The Mediterranean has always been conspicuously absent form European Union defence policies, and when it has been present, it’s been included rather indirectly, that is, because of a perceived threat. Commentators may consider it good that it not be included at all, but this primordial ambiguity creates a de facto conceptual disorder in the relations between the EU and its Southern and Eastern periphery. Indeed, in Community texts, Southern and Eastern countries were perceived, on the one hand, implicitly as a potential threat, while on the other, they were officially the object of cooperation and stepped up development – the pendulum swinging to one side or the other depending on the period and crises. This slightly schizophrenic relationship was never resolved, for EU engagement in security and defence affairs was very progressive and required, and still requires, an effort towards ownership. We are still at the same point today, whereas a truly integrated policy is indispensable now more than ever.

The European Union was built slowly, in successive stages. From 1957 to 1992 (and the Treaty of Maastricht), the European Economic Community, then the nascent European Union, were expressly deprived of defence competencies (including industrial ones) by its Member States – with France at the fore. This initial exclusion would have a number of negative effects. First among European officials, who not only developed a strong suspicion of anything having to do with defence and security (even in the sphere of data protection) but also and above all, gained a very gradual entry into the concepts and operational dimension of defence and security. It was more often successive shocks – wars and attacks (2001, 2003, 2004…) – that would make them cross stages towards defensive bodies. What’s more, the participation of a good number of Member States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO (who refused the redundancy or supposed weakening of relations with the United States entailed by the hypothetical emergence of a European defence system), on the one hand, and the presence of purely neutral countries on the other, did not make it easy for military matters to enter the institutional framework.

Nonetheless, things gradually evolved. At the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in 1991, Jacques Delors stated the principles that continue to underlie what would become the European Union and its security and defence policy – today the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The President of the Commission claimed to be in favour of “aform of political union entailing a common policy in matters of foreign relations and security” and of a “single community” with economic, political and security power. 

As Jacques Docquiert remarked at the time in commenting on the conference: “The security or defence policy ‘should, according to him, express double solidarity’: unified analysis and action in foreign policy matters on the one hand, and on the other hand, reciprocal engagement ‘to come to the aid of countries whose integrity were threatened’ by enshrining in the future treaty the provisions of Article 5 of the Western European Union (WEU) treaty setting out this principle.”[1]

At the same time, and unrelatedly, the think tanks were being established that would conceive the general framework of an integrated partnership for cooperation in the Mediterranean that would be both inside and outside the Community institutions – among them the Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo), which would lead a bit later to the emergence of the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo).

Indeed, the first global concept with an integrated approach appeared in December 1990, in the middle of the Gulf Crisis (invasion of Kuwait by Iraq), with the launch of the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) which, though it maintained the traditional bilateral practices of the European Economic Community (EEC), opened itself up for the first time to cross-cutting cooperation programmes in spheres of general interest (water, environment, energy, transport). EEC investment was symbolized by a significant rise in the sums allotted for financial aid and loans, since over the course of just four years they were the equivalent of the entire funds allocated since the Mediterranean cooperation programmes were launched (i.e., since 1960).

Nevertheless, it wasn’t until 1994 that the European Union, finally established by the Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992, truly took into account the Mediterranean imperative. This awareness and the action derived from it was made possible by a remarkable analysis of the situation in the Mediterranean Region by the European Commission, summarized in the October 1994 Communication from the Commission to the Council, Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,[2] and by the happy chronological coincidence whereby France, Spain and Italy successively took up the EU presidency at that key point in its history. These three countries (with the decisive support of Germany) decided to make the Mediterranean the political priority of their successive terms, that is, an exceptional continuity for the EU of 18 months with the same initiative. The result was the Barcelona Declaration made at the end of the conference held there (26-27 October 1995), which gathered around the same table the EU countries and the countries of the Mediterranean Basin and vicinity, as well as Jordan, Palestine and Mauritania.

