New Social Movements in Turkey Since 1980

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First, this article aims to constitute a theoretical framework to define and analyze new social movements in comparison with the classical collective action of earlier times. Then it dwells on the Resource Mobilization—versus New Social Movements Theory debates. Resource Mobilization Theory, more popular in the US, and New Social Movements Theory, its European counterpart, are the seminal theories developed to analyze new social movements. The case of Turkey is scrutinized and explained through Islamism, Feminism, Alevism and Kurdism, respectively. Then the article ends up with an overall evaluation respecting the attitudes of society at large towards these movements.

INTRODUCTION

Social movements have changed a lot since the time of Gustave Le Bon and Karl Marx. Starting with the 1960s, social movements gained momentum and versatility not only in quantity but also in quality. Besides trade union, student and classical nationalist activism, a plethora of new social movements such as feminism, environmentalism, human rights activism, religious fundamentalism, cultural, ethnic and sexual preference movements sprang up one after the other.

New social movements were different from their older counterparts in many respects ranging from their aims, to their symbols to class background and style of organization. New theories began to follow new social movements in order to explain them. Resource mobilization theory, more popular in the US, and the new social movements theory, its European counterpart, are the most outstanding of them. New social movements came to be more and more visible and widespread after 1980 via the increase of technological advances and global communications.

Turkey, having substantially suffered from political polarization and violence in the 1960s and especially in the 1970s among university students, workers, police, teachers and even bureaucrats, ended up with a military intervention in 1980. The military council and the ensuing governments tried to exercise strict control over all kinds of voluntary organizations, associations, foundations, especially the Leftist ones, which were

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highly active in the political sphere before the coup. Turkey employed a strategy to implement liberal economic policies in order to integrate the national economy into world markets, on the one hand, and started to develop conservative attitudes in the cultural and political spheres on the other. Prompted by the tension between these liberal and conservative policies, an array of social movements easily ascended to the public sphere in the absence of the umbrella ideologies of the 1960s and 1970s such as Marxism and ultra-nationalism. Turkey tried to maintain its strict control over all kinds of social movements and organizations until the end of the decade. It was only by the late 1980s that Turkey began to tolerate the existence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with different cultural and ideological orientations, and their activities.

However, since the mid-1980s, the most widespread movements have been Kurdish ethnic nationalism, Islamism, feminism, the Alevi cultural movement, environmentalism and human rights activism. Compared to the anti-capitalist student protests and workers' movements in the 1960s and 1970s, these new social movements have had many dimensions and characteristics which are exclusive to them. The aim of this essay is to constitute a theoretical framework to define and analyze new social movements in comparison with classical collective behavior. Then, it dwells, to some extent, on the resource mobilization theory versus new social movements theory debates. From the second to the fifth sections, the case of Turkey will be scrutinized and explicated through Islamism, feminism, Alevism and Kurdism, respectively. However, through examining these four movements one can by no means draw an exhaustive representation of all social movements in Turkey. Finally, the article will end with an overall evaluation respecting the attitudes of society at large towards new social movements and projections about the transformation that Turkey is undergoing at the turn of the millennium.

NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE THEORY

There is a tremendous amount of theoretical and empirical literature on social movements. Social movements, which have appeared in the last few decades, not only altered our way of life and thinking but also mainstream sociological theories. There has been a substantial increase in phenomenology, hermeneutics, ethno-methodology and other interpretive studies such as postmodernism, post-structuralism, semiotics and de-constructionism[1]

in accordance with the increasingly popular approach which takes social reality not as an objective structure shaping the attitudes of individuals and groups, but as a dynamic structure constructed and reconstructed by social actors, subjects and their interactions. For instance, Alaine Touraine suggested that the notion of society should be excluded from the analysis of social life. Instead, he wished to bring the concept of "movement" to the center of sociological study.[2]

Scholars engaged in the study of social movements have attributed certain characteristics to them, though not always the same ones. According to Popenoe, social movements have four basic traits:

1. a new perspective to see things differently;
2. an ideology maintaining group loyalty;
3. a commitment to action; and
4. a dispersed or decentralized leadership.[3]

Robert Merton and his colleagues, on the other hand, suggest that all social movements share three characteristics:

1. social movements seek specific goals;
2. social movements are cohesive organizations; and
3. social movements have a unifying ideology.[4]

Although named differently, these characteristics are quite similar in substance. According to Jasper, social movements are: conscious; organized; long-lasting; particularistic (pursuing specific aims); and non-institutionalized activities.[5]

Andrew Heywood suggests that new social movements are:

1. based on (new) middle classes;
2. post-material oriented;
3. adherent to a more or less common ideology;
4. linked to the New Left; and
5. decentralized, participatory, innovative and theatrical in performance.[6]

Gary Marks and Doug McAdams mention four mutually opposed sets of characteristics, which dichotomize the social movements under the *ancien regime* and in the modern democratic context. According to them, popular protest is local in origin and scope; reactive; spontaneous; and ephemeral under the *ancien regime* whereas in the modern democratic context, it is national in focus; proactive; planned; and enduring.[7]

Claus Offe compares new social movements with classical movements with respect to their actors, themes, values and forms of mobilization. The actors of classical social movements are socio-economic groups struggling primarily for their material interests such as better distribution of income whereas those of new social movements are groups and individuals gathering around various themes on behalf of diverse sections of society. The themes and issues raised by old movements are economic growth, income distribution, military and social security and social control whereas new social movements have the maintenance of peace, environment and human rights on their agenda. In terms of values: old social movements used to give primacy to freedom, security of consumption and material advancement while new social movements champion individual autonomy and identity against central control. Finally, as to the forms of mobilization: old social movements used to exercise internal formal organizations, large-scale representative unions; external pluralist or corporatist interest representation, competitive party politics and majority vote. New social movements, on the other hand, enjoy an internal informality, minimum vertical and horizontal differentiation; external protest policies based on demands, which are formulated in rather negative terms.[8]

According to Alberto Melucci, new social movements display the following characteristics:

- they are multi-dimensional phenomena that pursue diverse aims and influence various levels of a social system;
- unlike traditional social movements, they are not concerned with production and distribution processes: rather, they challenge the administrative system on symbolic grounds;
- they are self-reflexive actions: action is a value in itself and a message to society;
- they have a planetary dimension: social movements display global interdependence and trans-national dimensions;
- they rely on a specific relation between latency and visibility;
- they bring about institutional change, new elites and cultural innovation.[9]

In addition to Melucci's list of new social movements characteristics, Maurice Roche suggests that new social movements include movements linked to the New Left such as ecology, and feminism as well as

movements connected with the New Right such as traditionalistic neo-conservatism and pro-market libertarianism; they include an enhancement or renewal of citizen rights against various forms of established authority; they contribute to the enhancement of the political sphere; they translate private problems into political grammar or discourse; and finally, they are essentially post-national phenomena which call for both sub-national and trans-national approaches.[10]

