir Zeit University. Palestine

JAMAL, KHALIL. Université Hassan II. Morocco

JAMSHEER, HASSAN. Lodz Academy of Humanities and Economics. Poland

JAOUANI, ALI. Tunisia

JARA, HENAR. Fundación Alianza por la Solidaridad. Spain

JAY, CLEO. SOAS. France

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JEBLAOUI, EMNA. Institut International du Développement Humain. Tunisia

JENOUBI, MOUNA. Rescue Association of Tunisians Trapped Abroad (RATTA). Tunisia

JOFFÉ, GEORGE. Centre of International Studies. University of Cambridge. United Kingdom

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KADHI, RIADH. Collège d’Europe. Tunisia

KAHLOUN, HATEM. Organisation Association Tunisienne des Urbanistes. Tunisia

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KARAOLI, ELENI. Center for Security Studies (KE.ME.A). Greece

KEFIF, MOHAMED. Institut National d’Études de Stratégie Globale (INESG). Algeria

KEKEC, SENA. Turkey

KENNOU, HACHMI. Institut Méditerranéen de l’Eau. France

KENNOU, SALWA. AFTURD. Tunisia

KERDOUDI, JAWAD. Institut Marocain des Relations Internationales (IMRI). Morocco

KEREMIDOU, EIRINI. Center for Security Studies (KE.ME.A). Greece

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KHERCHICHI, MOHAMED. Université Mohammed V de Rabat. Morocco

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KHADRA, ROULA. CIHEAM - Mediterranean Agronomic Institute of Bari. Lebanon

KHALAF, ABDULHADI. Lund University. Sweden

KHALIL, ADEL. Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University. Egypt

KHAOUA, NADJI. Université d’Annaba. Algeria

KHARCHICH, MOHAMED. Université Abdelmalek Saadi. Morocco

KHECHA, ABDEJADIDI. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Algeria. Algeria