From the Barcelona Partnership to the Union for the Mediterranean: Moving Towards Disillusionment

The “Revolution” of the Barcelona Conference

The “revolutionary” nature of the Barcelona Declaration lay in its globalizing approach to security, which associated defence-type security (hard security) with the positive evolution of economic and socio-political conditions in the Basin.

It established a significant financial effort by the North (10 billion euros in loans and grants) while the South committed to upgrade its economic and administrative structures and above all, modernize its political and social framework (progress towards democratization, respect for human rights, minorities’ rights, women’s rights, etc.). A constraining dimension had even been accepted by the Southern participants via the principle of conditionality, which a priori associated the granting of economic aid by the EU to respect for the basic Human Rights principles endorsed by the United Nations. This concept of global security, which had been tested by the EU initially with its Eastern neighbours (before their accession to the EU), tended to be a distinctive structuring feature of the developing European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

In both the North and the South, the Barcelona Declaration was perceived as a great nascent hope. The gap of indifference or even fear conditioned by mutual perceptions arising from the Gulf War (Scud missiles and Muslims taking to the streets on the one hand, and brutal, domineering technology on the other) was becoming a reality. Barcelona was to restore strained relations and endorse a common effort, knowing that indifference on the one hand, and the weight of paralyzing traditions on the other would not facilitate the convergence of mindsets.

The first component of the political and security Partnership proposed adopting a declaration of principles establishing common goals, such as respect for: fundamental texts, the rule of law, fundamental liberties and human rights. In the sphere of security, countries committed to: principles of non-interference with regard to territorial integrity, not resorting to force, the pacific resolution of differences and the struggle against organized crime.

The Barcelona Partnership actually represented a pacified approach to international relations. This vision was part of a security dynamic associated with the end of the Soviet Union and the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In many regards, the declaration signed in Barcelona in 1995 could not be adopted in the same terms today.

The 2001 Reversal

As if mirroring the Kuwait War, the events of 11 September caused a reorientation of the Western world’s view of the Arab world. There is a confusion between radical Islamic terrorism and Islam in general in certain minds.[3] Though the Arab world viewed the West as an aggressor in 1991, the opposite was happening in 2001.

Added to this was the perception by the countries on the eastern EU border (Poland and Bulgaria, as well as Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics) that the deal made with the Mediterranean countries was much better than those made with the East and that a rebalancing was needed.[4] This was the point, in 2003, when the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched. This new policy, although the EU would deny it, considered any Union “neighbour” as an entity to be treated equally insofar as what it expected from them and what said neighbour could obtain from its bilateral relations. The new policy was specified in the document Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours.[5] The aim was to “avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union” by enhancing relations (apart from with Russia) “with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Southern Mediterranean countries to be based on a long-term approach promoting reform, sustainable development and trade.” The Commission suggested that “the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations. […] To this end, Russia, the countries of the Western [Newly Independent States (NIS)] and the Southern Mediterranean should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms).”[6] This policy was recorded by the European Council on 18 June 2003.

The Barcelona Partnership actually represented a pacified approach to international relations. This vision was part of a security dynamic associated with the end of the Soviet Union and the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process

Thus, from a temporal viewpoint and despite (or perhaps because of) its initial ambitions, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership based in Barcelona was but an interlude amid a crisis-oriented vision of the Mediterranean which, before and after it, has been the guiding principle of this period of post-Cold War inter-Mediterranean relations.

In 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy decided to replace the Partnership, considered ineffective and outdated, with a Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Launched to great pomp and circumstance in Paris in July 2008, this new process, poorly conceived, ran up against the resistance of various countries of the North and South Mediterranean and the tsunami of the world economic crisis that killed the ambitious projects that the UfM wished to carry out before they were even launched. Today this organization manages development projects, and not without a certain success. But its political ambition is gone.[7]

The CFSP/ESDP: An a Priori Neutral Tool, Yet a Focus of Concern 

In the field of defence and security, the Treaty of Nice (26 February 2001) ratified the pre-eminence of the European Council, which established the EU’s “common strategies” and “common actions”. A defence dimension was added to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) present in the Treaty of Maastricht, now becoming the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was intended to have an operational dimension.