Hank Johnston and his colleagues submit an even longer list of characteristics to distinguish new social movements from their traditional counterparts: (1) the socio-economic background of new social movement actors excels the established class boundaries; (2) the ideological framework of new social movements is characterized by pluralistic, pragmatic and participatory values; (3) new social movements create new identities or uncover the repressed ones; (4) they transform the boundaries between the "individual" and the "collective," that is, individuals can enjoy personal autonomy and group identity in social movements; (5) new social movements reflect the private aspects of human life such as abortion and sexual preference; (6) new social movements develop new forms of mobilization which are characterized by anti-violence and civil disobedience models of action; (7) they introduce alternative ways of participation in decision-making processes; and (8) new social movements tend to get organized in decentralized and pluralistic structures.[11] As can easily be seen, the literature on new social movements and their distinctive characteristics is not only tremendous and varied, but also considerably subjective, as bound by the yardstick of its authors. Any new list yet to come cannot help running the same risk. However, it may still be useful for analytical purposes, to make a new list composed of the most stressed and shared elements in the lists presented above:

- *New social movements basically exhibit post-Marxist, post-modernist and post-traditional tendencies:* they appeared as the critique of socialist ideology, the modernization process, nation building, secularization, urbanization, the welfare state, traditional understandings of religion and morality.
- *New social movements are generally middle class based movements:* most of the actors and participants in new social movements come from the new middle classes or new layers of the middle class.

- *New social movements are post-material, identity-oriented initiatives:* they demand room in the political and public spheres for their cultural characteristics, interests and problems.
- *New social movements are proactive and particularistic movements:* they do not appear merely as reactions to some kind of oppression or deprivation. Instead, they are voluntary and enthusiastic initiatives to raise public consciousness about a particular issue or to put a particular problem on the political agenda.
- *New social movements display relatively decentralized and less hierarchical modes of organization as well as new forms of action:* they are likely to suffer less from what Robert Michels called the "iron law of oligarchy" nearly a century ago.

These five characteristics will be used as a referential framework for the rest of the article. Islamism, feminism, the Alevi movement and Kurdish nationalism, which have all appeared since 1980, will be analyzed with reference to these criteria.

As for the theoretical paradigms concerning new social movements: resource mobilization (or management) theory and the new social movements theory are the most outstanding. Resource mobilization theory, the leading proponents of which are Charles Tilly, Anthony Oberschall, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, emerged as a critique of universal ideologies assimilating small groups and individuals. New social movements theory proposed by sociologists like Alaine Touraine, Alberto Melucci and Louis Maheu, on the other hand, appeared as a European version of, or rather rival to, the resource mobilization paradigm. Both paradigms see social movements as a confrontation between groups that are organized in autonomous structures, equipped with highly developed forms of communication. Both paradigms, unlike classical theories of collective action, conceive of conflicting collective behavior as a normal course of social life. They accept the actors of social movements as quite rational agents seeking to advance their interests. In sum, both paradigms do not see collective behavior and social conflict as a matter of deviance or anomie, but a normal and integral part of our life. Both theories also share, to a certain degree, post-Marxist traits.[12]

As succinctly stated by Robert Merton and his colleagues, resource mobilization theory: "argues that social movements are rational organizations that seek specific goals, mobilize resources (e.g., money and

members), and invent strategies and tactics to win support. According to this theory social movements occur not merely because there is widespread discontent but because organizations channel that discontent in concerted action."[13] However, the theory looks too much like a game theory which produces strategies and tactics in an extremely volatile arena for those who lack power and other resources to have their voice heard and their interests represented in decision-making processes. According to the theory, almost every society is dominated by a few interest groups such as trade unions, business chambers and the military. Other groups, which would like to participate in the political system, have to organize and mobilize various resources. For instance, blacks, women, and students could do this successfully and integrate into the political system in the US and other Western countries.

The major resources that a group can mobilize are time, numbers, money, powerful third parties, ideology and leadership.[14] In fact, the core elements of this theory are organization, interests, resources, opportunities and strategies rather than real social movements. Some of the assumptions of resource mobilization theory are as follows:

- social movements should be understood through the conflict perspective of collective behavior;
- there is basically no difference between institutional and non-institutional collective action;
- collective action enables groups to defend their interests in a rational way;
- the formation of social movements depends on the availability of resources and opportunities;
- the success of a group is measured by whether or not it is recognized as a political actor, and whether or not any increase is observed in material benefits.[15]

This theory seems to be quite compatible with US politics, which is mainly characterized by power politics, competing interest groups, voluntary organizations, local governments and poliarchies.

New social movements theory, on the other hand, is based on cultural analysis. Social movements question the existing cultural codes, symbols and forms of authority. They are self-reflexive activisms. Social movements give certain messages to their audience through the way they are organized, the relationships they set up and the means they use. New social

movements are, as suggested by Jean Cohen, "self-restricting radicalisms." In other words, they do not pursue millenarian, utopian, and totalizing goals in the main, but rather, they seek particularistic and pragmatic goals.[16]

New social movements theory is obviously a post-Marxist theory. It emerged as a critique of Marxism's economic determinism. According to Steven Buechler, "(t)his approach is, in large part, a response to the economic reductionism of classical Marxism that prevented it from adequately grasping contemporary forms of collective action."[17] Discontent created by modernization, industrialization, nationalization and centralization, combined with the failure of the socialist experiment in the Soviet Union paved the way for new ideological, socio-economic and cultural endeavors. All together, these endeavors changed both social practice and social theory in Europe.

Proponents of the new social movements theory criticize the resource mobilization paradigm most frequently and radically on the grounds that it neglects the cultural dimension of social movements. They argue that cultural and symbolic aspects of life are inseparable from the strategies, tactics and ways of organization, which constitute the main themes of concern for the proponents of the resource mobilization theory.[18]

The basic assumptions of new social movements theory are as follows:

- new social movements are mainly middle class based activisms;
- they are actually characterized by statuses other than class such as religion, gender, and sexual preference;
- social movements are responses to the politicization of everyday life;
- they are responses to modernity or post-modernity in the broadest sense;
- they address a wide societal context;
- they seek post-material values;
- the role of symbolic and cultural resistance is essential for social movements;
- they form decentralized, egalitarian and participatory organizations.[19]

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE TURKISH CASE

Which theory applies more to Turkey? In order to answer this question one should look carefully at what kind of a society or nation-state was founded in Turkey, and the great transformation Turkey underwent in the 1980s. Turkey was founded as an authoritarian unitary nation-state although its

population was highly heterogeneous. Turkish nationalism and modernization have always taken French and German nationalisms rather than American nationalism as their reference groups. In contrast, the constitution of American society was quite different from European nationalisms and statecraft. As Seymour Martin Lipset called his book, the US was "The First New Nation."[20] This is to imply that representation of various cultural, ethnic and religious identities has always been possible, except for the citizenship rights of the blacks until the mid 1960s. Thus, the question of cultural differences and identities were of secondary concern for the proponents of resource mobilization theory who took the American example as their frame of reference. In terms of its homogenizing and authoritarian aspects, Turkish nation building has much more in common with the European experience than with the American one. That is why the new social movements theory, which reflects European social and political mobilization, better applies to Turkey than the resource mobilization paradigm that is based on American mobilization.

In Europe and Turkey, nationalism and modernization, consciously or unconsciously, repressed many ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious elements. Only after the authority of nation-states was undermined by globalization, technological advancement and global communication, did the repressed, the marginalized, and the traditional elements begin to appear in the public sphere. In this respect, new social movements theory, which is largely based on culture, identity, symbolism and reflexivity, better applies to Europe as well as to Turkey.