KHOUFI, ISLAM. Access Now - Tunis Office. Tunisia

KHOURY, EDLIEN. Jordan Forum for Business & Professional Women. Jordan

KHOURY, GISÈLE. BBC. Lebanon

KLUCAR, MARTIN. Czech Republic

KOCH, CHRISTIAN. Gulf Research Center (GRC). Germany
KOMARIC, NERA. International Organisation for Migration. Croatia
KONOVALOV, VECESLAV. Arabic Culture Forum. Lithuania
KOSTANYAN, HRANT. Centre for European Policy Studies. Belgium
KOUAOUCI, ALI. University of Montreal / Université de Batna. Algeria
KOUND, ABDERRAHIM. Le Centre UNESCO Droits et Migrations (CUDM). Morocco
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KREUTZ, MICHAEL. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Münster. Germany
KYNILEHTO, ANITTA. Tampere Peace Research Institute. Finland
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LABII, BELKACEM. Université Constantine 3. Algeria
LABNOUJ, AHMED. Interpeace. Morocco
LAHLOU, MEHDI. INSEA · Rabat. Morocco
LAHNAIT, FATIMA. Institute for Statecraft and Governance. Morocco
LAHRICH, IMANE. Forum Méditerranéen des Jeunes. Morocco
LAMBRECHT, VANESSA. Het Grote Midden Oosten Platform. The Netherlands
LANDABURU, ENEKO. Jacques Delors Institute. Spain
LECKA, IZABELLA. University of Warsaw, Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies. Poland
LEGRAND, VINCENT. Groupe d’Études et Recherches sur le Monde Arabe Contemporain (GERMAC). Belgium
LEHTI, MARKO. University of Tampere. Finland
LESACA, JAVIER. George Washington University. Spain
LEZZAR-BENRACHI, BOUBA. Mentouri University, Constantine. Algeria
LIBERATORE, ANGELA. European Commission · DG RTD. Italy
LIMON, CAMILLE. University of Geneva. France
LINDENSTRAUSS, GALLIA. Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Israel
LISA, PATRICIA. Real Instituto Elcano. Portugal
LISNEY, TIM. Council of Europe. United Kingdom
LOEVERAS, FERRAN. HCNUDH (OHCHR). Spain
LOEWE, MARKUS. German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). Germany
LORBER, LUCKA. International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies. Slovenia
LOUASSINI, ZOUHIR. RAI Internationale. Italy
LOUHIDI, HAITHAM. Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency. Palestine
LOULICHKI, MOHAMMED. OCP Policy Center. Morocco
LOVEC, MARKO. Centre for International Relations. Slovenia
LOZANO, CARLOS. Confederación Empresarial Española de la Economía Social. Spain
LUTTRELL, ANN. Anna Lindh Foundation. Ireland
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MAKKLOUF, SANAA. The American University in Cairo. Egypt
MAKIS, GERASIMOS. Panteion University, Athens. Greece
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MANS, JAN H. Forum Local and Regional Disaster-Management. The Netherlands
MARIANI, MARIA ANTONIETTA. Strane Straniere. Italy
MARIN, SERGIO. Collège d’Europe. Spain
MARTÍ RAZI, JUDITH. Collectif 13 DDF. France
MARTÍN, IDAFE. Clarín. Spain
MATUSZEWICZ, RÉGIS. Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne. France
MBARECK, MOHAMED ABDELLAHI. Fédération Handisport Mauritania. Mauritania
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MENUCHIN, ISHAI. PCATI. Israel
MEYER, GUENTER. University of Mainz. Germany
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MILGRAM, JULIETTE. University of Granada. Spain
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Odasso, Laura. Aix-Marseille University. Italy
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OsmAn, ISCI. Human Rights Association (IHD). Turkey
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OTT, MARC. EGMONt - The Royal Institute for International Relations. Belgium
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RAHEL, SCHOMAKER. Germany
RAIS, MEHDI. Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Morocco
RAISSOUNI, SAMIR. Société National de la Radio Télévision Marocaine. Morocco
RAJAB, RAIKA. Ireland
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ROSSANO, MARILENA. Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche. Italy
ROUX, MARIANNE. France
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RUMAYED, OUSAMA. Directorate General of Antiquities & Museums. Palestine
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SAAD, RAOUF. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Egypt
SAGLAM, NECDET. Association of Civil Society and Development Institute. Turkey
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SAID, NIHAL. UNFPA. Egypt
SAKMAN, TOLGA. TASNAM - Turkish Asian Centre for Strategic Studies. Turkey
SALAMA, KARIM. Middle East Logistics & Consultants Group (MELC Group). Egypt
SALECK, MOHAMED AHMED. Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs de Mauritanie. Mauritania
SALEM, ANIS. Development Works International. Egypt
SALOUA, GHRISSA. Association pour la promotion du droit à la différence (ADD). Tunisia
SALVAT, HILDEBRAND. Gabinet CERES. Spain
SAMIL CAKIR, TALHA. Sabanci University. Turkey
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SANADIKI, SAID. UNDP. Lebanon
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SAQER, SULAIMAN. Ministry of Interior, Palestine
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SCHOLZ, HELMUT. European Parliament. Germany
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SCREKIC, VALENTINA. Educo Centar NGO. Montenegro
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SHABAN, OMAR. Palthink for Strategic Studies. Palestine
SHABAREK, MUHAMAD. Syrian Enterprise and Business Centre (SEBC). Syria
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SHTEIWI, MUSA. Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan. Jordan
SHUKRI, KHAIREDDIN. Economic and Social Council. Jordan
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SOURIS, JAVIER. Embassy of Spain in Amman. Spain
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SOUID, YASSINE. Morocco
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STAROVLAH, VANJA. Union of Municipalities. Montenegro
STERN, YOAV. Freelance. Israel
STRNAGIS, DAVIDE. Conférence des Régions Périphériques Maritimes d’Europe. Italy
STUCHLÍKOVA, ZUZANA. Europeum. Czech Republic
SUKRU, ERDEM. Akdeniz University CREM. Turkey
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TEEVAN, CHLOE. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Ireland
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TOURE, KADIATA. Ong Yakaare. Mauritania
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TRAMONTINI, LESLIE. Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies. Germany
TRUNK, NADA. Higher Education. Slovenia
TSAKONAS, PANAYOTIS. ELIAMEP. Greece
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Urrutia, PAMELA. Spain
VADHEL, CHEIKH MOHAMED. ATED. Mauritania
VALLADÃO, ALFREDO. PSIA Sciences Po. Portugal
VALLIANATOS, STEFANOS. Anna Lindh Foundation. Greece
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WADIH, AL ASMAR. Centre Libanais des Droits Humains. Lebanon
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WEISMANN, ITZCHAK. University of Haifa. Israel
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YAHFOUFI, BATOUL. Lebanon
YOUNG, JACKIE. United Kingdom
ZAGAGLIA, BARBARA. Università Politecnica delle Marche. Italy
ZAHRA RITAB, FATIMA. Morocco
ZAJAC, JUSTYNA. University of Warsaw. Poland
ZAPATA, RICARD. Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Spain
ZARDO, FEDERICA. University of Viena. Italy
ZAYED M. QOED, DIAB. Bisan Center for Research and Development. Palestine
ZEIDEL, RONEN. Mitvim - The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. Israel
ZEKRI, AHMED. Université Mohamed V Rabat. Morocco
ZEKRI, RADHIA BENHAJ. Association de Femmes Tunisienne pour la Recherche sur le Développement (AFTURD). Tunisia
ZEMMOURI, MAILLA. Université de Sétif. Morocco
ZENIA, SALEM. Algerian journalist and writer in Tamazight language. Hosted in Barcelona by Catalan PEN, Refuge Writer Programme. Algeria
ZENON, MAGDA. Hands Across the Divide. Cyprus
ZISSER, EYAL. Tel Aviv University. Israel
ZOGAIB, ASSAD. Zahle Maalaka Municipality. Lebanon
ZOGHLAMI, MOHAMED. Axismed. Tunisia
ZOHRA, FATIM. University of Oxford. Morocco
ZOHRY, AYMAN. Egyptian Society for Migration Studies (EGYMIG). Egypt
ZOROB, ANJA. Centre for Mediterranean Studies (ZMS), Ruhr-University Bochum. Germany
ZOUAIN, GEORGES. GAIA-Heritage. Lebanon
ZVYAGELSKAYA, IRINA. Institute of Oriental Studies. Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Russia
## Sample of the Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Total Survey</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total MPCs</strong></td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5,4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5,9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td>1,4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
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<td>0,4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
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<td>0,0%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
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<td>7,5%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
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<td>5,3%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
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<td>1,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>1,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>2,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total EU</strong></td>
<td>414</td>
<td>54,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>760</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Other 2018: respondents from Ghana, Iraq, United States of America, Russia, Serbia, Sudan and Switzerland
COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE
In order to facilitate the data processing and to improve the statistical analysis, we would be very pleased if you could provide us with the following information:

**Gender**
☐ Male  ☐ Female

**Nationality**
☐ Albania  ☐ Greece  ☐ Netherlands
☐ Algeria  ☐ Hungary  ☐ Palestine
☐ Austria  ☐ Ireland  ☐ Poland
☐ Belgium  ☐ Israel  ☐ Portugal
☐ Bosnia and Herzegovina  ☐ Italy  ☐ Romania
☐ Bulgaria  ☐ Jordan  ☐ Slovakia
☐ Croatia  ☐ Latvia  ☐ Slovenia
☐ Cyprus  ☐ Lebanon  ☐ Spain
☐ Czech Republic  ☐ Lithuania  ☐ Sweden
☐ Denmark  ☐ Luxemburg  ☐ Syria
☐ Egypt  ☐ Libya  ☐ Tunisia
☐ Estonia  ☐ Malta  ☐ Turkey
☐ Finland  ☐ Mauritania  ☐ United Kingdom
☐ France  ☐ Montenegro  ☐ Other
☐ Germany  ☐ Morocco

**Position** (optional)

**Institution** (optional)

**Sector**
☐ Governmental  ☐ Political party  ☐ NGO
☐ Diplomatic  ☐ Think tank  ☐ Trade union
☐ EU institution  ☐ Academic  ☐ Company (Business sector)
☐ Other international organisation  ☐ Media

**What is your main area of specialisation?**
☐ Political Cooperation and Security
☐ Economic and Financial Cooperation
☐ Social, Cultural and Human Exchanges
☐ Migration Justice and Home Affairs
THE STATE OF EUROPE
### Q1. Compared to 1995 when the Barcelona Declaration was signed, overall the European Union today is in:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Better shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Worse shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>I cannot say</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

---

### Q2. What is the main threat to the European integration process? (please choose two options)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Inability to reform the European Union and to make it closer to the citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Lack of cohesion and unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Populism and nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Slow economic growth, unemployment and inequalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Vulnerability to threats from outside (please indicate which ones) If chosen go to 2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Q2.1. Which ones?