The management of everyday politics was left up to the Council of Foreign Ministers (which could involve Defence Ministers when needed). Execution was monitored by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) composed of ambassadors or permanent representatives of member states. Management of action was assigned to a Military Committee (EUMC) consisting of military representatives of the Chiefs of Defence and who were to apply the PSC’s directives. And finally, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), based in Brussels, was to implement the decisions of the Military Committee.

The military actions apt to be conducted by the EU at first came under the so-called “Petersberg tasks” framework, namely: evacuation of EU nationals, peace-keeping missions, crisis management, and humanitarian missions.[8] And finally, recall that the treaty of the Western European Union (WEU), a defence treaty also known as the Treaty of Brussels, of 17 March 1948, signed by a sizable number of EU members, was integrated into the Treaty on European Union (except Article IV of said treaty on management of compulsory mutual assistance, which was the object of specific provisions and reservations by certain Member States regarding their participation in exclusively European actions). The EU’s new remit insofar as arms cooperation and the establishment of an ad hoc military structure were derived from the WEU’s former prerogatives.

After the failure of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Lisbon Treaty added to the Petersberg tasks the possibility of conducting joint action on disarmament, military advisory and assistance missions, conflict prevention missions, and post-conflict stabilization operations (Article 42, expansion of former Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union – TEU). The Lisbon Treaty also established that all these missions can contribute to fighting against terrorism.

Thus, the ESDP has not a priori had any particular effect on Euro-Mediterranean relations. It was conceived as a neutral tool with which to respond to erga omnes crisis situations involving Europeans or entailing the EU mobilize to stop international “scandals” (collapse of the humanitarian aid system, civil war, etc.). The ESDP reflected a technical vision of a “defence Europe” expressed by the definition of mission and not political or diplomatic goals. But this absence of goals, in fact, troubled those who might feel targeted. The EU geopolitical environment seemed to indicate that the EU might project its military power towards the periphery rather than elsewhere. Some of the Euro-Mediterranean Partner States were not mistaken in feeling concerned by what at times seemed to them like preparation for interference (and the intervention in Kosovo and the example of Iraq at the time did not exactly reassure them).[9]

The European Strategy in 2003: Between the Need to Exist and Condescendence

In 2003, the invasion of Iraq by the United States and a circumstantial coalition obliged the Europeans to react collectively – even if some European countries were part of this coalition. At the same time, the existence in the Treaty of Amsterdam (followed by Lisbon) of an ad hoc position specifically responsible for the CFSP – the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy[10] – (in this case, Mr. Solana, former NATO Secretary General) lent a decisive spirit and a new impetus to European engagement in security affairs. After a long battle, Mr. Solana pushed through a text that can be considered the EU’s real entry into security policy. The world had just entered the Iraqi conflict in a general setting marked by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – (Saddam’s supposed weapons, never found) and Solana used this lever to establish the EU as a major world actor for non-proliferation.[11] The struggle against terrorism – which would strike Europe continuously as of that date – was the second structuring element of that text, the others being regional conflicts, failed States and organized crime. In a way, the Mediterranean, without being cited, can be found as a “negative space” in this catalogue, but what is truly striking is the tone of the solution proposed by the EU to remedy these problems.[12]