Even before the military intervention in 1980, Turkey had started to dismiss the import-substitute planned (mixed) economy that she had applied for a long time, in favor of export-oriented liberal economic policies. A rapid population increase and insufficient work opportunities pushed millions of young and unemployed people to the large cities. By the early 1980s, more than half of the population began to live in urban centers. Just 20 years before, the situation had been just the reverse. This rapid economic and demographic change brought about even deeper changes in the moral, cultural and religious values of society. The class structure, status, and cultural groups of the country were diversified and restructured in the 1980s.

The Özal governments invested important sums in the construction of new highways, communication technology and electronic facilities. This in turn accelerated Turkey's integration into the global process. Thus, what

Turkey came to experience in a decade or two was a total revolution of the social texture from top to bottom. This revolution allowed many repressed, disadvantaged or relatively deprived groups to begin to organize. Their endeavors and struggles included both material and post-material elements. But, cultural, symbolic, linguistic, ethnic and religious recognition has been a major issue on their agenda since their formation. Therefore, new social movements theory, rather than resource mobilization theory, is more apt to explain the case of Turkey. However, we need not exclude the latter theory all together. On the contrary, when we wish to analyze a social movement in detail, we can employ resource mobilization theory concepts to examine the organization, strategy, tactics and resources of it. In short, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive theories.

IS ISLAMISM A NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT?

Islam is by no means a new phenomenon in Turkey, as the constitution of the Ottoman Empire was based on a *gaza* (war in the name of faith) culture. However, the foundation of the Turkish Republic pushed Islam out of the political and public spheres. Both under Ottoman rule and in the Republican Era there have been countless revolts with varying Islamist elements, large or small, against central authority. In this sense, Islamism is one of the oldest movements, if not the oldest one, in Turkey. However, what is new concerning Islamism after 1980 is that it emerged as a widespread, organized political radicalism in Turkey. Therefore, its systematic analysis is both necessary and highly difficult as it is connected with a number of different factors. It may be useful by beginning with a brief description of the socio-economic and cultural context in Turkey in the 1980s.

Şirin Tekeli outlines such a context in order to explain feminism, but it is also quite relevant to the rise of Islam as well as other social movements in the 1980s. She mentions three main cultural groups, each one of which reflects a particular socio-economic background:

- the first is the traditional rural culture, in which the remnants of a feudal world-view are still present;
- the second cultural group is made up of the urban, industrialized segments of society, which have more or less internalized modern/Western rules;

- the third group could be labeled as the "new urban" cultural group, which occurs at the intersection of the two other groups.[21]

Thus, Islamic movements sprang up in the early 1980s mainly within the "new urban" cultural group. Many female university students, who wished to attend universities with their headscarves, began to demonstrate in various ways to protest that the authorities were keeping them out of the campus. Although the issue was of direct concern mainly to women, male students made up the majority of the protestors. The basic claim of the rioting students was: "I cannot practice my faith as I wish."[22]

Although many young women had (and still have) difficulties entering university campuses with their headscarves, the conditions in the 1980s were to assist the rise of Islam. In order to dismiss Marxist and other violent movements of the 1970s, the military council and the ensuing governments reintroduced Islam as part of Turkey's official ideology. The secular Kemalist ideology was now being supplanted by a kind of Turco-Islamic synthesis. The number of *İmam Hatip Liseleri* (schools training personnel for religious services) was increased. Quranic courses became more widespread than ever before. Mosque-building activities increased steadily both by the state and by conservative groups and individuals. Religious foundations and *Tarikats* (religious brotherhoods) began to rise both in number and in influence. Religious courses were made compulsory in primary and secondary schools. Henceforth, major school curricula and books were reformulated in more conservative terms, if not all together in religious ones.

Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP), having an Islamist/conservative wing itself, started to place more and more conservative people in state cadres. Özal also encouraged owners of small capital in small cities and towns in Anatolia to invest their capital in market-oriented businesses. Religious press and publications, as well as radio and TV channels, were allowed to open.

Thus, as such and similar seeds were planted in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a large number of Islamist groups appeared as final crops. An important number of those young people served as ready votes for the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP), which was extremely ambitious with its motto of *Adil Düzen* (just order). The rest of these young people participated in various religious movements and organizations such as that of Fethullah Gülen who reinterpreted and propagated the teachings of Said Nursi.

As the major representative of political Islam, the RP came to power first at the level of local governments and then finally in the national coalition government with the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP) in 1996. The RP politicians began to use every chance they could to introduce Islamic elements. They granted scholarships to Islamist students in various grades, hired veiled personnel for departments of local governments and the companies associated with them, limited the number of cafes, bars and restaurants which could serve alcoholic beverages, organized special festivities such as the *Ramazan Çadırı* (lit. Ramadan tent under which meals are served for the poor in times of *iftar* and *sahur* (break time and starting time of the fast, respectively)). They started to open non-alcoholic public places under their local governments as well as *mescits* (small praying places) in the train cars, terminals and other municipal places, which were under their control. In short, while circumscribing social and public life spaces with such activities, many young students were at the same time encouraged to enter teaching, political science and international relations departments as well as military academies to become future teachers, bureaucrats, diplomats and officers on behalf of this party. In this way they started to build the roots of a theocratic state based on Shari'a encouraged by the Islamic revolution in Iran.

Fethullah Gülen's community[23] and movement, on the other hand, tried consciously to stay clear of politics. Instead, they invested in education and culture. They successfully mobilized material and human resources, and built schools and colleges both in Turkey and abroad, such as in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Especially young artisans, businessmen and university students supported the movement. Fethullah Gülen and his followers carefully abstained from appearing in the press, media and public places. The students graduating from their schools began to do very well on university entrance exams. Thus Gülen's movement began to reap the benefits of its actions. The movement evolved into a middle class elitism as compared to the religious and political populism of the RP.

The author of the present article had a number of occasions to observe and compare, more or less systematically, student groups who were supporters of the RP and Fethullah Gülen at some university student halls in the early 1990s. Students who supported the RP were highly demonstrative in their prayers, and assertive in their political ideologies. Most of them were active in the programs of their party such as propaganda, communication and education. In addition, they were quite eager to gain new

supporters.[24] Students who adhered to Fethullah Gülen's community were quite modest in their manners: not extroverted enough to reveal their ideology or belief in public. They would go to their special rooms to pray rather than praying in any room immediately available to them.

The movement led by Gülen did not stress Islam directly in its colleges. Rather, they adopted a kind of moral conservatism and cultural identity. They suited their actions to conform to a respect for the official Kemalist ideology. They would rather have appeared in the public sphere not through protests, meetings or other political means but through a kind of moral ideology, so deep and restricting as well as so docile, that it was not readily visible—a sort of Anatolian Confucianism.[25]

Thus, in light of the above, is Islamism a new social movement? The answer to this question is "yes" in some respects and "no" in others according to the criteria formulated in the theoretical section.