Comments:
### Q3. What is most likely to affect the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean? (please choose two options)

1. Brexit
2. Contractual asymmetry between the EU and its partners
3. Divisions within the EU on key issues and re-bilateralisation of relations between EU member states and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries
4. Inconsistency of the EU’s approach vis-à-vis different Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries
5. Inability of the EU to renew its offer to the “Southern neighbourhood”
6. Securitisation of migration policies
7. Support to authoritarian regimes
8. Weak role within conflict zones
9. Other

**Comments:**

### Q4. Which of the following actors is more likely to have a negative effect on the stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region? (please choose one option)

1. China
2. European Union
3. Iran
4. Russia
5. Gulf Cooperation Council countries (if you think of specific countries, you may indicate which ones) If chosen go to 4.1
6. Turkey
7. United States of America
8. Other

**Comments:**

1. The concept of contractual asymmetry refers to relations between a dominant actor and another actor who suffers inequality of bargaining power, e.g. in trade negotiations.
2. “Securitisation of migration” refers to the perception of migration as mainly a security phenomenon and threat, and materialises in measures and policies geared towards dealing with this threat, to the detriment of other dimensions.
3. The European debt and financial crises and the newly-introduced austerity measures have put pressure on the Mediterranean Partner Countries' economies, contributing to declines in their real GDP growth rates, commodity exports, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows, tourism revenues, workers’ remittances, and stock market performance (Neaime, *Mediterranean Yearbook 2015*).

4. In September 2014, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted the 2178 Resolution Condemning Violent Extremism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Support for Foreign Terrorist Fighters. The resolution expressed grave concern over the acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, namely individuals who travel to a state other than their state of residence or nationality for the purpose of perpetrating, planning or preparing or participating in terrorist acts, or providing or receiving terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.

### Q4.1. Which ones?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Q5. From the following options that relate either to the situation of the EU or to its policies, which one is likely to have the most negative effect on the stability of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries? (please choose one option):

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
1. | Arms exports from some EU member states  |
2. | Poor EU economic performance³  |
3. | EU home-grown “radicalisation” and foreign fighters⁴ coming from the EU  |
4. | Military interventions from some EU member states  |
5. | Securitisation of migration policies  |
6. | Support to authoritarian regimes  |
7. | Other  |

Comments:  

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
BLOCK 2
ENGAGING WITH EUROPE
### Q6. Overall, since 2011, the EU’s attractiveness for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has increased</th>
<th>Has decreased</th>
<th>I cannot say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governmental authorities in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental authorities in your own country (only for Southern and Eastern Mediterranean country respondents)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society in your own country (only for Southern and Eastern Mediterranean country respondents)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents from a Southern and Eastern Mediterranean country: Continue to Q7-11

EU respondents: Go to Q12-13

### Q7. To what extent is the European Union a priority for your country’s foreign policy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To a very low extent</th>
<th>To a very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ 0</td>
<td>☐ 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 1</td>
<td>☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

### Q8. In general, what do you think that your government should do with regards to its relations with the EU?

5. 2011 is identified as a juncture here since the Arab revolutions transformed the Mediterranean, as well as the EU’s policies and strategies towards the region.
Q9. The most important aspects, when it comes to my country’s relationship with the EU should be: (please choose three options)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Democracy promotion, rule of law, good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Education, and cultural and scientific cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Financial and technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Foreign policy and security cooperation²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Job creation and employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Migration and border management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Regulatory convergence and approximation to the EU acquis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Trade and investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q10. In order to achieve these priorities, the most important partners or frameworks should be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>One or some specific EU member states</th>
<th>EU policies (in particular under the ENP framework)</th>
<th>The Union for the Mediterranean</th>
<th>Non-governmental actors²</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>First choice in Q10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Second choice in Q10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Third choice in Q10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

6. Foreign policy and security cooperation refers here to the cooperation between the EU and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries in issues such as crisis management, conflict prevention, and regional and multilateral cooperation. It may materialise for instance in joint initiatives or coordination of positions in multilateral fora.