In the spirit of this text, the Mediterranean (along with Eastern Europe) is basically only perceived as an instrument. “The task should be to promote, to the East of the EU and at the borders along the Mediterranean Basin, a series of well-governed countries with which the EU will be able to have close relations based on cooperation. Settling the Israeli-Arab conflict is a strategic priority. In the absence of such settlement, there will be little chance of resolving other Middle East problems.” Note the paternalism here, the notion of good governance being what the EU conceives as such, for the supposed good of peripheral countries, without this notion itself ever being specified. Does it mean to “govern well” for the good of the people and the countries? Does it mean to respect such EU criteria as described in the Neighbourhood Policy that was established at that time? Or does it mean to enforce security as the latter is seen by the EU, i.e. prioritizing the struggle against terrorism and non-proliferation? In this context, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has but nominal value in this text. It gives the serious impression that the Mediterranean is only being dealt with because there is no other choice, and the countries concerned are requested to comply with the EU’s benevolent injunctions for their own good. To correct this perception, much too pervasive in the “target” countries, the EU endeavoured to develop a strategy specifically dedicated to the Mediterranean.

The Shooting Star of the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East

A year after the invasion of Iraq and the launching of the (quickly aborted) Greater or Broader Middle East project by the US to conceptually accompany this mad military campaign, the EU, in order to lend substance to the 2003 Global Strategy, took into account the strategic changes that had just occurred and transferred the global strategy it had just established to the regional level, adopting a “Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East.”[13] The main lines of this strategy were:

– Reaffirming the principle of the partnership notion;

– Emphasizing North Africa and (as a new element) the Middle East;

– Taking into consideration each country’s specificities (taken from the Neighbourhood Policy);

– Pursuing actions that had already been undertaken, such as the Euromed Partnership or cooperating with the Gulf Cooperation Council;

– Recalling the EU’s economic engagements, but also its social and human rights goals;

– Strongly engaging in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;

– Maintaining coherence with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), this latter element being given with no particular specifications.

The idea and conception were excellent – extending the partnership to the Middle East and the Gulf States. But in reality, this strategy, which never saw the light of day except on paper, was never put into practice!

The Mediterranean governments’ “political” reading of these texts was that they represented carte blanche for their security policies. On the pretext of struggling against terrorism, repression returned with a vengeance in the majority of countries, progressively expanding to include any political opposition, as in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria in particular.

When the revolutions and other Arab movements of transformation began, there was utter consternation among all the stakeholders involved because the model of authoritarian stability that had been patiently built with the implicit or explicit accord of all parties had suddenly collapsed and, on both sides of the Mediterranean, the emperor had no clothes!

The ESDP has not a priori had any particular effect on Euro- Mediterranean relations. It was conceived as a neutral tool with which to respond to erga omnes crisis situations involving Europeans or entailing the EU’s mobilization to stop international ‘scandals’

The European Union Strategy in 2016: A Mediterranean Essentially Present Only insofar as its Dangers and Risks

The shock of the Arab Revolutions was so great that it took the EU months to react – never mind the tardy reaction of certain Member States, including France – and at times inopportunely (cf. intervention in Libya).

The first real EU text, designed to take note of the changes, was that of High Representative Ashton in July 2011. Rather uninspired, it noted the need for democratic processes in the area and indicated an awareness of the difficulties to be surmounted.[14] This is what some countries call “the bare minimum.”

A truly serious paper did not arrive until November 2015, namely, “Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy.” This text, which addressed the Mediterranean much more than North-Eastern Europe, states the positive effects of the revolutions in improving the rule of law, social justice, etc. But it also notes their attendant negative effects (conflicts, terrorism, refugees). According to this paper, the answer lies not only in the economy, good governance and open markets, but also in preventing crises, “enhancing cooperation on security sector reform […], tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation […], in full compliance with the rule of law and international law, including international human rights law.”[15]

Thus, for the first time, the EU was truly beginning to assume the junction between security, cooperation and development.

On the pretext of struggling against terrorism, repression returned with a vengeance in the majority of countries, progressively expanding to include any political opposition, as in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria in particular

Clear Vision of Threats and Risks; Limited Solutions

The positive thinking of 1995-2000 quickly gave way to a danger zone. From 11 September 2001 to the elimination of Gaddafi, not to mention the rise of Daesh and the events in Syria, terrorist attacks and waves of refugees and migrants, European public opinion and certain governments’ perception of the Mediterranean crystallized around an image of an area principally radiating violence and insecurity. This perception is evident in the majority of texts.