Is Islamism basically a post-Marxist, post-modernist and post-traditionalist movement? Marxism or post-Marxism is irrelevant to Islamism. But, it is substantially a postmodernist movement in that it perceives the modernization process and its associated phenomena such as secularism as highly repressive of its system of values and other major projects such as the Islamic way of life and its own understanding of civilization. It is post-traditionalist as much as it is post-modernist. A critique and reinterpretation of traditional faith is a major part of Islamic revivalism. It both transforms the "passive", "subjugated" tradition by emphasizing and making visible its several aspects in the public sphere in order to enhance and restructure the latter, and tries to formulate its own modernity through some kind of hybridization between the revived tradition and modernity.

Is Islamism a middle class based movement? The leaders and devoted actors of this movement are mostly of newly urbanized middle class origin. However, at the electoral level, important support has come to the RP from the urban poor and the destitute.

Is Islamism a post-material and identity-oriented movement? Indeed it is as Islamism raised quite symbolic issues such as veiling. It also demanded religious and cultural recognition in the public sphere and tried to create an Islamic identity and way of life.

Is Islamism a proactive and particularistic movement? It started perhaps as a reactive movement against Kemalism and modernism, but later it gradually turned into a proactive social movement by raising diverse issues. Similarly, it started with millenarian and utopian demands but later

turned to pursue goals concerning the present and everyday life. Islamism in Turkey, as William Hale aptly put it: "… has to compete in the political market place with other, secularist parties, and to play the game according to the rules of secular democracy, rather than a millenarian revolutionary vision."[26]

Does Islamism exhibit decentralized organization and new forms of action? At the political party level, there is a highly centralized organization. Both the RP and the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP), which was founded after the RP's closure by the Constitutional Court in 1998, have been dominated by Erbakan's charisma (although he was punished with a five-year ban on active political participation). The Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP), which was established together with the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*, SP) as heirs to the FP, adopted a more centrist attitude than its predecessors. Its young, ambitious leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, even exceeded Erbakan in both political charisma and popular support. Erdoğan too strengthened his position and the hierarchical order in his political party through a recent amendment to the by-laws. However, at the civil society level, Islamist NGOs seem to organize in more democratic forms, and do perform new politics.

FEMINISM: THE HEART OF NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Before organizing autonomous new social movements in the 1980s, women in Turkey had been quite active in various radical ideological groups of the 1960s and the 1970s. However, their activities swirled around socialism, anti-imperialism and exploitation rather than issues directly concerning women. Their former activism, albeit far from a feminist quintessence it might be, served as a guideline for their post 1980 quest.

The repression of all movements, ideologies, and organizations by the military regime severed the feminists' connections with them. In a sense, the intervention of the military, though deleterious for Turkish democracy, paved the way for the rise of an autonomous and reflexive feminism in Turkey. Some critics, for this reason, called it a "Septemberist" movement, implying that it was a result or a by-product of the military coup, which took place on September 12, 1980.[27] However, the Turco-Islamic synthesis enacted by the new constitution and adopted by the ensuing governments was also an important factor in the rise of the feminist cause.

There are a variety of feminisms rather than a single feminism, such as Kemalist feminism, post-Marxist (or post-Leftist) feminism, and Islamist feminism. This is similar to the existence of different feminisms in the West such as radical, liberal, Marxist and socialist feminisms of the 1960s and 1970s.

Feminism gained visibility in the Turkish public sphere with a diverse array of activities and organizations. The first important activity was a conference on women's problems held in Istanbul in 1982. The following year, various feminist groups founded a women's journal, *Somut* (concrete). Professional and intellectual women organized a study group named *Kadın Çevresi* (Women's Circle) in 1984. Its major concerns were publishing materials, organizing symposia, and panel discussions about women's issues as well as providing care, health and consultancy services for women. Some academic and intellectual women started to translate and publish the masterpieces of world feminist literature in those years under the auspices of YAZKO (the publishing company of authors and translators).[28]

In 1986, the first campaign against the government was run in Ankara to force it to ratify the UN Convention on Elimination of All Kinds of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). A joint petition to that effect was signed by 7,000 people. In 1987, nearly 3,000 people demonstrated against battering women. In 1989, feminists held their first congress in Ankara. That same year, feminists and socialists held a joint congress in Istanbul where important ideological disagreements emerged between the two groups.[29]

In the late 1980s and early 1990s a plethora of women's institutions were established. In 1990 and 1991, respectively, two important shelter foundations were opened in Istanbul and Ankara. These were followed by other shelter houses, which were opened through the collaboration of women and municipal governments in Şişli and Bakırköy (Istanbul), Nazilli (Aydın), Kayseri, and Bornova (İzmir). Libraries and information centers were opened for women. A number of universities such as Istanbul, Marmara, Ankara, and Middle East Technical universities opened women's study centers and institutes. All these made a certain impact on politicians, and in 1990 an institution called the Directorate General on the Status and the Problems of Women was established under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security.[30]

In the last two decades, an array of women's magazines and journals have also appeared. *Somut* (Concrete), *Kadınca* (Womanly), *Kaktüs*

(Cactus), *KİM* (Magazine for Woman), and *Kadın Kimliği* (Woman Identity) are only a few examples.

A major distinction should be made between Kemalist, Liberal, and post-Marxist groups and the Islamist feminists. Women who had appeared in anti-dress code demonstrations in front of university campuses joined Islamist women's organizations and initiative groups. They followed quite similar patterns of organization and forms of activity to those of other feminist groups, but with different moral and ideological concerns. They also held conferences, symposia, discussion groups, and seminars on women's questions. They issued their own magazines and journals such as *İzlenim* (Impression), *Kadın Kimliği* (Woman Identity), and they also wrote to other Islamic journals like *İslami Araştırmalar* (Islamic Studies). The issues they raised were mainly concerned with being a good professional in public life and a good Muslim woman. Although they seem to criticize, to some extent, the secondary position of women in Islamic movements and organizations, they still far from directly questioned the patriarchy inherent in both Islamic nomenclature and practice. Their communication and collaboration with other feminist groups are minimal. They disagree with them on issues such as abortion, style of dress and divorce.[31]

How far is feminism a new social movement according to our criteria?

Is feminism a post-Marxist, post-modernist and post-traditional movement? The best answer to this question can be found in a manifesto declared by the first feminist congress held in Ankara in 1990. Part of the manifesto is paraphrazed and translated by Şirin Tekeli as follows: "The manifesto claimed that women's oppression is multiple, as all male dominated institutions—the family, schools, the state, and religion—subjugated women's labor-power, their bodies and their identity."[32] As the manifesto shows, feminists saw all major institutions, from economy to religion, from politics to education, as the source of their grievances, and patriarchy is the intersecting concept among all of them. Only Marxism is not mentioned. But, if we remember the Istanbul congress where socialists and feminists finally decided to go their own ways, we can see their (former) association with Marxism.

Is feminism a middle class movement? Feminism is one of the most intellectually advanced movements. It refers to many theories (economic, social, cultural, political and religious) and references literature frequently. Only highly educated and motivated people with some minimum resources

such as time, money and the like can progress in this movement. This implies a strong middle class background.

Is feminism a post-material and identity movement? All the activities held and all the issues raised by feminists refer to certain phenomena of political, economic, public and private life. They seek concrete solutions to their concrete problems which, they believe, are unique to them. In certain instances they may show sharp reactions, but in others, they try to develop certain projects and raise public consciousness about their problems. Thus, their demands are basically of a post-material nature, and call for identity politics.