7. The category “Non-governmental actors” is to be understood here broadly and includes, for instance, civil society actors or local and regional authorities.
Q 11. As you see it, the top two foreign policy partners of your country are:

1. Africa (if you think of specific countries, you may indicate which ones) If chosen go to 11.1
2. China
3. European Union
4. Iran
5. Russia
6. Gulf Cooperation Council countries (if you think of specific partners, you may indicate which ones) If chosen go to 11.2
7. Turkey
8. United States of America
9. Other

Q11.1. Which ones?

Q11.2. Which ones?

Q12. In general, to what extent do you think the following partners or frameworks are relevant to Southern and Eastern Mediterranean governments?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To a very low extent</th>
<th>To a very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Bilateral cooperation with some specific member states of the European Union</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>EU policies (in particular under the ENP framework)</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The Union for the Mediterranean</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Non-governmental actors</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
Q13. To what extent do you think that the European Union is a priority for the following countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To a very low extent</th>
<th>To a very high extent</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
BLOCK 3

REINVENTING EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS
Q14. What is the major impediment to further strengthening Euro-Mediterranean relations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To a very low extent</th>
<th>To a very high extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Offering more flexibility in the use of EU instruments</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ensuring a differentiated approach to partners</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Enhancing joint ownership based on both partners’ needs and EU interests</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Greater involvement of EU member states in the ENP</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Intensified cooperation on both regular and irregular migration</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Stepping up work on security sector reform, conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation policies</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Contributing to economic development for stabilisation</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specific comments regarding your country (only for Southern and Eastern Mediterranean country respondents)

---

8. A Joint Communication from the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy was presented on 18 November 2015. It brought a greater focus on stabilisation, resilience and security.
Q16. To what extent would you agree with the following statement: there is a need for yet another review of the European Neighbourhood Policy?

![Survey Options]

Q17. If the answer to Q16 is from 5 to 10, how should it be re-designed? What should be the main focus?

Q18. Do you think that the ENP should be replaced by another framework?

1. Yes (If yes go to Q19)
2. No

Q19. Why?

Q20. In line with its initial mandate established in the 2008 Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, to what extent has the Union for the Mediterranean succeeded, as stated in the Joint Declaration, in newly encouraging the following:

1. *Making multilateral relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects* 

![Survey Options]

2. *Providing for further co-ownership to our multilateral relations* 

![Survey Options]

3. *Upgrading the political level of the EU’s relationship with its Mediterranean partners* 

![Survey Options]

Comments:
Q21. Which of the four main areas of action identified in the UfM roadmap adopted by the UfM Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 23 January 2017 in Barcelona should be pursued as a matter of priority? (please choose one option)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>“Enhancing political dialogue among the member states”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>“Ensuring the contribution of UfM activities to regional stability and human development”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>“Strengthening regional integration”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>“Strengthening UfM capacity for action”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Why and how?

Q22. Do you think that the Union for the Mediterranean should be empowered and its mandates should be extended?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Yes (If yes go to Q23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>No (If no go to Q24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q23. How?

Q24. Why?

9. According to the roadmap, intensifying the political dialogue between the member states on key issues of the region includes: enhancing regional dialogue on political and stability related issues between the member states, further strengthening inter-institutional work and building thematic common agendas.

10. According to the roadmap, this would mean an expected specific focus is on: Intercultural and Interfaith dialogue, Mobility, migration and development, Prevention of extremism and terrorism, and Regional human development (inclusive growth and employability within the framework of the med4jobs initiative, education and youth mobility, research and innovation, women empowerment, tourism).

11. According to the roadmap, this involves: Cooperation on trade and investments, Infrastructure connectivity, UfM agenda on sustainable development, and Regional integration progress report.

12. According to the roadmap this includes: Increasing articulation with the European Neighbourhood Policy and its instruments, Intensifying partnerships and synergies (acting in partnership with other stakeholders, increasingly interacting with sub-regional frameworks and building on the existing synergies and complementarities with them, such as the 5+5 Dialogue and the Agadir Agreement framework), and Improving the operational capacities of the Secretariat.