In June 2016, after a long road and countless meanders, the new Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy was born, under the heading “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe.”[16]

Even if the text acknowledges that “these are also times of extraordinary opportunity,” the 2016 Strategy takes a dramatic view of the future: “existential crisis,” “Union […] under threat,” “European project […] being questioned.” Threats of varying order, nature and scale “endanger our people and territory”: “terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity.”[17]

The text obviously focusses on the Mediterranean in the section entitled “A Peaceful and Prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa.” The considerations made under this section generally reflect those included in the reviewed Neighbourhood Policy.[18]

To respond to these challenges and threats, the EU was to foster “functional multilateral cooperation.” This “practical” cooperation was to be conducted via the Union for the Mediterranean and would work on issues such as border security, trafficking, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, water and food security, energy and climate, infrastructure and disaster management.[19]

Turkey – now managing refugees from Syria – is present in a section where the EU states it will “strive to anchor Turkish democracy” and “pursue the accession process” (a statement made more in a spirit of entreaty). The matters of refugees, terrorism and energy would be likewise on the agenda of future discussions.[20]

To respond to these challenges and threats, the EU was to foster “functional multilateral cooperation.” This ‘practical’ cooperation was to be conducted via the Union for the Mediterranean

The interesting development – survivor of the stillborn strategic partnership of 2004 – concerns the EU’s opening up towards the Gulf on the one hand, and – as a novelty – the Sahara-Sahel region on the other. The EU also suggests a dialogue with Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The European response to this crisis of metaphysical anguish, which also reflects an absolute reality, according to the EU, calls for security, resilience, an integrated approach to conflicts (that is, involving all factors), “cooperative regional orders” (including the Mediterranean) and world governance. Among the means mentioned to attain these goals, the text emphasizes “joining up”, in the English version – which is translated into French as “concertation” (i.e. acting in concert, collaborating, cooperating, agreement…).[21] Acting in concert with Member States, acting in concert with Partners States; but to what end? This is perhaps a limitation of said good text, i.e. its lack of substance and, no doubt, ambition in the solutions, which, in a way, is the antithesis to the Barcelona Declaration. But could it be otherwise in an EU devastated by the crisis and still largely convalescent?

“The Future of European Defence”: As Always, the Mediterranean Threat

On 7 June 2017, the European Commission published a Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence, which established the framework for the indispensable future development of this sphere in the EU. In this short text, which is intended to serve as a basis for in-depth reflection by European institutions and Member States, the Commission specifies that: “Across the Mediterranean and parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the spread of ungoverned spaces and conflict has left a vacuum for terrorists and criminals to thrive. Regional rivalries are escalating and we have witnessed a dramatic rise in civilian victims and refugees across the world, with more than 60 million people displaced. Greater connectivity is blurring the boundaries between internal and external security. And climate change and resource scarcity, coupled with demographic growth and state fragility can also drive conflict and instability around the world.”[22]

Conclusion: Towards Convergence

“The message from Europeans is crystal clear: security and defence should be an integral part of what our Union does,”[23] says the 2016 Strategy. But this Strategy cannot be implemented unless there is a global vision of European foreign policy. The problem is that issues of defence and foreign policy, including cooperation and development, have advanced on parallel tracks (except during the brief, suspended Barcelona period). The administration as well as experts on both sides hardly communicate –except for significant efforts by the EU External Action Service (EEAS).

Security experts only see threats. Benoît d’Aboville, for instance, states that “threats to the future of European security have shifted to its environs.”[24] According to Nicole Gnesotto, “what they [i.e. European citizens] expect is for Europe to play an effective role in pacifying the crises of the South that are feeding terrorism and streams of refugees. Not in 2027, but as soon as possible.”[25]

The contradiction arising from the 2016 text, however, cannot be resolved unless the Mediterranean countries are associated; first and foremost, those of Northern Africa – from Egypt to Mauritania (while awaiting more positive developments in the Middle East) – in a veritable political-military alliance based on a very strong economic component.