Does feminism exhibit decentralized organization and new forms of action? Both Islamist and secular feminists are organized in highly decentralized structures. They hold congresses and constitute platforms and initiative groups. They perform new politics, and use creative means quite successfully.[33]

THE ALEVI MOVEMENT: A SPONTANEOUS OVERFLOW OF A FORGOTTEN CULTURE

The Alevi have been active since the founding of the Turkish Republic, if not before. Their existence resembles a delicate barometer sensitive to the position of Sunni Islam. When Sunni Islam is in the ascendant, the Alevi begin to support strongly the official secular ideology.[34] At other times, they prefer to remain invisible to the public.

However, this two-dimensional Alevi attitude began to change drastically in the 1980s. First of all, the Alevi themselves started to leave behind the image of a traditional confessional group. They began to appear in the late 1980s organized into *Cem Vakfi* (Alevi's religious/cultural organization) and *Pir Sultan Abdal Dernekleri* (association of young and politically mobilized Alevi). Apart from these organizations, many Alevi became active in other social and political organizations such as student associations, labor unions and the ÖDP (socialist-oriented Freedom and Solidarity Party).

Meanwhile, an abundance of Alevi literature, both academic and popular, began to flourish, especially in the 1990s.[35] One of the most important and symbolic of such publications is the periodical *Cem*. Indeed, the term *cem* (religious ritual) and its derivatives, *cemevi* (the place where the Alevi hold their moral and religious performances), *Cem Vakfi* (Alevi's religious

foundation at the legal and civil societal level), *Cem FM* (radio channel which broadcasts popular Alevi music and poetry in Istanbul) and the like are actually the essentials of Alevism.

It became quite fashionable to hold discussion programs on TV channels, to have research series in major daily newspapers, and conferences and symposia on Alevi religion, culture and politics.[36] Some universities started to prepare research projects, and to consider opening institutes in order to study Alevi culture.[37] In addition to *Cem Vakfı* (Cem Foundation) and *Pir Sultan Abdal Dernekleri* (Pir Sultan Abdal Associations), another chain of Alevi organizations, the *Hacı Bektaş Vakıfları* (Hacı Bektaş Foundations) started to open both in certain parts of Turkey where the Alevi population is densest and in Germany where nearly two million Turkish people are living.[38] In these foundations, courses on Alevi religious practice (*cem*), Alevi music and folk dance were started. Poor students were supported with scholarships and school materials. Alevi solidarity is intended to protect and develop the interests of their community.

What has happened to revive a dormant, if not totally extinct, culture after the military coup of September 12, 1980? There are many causes underlying this cultural explosion. The first and perhaps the foremost one is the state's Turco-Islamic cultural and ideological policy to keep the society clear of the former political conflicts and violence. As an extension of this policy, religious courses (Sunni-dominated) were made compulsory for most primary and secondary school students. Since an important part of the Alevi population, especially the young, had been engaged in Leftist and socialist activism in previous decades, the military regime launched a kind of assimilation policy against the Alevi. Building mosques in Alevi villages is just one example among others.[39]

Secondly, fostered by this official policy of assimilation and drastic socio-economic changes in Turkish society, the rapid rise of Sunni Islam in the form of a reactive and totalitarian political movement (at least at the beginning) ignited Alevi revivalism. Sunni Islamism had shown the typical syndrome of a majority group by either threatening or ignoring other groups, thus encouraging response.[40] The Alevi, on the other hand, showed the symptoms of a minority group. They tried to act peacefully and constructively rather than in showy and aggressive behaviors. They tried to develop and practice a humanitarian morality.[41]

Thirdly, the religious leadership of the Alevi, *dedelik*, could not adapt itself to the rapidly changing conditions of the 1980s. The influx of the

Alevi into urban areas curtailed the authority of the *dedes* who were products of the traditional community life. The highly educated new generations in big cities began to participate in more modern groups and organizations rather than traditional *cem* ceremonies directed by *dedes*. In short, Alevi community was uprooted from its original peripheral habitat and carried to the center. A new Alevi middle class, who consisted of highly educated intellectuals, professionals, businessmen and university students, started to emerge. The new dynamic middle class mobilized sufficient resources to discover and revive their forgotten culture.[42]

Finally, the decay of the socialist ideology in the 1980s led the Alevi to adopt new ideologies, identities and activisms with which to occupy themselves (similar to the feminist movement). However, there is a continuity between socialist movements of the 1970s and some branches of the Alevi movement in the 1980s and 1990s. The militants of the former movements, with their experience in leadership and activism, invigorated the latter.

Among the basic issues the Alevi raised, the recognition of their religion by the Directorate of Religious Affairs was their priority. They demanded financial as well as nonmaterial support to open their own religious schools and praying places. *Cem Vakfi*, which is centered in Istanbul, frequently raised this issue. Those Alevi who organized under *Pir Sultan Abdal Dernekleri*, perceived Alevism as an ethnic culture rather than as a religion, and struggled to establish a more democratic and pluralistic society in which they could practice this culture more freely.[43] The maintenance of state secularism, the quest for solidarity and communication with the uprooted and urbanized Alevi population, reorganization of their life practices such as funerals, prayers and weddings in accordance with the conditions in their new urban habitat are some of the other issues they pursued.

Although at times there is a great tension and dislike between the Sunni and the Alevi, the activism of the latter exhibits great similarities to that of the former. Like the Sunni Islamists, they established their own associations, issued their own publications, opened their own radio and TV channels, and even set up their own political parties. In 1995, an Alevi political organization, the Democratic Peace Movement, was initiated. The Constitutional Court closed down this organization due to its demand to abolish the Directorate of Religious Affairs. A new one, the Democracy Party,

succeeded it in the same way that the FP succeeded the RP, after the latter had been closed down by the same court.[44]

As for the criteria formulated to evaluate new social movements, Alevi activism scores quite high, almost as high as feminism.

Is Alevism a post-Marxist, post-material and post-traditional movement? An important number of Alevi participate in the New Left and post-Marxist organizations such as the ÖDP and the Pir Sultan Abdal Dernekleri. Alevi revivalism is critical both of modernism, which is represented by the central government and its biased understanding of religious neutrality, and traditionalism, symbolized by old institutions such as the *dedelik*.

Is Alevism a middle class movement? Like feminism and Islamism, Alevism is also a middle class movement. It is the material and intellectual resources mobilized by the educated and better off Alevi on which the Alevi movement has progressed.

Is Alevism a post-material and identity movement? Like the Hawaiian revivalism under a plantation economy and modern capitalism, the Alevi, under the alienating conditions of urbanization and globalization, set off to discover their authentic culture and identity.[45]

Is Alevism a proactive and particularistic movement? The issues raised in Alevi revivalism go far beyond a mere reaction to Sunni Islamism. The Alevi are now trying to reorganize their institutions and way of life. They are trying to improve their culture and identity. Since they are already a minority group,[46] they seek particularistic goals of their own rather than totalizing goals for the whole society.