The debate on ‘Defence Europe’ faces a number of unknowns: within the EU itself, the diverging positions of the major Member States; the fear of countries worried about marginalization in a ‘Franco-German space’ that has become too stifling; the nationalist obsession and retrenchment

The document on the future of European defence also states that: “Enhancing European security is a must. Member States will be in the driving seat. They will define and implement the European level of ambition, with the support of EU institutions. The initiatives currently under way indicate clearly that Member States and EU institutions have already embarked upon this road.” But at what pace do the Member States wish to build a real European Union of Security and Defence? To what point are they willing to anticipate rather than react in the strategic context? To what degree do they consider European security to be a European responsibility? The debate on “Defence Europe” faces a number of unknowns: within the EU itself, the diverging positions of the major Member States (Germany, Brexit, Poland); the fear of countries worried about marginalization in a “Franco-German space” that has become too stifling (Italy, Spain); the nationalist obsession and retrenchment. The migrant crisis has created a possibly irreparable break. As stated by Dominique David, “There is no agreement today among Europeans as to what the European Union should be insofar as a body politic confronted with others. Europeans even diverge on their very conception of the world order and what their place could be in it.”[26] For, with the shift of the world’s strategic centre towards the Pacific already underway, the Mediterranean Region and Europe find themselves in a Finisterre-type periphery (in its strict sense of physical “end of the world”). And this peripheralization could, in the future, be political, economic and social. Jean Dufourcq illustrates this problem well when he says that “the Euro-Maghreb region will be but a small neighbourhood of the world megalopolis, a small neighbourhood that will have to make the most of the situation by using its most competitive assets.”[27]

The EU must therefore meet a double obligation. First of all, it must define what it is and what it wants to be in order to be able to project itself – and in this regard, the question of the EU’s definitive borders will gain crucial importance![28] And secondly, it must offer a real political proposition to the Mediterranean States, and first and foremost the Maghreb – for the moment the least problematic and best structured area – in order to draw the Mediterranean seaboard countries into a true alliance and a real, integrated regional project. Defence, security, development and cooperation are not mutually exclusive. They are the multiple and complementary facets of a major political project for tomorrow – doubtless the only viable option.

Notes

[1] Doquiert, J. “Jacques Delors plaide pour une politique de sécurité commune”, in Les Echos, 8 March 1991 www.lesechos.fr/08/03/1991/LesEchos/15844-024-ECH_jacques-delors-plaide-pour-une-politique-de-securite-commune.htm

[2] “The Commission approved today a communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the guidelines for future relations between the European Union and the Mediterranean,” European Commission Press Release Database, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_P-94-56_en.htm; and Archive of European Integration, University of Pittsburgh, http://aei.pitt.edu/2950/.

[3] See Ahmed Driss. “After September 11, is there a future for the Barcelona Process?” in Carlo Masala (ed.) September 11 and the Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation, ZEI, Bonn, 2003, p. 56.

[4] A Portuguese observer at the time was particularly clear on this issue: “However, to realise the full potential of the Wider Europe Framework differentiation based on geographic criteria must be avoided. The Commission must restate that progress in political dialogue with any partner can be based only on actual merits and sharing common values.” – Madalena Meyer-Resende. “The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on the Barcelona Process”, EuroMeSCo Papers No. 38, November 2004, p. 11.www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/200411-EuroMeSCo-Paper-1.38.pdf

[5] Com (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003, in Batt, Lynch et al., “Partenaires et voisins : une PESC pour une Europe élargie”, Cahiers de Chaillot No. 64, September 2003, Annex 2, pp. 137-161.

In English at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52003DC0104

[6] Ibid., Section 1-[4].