Does Alevism exhibit decentralized organization and new forms of action? Alevi activism is quite rich and diverse. It includes activities such as Hacı Bektaş festivities, conferences, press releases, TV and radio programs, discussion and initiative groups where the structure of organization is relatively egalitarian and decentralized.

THE KURDISH MOVEMENT: THE UPSURGE OF A PERENNIALLY DENIED PEOPLE

The association of the Kurds with Turkey during the Ottoman period had been through religious proximity, rather than ethnic or national ties. The Sunni Kurds especially had collaborated with imperial rulers, as opposed to the Shi'ite Kurds' connections to Iran.[47] However, this religious bond began to wear out under the modernization and centralization processes

that occurred since the nineteenth century. The new Turkish Republic was based on a secular Turkish nationalism, which denied the existence of any minorities except those referred to at the Lausanne Treaty, namely, the Greeks, the Jews and the Armenians. The Lausanne Treaty recognized only non-Muslims as minorities and since Kurds were Muslims, they were not granted rights similar to those granted to the Jews, Greeks and Armenians.

The new regime developed a policy of denial concerning the Kurds. The view behind this policy was that the Kurds were of Turkish origin but during the course of unexpected historical events such as migrations, wars and draughts they had to live under the influence of foreign powers, and thus had become self-alienated. What the Turkish government had to do was to teach them what they had forgotten about themselves.[48] With some lessening of intensity, this policy of denial is still the case. There are a number of right-wing academics and intellectuals who continue to try to prove that the Kurdish people and their identity are no different from the Turkish people and culture.[49]

Despite (or rather due to) this official denial, the Kurdish movement started to gain visibility in the 1960s as it merged with Leftist labor and student activism. In 1967, for instance, a number of successive public meetings were held to raise consciousness about the problems of eastern Turkey. Meanwhile, new organizations began to appear in defense of Kurdish interests. One such organization, *Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları* (Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East) was established in 1969. At the same time, some of the existing organizations and political parties such as the Turkish Labor Party (TIP) started to recognize and work for Kurdish causes. In the 1970s, the number of politically mobilized groups increased further. The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), among other revolutionary and separatist groups, came to the fore and took up the Kurdish problem as its principal engagement in the late 1970s.[50]

The ban on every kind of separatist, extreme-rightist, extreme-leftist ideologies and organizations in the first half of the 1980s led to a type of incubation period rather than a complete cessation. Old ideologies and organizations reemerged under different forms and with new demands as they underwent a deep transformation in accordance with the effects of globalization. In 1984, the PKK started a violent guerrilla war against the Turkish state and the army; this war continued ever increasingly until its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was finally caught in Nairobi in early 1999.

However, the Kurdish movement should be understood as a far more comprehensive phenomenon than just represented by the PKK. The PKK benefited largely from the opportunities created by globalization. Gary Marks and Doug McAdam have suggested that, through globalization, the impact of regional groups and supra-national powers began to increase while that of the nation-states started to diminish.[51] This strongly implies that those groups which suffer in their local regions would apply to supra-national powers such as the EU. This is actually the case for the Kurdish movement. Both the PKK and other elements associated with it, like the Kurdish Parliament in Exile (KPE), the MED-TV and various Kurdish NGOs abroad have raised their complaints about the Turkish state to Europe, both at the national governmental and supra-national governmental levels.

In Turkey, the Kurdish people, beleaguered by the Turkish state and the PKK, had great difficulties in creating legal grounds for their political representation. Publications such as *Özgür Gündem* (Free Agenda) and *Özgür Ülke* (Free Country), political parties such as the People's Labor Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*—HEP), and the Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi*—DEP) were banned and closed down one after the other.[52] Finally, the People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*—HADEP) emerged as the legal representative of the Kurdish people in Turkey. However, it was soon excluded from national politics by the setting of a high electoral threshold (10 percent) in the parliament. Nonetheless, the HADEP is in power today in several provinces, many districts and small towns in southern and eastern Turkey.

At the civil society level, the Kurdish issue was raised by the *İnsan Hakları Derneği*—İHD (Human Rights Association), the *İnsan Hakları Kurumu*—IHK (Human Rights Institution), the Turkish branch of the *Helsinki Citizens' Assembly*—HCA, the *Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi*—YDH, the Union of Business Chambers and Stock Markets—TOBB, and some student and bar associations. The İHD took up the Kurdish issue through the human rights angle. The HCA organized a conference on the Kurdish issue in Istanbul in 1995. The TOBB sponsored a comprehensive survey of the Kurdish population.[53] The YDH, which emerged as a coalition of the economic New Right and the political New Left under the leadership of Cem Boyner, promised to restructure the Turkish state and to implement a multi-culturalism based on identity politics concerning all cultural and ethnic groups in Turkey.[54]

By the end of the 1980s, some Turkish politicians had started to address the Kurdish question in public. President Özal, for instance, claimed that part of his ancestry was Kurdish, and called for a peaceful and democratic solution to the question. Likewise, Erdal İnönü, then leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*—SHP), suggested that the Kurdish people should be given their cultural rights. Even Süleyman Demirel, a centrist right-wing politician, announced that he recognized the Kurdish reality.[55]

However, the rigid attitude of the military and the violent attacks of the PKK scared many people in Turkey. Thus, efforts to begin an open discussion of the Kurdish problem failed each time. Feminism, Alevism, and even Islamism had gained the sympathy of third parties such as the media, intellectuals, professional organizations and a number of secular groups. But, this kind of support was not enough for the Kurdish movement. The triumph of the Southern blacks in the Civil Rights Movement in the US became possible only through the support of the Northern white middle classes.[56] The PKK could draw the attention of Europe to the problem but only at the expense of losing potential support from the Turkish middle classes. Only after the arrest of Öcalan and admission of Turkey by the EU to candidacy for full membership in 1999 did more people begin to sympathize with the Kurdish movement in Turkey.

Is the Kurdish movement a post-Marxist, post-modernist and post-traditional movement? The Kurdish movement emerged to criticize the unitary structure of the Turkish nation-state. This implies a highly post-modernist tone. At the same time, Kurdish activism emerged visibly in the 1960s in association with Marxist groups. However, after 1980, the gradual termination of the Cold War as well as the ideological polarization between East and West influenced the Kurdish activists to revise their position. The PKK, for instance, in a pragmatic attempt to garner the sympathy of more Kurdish as well as non-Kurdish people, dropped the hammer and sickle from its flag.[57] The Kurdish movement, like Islamism, began to stress Kurdish traditional, cultural aspects turning them into politically recharged symbols. For instance, the Nawroz (new year/new light) festivities of the Kurds have appeared to be political demonstrations for the last decade, where they try to stress green and red as their national colors (Turkish national colors are red and white).

Is the Kurdish movement a middle class activism? Although we cannot say that most Kurds are middle class, since the eastern parts of Turkey

include the lowest income groups and highest unemployment rates in the country, the activists of the movement are middle class intellectuals, professionals and businessmen.

Is the Kurdish movement a post-material and identity movement? According to the results of a survey conducted by Doğu Ergil in 1995 with a sample of 1,267 people who were chosen to represent the Kurdish population in Turkey, of those surveyed, 91 percent identified themselves as Kurds; 63 percent wished Kurdish to be used as the second official language; 88 percent wanted some important changes in state structure, and wanted new policies adopted.[58] Thus, these results imply that the Kurdish people are, first and foremost, in quest of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and political recognition of their identity, all of which is highly post-material in nature.

Is the Kurdish movement a proactive and particularistic movement? Kurdish people are demanding new things for themselves, rather than just reacting to oppression. In the same survey, 13 percent advocated independence; 43 percent advocated federation; 19 percent advocated local self-government; and 13 percent championed autonomy.[59] As we see, not all Kurds want the same thing, nor do they seek any totalizing hegemony in Turkey or in other trans-state Kurdish-populated areas. Their demands are restricted to themselves.

Does the Kurdish movement exhibit decentralized organization and new forms of action? Apart from the PKK and Kurdish associations abroad, the Kurdish movement has hardly had any regular organization, as the political parties representing Kurdish interests were closed down one after the other. Secondly, neither the PKK nor the HADEP enjoyed the support of the majority of the Kurdish people. Thirdly, some Kurds chose to be active in other political parties, student associations and professional organizations. Thus, there is insufficient information available to say whether the Kurds are centralized or decentralized. Apart from reviving their traditional symbols, the Kurds have found interesting ways of becoming visible. Over the last decade, one such way was that a group of Kurdish activists used to appear at almost every football game between Turkish and European teams. They would jump onto the field while the game was in progress, with flags or placards in their hands depicting the symbols of their Kurdish consciousness and demands, and then they would demonstrate until security was finally able to capture them.

CONCLUSION: ATTITUDES OF SOCIETY AT LARGE TOWARDS NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

It is not always easy to measure the attitudes of a society towards a particular social movement because both the views of society and the nature of the movement are dynamic and therefore subject to change. However, some impressions can still be obtained, and observations can be made.

In the beginning, the rise of political Islam, for instance, scared secular groups, non-orthodox Muslims and feminists. This in turn paved the way for an explosion of Kemalist, Ataturkist, secularist and Alevi NGOs in the country to balance and check Islamic fundamentalism. Even high-school students formed Kemalist groups, who adopted Atatürk's rosette as their symbol against the Islamist students.[60] Later, the situation gradually began to change. Islamists transferred their reactionary energy to more diverse and more cultural issues. This change, however, does not seem to have convinced secularist groups that should Islamists come to power, they would not abuse democracy to form a theocratic regime. A nation-wide survey conducted by Binnaz Toprak and Ali Çarkoğlu shows that Islam is not an immediate threat to democracy, and society at large is not all together intolerant towards Islamists. Approximately 21 percent of the sample (n: 3054) said that they would like to have a state based on Shari'a (cross-check questions however, pointed to a lack of shared understanding of what is meant by this concept). Two-thirds of the sample said that women should be able to wear headscarves in public institutions and universities. Seventy-seven percent believe that Atatürk's reforms contributed substantially to the progress of the country. Twenty-four percent support the existence of political parties based on religion. Eighty-one percent support the existence of the Directorate of Religious Affairs while 69 percent suggest that this institution should also serve the Alevi citizens.[61] It seems that Islam and secularism are likely to cohabit and even communicate on more peaceful terms in the long term.

As for feminism in Turkey, at the beginning, old Marxist and some religious conservative groups viewed them with suspicion. However, as women started to raise their problems and demands, society at large started to receive them with more sympathy. Today, there is a lot of respect for feminists, not only among politicians, but also (especially) among intellectuals, professionals, academics and the media.

The Alevi movement has generated a lot of sympathy among secularist groups, the media and a large section of the Turkish intelligentsia. Even politicians and state authorities have begun to be interested in the problems of the Alevi. The Directorate of Religious Affairs, which is well known for its Sunni character, have now and then invited Alevi representatives and religious leaders for round table meetings to discuss their problems. The Alevi movement seems to be well recognized, but it may yet take a long time for them to realize their demands.

The Kurdish movement has garnered the least amount of sympathy among society at large compared to the other three movements. The war between the Turkish army and the PKK scared most people away from the Kurdish cause. Only after the PKK had stopped warring and the EU accepted Turkey as a candidate member did intellectuals and the middle class in Turkey begin to express their sympathy towards the movement. However, at this point, there is still not enough cognitive distance between the Kurdish movement and the PKK violence in public opinion.

On the other hand, the Kurdish movement enjoyed more outside sympathy and recognition as compared to other social movements in Turkey. The Accession Partnership document, for instance, includes many requirements from which the Kurds could benefit. Recognition of Kurdish identity, culture, language, the right to receive education and to broadcast in Kurdish are only a few examples. Both Bülent Ecevit, former prime minister, and the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—AKP) governments responded positively to the requirements of the Accession Partnership document. They passed a number of reform packages to improve the rights of cultural, ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey. Recent legal amendments, motivated by the EU, promise to enable the Kurdish people and other minorities to learn their mother tongues freely in formal courses; to broadcast in their mother tongues; and to give their children original (non-Turkish) names.

By and large, Turkish society seems to be more tolerant and sympathetic than Turkish politicians, and civilian and military bureaucrats towards the Kurdish quest for their authentic culture, ethnicity and identity. The Kurdish question needs to be defined and discussed in detail by all relevant actors before any settlement is attempted, as there is still a long way to go before a solution is found.

As a final remark, new social movements in Turkey, combined with processes such as globalization and supra-national or trans-national powers

like the EU, seem to have caused and continue to cause substantial transformations and re-structuring in Turkish society and politics. Finally, new social movements are expected to bring about new perspectives and ways of thinking, as this is actually what makes them "new," rather than material progress.

NOTES

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1. See Alberto Melucci, "The Process of Collective Identity," in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (eds.), *Social Movements and Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp.41–67; Steven M. Buechler, *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural Construction of Social Activism* (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.163.
2. See Alaine Touraine, *Return of the Actor* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1988).
3. Ibid., p.532.
4. Robert Merton, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1983), p.434.
5. James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1997), p.5.
6. Andrew Heywood, *Politics* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997), pp.265–6.
7. Gary Marks and Doug McAdam, "Social Movements and the Changing Structure of European Union," in Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schimitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), *Governance in the European Union* (London: Sage Publications, 1996), pp.97–9.
8. See Claus Offe, "Yeni Sosyal Hareketler: Kurumsal Politikanın Sınırlarının Zorlanması," [New Social Movements: Forcing the Limits of Institutional Politics] in Sabri Özburun (ed.), *Yeni Sosyal Hareketler: Teorik Açılımlar* [New Social Movements: Theoretical Openings] (Istanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 1999), pp.53–79.
9. Alberto Melucci, "The New Social Movements Revisited: Reflections on a Sociological Misunderstanding," in Louis Maheu (ed.), *Social Movements and Social Classes: The Future of Collective Action* (London: Sage Publications, 1995), pp.112–14.
10. Maurice Roche, "Rethinking Citizenship and Social Movements: Themes in Contemporary Sociology and Neo-conservative Ideology," in Louis Maheu (ed.), *Social Movements and Social Classes* (1995), pp.186–91.
11. Hank Johnston, Enrique Larana and Joseph R. Gusfield (eds.), "Kimlikler Şikayetler ve Yeni Toplumsal Hareketler" [Identities, Complaints and New Social Movements] in Sabri Özburun (ed.) (1999), pp.131–61.
12. Jean Cohen, "Strateji ya da Kimlik: Yeni Teorik Paradigmalar ve Yeni Sosyal Hareketler" [Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and New Social Movements] in Sabri Özburun (ed.), *Yeni Toplumsal Hareketler* (1999), pp.109–29.
13. Robert Merton, (1983), p.437.
14. Ibid., pp.438–41.
15. Cohen (1999), pp.109–29.
16. Ibid.
17. Steven M. Buechler (2000), pp.45–46.