[7] For a detailed analysis, see Daguzan Jean-François, “Les politiques méditerranéennes de l’Europe : trente ans d’occasions manquées”, Politique étrangère, 2016/4 (Winter), p. 11-24. DOI: 10.3917/pe.164.0011. www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2016-4-page-11.htm

[8] “Réunion du Conseil des ministres de la défense de l’UE de Sintra, 28 February 2000,” in Maartje Rutten, “De Saint-Malo à Nice, les textes fondateurs de la défense européenne,” Cahiers de Chaillot No. 47, May 2001, p. 102-116.

[9] This was attested to by the numerous, at times heated debates on this subject held at EuroMesCo meetings in the following years.

[10] The position was created by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The office-holder’s functions were extended in the Treaty of Lisbon with a seat on the European Commission and the position of chair of the EU Foreign Affairs Council.

[11] “European Security Strategy”, Brussels, 12 December 2003, in “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World”, Brussels, 2009, p. 28-43, www.european-council.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf.

[12] “The Mediterranean, an area of major importance and opportunity for Europe, still poses complex challenges, such as insufficient political reform and illegal migration. The EU and several Mediterranean partners, notably Israel and Morocco, are working towards deepening their bilateral relations. The ENP has reinforced reforms originally started under the Barcelona process in 1995, but regional conflict, combined with rising radicalism, continues to sow instability.” Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World, in “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World,” 2009, pp 17 & 18, www.european-council.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf.

“The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union’s interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.” in “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World,” 2009, p. 36, www.european-council.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf.

[13] Euromed Report, Issue No. 73, 23 March 2004, 11 pages.

[14] European Union. Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine ASHTON on «The EU Response to the Arab Spring», Brussels, 12 July 2011. www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/123726.pdf

[15] European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. “Section V.2. The Security Dimension,” in “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy,” Brussels, 18 November 2015, p. 12, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/neighbourhood/pdf/key-documents/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf

[16] Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, 57 pages, http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf  

[17] Ibid, p. 7-19.

^[18] A physically unattainable yet symbolic goal.

^[19] Ibid.,p. 34.

[20] Ibid., p. 35.

[21] “A Joined-up Union […] We must become more joined up” (!), ibid, p. 49-50. Summary in French: SN 10193/16, p. 5.

[22] Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence, p. 7, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-defence_en.pdf.

[23] Ibid., p. 7.

[24] Benoît D’Aboville. “Le rôle des Européens au sein de l’Alliance atlantique,” in Thierry de Montbrial & Georges-Henri Soutou. La défense de l’Europe, entre Alliance atlantique et Europe de la défense. Paris: Hermann, 2015, p. 159.

[25] Nicole Gnesotto. Europe de la défense : une renaissance entre sérieux et illusions. Toute l’Europe, 2017 www.touteleurope.eu/actualite/europe-de-la-defense-une-renaissance-entre-serieux-et-illusions.htm l

[26] Dominique David. “Puissances fluides, équilibres instables,” Revue Défense Nationale Enjeux Stratégiques, June 2014, p. 46. www.jd-giuliani.eu/dossiers/revue-defense-nationale-04062014.pdf

[27] Jean Dufourcq. “Pour un espace stratégique euromaghrébin,” Paix et sécurité internationales. Revue maroco-espagnole de droit international et relations internationales, No. 1, January-December 2013, p. 146, http://catedras.uca.es/jean-monnet/revistas/paix-et-securite-internationales/numerosPSI/psi-01-notes-dufourcq-espace-strategique.pdf

[28] Dominique Reynié. Le rapport désinvolte à la frontière est la faute historique des responsables européens. This matter causes political secession: “One cannot open the borders without closing them,” write Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande (Pour un empire européen, Flammarion, 2007, p. 367). “To take people in, one must be able to refuse to take people in. Asserting and defending one’s borders has become an urgent necessity for Europeans,” interview in Le Figaro, 7 March 2018, www.fondapol.org/dans-les-medias-fr/le-rapport-desinvolte-a-la-frontiere-est-la-faute-historique-des-responsables-europeens/