18. Ibid., p.38; Cohen (1999), pp.109–29.
19. Steven M. Buechler (2000), p.46.
20. Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (London: Heinemann, 1963).
21. Şirin Tekeli, "Introduction: Women in Turkey in the 1980s," in Şirin Tekeli (ed.), *Women in Modern Turkish Society: A Reader* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1995), p.4.
22. Kenan Çayır, "İslamcı Bir Sivil Toplum Örgütü: Gökkuşağı İstanbul Kadın Platformu" [An Islamist NGO: Rainbow Woman Platform] in Nilüfer Göle (ed.), *İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri* [New Public Faces of Islam] (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2000), p.66.
23. Aside from Fethullah Gülen's community, there are *Yeni Asyacılar* and *Yeni Nesil Grubu* (both Nurcu, followers of Said Nursi). But Gülen's movement is far more popular than the latter. See Ugur Kömecoglu, "Kutsal ile Kamusal: Fethullah Gülen Cemaat Hareketi," [Sacred and Public: Fethullah Gülen Community Movement] in Nilüfer Göle (ed.) (2000), p.163.
24. At one, I happened to witness one of the two students, who were just beginning to pray, address a third person: "Aren't you praying with us?" The student said: "no, thank you." The second student said to the first one: "he will pray soon, however."
25. See Kömecoglu (2000), pp.148–94.
26. William Hale, "Foreword," in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), *Turkey, Identity, Democracy, Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp.VII–VIII.
27. See Şirin Tekeli, "Introduction," in Şirin Tekeli (ed.) (1995), p.13.
28. See Yesim Arat, "Feminist Institutions and Democratic Aspirations: The Case of the Purple Roof Women's Shelter Foundation," in Zehra Fatma Arat (ed.), *Deconstructing the Image of "The Turkish Women"* (London: Macmillan. Press, 1998), pp.296–99; Şirin Tekeli, "Introduction," in Şirin Tekeli (ed.) (1995), p.14.
29. See Tekeli, "Introduction," in Şirin Tekeli (ed.) (1995), p.14.
30. See Yesim Arat (1998), pp.297–9.
31. See Çayır (2000), pp.41–67.
32. Tekeli, "Introduction," in Tekeli (ed.) (1995), p.14.
33. In 1989 the Constitutional Court ratified an article reducing the punishment by two-thirds for those who rape prostitutes. Women held a large protest meeting with an unheard of slogan "we are all prostitutes." Although it may appear theatrical and innovative to political sociologists, the slogan was certainly detrimental for Turkish culture and morality. The slogan, however, became very successful in gaining support from a large public, and finally the Parliament abolished that law. See ibid., p.15.
34. Cf., David Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey* (Cambridgeshire: The Oethen Press, 1999), p.133.
35. For a bibliography on Alevi cultural and religious literature see Karin Vorhoff, "Academic and Journalistic Publications on the Alevi and Bektashi of Turkey," in Tord Olson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Catharina Raudvere (eds.), *Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives* (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1998), pp.40–50.
36. Among such activities, the conference held by the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul in collaboration with a number of Turkish and foreign intellectuals, for instance, is an outstanding one.
37. See Fuat Bozkurt, "State-Community Relations in the Restructuring of Alevism," in Tord Olson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Catharina Raudvere (eds.) *Alevi Identity* (1998), p.87.
38. See Helga Rittersberger-Tiliç, "Development and Reformulation of a Returnee Identity as Alevi," in Tord Olson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Catharina Raudvere (eds.) *Alevi Identity* (1998), p.76.
39. For further methods of assimilation of the Alevi see, for instance, Ruşen Çakır, "Political Alevism Versus Political Sunnism: Convergences and Divergences," in Tord Olson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Catharina Raudvere (eds.) *Alevi Identity* (1998), pp.63–7; Bozkurt (1998), pp.85–96.

40. Cf. Shankland (1999), p.116.
41. Cf. Çakır (1998), p.64.
42. See Reha Çamuroğlu, "Alevi Revivalism in Turkey," in Tord Olson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Catharina Raudvere (eds.) *Alevi Identity* (1998), pp.79–80.
43. Cf. Shankland (1999), pp.152–63.
44. For a comparison and contrast of Sunni Islamism and the Alevi movement, see Çakır (1998), pp.63–7.
45. Cf. Jonathan Friedman, *Cultural Identity and Global Process* (London: Sage Publications, 2nd ed., 1996), pp.120–32.
46. The Alevi population in Turkey is estimated to be one-fifth of the total population which is now approximately 65 million. This amounts to 13 million, 20 percent of which are Kurdish Alevi. Although there are certain provinces such as Çorum, Sivas and Kahramanmaraş where the Alevi live in some density, they are generally dispersed all over the country. See Shankland (1999), p.136.
47. For an interesting analysis of the relations between the Kurds and the Ottoman government, see Mesut Yeğen, "The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity," in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.) (1998), pp.216–29.
48. Cf. Sefa Şimsek, "People's Houses: An Experiment in Ideological Training in Turkey, 1932–51" (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University, 1996/doctoral dissertation), especially the chapter entitled "The Quest of Future in the Past."
49. See Orhan Türkdoğan, *Güneydoğu Kimliği: Aşiret, Kültür, İnsan* [South-Eastern Identity: Tribe, Culture, People] (Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2nd ed., 1998), pp.421–48.
50. See Kemal Kirişci and Gareth Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp.109–10.
51. Marks and McAdam (1996), pp.109–16.
52. See Hamit Bozarslan, "Political Crisis and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey," in Robert Olson (ed.), *The Kurdish Nationalist Movements in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East* (Kentucky: The University Press, 1996), pp.146–8.
53. Cf. Kirişci and Winrow (1997), pp.149–50.
54. Cf. Robert Olson and Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, "The New Democracy Movement in Turkey: A Response to Liberal Capitalism and Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism," in Olson (ed.) (1996), pp.154–72.
55. See Kirişci and Winrow (1997), pp.111–13.
56. See Robert Merton (1983), pp.444–48.
57. Aram Nigosiam, "Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Recent Trends," in Olson (ed.) (1996), pp.43–44.
58. Cited in Ibid., p.45.
59. Cited in Ibid., p.45.
60. See Buket Türkmen, "Laikliğin Dönüşümü: Liseli Gençler, Türban ve Atatürk Roseti," [Transformation of Laicism: High School Youth, Headscarf and Atatürk Rosette] in Nilüfer Göle (ed.) (2000), pp.110–47.
61. For more detailed statistics on religion, society and politics in Turkey, see Binnaz Toprak and Ali Çarkoğlu, "Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset" [Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey] (field survey), at <www.tesev.org.tr>.